tv Today in Washington CSPAN January 11, 2011 6:00am-9:00am EST
and you're forced to a quandary. and that's dilemma, these choices, that are being made on the ground that i would like to highlight today. they'd been lots of -- preamble sort of on the challenging of the environment, the reality of the number of people in the camps, but it comes down to small little changes. is getting a tent up to provide education. it's seeing that, say, the children are sent in a tent, learning that 90% of the people who were in education system before, are now back in -- at school. their school in tent and you see the children trying to build 54 schools going forward. at the same time before the earthquake, we had half the population not going to school. so returning to preearthquake levels is what the difference here it is not rebuilding a haiti, it is building a haiti for the first time.
it's seeing a rather ingenious rubble removal project run by catholic relief services. spent time in the areas where there's no truck could, go as all wheel barrels, it's walking through rubble with wheel barrels, bringing it to a site where a $6,000 grinder is being operate by a group of men and it's all being run by a business, a business woman who had a business before the earthquake is now running this. there are 30 or so people involved. they are gathering the rubble from the neighborhoods. running it through this crank. turning it into small pieces of rock and sand. bagging it. and selling that to the organizations that are rebuilding houses and temporary shelters per all of the people that enterprise are paid for by the proceeds of that sale. so you see these types of exercises replicated throughout the city. but an ability to get this many
people out of camps as everyone has said is going to take time, most of the resources that the american people gave to nonprofits is being spent on a tremendous burn rate of simply keeping people alive, of ensuring that water and sanitation facilities exist in camps, are ensuring that drainage is available when the rains come, that there is some degree of hope. but the challenge is, and this is the dilemma that sean penn pointed out. the challenge is that you have to ultimately move your attention to communities around the camp tent. the ability to have a clinic at the edge of a camp providing health services that is also now being -- providing services to 80% of its clients, being people from neighborhoods, because there's actually now less demand in this one camp from within the camp than in the outside. but tensions are real, and this
is where coholera. you need to staff it 24/7. you had case coming in the night. eight people died in this clinic. there simply wasn't the staff to be able to take trained personnel to enable that cocol . you got it up and running and now that cholera is up and running. clinic at edge of the camp up and running again. it's these trade-offs that are tremendously difficult for us to deal with. one of our member organizations, you know, sort of talked about haiti as sort an onion. the more you peel it, the more, in essence, each crisis makes
the population cry a little bit harder and the challenge has been, not only was there is an earthquake but there are series of emergencies after the earthquake. and my guess is there will be service of emergencies going forward. we don't know what the political situation will bring. we do not know whether another slew of hurricanes will come through again next year. we do know and one thing that's pretty clear is that the resilience of the haitian people, the ability of the haitian people to rebuild is real. when people talk about building transitional shelters, this is not someone coming in to build shelters. these are haitian people cranking out every single day, frames of wood, floors, roofs out of tin that can be bolted down so that they're safe from hurricane winds, just three different ngos it was roughly about 500 shelters of the shelters being built every week. you see a cranking up of a capacity to produce. what slows things down is there's no land.
there's hardly any space. every piece of land, there's no clear tenure system. you have two or three landowners claiming that same piece of land, claiming the house on that land. the only way to sort that out is to have a dialogue with the community because you don't want to rush to rebuild in the wrong way. you want to rebuild where you can rebuild effectively over time. cash for work, and this is the cash that has, for hundreds and thousands of haitians, is providing removal of rubble eventually will run out. over time, we'll see clinics moving out of camps and i think sean penn put his finger on it accurately. if you move too fast, you in essence, are stopping services for very needy people right now. there's a reality that individuals who are left in the camps, if we're down to about 750,000, we're down maybe about half of what they were at the peak of the earthquake. the individuals left in the camps are not the easy ones to
solve. most of the people in camps were renters. they're multidwelling buildings. those multidwelling buildings collapsed. there is simply no land to build those buildings again, it will take time. efforts to build outside of the city have proved somewhat problematic. the challenge is that there is a clear frame under the interim commission of a general direction for the country but there is no clear operational direction. the ngo community is committed to partner of the government with haiti, in many ways having done an evaluation of the tsunami for president clinton, we see better coordination in this disaster than during the tsunami, for example, but we need a clear vision and direction, not as simply the high direction at policy, but at the operational level. what do you do with these 50,000 people in this neighborhood? what if only a quarter of them with move back to their previous where they used to live? how do you handle, enabling
populations that have moved out of the city, have some access to jobs when there's a poll of international aid bringing people back to the city? and these dilemmas are at the heart of what has slowed down the reconstruction. it is the ability of an organization like provision. building 167 temporary shelters. about 6,000 people have sheltered that n that area. concerned worldwide a similar effort, do then build a school, and you'd negotiate for the department of education, to build that school? when you build the school, what happens when the government doesn't have the resources for the teachers? does the ngo then step in and pay for teachers? and it is this vacuum that we're trying to feel in some ways. but at the same time it is not our role to fill. the international aid community, in particular the international nonprofit community, is not the government of haiti.
we can't go in and pay for teachers over time. ultimately, it requires a partnership. and it requires the ability of the haitian people themselves to stand up and that will take time. there will be people in camps a year from now and over the next ten years, many of the organizations that are part of interaction will be there. and i think the best way to get a sense of the diversity and direction of our community is we've recently prepared a map, it's called the haiti aid map. you can see it on our website at interaction.org. it lifts where, i think it's about 67 different ngos and 500 projects around the country. it gives you a sense of who is doing what, where. that is just our piece. and will take many other pieces to make this all come together. thank you. >> thank you, sam. before we turn to our other panelists. i know, sean, you have to leave. i want to thank you again for being here. >> thank you. >> and good luck with all of your work. we really honor it. >> thank you very much.
>> see you, sean. >> okay. we're going to continue and next hear from beth ferris. beth? >> thanks a lot. listen, every speaker so far has mentioned internally displaced persons and so i'd like to do in about five minutes is to deepen the analysis a little bit. and look at some of the particular challenges of working with idps in haiti and some of the challenge that haitian displacement poses for the humanitarian community generally. displacement in haiti is massive. you know whether the numbers are 800,000 or down from 1.8 million, when last summer, this is a large percentage of the population. over a thousand idp sites or camps in port-au-prince alone. every street corner, every empty lot is filled with makeshift
tents -- actually it's filled with pretty tattered tarps a s rather than tents themselves. the numbers are soft. we really don't know a lot about displace in the haiti. i om has done a magnificent job of trying to track the numbers, but it's hard, in part, because this is a dynamic, complicated situation. not everybody living in these idp camps lost a home in the earthquake. you know desperately poor people do desperate things. when there's rumors that assistance is being distributed, to idps, suddenly it becomes popular, attractive to be an idp. and certainly people have moved into the camps from poor urban communities in hopes of accessing some kind of assistance. it's hard to imagine these camps as being a draw, but at least people have a bit of shelter. usually they have water. and 1 out of 5 sites they have some access to health care.
but it's a dynamic population. people move in and out. a month after the earthquake, reportedly half a million people moved to the countryside. we don't know what happened to those people. anecdotally, we hear that a lot of people have come back to the capital because they didn't receive sufficient assistance, but no one is keeping track of these movements of people. reportedly some families keep some members in the camp in case better assistance develops there while sending kids or relatives to live elsewhere in the communities. it's been mentioned with the number of idps reportedly dropped by about about half in recent months. that's a good thing but it's also a troubling thing. why would people leave and go back to homes that have probably not been reconstructed in a safe way? perhaps because they saw the damages of hurricane thomas and the flooding, and made the
judgment that maybe it was better to take a chance back in those damaged buildings than to suffer another hurricane season or threats of flooding given the tarps and the tents under which they were living. there is a fear, i think, as well that cholera might hit the camps and although the evidence so far has been the it's camps have been less hit than the other areas. simply because of the congestion of the people. or perhaps it was the election violence. it's been a truism and work with idps for years, but in order to work with displaced people, you have to work with host communities. but it's all mixed up in haiti. host community, urban poor, displaced people, other people affected by hurricanes, by the earthquake. while are there some displacement's specific needs in such a setting the vulnerabilities and the needs are so widespread that perhaps it doesn't make sense to single out assistance to idps, but rather to work with larger
vulnerable communities. but our humanitarian system isn't set up that way. our wonderful humanitarian relief actors are set up to provide life-saving assistance, not to deal with structural, urban, longterm, chronic poverty. and this has always been a thing that several of the speakers have mentioned, this -- this difference between humanitarian response, long-term development. we haven't got ten right anywhere in the world. but i think it comes in stark relief in the case of haiti. solutions for displacement are needed urgently. estimates are that about 20% of these thousands or so idp sites in port-au-prince around the country are facing the threat of forced evictions. a lot of these camps are built on private land. of course landowners want their land back. it's been a year. land is a very valuable asset in haiti. the negotiations with landlords.
can you get them stay a little longer while we look for solutions? they're labor intensive but they're vital with coming up with solutions. when i think about the magnitude of things to be done, number one, as we need a strong haitian government. there are decisions that need to be made whether it's operational plans, sites for dumping rubble, decisions on which camps will become part of the new urban landscape of port-au-prince, decisions need to be made by the haitian government. but the political situation is such that a lot the government energy is directed towards the elections ands politics around that. ngos and u.n. staff dealing with the government, wonder, oh, i'm talking with this minister. he probably isn't going to be here in a few months. so some of the uncertainty and the fear that if the clear decisions aren't made, there will be a political vacuum which will last longer, means decisions won't be made and so
on. last comment i'll make is that i think that what we're seeing in haiti is the humanitarian scenario of the future. the urban nature of the disaster. the juxtaposition with a devastating natural disastwer chronic poverty, underdevelopment, poor governance, conflict, and a politically mobilized population is different. it's very different than working even with displacement refugee situations in rural africa. requires different skills, different kinds of coordination, and most of all, much better work between long-term development actors and long-term response. >> great, thank you very much, beth. now -- >> good afternoon and thank you for inviting me.
as a haitian born in haiti raised in haiti and i was a survivor of the earthquake. allow me to just take a minute to say thank you to those who organized this meeting this afternoon. and thanks to you who take part of your time for assistance. for me a sign, a grit sign of support to a country that really needs this support. i am not to be here today with you, my fellow panelists, guests and members of the media. i wish to take interaction and the brooking institution for inviting me to sit on this panel to share my perspective of the -- process in my country and to provide my thoughts as a citizen of haiti and i represent
it -- for humanity. an organization that has walked in haiti for more than 26 years. providing thousands of families with decent, safe and affordable housing. committed to haiti for the long-term and engaging with local communities and its partners to address current and long-term shelter needs. i also come to you today as a survivor of the earthquake. to leave as in wars as the former offices came down on me. for me my fellow haitians and all who were impacted by the earthquake, this is not an easy time. the one-year anniversary
connotes something to celebrate. we're not celebrating the earthquake. we are marking this occurrence one year later and taking note of what is going to work and what has not since that dreadful day. for me and millions more, this past year has offered little time to pose, reflect, and cry. we have not moved beyond the emotional impact, and i suspect we may never. whereby the grace of god the support of the local and the international community. the haitian people, we will move ahead and make haiti a better and safer place to live. my assessments of the work
construction process in haiti is a very mixed one. the challenges for humanity and ngos over the past year have been well documented. from the weaknesses on the current outbreak, the lack of infrastructure, the international support in the economic systems. unrest and rubble removal. to name some of the biggest challenges. that being said, there has been progress. interaction members are prepared. 1.6 million people build tens of thousands of tents for families. and activities into shelter construction in the mobile of our projects.
the emergency response immediately after the earthquake including the distribution of 800,000 tops, 100,000 tents was both mixed humanitarian effort and note work the the successes. humanity and its partners including the american red cross, the catholic services, brother-in-law, care usa have shared the children. [ unintelligible ] conducted 2,000 damage assessments. and constructed more it has on the shelters. we're going to complete many more in the coming weeks and months. also trend more than 500 haitians in seismic.
and hired more than 200 local workers to help in construction activities. in the nation rate and employment rate of 60%, job opportunities are crucial, part of rebuilding. placing experts from the haitian -- to provide community focus, technical support to help the haitian government make critical decisi decision. on their program funded by the u.s. agency for international development through its office of foreign disaster. progress has been made but it's clear to me today that in national comprehensive urban strategy including settlement
and shelter is desperately needed. shelter is a busy human neerksd critical to good health, stabile employment and effective education. a failure to prioritize decent shelter in haitian efforts will not only affect the quality of life for hundreds of thousands of haitian, but also diminish the returns of order, long-term allotment investments the delaying or founding of haiti. must be the call of this plan. the lack of clear land right system today are slowed, the ability for the shelter of the agency to be responsible as possible. landownership was a complicated
manner in haiti before the earthquake and is more complicated now because of the loss of life in the tragedy. much of the poverty in haiti lacks clear issue. many deaths during the earthquake have not been formally documented, making claims on land by earth's complicated, if not impossible. it is very difficult within the current system to have easy and clear access to land building permanent homes is not possible if shelter agencies do not own the land or have a long-term deal rights on the property on which to build. putting haitians back into homes without the security of tenure will put them under the same risk for evictions. that existed before the
earthquake as most people who lost their homes during the earthquake while renters. it gives a reason to invest in their homes. their investments will create gross domestic product and contribute to the economy as a whole. successful plan under the context of a broader urban strategy depends upon the work of the haitian government and the international community to empower locale communities and citizens to walk together to solve land disputes and security of tenure. comprehensive urban strategy about which i speak must be led by the government and people of
haiti. improved haiti of tenure. environmental issues. the improvement delivery of business services including water, sanitation, air services and transportation, national community appointment and job creation appointments. import from those who have lost their homes and communities and the needs of renters will make up the majority of the populati population. the plan must include incentives, implementation plans and realistic timetable to transition families from their camps. to support shelter settlement, policemakers should focus on a community in neighborhood -- families to fix homes that can be repaired and that are
practical plans for the integration of haitians into their original neighborhoods. policymakers also address shelter needs, are farmer renters, when return to -- units is impossible. policies of urban inclusion and -- with establishing fair neness underground. priorities should also be given to building the capacity of the haitian government of the international looker on many levels. it is now frequent as the ngo capital of the world. this is both the recommendation of the incredible -- of support of the united states and the international community. and a warning on the amount of
work to be done in developing local haitian capacity in all sectors. not just shelter. international organizations. vibrant, stabile and prosperous long after the recovery effort. all the international ngos must work to increase the capacity of local and municipal governments. local ngos, community base organizations and the private sector to address the daily needs and aspiration of the haitian people. while i firmly believe in an urgent advocate for a comprehensive urban strategy, we do not have the luxury to make
it a prerequisite for current project to continue or new ones to launch. we cannot wait for a plan to be develop developed but must continue to move ahead, cooperating with local capacities, communities, partners and donors to provide logical and effective support needed, to give millions of haitians a better life today and a brighter future tomorrow. let today be the first day of a new opportunity to rethink of our policies, to be flexible and creative in our response and to find new ways to help haiti recover and rebuild. today when i visit refugees, i see families coming together, singing and playing, i see signs of hope.
habitat for humanity following the earthquake say, "when you know someone cares about you, you feel less pain." because of the global support that we've received over the past year, people like -- let us join together once again to bring hope to many more families. i thank you for giving me this opportunity to speak. i am humble every day by the outpouring of prayers, support. i'm thankful to be alive. and i am personally committed along with habitat for humanity to be part of haiti today and in the weeks and months and years to come. thank you again.
>> well, i thank you really for those very moving and personal words of both thanks and looking forward to very practical solutions and your comment in particular about how a sense of caring helps alleviate pain i think is one that we can all take home and inspire us in the months and years ahead. let's take some questions. and i did want to pose two thoughts and then before coming back to the panel, we'll also go back to the room, but there are two subjects that we really haven't touched on very much which i know are of pressing concern. one is sanitation. and, beth, in particular thinking about some notes that you sent me yesterday about this. you know it's such a difficult and practical problem and it involves land use, of course. help us think about that problem. and, secondly, the issue of sexual violence business particularly in the camps. you know, what's being done more generally about security around the camps.
do we have enough international presence to deal with that? is there enough training going on of local police? i'd like to hear a little bit more about that as well. let's take a couple of questions from the floor. i see someone in the way back and then we'll move -- try to move forward. i see a gentleman also. >> thank you very much. my name is amy, i'm with the pan-american development foundation and i did want to say something about the sexual violence, gender-based violence peace in the camps. my organization had been implementing a human rights project over the past three years, and one of the things that was done immediately following the earthquake was to immediately work with our 40-plus haitian partners, organizations, to set up monitoring committees in the camps. specifically to address the issue of protection and sexual and gender-based violence. so there are efforts going on that are spearheaded by camp
leaders, camp, community-based organizations to -- to report, monitor, and try to work with local authorities on that issue, although the issue is overwhelming and a lot more work needs to be done. so one piece i wanted to ask is, what usaid strategy going forward might be related to that issue? some those projects are closing down. and the need remains very, have been great. the only other thing i wanted to mention, sorry, my original comment was to pick up on what the colleague from habitat was discussing with regard to one of the achievements, i think, one of the positive notes is this damage assessment piece. working with the ministry of public works, unops the pan-american foundation with the funding from usaid and the world bank over 400,000 structures in port-au-prince were assessed with damage assessments that are
quite detailed. and the outcome of that is now a prepa repair strategy. meaning, homes that have received limited untreat yellow tags that can be repaired at a relatively low cost. not only that, it creates jobs in the neighborhoods, it gets people back into their homes, and also works with haitian engineers, mason, contractors, et cetera, as well as the ministry of public works. so my second piece was to get additional comments on what some people call the neighborhood approach, the neighborhood strategy, and, sam, maybe any comments you may have from your recent trip about that repair-based work? i know that are there plans moving forward to increase that, in fact we're holding a training that -- >> thank you, we have a couple of other people who want to jump in in. >> sorry. >> thanks very much. i appreciate that. >> yes, this gentleman in the back and then biehl move
forward. >> good afternoon, how are you? i thank the entire period. my name is dominique. the reason that most of the ngo organizations are in haiti is because there was a vacuum of leadership that existed right after the earthquake. people donating massive amounts because they wanted that vacuum to be filled. they thought the solutions would come. they're still not there. what i would want to ask specific to emergency preparedness, the rainy season is coming a few weeks. what is being done to prepare people for that time frame? and a couple of weeks later we'll be start of the hurricane season. so what is being done and that's based there? the final comment is, instead of focusing so much on the difficulties that exist, which is clear. you know we've been seeing the reports for the past year, let us try to focus more on the
possibilities and the solutions that can be found. thank you. >> thank you. let's take one more. over here, this gentleman in the middle. >> my name is johnny young, i'm with the u.s. conference of catholic bishops. and we have been in haiti through catholic relief services for over 50 years and of course we'll continue to be there. we helped in the immediate aftermath of the earthquake and hope -- and will be there for the longer term. we've talked about no quick fixes, and we certainly agree with that. but there are -- there remains some items that still need to be done and i would like to ask that the u.s. government look into what more can be done in four areas. one would be in delaying the
deportation of persons back to haiti for criminal offenses. the second would be, family reunification for persons who are brought to the united states and the immediate aftermath of the earthquake and now are separated from their family members who are still in haiti. we have one case for example -- >> we have little time left. >> well, family reunification. >> give me your two more. >> okay, fine. the other would be in temporary protective status for persons who came to the united states after the earthquake. and the other would be expeditious approval for those haitians who have already been approved to immigrate to the u.s. moving them up in the queue. so those are the four areas. >> thank you very much for those very specific. go back to the panel for some
final comments, and please respond as much as you can to these questions. >> starting with me. >> thanks. yes, please, paul. >> i guess i will start with the sexual violence question, which i think you know -- we know that if you have a situation of large displacements, it's predictable that there are worries about sexual violence. we have, as the person who asked the question answered, we've programmed some resources to try and deal with that issue in a number of the camps. if the money's running out, as long as the camps are there, it's something that we need to seriously consider, continuing to program resources for. the long-term solutions have to be with strengthening the local capacity of the social -- of the welfare ministry to deal with these issues, as well as the security option. we don't -- on usaid we don't work directly with the police but obviously a security dimening to this, the haitian national police are the organization primarily responsible. i think it's also one of the successes over the last year. i think we've seen multiple polls that show that if haitians
are asked, where do you get your -- where do you want to get your security services from, they choose the haitian national police over the international community which -- and there's been a lot of work over the last several years, not by us but by the international community but by the state department principally on strengthening the police. so we need to continue do that to make sure that the security option is there and working. emergency preparedness, there's been an ongoing effort for years. it was accelerated last year before the onset of the hurricane season to strengthen it at the national level, private and civil protection, as well as the municipal levels. it's not just port-au-prince. there are lots of areas where we're working with local government to strengthen their capacity to prepare for and to respond to hurricanes and storms. we'll also have to take another look at the hurricane mitigation efforts that were done before the last season and to see what needs strengthening. on the range of immigration issues, i know that the department of state, the department of homeland security have been in a dialogue with
elements of the haitian dias per, the haitian got those issues and i know that there's a lot of under consideration. i can't speak to the specifics of those four issues. >> great. beth, we'll just come down. >> on the sexual violence. it is horrific. it is horrific, widespread. the police are barely present, sorry. when i met with the u.n. protection class are talking about this, and i said what about the police? and they said, we're trying to get phone numbers of local police stations. we're trying to get phone numbers. you know county's a big success. policing arm is now patrolling the most vulnerable camps but that's 1/10 of the total camps and by patrolling it, it means driving around once or twice a month. the violence is horrific. and much more needs to be done on it. sanitation is very much related to the temporary nature of some of these camps. it doesn't make sense or it isn't possible to construct permanent latrines or other
ways, disposable that is temporary. and so these portable toilets are being used which are very expensive to bring in, out, clean, so forth. and so long-term solutions for sanitation depends in part on coming up with a governmental policy for development. >> sam and then claude. >> there is a clear gender i mentioned to haiti. the average haitian household is run by a woman. it has to be a recognition of the role of gender in the haitian context. and i won't say more than the reality is a rough one. people don't go into the camps at night. there's a degree of security in the daytime, it's at night when we have a problem. on sanitation, it's a long way to go. i'll give one very positive example. it's an interesting role for ngo, worldvision, every single sludge truck that drops human wastes in one place that leaves that site is cleaned with chlorine to not spread cholera
and other diseases. you've got sites where you could begin to do this. but ultimately it is not an attendable situation. the efforts on sanitation have to be in each village which gets me to the neighborhood approach and this was an interesting effort that we saw of the catholic relief services. it is an effort in a community. it is that neighborhood rebuilding itself. it is providing the materials to build a house. it is looking at the drain of water in the center of that community, and can you clean it over time, so when the rain falls, that there's significant place for that water to go. we are not ready for another hurricane in haiti. if there is a direct hit, it would be a real mess. an enormous amount has been done to dredge, to move resources, but ultimately we're going to need some more secure shelters. and it comes down to this ability of haitian institutions and haitian neighborhoods to
take some degree of control over their lives. that transition from international nonprofit to a local institution is a transition that is taking time. it is a transition that needs to take place, and i think it will happen neighborhood by neighborhood. neighborhood development will not happen overnight. we'll be at it for years but it is ultimately the core of any success in this effort. >> claude? >> i would like to make two quick comments about -- to sam's questions. for the rainy season, as an organization habitat for humanity keeps building secure and safe building for the families affected. so we -- we not only build more than 1,000 but bear planning to build almost 2,000 in the next coming months. it's a way to take people out of camps and to place them in a more safe place -- in a safer place. besides of that, we are working
closely with municipalities and civil protection department where we are building -- we are putting in place some local communities to identify the risky areas. if something happened, if there's a flood, for example, where to go? so we have six local communities all over the country. they clearly know where to go if something happens. it's the best way that we can support the civil department the municipalities wheel we are building a safer place for them. in terms of, let's focus -- let's be focused on solutions instead of problems. as i mention before, the best way to do it is to empower haitians to take them in charge instead of coming and acting on behalf -- to do some mistakes. give us the possibility to work
besides international community. because there could not be in haiti forever. so a certain momentum, we need to be able to take charge. so the best way to bring solutions is to empower, to trust me, the knowledge the competency we don't have now. we have so many organization working down there, lack of leadership, as you mentioned, lack of capacity. so how long can we actually act organization. let build the capacity. maybe if something happened in the near future, we'll be able to welcome any helper, but we have less because we got the capacity to respond directly to our problems. >> well, i think that's an appropriate note to end on. we've run out of time. thank you all for coming and please join me in thanking the panelists.
we appreciate you coming along. i'm sure there'll be a few people drifting in as we get going, but i thought we'd try and make a start now so we have plenty of time for discussion. my name's richard downie, i'm deputy directer of the africa program here at csis and really grateful this morning for our panelists and a chance, really, to tackle the sudan referendum. probably being monday morning we get first crack at discussing the referendum which began over the weekend. so as we, as we sit here and discuss the sudan this morning, the people of southern sudan are in the middle of making historic decision as you know. voting began yesterday this referendum on their -- in the referendum on their future, whether to remain part of sudan or to secede and form their own nation. millions of people appear to have taken that opportunity so far in the first day and a half
of voting. many of them lining up outside polling stations hours before they opened, patiently awaiting their chance to play their part in settling the future direction of southern sudan. a few months ago it seemed unlikely we were even going to get to this point, at least on time. but we've seen a big push in recent weeks by the international community to get the arrangements on track, and, of course, the sudanese people themselves have taken the lead channeling their energies into making this process work. so the result in recent weeks we've also seen public statements by politicians both north and south that have helped to reduce tensions and create an environment where we can be more confident that the process will go smoothly and the outcome will accurately reflect the will of the people who take part in it. so this is a momentous time, and i'd like to acknowledge the
presence of our representatives from the government of sudan and southern sudan as well who in getting to this point today have traveled a long way through decades of civil war, of course, the peace agreement in 2005 and the subsequent six-year-long process of trying to make this deal work. so we're glad they can join us, and we look forward to, perhaps, hearing them speak as well this morning. but today we're going to reflect a little bit about, upon how sudan has arrived at this moment, but mainly we're going to look forward and think about the upcoming challenges as well. because while those who have worked on the referendum, of course, deserve a great deal of credit for the fact it's taking place on time and so far at least in a relatively orderly fashion, the referendum isn't the end of the road. as was said yesterday as his vote was cast, it's premature to
say job done. in many ways the real challenges lie ahead. particularly in the six month-long period following the referendum. if the vote comes out in favor of secession, this will be the time when the tough negotiations really begin in earnest on all the issues which will help determine relations between north and south for years to come. and, of course, the state of ab yea remains undecided. people there have been denied their chance to vote in a separate referendum on whether to remain part of the north or join the south, and we've had worrying reports of violence there during the past few days. so our speakers are going to discuss some of these big issues today and perhaps say something about the role of the international community and the role they can may going forward. the united states, sue tan's neighbors and the african union as well. we're very pleased to be joined by two experienced analysts from international crisis group, an
organization whose thoughtful analysis issues reports we always find useful here on the africa program. on my immediate left we have icg's new africa program directer comfort arrow. comfort oversees four different projects in africa covering central, southern, west and the horn of africa, 20 countries in all in these regions. comfort was previously directer of the africa program at the international center for transitional government, transitional justice, i apologize. we're delighted, also, to have with us, fouad hikmat who's special adviser and takes part in icg's work in relation to sudan, and his professional background includes management of humanitarian and post-conflict programming. he's literally just touched down
this d.c. this morning from sudan as well, so he can give us really the up-to-the-minute perspective on what's going on in sudan now. no pressure there as well. i'm going to hand it over to comfort who's going to give us an overview of icg's work, and then we'll have plenty of time for questions and comments from all of you as well, hopefully. thanks very much. comfort. >> thank you very much. and i would like to start by wishing you all a happy new year, but also thanking csis, especially richard and the staff of the center for hosting international crisis group on the day after the start of the important referendum. i also think it's quite telling that the very first job for the new africa directers of icg is to come to washington and speak
to a gathering here, and that shows you, also, the importance of washington in the question of the future of a new sudan and the future of north sudan as well. so it's a pleasure and an honor that we have been asked to come this morning, very cold morning, but this morning in washington to talk about a new dawn in the africa as well. just briefly, as richard was saying, i would start off by just introducing the international crisis group to all of you for some of you who don't know it. we are generally recognized as an independent, nonpartisan organization that services or provides analysis to governments and international governmental bodies like the united nations, the european union and the world bank, and we work quite closely with a number of organizations like the cics here in washington. and we're founded about 15 years ago this 1995 -- in 1995 as an
independent, nongovernmental organization on an initiative by a number of transatlantic figures who despaired over the international community's failure back in the 1990s on tragedies such as somalia, rwanda and bosnia and even at that time sudan as well. and we are quite well known for the reports that we publish. it wavers between 80 and 90 reports that we do, and i even in the sudan program, the sudan team if they were given a lot of leeway, they could write 80 reports in the space of three months in sudan because of the nature of the situation there. we also produce what we call the crisis watch bulletin which provides a monthly snapshot of what we consider to be the conflict alert countries at that moment in the month. we have several advocacy offices, and most of you may know our washington office. we also have an office in brus ls and in new york as well, and the headquarters for the africa
program is strategically located in nairobi which is a critical hub for us. and as richard has already said, as the africa directer, we operate in 20 different countries across the continent. before i joined icg, i was also working for the united nations in liberia as well. specifically on sudan, my colleague will go into more deeper details on sudan, but i also just want to acknowledge that this is a mow men powstous -- momentous moment in the history of the continent when you're looking for key moments, key dates on the continent we'll make reference to 1957, ghana z as the first independent country on the continent after the end of decolonization. we'll also note the freedom of nelson mandela in 1990 and the end of apartheid in 1994. this is another historical moment on the continent, the
birth of a new nation. and the key concern for us is how that is going to unfold. the voting for the referendum, as richard pointed out, started yesterday on the question of self-determination which may result in the independence of the south. two decades of war have come to an end in sudan in 2005 with the signing of the comprehensive peace agreement, but now we are at a stage where the dell delicate peace -- delicate peace is going to be tested. the long-term stability of the region lies in the ability of the north and south to forge a post-cpa relationship. and the situation, if it goes well, we'll see the smooth outcome of the referendum. and if results are respected by the khartoum government, we should see some significant progresses being made. and this would provide a perfect
platform for negotiations for post-referendum arrangements to go successfully. but should it go poorly, we might also witness a reignition of conflict in between the north and the south and also an escalation of the violence in darfur which fouad will talk about and again, also, the impact on the region will also be quite grave. so at this point the situation is quite fluid, and it's quite uncertain how things are going to go. the situation is quite tricky in creating a new and can independent southern sudan which already has been dubbed as a prefelled state. the borders remain undecided, and meanwhile institutions and services which urgently need to be regenerated and rebuilt, this is still a fundamental issue at stake for the new south sudan. the future arrangements on citizenship, on nationality, on national resources, on wealth
sharing, on management of oil and water, currency, assets and the liabilities, security and international treaties must be negotiated regardless of the referendum outcome. these are issues that we pointed out in the briefing we produced in december towards the end of last year. and, of course, the question of the future of abyei needs to be addressed. of course, we must congratulate ifis for their work in the last three weeks in bringing out the voter registration process. there will be a need for cohesive statement from relevant actors, in particular in this instance we'll call upon the african union and key leading space on the continent, nigeria, south africa, egypt also to make the necessary statements, positive statements in relation to sudan. and be, of course, the secretary general's monitoring panel needs to take a more public leading
role in the pronouncements made over the next three weeks. there must be a careful monitoring and communication over these next three weeks which we judge to be a tense period for sudan. the real challenge, the real issue that we need to avoid in this next three weeks is disinformation, is rumors, and these are real triggers for instability. and, of course, here in washington we can't forget the role of the united states' government. the u.s. incentives have been very helpful, however, ultimately limited given that khartoum is politically savvy enough to understand it's the u.s. congress and shot the executive that makes many key decisions on the table. the absence of a basic blue prohibit for the post-2011 referendum between the north and south constitutes the uncertainties about the political and economic future of each and risks the referendum as a serious game that sustains affairs and smooths the conduct of the exercise and acceptance
of the result. added to this is the deterioration situation this darfur and concerns about insuring a more credible and serious negotiation process ongoing in qatar. insuring stability in the south and improved relations between the north and the south in the post-referendum climate will be critical to softing the darfur problem -- solving the darfur problem. getting the situation right in sudan will be a significant and game-changing moment for the continent, but also for the international community also. we, therefore, welcome this opportunity today to engage in a debate with you all here on the future and how to guarantee stability in the north and south and a new north while we concentrate heavily on the future of south sudan, we mustn't forget the future of the north is at stake as well. so i'll turn it back to richard. >> thank you very much for that
overview, comfort. yeah, i'll pass it straight over to fouad. thanks very much. >> yeah, good morning. our protocol observed, i want to say that in my directive, it's impressed me very much. she's saying she's new, but the speech doesn't sound like she's new. [laughter] because i think she did half what i'm supposed to do. she already did half of my briefing which made things easier to me. but i would like to start by saying thank you so much for the cis to invite us for this event. and and it is difficult moment for me as a sudanese. if the i remove my hat from the ipg, at the end i am sudanese, and this is about human relations. as far as i am very, very happy for suit sudanese to go and vote
for this historic moment and to get their country. and if i am on that side, i will be happy and grouplating for a lot -- jukelating for a lot of reasons. and i am happy for that. but also as a sudanese to see the map that we knew from the primary schools, that we draw it now by half and the map of sudan, i don't know how we are going to draw it in this six months' time. the south will be very difficult to draw. it's very, very sad moment for us. for me it is not a surprise that sudan is going to secede because before going to talk about the challenges, i think one of the main reasons underpinning the current context is that the two parties simply failed to implement a comprehensive peace agreement. it is the mistake of the two the fail to implement the
comprehensive peace agreement. i don't hold the two parties only on the she she saying. we can go up from the government that took control of sudan after independence. the respondent goes from there, and i think -- responsibility goes from there, and i think all the government failed. but focusing on the cpa, it has got two important principles. one is democratic transition and included in that is the reconciliation process. and, hopefully, if democratic transition happened, reconciliation happened, that will force the principle of self-determination that makes it attractive. those two principles did not happen. for a lot of political reasons, and as we know that a benchmark in democratic transformation was the elections that were supposed to happen in half of the interim
period to leave another three years of the second half of of the interim period to foster the constitution and legal arrangements being done and then to work in these three years to make sure that unity is going to make attractive. elections didn't happen until third or fourth year. it happened sick or eight months -- six or eight months just before the end of the sewer rim period -- interim period, so three years being shortened to eight months for a lot of reasons. and, of course, they wanted to augment that influence of control, their power to remain in power x that's why, i think, they didn't want the elections to happen on time. so both, i think, failed in these three principles, the democratic transformation if i could consider reconciliation has another principle. and the -- but the only success
is that they reach the referendum. and so for me, then, when i look into the comprehensive peace agreement, all what i can describe is it became a grand cease fire for six years. there is a cease fire in six years and now after six years that the question here is can we maintain that cease fire? so, and the other reason is, also, and i may want here to draw specifically on islamist when they took power in 1989 they had their own vision for sudan. and, unfortunately, that region could not accommodate the preference because they saw the preference at marginal, ours as minority groups rather than groups of their own right. and they wanted to maintain power. so the cpa which should have used their power from 100% to
52% will give the splm28% and the other political parties that are remaining, they saw that in these six years how they can continue maintain the power rather than looking into inclusive pluralism. and that is, i think, one of the problems that made the cpa to fail. so its operation is a logical outcome, and i don't think unity is going to be an outcome, and i don't think there is happy magic in sudan. what there is is sadness always, and i hope that one day this turns into some of happiness. so the challenges are immense. and let me focus on few things. the positive referendum issues, of course, we come to them. but it's a procedure. it's a procedure. but it is happening in an environment where there is serious tension, there is
serious nervousness and volatility. that is where this procedure is happening. and at the same time there is no full agreement on any of the referendum issues. none. and also there is a military buildup along the borders, and there is an economic embargo on the south. so if we see in the last weeks the government, or let me say president what sheer, it's not the government made this decision. let's make a distinction here. sometimes when president but she talks, he's not talking on behalf of the -- [inaudible] he made a decision that 20% of the southerners on the civil service they are going to go home after secession. and refuse to give the sudanese
people citizenship. only if there is a lit call arrangement. and to be dealt as foreigners. to give you an example, at least 24,000 southern sudanese students in khartoum, what is going to happen to these 24,000 if you send them home? and at the same time we know e that there is a lot of people going back, now, to south sudan, over 100,000, that they are really in a very dire situation as there is no humanitarian assistance, no shelter and is -- so on. and i question that question there the ncp. it is an ncp rather than a government unity decision. so on thely, for example -- recently, for example, there are, the transactions or transfer of vital goods to south sudan have blocked. the cereal market for the government and so on.
they got the message that not to transfer cereal to the south of sudan. the aspect of oil is becoming a very big problem. [inaudible] so over 100%, prices shot to 30 or 40% in south sudan. these are policies not favored for a mutual good relationship between the north and south. so this sort of direction, it will reflect negatively on the communities along the borders, especially -- [inaudible] because if the splm begets such policies by blocking -- who have 11.5 million heads of cattle that spend nine months along the
borders of 1956, that is their livelihoods for the last 200, 300, 500 years. if south blocks that, that will be very serious, and they are very serious constituency of sudan. and these communities along the borders are highly militarized as we know that in abyei, but also the baa forward rah are highly militarized. they have been used, abused during the last wars. militias, popular defense forces, and they were, like, the front line of the regime the last 20 years in fighting the war against the south. highly militarized. so this kind of policies in the last weeks meant some people and analysts in sudan to describe like this kind of policy
direction from the ncp rather than from the government. it's a sort of like soft touch or the freshest steps to sort of on ethnic cleansing. and now it is debatable because that's a legal term. but when you deny your own citizens the right which is actually in the constitution of sudan, it says that sudan allows dual citizenship. sudanese can have citizenship of other countries and can even the president does not have the right to remove the citizenship of a person even by internationalization. and international law also doesn't accept that. so what i think it is important now for the north and south is to secure that strategic relationship to get these consequences of the political separation. it is a political -- so they need to focus on the economic and financial union, unity and
looking into the common markets. .. >> therefore, one the main conditions in the coming six months is how to avoid the confrontations along the borders. unfortunately, as i say, that both parties and particularly are creating the position along the borders. they are actively mobilizing, tribes along the borders to
rejoin the pdf, popular defense forces. and on the pretext they are going to lose their interest by the succession of south sudan. if it doesn't go well, and the results not accepted, it means the separation would not go safely. the transitional period would be full violence in my opinion, and the communities along the borders will aggregate the situation in abyei. and abyei configures the wall between the communities in the armed forces and into why the conflict on the process and two parties to conclude the cpa. as i say in the last six months, we failed to find solution to the issues. although the framework presented
by the african union high implementation which includes principals, but no solutions. and i think what is important now is to discuss the issue of the citizenship and economic relationship that it affects day-to-day lives of the people along the borders. if the issue of the citizenship is resolved, in the interest of both, i think it could open this place for political dialogue on the issues, and the kind of borders, and so on. i think that is an entry for the positive referendum. there's no need for this huge military buildup that we see now along the borders. north of the borders and south of the borders, a very serious one. and the second challenge which i want to draw the attention to which people are not aware of it is the blue light.
these two have good forces inside south sudan, and also along the borders of 1956. these with military forces that they fought with the splm for the last years. they fought for their rights, they have the protocols. it's called south sudan on the complaints of the peace agreement on the resolution of the conflict. it is a protocol blue nile that will go through the public confrontation, and into negotiate with the centers and once they agree then they protocol becomes a find binding peace agreement. at the moment, it's not a final binding for kurdufan and the blue nile. they have to go through negotiation. now recently the government or again the national congress party asked the splm to draw the
forces and disarm and they cannot come over the 1956 borders with arms. and to redeploy up to the borders in 1956 in a way to cut strategic depths between these forces and southern sudan. blue nile is going to refuse disarmament. because they know the public confrontation in the context now of the referendum is sort of a constitutional vacuum. it is not going to break the final solution that it is acceptable to the people in southern kurdufan and the blue nile. as we know it was supposed to be happening in the context of half a year of the interim period that was the democratic elections and then people who are elected in the fair and free elections and then there is the
public concern on the framework of the cpa. that's sort of the vacuum of the framework. you can imagine if the republican confrontation is going to bring any lasting solution. that's why they want to keep their arms, they want to keep their forces. because they know there's a future challenge meeting them. so -- and i think this is a very big conference. recently south sudan agreed president basheer. i think it is important. but the risk here is that ncp could disagree or change their mind from here until then. what happens if they try to move their forces up to their borders of 1956 with not recognizing the
specifics of blue nile. that's one the serious risk. the cease fire agreement which is in southern kurdufan, if you remember, the geneva cease fire. there it is still valid. it might be debatable if it's valid or not. but there's an agreement. but the cpa did not specify anything for this information for the forces in the blue nile. i think one the channels now is the two parties, they need to renew the cease fire agreement in southern kurdufan, and looking at how to maintain the cease fire in blue nile. i think this is one the very big challenges in the coming period. and that's the role of the international community, and it's very important and look into the public confrontation cannot happen in a constitution
and vacuum. because the constitution of sudan is going to end in july 2011, after that what is the constitution? after that, the public is going to work on what? that's why a lot of people argue that the constitutional arrangements have to be debated before the public consultation. and therefore, until this happens, the cease fire needs to maintained in southern kurdufan and blue mile. -- blue nile. people focus on abyei and they don't see this point. as we know that, all the time ncp wants to weaken it's part, because it's important to negotiate with a weakened splm. now with the referendum going, i think it's not subsiding. because even the southerners who are opposing the splm now at the moment, they can't go around the
current. the referendum is going in new country so even the opposition parties, in south sudan, they need to be careful. at the moment, there is no leverages to use and so on. splm is becoming more stronger. but they might get weaker along the line. and as we are going to talk about it in the challenges of south sudan. so in general, instability in south sudan is not -- but the political stability in south sudan cannot happen unless there is a stability north sudan. and if this is a stable advisory. if the south hits one area, the north will be able to hurt it and vice versa. it's important there is stability in both, and if people want the stability in the south to progress, they have to seek the stability in the north. and i think pluralism is the
direction. for both south sudan and north, given the diversity of cultures and regional interest. it appears the splm is aware of this. they had the south of all parties on the conference, they agreed during the framework, it is still on paper. it needs to be implemented after the referendum, and the referendum of the party is over, so they move towards pluralism. but the problem in the north even if that president basheer recently said he's calling for the national unity. it's a calling. but looking into the last 20 years and the six years, can we imagine that you had our 100% cpa to 28% or 48% of that and now there is a possibility to go to 100%. they are going to go for the national government to reduce your power to what?
and that's a very big question. it's going to create the reasons for continue struggle in the north of sudan. and this, of course,, -- an approach like this for the no option for darfur. the dialogue as we see cairo agreement, old agreements, sudan is governed by so many agreements, sudan, agreements, there are about seven or eight of them. they didn't go anywhere, includes cpa which became the cease fire. the option is very clear. the darfurians picked it up. the darfur is not going anywhere. i think they did. if people lose the opportunity to go to the boxes to change the situation, they will go for the boxes of ammunition rather than
the books of elections to change the situation. now at moment, the south sudan is -- succession is a reality. and the government will not oppose it. and the acceptance of the north of the referendum hopefully it will reflect in the north and south, and then the south will start to deal positively with the north and the north to try to deal responsibly with the pending issues. but, of course, that will be different dice if one or within one the two take a different approach. so if people use the secession of south sudan for regime change, some political forces think so, including people from
outside, that is very dangerous for sudan. i think people need to be thinking very seriously about these. and it shouldn't be a step for a regime change. and a lot of people argue that in the recent america international community, market twist the arm of the ncp to accept the referendum and the results. and this perhaps encouraged the opposition party, darfur rebel groups to say now this is the time since the bull has started to fall, it is time to take out the knife and kill the bull. i think that's very dangerous for sudan and stability, not only for sudan, but the southern is highly mobilized, and it is highly mobilized and it will not
be easy for them to let go. what is important here is to force a strategic cooperation and relationship between the north and south, to look into the constitutional arrangements that i talked about it and how can the north and south address this issue of pluralism, but also for the north if there's no discussion about the constitutional arrangement, the public consultation will not be resolved, the conflict in darfur is not going to be resolved. you know that doha, i don't know where it is. i mean if somebody could tell me what is a doha now? but there is an agreement. but that agreement if this is a genuine solution to darfur, then people have to address the cardinal issue in sudan, governance. the issue of the center. and as i say, that will not be easy issue that the ncp will accommodate. that's why it is very difficult to go for vice president for the
region, for the regional government and so on, because also the arabic tribes in darfur are seriously conflict, seriously conflicted, they want more districts and more states in southern darfur. now we know there is three. people are arguing for another three extra. because the idea -- the thinking of the division and so on that actually led to the conflict in darfur during the beginning of this regime when they were trying to put the pluralism dividing darfur into the districts and borders between the ownership of the tribe was divided with the others. with so many districts, everybody started to want to have the control of that district which then led to the tribal differences. and that was the beginning of their conflict in darfur.
it started from the beginning of the '90s, because there is historical beginnings. but that was the key point. i agree with many people that darfur needs to be resolved from the bottom up. definitely darfur dialogue is extremely important. it is burg djibouti, and now darfur, they talked about it the darfur forum. now the government came out with a new strategy in darfur, let's find the solution for doha, and bring it to darfur. in principal and theory, it is good. but if we look at it conceptually, it is very questionable. and i don't think it is a strategy that it will bring a lasting peace in darfur. because if it is to bring lasting peace in darfur, then the elections could have, should have been a fair elections where they were presented in the
counsel of the three states are two representatives. now it is a strategy put by the government to be discussed by the legislative states of the council of the three states which is actually the government, but the three governments, which is actually the government, but the tribal leaders who are corrupted by the government. so this is the government. it is the government with the government with the government, i don't know where the rebel groups and the rest of the darfur people. i think the african union high implementation plan now they are advocating for let's go since doha is not going. i think the americans have the approach that we go for the darfur forum, i think it is a grave mistake and will deepen the crisis in darfur. and so i suggest let me make it short and just go over very quickly on the -- on south sudan
before i go. for south sudan, the issues is the challenges are immense. as we know that now, the party will continue in couple of days until july 9. where then they became independent, and even the party will become more stronger, may finish maybe a dent of the year. there is one year of party jubilation and so on. but they need to look into the political instability. splm is not stable, it's not professional army. so the issue of the security sector is a very big challenge for the splm. this is what political stability, inclusiveness, what they agree to is the south sudanese political parties. they need to force. they need really to implement
it. first of all, the interim south sudan constitutional is ending in july, they need another interim or draft constitution for south sudan. that will be the law of the land. i think that is the first step. the ddr, disarmament of soldiers and so on, that's something that's not going very well. there's a lot of arms, a lot of militias, the disarmaments didn't go well. if you look that it comes actually from the oil revenue from the north. half of it is going through this big, big security sector. army and so on, nothing going for social big securities sector. nothing's going for social services of sorts so some of this money, how they will do
that integration for people to do that because even now, those coming from the north, we know there's nothing for them on it. so the challenge -- and of course they need accountability very seriously. and during the education period they have to be careful thinking of how they're going to use the money if they agree with the government of the north or the oil and so on, those issues are very serious and i won't go into the details. nothing has been agreed but citizens are very important. so what i really see, way forward here is as regional and international players. if we look into the region, egypt and the girl libya, or
sudan, they want stability. i think so. people talk about as far as egypt is concerned the kind of issue that is not going to affect -- this is how sudan protect its share from the north to, from sudan. fifteen billion cubic meters. corp. framework signed by several countries is going to be an issue and i don't see how that is for the moment. egypt has been very good. to make it attractive for them. they have borders with border country's north and south and they are really looking for stability. but of course can you, you done the, they are reaping the
benefit of their hard work. their business people and they want stability and they don't mind secessions because of that assessment in the last six years or so. people are generally concerned about islamic discourse. in my opinion, and cp became a middle-class business people while looking into the interests of oil, wealth, money, mort then becoming the iranian regime. third different in concept and principle. the beating of the gavel and all that is a technical consideration to keep them together because a lot of people started to ask several questions
about their leadership and it is not very solid. that call to go back is an important call. to maintain the unity of islamists. the division happened in 2000 when it is divided and i think that would be a problem. but still they have a very big challenge to maintain that because decisions are now in the hands of five or six that are supposed to work on islamic discourse where it is a democratic process that is very highly centralized. that will weaken the islamic organization behind the national commerce party. still there are the major players if people need to be with them so i question the issue of the regime change.
a lot of countries in the region, facing fee regime change shouldn't be there. they wait to go forward. to have the monopoly of money, and for the north, they have that monopoly. and the major players and to see how we can get strategic corp. between the north and south end to force or define political stability, political stability in the north cannot happen unless there is space for political dialogue, more pluralism with the solution of forces that feel they're part of the center and i say this cannot happen unless there is serious rethinking of the political system in the center and
suctioning of the state. someone is saying this person is talking on behalf of the fpl them or opposition party. i don't know if anyone in sudan might say that. it is a reality. if that doesn't happen, sedan will face serious challenges. in sudan, in south sudan we can see there is a lot of challenges. it might take time. i think so but problems in the north might not take time. everything is going very well, might be accepted for discussion or a problem and so on but problems in the north will go faster than in the south and that might jeopardize in south sudan. that is what i want to say. thank you. now we will have a discussion.
[applause] >> thanks for that comprehensive analysis of a very confused picture. i will open the floor to questions in a moment but first, want you to think about a very short picture and actual referendum process itself and the role of the international community in that process. it is -- voting takes place over a goal of this week. the final outcome won't be known for several weeks after that. we might have some results trickling out in the meantime all of which creates the conditions through uncertainty and instability and the worst case scenario that the outcome might be contested. faced with this potential pitch what is the role for the
international community do you think? particularly, how should it be coordinating its response if the outcome is uncertain or challenged by the north or one of the other parties? think about that. i will take a couple questions from the floor as well. please identify yourself. microphone should be on their way as well. at the front here, please. >> that was a great talk. i am doug bob brooks with the phillies organization. to follow-up on the next question, with the united nations what should they be doing at this joke right now that could be most beneficial? >> let's take one more for this round. gentleman in the middle here.
>> thank you. my question is about the development on the ndp side. they were reluctant to do that to bolster from them and even stepping from the most recent event started to publicly accept the results and the news to be recognized. why do you think this doesn't shift? the second question is more horrible, a african union times of ambition in relation to doing the negotiations between north and south. >> who wants to tackle some or all of those questions?
>> don't ask me challenging questions. i want to say hello to my friend. good to hear you. all of the international community is extremely important for the results. there are a lot of observers and european union people, the carter center, close the eu and, separate because working on the logistics of support so it cannot be reported that satisfy and make a statement on their process because it is possible because there's a pattern led by former president of tanzania. what is really important now for
the national community, plus other observers and monitors is to keep on a day-to-day basis, to the international community, how is it? this is very important not to me but until the end within the result is going to be contested. if they wanted to contest it they could have derailed the whole process. legally some of the petitions taken to date constitutional, it could have -- they all could have. but given -- stop that and that is actually in his speech because he wants to them to go and they will accept his answer. the petitions are there.
still it cannot be in the coming days. it might surprise us. the international community is important, to communicate on a day-to-day basis how is it going and if there's anything to mention so the results is not contested. and this is very important. how they accepted this, what is before the conclusion, wanted more time. that is why they want two people's points to identify ability and if we talk about this, the state. if you talk about the vulnerability of the state, the
ability of the state. so the division's of the islamists themselves could have been very serious. after the elections things went bad. and the intolerable be of this organization, the second thing is to the dish the issue of the economy and the economic situation to build reserves and negotiate on the referendum and a positive referendum to negotiate what we know. the issues of sudan, relations with the u.s. and issues in between 80 so far. at least in the powder functions and also the issue of the icc. so to buy time to address cabinet issues and extend issues but it doesn't go anywhere.
some celts were provided -- that was supportive. i don't think it speaks well of the in cpi. a matter of time, it doesn't work. so i don't think -- that is one of the reasons that this issue is very difficult to delay to delay because it is going against even -- going to lose to the african union. if they continue they might end of this table as an organization. that is a decision to be decided to let go of the -- more than the extended pressures that play but more reasons that made them to beside let's go and let it happen and the consequences.
>> thank you. let's have another round of questions. microphone on its way. >> time must confess, it is pretty gross ignorance about sudanese politics, little understanding of the problems of cartoons. i was interested in what you said and i would like to push you a little further about probably the fundamental problem. that is the factional division. there is a tendency to cv and cp
as a uniform block. that is fundamentally wrong. there are serious -- islam as an ideology was fairly attractive to many northern sudanese not only in the nile valley, in the 1990s. and the agenda has many supporters may be mobilized. by what they see is a compromise or a sellout over the independence of southern sudan and 200 years of sudanese history. and within the n c p it did without the n c p colors for opposition in 2000.
how potent a challenge are they? obviously darfur, flow blue nile, issues but it might work. i would be much more worried about these guys and what they are likely to do. the international community does not pay sufficient attention, i would be interested to know what you think about that. >> that is a good question. >> question about the post referendum reconstruction of the south. there has been a lot of criticism, in terms of the development activity occurred in the south and the limited success in going beyond humanitarian service provision
against redevelopment and reconstruction particularly at the world bank. with the government of south sudan spending upwards of 90% of its revenue on security sector issued, not able to invest much in social service provision what do you see are the prospects to actually get beyond the paradigm of ngo, south sudan, adequate capacity. and a will to start providing funding services, a donor structure or international funding structure that would be more effective in getting both the community and the government to that point. >> gentleman at the front.
>> the department of state, pardon the question of the second gentleman, i was surprised by how pessimistic about the framework that the eu had brokered. because in november spoke to a group that u.s. ip, in terms of saying that no framework agreement has been assigned. he cited citizenship as being the two outstanding areas, using the 80% figure in terms of
agreement. the question really is how you view the a you in all of this particularly north/south and your thoughts on the role of becky who has emerged in the south and threw down for in a major role. how will continue after the referendum? >> and from the government of sudan, would you like to say something as well? >> this is all so sudanese. your views might be your own
analysis. >> is your microphone turned on? >> this critical time of sudan history, bold points which might be, positive side of this, the outcome is expected to be recognized by the hole parties. at this moment people should be optimistic before they were very worried about how it goes. positive direction at this time, what is evident this time.
security arraignment's. and many other political issues which you mentioned here. they are negotiating. very high implementation. vice-president center -- they are negotiating. these issues one by one. many issues and those issues but they think what you do is a mistake. people are optimistic that this would be overcome in coming
with v negotiation. inside the country between the north and south. and now there are committees forced -- there are many other formations here. people are working--a delay when there is disagreement so there the delay -- i think at random now, people starting to -- within a week, people are optimistic about -- will make
north and south. >> any responses to the details on the internal dynamics and strength of the islamist within them, question of long-term development in the south where versus owls will become economically self-sufficient and question from the representative about you being too gloomy about efforts of high-level implementation and post referendum negotiations? >> a question from the department, which is a little bit also touching on my brother here from the embassy. i am a little bit worried about what you say because that is the
rhetoric that caused problems in sudan that we come to. in terms of the a you h i p the framework is important that, this would have been so far -- if you remember the decision was taken in september, when presented the report and the security council mandated partners to become high implementation. much has been achieved and the framework itself including the peace that is very important and what is actually important now is those principles should be communicated to the people because a lot of people don't know what is in this framework or those principals. communitys at the ground, the reason -- active mobilization of
the tribes. there is -- as my colleague said in, no need to build up, no need to mobilization and those efforts to go for something positive or something else. these can couples need to come. the random issues need to be discussed in the coming six months and the goal in the support -- by the international community partners and so on is key and important that -- the point is unfortunately the panel is not mandated. they cannot bring the two parties and say come here. i need to discuss with you. the two parties to discuss and
when they want to ask and come and take and that process to give support. i don't mean to imply it is mandated but in the coming period the african union panel needs to push this to discussed a positive referendum. in this community, and so on, contrary to what you say they look beyond the presidential covenant of the government to fashion unity, no discussion of positive referendum issues. this is someone who sits next to the president. still, is very important. so i am not pessimistic but if versus thinking about strategic relationship that i alluded to in my presentation, if the two
parties don't agree on the forms in principle, relationship, union, political separation, according to a union in terms of economics but they will be the same for another currency. we will agree on that. .. the issue of citizenship we agreed. everybody remains if you want to be here or there, no need to keep the 24,000, no need to push the seventh or so one. so that is negative. it is not a positive. it is started by one of the senior ncp people saying not a single injection for southern. that is the government of national. but i don't think, it is ncp government. then president bashir says no, no, no. we will protect with this, we will do that. and then comes, he merely
followed by 20% have to go out from the secret service, consider them as foreigners. what kind of policy is this? i don't know how to describe it. if this is a policy for mutual and peaceful, you are setting a tone for very difficult confrontation on the positive round of discussions. >> i agree that there is a fundamental problems. and it's very difficult to shift from humanitarian assistance into, i have been in this field for a couple of years, and before coming to crisis group. and definitely people need to shift the assistance into long-term, to adjust the >> to adjust the pipeline of the, of the human intelligence
system and to get.h >>s for long term so he doesn't go out. and that's always the debate ofo that continuum. independence, become a member of the united nation, the ss by their imf and in recommend world bank to give money for development, which is going to include employment. at the employment -- at this moment, there is no money for major development that can create jobs in south sudan. so the priority is to work with the security sector, to reform the security sector, to continue building the institutions >> to continue building the institutions while force beering then political -- fostering the political consensus to accommodate those who aree against so when it's finished, at least then they can have aet common ground where they can ald
move of together. first, they need to address then issue of identity. a lot of people think they are homogeneous. there is no suit sudan -- south sudan identity. when it comes to elections, everybody goest to their constituency. that's why the issue of some of the southerners say why do we need to jeopardize our religion? it's so small thing. but the people, the leaders at the top who are from ab yea said, no. people still go to yourr constituents. who are you? whereh, are you from?o if you say you are from abica, who's going to vote for you? so there is no, that issue of
identity, they need to work. and the beginning of it is to set up the rule of the law, the rule of the land, where theyenes need to agree and to put the political system for inclusiveness. and then, definitely, if that stage is there, we'll be able to create the conditions fromhu shifting from humanitarian assistance into a long-term rehabilitation reconstruction which is, it's going to be ideologically, of course,vern driven. or is it an inclusive government to put that framework for reconstruction and development? definitely, it is a challenge.hi finally, i come to the question, i think, which is a very serious question, the issue of the islamists. and i agree with you, it's not a uniform bloc, and there is shot a lot of -- not a lot of deeptor understanding. people tend to hi of ncp, south
sudan.la but if you really want to understand the problems, youhy t have to go deeper into the islamic movement. then you will understand why th cpa, it happened. during the discussions when is the fairest possibility of reals unity for sudan was lost? it was lost when the islamists and the dop didn't go on theited agreement. that was the very support you needed for real united sudan g after the regime fell.n islamists didn't want to go, dop didn't, then there was the in transition, then there was an election. all forces this sudan agreed to postpone the elections, to have a constitutional conference, to discuss about the constitution of sudan, the nature of the sudanese estate and to abolish the september law is which isi
the sharia laws. but i the islamists when they joined bashir, islamists refused.on and when they went for thefive elections and became the prime minister, he formed maybe about five governments, three of them, or two of them was islamist,a broad-backed islamist, and thatb is where pdf and all these fighi and sbm was about to take -- [inaudible] that became a problem, andge that's when they brought, the military brought the hedge to prime minister -- message to prime minister saying either you do something, or we are going tt change the regime.n so they agreed on the agreementp to go and be implement outcomesl they agreed. and that abolishing, not abolishing, but to suspend
freeze the sharia laws accept sudan as an arabic, africa buth not an islamic.vi and toew go for the constitutiou review conference, to review political constitution, form an interim government with sblm anc all the civil society, the tradl unions and so on including thety transition military counsel at that time. they all agreed. so after pressure,, turabi washe removed from power, and they agreed finally on the constitutional conference. pleasure that would have led to it, but who then very quickly made a coup? the islamists.ey d they made the coup because they
is simply doesn't want that to happen. they moved the democratic period, closed the door for constitutional conference, andis we know what happened. so that's why halfway the idea is to create that islamic country where the islamic organization of the islamicsa movement that, you know, it -- how do i say it, that it simulates the sudanese peoplenia into that islamic thinking. of course, creating a at -- pat ro imagine the system and thenst the rulers of the states who also make their own patronized system within the state. and to simulate the wholee sudanese together and then to gn for federalism andonth decentralized. but they took it wrong. the military was supposed to move after three month bees -- three years.
they disguised military in uniform and bashir and all thisa they were supposed to move afteu three years, that's when they agreed.they put them in prison so nobody knows it is -- but they were hiding, they were doing that. they were striving the whole thing -- driving the whole thing.om and then the military to go out of three years and to start to put the constitution of sudan, federalism, decentralization. they like it because they have been three years there. so they refused. so, okay, president bashir became the president, his vice president who died late -- i forgot his name, the vice president, and then the military became the power. president bashir remained, and that continued until today. and so they had that discussionr and division until when they
disagreed on the federalism andc the decentralization system andt also, that the army should gora. back to the barracks and the civilians to rule and to go back to the shura when it is agreed they divided. so what remained thousand in th, ncp became the business peoplel who filtered the money, and that was a problem. that's always a problem when oil is discovered. and so that became a problem. and so when the money started t flow, that patronage system became so strong.o e and now bit by bit that system went into ethnic patronize system. if you go to the palace, you will see whose tribe is this. to the nis, to the government, to the positions, to everything. they cleanse the civil services; the army, the police, the's a journalists, the secret service and everything. that's a system, now, of very serious patronized system.
but now with the cessation coming, of course, people are asking questions. president bashir, you ruled for 20 years. you did couple of agreements.n the cpa came, you didn't maintain the unity of sudan, and you want to continue ruling the sudan. the on what basis? on what legitimacy you want to continue ruling sudan?part so they've got to question the president verse is us the future of the party as a politicald it party. the party versus the future of sudan and the stability of sudan, now it is -- but alsos finding solution to darfur, and also the president verses us thd whole future of sudan.thre between brackets there is the issues of -- [inaudible] those three fundamental questions need to be asked within islamists if they want t, maintain to continue as a viable political party to play. that's why there is those divisions within even the current, and i can go further,j
but i can see eyes looking at me. [laughter] but it's a may juror, major question. so that's why i question the ambassador here talking about is the president sane. it's not about sane, it's about what are the key issues you want to talk about. you'd have to address the vulnerability of the party which became a state. that state have to be separated from the party.th is the ncp willing to do that?la if not, that will continue to struggle to find a viable,ucta lasting peace in sudan. >> thank you very much. i'm very reluctant to stop you in mid flow.ysis i very much appreciate your analysis. but i'm afraid we're pretty much out of time now.o comfort, do you have anything to add? >> [inaudible] >> okay, fair enough.t [laughter] i'd just like to thank you, both of you, for coming and agreeing to take part on what is really a
momentous time right now with the referendum underway.es i'm sure you'll all agree despite the notes of somet. gloominess and pessimism that sudan has come a way to this point at least.all but, of course, the big challengesa lie ahead both internally within north and south and how these two areas, if they are to separate, govern, themselves and manage the diverse peoples and interests within their borders. so, please, join me in thankingt our two guests, fouad hikmat and comfort arrow. [applause] and thanks for your interest, and we'll be following the twists and turns of the referendum at csis, and you can find more information on our weo site. similarly, the icg will be putting out a new report on sudan shortly?that >> there is a report, there is h report that somebody's working on it answering all the big
questions.se the islamists and the future of sudan after secession. and that's the key, i think, for me. >> right. well, thanks very much. >> today on c-span2 senate foreign relations committee chairman john kerry's remarks on domestic policies and u.s. global leadership. the center for american progress action fund in washington hosts this event. that's live at 10 a.m. eastern here on c-span2. >> the c-span networks. we provide coverage of politics, public affairs, nonfiction books and american history. it's all available to you on television, radio, online and on social media networking sites. and find our content anytime through c-span's video library. and we take c-span on the road with our digital bus and local content vehicle bringing our resources to your community. it's washington your way. the c-span networks, now
available in more than 100 million homes created by cable, provided as a public service. >> defense secretary robert gates is visiting china to discuss military ties between china and the u.s. now, a discussion looking at china's military and what goals secretary gates might accomplish on his trip.ar this is a little less than two hours. [inaudible conversations] >> good afternoon, everybody. welcome to the nixon center. i'm really pleased with such good turnout. we've got a fantastic group of people in the audience. if i could remind everyone to turn off your cell phones,n please. and if you can, please turn them all the way off, not just
vibrate just to reduce the electromagnetic interference in the room. i'll say a few words, introduce the speakers, and we'll try to wrap up by 2 p.m. sharp, if not a few minutes earlier. but first, let me welcome our guests and our speakers. we've got a great panel of experts and, definitely, coming to talk about a complicated and very important issue at exactly the right time. as all of you know, secretary gates left for beijing this weekend and is spending two days, two and a half days -- three days?it three full days in beijing. he met yesterday with theh general, and he met with the vice president. tomorrow he will meet with president hu jintao, he'll visit the pla's second aroundake
tilley -- artillery gre headquarters, and he'll make a trip to the great wall. this is not tourism, but it's a great opportunity for him to see the long history and culture of china's defense infrastructure. [laughter] so i think his trip marks a fairly important, fairly important moment in the ten bilateral relationship. it's been a rather tense 12 months since last year whenly high-level ties were virtually at o a standstill, at a cutoff after the announcement of arms sales to taiwan at the beginning of last year.e wa this, i think there were a lot of incidents that we all watched carefully, snubs both ways, insults in, you know, veryforu public forum. and really mismatched expectations. and, hopefully, this is theelp first or one significant meeting that will help put the
relationship back on track.re i don't think there are any expectations for significant breakthroughs on this trip, but there were two that were announced last night. the, la general -- pla general will visit washington, d.c. at some point this year. the date hasn't been set, and i think there was also an agreement that was written up in the new york times, and as they put it, the establishment of a working group to talk about more talks. so at least we see a consensus building on both sides that there should be more talks, continued and sustained and not cut off for, you know, political purposes. but it's, you know, obviously, there's a great deal of
uncertainty, there's a great deal of mutual mistrust betweent the two sides, so we have a set of three panelists that are ardent watchers of both the u.s. ask chinese defense establishments who can give us their interpretations and their impressions of expectation onsi both sides and outcomes for this visit. i will briefly introduce them both. their biographies are out front on the podium so, please, help yourself to that as well as a guest list for the event. but, first, start with the " editor of defense news, and he's the host of defense news tv which is a weekly television program airing every sunday at 11 a.m. locally here on channel 9, cbs. a number of other stations as well around the country. he was previously the managing editor of defense dailys international, and he also covered global operations at air force times.
next we have phillip saunders who's the directer of studiesf and the directer of the centerth for study of chinese military affairs at the national defense university, and he's a distinguished research fellow at the institute for national strategic studies where he's been since 2004. f previously, he'd worked at theed monterey institute for international studies where he served as the directer of the east asian non-proliferation program from '99-2003, and previously he worked on asian policy issues at the u.s. air force as an officer. and then lastly, we have james mulvanen who's the vice president of defense group inc.'s intelligence division ani directer of cgi's center for intelligence, research and analysis. and he's one of the foremost experts on chinese c4isr andent defense development andthe acquisition organizations and policy. he's also the author of "soldiers of fortune," written in 2001, which detailed the rise and fall of the pla's ventures
in capitalism. so with that, we'll start with vago. please. >> thanks very much. i'm honored to be here, especially on such an expert panel, so drew was charitable to allow me to go first in terms of an overview. as the late richard holbrooke once said, the most important bilateral relationship in the world is the one between the t united states and china, and hoa to shape that relationship has actually consumed an enormouse amount of time by successive administrations given that thatt relationship touches every g element oflo u.s. policy, global interests and that just about everything involving china tends to be hard. as a security council member, china's essential to progress on the thorniest issues in then, world; north korea, iran, energy, etc. but it also constitutes in the eyes of some in washington ari growing security challenge in its own right. it's also america's leading trading partner and owner of
nearly a trillion dollars in u.s. debt.ue t while tactics continue to be debated, there's consensus amono administration officials that theych need to work very, very hard to try to engage china to foster a greater understanding and a greater openness and to shape a positive future ofdy i global partnership with the rising power. the last thing anybody inand washington wants is to have th s relationship somehow or another go sideways and turn china, obviously, into an enemy. improving the spirit of s understanding, obviously, is one of the major aims of secretaryo gates' trip to china. no one has any illusions this is going to be easy, no one has any illusions that building theil partnership will be difficult, and no one has any illusions there won't be more significant challenges coming down the pike as china continues its growth. obviously, some of the progress we've seen on the mills side iso important be. everybody in the t administratin has continuously said for successive administrations,g again, that to build a lasting relationship you really need to, you know, increase the dialoguei increase the openness, increase
the communication, reduce the risk of miscalculation and relouis the risk of -- reduce the risk of misunderstanding.oru china has used it as a bargaining trip, unfortunately. while improving the short oruabl term, i think, is valuable through new working groups and promises to hold more meetingsan on moresf meetings, the future s into more challenging. china's maintained it is seeking a peaceful rise, poses to threat to might anybody in the region d claims it wants a military as a rising power. the trouble is that its actions, its rapid rise, its lack oflace transparency and increasingly clear intentions to replace the united states as sort of asia's hegemon are what are worrying folks in washington. under the hide and bide strategy that china has adopted for quite some time, there's been steadyt progress to what, you know,as folks in washington view as the anti-access area denial
capability to force the united states over time out of asia. whether it's using a combination of economic, military and a diplomatic means or to rely increasingly on long-range -- rather, wide missile arsenal ton threaten u.s. bases in the region, u.s. units that are operating in the region as well as countries that are hosting them.am the aim, i think, has been to convince america's allies in the region to cozy up to beijing because america's no longer able to abide by its fundamental security commitments to the region. the other part of the strategy is, obviously, leveraging its economic and development power to compel america and its allies to choose between maintaining good relations with china or sticking by, again, it's longstanding alliances. it's a strategy that almost worked. united states has been embroiled in iraq and afghanistan for much of the past decade and was seen as being disengaged from asia. as china kicked up it commercial growth as well as its military
advancement and prompting even some of of america's closest allies this the region to sort of wonder exactly how deep or te lasting america's commitment to the region was going to be. china's foreign ministry last year said, quote, as the current wars dragged on without a decisive outcome, this would further chip away at the united states' strength and increasingly narrow the room for maneuver on other issues. china's military growth is no surprise, but it's something that washington, for a number of years, has down played. much is being spent.your you get more for your yuan than you get for your dollar. those capabilities have expanded through focused and relentless espionage efforts, buying technology and systems from somh of america's closest allies andm gaining advanced technologies from the thousands of commercial manufacturers that produce their wares in china.d ar what's clear is that the capabilities that aring withld developed are significantly
beyond what most people would reasonably assume china needs for its own immediate consumption. all this diligent effort isf bearing fruit. we've seen the headlines over the past if few years, china's spent a man into space, fired antisatellite rockets and lasers, developing and producing fighters, ships, submarines, missiles, all of which are getting steadily better. china's stealth fighter unveiled a few weeks ago surprised washington which is also worried about the antiship ballistic missile which is being developed to hold at risk american major surface units like aircraft carriers. the df21 issue has been around for years, but i think the issue is that they're here a little sooner than expected, so that makes you wonder what else is behind the screen that we needo
tono be paying attention to. we don't know if they work or don't work, but they offer strong evidence of intent and china's drive to close the military capability gap with the united states which is whatr, worries leaders like bob gates and those across the region. despite gains, china's soviet-style military remains inefficient, it has a larges thurm of strategic -- structural flaws, among them kind of a top-down cover your own butt culture that can impede change and progress. still, china's breathtakingican commercial rise suggests that it would be a significant mistake to assume that it won't get itsa military act together and, perhaps, sooner rather than later.as the chinese defense minister in the his statements has said thaa china will keep continuing to press ahead in advancing its military capabilities and that it is also going to respond to security challenges or threats by cutting off trade, cutting off trade, but also the supply of vital minerals, for example, rare earths as recently was the case with japan in the wake oftt
the confrontation.utio the united states is beginning to respond accordingly, but it is doing so cautiously to play it neither too hot, nor too cold.ncem the most important announcement, in my view, that secretary gates made last week before going togo china was his decision to start work immediately on a long-range, penetrating bomber. i don't think the decision was e coincidence. but it is, rather, evidence of of gates' reorienting u.s. priorities toward capabilities that will allow the united states to operate effectively against future foes to think that their weapons, including nuclear arms, will successfully deny us access to their air,e sea, land and cyberspace domains. i think china would have gotten away with it had it not been for the bolder and more aggressive stance officials have takenng grounded this view that china is ascending and america is a declining.ing among the factors that haveives played into this notion is the
misunderstanding, i think, from the new administration's good faith outreach at the beginning to treasury secretary's geithners pleas, that the president didn't meet with the dalai lama or didn't approve fighters, for example, being sent to taiwan. v each one of these were seen, i think, as successes for beijing, and i think china's view is mashed by headlines. it appears that by listening to their own rhetoric, the chinese leadership, some say because they're surrounded by sick o pants, dramatically overplayed their hand last year and beijing's hyperaggressive stance on smaller issues alarmedo governments across the region and prompting them to seek stronger ties with washington, a strategic opening that american officials have been all too eager to take advantage of. secretary of state clinton has
reiterated regards the waters around china as international. america has increased its diplomatic and military outreach this the region -- in the region, and interestingly, regional states that have heldi long-simmering an animosities, r example, japan and korea, are forging closer relations. obviously, north korea's the driver whereas most people who talk to folks over there recognize that china is ant fundamental element of those discussions. that's the good news. the sort of challenge here is that chinese military being leta out on a longer leech at a time -- leash at a time when no one wants to appear weak.es a this change this tone comes as washington and the rest of the world struggle withish i shoes like north korea and iran. china doesn't necessarily see eye to eye with washington on either issue as it sees north korea only as a problem if it collapses and causes a refugee
crisis on us border. -- its border. american policymakers have ton bear this in mind. it still remains an authoritarian country, it doesn't care whether it does business with bad guys or not, and as an arms and at one point a nuclear probe live ray todiff have, its view of controlling the spread of nuclear technologies, i think, are different.d it matters whether or not they think those technologies willicn ever be used directly against them which is significantlyho different from how most other countries view it.rica so we stand on delicate ground. america's security guarantors under whose benign and stable umbrella the region has prospered, as an open society we don't see ourselves asith threatening. china, however, is an ancient nation with a long network, it's lived for centuries with h external strife, and that's bred a curious blend of arrogance, paranoia, territorial ambition and hypersensitivity about
losing face without forcing anybody else to losewe face thah will prove a challenge.beco we've got to be ready for a nation that, as it grows, willwe become more difficult as it becomes more assertive. as one administration friend. told me, we have to be clear-headed and smart to convince asia's leaders to recognize they have a stake in regional and global stability as well. that'll mean toughness on theon part of u.s. leaders which, whi unfortunately, may merely embolden beijing which views accommodations to its positionst as weakness. the two have major difference, and i think that secretary gates -- tie won among them, the surveillance missions is another issue -- but i think that secretary gates has it right, are we going to define ourselves more by our differences than by our common ground? thank you very much. >> thank you, vago. phil. >> can let me start a little bit going back to 2008 and just do a
little review of where china was. and they had a policy toward the region that was spectacularl' successful, assuring countries that china's economic rise presented opportunities for them economically, became the numberu one trading partner even for u.s. allies such as japan, south korea and taiwan. and had a new administration coming into office that was determinedded to not make the mistakes of their predecessors, not spend the campaign talking tough to china and spend the first year in office repairing the damage. instead, this administration, a the obama administration, was careful what they said in thete campaign and thought strategically about how they wanted to engage china, and can the focus of that engagement, as vago said, was on recognizing china's importance as a potential player in solving regional and global problems
including global warming and then quickly including the global financial crisis. ask is so you had -- and so you had an administration coming into office that reached out its hand, wanted china to play a greeter regional -- greater or regional role, was willing to facilitate china's entry andese expansion of chinese voting rights in some of those institutions. and wanted to make china a cooperative partner on a range of issues. that's a very good position to be in. and then if you look at where wo are today, a lot of that has in a sense been thrown away. so i think that's kind of a central question is, why? what explain that? a different from how vago talked about this, the initial piece was the global financial crisis- which panicked chinese leaders. they saw their exports plummet, they saw employment consequences for that and wanted to be part
of solutions that would contain that damage. that was positive. but as that crisis went on, they discovered that they were recovering faster than the u.s. and europe, and maybe thisd. wasn't such a great threat as they once feared.hat and instead saw a shift in the balance of power that had been occurring over time, perhaps accelerating as a result of this crisis. so i think that's a key factor. but the key thing is that even a as the obama administration reached out a hand, offered expanded cooperation andagem engagement, the chinese response was w suspicion. why are they doing this? why are they offering to expand cooperation to give us a greater voice in international institutions? it must be to tie us down, to make us make commitments that will threaten our economic growth, to buy into supporting p
u.s.-dominated system. and so while i think there was a huge opportunity there, the chinese government largely has looked at that with suspicion and decided not to pursue that. and instead what we have seen is they had this sense that the balance of power both within the region and globally had shifted this their favor -- in their favor. this became the opportunity to take more assertive verbal positions on a number of issues and then to take actions, especially within the region, that reflected this perception. and i think about the first year, the year of 2009, was focused on this. now, of course, when -- howar china defines problems, they are always responding defensively to what other countries are doing. so one of the earliest manifestations of this was in the south china sea where a number of southeast asian companies with claims to the islands made their declarationsi under the u.n. convention, didth
it for their own particulare reasons. there was a deadline in maybut 2009. but how this looked from beijing was a concerted u.s.-led, organized effort to challenge e chinese claims in the south china sea and the east china sea. that's how it was framed in their debate and prompted whatch they characterized as a defensive response and what everybody else in the region sees as a much more assertive policy to reinforce and protect those claims.ecca part of this was the issue withw the impeccable in the south china sea when they harassed aht u.s. navy ship operating within, but there'd been a host of thesh kind of incidents. and i think the key thing is it reflects the sense that the balance of power had shifted. they no long were so bound by u.s. demands.s th they didn't have to be so attentive to what other countries thought. and that has prompted a shift in policy that's caused a lot of concern in the region and caused
a lot of countries in the region to be reaching out to the u.s. and encouraging the u.s. to play a more active role to balance this chinese policy. and one way of thinking about that is 10 or 15 years of veryes patient, skillful diplomacy, listening to what countries wanted, trying to frame their b proposals in light of that has been replaced by a tone-deaf, assertive diplomacy focused on narrow chinese efforts such as maritime claims in the south china sea, bullying other countries sometimes publicly, sometimes in the diplomatic regions, a very nationalistic tone in the press, military commentators coming out in really assertive ways.om the and i think a lot of that progress, a lot of those gains from the last decade were thrown away. thousand, how does that -- now,i how does that relate to u.s./china mill to mill and the secretary's trip?
i think it put china in a position where they felt if then u.s. was encouraging china to d more, we must need china more, and that reflected a shift ine the balance of power and the balance of need, and now china could be the demander. it could try to set the agenda, try to press the u.s. for concessions on issues such as taiwan, try to get restrictions on where u.s. navy and u.s. air force ships operated in waters and air space near china and that they had the power to push these issues, and they had thebu leverage to try to get concessions. yet if the you look at the relationship, they really haven't gotten very much. they haven't gotten anything, really, on taiwan.what the things that vago mentioned really were shifts in timing of u.s. things, so the president didn't meet with the dalai lama during one trip, but he did meet with him two months later. arms sales announcements, maybe the timing shifted a little, buh the content, i don't think, changed. so in that respect it hasn't
been a successful policy in terms of obtaining the concessions that china wanted, but it has created a lot of tension in the region, a lot of concern in the u.s., and as we've seen some of the fruits of china's military modernization payef off, an increasing focus n how does this new assertiveness coupled with new capabilitiesheu pay off, and what does that mean for the u.s.? this i think that's the context in which strategic dialogue between the u.s. and china and the mill to mill dialogue in particular is important. you have a china that now is a player, certainly within thet a region and sometimes at a global level whose nuclear andbilities, whose space counterspace capabilities, whose expanding naval operations andsr certainly whose cyberonal capabilities are things thatalan affectce regional military balances and do directly affect the u.s. and that has prompted an effort to take china more seriously which the chinese welcome. it does give them face in some
ways. but also potentially makes them a target. and this is kind of a key question. i think on the u.s. side we view mill to mill dialogue as a way of increasing understanding ons, these issues, reducing suspicions, finding ways to operate in proximity to each w other without damage or without risks of accidents or incidents. and so we see this dialogue as really important for working out a new strategic relationship where china is a stronger global player. and that's behind, partly, theut qdr's call for a strategici stability dialogue with china td address some of these issues. i be i think -- but i think they've been reluctant to do this, and i think if you look at their willingness to cut off mill to mill over taiwan arms sales although they claim it wasn't really cut off, they just
didn't want to meet with anybody -- schedules were full, those kinds of issues -- it shows there is still suspicion and reluctance to engage seriously on this issue. will the secretary's visit change this?re i don't think so. i mean, i think it will make modest progress on this. i think the establishment of a working group to figure out how to do a serious dialogue on these strategic issues is a good thing, but if you look at the timing of it, it's kind of squeezed in. it was important to the chinese to have this visit happen before the summit between hu and obama. it's partly because one of the u.s. talking points has been president obama and be -- hu agreed on the importance ofin talkinesg about these issues, bt it's the chinese side that has frequently cut this off or been unwilling really to engage sub w instant iou havely. if secretary hadn't gone to china, that would have been a big u.s. talking point and the
focus of a lot of coverage. as it is, they have squeaked itt in before the summit, yet without time for any agreements reached during the visit to h really be implemented or to have the summit visit be kind of a follow-up how are we doing on this. so they've, they've addressed that issue of the presidents agreeing and the suspicion that the chinese military wasn't really going along with this. fn but i don't see a fundamental shift in the is -- suspicion that they have or the view that the mill to mill relationship is a tactical lever that they can use to try to get concessions on the issues that they care about. and that suggests the dialogue is going to continue to be difficult, our efforts to talk about how our ships and planes operate in proximity to each other and the military, the mutual military maritime
communications agreement haven't been that successful. their view has been if you're not operating in this our space space, then there's not a problem. we point out that those exclusive p economics is part of the global commons. the navies and air forces can operate there. so i think the secretary's visit is an opportunity to talk about these things. i hope the working group onthe dialogue on strategic issues will lay the groundwork for a more substantive dialogue. there are some positive signs. that's one consequence of m china's greater power is they feel less vulnerable and maybe more willing to talk aboute so capabilities and some of the neo things, and there are some signs of that over the last six months or so.is but i don't see big breakthroughs, and i think this issue of how the u.s. and a china that's stronger militarilo get along with each other both within the region and outside the region are going to continue to be contentious issues.
>> thank you. james. best for last. >> well, all of you have been in the third position in a three-person panel, can appreciate my dilemma. there's really no point in preparing anything. [laughter] you've got about, you know, 15 minutes to react to the first people's comments, and then you're off to the races. but i think that vago and phil have done a great job of are strategic scene setter, and because of that what i'd like to do is drill in a bit to theis stated operational goals for the visit if you look at deputy assistant secretary shipper's ad recent speech and also the i statements by the chinese. and then extrapolate out a bit to the future as to whether any of the water in these is going to the hold. you know, with many of the pioneers and practitioners here this room, i think i'll be brief so that we can have a good dialogue about it. i would like to reemphasize, though, you know, when we talked
about the six principles and our four goals and our three characteristics and all the other key points from mike's speech, there's a continuous theme running through all of it which is the why it matters question. and the why it matters questionw is was ie think we've gotten incredibly lucky in the last ten years that we have not had a very significant accident orhine collision of one sort or another with the chinese military that has resulted this significant loss of life and a real's ca la story problem. i realize we had the hostage crisis in 2001 ask the recentth unpleasantness with the impeccable, but all of us know out in the field those things could have gone a lot more sideways than they d did and cod have been a lot more teenager than they were. and the real dilemma for me is i still don't have any confidence in the protocols, if any, that we have with the chinese whether
it's crisis management or strategic communications which seem to have fallen apart and not worked as we would haveat w liked in every single one of those crises, that that would be a very escalatory situation, particularly if it involved the taiwans because then you have a triangular escalation scenario with no protocols on how to step those down systematically like we've had in this other strategic context. so i don't worry about the bolt from the blue. i don't worry about some, you know, i was in the heartland recently, some faceless chinese stroking a white persian cat in his lap in this his floating sol cay no headquarters that signals 12 months from this day i want to have a massive amphib invasion in northwest taiwan. i don't worry about that as much as i do another impeccable where, in fact, things go much worse than they did in the past. people die, we flow search and
air rescue forces to the area, the taiwans flow forces, and the net result of that is we're all out there pinging each other with fire-control radar, and there's no real mechanism for stepping that down. nobody's answering the hotline, pay-com commanders, you know,ryr years of dedicated contacts in the military region and thee a general staff don't answer the phone, and then we're in quite a mess. and you only need look at the incidents that were mentioned earlier, the u.s. impeccable ist a gooded example.ti if that poor young man had actually succeeded in getting et that grappling line on to thatth cable he would have either been ripped in half, dragged under the water and drowned, so, you know, he's very lucky that he had such bad aim, in this my view. and when a chinese submarine ran into the towed array behind th'
john mccain, that could turned into a position like we hear about in blind man's bluff. i did ask the general who doesn't have as much of a sense of humor as i would have liked when i saw him last whether, in fact, the chinese navy had asked the philippine government for a prior military transit through i philippines exclusive economic zone in that incident. and i believe at that point we went immediately to lunch. [laughter] so why it matters for me is very much as china's military capabilities have expanded what theyio define as normal patrollg behavior perhaps without having to ask mother, may i to the civilian leadership every single time has expanded both in intensity, tempo and geographic scope. we are increasingly rubbing up against each other's military forces, and yet years later
forces such as the military maritime agreement are still stalemated on the issue of whether the united states is going to conduct strategic reconnaissance operations in international waters off of china's coast. so that's why it matters. point number two, when you look at the rhetoric and guiding principles that we have articulated before secretary gates' visit, i was very struck by the phrase sustained reliable and continuous military to military relations. and embedded within that statement, embedded within those words is our frustration, as phil described, that the mill/mill relationship seems to be hostage to every crisis and that, in fact, it is most important for a strategic relations for the mill/mill to be active during periods of turbulence and crisis when, in fact, it's the first thing to be shut off, and this is deleterious to the stability of
the overall strategicthe relationship. but when you look at the three conditions that the chinese side have put forward for what they would regard as the basis for a stable relationship, in other words, the cessation of all arms sales to taiwan, the cessationni of those strategic reconnaissance operations in international waters off of china's coast as well as the third principle which, remind me -- >> it's the lifting of the -- >> the lifting of the 2001 ndaa that constrains the activities the military to military relationship. i see noio hope in the near fute of two of those ever changing and probably shot the thirdng given -- notin the third given e composition of the congress. so by stating those as their conditions, the chinese have automatically built in an escape hatch that allows them to go right back to the pattern of canceling and shutting down the mill/mill in times of crisis. so i think that, you know, in
terms of disingenuousness orne ingenuousness of both sideshas going into this visit, i feel that the tone from the chinese side, as john said this morning, hasey been very tepid, and theye clearly being forced to do this by their civilian masters who are, clearly, trying to check that box and create, again, the proper atmosphere for president hu's visit later in the month. but it is important to note those three conditions because i think those were chosen withos greaent care. they were not conditions chosen, in myes view, that could easilye removed as obstacles. and i think you do that ining negotiation where you're really not interested in the making significant gains. my third point is that the areas that we highlighted as our areao of greatest interest by name in these discussions are also the areas least likely for cooperation with the chinese. i don't think we did that in order to sort of create a straw man that led to the failure.eir
i think we derived our interestp in their growing nuclear capabilities, their cyber capabilities. i would ls also add their anti-satellite capabilities as areas of strategic discussion because they are the issues that concern us most. but once again i'm drawn to the distinctions between strategicdi discussions with the soviets in which we could talk about those fundamental areas because of parity in the sizes of our nuclear forces and other things, the continuing chinese view of their asymmetry in those areas really, in my view, is a major obstacle to us ever getting to talk about them. now, it is significant that we're going to talk to the second artillery again, but what it actually highlights in stark relief, again, was the breakdown in that reciprocal dialogue between the second around tilley and stratco, and the failure -- not on our part -- to get the
commander of of stratcom to reciprocate the visit to ohm man they had a great discussion about recreation' facilities to offat air force be base, and i'm sure they visited a lot of chapels and everything else, but as befitting the the common star of the pla, but it wasn't the dialogue that we wanted.to and when people have asked mehew why was he so reluctant to come, is it because he's not comfortable with foreigners, i h this, that or the other, i saidy fundamentally from what i've read, they have nothing left tor say.st they gave us the we will never h strike firste briefing, and ift have to come up with something different because we've heard that before, and i don't think they're prepared to say anything more on that issue, so they don't want to put themselves in a position where they fail to deliver even the most basic content. similarly, on the cyber side as much as i would like to have a
cyber dialogue with the chinese military about these issues, the plausible deniability that lies at the heart of computer network operations always give them angi out. i mean, i spent two hours this morning dealing with china origin cyber intrusions into my corporate network, so maybe that's just in my frontal lobee right now. c [laughter] but the nature of cyber and the slipperiness of cyber means it's a very difficult issue withe nu which to have the kind of concrete discussions where you could have on the nuclear one where you have this kind of a defensive structure and so on ask so forth. and can then finally, you know,t i think it was important to talk to second artillery, at least te state our positions about second artillery's ownership of that capability, potential ownership of anti-satellite weapons, but we will largely be in transit mode and probably not expecting much in return. so, unfortunately, i share my
fellow panelists' pessimism for the future. i think once the hu jintao vis't photo ops have been taken in the rose garden, i'm not sure that behind that is going to be aous robust and sustained, reliable and continuous mill/mill for all of the strategic reasons that the other panelists havehank outlined. thank you. >> thank you very much. this is sobering. let me ask the first question, and then while i'm doing that, please, raise your hands, and i'll take, i'll take names. but, i mean, i think it's clearn what the u.s. wants. i mean, and recognizes the need for hue call respect -- mutual respect, mutual trust and reciprocity, and we've had trouble on all three of those in the past. can you think of a concrete example of what the two sides might do to build mutual trustat and start a there? what are the likelihood of that occurring in the next year or
so, and where do you think wee u might make progress on that? and if i could ask each of you to make quick responses to the q&a, and then during the questions from the guests we'll maybe pick and choose panelists. >> do you want us to drone just on and on and on this the answers to those. >> if -- [laughter]tart somewhere there's a gong, we'll have to bang. so, vago, why don't you start. >> i think -- [laughter] the light comes on, and that's the end. submit my statement ford. look, i think training exercises are always a good historical place to start, naval exercises. everybody tends to be on their best behavior when things like that happen.e to you actually get glimpses of what they're like operating with. wit fortunately, you know, there isf some experience with operating with chinese units, obviously, in the counterpiracy operations off of the african coast which had been important for china and everybody else to operate withe china and understand what it's like to operate with them at sea.
i think one of the other things is, you know, submarine rescue would be, certainly, more interesting, somewhat more tha problem mat problematic, but that's also something countries do to try to push boundaries with one another and see how they operate. >> thank you.ay t >> i guess i would, i would sayi that part of it is having a franker discussion about military capabilities.inte i mean, i think in some of the interactions i've had with chinese you talk to them and get answers that not only don'tut produce confidence or mutual trust, but sort of erode it because you hear flat denials of things that you know are actually going on or statements that don't match, statements ofn intent that don't match what's happening with their capabilities. i think the u.s. has tried as the administration has produced its various policy reviews to give china, most of which have been published in