or the other, i don't know the basis in the background on your equity in your home, that the other side is, is freddie mac subsidizing not necessarily in your case, some borrowers who won't ultimately be a little stay in their home, getting them to pay cash into a house with a habit done the appraisal, as he said, had a tenant income verification. there is a big difference though on top of that between the two when comparing apples to oranges. fannie and freddie are government guarantee. the own the credit risk already. ..
to in the second cleans the hold on the balance sheet and first the service for people like your project. >> thanks very much for writing the book. i have a couple questions. fannie and freddie might be profitable at the end of 2012 may be in 2013. there's a dividend they might in the treasury. the pressure to bring them out of conservatorship. they have patented the mortgage
business over 40 patents now and continuing to get patents so they've patented the mortgage, everything from the mortgage application process all the way to the securitization. in a lot of technology and information on every single homeowner in the country. i guess i'm asking what this be put in the public domain along with the information technology and are we going back to business as usual? >> well, so there is a great divide right now in washington between those who are afraid if we wait too long to address it and wait until after the presidential election there's going to be a push because they are profitable just let's put them back out there, let's bring them back into the public market
brough everything's okay for the regulation around the edge, and then you've got those saying let's get rid of them. i actually am agnostic. there is value to the franchise and patent portfolios and the information that they have which i think you could use if you could figure out a way to make not a government sponsored enterprises, but enterprises that were fully private. there's some value in that because the value in the information or you can offer it to the entire market, open it up, but the debate right now unfortunately is we have fannie and freddie or do we have the mortgage tax as x feeney and freddie, and so i think really the question is should either of these groups be mechanisms for social policy delivery or helping more the mortgage market structure, financial market intermediaries to the mortgage
finance systems fannie and freddie at this point are going to come out the other side it seems, not with the same names, not the same structure, but i think some of the franchise value will be retained. it's unclear as to what matter. >> thank you, gretchen and josh. [applause] a marvelous evening. >> what are you reading this summer? book tv wants to know.
coming up next booktv presents "after words" an hour-long program where we invite guest hosts to interview authors. this week former u.s. secretary of state henry kissinger and his new book "on china." the diplomat who accompanied president nixon to the communist nation presents his fault of the history of china's relationship with the united states and its current influence on american politics in the monetary policy to read he shares his perspective with the former aide and fox news contributor monica crowley. >> host: . >> great to see you as always. >> congratulations on your new book which is called "on china". and i can't think of anyone else
would rather talk to on china. china has gone the last few decades being a very important concern for the united states to an important urgent and primary concern for the united states and there's so many lawyers to the final american relationship we are going to get into with you. thank you for being cared. >> let's begin with how china sees itself in this traditionally seen itself. as i was making my way through your book you write the united states and china believe they represent unique values in the world. and that the united states believes an obligation to spread its values to every part of the world whereas china acts on the basis of its singularity and its expanded through what you call cultural osmosis. tell us what you mean. >> the market believes its values are applied everywhere and that any society can adopt them and that our institutions
can be spread everywhere. they represent a unique civilization. you can't really become chinese, you have to grow up in its cultural environment, you can't naturalized as a chinese. americans thought of the world as composed more or less equal societies than it had a concept of sovereignty to go with it. the chinese until the end of the 90's solvable thus tributaries to what they call the entire. tributaries didn't mean that they had to pay tribute, they had to bring come it was expected they would bring some gifts, but they were also given
gifts in deterrent but what it did mean is it became the respect for the chinese society and chinese supremacy in its region so chinese relations are placed more on mutual respect than a concept of equality. but the chinese, as we do, believe the values are unique to and makes them even more sensitive than we would be to outside treasures telling them how to redo their society. >> is it a superiority? >> host: you also write winter at entered the modern age, it
had a tremendous experience with diversity by the end and the accounts you had cities that govern themselves and an entire political philosophy built on that concept. you also think when china entered the modern age and had been a fully functioning imperial bureaucracy for over five years. tell us what you mean about imperial bureaucracy. >> china, the modern china about 2,000 years ago which china unified, and then it was governed by a bureaucracy that was elected by competitive examination. so in that sense, it was more modern than that period and
china had a governing philosophy with the legislation and governing proxy which was operated on the national basis, and therefore when others said occasionally china was conquered by its neighbors, the didn't know how to government and they needed the chinese bureaucracy so on at least two occasions in the chinese history of the foreigners came in, conquered the country, use the chinese peroxy to government and became themselves. so china expanded the opposite of the western lights and that accomplished by being conquered and then signed in by the congress and from the north. >> host: a much more efficient
way, isn't it? >> you say because china was never enforced to engage in the larger civilizations in the world it remains basically insular but it also considered as of the center of the world. does that still hold true with? >> in a way it is still held true to china. the cutback of the diverse revolutionary leaders in china were still influenced by the chinese patterns. for example, you never had an appointment with what mao. you were summoned to see mao, and that was also the game of any that came for the previous.
and of the 18th century the british sent to beijing, and he was supposed to help them trade and diplomatic relations and everything. he was marvelously received but he couldn't get an audience with the emperor, and it took him three months before he was summoned, and then it said that you have nothing we want, and we have nothing you should want because good trade is not possible, and we don't receive them because anyone who lives in beijing has to wear chinese close, live in a chinese house, and can never leave china. so, the question is do they still think this way?
of course not exactly this way. but with globalization of the economy and the daily contact but there is still a tendency to sink in and the central kingdom terms of though its much attenuated in the modern period. >> host: you mentioned of course the author of the chinese communist revolution. you knew him and worked with him or spoke with him. >> host: what were your impressions of him both as a strategic leader and a movement leader? >> guest: first as a movement leader to understand and then tens of millions of people were killed and the reason for that was because he wanted to
complete the communist revolution in the lifetime. he knew that in chinese history the leader is expected most was an emperor of unified china, and then 20 years after his death they had disappeared except to the unification. so he organized was called the great leap forward in which china was supposed to move from the underdevelopment to its protection at the level of great britain. and in three years and in order to do that if the had to get resources from the countryside, and the result was a famine in which as many as 40 million
people may have been killed, and ten years later he started the cultural revolution, which was another, produced another on the moral ground. he was -- at the same time as the ruler of china he had to maneuver china along a whole host of other countries, and the china but was poor, underdeveloped, not very strong militarily and had just emerged from the century of the colonial degradation so on that strategic level he was a great leader. he had an enormous skill and
strategic analysis, and he maneuvered china of course the only major country that survived the communism all over the world and he managed to switch from the winning side to the cold war without missing a beat. so from that point of view as a strategic analyst which is how we got to know him first, he had extraordinary abilities as you would expect from somebody who started and a unified a huge society and the decade-long civil war. >> host: you mentioned you met him a total of five times to three times a loan of one on one. what word your impressions of him as a man?
>> guest: it is the principal. mao, as in those contexts, i didn't have to deal with him speak to how the meetings can about. as i said the summit the chinese escorts would take off almost always in chinese to where he lived. he had many places where he lived, though one was soviet-style in which it was none of the majesty of european and the first time i saw him
they had a big round table, and he had received juan in the study in which books were scattered all over the place and he was in the middle of the circle. he had very satanic manner. he did not as almost every other leader i met over the years most leaders would say five points and here are my five points. mao wouldn't do this. he would begin his conversation what is your consideration, and then he would pose an issue then say whatever you wanted to say and he would say but have you considered the following?
every once in awhile, he would make interjection. at one point we were discussing the contribution europe would make to the common defense, and he said as they remind me of swallows to fly into the air at an approaching storm, but you, professor, and i, will no doubt the flapping of the wings does not affect the coming of the storm. so he had achieved in that two things. one, she gave me equal status with him, sort of a fellow sufferer, you, professor, and i, then he had his medical
deterrence -- impotence and this is how you would conduct a conversation. and sometimes, she would get poignant but it was in an indirect way but very forceful. when he spoke you knew that it wasn't that his voice, he vibrated physical dominance. the last two times i saw him he had a stroke and he had great difficulty speaking, and he had to croak out his sounds coming and china being a tone language they had to hold what they understood him to say before they could interpret it. but even then, he conducted a meeting of over two hours, so he
was obviously a formidable person. >> let's talk about 1972 in that dramatic diplomatic breakthrough. he talked about president nixon of course. it's interesting because president nixon told me in the 1990's the thing that brought to of you together, china and the united states was a major strategic concern with a crew of soviet power and the chinese across the borders of the assertiveness, they saw an accelerated nuclear buildup, very concerned. and so they approached the united states coming to approach china and came together for strategic reasons. could you describe the strategic dynamics at a time that allowed the kind of try and avert a policy that you and president nixon were trying to develop? >> as you say, we saw the growth of the soviet power. and the soviet union had in the
space of ten years occupied hungary and subject to the poll in the second time, and it had occupied czechoslovakia. now in the summer of '69, the buildup along the chinese border into the military clashes along the river between the two sides and we were sort of watching this. and then the soviets made a mistake that accelerated our considerations. the mistake was they send their ambassador to brief us with the chinese to read the did that probably because they were considering attacking china and wanted to prove they had a good reason for doing it.
i created a map for nixon to look at the location of these incidents and said if there are incidents in these places quote with the suggest to you who is the attacker and experts said this is the soviet supply and from the chinese supply forms, therefore it is unlikely the chinese if they wanted to attack would do it from such a half and then we would take a few others and then mix and made one of the announced but important, most important decisions which is we
discussed war with a position as the united states take, and we have concluded that it was against the american interest to have china defeated, even though we had no contact with them, and so we decided that in case of a war we would be technically neutral and try to give it as much ability to survive as we could. we didn't communicate that to the chinese because we had no way of communicating with them, but what we did do is to step up statements that we would not be in different to such war, and we had the director helms
participate and make a speech i think it was to political science association, something that we knew would lead in a low-key way he made that point, and the deputy secretary of state, and then we began looking for channels into china at the same time and we did a number of little things it looks very minuscule. chinese and nobody, no american compared chinese goods anywhere, and so we lifted that restriction so that as a tourist you could buy $100 worth of chinese goods. the chinese in term released some people to the chinese
waters, and the occupants, but anyway had been captured and were released, so we had these signals, but we found it hard to establish contact because, for example, we sent some messages to rumania or rather we told the romanians what they might tell the chinese. we chose the channel because nixon had been in romania, and the romanians had been the most independent of the east european communist countries. so we thought they might have in beijing. the problem was that the chinese communists didn't trust any communist, so they were reluctant to be very specific to
romania and violate again nixon talked to the pakistan president and that astonish a contract which we then used. >> host: let me ask that the immediate backdrop what you are doing with the opening to china with the vietnam war that. you talked about the strategic dynamic between the united states and the soviet union which was growing and based on a strategic terms and china. talk ehlers little bit if you would about how you expected the opening to china not to affect the war in vietnam. >> nixon didn't start the war in vietnam, nixon inherited the war in vietnam and there were 545,000 americans in vietnam,
and we had just gone through the tet offensive, and which was a major attack by the vietnamese and we had riots in the streets in this country against the war in vietnam. at the same time, we were the country on which the security of almost every regional dependent, and nixon felt even though he hadn't made the original commitment she would not abandon the people who rely on the american promises and staked the future on cooperating with us. so nixon decided to withdraw from vietnam but to do it in a way which the people of south vietnam would be given the opportunity to determine the
fate. the one condition he would not meet is to turn over the vietnamese population. he wanted a free political process. and when people say he could have ended it or we could have ended it more quickly, they never tell you how because if you look at the record of negotiations, you will see that every other condition we were willing to meet. now the vietnamese approach and negotiation was to try to -- every periodic to paris to negotiate on behalf of nixon and at the united states and their strategy was to outweigh that. by opening to china, we had to
follow benefits. it changed the hon de bate. it showed that nixon who would be vilified as being opposed to peace in viet nam had actually large almost grandiose conception which included the whole world, and so at the same time it isolated the vietnamese because it meant that the closest or the most nearby ally was willing to deal with the united states without informing them and to some extent the disadvantage because it interrupted the secularism and they thought they had established. so that was an important aspect. pressed to in any national security and foreign policy calculus, there is always
american domestic opinion which any great leader knows how to change, how to persuade, how to move. now, when you think about the opening to china and the help with the soviet union which you conducted as well, was that part of a strategy to signal to the american people why we were fighting this war in vietnam this administration was seeking longer-term he says. >> it wasn't done as a political maneuver, it was done because he believed to be that and we believe to be fat. it had the practical effect of telling the american people not to be obsessed with defense in one part of the world that we had in fact to be true in fact inherited and are trying to liquidate, and to look at the overall design which put china, soviet union, europe into a
pattern that could be grasped by public opinion. >> host: tie one, united states and china still have wildly divergent views about taiwan. how does president nixon announced the kind of move past that cracks >> for 20 years, the negotiation between china and the united states, the chinese negotiator at would say we won't do anything else until you turn taiwan over to less when we turned that down it ended the pool. the american negotiator would say we won't do anything else until you give us a pledge of peaceful attitudes towards. so there was an absolute.
even before i got to beijing, and in the first communication to us, the chinese valued as important to describe the secure to china we replied we were willing to talk about the issue of taiwan, but only in relation to all other issues of asia and in the world. and the chinese accepted that. so that was already a huge concession before we ever got there. but then one has to remember the united states and president roosevelt in the declaration of 1943 had declared the united states considers taiwan to be a
part of china. so the fact that taiwan belonged to china had never been revoked by any american president. the only condition subsequent american presidents meet was the takeover over the union should be peaceful. so we got around this problem by spanning the communique in which each side stated its own views. we stated in our view that the chinese people on both sides of the taiwan straits assume that there's only one china. the united states we sit does not challenge so that was a way of accepting one china but we
still did not recognize beijing as the government of china and nixon that he did not recognize as the capitol of that country. so if you look at 40 years that it's happened since then, both sides have the taiwan problem on the theory of the principles that the united states accept the principal of china that the united states strongly insists on the need for a peaceful solution and let the united states warns each site, plus the taiwanese not to take action and
to consider that this has been carried out for 40 years is quite remarkable. now today there are many heroes of diplomacy who say what nixon might have done and what nixon might have expected and we didn't hear from any of them at that time. >> host: of course not. >> host: the framework to put in place in 1972 has been remarkably durable to this day. >> guest: the american administration of both sides, so it is one of the most continuous american foreign policies. >> host: dr. kissinger, please stand by. we are going to take a short break. i would like to move into more current affairs in the united states relationship with china economically, strategically and in human rights. we are going to cover all of those issues with former secretary of state henry kissinger in his new book on china when we come back.
>> you can find out about upcoming book tv programs like "after words" by using your mobile phone. text the wordbook to receive a weekly e-mail about our schedule and sign up now for a chance to receive a copy of henry kissinger's book "on china." standard data rates apply. >> we are joined by former secretary of state henry kissinger who has a masterful book called quite simply "on china." dr. kissinger, let's talk about more current events, particularly as they relate to the united states relationship with china. it's very complicated now. i remember when i was working for president nixon in the early 1990's he said it's interesting because when kissinger and i opened relations with china in the early 70's it was all but
strategic issues which we talked about before the break. she said in the early 90's it's almost all about economics. now in the 21st century is a combination of both, the strategic and economic. when you look at china's incredibly rapid economic rise, are used on or surprised or not at all? >> guest: i am surprised and so what mix in the in the group that opened to china. when nixon -- when i had been to china but before nixon went, he invited the french who had been in china to see what we could learn from that and lonrho said it's a desperately poor country, the most important thing you can
do is to do it plan had to get the economic aid but he didn't want economic aid and he didn't want china connected with the rest of the world. when nixon went there and they didn't have the telephonic equipment to protect us with washington in a way appropriate to the president. [inaudible] at any rate, we would have been amazed at the lack of progress that's taking place and couldn't take place until mao had died. >> host: in the late 1970's he revolutionized the chinese economy because he began reform
through agriculture commissioner and agricultural reform that has been laid up a framework for what we see today. everything was ideology. i don't know whether it is black or gray as long as it catches mice. so anything that worked. and he liberated the energy of the chinese people. one has to remember that over the last 2,000 years, in 1800 or the last 2,000 years, china had the largest gross domestic product in the world. it was just in the 19th century because of the impact of the colonialism. the chinese economic droves didn't really take place until
just about 20 years ago. as to what he is a chinese capitalism? would you describe it as managed capitalism? >> guest: i would describe its a market economy -- >> host: and its characteristics. >> guest: what it is is market economics, but guided by strategic decisions from the center which helped establish parity is. and so far it has worked amazingly to have a growth rate of eight to 10% over a three-year period is an extraordinary achievement. >> host: even during times of
global recession? >> guest: even in terms of global recession of course they can do things we can't even think of. i was in china in 2008. i talked to them a year of the city, and he said they had about 5 million unemployed in that city. so, i asked him what he was going to do about that and they said they all go home chinese new year, and we will only let about a quarter of them come back so they use of the chinese family tradition of taking care of people as their family as a social security network. but on the purely economic level it is a combination of market principles and central management. it's not a planned economy in
the soviet sense. >> host: what is the major point of contention that in the united states and beijing over the chinese of its currency. how is this relationship and how should the administration be dealing with it? >> guest: the argument that is made is the chinese are manipulating the currency at a potentially low level which gives them another vantage in exports, and therefore in proves and gives them greater economic financial reach. my view is some of the deficit is caused by our own actions. some of it is caused by chinese actions. it is caused buy ever own action because as long as we are
financial and run huge deficits, they are now the current and inevitable and he -. from abroad to meet the deficits so we need to work on those problems first and concurrently and take the advantage. we have to defend our interest, but the way that it is usually done is to arrange for a balance of penalties and. >> host: it is striking to me just about every time the chinese leadership meet with the american leadership whether it's president obama, tataris did
clinton, treasury secretary geithner they never miss an opportunity to lecture us on these issues, the spending levels, deficits and debt. and it's very ironic we have chinese communists lecturing the capitalists. >> host: >> guest: but it's an ironic evolution for the greatest part of the opening of the relationship the chinese basic attitude was they thought that some of our political enthusiasms some of them were amateur and so forth, but they had huge respect for our economic capacities. and they thought we were on to the management of the world financial system from which they could learn a great deal. so they sent students over here but sent practicing capitalists
over here to the banking systems and american investment banks and so forth. then in late 2007, 2008, they learned or they think they learned that americans didn't know how to run their economy very well either and what caused it to proceed both for us but also those chinese who had been associated with the reform, and some of the difficulties that followed afterwards in which it is claimed and correctly that the chinese were to matt assertive to go back to that period and that shock occurred. >> host: the chinese are the biggest foreign creditors. how much of a threat to us in fact? >> guest: it's a very complicated issue because of the
one hand, you can say if the explorer their credit and they can make life difficult for us. at the same time if you a $100,000 to a bank it is your problem. if you owe 100 million to a bank it is their problem. so the creditors suffer enormously also several trillion dollars that they are holding of became worthless as a result of inflation. that would be a huge blow to them so we have a kind of ritual suicide. >> host: there's a lot of members the chinese mother terrie who said last year she began talking of the united states in terms of economic warfare. not military war for the economic warfare. how big a concern should that be for the united states? >> guest: what i think the
book says is we are the two most powerful countries in the world today. there is a series of issues that are new, and limit, proliferation, fair distribution of energy, these are unique problems. they can only be solved on a global basis. second, we ought to learn from the european experience when the rising germany and established brinton had to deal with each other but didn't manage to do it and the result was world war i. and i had to ask myself if the leaders had went to war in 1914 and had known what the world look like four years later when the war ended with the ever have done it, wouldn't one or the other have made an accommodation. so what i see in the book is we ought to approach foreign policy
with china with a that in mind. we are to look for opportunities of a relationship and at the same time to defend the interest and if the chinese approach to the problem in the same way, then i'm hopeful that the ingenuity on both sides will find a way through. but both sides have to have this attitude. the united states cannot do it by itself, and i think this is a stipulated challenge to peace and the greatest test over the progress. >> host: let's talk about the strategic challenges facing the final american relationship. the amount of concern in the united states about the chinese military buildup. i would like for you to comment on how worried should we be about that, about the growing chinese assertiveness in asia, in the region and globally as
well its ability to project power, and should we be doing anything too sure of our allies in the region, south korea, japan and others increasingly worried about china? >> guest: chinese grows economically. the military capacity is bound to grow. that is inherent in what is going on what we have to watch is at what point does the chinese military capacity go from beyond defending its country to a capacity to intervene all of the world and challenge the existing institutions. at that point, we are in a period of potential confrontations and not intended
it then it could slide into a confrontation. they haven't reached that point. we have to be sure that we maintain the image or the balance that has characterized the situation. now if they conduct these early policies, we should have a clear notion of our national interest. our national interest is challenged assertive or non-hazardous policies we would take measures to protect its so when the chinese conduct the foreign policy that the commitment to cooperate i would have to say then the american
interest comes first. if they conduct an open mind policy, then we should have a discussion of the positions and where the progress can be made but it's always necessary any foreign country dealing with us should understand that we protect the interest and strengthen our relations with korea, india and japan. it is absolutely central america remain an asian power and american maintains its relationship in the asian world. we can't do this and we it was done in europe because in europe there was an existential served so the relationship with europe took on a heavily military kind
in the relationships between japan, korea, the united states, india, the economic social factors play a huge role and similarly we show that america is committed to the independence countries and of some of these projects the chinese participated so long as not the hegemony will cover of asia. >> host: talk if you would about china's role in nuclear proliferation china is working with rhode power like north korea, even pakistan to some degree to share the nuclear technology with the iranian is perhaps the syrians, perhaps in venezuela. all opponents and enemies of the united states. what can we do to try to rein in
china and the proliferation area? >> guest: all issues except north korea the chinese national interest is very prevalent and can be interested in the proliferation of nuclear weapons because its nuclear weapons are spread to countries that cannot have the same technological safeguards. and they do not understand the nature of the modern technology adequately. the danger of a catastrophic conflict or even of an outburst of terrorists are overwhelming. so, i am quite hopeful we can get gradual chinese support. the major hesitation is they are reluctant to outside forces can
tell a country internally but with the increasing globalization, china will come to that point to the complicated issue is north korea because of the one hand, it's not in the chinese interest from north korea to have nuclear weapons. on the other hand, the chinese believe that those that are not in their national interest to have north korea collapse and then face the prospect of a large country on its border which may inherit the north korean capability, so i think china has been going back and forth on the north korean nuclear issue and hasn't made a decisive move. i think we would be delighted if these weapons would go away. but they don't want to do what is required to make him go away.
so, the bear the responsibility. now they themselves have not been active in the nuclear proliferation because it would hurt them more than, but north korea has because north korea is broken and is about the most oppressive country the world, and sooner or later the other countries have to face the issue what happens when the nuclear country continues to operate and that is an issue with us with iran and an issue also is a more complex way with north korea, and it can't really be solved as
an isolated problem to be it needs to be a security conflict developed for all of northeast asia that other nations can join. and it may be under that system, north korea is denuclearized. >> host: human-rights. we dictate that we should not be all that concerned with what goes on internally within a country that we should only be concerned with their external behavior, and that brought in to american foreign policy for quite awhile. but over the last two decades i would say the united states has concerned itself with what goes on inside china. there's a lot of talk now and worry that the chinese are now retrenching and that there's been an escalation on the detention of dissidents, of those that are out there are doing very publicly for the democratization, liberalization, journalist detained religious minorities, catholics and so on. what do you say to the chinese
when you talk to them about their human rights record? >> guest: let me say a word about the public which is a term i never used. it's a term of my critics use if they want to the will to say, and this is not an american concept even though i live in germany as a child as part of a persecuted minority. so that in the the jewish school in which i had to go study in of the politics by putting that issue aside, the fundamental necessity of the peaceful world is to elements the equilibrium balance of power, why, so that
the strong cannot simply dominated the week. at the same time you need legitimacy, whatever you want to call it so that the existing arrangements for most of the members, most of the people so that they don't want to challenge it, first thing that deals with capability, second one deals with attitude. so it's that balance that has to be achieved. the aspects of the issue one of our convictions with respect to human rights come second what we do about that? america has been founded on the principles of human dignity, human liberty and human