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tv   Book TV  CSPAN  June 25, 2011 2:00pm-3:00pm EDT

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question. that's an open question. what that means exactly. certainly evangelicals have embreakaged and she has come from a fairly recent tradition in american public life and in john ashcroft this is the highest of someone from that background has reached in american power. >> is sarah palin still a factor in republican politics? >> absolutely. and i make the point that in ronald reagan years, since still 1957 and 23 years of reaching where he reached his moment of maximum impact so i think -- my hunch is that she will run but if she's well-advised she will spend a lot of time really preparing to lead a movement and that's what i think will happen in the years ahead. it could go another way but that's my best guess. >> did you spend time at the wasilla church that she extends? >> i did not but i did meet her one time. there are other books out there of people who spend a lot of time with her and have emails.
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i think i have the advantage of stepping back and certainly i've spoken to people in the campaign that have worked we are but i've written it from afar and researched from afar. >> what is bully pulpit books? >> we publish books on politics, pop culture, religion. we have books on the chronicles of narnia, a book on bob dylan and his spiritual background. and we try to operate in that sphere where the three intersect. >> what's your background? >> i'm formerly back with the cnn back in the days of the entertainment reporter and i'm a film producer. >> mark joseph this is the book wildcard the promise and peril of sarah palin. ..
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>> sold or others, historians in the country today. jeffrey wert was bigger but his new book teenine -- "a glorious army: robert e. lee's triumph, 1862-1863". this book, we are delighted to say is a mainstay of the book club. this book is one of the most sought after civil war books in the country right now today. mr. jeffrey wert is the other of nine books and has been writing about the civil war for 40 years. it took awhile to get that out. forty years, and he really is well known from pennsylvania to california. his most notable achievement, one of them, is a barber feet and general james longstreet of the confederacy, the most
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controversial soldier. we are delighted to have. ♪ with us here today. at the conclusion he will take your questions. let's give him a nice round of applause. [applause] [applause] >> thanks, joe. when i was here, i don't know if you were here are not. many of you were so kind to ask questions. please, if you have questions and going to allow time for this. i certainly applaud like to hear them. if you disagree with what i have to say. in fact, i was digging about this coming down on our drive this morning. this is the first full talk have given on the book presoak parts of it don't make sense, forgive me. i haven't gone through this all together. so please, when i'm done, i would like as many questions as
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you have. when ready lee rode out nine mile road on sundays in first 1862 to assume command of the army in northern virginia there were, i will tell you, very few people who were quite optimistic about the prospects. there were a few in richmond, but there weren't many. now, lee had a great virginia family named. a west pointer, a model soldier in many ways, but he had commanded in western virginia in the fall of 61 and between lousy weather and even worse subordinates it was a failed campaign. that kind of hung over his reputation. actually, lee was temporarily exiled to the south carolina and georgia and coastal defenses until march of 1862 when jefferson davis needed a military advisor. so he chose lee, and he joined
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davis. what was critical for the next march, april, and make was that these two men developed mutual respect and trust for each other. davis, you know, has so many problems with joseph e. johnston. yes justin he would have some new problems. their relationship was very, very icy. getting more difficult. then of course johnston is wounded on may 301st. in davis roadway that evening on may 301st. the was with them. you can make the argument. he was going to command the army. there was no subordinate to give it to. he turned to lee and set on going to appoint a temporary command, not permit their -- permit command.
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so that is highly get the job as being commander of the army number virginia. when he joined the army he realize very quickly that johnston was a bad administrator. the organization of the army was week. discipline was miserable in many ways. dhl wrote to his wife at that time. hundreds, if not thousand men was slick away from camp and enjoy the saloons and brothels of richmond. you can run an army that white. so we in turn in heritage army that was not quite ready for what lee is going to expect of them. yet i thought about this when i was doing it. you know, you can write in a book that all the stars aligned. people will think it -- you can prove that all the stars aligned.
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in the sense all the stars aligned for the confederacy on that june day. there is no body really in the army of the atomic which were at the gates of richmond that simply -- i know the names. stonewall jackson, james longstreet, jeff stuart, epo, dhl, richards yules, left eight. there simply wasn't in the union army those kind of subordinates. so what they needed, if you will was somebody who could take them somewhere. that man was lee who rode up their the morning of sunday's in first. what tiddly do immediately? what he would do for the next three years, he went to work. he issued an order immediately
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saying that all commanders would have their brigades and divisions ready to move at a moment's notice. today's letter, two days later lee decided that he was going to attack the union army of the atomic. what is critical to understand about this, and i think it is what becomes of hallmark of his generalship certainly for the next 13 months. arguably as long as he could do it leave incest rationally. some have argued that he had that in a combativeness. it's hard to measure that. if you remember, there is a famous conversation between one of davis's aids and porter alexander, the future gate are terrorist. this happened soon after we took command. alexander asked, is generally audacious enough?
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we need audacity. endive's said, alexander, you will see shortly all the audacity you need to seek. and he had it right. but it doesn't come from a combativeness assets. it comes from our recent calculation. if you look at june 1862 the confederacy had a terrible winter. henry donaldson surrendered. you have natural captured. you have the battle of shiloh will give better sue lost, and you have enormous captured. excuse me, the year army up atomic. the attitude in the north, they set down the recruiting offices. there is every reason to believe it may be our very charlie. the winter of 62 was a winter with the confederacy of on the
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defensive. the union army sought defense all that massive stretches of land. we saw that the only chance they had against an opponent his material might and manpower may not be unlimited but it was certainly a limited compared to the confederacy. he felt he had to take the word to them. you had to assume the offensive. you had to take risks because if you don't take risks you are impossibly for a slow death. you had to prevent that we calculated that the only thing the confederacy needed to do, if you will, was be audacious and bold. some have argued that lee was too bold. but what i will tell you, lee was doing what the seven people expected their generals to do. the old line was that any kid
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representative. he probably exaggerated the numbers. they believed that their voice to with a fair number of the yankees. they had this marshall attitude in the south prior to the war. the davis a ministration, he wanted aggressiveness. the seven people, so when the s&p aggressiveness, the offensive he really in turn is reflecting what the seven people expected them to do. so by doing so if you are general you can dictate within your theater how the campaign and operation is going to unfold the strategic or operational offensive. so within two days on june 2nd in june 3rd lee made the
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decision within two days to strike the enemy. charles marshall would say in conversations with lee and a reflection of the strategy we believe the best way to defend richmond was to be as far away as possible from richmond. yet to take the war away from richmond. he had to get away from that. grant tensor to richmond. during the bleated slow death. so until the you have to fight it away. so the other factor, and this is critical to understand. lee will write about this time and again. he paid close attention to what
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was going on in the north as a trivia lee's favorite newspaper was the philadelphia inquirer. he felt that they had the most reliable correspondence with the army of the potomac. he would read other newspapers, but his favorite was the philadelphia inquirer. he knew that the confederacy to win this war had to achieve on the battlefield. ultimately what they had to do was to break the will of the northern people. the will of the northern people to sustain the war effort in the face of defeat and sacrifice, the loss of husbands and brothers and so forth. that was the german military analysts, it was the center of gravity, the crucial thing that has to be broken. to do that in lee's mind you have to fashion together a series of battlefield victories that might break the will of the northern people and forcing
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billing demonstration to negotiate a political settlement. the confederacy could never caulker the north. they had to bring the north to the table. in the speculation that was part of his strategy. and so as many of you all know, at the end of june 1862 the confederate army struck. the army struck in what is known as the seven days campaign. actually, we like turning points and worst. in the war. civil war is famous for it. the military turning point. folks come in some ways a critical turning point was the seven days. the war took a new course because of the seven days.
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lee and his army are going to change everything in the east and are going to change it for the next year. when he drove the army of the potomac with george mcclellan's help in the sense that mcclellan wanted to retreat away from them, but when they receive flatbush the war in the east is going to change. that is because we was willing to do that. this is an army that will be not the army did you think about later. just a couple of things that struck me. one of the standard things, of course, terrible mass communication. jackson had a bad campaign. given over to 50 in dallas. we are not sure, but he doesn't do very well. in fact, lee had serious questions about someone jackson's conduct in that campaign. but one of the other things that struck me was the amount. my goodness. a lot of good all seven boys
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that weren't interested. when they came close to the battlefield they went around. this is going to be a problem throughout 62. we get into antietam, but this is clearly a problem at that time. just for an example of how they weren't a machine by any means, and that is malvern hill, the question has been argued and still remains argued. i just saw recent market -- article. the premise and part is wrong. piteous to a string of bloody battles. if you're engaged in bloody battles you will lose more men. it is aligned there.
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he said it was not war but murder. the confederate slipped to five trips were slaughtered. they never had a chance. there were slaughtered the important thing to remember, that is an example of these aggressiveness and combativeness. on the west wing of the army late that afternoon. james longstreet. there were discussing this. lee had decided to cancel the attack if there were going to make an attack. they were preparing for an attack. lee decided that he was going to cancel. two things happened, two messages came. one said that the federal army was in retreat. well, lee had been trying to catch them for a week. secondly, the armed raid, his brigade had made an advanced degree these two messages daintily we have an opportunity to be
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that federal's are scurrying away. as we would say, he wants to destroy their armies. unfortunately both pieces of information were wrong. is that heavily ordering a massive assault, he was drawn into it by a false information. the result was murdered. the next campaign i say in my book, and not just saying it. i think both run and manassas degree in fact, it is really the second manassas. if you go to the park is manassas battlefield. grizzlies masterpiece. combined a strategic or operational offensive around john pope. they assumed the tax bill defensive until august the 30th. then it would counterattack.
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they came very close to destroying the army of virginia. then you go down there. henry house will. down below it is a stone house. it is where the work turned. if they were to capture that pubs army would have been scattered all over. he would have been forced to surrender. they came close but never did. from the seven days at the beginning of july until the end of august some of this army to all parts of it came together. this is a different army. the communication was much better. jackson had gotten out of would never have bothered him or costa and to have a subpar conformance during the seven days. he was the one that executed the flag marched. forestry is clearly becoming a solid wing commander.
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but he and jackson. in that sense it is in many ways the masterpiece even the chancellorsville is considered the greatest battle. if you want to look at the end what he hoped. in a lot of mind. and i know wind. i imagine all of you have been to gettysburg. you walked out of there from the virginia monument. alexander's guns. you look across that line. how could he do this, or his army across this ground? you know, is he that combative? and so we have this image. but actually have to look more closely at these campaigns, he preferred maneuvering to give him a situation that was very favorable tactically on the battlefield to an army.
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he used it in seven days. his use it and second manassas. but after that he is sitting in northern virginia. he is looking around and he feels he has to take the war across the potomac into maryland the difficulty with that is he is looking at an army that the men are physically just worn out. they have gone many miles. they're going to fall. what is interesting, we know from research of others, probably his army at that time numbered in the neighborhood of 70 to 75,000 as it sat there just south of the potomac river. he had to inform davis of this. he wrote to davis to ask
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permission. davis is going to grant it. davis in that year, there were discussions within the administration, how can we take the war not into maryland and pennsylvania. they wanted to expand the borders of the confederacy. soberly across that river he is going to risk a great deal. straggly becomes epidemic. they probably lost, and it's hard to estimate. we know thousands of them could not cross the river because there were just physically exhausted or build. more than likely anywhere from 25,000 to 30,000 confederates during a campaign that is going to last two weeks are going to abandon the ranks. they're going to head back into virginia. i know the second virginia which
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is the stonewall brigade, they will go with jackson's demand to capture harpers ferry. then there were ordered back across the potomac to go to sharpsburg. they decided they had been to maryland and see enough. they weren't going back. they don't come back. they're doing duty south of the river. you ticket numbers. we all want to have them. recently this. how many federal assault on the field and antietam? the consensus is probably about 40,000. i've gone through some of the records and other fellows have to. bin federal regimen folks before the battle, not after the battle, before the battle lasted 15 man , 25 men. these are regiments of a thousand in the ranks and 61.
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when you look at 50 men, a battalion, not a full regimen, but of italian. i believe that is the south carolina union. what happens, of course. lee is going to be criticized. why did you fight there? these explanation was it was better to fight a battle in maryland than to leave without a battle. if you go to sharpsburg in the visit that battlefield, and it is a wonderful place in the sense of it, i think gettysburg is a great place to go. sharpsburg is a wonderful jewel of there. you know, there is not a motel in town, not the mcdonald's. it is hardly changed. if you want to stay overnight to have to go back up be read it is a small battle field and a sense. it stands, you know, the potomac
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river is 3 miles. how do you -- had he lost his army faced possible destruction. okay. what if c-span2? well, if he won he wasn't going to hurt the army of the potomac that much. antietam creek will divide you. he cannot pursue them. he is not going to tear into the rear of the army of the potomac as it crosses the south mountain. so what lee asked his men to do as one confederate officer said is probably the greatest testimony. i think it is the greatest day in the history of the army for its rank-and-file. sacrifice, folks, measured the hours of minutes at sharpsburg for the confederates. there is an north carolina soldier who john in his diary, my god, when will the sun go down? the sun seemed to hang in this guide.
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from the opening attacks, and we know the place, when that fighting was over their were 8,000 men on the ground in esquire mile. it would shift to what we call bloodline. the yankees would break through bloody lane. two is in the front? james longstreet's maintenance. d. h. hill, major-general rounding up 200 men that he could find. this is the center of the army of northern virginia at that moment, and they are going to counterattack with 200 men. this is how close it came. then you have the collapse. once burnside gets rolling. the only thing that saves lee's army is the hills division. what he asked his men to do is simply remarkable. they did it. and you know what is also interesting, as the battles shifted from the north and
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through the center into bloodline midafternoon, and jackson's men, was left of them are hanging on in the west woods and around the church and so forth tamales sends a request to jackson to have chips toward conducting reconnaissance a round the flank of the army of the potomac to see if he can counterattack. they are hanging on by a thread. lee is looking to see whether they can counterattack. the boldness of that very idea is astonishing. it really is. of course, as we know, it's the bloodiest day in american history. lee would say later, amid himself that what he asked his army to do was probably the greatest. i would almost agree with that. and they saved him. of course lee was all over the field. jackson was superb. so was longstreet.
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subordinate commanders. the phrase many of you remember. john cedrics division. many of them came from pennsylvania. they're going to charge into the west with. there would lose 2200 men in 20 minutes. he didn't bother putting skirmishes out. they just plus ten. this is the level of fighting. in the aftermath of that we would establish. congress would approve course. long street and jackson became the two core commanders. it is lee who will promote james longstreet ahead of stonewall jackson. so if we would have fallen in battle battle -- he would have a sense temporary command of the army, not someone jackson. you know, there are two
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different men entirely. jackson, i have always been amazed at how unmanned kit imposes will not only on his men but upon his enemy. jackson did that. i remember in april of 62 he wrote to his wife that he wanted to create the army of the living god. a whole bunch of centers following the living down idea. all of them left the range. but there is jackson. he told the vmi cadets as they are leaving when virginia seceded. he said in the civil war when you take the sword you and said -- unsheathe the sword. from the moment stonewall jackson became a confederate officer he had unsheathe the sword. he would throughout. james longstreet is a different man. james longstreet was probably
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the best tactician in the army. longstreet was much more careful in the expenditure of things. could longstreet have done the 1862 campaign? i don't think so. jackson knew the region, but secondly what it took to be jackson would push men and pressmen and punishment. lee says jackson around because jackson can push men be really understood it. when you wanted to defend a position or you wanted to launch a counter-attack he didn't give it to jack. that is where long street excelled. of won't talk much about fredericksburg. the it is a terrible, terrible day for the army of the potomac. you think about it. the resonance and brigades
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charge of toward the stonewall. the cannon fodder and gunpowder is so heavy, so heavy the dead men removing because the boats a striking him with such frequency that they're actually making their bodies moved as more and more union soldiers are going up the slope. if there is ever a place where the army of the potomac prove the courage of itself it was at the front of the stonewall in fredericksburg. during the winter of 1863 lee would be plagued with what are you believe would be a worsening condition that goes on. everything you need. he had that calvary in units. it's only going to get worse. sixty-three is a precursor of the difficulties. lee was an excellent administrator. he lifted his confederate
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career, most of his time is spent trying to hold the army together. probably in some sense like george washington. i mean, as ceo trying to make sure that we have food and things like that. he hated paperwork. the staff behind his back called in the tycoon. qaeda we have this image. was in rows dauphin. when he was roused he had a foul temper. some of the staff would complain how they just wished they could come down and things like that. what did he say about chances of? well, clearly he is of numbered. by the way, joe hooker executed what pour alexander would say would be the finest movement against them during the war. now, i don't know if that is for sure when grant manages to cross
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the brilliance of the maneuver. nevertheless he had leacock between two wings of his army. what does lead to? he has to calculate which one is a real one in which one is that fake. he decides the real and is up river. he advises his army already outnumbered two to one and since jackson against tucker. the critical day in some ways is may 1st. puckers army is coming out of the wilderness, the wing of the army. they run into jackson. hooker will order them back into the wilderness. that negated the artillery. he didn't have calvary. the best thing about the army of the atomic relative to of the confederates was their artillery. mom and under a superb officer. but that was negated with this bella ground that they chose.
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they were able to execute the famous flag march against the army of the potomac and the afternoon of may 2nd day assault down plank road and collapse the 11th court. the old battle is changed. may 3rd again if you look at may 3rd a chance of oil it was a bloody, bloody slugfest. jackson had been wounded the night before. his good friend in the army. replaced him. lee had to unite the wings of his army. he had to attack there. i'm trying to make a point of this. circumstances telethat he has to attack. he has to unite the wings of his army. if hooker figures out that there is a big gap there he can file through and possibly crushed some segments of the army. they will.
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and that is the day their release sealed it more less who would win at chances will. ultimately joe hooker would order a retirement and retreat. as many say this is his greatest victory. when he heard the news about chances will hero what a glorious army. port choices for a title. this seemed like a glorious army the texan civilian description of lee's army which i think is a prescription. what lee does not know after chances will and is critical to understanding of what will transpire he does not know that he had defeated the commander of the army of the potomac, meaning joe hooker. he had not defeated the
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rank-and-file. many of the corps commanders. george b. n. john reynolds were on the verge of discussing the fact whether there would disobey hooker's order and not retreat across the river. tucker had to send them. you will cross the river. that is how much dissension was in the army. the rank-and-file was a different story. there is no way that we could know that. and after it chancellorsville if you start to read all these things that the confederate deriding they essentially say, i'll carry. or ever the army of the potomac is we would go meet them. by the time they reach gettysburg they believe they were invincible.
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they had every right to believe that. why did the go to pennsylvania? well, charles marshall quoting him, marshall would say that from a time lee took command and to link all these campaigns together, they all went together. in other words, this idea of carrying the wore north whenever, part of leaves alternate plan. davis was looking in '62 and talking about the possibility that he may go into pennsylvania. so until the year was an opportunity to finally do this. also i think you can in some ways argue that this is the best army he commanded an a given point. jackson is dead. i understand that. you can't replace jackson. that is going to show.
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don't ask me. police. i don't know. there are other commanders that he cannot replace. if you look at our immense and the things that kaelin said, from when you read the records and diaries, very little straggling in pennsylvania which had been a curse. that is what we called it, the curse of the army. leave the roads in enjoy the valley farms. they're going to be back again. there's a difference. if you got an raid a farmhouse where the smokehouse, raid that, but come back to camp that night, you're with the army. you're not straggling but having a good time. a very good time in
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pennsylvania. as we would much north he would write to davis. a sense the time it come. it looks like we have a chance. vicksburg had not settled yet. grant had tried and assault there and was bloodied. this was our chance. maybe hit them again on free soil, when the victory that would bring the lincoln administration to negotiation table. davis was so taken by the idea in a sense, but he formed at reman commission that would negotiate with the lincoln government upon a confederate victory in pennsylvania. so when we went north he went north to settle. now, if you read his report you will get a different interpretation of that. it is almost like i'm taking the
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boys into pennsylvania. we are planning to spend a few times there on a holiday and then come home. we won't fight a general battle. he didn't. the folks, he was looking for the army of the potomac in pennsylvania because he was hoping that they would have to march after him and be strong and he could hit them. he did not want that fight on july 1st. and part of the reasons -- and i know. he failed in his campaign. some will argue, no. stewart has orders to do what he did, but i mean where you failed was his misjudgment, serious misjudgment. it left lee in many ways blind to what was and is front. and so on the morning of july 1st 1863 police crossed the south mountain and here's the rumble of artillery he is
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upset because he had issued orders not to bring. the new that the rules were in the area. in new heard the word and how many. then, of course, on that day is one of the rare moments in the history of the army. they were able to bring together more men on the battlefield than the yankees had. i think at one point he argued about 28000-22. as you may know, they swept the first and 11th core of the field and some of the town. so lee had won another signal victory. everything he had asked the men to do they did again. he would turn his worst south and ride toward the present a seminary. he said that he saw that lee was engaged.
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he takes some time, got his field glasses out, looked across the open ground. back then you could see cemetery hill and this other help to the rear. he concluded that was pretty good ground to fight the defensive. so when he met lee 15 are 20 manslaughter once reset and on general, and i'm paraphrasing, we have and where we want him. all we need to do is move south. he maintained are 12 miles. find good ground, find a defensive and make the yankees attack. and you can argue that he was right about that. if you just jump ahead the first time in the history of the army of northern virginia where the hell the battlefield and were driven from a was april 2nd 18651 week before.
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so if they are going to defend the ground chances are pretty good that the yankees are not going to drive them from that ground. we elected him and said, no. and again, paraphrasing. if they are there to marron going to attack them. if they are there tomorrow it's a good reason why we shouldn't. that is arguably the most serious controversy of gettysburg. long street believed that at this point in the war we are wasting too many men's lives and have to fight on the defensive. he had a sound argument in that sense. we had no way of knowing, but you would send -- and again, just based on some kind of gas, wherever you want to say. if the confederates had held seminaries and waited for the yankees to see what he was going to do you almost have to think he's going to attack. can you imagine the reaction in the white house if george mead said the telegram to the white -- president saying these army
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as a mile away and i'm watching them. i don't think. back to me was thinking about it. if he doesn't attack on july 3rd that he may have to assume the offensive. i can't give you a definitive answer on take charge. i can do what lee said. he said i probably ask more of the men then they could deliver. i think that is right. to think that he had to believe that they could take that position. if he did not believe that they could take cemetery ridge on july 3rd after what they had done july 2nd, coming very close on july 2nd. it was a different army. as one in surgeon was a letter, we are an army of lines
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commanded by jackasses. fewer jackasses at gettysburg and there were prior to that. they got the leaders. it is the sense of invincibility. it is the sense that whenever i have asked these men to do they have done for me. one thing you cannot calculate. you write about the army of northern virginia. maybe it's just me or whatever. how you calculate the fighting spirit of these men? you can't measure it. it's there. there was something about the confederate infantry. others would right. logic would say later, i knew our men would be good soldiers. others would say, but there were different. they had this spirit that just, you know, you look at what they do. you say where is it? it comes from within. well, on the other hand unfairly
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i think, we look at the army of the potomac. oh, they don't measure up. those boys measure up. you know, but they warned commanded by law street in jackson. mcclellan, hope, burnside, and tucker and a few other losses. so it is also. but on that day as that confederate infantry, we must have believed they could do it because he always had. when they step up their end up there on better is a guy he went in the west woods that i told you about, those of the fellows letting an end. as opposed to step and sat in fredericksburg, fredericksburg. one of them shot, come to death. they're waiting. they held because there were lines. lee had underestimated that. he had misjudged his opponent. and so have many in the
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confederate army. these boys the coming gettysburg, the boys in blue, gettysburg becomes a redemption for them. but if you look at gettysburg, it is probably the combination of what we've had planned to do from the time he took command. when he took command and they move out in seven days, as i told you, the war in the east changed. they redirected the war. i think they gave the confederacy and lee's strategy the only chance at winning the war. so, if you well, i think figuratively and literally the army of northern virginia was reborn on the sabbath day in june 1862. thank you. [applause] [applause]
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>> well, mr. jeffry wert will take questions. anyone who would like to ask a question step up to the microphone. we have great gentleman here. okay, sir. >> this has been perhaps the most dramatic and interesting and comprehensive discussion of the civil war. thank you. i also want to make a suggestion that in the future we have a screen showing good geographic relationship of all the towns you mentioned. it would really complete our vision of what your saying. you said a greatness. thank you. >> very kind. the reason i stopped there is i am probably a computer 88. everybody asks me.
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power point. i'm thinking power point. actually, just as a confessional i ride my books on legal pads from note cards with cheapens because i have all wife who is a wonderful secretary. she types everything into the computer for me and then says, you know, this is stupid, which i think she enjoyed. but your point is well taken. i agree with you. i am too old an honorary degree of think about it. thank you. very kind words, and i appreciate that. >> high. i am the assistant director at the lehigh valley heritage museum. i wanted thank you for being here today. i have a question. what do you say about people of scholars and laypeople who consider lee a trader the best
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thing would be to have executed him. what your thoughts on that? >> i saw a line in the loss in tempos. one of our columnists wrote that. he did not understand why lee was so praise in america because he was a traitor. every confederate arguably if you will fully understanding what they did where traders. but the finer moment in our history are moments in a sense of forgiveness. lincoln saw that. johnson would do it for different reasons. remember, harry truman does it after world war ii if there were
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in a sense, if you want to look at the conference of the constitution. we were a country created by traders. they were in a line of traders. and to then they warrant. there were just following in the revolutionary father's footsteps. that is why i, you know, to have executed the and everybody else, you know, they finally abandoned the idea of getting davis to trial after imprisoning him for two years are so. but the men who fought against them, if you looked at them, that is what they couldn't understand. they couldn't understand, how can you seveners risk this country? this is like no place on earth.
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they bought into american exceptional as an. they really did. when a guy from wisconsin says i'm from the best country ever created, they got it. so in a sense technically, i guess, constitutionalism not a lawyer there were. but what lincoln did would have done certainly already planning this. then johnson would. the best thing to do is heal this terrible wound and go on and let these men go away. that is arguably almost destroying the country. we got to go from that. >> excuse me again. how do you compare the mentality of the confederacy as a revolution, very much the same where we're seeing in the middle
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east. people are striving for identity and recognition. can you interpret that in the confederacy? >> i don't think so. there is a real argument to be made that this is a top-down revolution in the confederacy. if you want to call it a revolution, this is led by the class of politicians. would you are seeing in the middle east is not wealthy. i don't think there are very wealthy and established arabs in the streets. i think they're trying to cling to it. they owe their existence to people like khaddafi. again, i don't really know for certain. but in fact northerner's saw it in those terms at the time. this is slaveholders pulling their people into a war. you know. there are the ones who are blamed for these leading
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slaveholders, politicians. so i think it's different. and in many ways, too, the american revolution was actually led by men who had a lot to lose it is an unusual revolution in that sense. as you point out, the people who have nothing to lose, they want to gain something. a revolution was led by men who had a lot to lose. in that sense it is different one. >> the battle of gettysburg, was it really all these fault? did the commanders under the really let him down? for instance, i guess the attack didn't take place when it was supposed to be read the unsalaried bombardment was of schedule. nothing seemed to be scheduled right. finally long streak finally agreed to the attack the calvary
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commander bill around and come back he was really being -- equipped men had men they're trained to take over the canyons and everything else. they really let him down by not getting through so really they had between the mall strip lead of his plan. is that possible? >> i can answer that in a number of ways. first of all, one of the favorite sports of historians and civil war stories, the ten reasons for the confederates to have lost at gettysburg. what all this is interesting to me is number 12, the union army. they never make the top ten.
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probably in the top three. anyhow, with that said, longstreet made a critical mistake on the night of july 2nd and 3rd. lee wanted to get on the field at dawn. they were going to attack in the same area as july 2nd, the we field, you know, up through the tortured into the southern part of it. wall street does not send out the order. he comes out with a lame excuse. so the picket charts that you know and we all know was, yes, indeed, cobbled together by lee, put together because his original plan would be to attack there at dawn and renew the gasol that told harbor. so, yes. we had to change that. during the morning he would put together what we know as longstreet's assault.
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a friend. i wrote a book. i looked and looked like everybody else. you know i cannot find that piece of paper and says jenny answered is supposed to attack the rear of the union army gettysburg. at the service and out there to protect the flank possibly. it's unclear. with stuart said in his report, on the instructions of the commanding general, that is on recess. well, we assume you were instructed. he doesn't tell us. so what i'm telling you, this idea that he was supposed tonight into the rear of the army has no paper trail to say that's the case. supply line. he was out there. i think part of it would have
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been, we don't think we met with stuart. we know he doesn't. if he met with any court commander it would have been held. he certainly doesn't meet with you or longstreet. probably didn't even meet with hill. no evidence that i could find that he met with stuart. whenever instructions stored received argon. that's all long street, lee would say that night that he could not understand why more men were not put into his assault. longstreet had command of andersen's division. he says tuber dates forward with that. he was ready to move forward. he canceled the order. if you read their men's choirs and diaries they wanted to go up for the fact that he didn't send them.
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every army as a human endeavor. they could not be in the field. that burden rests with james longstreet. >> the end of day one and a two on the left wing of the confederate army. we advocated a story there and gave up a great opportunity both days of primarily day to. he was sort of, don't you think? >> a very good question. the other controversy of gettysburg, the seizure of richard you'll recently


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