conkling tightly controlled patronage within the state and he expected complete and unquestioning loyalty. in fact, his apartment in new york was known more peered conkling was enraged when his candidate, former president granted him get the nomination, but he was apoplectic when he realized he couldn't control garfield. to conkling committee attempt to garfield place was his ticket back into power. >> coming up next, booktv presents "after words," an hour-long conversation where we invite guest poster and a few others. this week, former u.s. secretary of state, henry kissinger and his new book, "on china," the
diplomat who accompanied president nixon to the communist nation presents his thoughts on the history of china's relationship the united states and current influence on politics and monetary policy. he shares a fox news contributor , monica crowley. >> dr. kissinger, great to see you, sir. >> guest: always good to see you. >> host: congratulations on your new book called quite simply, "on china." i can't think of anyone else had rather talk to about china. china has come over the last two decades from a very important concern for the united states to an important, urgent and primary concern for the united states. there are so many layers to defend the american relationship to relocate into with you. thank you for being here. if we can without china sees itself and how it is traditionally seen itself.
others make you wait for your book, he writes about the united states and china believe they represent unique values in the world can you say the united states believes that's not the case to spread its values to every part of the world were as china acts on the basis of this singularity knots expanded through what you call coulter off buses. tell us what you mean. >> the american believes that its values apply everywhere. in any society cannot stop them, that our institutions can be spread everywhere. the chinese believe that they represent the unique civilization. you can't really become chinese. you have to corrupt in its cultural environment. you can't really naturalize out the chinese. so as a result, americans have
thought of the world is composed of more or less equal societies and had the concept of sovereignty to go with it. the chinese until the end of the 19th century thought of the world and its tributaries to what they call the celestial empire. tributaries didn't mean that they have to pay tribute. they had to bury -- he was expected to bring symbolic gifts. but they often give baker case in the term, but it did mean that they indicated restart for the nature of chinese society in cheney's supremacy in its reach. so chinese pollution interest are based more on mutual respect than on a concept of equality.
but the chinese as we do believe that our values are unique and it makes them even more sensitive than we would be to outside pressures telling them how to redo their self pity. >> is a superiority? to the chinese and you say -- is not necessarily a good to their superiority. >> you also write them in europe entered the modern age come in a tremendous with diversity by then in u.s. cities across europe to cover themselves and you have an entire political philosophy built on this concept that's liberalization, right-click you also say when china entered the modern age it has been a fully fund should name imperial bureaucracy for over a thousand years.
tell us what you mean about imperial bureaucracy. modern china 2000 years ago and when china was unified. and that it was covered a bureaucracy collected by competitive examinations. so in that sense, it was more modern in europe was at that. but china had a governing philosophy, which was confucianism and a governing bureaucracy, which operated a national pages and therefore occasionally china was conquered by its neighbors. but they didn't know how to cover it and they need of the chinese bureaucracy.
so on at least two occasions in chinese history, foreigners came in the crocker the country, used chinese bureaucracy to cover and it mbk signified themselves. this is china was sometimes the opposite of left and right, not by conquest, but i've been conquered and then satisfying the conquerors. mongols than one occasion in the manchus from the north. >> host: a much more efficient way, isn't it? you also say that because china was never forced to an age with larger civilization in the world, it remained basically insular. but because of that, it also considered itself the center of the world. does that still hold true?
test code in a way, it still hold true when nixon and i went to china. the combat of mao and revolutionary leaders in china still was subconsciously influenced by the chinese patterns. for example, you never had an appointment with mao. he responded to see mao. and i was also the same as any foreign envoy. there is a british at the end of the 18th century, the british sent in on roy to beijing and he was supposed to offer them trade and diplomatic relations and everything europeans who are familiar with. he was marseille received but he could get an audience for the emperor. and it took him three months
before he was simon, mesa you have nothing we want and you have nothing we should want. therefore, trade is not possible. for anyone who lives in beijing has to wear chinese clothes, live in a chinese house and can never leave china. so your question is, do they still think this way? of course not. it's exactly this way. and with globalization of the economy and daily contact. but there's still a tendency to sink and central came down terms though it's much attenuated in the mother being.
>> host: you mention the father of the chinese communist revolution. you knew him or worked with them? >> guest: >> guest: i met him five times. post a what were your impressions of him both as a strategic leader and as a movement leader? >> guest: first as a movement leader, one has to understand that the tens of millions of people who were killed and the reason for that was in part because he wanted to complete the communist revolution in atlanta. he knew in chinese history deleter you respected most with an upper unified china. and in 20 years after his death, all the best features of its brew had disappeared except the
unification. so he, for example, organized what was called the greatly forward and reached china was supposed to move your economic development to the steel production at the level of creeper in it for years. in order to do that dedicate resources from the country and they melted down and steel implement. the result was a famine in which as many as 40 million people may have been killed and 10 years later he started the cultural revolution, which was -- produced another huge casualties of the movement leader crom he was enormous cruelties and disasters literally.
at the same time as ruler of china, he had to maneuver china among a whole host of other countries in the china that was poorer, underdeveloped, not very strong militarily had just emerged from a century and a half of colonial depredation. so i'm not strategic level, he was great leader. he had an enormous scale strategic intelligence. and he maneuvered china. of course the only major communist country that survived because he managed to switch from the communist side to the winning side in the cold war without missing a beat. so from that point of view as a
strategic analyst, which is how we got to know him first, he had extraordinary abilities as you would expect from somebody who started and unified a huge society for a decade-long civil war. one cannot forget it the suffering he caused. >> host: you mentioning that a total of five times, three times a little one-on-one. what were your impressions on him as a man? >> guest: it was never totally one-on-one, but i was the principal. mao in that context i didn't have to do with him on a different level. i think it's great how these meetings can about. as i said, you were summoned.
so your chinese escorts for takeoff almost always in chinese cars to where he lived. he undoubtedly had many places where you lived. they showed foreigners a soviet style guesthouse. eventually it was none of the majesty of european powers. the first time i saw him anteroom had a ping-pong table and it. and he received one in the study in which books are scattered all over the place. he was sitting in the middle of a semicircle. he had a very satanic manner. he did not come as almost every
leaker by now and have met over the years, mostly with they have 5.20. and here are my five-point. mao wouldn't do this. mao would begin his conversation. what is your consideration of -- and then he would pose an issue. then he would say whatever you wanted to say and then he would say, but have you considered the following is an every once in a while he was a down again. at one point we were discussing the co-op -- the contribution europe could make to the common defense. and he said they remain as
swallows who fly into the air in an approaching storm and flattery country flap their wings. but you and i know the flapping of the wayne does not affect the coming of the storm. so he achieved in that trend to things. one, he gave me equal status with, sort of a philosophy. and then he added that if our living up to and this is how he would cannot be conversation. sometimes he would get appointed, but usually in an enduring way, the very forceful when he spoke e-mail tashi
vibrated physical -- almost dominance. the last two times i saw him he had great difficulty speaking and he had to croak out his songs and china being atoned language, the interpreters had to hold up what they understood him to say before they could interpret it. but even then he conducted a meeting of over two hours without his physical disabilities. so he obviously was a formidable person. >> host: let's talk about 1972 and that traumatic diplomatic breakthrough connector by u.n. president nixon of course. it is interesting because president exton told me in the 1990s at the thing that brought the two of you together,
china and the united states was a major strategic turn over the growing soviet power in the chinese sent across the border and accelerated nuclear buildup very concerned and they approach the united states. you approach them and came together for strategic reasons. could you describe strategic dynamics at the time that allowed the triangular diplomacy with president nixon returned to develop client >> guest: as you say, we saw the growth of soviet power. and the soviet union in the space of 10 years had occupied hungary and subjugated poland at the time and it occupied czechoslovakia. now in the summer of 69 at the beginning of buildup along with chinese borders and the interiors of military clashes, the surrey neighbor between the
two sides and we were sort of watching. and then the soviets made a mistake that accelerated our considerations. the mistake was that they sent their ambassador to greece has periodically about clashes with the chinese. they did that probably because we were considering attacking china and they wanted to prove that they had a good reason for doing. it had to practically think that i created a map for next to -- to mix and head for being the stuff to look at. and then we called and asked her if there incidents in these places, what would that suggest to you all ask who's the attacker? and the experts said well the
soviets are close to supply points. and therefore it's unlikely that the chinese wanted to attack would do it in such a pasture. then we picked up a few other signals. and then mix that made of the unannounced but important and most import decisions, which was as we discussed assuming there's a war, what position does the united states paid? and we concluded that it was against the american ranchers at china defeated even though we have no contact with them. and so, we decided pincay civil
war we would be technically neutral. but north china try to give it as much ability to survive as the country. no we didn't communicate that to the chinese because we had no way of communicating with him. but will retain two is to step up statements that we would not be different to such a war and we had direct or homes for the cia's speech was to political science associations, something we knew would lead in a low-key way he made a point and the deputy secretary of state. and then we energetically begin looking for channels into china at the same time to read a
number of little things. for example in retrospect it looks very miniscule. chinese -- no american could find chinese experts anywhere. and they relived root is turned is that as a tourist you could buy $100 worth of chinese goods. the chinese in turn release some people that had strayed into chinese waters and the occupants anyway had been captured. so we have the signals. but we found it hard to do a separate contact because, for example, we sent some messages to romania or rather retold the
romanian. nixon had been in romania. and the romanians had been the most independent of the european communist countries. so we thought they might have most credibility in beijing. the problem was that the chinese communists didn't just anti-communist. so they were going to prepare specific to romania. but finally on the trip around the world mcclintock to the pakistan president not established a contact which we been used. >> host: let me ask you about the media pack tribe to which you are doing the opening to china, which was the vietnam war. he talked about strategic dynamics between the united
states and the soviet union which is growing in strategic terms china. talk a little bit if you do that you expect to appeal to need to china to affect the war in china country in vietnam. >> guest: nixon didn't start the war in vietnam. nixon inherited the war in vietnam. when nixon and if there were 540,000 american troops in vietnam and we had just come through a major attack by the vietnamese and we have it's in the streets in this country against the war in vietnam. at the same time we were the country on which the security of almost every regional world
depend had. and nixon felt that even though he not meet the original commit the company would not abandon the people who and reliance on american purposes had staked their future on cooperating with us. so nixon decided to withdraw from the, but to do it in a way by which the people of south vietnam would be given the opportunity to develop to choose their own states. the one condition he would not meet this to turn over the vietnamese population to the communists. he wanted a pre-political process. when people say we could've ended the war were quickly, they never tell you how because if you look at the record of negotiations you'll see every see every there can -- and we were going to make that except
the vietnamese approach to negotiation with us was to try to break out. i would periodical independence to negotiate on behalf of nixon that the united states. their strategy was to help us by opening to china we had the following benefits. he changed the debate showed that nixon who had been vilified as being opposed to peace in vietnam have actually a large almost grandiose conception which included the whole world. so at the same time it isolated
the vietnamese because it meant to release the most nearby ally was willing to deal with the united states without informing them and to some extent to their disadvantage because it interrupted the psychological reason they thought they had established. so that was an important aspect. >> host: any national security and foreign policy calculus there's always american domestic opinion, which in a great leader knows how to change, how to persuade come out of moves. >> host: sometimes decanted sometimes you can't. >> host: when you think about the opening to china with the soviet union which you conducted as well, with a part of a strategy to signal to the american that why we were fighting this war and vietnam
that this administration was seeking longer-term pieces for china? a >> guest: it was not done as a political maneuver. it was done because he believed it be that and we believed it to be right. it had the events of telling the american people not to be its last with events in one part of the world that we have inherited retract it. and to look at the overall design, which put china, soviet union, europe into a pattern that could be grasped in time that public opinion. >> host: taiwan. the united states and china still have widely divergent views about taiwan. how did president nixon move past that?
>> guest: for 20 years to negotiation between china and the united states took the course. the chinese negotiator at the spokesperson would say we won't do anything else until you turn taiwan over to us. what returned my dad ended. the american negotiator would say, we won't do anything else until you give us a pledge of peaceful attitudes towards power. so there is an absolute deadlock. so even before i got to beijing and in their first communication to us, the chinese invited us in order to discuss the turnover of taiwan to china, we replied that we were willing to talk about the issue of taiwan, but only in
relation to other issues of asia and the world. the chinese expected that this is a huge conception before we ever got there. but then one has to to remember that united states and president roosevelt and its declaration of 1943 had declared that the united states considered taiwan to be a part of china. so the fact that taiwan belong to china have never been revoked by any american president. the only condition accepted with the american president was to take over when the union should be peaceful. so we got around this problem by
signing a communiqué in which each site stated its own views. we sit in our views that the chinese keep on both sides of the taiwan straits assume there's only one china. the united states does not challenge the proposition that. so that was the way of accepting one china. we still did not recognize beijing as the government of china, so nixon was in the convent of the country that he could recognize as the capital of the country. so if you look at the 40 years that have happened since then,
both in norway have announced the taiwan problem on the theory of three principles, that the united states except the principal on china, that the united states strongly insists are refused the need for a peaceful solution in the united states warrants each side plus the taiwanese not to take precipitate action and to consider that this has been carried out for 40 years is quite novel. not very many cures the retrospect it was a wet nixon went up to and what makes them might have extract debut we didn't hear from native habitat
time. >> host: of course not. the framework you put in place in 1972 has been remarkably durable. >> host: -- >> guest: it is one of the most continuous american foreign policies. >> host: dr. kissinger, stand by. we come back with you to move into more current affairs in the united states relationship with china economically, strategically and in terms of human rights. the cover-up is issues with this new book, "on china" when we come back.
we are returned by secretary of state, dr. henry kissinger who is a masterful new book called "on china." let's talk about more current events, particularly as purely for the united states relationship with china. i remember when i was working for president nixon in the early 1990s company said it's interesting because when kissinger tonight opened relations with china in the 70s it was all about strategic issues which we talk about before the break. he said now in the early 90s it's almost all about economics. i think now the 21st century is a combination of both a strategic and economic. when you look at china's incredibly rapid economic rise, are you sound? are you surprised or at all? >> guest: i am surprised and so would nixon be at the
original group that open to china. would nixon -- when i had been to china before nixon when, nixon invited the french novelist, andrea munro who had been in china to see what we could learn from them and the growth in china to such a desperately poor country that the most important thing you could do for them is to do a kind of a personal plea of economic aid. but he didn't want china to fit with the rest of the world at all. china was so poor at the time that would nixon would there they did not have equipment to connect to us with washington in a way to the president. so we brought in a ground station to the chinese sort
could not be said they did not do it. at any rate, we would have been amazed at the rapid progress taken place, which really could take place until mao had died and the reforming crew came in. >> host: until now he was succeeded by deng xiaoping to which revolutionized the economy because he was under agriculture and reforms had laid the framework for we see today. great? >> guest: ray. he, for mao everything was radiology. he said i don't know whether it's black or gray as long as it catches mice. so anything that were as acceptable and he liberated the energy to the chinese people.
one has to remember the last 2000 years in 1800 of the last 2000 years, china has the largest growth -- grossed about a product of the world. in 1970 cello part because of the fact of colonialism. but the chinese economic growth didn't take place until 30 years ago. in a cow would you describe chinese capitalism? would you describe it as meters capital movement? >> i would describe it as they call it -- what do they call it? market economy -- >> host: chinese characteristics? >> guest: what it is is market
economics, vacated by strategic decisions from distended which helped establish priorities. so far it has worked amazingly at eight to 10% over a 30 year period is an extraordinary achievement. >> host: even in times of global recession. casto of course they can do things that you can't even think of. i was in china in 2008. i talked to the mayor of the city and he said they have and since in city. i asked what he was going to do about it and he said they all call home in the chinese new
year's we will only let a quarter of them come back. so we use the family tradition of taking care of their people as a social security number. but on the purely economic level, it is a combination of market principles and central management. it is not a planned economy. >> host: there is a major point of contention between the united states and beijing over the chinese inoculation of its currency. how is this training a relation ship be dealing with? >> guest: the argument made with the chinese manipulating the currency at a low level, which gives them an advantage in exports and therefore improved
balance of payment with greater economic and financial needs. some of the toughest fit is caused by your own actions. some of kostka chinese action. as long as we are financially profitable as long as me run huge deficits, deficits in her current economy are inevitable because we have two daynard. so we need to look at our own problems first and we do
concurrently. we had chinese take an unfair advantage. defend our interests, but the way it's usually done is to arrange the balance of penalties and rewards the chief has. >> host: it is striking to me that just about every time the chinese leadership meet with the american leadership on this president, secretary of state clinton, secretary baker, they never miss an opportunity to lecture us on the issues of her spending level, tough are dead. it strikes me as ironic via chinese communist lecturing american capitalists. >> host: is an ironic solution. for the greatest part after the opening of the relationship, the chinese basic attitude was they thought some of our political and busy atoms, while there were
various attitudes for a come as some of were immature. that did huge respect for economic competitiveness. and they thought we were on a management from which they could learn a great deal. senate doctors cabinets to learn they consist of an american investment banks and so forth. then in late 2,072,008, they heard the americans didn't know how to run their economy very well. i'm not caused a tremendous loss of prestige, both for us, but also for chinese have been
associated with the reform program in some of the difficulties that follow in which it is claimed that the chinese were too assertive to go back to the period when occurred. >> host: the chinese are biggest foreign creditors. how much of a threat to us is that? >> guest: is a very complicated issue because i'm the one hand you can say if the exploit their position they could make life very difficult for us. at the same time, it has been said a few $100,000 to a bank's problem. if you owe a hundred million to the bank it's their problem. the creditor suffers enormously also there several trillion dollars suddenly became
relatively worthless or as a result of their heritage would be a would be a huge blow to have. we have a mutual suicide pact. >> host: there is a high level of the military who began talking about the united states terms of economic warfare. not military warfare, and economic warfare. how big of a concern should that be for the united states? >> guest: what i see in the book is there's: we are the two most powerful countries in the world. the whole series of issues of new environment proliferation and energy, these are unique problems. they can only be sold on a global basis. second, we have to learn from the european experience when an
arising truth and establish britain had to do with each other and didn't manage to do it and the result was world war i. and i've asked myself that the leaders had been to war in 1914 patent on what the world would look like four years later when the war ended, would they ever have doubted or wouldn't one or the other have made an accommodation? what i say in the book as we order the approach for policy. we got to look for opportunities of a cooperative relationship. at the same time, we will strenuously defend our interests. ..
one point* is is to ideas military pat -- capacity going from defending his country to the capacity to be all over the world to challenge existing institutions? at that point* we are in a period of potential confrontation with in if that is not intended to then it could slide into a confrontation. they certainly are increasing their military capabilities. we have to be sure that we maintain the edge or the balance of the situation before that we should have
it is absolutely central to a we cannot do the same way it was done in europe so that the relationship with europe with the military character japan in united states, the social factors play a huge role. to attract the consequences to show america is committed to the key countries five would not object of those that i had participated as
long as it is not the hegemon no power. >> talk about china's role of nuclear proliferation there is a concern it is worthy with north korea, pakistan the mid to share nuclear technology or venezuela, all enemies of the united states. what do we do to rein in china on the proliferation and area? >> all issues except north korea i think that interest is parallel to our i's. to be interested in the proliferation of nuclear weapons the two countries that cannot have the same technological danger they do not understand the then for
the outburst so i am quite hopeful we can get chinese support. and then the outside forces can tell the country who buy the eight competing globalization will come to the point* as it is a complicated issue because on the one hand it is not in the chinese interest to have nuclear weapons but on the other hand, it is not in their national interest to have north korea collapse to
have such a large entry on its border to have such a capability. so going back and forth of the north korean nuclear issue to make such a decisive move, i think they would be delighted if they went away but they don't want to do what is required to make them go away. so it is their responsibility for the consequences that they themselves have not been active in the nuclear proliferation because it would hurt them more. but north korea has. it is broke into the most repressive countries and the world.
sued the other countries will have to face the issue what happens when a rogue nuclear country continues to operate and that is an issue before us with iran, also in a more complex way with north korea and their needs to be a security concept developed for all asia that other countries can join. >> thank you writes. we should not be all that concern drug goes on internally only concerned with the extra of behavior over the last two decades in
nine states has concerned itself going on insider's guide them. there has been an escalation of dissidents who are out there journalists been detained and religious minorities coming catholics catholics, in so on. what do say to the chinese about their human rights record? >> let me say a word with a term i never use and this to say what jim he is really a german. it is not an american concept although i lived in germany sdn zzzz prosecuted minority to the jewish
school that i had to go there not exactly steadying politics but put that issue aside good to be preteen that all my life, you need equilibrium. the balance of power but at the same time whenever you want to call it with the arrangements for most of the members in most of the people so they don't want to challenge it. it the second deals with
service is one of the rights of the human rights issue. second, what do you do about that? america was founded on the principles of human dignity and human equality. we can not only that renounce these principles with other countries should know how they stand on human rights issue of. the next question is what do you do beyond this? comedy sanctions and to what degree do you assert what
domestic institutions they should have? at that point* it is a difference of opinion almost every american president that through an apology of the engagement, want to move the chinese better than two negative confrontation to evoke all of the memories in which they have always resisted. he adopted a policy of confrontation and after three years of failure whenever i am in china, every president we
are aware, the individual cases, we often speak to the chinese privately so there is no disagreement about human rights of the role of america. buy public demonstrations are diplomacy. >> just a few minutes left. when you look at the geopolitical landscape today end user pay the world, what worries you the most? what is looming out there? >> what worries me a people of every part of the world
the 41 to be very enthusiastic but the key test to the revolution is not the day that they occur but how it is sorted out. of the technical level, the spread of nuclear weapons and if any of them never get used, it is so unbelievable but it would affect in the political system that cannot prevent us. >> host: it has been such a joy to talk to and you are
one of my personal heroes. i have no new 18 years. has been such an honor to get to do you and such a pleasure and it is a pleasure to call you a friend as well as a mentor. >> your work over the years has been tremendous achievements 27 think you. dr. kissinger whose masterful book is called on china. thank you for joining us today.