tv Capital News Today CSPAN December 22, 2011 11:00pm-2:00am EST
if i had one critique of the law, it didn't aim at where the cost of going out of control. i can't -- >> is not what's posed for ipab was supposed to do. >> that i brought her practice? be backed up by go back to that point. >> do you think drugs are too expensive skirmisher tried to seize and see how expensive that is. it's 10% of the budget. if you're been a focus on 10% and are not going to focus on the efficiency of the town system, then you're missing a big opportunity. from my standpoint, after this one is questioned, the most important thing i am famous was
focusing on some of the incentives that create the inefficiencies. >> yes, sir. right here. >> so i would like to talk -- or ask about your r&d and particularly a bunch of things are happening. one, with both genomic samp ergonomics, when you do clinical trials, you can now look at different populations, not just race or age or sex, genotypes and so forth good in many cases you're likely to discover the certain track is very good for a subset, useless for another subset and toxic for it. it's great for you to discover that. it means in theory you can target the drugs to a smaller population, may be charged more. but the ipab and the fta need to
recognize that. i'm curious where you think they are. second, we talked about the doctors and social media and how much by the.tercel. the.tristani to understand that and know more about their impatient. diagnostics are going to be more. diagnostics and gina will be more important. so the whole amount of knowledge required is in fact going to be much greater. how does that happen? and a third thing -- >> how many are there? >> so i believe it was merck that long before you're about to pay 225 million for a drug test in russia that proved to be useless. >> i don't think it was. >> it was that, okay. >> we had around atrocity. >> so the question is in a polite way, how reliable do you think that kind of research is
going to be in china? >> that they start their first question around personalized medicine. that's one of the exciting is happening. as we get more information about the human genome and personalized gene expression, it gives us the opportunity to talk about to really focus not only a broad populations were appropriate, but also in error populations might respond badly to it, to those medicines. i think the fta is very much focused on those kinds of issues. one of the things we can do as an industry and as a society spend more money on the fta said that the resources to stay current in the science. they keep up with basic science so that these changes. that's an exciting thing about her industry frankly because that's the cost of drugs increases and the economic pressure gets greater, it will help us to be able to demonstrate the utility of that
draft, the benefit in a specific population. i see that as an exciting thing in a way to provide value going forward. i think that will only help innovation, not hurt innovation. on the china thing, i would not take one example of a clinical trial that was done in russia and not having it replicated to say there is a problem necessarily in china versus the united states. the fact of the matter is our industry is one where most drug candidates are there and often in smaller trials we can replicate them in larger trials, but we learn about a side effect and a smaller trial. so i would say that what we do when we come to life is tried very hard in our due diligence to ask all the right questions and make sure not wasting our shareholders money to get access to the underlying data and give ourselves the right opportunity to make those judgments. coming back to the main thing, the fact we not diagnostics and
genetic insight into the strokes i think opens up a whole new avenue of valuable drugs intervention in drug innovation. >> question right here. >> lieu crosscut from reuters news. a couple questions on penn state. you mention the investigation. wondering if you could let us know how the investigation is going in about the role of louis freeh and i might speed up growth process. given his ancestor in the investigation may be over? >> add-on up a timetable because we've said if you've got complete free reign to do the right kind of investigation and he's very much early in the stages at the investigation. i would hope that it would be done by the end of this academic year to make a comeback in a new academic year and have all of that behind us. but i can't put a timetable on it. i think judge frees the right
person to do the investigation. i think he's got the scale in the background. all they've heard so far is his getting cooperation from people and so that's a good sign. i'm not in a position, by the way, and i don't want to ask for reporters. he is to out investigations. to the extent they require to get interim reports, they can compromise that investigation and that's not what we think. >> question right here. >> to speed the market of unnecessary delays at at the fta is a firm of the editorials. i wonder how you comment imbalance given the fact it takes so much to bring a new drug to market and at the same time attacked public safety. >> for companies like merck, our goal should be to work constructively with the fda. i think the fda works under very difficult circumstances. i just alluded to the funding that they have, that they are
not challenges from congress and others that we saw the other day, the administration overruling the fta with respect to determination on plan b. i think they thought they had pretty good evidence that this could be used safely. so i'm not a person who knocks the fda. i think it's full of talented people. they are first-rate people who work for government and i think people know they could lead to make a lot more money in the air. so i think we've got terrific people. the challenge we have is to find ways of meeting their needs in a more expeditious way. i think from their standpoint, a little more transparency about what the standards are going to be is what i think would help us because we have to design the clinical trials years in advance. if the evidentiary standard shifts, it's pretty hard to adjust to it. the good thing for me is the
openness back-and-forth in terms of dialogue and transparency, in terms of what quantum of proof are on benefit risk is really going to be necessary to get it approved. >> thanks. i really appreciated your comments on the need for continued innovation in her industry. i love your thoughts when you look at the changes taking place in the health care marketplace, physicians coming together, consolidation. 50% are actually part of corporations. there are more employees of corporate goals and counterterror organizations. do you feel this landscape is more conducive to innovative medicine or is this another way to squeeze costs, take the drugs out? >> bow, i think every industry has to figure out how to compete in the marketplace it has. you don't get to choose your customers. your customers choose you.
and it is very clear that health care generally has been viewed as a pretty inefficient marketplace with a lot of discontinuity. the challenge we have inside merck is to adapt to the environment. i think there is still unmet medical need and people still value innovation. i think the challenge for us is to recognize that the customers out there, let's be clear, our government customers in europe are mostly bankrupt, right? so we have to think about innovation, not just technical innovation, the low-cost innovation will be a big part of our bundle going forward. i know reid and his colleagues are doing the same thing at pfizer, a great company. these companies have to think about running themselves in a way that's sustainable to provide not just benefit from a therapeutic standpoint, benefit from a health economics the
employee. certainly the biggest change occurred since i've been in the industry is the rise rise of health economics. before it was just a physician sitting there making an individualized medical judgment. positions are not necessarily decision-makers anymore because they are people looking at drugs, whereas the managed care provider or nice in the u.k. these are the health technology assessment agencies. they are people who are now trying to ensure that there are evidence-based ways of deciding which drug should be used not just benefit risk, but also cause. i think we can lament taliban. everybody else gets challenge to provide a better service. i mean, if you get a new cell phone, each subsequent money has to be better and in fact cheaper. so i think in many ways her industry has had the luxury of not having to compete on the basis of cost. going back to the questions
allen asked. i am not saying we shouldn't compete on the basis of cost. and seeing the problem is 50 on the customers the government and the government gets to describe the value without regards for an impetus to others, and that's what worries me. >> other questions? and there some here. >> thank you. you mentioned plan b. and i realize this is kevin's issue per se, but do you feel it would have a chilling effect on the industry as a whole? >> i think that's a special circumstance. i think the link to them that in the discussion we started off with respect to the texas governor's executive order. every time you talk about children and sexuality, you are in a space where the political dynamics are going to dominate the signs. i think that is what both of those cases have in common.
and i think that scientists tend to look at it from the dead of to provide young women with actions when they have an unintended the that's a medical problem. but we need to protect young women from the risk of cervical cancer that's a medical problem. but when you move from that sort of public health arena into the political arena, then we know that we have different kinds of considerations and as the president said himself, he thinks that quote, common sense needs to be applied. i guess that implies that science and common sense are not compatible at some level. i'm not so sure about that, but the fact that the matter is it's highly politicized. so i would think it won't have a chilling effect gets most of our drugs are not used in that context. >> here's another question from that table. >> a copper base. i have a question with regard to cost and innovation.
and there is a significant amount of child development financed by the venture capital market and by individuals who are in drug discovery. i'm curious as to whether that's important or demand a mess in terms of burke and development of new drugs. >> it's very important. one of the challenges we have in terms of ensuring that we have the right kind of return on investment is to get the balance right between work we do internally in basic research and what is done externally. so a lot of fantastic work being done by start up companies. many people would argue that big drug companies have to spend less internally and more in terms of the work being done on the outside. so i would say it's not unanimous. it's very important. one of the things we said to investors is merck wants to be a good partner. the fact that the biotech industry is struggling a little now, i think their struggle are a mirror image of our struggle.
we have the resources to take some of these medicines into broad populations. and so, that is the benefit we can provide. if you have the resources and ability to do big clinical trials. you often see a biotech company bring a drug simply because they can't afford to do the large clinical trials. so to me, that kind of partnership is one that will create value for the biotech industry and create value for our industry, but most importantly for patients. >> with one of these you point conversations with by trees and who invented the netscape browser in california earlier this year. and he said that he thought we were talking about bioscience and light has been at the same kind of explosion. he made the argument when it gets to the point that you can put the human genome and some of this data in open databases in the 12 euros and 13 euros and start playing around and innovating the way they do with computer software that that's
when it would explode. do you buy that argument? sort of a more open immigration? >> i think that's the world we're going into. and that ain't bad it has been shown before that more access you have, the more people who are trying to solve a problem so to speak, the better you are in terms of getting that that outcome on the problem. i think that will be beneficial. there's a role for our industry because it takes concentrated amounts of capital to take something from the very beginning stage of discovery all the way through large-scale clinical trials, fda approval and broad commercialization. so i think that frankly i'm excited by what you just said because the more discoveries we actually can validate, the better off the industry will be in terms of the pull through on the other end. >> i think we have time for one or two more questions. >> hi, diane brady from business
week. i want to go back if they don't mind to penn state for once i can't. i know, i care about merck. >> this is so predictable. >> i have two elements. one is i know there's investigates into the actual case, but how do you feel the trustees handled the crisis since you've got a lot of experience with crises? i'd love to get your thoughts on this new venture for exploited children or whatever is being set up a penn state because they think there's some question of whether that's the best use of money. so just your sense baby if you can go back up anything my done differently. >> i think the board of trustees at it rather quickly after the information became public. i'm not going to go back and critique. i remember what it was like, how shocked we were to hear the information when it became public. i think it became public on a saturday evening and i believe we took action with respect to
the president and the head football coach on the evening. and so i think given the fact that we are a large board geographically dispersed, i think we react to it in a fairly quick period of time. i think that we did the best we could with the information we had in the circumstances under which we acted. i'll leave it to others to decide whether or not we did a good job on that point. on the senate for exploited children, i think that's a positive thing. one of the things that is being missed in this tendency, which is an unfortunate aspect of public life in media and the american people is that among the strongest forms of rhetoric in our society is what i like to call the rhetoric of blame. and when these things happen, we spend more time trying to parcel out blame than we do looking at the broadest issue. so the issue here is that too often children are being exploited in our society.
this case arose at penn state. subsequently we had issues with the accused and the aau. we've had the issues and the catholic church. these are not unique to any particular strata of society. i just read in "the new york times" the issue that has occurred in new york with respect to children in the orthodox jewish community. my point is only that it's happening everywhere and it's happening far too much. i think the real disappointment of this thing is that this could've been a moment -- a teaching moment for our society has grown ups. could focus on our role and not looking carefully and not being willing to talk about these things with their children and to expose these things when they happen. so my biggest disappointment in this is that no one is focusing on that. they are acting as though this is a penn state issue because it arose on the penn state campus. i don't think there's any reasonable person who doesn't understand this is a broad
societal issue and really got to be in. i wife and i give thanks every day for children i think we really have to be thinking, what can we as society do to protect our children? >> i think we should add that into the final word to one of our sponsors, peter tallman with ecg. >> thank you very much for a terrific and inspirational talk. i think it met all the expectations that robert said earlier for various type this therapy. and thank you for championing the cause of innovation, which i think it's important to society as a become a senior citizen, hearing positive news about diseases like alzheimer's is pretty important given what i know is happening to my memory. so thank you again. it's a tough challenge of course managing a pharmaceutical company apart from the general leadership challenges. we've heard how complicated by other years in the marketplace.
and so we look forward to following your success as you move forward with your tenure at merck. thank you. so this brings to close the fourth year, a successful year of the viewpoints series. we had the group in "wall street journal" absolutely delighted to be associated with this and look forward to another good year and look forward to seeing you next year. and with that, thanks very much. have a terrific holiday and see you next year. ♪
[inaudible conversations] >> okay, good afternoon and welcome to another carnegie event that we are doing jointly with the american arab institute. we are going to talk today about public opinion on iraq and the arab spring and we are dividing this afternoon session into two sessions. one or two panels. one where we will focus on iraq and look at the views on u.s. intervention in departure. as we all know, yesterday marked beyond of the u.s. military presence in iraq. and the zogby group conducted in september and october looked at the iraqis, but also at people in the region views on the
departure and what it means for iraq. and in this first panel, will have first first jim zogby, founder and president of the american arab institute present the findings of the poll. and then we will have two colleagues and dear friends comment on the findings. at a date, but who i know more closely as the american ambassador to jordan. when i was still in government and we formed a very close relationship and at the carnegie middle east program. we will have a short coffee break after that and then we will start the second panel,
where we look at political change in government in the arab world in general, in six arab countries that were also told by the zogby group. again, jim will present the findings. i will comment on these. came from yesterday on a plane that was diverted his data -- to washington because of a sick person on the plane, so he unfortunately could not be with us today, but perhaps we can skip to comments on defining the gym at present. so with that, i turn the floor over to jen. >> thank you, marwan and thank you all for coming. i want to acknowledge upfront that these these polls were done in september of this year. after they and the forum which
is held annually. the polls.with polls don't approve of social media in arab spring. besides and i am releasing them out. as marwan noted be pulled in iraq six other of countries the united states and iran. in an effort to measure attitudes at this point towards the war itself, its impact toward the ceiling that iraqis and people in the region have about the future and how iraqis and the world. there are three essential observations that pretty much followed through all of the findings. the first and foremost i think is the divergent attitudes we find among the three major iraqi
groups. i mean, we've come to talk about them a lot, but we have some hard numbers to put two the differences in attitudes between kurds on the one side and shiite and sunni arabs on the other. and then there are -- there's a partisan divide that exists here in the united states. it is so deep that sometimes you get the feeling that democrats and republicans are looking at two different wars that took place in two different countries. and finally, the attitudes of the respondents in the arab countries and in there and that both neighbor and are in some proximity to iraq, those attitudes were more negative towards the war and more positive about the future of iraq's post with all prospect and the iraqis themselves. i'm going to start as i began with the iraqi people and their attitude towards a more general
assessment. what you find is overall, i iraqis feel that they are worse off than they were after the war itself. when we asked the question specifically after eight years of work, are you better off or worse off than you were before the war began, 42% were soft on 30% only say better off than 23% say the same. you will notice here the divide as i pointed out, sunni and shia are more kind to say worse off only among the kurds is there a sense that iraq is better off or that their situation is better off than it was before the war began. when you ask in the broader region, you get a much more decisive response in terms of worse off. and jordan and saudi arabia are not going to give all the countries we pulled. those are in the book you have in front of you and results are available if you want to log onto our website or write to the
arab american institute we can send you the whole poll. in jordan in south arabia, the two closest to iraq, almost two thirds say worse off. more than one half, the slightly less concerned than saudis and jordanians. overall in the arab world, about six in 10 say worse off. what can americans. when you split it up, democrats, only 24% think iraq was better off than it was after the war, before the war verse 50% of republicans say iraq was better off. iraqis are better off. this transit when you ask the question was the were birthday? over a 56% of americans say it wasn't worth it to your 75% of democrats say it wasn't worth it, but a plurality of
republicans, 43% say it was in fact worth it. when we ask questions of iraqis as to how the war impact did various impacts of their lives, did it improve their personal safety and security? do to improve education? did it make them for your? did it make them respect the rights of women? in almost every instance the results pretty much track the numbers we have here for effect on personal safety and security. what you see is overall, kurds largely give the were a positive rating in terms of how it impacted their lives, where sunni give it overwhelmingly negative and shia only slightly more positive. but still, a substantial majority negative. among democrats and republican by two to one, republicans seem to always want to find the were having had a positive impact. democrats much less though.
where you see the numbers don't go up to 100 is because there were people who weren't sure. which is itself interesting. some of the instances you'll see the no impact are not sure numbers equal 30, sometimes 35%, which is somewhat surprising after eight and a half years of a highly debated in highly contested war here at home, which took a tremendous told that you have about a third of americans with either no opinion or a sort of ambivalent about what the outcome of the consequences of this word. is the withdrawal positive or negative? decisively americans, republicans and democrats say it was positive. it is positive. it's something i look forward to among iraqis. it is the same. iraqis overall 60% with shia
were highly supportive of withdrawal. sunni and kurds in the majority still sane that it was positive. what emotions do you feel? here, the convergence of attitudes you have between iraqis and americans that it withdraw its positive breaks down when you say, have you feel feel about the withdraw? americans very happy. democrats overwhelmingly happy. republicans on the 60% happy. but iraqis, the plurality worried. worried about the outcome of what will happen now that american forces are the theme. with sunnis, arabs in the majority being worried about the outcome. why are they worried? ask what their concerns are. almost 60% say they are worried about a civil war, where the country being split into parts, worried about terrorism and in almost every instance.
the questions we ask about what are you worried about coming up in the future, almost 60% say the air worried. and that goes across the board between sunni, shia and arabs on the one side and kurds on the other. optimism and pessimism about the next four years. while iraqis are worried, arabs are not. almost an insensitivity or a disconnect between arab attitudes about this war and about higher iraqis themselves are feeling about it. two thirds jourdan, 75% in saudi arabia are optimistic about the next four years in iraq and 60% and a rant. when we ask iraqis to assess other countries, how do they feel about other countries and the role that they may play in
the future? only 24% favorable attitudes, 7% and 63% among kurds. the iranian members, only 2% of sunni and 5% of kurds have a favorable rating towards iran, whereas 41% of shia do. and in turkey, shia 53% favorable rating, 40% among sunnis that only 5% of kurds was a favorable rating towards turkey. uae is one of the few countries that was actually rated positively across the board. saudi arabia had favorable numbers among several other groups, but not across the board, bringing its overall number down to 39. democracy. can a work or want to work? this is almost the definition of being conflicted.
i'd like my country to be a democracy that will work here 21%. on a country to be a democracy, but it won't work here 41%. i don't want my country to be a democracy because it will not work here. meaning that 40 -- i'm sorry, 62% of iraqis would like their country to be a democracy, the 61% of iraqis don't take a democracy will work in their country. attitude towards iraqi leaders. nouri al-maliki, the prime minister has a favorable rating actually only among shia. i'll let allawi has a favorable rating amongst sunni and kurd, if less favorable rating among shia. he is the more popular leader overwrought in terms of rating of all of the people we polled in the country. and it's more a favorite among shia than any other iraqis that
we surveyed and look at very low favorable ratings among sunni and kurd. the issue here of iraqis being conflicted i think comes through. they are being divided also comes through. the fact that americans have sort of a weird, but deep partisan split also comes through. one can't blame the iraqi people for being complete and divided after years of ruthless rule an invasion and occupation and the company name terrorism and ethnic cleansing. while the trappings of democracy have been set up, but democracy is somewhat dysfunctional at that point inside iraqis are deeply worried about the future. happy america is going, worried about what happens now that america goes into quite see their way through to the future. i'll think i'll leave it there and hear what the folks have to
say. >> thank you very much. a couple of surprises here, things they've expect did, but things that many of us did not expect. then they turn it over to skip. skip of course was the american u.s. ambassador to kuwait and such as they think a unique live on these issues. >> thank you, marwan. it's nice to be here today. thank you or image for your presentation. i was intrigued of course by the polls and results than i thought my first reaction was that it does confirm many of the things that we had sensed would be the case and i particularly think of the three demographic groups in iraq, the fact that they were going to have different attitudes about the questions that you ask him a particularly u.s. presence, the kurds are within the american presence is very supportive. and the questions of whether or not we are worse off are better off and particularly concerns
about the future. if i look at where they were better off or worse off, the first of the king to mind was really understandable given what the iraqi people have been through since 2003. i really did like the phrase they choose the dead. i think that really does capture in a correct way that it is sort of at that point in life, where there's still a lot that can happen and a lot of formation that needs to take place. it is easy to forget or to rationalize if you are in iraq each day, the past and to think back on the days of saddam hussein when they could say that violence hardly existed, there were certainly other kinds of violence that generally safe conditions, the schools were,
different things, job security. most people work for the government and most of these things have been turned upside down and so today they see a situation which there's a great deal of uncertainty. it's easy to understand how those% to founder likely to be. but i'll make this prediction for the future because of the human nature. if things improve in iraq and things do get a bit better, you're going to see that compares them to shift and we will see more people in iraq saying we're better off off than we were before. i was impressed, frankly, with the similarity of views between shia and sunni towards what happened hadn't improved. this was on i think you showed it, but when you look at those two communities, political freedom has not improved, education has not improved. health care has not improved.
personal safety security, relations with the neighbors also very negative government. women's rights a little bit better, but have been improved. so it's really only in religious freedom, where they shia see they have a better situation than they did before. but i think that commonality between two communities often at odds with each other is worth taking note. on the question of withdraw, i think it is clear to most observers here know any of the history about iraq but it's not surprising that virtually all communities in iraq support beyond of the u.s. military presence. if you don't say anything at all about the history, even under the monarchy of just after world war ii, when the government then find a renewed agreement with the british, which didn't fact check the immunities involved come in the streets in turmoil.
there was rioting. there is cause for the execution of whoever signed the agreement. the prime minister who did left the country in the middle of the night and never did return. so there's the whole history of iraqi nationalism is very powerful and very potent. and to have thought that we were going to get a continuation of the status of forces agreement is really very simplistic. i say that though with one point of criticism. i think the administration really didn't approach the whole issue of ongoing military presence appropriately or in a way that might have led to a different conclusion. but certainly, given the political fragmentation at the center, we were going to find any political figure to stand up and say we like u.s. forces here and they can have the immunity that they had before. just impossible. worried about the future? absolutely. and i think they have every reason to be.
but i did notice and note the concern about domination by neighboring state and not unhappy as americans see that iran managed to be a there at the front with us in terms of concern by all three communities accidentally over their involvement. kuwait along with -- with iran are not consider countries that are likely to be hopeful to iraq. and i was intrigued by jordan received such high ratings in a very positive way. so i wanted to take a moment and talk about jordan, which was mentioned several places in nepal, but also kuwait, which is not an appalled that i think i can share with you some insights. i just got back a few days ago from there. that 61% see iraq were soft, see
the u.s. 60% is chiefly beneficiary, but also visceral and kind. and say that 92% of jordanians believe that the u.s. made a negative contribution in iraq have deep concerns about the future of iraq. imagine the civil war, terrorism, the foreign neighbor influence. i think all of this is very unsurprising when you realize that the jordanian public at least was very, very heavily against any sort of military intervention by the united states, and made it quite clear prior to 2003 that the ties that jordan has had with the iraq overtime, both economic and this is trade, but also oil, that they received concessionary rates per the port of aqaba, which was so critically important to the iraqis during the iraq iran war, there are these ties in a sense of a president, just on the east and
therefore these concerns that you see the jordanian speak about i think ari can legitimate. they worry about iraq being dominated by iran. it is the sunni issue certainly. they worry about the turmoil and chaos inside iraq with the resulting flow of refugees from the country as they saw in 2003, four, five and six and would see a disruption in the economic trade relationship, which has been pretty much reestablished. so i think those views are quite understandable. kuwait is unique and we have to openly and forthrightly. the kuwaitis i think -- i know the government -- in fact i think it quite clear about populations as well. they would just send stay in iraq as long as they can possibly keep a spare. they are suspicious and they are
certain in their mind that iraq remains a threat, will be a threat. they don't see the historic relationship being so different, that they claim and hope so and are trying so. having a un-american military presence as a security blanket compensated for today is a decision by the u.s. government to continue to the military presence in kuwait itself. that suffices to go part of the way. but they really have little confidence in the way, particularly again this situation and that night and the willingness of legislators in bed dad to use the kuwait situation for their own political ends and i'll add there's kuwaiti pop was politicians were doing the same thing from their days. so let's keep this imbalance. i just have the a few quick thoughts.
poles. these are clearly based on individual attitudes and it's good, i learned a long time ago in my service, their people by their nature can hold very contradict or the feelings inside of us. and we rarely pull ourselves apart, look at ourselves and see a. i think of my time in jordan, but it's been in other countries in the region, where i have passionate attacks on me, not me personally, but i'm united states for what it is, does and doesn't do. and i have to turn that say you have to do something. you may become a really have enough confidence in asking what she said was no good to do something. but then we'll end up having a longer conversation than the type to be about their children in school mistakes and talked to me about medical problems. in other words, it is not unheard of the people inside themselves have very contradictory feelings and emotions and i think it is something always to keep in
mind. the poll of course doesn't cover attitudes of governments. it's not intended to. it's not meant to be a critical remark at all. it simply to say let's don't forget when we look at public opinion. and i do believe public opinion amounts more today painted a couple years ago. government still are the main drivers of foreign policy decisions by government leaders while they will consider the public views are going to still make decisions of the road national interest. and that is going to impact on their relationships, just as we see the saudi's as their reaction to a shia controlled iraq at this point in time. will the u.s. withdraw provoke a debate in the region? it is. it is a debate now. is the u.s. a reliable security partner? are we in fact a diminishing power fading out, can be counted on. we need to find some alternative security arrangements.
and i would just say this. this widespread sort of discussion in the region that the u.s. is a declining power is not true. and i spoken about it in kuwait recently and i'm so another countries. the u.s. commitment and interest we have in the region are going to keep us there. and therefore, we are not likely to be leaving. but the united states government has any awareness task in front of it, which is to convince people that that is the true. this whole idea then of arab governments reaching and looking for alternatives and turkey is always a good example today of being an alternative partner in a security range. the expansion of the gcc military capacity and nicole for a more assertive arab league. and often these are described as actions governments are having to take because they are concerned about the u.s.
commitment. i think that it's wrong, too. in fact, the united states has been pushing these governments to do some of these very things. we are happy to have turkey more engaged in the region. we have won it for 20 years to see the gulf cooperation council have a better security arrangement and capability in the same it be true of the arab league and certainly we were closely cooperative. so i don't see this as a zero-sum game at all. i don't think people in the u.s. government do, but see it as a way of being, frankly, the american partnership in the region and i'll stop there. >> thank you for the regional perspective as well as the u.s. to on the issue. let me ask marina to get her comments. >> thank you very much. i started with something i
didn't mean to talk about, but i want to add something to your last comment about the perception of losing power. i just came back a short time ago from a trip to the gulf and i heard a lot of people are talking a lot about this. my impression is that it is not that they want the u.s. not to have the presidency, but they are afraid the united states is no longer capable of keeping things under control. that seems to mean a discussion of not so much you guys go away as you cannot keep order in this part of the world. it seems to me that's what i've been hearing. i want to make a few comments about what i found the most interest in her most surprising in the polls and then raise the question in light of what has been happening in the last weeks her last few months.
you know, whether these polls still reflect to the present concerns that we would define the situation. of course we can only speculate. that may show you what i found most interesting. the fact that one third of americans rarely have opinion on whether what has been the outcome of this war. first of all, it is obvious they contradiction to the earlier questions that seem to be very clear opinion about whether the war was worth it and so on. but the most important point here is it is a good reminder of how much of it were because the war in iraq really dropped off the rate for most americans
recently. pass the surge, pass initial attack essentially everybody likes to put it out of their mind. and that is why the fact that people are not really sure what they think about the situation now. because if you think about it, there has been discussion of it in the press, and the media. and we read the "washington post" and many times most of us in the major newspapers. i think if you go to small town -- i go away from washington very often on weekends. and many of the local newspapers where i go to not talk about foreign news that is what most people read, the local newspaper. there's not been a word about iraq for a long time. so for a country that was in the very important conflict they think is very, very interesting.
i found very interesting this relative optimism of labeling -- people in neighboring countries about the future. and this may be very well -- a very important reminder about how we should not confuse the opinions expressed by leaders with opinions that the majority of the population. because again, if you go to the area and talk to government officials and talk to quote, unquote opinion leaders and so on and so forth, the attitudes attitudes -- the pessimist about the future of iraq is very strong, particularly in the cold. what you hear is doomsday scenarios about how iraq is now completely dominated iran essentially.
that the country is going to become an appendix to dearborn and republic, to the islamic republics of iran. this is cliché, but she's still here at all the time. the united states served to the iraq is on a silver platter. this was better off than it's clearly not affect you that the public opinion, which is again the united states is not the only country where the public is really not very much in the loop if you want about what the attitude is. very interesting all so i tank is this last -- the attitudes toward the iraqis. and why cannot read the figures very well because i am seeing the graphic, but the fact that massager -- it is not much a difference between the catawba
palace theater and nouri al-maliki. it is not a huge -- it is not a huge difference among the shia population. and i think that it is a very good reminder of essentially of things that we are seeing developing now. first of all, how dependent maliki is. it he very different form of the maintain the support among the shia population if it was not also explains the point that you raised about why maliki could not say yes to the american presence. i mean, it extending immunity to american troops so that they can stay because he had made it quite clear that he would pull out of the coalition if maliki
was to sustain such immunity. so i think it is really good reminder and bifurcated the leadership of iraqis that we think of during maliki, but it's really the core of the control on the country. the opinions are not surprising. he was actually representative of the sunnis and the kurds are certainly task long and hard on for a main ally and said then that information of the government. so that's not surprising, but it's really a fairly similar to
prison very i'll maliki. the last point that i wanted to bring up in terms of the result is what i really found very surprising is the fact that such a small percentage of kurds have a positive attitude about turkey because data seems to contradict essentially what we have seen lately. i have not been surprised if those opinions had been -- have been expressed in 2003 or even 2004 at 2005. actually i would have been surprised if it was as high as 5%. but it does point, when you talk to the kurds now, when you tie to kurdish officials, they talk a lot about the very positive role that turkey has -- is playing in the area. the investment into the developing building infrastructure. to what seems to have more reflected the situation.
they never do you like the idea of an autonomous kurdistan for the obvious reasons that they fear the same demand in arab countries. yes, all the indications have been that there has been ever approached by that turkey and kurdistan have found the models and positive ones in this game to recognize that the level of public opinion is not at the level of leaders are suspicious of turkey is still as much there. and i really did not expect to see. let me move now to what is happening because if you have been following closely, you not only how the last -- the last couple of months before the withdrawal of u.s. troops being
very difficult essentially, that has been an increase -- that has been an increase in a country that has been increased, but the developments that took place just this last week over the weekend is positively dramatic. just because of we also heard last week the speeches that were given. you know, obama and maliki about all the positive things and what we are seeing now is an impression one gets an iraq, much faster than anyone expected. in other words, if it's hamas does this, you know, everybody was waiting for the last to get out to really do some of the things that they wanted to do all along.
essentially, it is no longer a part of -- not only it's not a part of the coalition, if so then to how much was a part of the government coalition. they were very marginally part of the government. but they are not participating any longer. there are arrest warrants out that against allowing himself, but certainly against us know the personalities. in other words, there seems to be a very clear decision taken by maliki that, you know, they are not going to be very patient with -- that are not going to be an integral part of the government.
although we always referred to kyrgyzstan essay semiautonomous region. i don't think it could be more autonomous than it is now. i think it's semi-independent. in reality it's not autonomous but what we see is an increase in the trend that has been developing over the last two years essentially to set themselves up comic sees me, province is trying to set themselves up as regions. there are a lot of things that i certainly don't know, some of the intelligence community does but about this trend towards the creation of more regions and provinces because of course not everybody has, not everybody is in kyrgyzstan and at this point
they do not get sharing the revenue to the same extent. so, in a sense what we have seen now is the realization of those fears that you documented in the opinion survey a few months ago. it all seems to come to pass. it will be very interesting to see, to know what the opinions will be if the polls were taken again right now. and let me stop there. >> marina, thank you very much. i will ask jim about implications for democracy in the region. the polls seem to suggest that the iraqi is -- my government is no more responsive to the daily needs of the iraqi's been other arab governments that have not done or are going through transitions are responsive to their own parties.
if this is true, what does it say about the democracy in iraq and democracy in the region that is undergoing transition, but where people still don't see that eight years after the war, their own government as being more responsive to their needs than before? >> well it was an infantile fantasy of the neocons in the first place. [laughter] that iraq was going to be the regional model and everything was done actually to subvert iraq being a democracy in the way government was structured. it was structured as a set. model, which is inherently not democratic, and we are seeing that play out at this point. socom i didn't see iraq model. i don't think that the region as a whole, i also didn't believe that if iraq succeeded it would
be the beacon that would like the way to the whole region. it was not done by the people. it was done by a foreign government. teenager is more of an example of how people can, from the bottom up, create change. that is sort of the trial run that inspires iraq. it certainly is a tragedy though to see the situation unraveling. i just want to make the comment that to me the problem isn't that we withdrew. that we set the date for withdrawal. is that we didn't take advantage of the time between when we set the date and when we withdrew to help create structures that were more sustainable than what we left. it seems we did everything right to get everything out and in kuwait waiting to be positioned elsewhere, but what we didn't do was help create sustainable institutional structures in the government, in the country, or
in the neighborhood to create a regional security arrangement with the neighbors, who were going going to bm ball. we knew they were going to be in ball. they already were involved but they are are involved under the table, not sitting around the navel -- neighborhood finding a mechanism. i just want to make one comment on marina's observations about the ambivalence is, the u.s. ambivalence and skip, the arab and doubloons toward the united states. on the fourth anniversary of the war, i did a tv show, my abu dhabi viewpoint show with students in baghdad and students in the u.s.. i will never forget the iraqi woman who very passionately in one sentence said, without pause, you have to leave, you have to leave. you have to leave. not now.
[laughter] and this is what comes through. if i didn't read these numbers, but when we asked the questions about withdrawal, how long should u.s. forces today? almost half of iraqi said as long as needed. and 10% saying one year. only 29% said leave as soon as possible and that was across the board from seo, is -- shia, sunni and kurds. and the u.s., when should we leave? as soon as possible 47%. stay as long as needed, 22%, so it seems the u.s. was set up and wanted out because frankly they never saw the point of this ambivalence issue. issue. we were detached from the war from the beginning. it was never a shared sacrifice. it was never a country investment in lives and treasure
and any motion. we didn't understand the country when we went in. i think the last poll we did only one third of americans can still find iraq on a map. after 4500 people died from our country, only a third of us can find it on a map. given that, it's like it's done, finished, get out so the president did what people want to do but iraqi's are saying what now? and i think that if anything, what this war may do or the outcome of this war may do is further impact americans in the region as this thing unravels. if in fact it does. >> i couldn't agree with you more jim and the fact that you brought up statistics about the saying goes back to my observation that i went for quickly which is we didn't use the time that we had positioned their. if they had more leadership on the part of the united states to get some of these decisions made structurally we would have had -- for that.
we would have had opposition for sure because we are in outsider but we had an opportunity we simply didn't used. your question marwan about iraq as a model, i think even from the very beginning the way things unfolded in iraq it probably hurt the whole idea of democracy in the region because more of my friends throughout the region said, this is what democracy is all about, not for us. they have course looks at the chaos. they looked at the uncertainty. they looked at the government that seemed. unable to do anything and of course not anything beneficial to the population and that is simply not what they wanted. >> on the issue of democracy, i mean i agree with both comments concerning democracy. i think it is very easy to forget that while certainly from our democratic country -- in other words this is the
country that really has a very large number of policies at this point. the large number of centers of powers, first of all you have all these you know, large political alliances. not the parties and such but this large political alliance fighting with each other and these are real. these are groups to which people really are in allegiance whether it is malik e.'s state of law, whether it is anarchy of. it means something to the people involved and of course you have kyrgyzstan which is a totally different story but it there is a give-and-take between the prime minister in the parliament. how long it's going to go on i don't know, but you know, don't sort of dismiss the, don't discount the speaker of the
parliament who is really a very important figure in the center of power in his own right, and we are beginning to have more and more of these provinces that are claiming a degree of the economy. there are centers of power in the provinces, not just in kyrgyzstan but in many, and many different provinces. the problem is, and here is where the real danger is now, it is without rich. you cannot have democracy without pluralism but pluralism without rules is not going to lead to democracy. it will lead to chaos or lead to civil war and i think here is where we come to the issue of the u.s. role. because i think one, it's not so much that we did not build the institutions. i don't think you can build an institution. it takes time. you can't just go out and we always talk about building institutions. in fact it does not work in many
ways, but we really did not, we rushed to the process of writing the constitution and setting up a political system so much that there was never a chance for the iraqis to try to reach some consensus about what they wanted. we have forgotten now that what happened in 2005 in iraq was an incredible feat of political on the part of the united states that had nothing to do with the country. this is a country that you know is still in a state of war for all practical purposes. it had elected an assembly. it wrote a constitution and the constitution was supposed to be written between january and august. i understand from people who are directly involved that it took so long to set up the mechanism for writing this constitution that in the end it took -- the
constitution was discussed for less than six weeks. it was done and you know, essentially it was totally an inefficient process so there was never the building of consensus about what the country wanted around this constitution and what we are seeing now. the elections have created new centers of power. the system has created new centers of power but there is no agreement on the rules. >> let's open it up for question. i would ask the people who ask questions to identify themselves and where they are from and they be we can take three or four questions at a time to allow as many as possible to ask questions, please. >> my name is hugh grindstaff. one of the scenes i was watching over the weekend was a man who shot his three sons and his three sons had been killed at
his neighbor. it is sort of like looking at the tutsi and hutu in rwanda. du jour study take into consideration still, -- >> apologize for being late, but i saw the slide there, the attitude towards iraqi leaders and since the number and percentages of the kurds and the sunnis are much lower than the rest of the country, don't you think that particular slide has to be normalized to show the huge difference there, because
the kurds and the sunnis collectively have about 40%. the shia have 60% roughly, so it gives a different perception when you show a lally for example, what kind of support he had from the sunni group or from the kurds. but don't you think it has to be kind of normalized? thank you. >> hi, just have a question for doctors out it. i know you have a lot of questions in the survey to ask about iraq's people with regard to the troop withdrawal. i was wondering if any of the questions had any context about a guest the u.s. invaded iraq that it was also the same entity that imposed economic sanctions and i'm wondering if the two different situations were reconciled in that question because it's interesting to see people in a sole society sort of way, what it did to them before
all of that. >> one more question and then we will give the panel a chance to answer. >> thank you. allen with the enough resources. my question is to mr. zogby. you mentioned sectarianism, the emphasis on sectarianism in the government was inherently undemocratic and i think that is probably putting the problem the wrong way around. i think the emphasis was on democracy which in iraq is inherently sectarian. because of the 60% shia and the fact that they have not been in power. it looks like to me that is ron. >> let me start with reconciliation. the answer is we did not ask questions about that, but we did find in the poll numbers the
deep divide that comes through, but we didn't specifically ask questions asked questions about sword. the numbers are, you say normalized, i say average god and the totality and if you look in the poll toward the end of the booklet that you have, the section on iraq that is on page 21, attitudes towards iraqi leaders, that total there, and you will see that despite the fact that al-maliki's, i'm sorry a lally's numbers are knight is high among shia, much higher among kurds and much higher among sunni over all the favorable rating in the 2060 breakout that you notice of overall rating is favorable overall if you do a one-man, boat situation.
that is his list wins by a slight edge over al-maliki in favorability. we did not ask about sanctions. i did one of my tv shows at the beginning of the war and we did ask that question and it still is a wound deeply felt. it was then and i assume it is still today although with the passage of time, there are many other ones i think that have eclipsed this. on the sectarian issue and democracy, the first poll we did in iraq was october of 2003. we found a much less, much lower inclination towards the carrion, sectarian self-identification than we do today. i think that to some degree we structured governing in iraq around identification and it
certainly did appeal to leaders. i don't think that those leaders had mass base support for sectarian divide. in fact one of the tv shows that i did early on i remember asking the kids in the audience on the iraq side, how many of them came from mixed marriages. this was like sarajevo before the war. perp or -- people were sunni married shia. there was no sense of divide in that way at one of the things that worries me about syria is when people say oh we can't have it here. we are so different and no one ever expected to happen in baghdadi there. no one expected it to happen in beirut and no one expected it to happen in sarajevo. it can happen anywhere. this was the sector leadership in iraq who found a system of governance that said this many shia, this many sunni, this many
kurds work to their advantage. i don't think there was a broadband support for the lebanon the station of the iraqi political system which is why i say that our use of sectarianism undercuts the push to democracy and brother played into the sort of created warlords out of sectarian leaders. >> okay, please. >> microphone. >> the uphold and i'm talking about, october 2003, less than one in five iraqi's sol religion as having any role to play in governance as i recall back then. today you would get some very different numbers. >> thank you. i am from the arab league. i'm not sure if i mentioned are not the number of percentages of
iraqi's -- what is the number? >> the democrats, 1000 iraqis nationwide, 1000 iraqis nationwide, yes. that is what it was. >> okay, can i have the section on the arab spring thing? >> that is going to be the second half of the discussion. >> okay, questions please? >> stanley kober. at his first inaugural address, abraham lincoln said that public opinion has to be the master of a free society, that majorities and minorities can change with elections as public opinion changes and that is how they change really. what is being suggested here as a result of the invasion, the sort of sick terry carrion
identity politics strengthened and it raises the question to me, that was the case and if lincoln was correct, that all this talk about institution building, we are kidding ourselves, that it was this creation of the sectarian difference that was fundamental. >> i am with the center for international private enterprise. we work with the iraqi private sector and one of the things we are finding in our recent surveys is that there's quite a negative perception of the political parties themselves. instead of working for the will of the people many politicians where are the will of their political party. i'm wondering mr. zad if you have any questions that relate to that issue and if you could comment on it? be one more. okay, shall we go on? no? [laughter] were you asking about here in
the united united states or in ? okay. [laughter] no, we did not pull on favorability towards party or groupings, just stored leadership and as you see in the numbers, every iraqi leader has a net unfavorable attitude. the highest favorable rating is al-maliki, i'm sorry, is awlawi and that is at a 40% level. respectable by american standards i guess is where we are today. but we didn't poll institutions. i supposedly pulled institutions the numbers would be low, but no, we didn't pull them. and i'm not quite sure i understood or maybe the question was sectarian issues in public opinion. the question i was asked by the
gentlemen here. >> if i understood the come in terms of the specific question, if i understood it correctly, i think it's true that what makes a democracy possible is the fact that people can change their opinions from one, from one election to the other. otherwise you would have majorities and minorities and then you would have, you will have -- [inaudible] those people who change their minds all the time. you are not doing very much for democracy in the long run. and identity does not change
obviously, then you risk having permanent majorities and permanent minorities. you are absolutely right on that one. what i would like to bring up, not totally convinced about this idea that sectarianism is somehow the result of the way the united states handles the government formation in the beginning. sectarianism was built into the iraqi national congress. i mean it was built into the nature of the parties that came together to form the iraqi national congress. just look at the names of the parties. i was always surprised why after the first elections people say oh my god, people are voting for religious parties. when you have the parties in the national congress with names like the supreme council for the islamic revolution in iraq, you say you know, but all the political parties that existed before the -- were based on
carrion divide. and this is one of the problems that we are seeing in country after country. >> that may been one of the reasons why it was a problem for us to have seen iraq through the lens of the iraq national congress at all and had them as the people who directed traffic for us early on. we learned how many of them have been discredited since those war has gone sour. but i think early on we did that, which is why i worry about the same situation in other countries as they are developing that when you rely on these exiled groups, you begin to develop a very different perspective of how the country operates or what the future of the country should look like. speech drew but there is never been, and this is the last point i will make. let's keep in mind that there has never been a transitional situation where elections by parties that were formed after
the transition started. it is invariably the parties that went before. it is a liberation movement quote unquote and that gets very, that is very problematic because very often these parties are these movements are not one -- what one would like to see in a democracy but unfortunately that seems to be the case. donatist -- misunderstand me. i'm not a fan of the u.s. invasion and i'm not a fan of the way the u.s. handled the situation in the early period with this problem of hearings was built into it. >> i want to actually bring up something if i might, just another look at the u.s. withdraw from iraq because i think again, i thought your comments were wise. the american public and its disengagement from the issue. i would market from the day the president announced his withdrawal.
that seemed to solve everybody's problems. of course not everybody, but the one thing also of the american public, and i'm afraid the u.s. government doesn't think very deeply about it either, is what i want to call the balance of power in the region, and how the withdrawal of the united states, how the intrigue of the united states into iraq and the destruction of iraq as a power center is not real terms at least in the imagined terms in the region. you know this region is still struggling. iraq isn't there. and you can take it on on the role of egypt. i think one has to understand that america's withdrawal, the repositioning of itself is seen by the people in the region as an unsettling news from ongoing development in this decision about who is going to be in charge of what is going to happen. i don't think we should forget that and i don't think people in
washington calculated that when we went into iraq and how we dealt with things. >> and if you look at the whole question about who benefited from the war, the differences in opinion are fascinating. although almost across-the-board everyone thinks that america benefited except for americans. 40% of americans on the other hand think no one benefited. again, this total ambivalence, the sense that we don't know what happened and we almost want to wash her hands. it's over, forget it, be done with it. the second beneficiary of the war across the board is israel and then iran. only the american people say number two, that the iraqi people benefited. the iraqi people don't think the iraqi people benefited that the american people do. our two top, we said that no one benefited and the iraqi people benefited. after that, we are completely out of sync with the rest of the
world. >> anymore questions on the issue? please. >> i have two brief questions. was there any work to detect the military effort from the american civilian effort in terms of feelings in iraq, and the other one was, was there any data to show the, let's say, the perceived importance of military influence or american influence in iraqi politics at the time? i'm sorry if that is a little bit collocated. i'm asking the question though because having worked there is an american and felt worn more powerless over time affecting the political outcome in iraq. that seemed to drop off a cliff and not very much time. and, so the first question,
there was a concerted effort in 09 and 2010 to put a civilian face on activities over there and i'm wondering if that showed up in any sort of reception? >> if you look at the polls, we didn't disaggregate, as you asked, looking backwards but we did looking forward, asking what future role people saw for the united states. and about a third say the u.s. is simply being a source of interference, foreign interference but 15% want a special alliance. 14% see the u.s. playing a security role and 12% as an investor in development etc.. there is there's the same kind of sort of conflicted me church on the one hand get out and on the other hand we are afraid about what happens when you leave them on the other hand you still have a role to play in these different ways. so i think looking forward the iraqi's aren't ready for us to
wash our hands of the country completely. at all. >> thank you very much. this concludes the first half of our workshop. i want to tank the gym, marina and skip for very interesting and perceptive remarks about the iraq issue. in the second panel we will talk about the region, the polls that were conducted not just in iraq in six arab countries and covers the issue of political change in governance on politics so maybe we can take a ten-minute break for coffee and then reconvene for the second session. thank you. [applause]
[inaudible conversations] [inaudible conversations] >> okay, welcome again. to the second session. i don't think i need to make introductions because we are exactly the same people minus one. we were very proud of having a new speaker who is not one of the washington usual suspects and then unfortunately he got -- where he was not supposed to be.
you will have to put up with us again. we will do the same thing as before. we have the results of the polls and then marwan will comment. >> thank you for staying, staying around. it was nine months into the arab spring that we conducted this poll. it was the same poll that included the questions on iraq, and included issues on democracy, on political change, on satisfaction, degree of satisfaction of the way things are taking place in those countries. we pulled in seven arab countries and iran, and what we found is what we call an arab spring effect that had occurred. reform and rights issues were now perceived as being political priorities in most countries. the results varied from country
to country and they provided an important look into the unique set of concerns in each. we have conducted similar polls since 2001 and it was the difference that we discerned between this poll in 2011 and the one in 2009 and before that were most intriguing. for example, i have here a chart that presents the results in rank order in each of the countries that we pulled. there were eight overall countries. the countries that we had pulled previously in 2009 have the rank order of the issue after for example in egypt it was number two top priority in 2009 but we can see employment is the number-one issue across the board. everyplace but the uae and we can describe, we can discuss why
a bit later. it was number four in 2009. employment is the number one concern, and up until 2009, what we find is that right and butter issues, employment, health care, and education etc., they were always in the top rankings. there were unique issues of concern that every country. in egypt corruption and nepotism was always a big issue. israel and palestine were a big issue and in jordan obviously it's a domestic concern and it's also a issue of great importance in uae and saudi arabia. what is striking is when you go to 2011, and the countries that we have old before and pulled again, the issues are political rights, political reform and civil rights, corruption issues are now on the top tier in most of the countries.
and as you can see, it in some more so than others. in lebanon for example, five of the top or issues include ending corruption, political reform, civil rights and democracy. in uae they are the top two issues, civil rights and political debate. in saudi arabia number three is ending corruption, number force democracy number five is civil rights. the one that is unique in this regard is egypt. nothing changed. the top four issues in 2009 are still the top or issues now and what that says to me is something interesting all by itself. the people who lead the revolt in egypt, the youth, where he democracy movement but the mass base in egypt, poor, hungry, jobless, need government services and find corruption and
nepotism have harmed their ability to move forward. there is a disconnect i think between the revolt and the mass base that we are seeing play out in the election and the aftermath of the election but egypt was the one place where the top four issues before are still the top or issues now. iran, guess you could call it a political basket case. employment is number one for democracy, terrorism and women's rights and political -- tunisia. >> that is iran but it says tunisia. >> no, actually it's not. women's rights only in tunisia rubric -- women's rights number four and uae was another one where women's rights were high. let me go back if i can to hear where you can see the iran numbers. employment is number one and then democracy, civil rights, political reform, ending
corruption, political debate, women's rights number seven so the top seven issues, six of them are democracy related in iran. and it was the only country where the democracy reform and rights issues literally dominated everything across the board. you are absolutely right that the issues they are, that was tunisia and in tunisia it is employment, democracy, terrorism and women's rights. and women's rights interesting in tunisia in that for those who feared the culture of tunisia is set and is set by the decades ago probably by the period where women's rights are a part of the culture of the country and something that people are concerned about and therefore want to protect across the
board. the final question we asked was, sure country should country on the right track? we asked another question about whether the pace of change, but what you are seeing is that in most of the countries, in particular in saudi arabia and the uae which again warrant separate discussions, people think things are just fine. political debate and reform issues have broken into the top tier of people are politically satisfied and they are politically satisfied because life is good. they have a job, they have government services, they have access to government. they feel comfortable about their presence and they feel secure as a future and therefore government is on the right track. in egypt, jordan, the numbers are pretty good. the most worrisome obviously is lebanon, where only 25%. lebanon is always very low,
always very low and iraq and iran are also quite low in this regard. the tunisia numbers are interesting, 54% because 40% of tunisians were not sure, which is itself interesting. there is kind of -- now understand that the poll was done in september which is the month during which tunisia was preparing for its elections which explains maybe a lot of the intensity of or the concern. when we did the other poll about iraq, the tunisia numbers were way off because it was probably the last thing on earth tunisians wanted to think about what with their elections being within weeks from when the poll was done. so the bottom line here is that i think that the arab world is on the cusp of change. we are seeing not iraq but the arab spring having elevated issues of democracy and rights
into the clinical mainstream. people still want jobs. they still want to raise their families. they still want to have the ability to provide for their future but they also are now beginning to talk about your rights in reform issues. the question is how government response is a new vocabulary in this discourse will determine the future of the region and years to come and i will await your responses. >> okay. thank you, jim. i found it to be a very interesting set of points go in my days in government i also conducted jordan to engage the public more and i think they go very well jim with their findings. the first comment i want to make is that as we have seen from these polls, arabs are no different than anybody else. their number one issue is employment. they want to be employed.
this is a region that is very young, 70% of the population is under 30 years of age. this is the number one issue on everybody's mind, so from that aspect, i was not surprised at all to see the results of this poll. what i want to mentioned however is not to read into this that because employment is a number the number one issue on everybody's minds, that political reform is either not important or can wait. that is what is drawing the wrong conclusion and i say this because one it is clear that the polls themselves that change. reform issues have been indeed elevated in all of the countries that were pulled including in my own. but the other conclusion knight wants to make is that even
though economic issues are rowing, are going to need economic reform that can no longer be done in -- what they have felt to do is they have not done in the context of the political reform process, a system of checks and balances so abuses were checked in as a result of god,. [inaudible] so if employment is the number one issue for people, and it is according to the polls, the way to address employment cannot be
done without reform. in other words economic measures alone which have been tried in the past, cannot work if they are not dan in parallel with the reform process, the political reform process. the other, that want to make is on corruption. corruption actually today is starting to serve as a unifying factor among the different groups in the country. if you look at lebanon, you look at iraq and you look at jordan where you might have diverse ethnic groups or religious groups that do not agree on everything and have different needs and different demands from the system, all of them agree on -- so this is an issue that if you want to see in a positive way, what is positive about it is that it is serving to bring
people together in ways that other issues have not done so in the past. i am somewhat struck and somewhat not that what we have seen, because once again, even in jordan when i used to conduct polls employment was the number one issue consistently. but, what it shows is that right now, in this snapshot in time, people's focus are on issues whether they are economic or political. that does not seem in my view that people don't care about the issue even if it has dropped in priority at this time because of these concerns and of course it does not mean in my view that people should read into this
that you know just because the arab uprisings are on reform issues, that these issues cease to ceased to be of importance to the public and the arab world. just look at what happened in egypt with the storming of the israeli embassy. you will understand the strength of the feelings that people have about this issue within the proper context. and in my view, you know, as arab governments and countries make the transition to democracy, air for shames are going to have to be more responsive to the public and when the president of egypt is elected, they get what position they are going to take on israel after they are elected. to say that they will not be concerned with this issue i think what e2 misread the
situation. but it is also interesting to see where palestine is on the iran deadlock. as the political issues as jim said are at the top. it shows you the differences that exist today between the public in the government in iraq on both issues, political reform issues and a on the arab-israeli conflict. it is interesting to see people who are satisfied as jim also said with their change, with the pace of change. the one country that is doing, the view of the majority of not all of us, the one country that is doing the best in the transition, tunisia is among the countries where people are least
satisfied about the change. that to me actually is positive and it shows you people who are so fed up with the old system, that they are hungry for change as opposed to say the saudi's, who we would agree that they are in need of a political reform process but their situation, from their point of view, is it's more or less okay. and that is very interesting to look at the tunisian figures and the jordanian figures or the saudi one's. gem you did not talk about the youth and the social media. i don't know if you want to mentioned that but if you don't, would like to say something. [laughter] because there is also a section about the social media and to me
i think a number of very important results have come up. first, the notion that these uprisings were the result of social media is probably romantic and exaggerated in this country. that is not to say that they did -- social media did not play a role. is certainly did and as the polls show, the internet penetration rate in most arab countries were not particularly in egypt in the last two or three years, but the views from that in a region where still the internet penetration rates have not crossed 30 or 40% in many countries, the internet was the only or even the major part i
think is a simplification. the poll does show that traditional media still plays an important role in the arab world. networks play a very important role and of course the mobile phones which are available to everyone and text messages play a very important role. in fact, coming from jordan four years ago here, i noticed how people used text messaging their much more than they use it in this country. i think it's a recent phenomenon to use text messaging but what i want to say about these groups is, because i don't also want to be -- i think this is a rising phenomenon in the air for old and a very encouraging phenomenon in the arab world. as we have seen in egypt and tunisia and jordan and elsewhere. we are witnessing the growth of the youth groups who more or
less are characterized by the same traits. they are somewhat elitist. they are not afraid to voice their views as opposed to their parents. i love with lisa anderson said and i keep repeating it. this is a revolution she said on behalf of of their parents and not in opposition to their parents and it's very true. so they are not afraid and they are very politically aware but they lack political organization and a black clerical organization because you know, they and everybody else in their countries do not have a strong political party etc.. until that culture emerges and until they understand as we have seen in egypt, that is not just important to start the revolution but what is more important is to institutionalize
it and since they understand that the only way you can do this is two notches go to the street but to organize, politically organize, that we are not going to stop this pluralistic society and arab world. i think the futures with them given that 70% of the population is -- so that gives me hope is these people also are crossing ethical lines. we have seen it in lebanon where there is a small but growing movement for you know, people to cut across religious lines. seeing it in jordan where people are cutting across the jordan tell us tinian lines and we are seeing it in egypt where people are cutting across -- lines etc. and it's a movement that can only be a positively grown at
future and i will stop at that. >> let me just react to three points in agreement largely. first on corruption and nepotism. it is in the top tier in four of the seven countries so you are right. it's a major, and one of the great delegitimize her's errs and tunisia and in egypt of the regimes that were overthrown. i think that is also very interesting. is not to say there is not on iranian sentiment but i think it is intriguing that i don't think when the leadership uses it, that it is using it for its own people. is actually recognizing the point that you made that across the water, it's a major issue in the gulf and in jordan and i have never believed that israel was the target of iran.
i believe that it is the tool used by iran to appeal to arab public opinion which is what there'll to their altima goal list, hegemony in the gulf region and on the social media issue and one of the things that i have learned in this is that in areas where you expect there to be differences in attitudes between the young people and the older people, that doesn't ever seem to be the case. there are gender differences to be sure. women for example in most countries will support women's rights much higher than men except in saudi arabia where in some polls men actually are more supportive than women. but, its behavior among youth that is different and the simpsons in particular, the use of internet and where people get
information. older people tending to get information from more traditional media sources. younger people tending to get information from facebook and internet sites as opposed to the way their older peers do. so behavior difference, attitudes are not that much different. >> before i open it up, i will ask the chair to ask a question but also to make one comment. this is about what marwan said about the fact that about the fact that the social media plays a role but it is not a cause. the revolution that i'm aware of was attributed to the latest technology. do you remember iran?
the uprising of 1848 in europe, the influence of the newfangled invention called the daily newspaper. the same thing. would not have been possible without a daily newspaper. the one for which i have not found the technological explanation is -- i have never stumbled across the explanation so i think the bottom line is people use what is available to get the message across. the question though is concerning the results, the degree of satisfaction which was expressed by people in the arab emirates and saudi arabia. the new pole across the board -- >> when they polled in the
emirates we pulled through different ways. we polled everybody in the country and we have polled arabs and in moradi's. when we were pulling in the use of social media, we polled arabs in the emirates. when we pulled on the iraq attitudes, we polled arabs in the emirates and when we polled on this week polled just the iraqi survey actually polled everybody but we segmented out and moradi's from the larger public so i think you are right. if we had polled everyone the satisfaction levels would have been very different but when you talk about emirates period, satisfaction is high. >> maybe it's not surprising that the other part of the question was what is less understandable to me because, is why the saudi's expressing such dissatisfaction so wide is true that i don't think there are many unemployed in the emirates in the country.
because there are so few of them to begin with but there is a high-level of unemployment in saudi arabia. >> i did a poll in saudi arabia, a massive poll we actually did from mckinsey and i think that the reports of saudi unemployment are misleading. for example, we will get a 30 something% unemployed but many of them are students and loved, if after you have looked at the demographics and on the whole breakout you find that the person who is unemployed lives in a household of 10 people, four of whom are working and this person who says he is unemployed also reports in income, and monthly income of some significant number of
riyals every bump, then i question whether or not that is the same as someone who is unemployed living in a household like in bahrain on the other hand, someone in bahrain who is unemployed by and large lives in a household of three or four people. only one of whom is employed and reports no monthly income. so the saudi he was reporting income either from parents or income from property or income from the stock market or income from some other source and is in a household of many people at least three or four of whom are working, that is a very different categories of the number of real unemployed who are also economically needy is much less than what you would expect it to be if you just looked at the unemployment numbers which is not to say there is not need in the country. it's just that, they need is such that it doesn't affect the
satisfaction to the level and the degree of weighted it would in bahrain where the numbers were very bad both on satisfaction and also on employment in each. >> thank you. okay, let's open the -- back there. >> thank you so much. i'm with usaid and my question is based on something that jim said that for all of you. jimmy pointed out that in tunisia women's rights are such a concern because of its cultural history and he said it is just part of the environment. hauber for my questions about iraq, that for several decades women who held a prominent place in government and political decision-making while educated, until basically the u.s. invaded and so i'm wondering why such the plummet in women's status when actually historically it has been quite good? thank you. >> let me take another question here.
they are fairly large samples is 3000 in some instances than we did go beyond into the outlying regions. but in this one, we did not. so i can't really give you a number they are. and the question you asked was about women in iraq. the ranking was slow. i think without he and disrespectful of women's rights, i think interface design. other issues trump and for women too. it's not a question of women in iraq, you know, sort of saying it was a very profound need. i think in situations we saw back here. i remember during the women's movement or the earthy years unassertive overlapped with a very intense mobilization on the civil rights movement. white women saints who bought an end, what he taken the lead on this? there were some black women who
did, that in the african-american community committee issue of political rights and civil rights and national rights trump. i think in iraq that is what you are saying. where the turmoil that is what it is and were simply making, keeping yourself safe during the day and finding a way to sustain your life and the fear of getting blown out and whatever. i mean, the safety issues that ultimately end up grabbing. and so i stood over us as that come have women's rights improved or not improved? that's one question. where does it rank in terms of a political priority? pretty down the scale. in iraq, israel palestine, it we've pulled in iraq before on palestine. it is a big issue, but it is not a big issue speaking of fish to fry. it is not a big issue now in iraq is facing the fight for its very survival given the internal problems they faced as it moves
forward good thing in tunisia, were on the cusp of an election with all the things going on, does that mean tunisians about the history they have that the plo having been headquartered they are in a previous polls finding a very deep attachment with the issue of palestine, but that mean tunisians don't care? no. in this right now and september of this year, when they were facing a national election in their country that would determine the future, you know, what kind of country tunisia is going to be, that was not the priority issue. in fact, they are women and the role that women would play, something that many tunisians wanted to make sure with secure is a far more important issue. but in jordan, and saudi arabia and uae ran on top of the one place at that was interesting was in lebanon, where it's always been an important issue. but in lebanon, israel palestine
is not the issue. if israel that is the issue because lebanon has its own ax to grind. and that is israel's behavior in lebanon. so we didn't ask it that way. we estimate the israel palestine conflict and that is something that is secondary to if we asked about israel's behavior, which is something very different. >> i just want some thing on women's rights. i think part of the problem extends beyond the arc. we unfortunately and i say this isn't a read. i think the issues of women's rights is not seen by many arabs as one of the needed importance. maybe with the exception of few countries like tunisia and lebanon. but i think in general if you ask people for political reform, you know, the issue of women's rights does not come out as an important issue.
and the reason is both cultural and legal. culturally i think women are not seen as equal sadly. and legally, they are not seen as equal. and you know, you would be surprised to find out that issues pertaining to culture takes time. something can be done without legal discrimination and it's not been done. so in most arab countries if not in all arab countries, davis legal discrimination. and i'm not talking about inheritance. i'm talking about everything. social security, health benefits, pension, everything. there is a difference when it comes to how you treat women and how you treat men. and a difference that sadly is more accepted by the vast majority of men in the arab world. >> look at the uae numbers on
quinn and six and was fourth among women and seven among men. the next-door neighbor, saudi arabia is very different, but the ua numbers are very interesting in that regard. which are absolutely right. it's not an issue that is penetrated. >> molly williamson, american academy of diplomacy. first my compliments to the sustain excellent of zogby poll. >> i would say thank you. my brother thinks you. [laughter] my question is what happens if nothing happens? across the board, the importance of deployment has more want to emphasize 70% of these populations under the age of 30. 50 million new entrants into the
labor force expect that over the next 10 years. that's 5 million new jobs every year, just to sustain today's unemployment rate. you know, if the united states to how to do it, we do it. but we don't. and it would appear that nobody else does either. so what happens if not only is there not enough seem to be transparency, accountability, judicial independence and implementation, but most fundamentally the economic well-being, the employment prospects for being able to educate one young and not being addressed. what's going to happen? >> i wanted to make a comment on women in iraq in particular. in the north for instance where was quiet and not so much bombing of violence and so on,
there's actually a women's right fairway at the bottom and discrimination against women is way out. i mean, even worse than the central authority. so it is not really motivational. the violence and the bigger fish to fry sent issue. but there's also an absence of legislation that actually has a mechanism where women's rights are good. so is one of the highest per capita honor killings and so on wasn't curtis and. >> thank you. >> let me just take the issue of the employment question that molly williamson raises. we do other polls for the oliver wyman group on business confidence. and a major issue we have focused on his youth bulge and government reform making possible growth in the economy.
and because the situation is not sustainable, the employers of first resort, not last result in a region are government and as a result of that and saudi arabia in particular, you ask a college graduate right at the point of graduation but his goal list, is to get a government job. the benefits are better. the pay is better. security is better and they're available. our steps being taken to encourage the private sector to make space for the private sector to grow and play its role? because the question is, this is not sustainable in the long haul. you mentioned the number of jobs. the number creech and saudi arabia alone are greater than the number that have been created by the government here
they have to be done by the air because while oil income is a company does not have sufficiently enough to say it could be a never-ending expansion of government created jobs to absorb these new job people coming in. i think everyone knows it. the efforts of saudi ossetian whatever it's called from country to country have not succeeded in part because the private sector itself hasn't stepped up and moved into a desert space has been created. one of the things done in saudi arabia was tainted though it created his own stimulus package to promote trade and investment. when we pulled business elites and we say if given the choice between high. an ex-pat worker at last a foreign national worker have more pay if they have the same skills, he will go with the cheaper, which is one of the reasons why labor reform becomes
an issue is because governments, more than the kerry sees the need to create more opportunity for -- that are coming into the market. they are just not finding a way to absorb them. so i agree with you. it is a huge problem if the region moves forward. it's one that has to be addressed. it has not yet exploded. each is that the one place where bca inc. a real role of this youth oldish and someone who is describing it as the wait time between college graduate and first job as from so long and gas that it is a night air. 80% of young people have not had a job, no prospect of a child. these are situations not only not sustainable, but absolutely horrific. >> if i can recognize also, jim,
arab governments employ strategies in the past has centered around privatize the state and their praises in trying to attract foreign investment to be able to create jobs. well, that took care maybe the big companies, but it didn't take care of the smes. in this country, for example, small and medium enterprises employed 70% of the workforce. in a country like jordan, they employed 30% of the workforce. it is a huge, huge gap. and there have been no policies aimed at encouraging smes. neither insured and more most arab countries. this is one thing you need to do. you cannot keep employing people through government. 50% of the workforce in jordan is government.
he talked about killing productivity, that's a sure way to do it. and you're not going to create 50 million new jobs if you don't look at productivity. which is my second point about education policies. education policies so far are not here to encourage productivity, are not geared to encourage critical thinking. are not giving people the skills that they need to enter the markets, you know, the workforce. they are your two basically, if i can be candid, employ people to be no more than government bureaucrats able to push the pencil here in the air. i mean, you're not going. and governments have not spent money and resources on education
in the needed way. they have spent some money, but not on the right ways. university education in jordan in the 70s was 10 times better than today, even though today we have 35, you know, public and private universities. we had two or three in the 70s. but the quality of education and was much better because there's not enough attention given to this aspect of the public. >> okay. thematic omnicom activity at utah about any war not to read too much into it. you mentioned the disconnect between the internet savvy in the base, particularly in egypt.
and what we have done in the region, we found out that may be we didn't go far enough. when you look at young men for syria or libya, the percentage is awfully long. from 1.5% to 4% in the con activity and facebook and so on and sbc were problems there. on the other hand, we've seen uae and qatar with more than 40% penetration and it's exactly the opposite. so we do in fact read too much into it. the other point on a rant and the changes i'm really not sure how much of it is the impact of the arab reward. since the two men election in iran, things have been quite different from what it was prior to that. so i'm really not sure to what percentage of that move, if
there is any movement, what percentage is new to the area. the big question is actually on the employment side, which is common for all of them. tunisia in particular has a very low unemployment problem. i think it was the reply 5% come in very low. and yet we saw the problem there. so are we trying to politicize the situation and majority of the countries they are with the problems with the exception of maybe tunisia when the problem was said was the employment, mostly economic problems and the result of the poll basically shows that employment is number one, which is a good portion of the economic problems. thank you.
>> when they work on the con activity issue. just quickly on iran, i never made the point that these numbers in and of themselves are determined to stick as to what the causes of a revolutionary. i don't know -- i'm not going to point to a particular cause and tunisia. i think, you know, everything from the corruption of the regime, legitimacy, et cetera has a lot to do with what was going on there. in a rant, i am not arguing that the arab spring produces this change in priorities in iran. it does in the other. countries to be sure. but i do in the introduction of which this section make the point that this was inherits her he. it was not a regional spring. the massive strikes led by lawyers in pakistan didn't
create a blip in the arab world. the iranian revolt in 2009, people said look rather admiringly added, but it didn't change the landscape at all. it is a young in tunisia who burned himself that actually created the wildfire that began to spread. so this was arab. and in the reverse, i don't think -- like the iranians have looked at the arab spring and there has been much commentary about the fact they can, why can't wait? i don't think it jumbled the numbers. i was arguing the arab spring of fact. on the comment to beauty issue, the numbers are about. of the uae today are much higher. it's almost 80%. but that is because there is a huge ex-pat workforce in the country connected. in libya it was fascinating with libyan results started coming to
facebook and twitter users in the country dropped precipitously because this all the foreign workers going home. this is not incipient phenomenon this is not incipient phenomenon at all. in the arab countries for the most part, 30% range that marwan mentioned this about in the countries we pooled. in the urban areas, it's about double that. it is about double that and face the penetration is very high. in jordan and in lebanon it is more than one to one because people at old-school accounts. and most of the other countries that those who are online, it's about 60, 70%. so in the explosion of facebook is amazing.
it has increased, you know, in a tree that looks like this. now, it didn't create the revolt. it was a tool that is used by those who were organizing the revolt. and it has limits. built-in limits. it created space for communication. they provided a way around national traditional media that pluck them out. if you were a cute organizer trying to pull together a rally and held a press conference, you could be sure that callaham was going to to cover it. but you could create your own media and that media actually spread via really that we are also purchased incredibly over a period of time. unlike move on.org was able to create the deaths. meet up strata flash rallies and ultimately much larger rallies and actually worked.
as a tool that was effectively used the thing we noted because our survey not only was a survey of opinion, but also of behavior when we had people tracking messaging on facebook and twitter, but we found is the youth revolutionaries were the only people using the device. if you track those supportive of the regime and those of the demonstrators, there were days when supporters the regime had far more messages on facebook and twitter than the demonstrators did. it wasn't until mubarak stepped down but it shifted. with a caveat. and that is you then have a split between the brotherhood and its use of facebook, which uses rather extensively. i remember when the constitutional reform thing was passed, if you talk to young people in the movement, they were convinced he was going to pass overwhelmingly.
everyone bad copy that day was voting against the constitutional reform because it was the device. the government worked together. track messaging on both sms and twitter and facebook by a margin of literally tens of thousands to one. the messaging voting for the constitution trumps those who are opposed at the constitution. but the point was that people who didn't want change to the same degree that the young people wanted change were using the same tools as the regime that had its own electronic army saying support mubarak. if mubarak goes, all breaks loose et cetera. and the syrians are doing the same. i mean, this is a neutral tool that can be used by anybody. and it worked for organizers. it created space and allowed them to communicate and organize. the one thing that it did most successfully in syria and libya
in particular is created not only found out her unending network in the media sent, its own television network, they're able to download selected material from bbc or whatever and put it up for people to see. so if you access, you now to facebook did have access to a whole sordid preselected media that told the story the narrative the revolutionaries wanted to tell. secondly, it also developed a synergy with traditional media and that it tried tested them information that was able then to be picked up by the international media, et cetera, and make the story bigger than life so he would know what was going on in syria had it not been for social media, which then broadcast their information through the traditional media, which then picked it up, which is why as marwan notes that one
survey, but those are all available in our material on their website. you can find the whole pool and all of its forms, all of the different issues are covered including social media on the website. again, that was the part be presented on the foreign in abu dhabi in november. >> okay, i see some other hands, but it take to ask another question myself. and it is concerning the issue of employment. do you have any in your polling that allows you to judge to what extent people see the connection between the political reform and employment? marwan made the point earlier on that is not just an equation of solving economic issues, that you cannot thought economic issues without addressing some of the political issues. >> no, i don't. whenever asked the question
directly, nor if i strove to refer questions together immaculate to come up with some good terms of interpretation of it. but no direct questions outlived, with that connection. one thing that came to mind if i was thinking about this when you're talking about the privatization issue, that became its own problem as it has in the former soviet union countries as well. so people with egypt, for example, and saw the gdp going. it had tunisia and saw the gdp going up because there was a degree of privatization in those economies are growing. but it was also the truckers effect or that was going for a small number of people and was not filtering down so that it comes, real income of real people was getting nowhere. found again a lot erie.
the income gap in america today between the very rich and the very poor is greater than it was in asia at the time of the revolution. there is no determined to stick faster that produces a result, but it is a shocking number here and also this day or set that while the world bank and imf look at egypt and say it's doing very well. that wasn't the number you're getting back from people. it's not doing well. it was not doing well. >> okay. are there any more questions? is the one there. anything one last round. >> steel makeover. it has been said that people have lost their fear. that is why they go out in the streets in egypt and syria because they've lost their fear. internationally, we preserve peace through deterrence. and i feel like we have two restore our deterrent. deterrence is based on fear.
the people lose their fear domestically, could that also manifest itself internationally if countries base their strategy on deterrence. >> and the other questions? this is the last chance you have. all right. >> i think some people have lost their fear, but not everyone. and you lose your fear about one thing, but not about something else. so it may be true that in syria, some folks have lost fear of the regime, but a lot of people are afraid of changing what it it might mean for personal security or security of their community and they support the regime. when former president mubarak gave that speech that everybody thought was disconnected from reality, he was speaking over the heads of the square to
people in egypt who were not demonstrating and he believed they would turn the tide come when nixon used to call the silent majority. and we are seeing today in egypt this disconnect between those who've lost their fear and are in the square and those who aren't in the square to say let's give income is strapped. there's no tourism, et cetera. there is a disconnect that is real between those who have lost fear and those who haven't and those who are afraid of other things. i international level determines , dare i mean, i believe back to iraq that the great irony of that order was that it was the war of the project for new american century that was supposed to secure american hegemony and that we can mess it made us more vulnerable. and howard and embolden those who would oppose us and restrict
desirability to operate in some ways in the region where we have such vital interests and so much is at stake. but that doesn't mean that we've lost our ability to still be -- to have people be afraid of that. and the use of drones, for example, have become a fearsome weapon, one that i personally find immoral and totally objectionable. but we still have a way of project in power, even in this. as some decline. so it is not an open and shut case on fear and deterrence internationally or in each country domestically. >> okay. thank you very much. thank you for your participation.
[inaudible conversations] mr. mx >> the witness is mr. max mosley please. >> i swear by almighty god that the evidence is the truth, the whole truth and nothing but the truth. >> make yourself comfortable please mr. mosley and your full name pleas for the record? >> mack's group is mostly. >> mr. mosley can i thank you as well for the effort that you have put into assisting the inquiry. you must be -- even if you are one yourself, but i am very grateful. >> thank you. >> and mr. mosley, there is a witness statement which you have signed.
under tab on, on the 29th page, that is your signature on the 31st of october of this year that you have signed a statement of truth. yes i have. >> in relation to yourself in these terms you are born in 1914. you are fluent in french and german. you went to oxford to read physics and then you -- is that right? >> that is correct. >> in terms of your professional career, you didn't in fact practice full-time in the bar. you did something else altogether. tell us a little bit about that. >> while i was at the bar, i used to race as a hobby in that grew it eventually and i moved up to formula to which is just
below formula one. and i met people and we decided to start a relationship so i gave up the bar after five years and entered the world of motor racing. >> what happened, because it was a very distinguished career. it said at one point you were president of fisa which is part of the fia but in 1991, little bit late, 1993 you are elected president of the fia which is the governing body of formula one. >> that is correct. >> you remained in that role until your retirement in 2009. please just give us a thumbnail sketch of what might be said of your achievements and that role.
>> well, fia is known because of motor sports and particularly governance the world federation of all the big motoring club so during the time i was there we expanded enormously. the amount of activity concerning motoring and i had a great deal of activity particularly in brussels with road safety and the environment, and the main thing i did was, i started with other people in the new car assessment program which was a test program to improve the safety of vehicles and that led to really what could be called a revolution in the safety of road vehicles. i think this contributed to saving a great number of lives, hundreds in this country and thousands in europe and of course it wasn't just me. it was the organization which i
had it but that is a side of that nobody talks about it. they talk more about formula one motorsport but it was actually the road safety, the environmental things, things like improving the emissions legislation. there is an endless list of things to do. >> road safety across the piece? nothing to do with trying to drive fasba simply trying to drive safely on the roads in countries throughout europe? >> exactly so it was the best on the road for example in this country. about 30% of that is due to improve vehicle safety and i think what we did was probably responsible for most if not all of it so it is significant. >> the world as a glamorous world. would you say that you were --
publicity mr. mosley? >> no, never. i tried to get onto my job. is a bit like running a hotel. if it's done properly you receive -- and the people with with the stars and the publicity were the drivers. my job really was to try to run it and make sure first of all nobody got killed and secondly it was run as fairly as it possibly could be in a very difficult technological environment. >> we should note that he received aid -- in paris the only public function that your wife attended. is that correct? >> does correct. that was entirely to do with road safety. >> observing on a personal note, this world is a long way removed from the world in which your parents inhabited. is that a fair way of describing it? >> well it is and there was an element of deliberateness about it. the first time i took part in a club race, people were standing
around talking about the list of people. some said max mosley, he must be some relation of alice mosley from leicester and i thought i had found a world where it was slightly different. >> thank you. we will move straight now two paragraphs 10 and witness statement. and the date is the 30th of march, 2008. it is an article published in "news of the world." i'm just going to give the heading. we are not going to look at the text. let me just paraphrase one matter and certainly we are not going to go further than that. but the heading is -- [inaudible] >> formula one had with five
hookers. and the article itself links you with your father's. >> yes it does. >> the article appeared on the front page and then on pages four and five of the newspaper. photographs appear which were the result of i think a covert camera in the lapel of woman e as you recall. is that correct? >> that is correct. >> the article is not in the first edition of "news of the world." it was in presumably the second edition. why do you think that was the case? >> i think that was to avoid any danger of me finding out about the article and not being able to stop it from being published. >> this is what you said. the first to know the article is
when it was drawn to your attention and you were given no forewarning by anyone. >> that is correct. it was about 10:00 on a sunday morning. >> the article had two aspects, those personal aspects that goes without saying but overlaid on that was the nazi theme aspect. the nazi theme was particularly damaging. is that right? >> well yes. the other thing was straightforward and very -- which i thought was outrageous but the the not the allegation was completely untrue and to me particularly enormously damaging. i was outraged by that. >> what happened and tell me if i've got this right. on the "news of the world" web site, the -- was placed. is that correct? was it placed, put there in a
way in which it could be copied by others to your knowledge or not? >> my understanding is that there is software that prevents video being copied, but they did not for whatever reason have that software so the video was then copied all over the world. >> i think initially it was removed by the "news of the world," however they have been notified you that they were going to put it back on line and that prompted you to apply for an emergency injunction. have i got that right? >> i think that's right from memory. we asked them to take it down and then we applied for an injunction, but they put it up again over the weekend even. >> just moving ahead little bit mr. mosley, the precise chronology that the applications in emergency conjunction were heard by the justice the friday afternoon which was the fourth of april and you indicated you
had -- over the weekend and delivered it on monday morning. have i got that right? what happened over the weekend in relation to this? >> as i understand it, they then published a second story of which purported to be an interview but we found out subsequently at the trial that mr. fell becker wrote the article had written it beforehand, ticket up to milton king and said i want you to sign this. here is a thousand pounds and intimated if she didn't sign at her picture would be published on pixel weighted. >> selectman understand this, the article is the previous weekend. >> yes sir. >> it comes with a conjunction. he reserves granting relief over
the weekend. >> that is right. >> and that is when you learned of these other activities? >> yes. >> thank you. and the second article is over that weekend where you told us the circumstances in which was published. in other words no evidence at all. >> no, i mean what happened subsequently is that the woman who was supposed to have given the interview appeared on sky television and said there was no truth to this not see allegation at all. i should've said the main purpose of a story on the sixth of april was to try to stand up against the allegation but she actually didn't turn up at the trial because she was not prepared to perjure herself and secondly, there was no truth whatever to the story. >> hang on, i'm just using chronology because the trial is much later on.
>> end date sir, yes. >> sky news, i'm sorry. sky news came after the trial. i'm so sorry. she didn't turn up at the trial. >> the facts are very much in your mind that i've got them i think but i just want to be clear. >> was three years ago. >> is important to keep chronology in mind and not to rush too far ahead. >> i think we can do without that mr. jay. >> one aspect of the second article which you draw attention to in paragraph 15 of your witness statement at the end, we don't have the article available but they made it clear that the tape was being sent to formula one chiefs, is that correct? >> that's correct.
>> your feeling was when you develop this paragraph 16, that the purpose of the second article was to -- the news. is that correct? >> that is correct. >> now the judgment was given by the justice on the ninth of april which i think most of in a wednesday. it doesn't matter but in terms of summarizing it, its it's outcome, you were unsuccessful principally because the material was already so far into the public domain that there was no practical purpose the justice felt and granting future relief. >> said the damage burst and in another place he said he didn't want to -- he was really saying there was no point in giving a junction.
>> what he did order was that there should be an expedited trial of your privacy. is that correct? >> that is correct. >> and the matter was very considerably expedited because the trial itself -- >> you are going a bit too fast mr. jay. let me just understand it. the justice took the view that there was no point in -- was something that is already happened and if you refuse to release but he did as i understand your evidence, observe there was no legitimate interest, legitimate interest served by the footage at this stage. >> that is correct. >> didn't grant relief in relation to that. if i understand what you have
the 14th of july of 2008. the judgment itself was delivered or handed down on the 24th of july of 2008. >> yes. >> we know that from page 14 which is a judgment which i will count in a moment. so this is all happening very rapidly in the usual course of litigation if i can so describe it. 1.though, was it explained to you that if you decided to take defamation proceedings rather than proceeding to a breach of confidence, that the legal process would be much longer? >> well sir i was told that it would be about 18 months, and that for me would have been really academic because what i needed to do was have it very quickly and the allegation was completely untrue.
>> in terms of the choices which were available to you, on the one hand, you were facing expensive litigation. that is obvious. were you given any idea. i'm not going to ask you about in terms where the win or lose but were you given any idea of how much the litigation might cost? >> yes. when i had my first meeting with counsel, they explained to me very carefully at first of all there is no such thing as certainty in litigation which i was already aware of. that if i lost it would cost 1 million pounds or more. if i won, it would still cost tens of thousands of pounds. by taking the matter to court, the entire private information which i was complaining about would be rehearsed again but in public with all the press there,
which would have been an absolute privilege for anything that was said and the end of all of that, no judge could remove the private information from the public and indeed by going to court i was -- to which the public was aware of. taking all that into account, i thought what they had done was so outrageous, i want to get these people into the witness box and demonstrate that they were liars. the only way to do that was to put it -- this risky and unpleasant process which i then strive to do. >> with any other choice -- not the mike the only other choice was to retreat, and he. >> indeed and of course first of all i felt that was the wrong thing to do, because even if i went to some obscure village in the andes come in a week or two people would know about her thanks to the "news of the
world" information on the internet but i also felt that this was typical of some of the things they do and i was somebody who fortunately had the means and a little bit of knowledge and within 18 months would be free to concentrate anywhere. i felt if i don't do it, who was going to because the number of people they pick on, who have got the means to fight it is infinitesimally small and it really, i mean, one of the terrible things is unless you are very fortunate to have a bit of money you simply can't take this on. >> we will deal with the number of contextual points before we deal with the proceedings. the first is the draft of dissemination around the world with the internet of course is obvious that you touch on 22 of
your witness statement. indeed you point out that the print media alone, there were 790 separate articles written in various u.k. newspapers and on line between the 30th of march march 2008 and a third of june 2008. these articles were all commentary on articles and "news of the world." >> indeed and of course on the internet, it was even more extensive. one example -- though i have very good energetic lawyer in germany and they think they so far shut down 193 different sites which were repeating the news. not shutting down the sides, they call that removing --
>> and the matter itself is obviously of interest to the fia but they commissioned a report for leading counsel here and his report as you make clear in your evidence it has exonerated you. >> yes, he said there is no basis whatever so -- for the false allegations. >> this is paragraph 25. it is an unedited video copy of it that was sent to the presence of the fia by "news of the world" on their instructions. is that correct? >> is correct. that was a matter of complaint in the french courts at a certain point because it was potentially criminal what they did but they simply deliberately sent the entire video inviting
the fia to show it to all the members. >> and the inference said that they were putting some sort of fluke pressure on the fia to let you off. is that what you're saying? >> absolutely. i had the impression from the outset that as soon as i challenged the original story, that the entire resources of news international, news corp. would deploy effectively to try to destroy me. argosy one way of attacking would be to send this thing to the fia and tried get them all to look at it in hopes that they would get rid of me. [inaudible] >> yes, one of the things i did at the outset was i suggested that we should have an extraordinary general assembly and by the membership to vote. they were the ones who were
entitled to tell me i should resign nor should resign so i called the general assembly. everybody wants to say something was allowed to do so. at the end they voted and i won by a substantial majority. >> in relation to the evidence that was used in the civil trial -- >> before we go on to that new topic mr. jay let me ask a new question. two minutes ago you said your energetic lawyers in germany had to shut down 193 different stories on different sites. >> yes. >> is it only in germany you have taken such action? >> oh no. i've done it in a number different countries. i think there is litigation going on in 22 or 23 countries at the moment and it is just an ongoing process because i mean, i am trying to do everything i
can to get this material removed from the web and it's not easy. it's ongoing and it's very expensive. germany is actually number one of example because of the nazi thing. it got very much picked up in germany. >> how many sites have you been able to close down? if you don't know exactly and just trying to get a feel for the size? >> the order of magnitude. it's in the hundreds. my lawyers could probably give us an exact figure. one of the difficulties is that google has these automatic search machines. if you google my google my name that will appear and we have been saying to google, you shouldn't do this. this material is illegal and these pictures are illegal. they say we are not obliged to please the web and we don't want to please the web so we had brought proceedings against them and actually in germany where the jurisprudence is favorable.
we are also considering ring proceedings against california but the fundamental point is that google could stop this material from appearing but they don't. it's a matter of principle and my position is, it's the search engines where if somebody was to stop the search engines from producing the material, the sites don't really matter because without the search engine nobody's going to find it. the really dangerous things are the search engines. >> that is part of the problem. >> indeed. >> the evidence before the justice, this is quite complicated and sometimes if i