tv Book TV After Words CSPAN January 29, 2012 9:00pm-10:00pm EST
the sense that we now have when you call a crisis of global power in the subtitle. >> guest: it is. to be perfectly frank, i thought american might be last but they would last longer. i think it is now clear that we are moving into an age in which part because of our missteps but in the larger measure because of the character the world is no longer susceptible to the domination by the civil power. >> host: in this what you talk about the broad shift we from the 500 yearlong domination of the atlantic powers ending up on
the other side of the pond in the united states to shift for asia and the end of the era of the west global supremacists you talk about the need to enlarge the west as a way of a million reading the effect of the change. can you elaborate and what you mean when you say that if we don't follow the policy dire consequences could in sioux. >> it's not just on the question of power it is also on the question of the philosophical and ethical and moral content. if we are to have a world in which people eventually managed to cooperate to govern themselves on a global scale we have to have a world in which there is to some significant degree a universal political culture and i do believe that the west for all of its historical shortcomings and
scathing in my book and discussing the shortcomings because they have to be admitted for all of the shortcomings, the west was still today represents the most acceptable and workable universally workable political culture which is respect for others self-determination in the constitutionalism, respect of the law and acceptance of certain basic rules based on certain universal prepossessions for what is good and what is bad. that is the central message of the west and addition of course the technological initiative innovation come pre-eminence and power. so my argument is that the west to maintain itself and to preserve what is valuable about it has to pay an eminent role and that it is justified by the
need for the west but that the west to perform it well also has to become a broad and wide and increase others that are today part of the west and i specifically focused very much will only on the american european relationship as the hard core of the west, but on the shared need both of europe and america to partaken that enlargement through inclusion, cooperation in time i have no illusions about this of both russia and turkey into the west and maybe some joining countries and between and that is part of the strategic message and of course the other part of the message in the book is how the united states and the west should manage its relationship with the other half of the world which for some time to come was
centered in the far east and to some extent southeast asia. >> let's talk about that in a moment but i would like to hone in more on this question of the west and enlarging within days. during the cold war period, the west was more or less a concrete thing. you have formal alliances, defense treaties. do you mean that the west should be enlarged in this sense in some sort of a structure or power block or much more of a conceptual expansion of the value systems that you are referring to? >> guest: it's something else altogether. in a sense it is all of the things that you mentioned in the beginning that it doesn't just have to be one of them in other words i don't envision the west being compulsive. everybody. but i do think that nato is needed and so some parts of the west can be united in an
organization that enhances the security and gives recognition to the importance of security. he wouldn't have the west based on the financial and economic arrangements. but again, not necessarily to the same degree for all parts of the west. think of the year autozone and the other members of the european union that are not in the year ozone they are still part of the west and so forth. >> host: would include russia as a part of nato? >> guest: i don't expect that to be soon. you may have a lot of steps in between. sure if russia wants to be part of the larger security system, find. but without it being spelled necessarily in some sort of archer refashion russia has to prove its part of the west by
meeting the fundamental standards which define the west. >> host: this should be promoted with an eye to what is happening in the east and asia in the rise of china coming in here to talk about what you think should be the whole of the united states in the future. in the west the u.s. should remain i suppose in its role of a promoter and a guarantor of the creature and a broader unity. in the east be distinguished america's role saying that we should be the balancer and conciliator between the major powers. can you explain that a little bit more why these need to be separate roles? >> guest: in the case of europe we were engaged in the world for and had to be engaged in the world war because the two world wars were still fought on
a promise that the victor would dominate the world, and i think it is correct to say that the world wouldn't be better off if it was a stalinism. today that is no longer the issue. in the east is not going to dominate the world. the danger today in my view is that if we do not do the things i say in my book, and i'm thinking of it strategically, the world will succumb to greater and greater turmoil. the world is now not only composed of competitive states that should be as possible cooperative states. it's also composed, and this is a very major historical discontinue the that is composed now of what i call global political awakening, the population of the world is activated in its political conscience, it's politically restless and resentful it is
angry and therefore it is a much more complicated process. and our role in that setting and in the far east should be to try to conciliate also to balance between the major protagonists without doing what we did in europe becoming directly involved in the conflict. >> you have been given a good deal of credit in the last year for your press and preceding the there was this global political awakening on the horizon because it seems to have been expressed in the arab spring movement and you talked about that i believe in a piece you did back in 2008. how far do you think that spreads now? does it spread to china? it could be spreading to russia now with what we seem to be seeing as rebellion against
vladimir putin. >> guest: i think it's spreading. it is a universal phenomenon which manifests itself with different degrees of intensity and places and other places depending on the historical circumstances and things which stimulate that a weakening. but generally speaking, the world is now politically weakened and in some places like in russia right now we are beginning to see the emergence for the first time of something which can be generally called a civic society that is to say part of the middle class more than younger people in the middle class in russia, people who are physically comfortable and people who are now part of the world because of the internet but even more important because of travel and education we don't have that in china.
it may come. in fact they are due in my book that by 2015 it is very likely to have come and even earlier but it will take more time because the chinese government which has different values and different priorities than the ones i've spoken of, and like the soviets or even like putin is an intelligent government. it's more sophisticated. it's more skillful and very important economically successful. that creates a great deal of stability and continuity and also capacity to resist the process of change. >> host: let's talk about that a little bit because you do make a point of contrasting the rising china with the two major powers in the 20th century that you see got caught up in self delusion about how powerful they were in protecting the power one was of course not see germany
and the other was the soviet union. >> guest: there was also a third which diluted itself more nicely but equally wrongheaded leave that is to say the united states in the last 20 years in the 21st century you know who was saying that, george w. bush was saying that and then we match that with unilateralism that became self-destructive and self isolating. >> host: but china. they seem to be very cautious in their strategic approach to the economic rise. wasn't it natural when you have the rapid rise of the power that the hubris self delusion sets and perhaps it is too early for china to reach that point, but you do talk quite a bit in your book about the pitfalls of the rising china's to describe that
how long you think they can remain as you say an intelligent rising power. >> guest: i'm going to be a little resistant about responding on the left because i fear the to tendencies in our view in the united states. one is to demonize them out of concern and i thing we are over doing that already. and the other one is to take refuge in the assumption that automatically china is going to falter and kind of quiet we say to ourselves it is a challenge. maybe neither will happen that much, but there is no doubt there is a tendency in china which can be self deceptive, and i are doing the book cautiously that russia may be an example of something that china may be able to avoid for a while and postpone but nonetheless cannot entirely evade. namely in the soviet union you
have a self selecting elite that was perpetuating itself, it over time because it is arbitrary in power by force it is an elite that suffers a gradual degradation of its quality. i think they are aware of it or are introduced in the systematic regular shifts at the top leadership every four years. it's very good. that's going to give them more innovation within the leadership but to the extent that it is so controlled and arbitrary, it cannot entirely avoided the risks of the gradual decline of the quality because it does eliminate certain sources of innovation, alternative modes of thinking, new ideas or whatever, dissent even. >> host: you know a number of
observers, china observers and experts suggest that there will be some kind of reckoning particularly with their political system in the way that you describe something worse, but it does seem the current policy of china seems to be i wouldn't call with humility because you talk to various east asian leaders, the chinese do seem to like to throw their weight away any regional way but it does seem to be rather restrained in terms of protecting themselves as a global power. in your book you say that the global calling card as you term it is china's extraordinary growth. but again, i wonder will that last. right now we haven't seen too much of an assertion of a china model. an alternative model to the west even though one hears the term
beijing concensus occasionally. but do you think that we will see that? >> guest: we are beginning to see it. i also site in my book examples of chinese triumphalism of pounding your chest and saying how badly you guys are doing and there's more and more of that even though very explicitly at monished but which contain an admonition to be restrained to take too much credit and to be patient. there is still a great deal of patience but there is also some triumphalism and that is inherent in that kind of situation. nonetheless, look china existed as a state for 6,000 years and for most of its history was successful. the last century was extremely bad for china perhaps the worst because in addition to the occasional internal disarray which is the experience before
they were humiliated from the outside. the was a cultural shock which they present to this day and if you provoke them it erupts violently. and because of that, i think the chinese are going to be very deliberately self-conscious about how well they are doing and how badly they are doing and maybe they will not make these mistakes which some of us at least self-serving lee tend to anticipate because they think the thought is if the chinese falter the what kind of relieved us of the lack of success. >> host: let's go back to how the u.s. is or is not managing this crisis of global power and as you term it but in the book you criticize president obama because as you write, he has,
quote, failed to speak directly to the american people about america's changing role in the world and its demand. can you explain that criticism and why you think that he has failed to do that? >> he hasn't done it sufficiently because i do give him credit for the speeches particularly in the early phase of the presidency in which he demonstrated to my view a great deal of historic namely the sense of what happened in the world which is changing. but he hasn't persisted in that because of he discovered that the implication of doing it is doing certain things which may be difficult or on the popular and therefore is held back and he faces the additional difficulty that in my judgment the american public is so woefully ignorant about the world that this is a monumental task which is far beyond even the present. yet the president has to take
the lead but we also have to think very hard about our educational system and our information system. because today, and i demonstrate this with a lot of statistics in fact, the american public is just appalling ignorance about the global geography of the global history or international affairs or significant events abroad. most americans live in the world in which they are forced first of all to make a living and second, in which they escapes from the difficulty of struggling into the world not of information but of entertainment at the lowest level. >> host: can you elaborate what sort of unpopular thing the president obama or president romney or someone else need to do to prepare america for this new role? >> guest: we talked about it. one is to some of the educational work, but i'm saying
if he were to do that that's not enough. he's got to have a system which encourages a responsiveness to that kind of input from the president which means an educational system for the geography of the world what the geography in place. i have statistics in my book that shows that americans couldn't identify the pacific ocean and the map and couldn't find that on the map and so forth, couldn't forget new york city in many cases, and we have in the educational system which gives low perception of the downside will was about which some to demagogic for example of the 9/11 the kind of tendency to identify that horrible event with the world of islam is first of all wrong factually, seconded is very dangerous and damaging to us. so those are some of the examples of what has to be
overcome on the system x scale not just by the individual or the presidency, but by the national awareness particularly the process of self awakening that if we are to live in a world which is increasingly interdependent and which people are now assertive, not just we but the rest of the bold, we have to learn how to relate to double by knowing what it is like and how its problems are our problems and to be our problems. if america does in the long-term decline doesn't manage its internal problems and going to your book about what will the consequences become you talk about a number of as you call them geopolitical victims of the process can you talk about that a little, who would the biggest victims be?
>> guest: before i answer that and make a general statement i think if american soldiers there is not a world dominated by the chinese but the world is going to be increasingly chaotic because i don't see the next 20 or 30 years in the country even a very successful china beyond its current success be mailed to play the kind of role we thought we could play we tried badly to play in the last 20 years and i don't think that that can be undone the rest goes back to what we started talking about earlier. but in so far as sort of dealing with the question of imminent threat concerned there are a certain number of countries on the fault lines mean. that isn't just a small country. it's also a country which provides a major source of independent energy to europe, so
there are major consequences, geopolitically that falters in its independence. if ukraine gets reduced by russia it will move to the west much more slowly and we would be less likely to take place. >> host: this would happen as russia fulfilling -- mix of corrine that could be china and north korea and and taking it advantage of the resulting uncertainty is and a number of other countries, it could be eventually in israel if we are pushed out of the middle east in part because of our own mistakes and the conflict goes on, but the united states is out of the picture what are the prospects come a long term security prospects for israel, good question but not a very hopeful prospect. so these are some of the uncertainties that would arise for the countries that i would call the endangered not species of endangered states.
>> host: how much will the military power be a part of the equations, particularly when it comes to asia? and members of us journalists have spoken to the administration officials recently about what is described as a reorientation of power towards the asia pacific with an eye towards rising china in the wake of the withdrawal from iraq and afghanistan. i think president obama sees this as something as a corrective, too much focus and to much application of the resources to the middle east, and there is some evidence that there is even something of an arms race going on between the u.s. and china, and very much of the changing role for what has traditionally been the protection of the u.s. power and the asia-pacific and the south china sea where the carriers are now vulnerable better increasing
the technology the chinese ballistic missiles and so forth so it's a jury complex picture. can you sort it out a little bit? i know you to address it in your book. >> guest: let me first say that what i do think of american engagement in the far east across the pacific is a natural thing for us to undertake. i do not think that the way to define it is to somehow or another to relate its greater sycophant for us to the deepening military role of the united states and southwest asia specifically afghanistan and iraq, and i don't think it is particularly effective or persuasive to even illustrate that by announcing we are going to deploy 500 marines and australia. i find that to be on the verge of the absurdity.
what would imply in a larger sense i also disagree with because it would imply if we are really serious about it that we are going to do what we did in europe and in our earlier discussion there is a difference between what we have to do in europe with what is today needed in the far east because we are not going to dominate the far east. we don't need to engage some sort of a cold war with china if we are smart. and china needs us just as we need china we will do better meeting with britain did in europe during the 19th century which strike a balance between the powers hopefully thereby maintaining the situation which no one sees itself so powerful to the force and the same time we do what we can to promote what we have to promote in europe. we have to promote in europe franco-german reconciliation.
that in turn meant that the german who wish reconciliation. polish rock and reconciliation might be next on the agenda. i think that we could do a great deal but protecting japan and remaning its allies to promote the japanese chinese reconciliation. and the chinese might not. we can do the same may be between china and india but the last thing we should be giving is signaling that we are not going to be involved militarily somehow and maintaining the balance among the asian powers that are rising that are likely to be very nationalistic and could be easily provoked or among each other and we may even find them and asia that either relives the tragedy that europe experienced in the torian century or when we find ourselves drawn into the conflict as a party to the conflict on the agreement, and i
find it very hard to imagine anything more self destruction of for the united states than that. >> host: from everything and stand the pentagon is planning for some kind of military agency in the pacific. the air and the sea battle. >> and for what? we are obviously engaged by the treaty to the security with japan. we are committed to the freedom of navigation. i don't see the pentagon planning for the war either involving china and japan in some fashion or involving india and pakistan and china and some other fashion. >> host: you see in your book that the u.s. should not allow what some to be drawn into the war. you're saying your save for the security treaty with japan and korea. we are still somewhat baffled by the law.
in 1979 the taiwan relations act. >> guest: i also address specifically that issue in the book when i say as a matter of common sense we have to face the fact that we as a country have recognized under president nixon and secretary kissinger the notion that taiwan and china say that there's only one china. and we also have to face the fact if we want to have a stable relationship with china we cannot indefinitely keep arming tie one so they can remain separate from china even though at the same time taiwan is increasing its link with the mainland and vice versa and with its rapidly deily careerbuilder growing trade with the movement of people and hundreds of thousands of what we are selling in china and the mainland near shanghai and some reconciliation between them is likely and we should not obstruct this. we should try to facilitate it
and there are formulas which i discuss in more detail in my book. not just the subordination of taiwan to china. china said to speak, but different systems. >> host: are these an extension of the ideas that you had when you were the national security adviser? obviously diplomatic relations were established during your time in office. do you see this as a natural extension of what happened? >> guest: when i engaged in secret negotiations with the chinese with him personally on the unification we talked about china as a part of the pravachol. and i told him look, don't expect us to abandon taiwan, which he wanted us to do. don't expect us to accept your demand that will not sell arms to the taiwanese. we cannot do that because if we
did that there would be an of people in the area. that would not permit a stable relationship between you and us and it could even draw us into some kind of a conflict. let us accept the principle. that's what i told him, let us accept the principle this week to some extent government, governed by a process of historical change. history will resolve it. and we have already accepted under our predecessors nixon and kissinger the notion of the one china. so this will work out. but let's not try to accelerate it to the point that it backfires. but in the long run, why not? and then later on when i visited china as a private citizen from he used the location of my visit quite deliberately to have himself and be photographed together talking, and he issued a statement which accompanied that photograph to the effect that china henceforth will propagate the notion of one china to the systems and use
that as a basis for resolving its relationship with hongkong. and that includes an effect a great deal of autonomy from hong kong but the presence of the chinese army in hong kong to be licensed and started articulating the point of view which i shared with the chinese and other locations that ought to evolves into one of china, several systems, in other words, china and hong kong, one kind of arrangement, and then another kind of arrangement to get china and taiwan another kind of arrangement specifically in that case excusing, excluding the deployment of the chinese people's army on tie one. it's a historical process and if you have the historical perspective and they do, and we should, they existed 6,000 years and then 200 years.
and it's going to work out. but neutral the sharp lines or insist on the immediate change neither will work. >> host: the system seems to have worked in hong kong has allowed it to prosper. >> guest: i can envision quite literally in keeping my formula one china and several systems. >> host: let's talk a little bit more about the u.s. should be doing or perhaps doing wrong now the deployment of the u.s. marines in australia somewhat dismissively but as we understand this is a part of a very concerted effort at the alliance building by the obama administration in asia, renewing
ties with the philippines, even hillary clinton, secretary of state visit to myanmar, the first to that country under recently as part of an effort to build ties with a circle of countries that have had somewhat rocky relations with china. now the chinese have not reacted well to this and you read their officials press the see this as encirclement and even if containment. do you think this is not a wise policy that is being pursued, or do you think that it could be conducted better? >> guest: i would say that it is unobjectionable, and on objectionable policy. if it is not notarized by words which give it connotations, which are in my judgment not in
their interest, and probably not implemented because i find you don't think whatever our intentions are that we would ever get engaged in the ground war with china and say to the defense of burma, myanmar or hanoi for that matter. so i see no point in producing the mutual aggravation by using words or engaging in a symbolic actions that would convey wrong intentions or not the intentions the would serve the our national interest because the effect of the matter is the united states is not going to have the power to be the assertive arbiter of the far east the way it could be and was in europe. we have to be a player what we have to be a player much more sophisticated much more like great britain and terrapin the 19th century, and that is what i argue in my book. >> host: and you think that the u.s. administration's
clarified what they will or would not do in asia in terms of actions that might be taken out side of the already binding treaty relations that we have with japan. >> guest: we could have perhaps a clear definition of the of objectives and not be stampeded into the theorizing about the particular mostly military strategies, offshore hedging and stuff of this sort. and i think we probably want to ask ourselves how long with the chinese feel comfortable which they no longer do in any case with american overflights right on the edge of their territory how would it be like the chinese bombers flying on the edge of california nor necessarily with the demonstrable presence and
the immediacy of the seaports how would we feel this was reciprocated? in the brief we have to have a notion that within the changing world in which it is no more possible for any power us or anybody else to be traditionally dominant how do we define it a leading role in the most sophisticated and intelligent fashion. >> host: and as the chinese become more sophisticated at military technology that includes the ballistic missiles that can reach as far as the 1700 miles away apparently right now as far as the cyber warfare i would think that it would be wise for the u.s. to pull back. >> guest: we have learned to do that with the russians. what i'm saying about us and the chinese is in no way different from what we have learned in our reciprocal relationship with the russians. they could destroy almost all of the american cities in the
course of six hours and i have to deal with that in the capacity how it's supposed to be responsive for coordinating if something happened. we could wipe out all of russia in six hours more efficient than knous. if we continue to maintain the kind of competition the most characteristic of the 20th century we would end up with the chinese and us in the silent to the position. >> host: we may be entering one right now in your book you talk about the concept of the global system of rivalry. explain to me what you mean by that. >> guest: it's interesting you pick that because when i wrote this i said to myself it was a surprise to me when i thought of it and i said other people must have thought of this before.
and i looked around and i didn't find any indication. it was a very simple idea. manly today when you are talking about america and china or america and russia, what ever, you can instantly smooths out of the statistics and comparisons in the very activities of efficiency, crime, corruption, armament, income, longevity and so forth, and you have instances of these comparative data which assess progress and standings and rivalries and so forth. and it dawned on me that that was absolutely not the case even as recently as 150 years ago me the even as recently as on world war i people were not aware what. today we live in the world is now so interactive that we are comparing ourselves and measuring ourselves precisely
and in a way it is a good thing because this kind of systemic rivalry puts much more emphasis on who has hired and who has lower child mortality. what is longevity in their respective countries? what our standards of living? what are the levels of education and highways medicine dispersed and so forth? i think it leads to a much more sophisticated notion of competition in the world which everyone claims a rightful share to a decent life and keenly aware of its deprivation by watching every day this place of great wealth, self gratification come extraordinary greed in some parts of the world. >> host: and less lethal in the days compared to when the empire with each other in the
treasury and how good your military polis was. now we have in tie your social systems defeating. but i also wonder whether in the era when as you say the world was coming together and there is more similarity between political and economic systems setting aside the chinese political system for example, but with the enlargement of the west whether perhaps not unlike the earlier era when a was a question of how much had the treasury of the military was now is just a question of how good your education system is and. >> guest: the chinese are the first to produce a global comparative analysis of the leading universities in the world and they produce once a year and report on the leading 500 universities in the world and it is a reasonably good report without any hesitation that lists the first 20 as being
too exceptions, american and they don't posture their own achievements but they do convey a sense of awareness and that's great. and also incidentally when you said earlier apart from the chinese when you said the system is for less universal, you know, shanghai i think most american business or shanghai very different from new york city except the part of the chinese structure themselves. >> host: this is another reason why we have to leave antiquated notion is of hegemony and military superiority and the old imperial jostling behind us and look at it in a very different way. >> guest: i don't want to sound as a pacifist but maybe that is coming with age. yes, military superiority, military security, yes but we have to be very deliberate that
what i consider to be my security could be a source of threat to you and vice versa and that is the name of the game and we must start moving in that direction with concerns about nuclear weapons, with efforts to contain the skilled diplomat and nuclear weapons, and it has now become more comprehensive. >> guest: i would like to go back to your career as a little bit to the deluded to this question not having been accused during the carter at fenestration as a hard-liner in the soviet union and the influence with secretary of state was considered one of the -- >> guest: i wasn't lying for influence of him. [laughter] >> host: okay. fair enough. fair enough. but it is interesting that you did not take a long seen
different as kissinger and taunt that was in some ways a precursor to the approach that the reagan and administration leader took in raising questions about the viability of a system. you promoted the helsinki final accord focus on human rights a great deal, and of course the leader history of the decline and collapse of the soviet union indicates that the was a jury significant factor that as many of these groups in the soviet bloc and eastern europe began to increase human rights the was the beginning of the end. you know, i'm just curious whether this date three decades later in your views during those early discussions with the cold war was still going on? >> guest: at the risk of sounding self promoting i have to say yes i do feel that way and i deplore the fact that
reagan got more of my program them nixon's notions. nixon had the view that was basically status quo. you keep what you have, we keep what you have. we won't meddle in yours, you don't meddle in hours. it was totally different. i viewed stalinism as equally horrible, and i was always convinced that the soviet union had to be transformed or encouraged and i make no bones of the fact that i favored encouraging synergy and halt the process along because they are avoided in the horrible explosion. but i think the world became immediately much safer with the collapse of the soviet union and
i think the global conditions today in the world are such that that kind of competition in the nazis is no longer relevant and therefore we have to have the kind of approach that you and i have been discussing over the last hour. >> host: that was my next question is there any way in which those experiences that you had when you were the national security adviser under president carter informed the thinking in this book because it does seem of the conclusions of the book as you just suggested or different in approach from the hard-line approach that you are ascribed to have during the carter administration. >> guest: i think the nature of the challenge has changed. in the carter administration we are facing the soviet union which was lobbying the notion of the deterrent was a the same time proclaiming that it would replace us and would push us out
of the game and dominate the world, and in that kind of a zero sum game, i felt we ought to exploit the advantages that we have and the weaknesses from which they suffer. i think today the issue is no longer whether we will dominate the world or whether the chinese will dominate the world if we don't. i think the issue is we can all be consumed by mounting the global turmoil which would unleash the residual forces of hatred and dissent and animist that dominates so much of the human relations and therefore we have to be much more intelligent, much more prudent and return to our initial discussion is a much more conscious of the importance of propagating success for our values so that some day we move into a genuinely global community that is based on the shared universal political
culture. another aspect of that is the question of dealing with rising radical islam which is something that again is national security adviser you would put this to in the early days of the islamic revolution in iran dealings with the ouster of the shaw and of course we still cannot be radicalized the nuclear iran today with and the balance of power in the middle east about how it should be resolved in the past experience is. >> guest: the larger issue of the islamic fundamentalism and extremism and moderation and
more narrowly the confined issue of iran we diluted to in our discussion namely icy it isn't extremism as a minority in the islamic world but it's a big world because even the minority phenomena can be some sycophant if we are not careful. therefore we should be the reprint is not stimulating it but in a kind of black/white confrontation with the islamic fundamentalism as a shorthand definition of all of islam and is counterproductive and leads to the abuse of civil rights and many muslim americans in this country which is something that we will come to regret in the years to come because we have been treating some of the injury, very badly. but on the geopolitical level, we have to rather work with forces which are by far the predominant force of islam and that ranges from morocco of we don't indonesia and almost every
place the fundamentalist extremist minority and requires a think a diplomatic intelligence approach to prevent them to stop helping them become the majority. on iran we have the presidents of dealing successfully with the soviet and chinese nuclear threat which is far greater and that much larger. i don't want them to have a nuclear bomb but i don't think it will prevent them from having a if there has to be a showdown with iran over acquiring the nuclear weapon. one that is evident that they are acquiring it because it is still somewhat unclear whether they are seeking it or whether they want to be close to having but not getting it. and if we go to the war and we have to do it with others, absolutely. it's not to be a repetition of iraq for afghanistan. if we go to the war alone we will suffer all the consequences and those countries that can wish to be our rifles and whose
animals we have no special-interest would take advantage of it on russia and maybe china and may be india. i think the world would be laughing at us because of the war with iran in order to prevent iran from having the nuclear weapon when the of survived 3,000 years they are intelligent people in which the defense minister of israel says that the moment the of the first bomb they are going to attack israel they are not an existential threat. so i have to start a war over that would be to plunge the global economy to crisis, to engage ourselves in the conflict to take advantage of those that would not wish us well. >> what more can be done? there is already evidence there may be a covert war or series of covert actions taking place which the u.s. and israel together may be to some extent
responsible for. >> guest: we have to be careful not because if we are not careful we will fuse the fundamentalists with the nationalism and it's not in our interest. our interest is to separate the two because eventually many of the preconditions for a space revolution of iran the kind turkey has experienced are there but we have to pursue the policy which either limits the ability of the fundamentalists to be a threat or encourages even the physical political displacement. if we engage in activities which we wouldn't want others to pursue which means assassinating people come interfering and so forth, we perpetuate the regime and they get stronger. >> host: let's talk a little bit more about what's gone wrong with the united states closing minutes here. i do go into some detail about that in your book.
it's interesting. there was another passage from your earlier but the grand transport that came back to me. where you talked about as we become increasingly multicultural as a society and more difficult it will be to fashion a consensus on foreign policy foreign threat. it's interesting that since then, you read that in 1998 and since then you've had 9/11, and yet you have this deep disagreement in this country over the conduct of the response of the threat that the iraq war we seem to have if anything a much greater sense of division now than we had when jimmy carter was running for president against ronald reagan. talk about how serious you think those problems are and how do we resolve them?
>> guest: why don't have a process for the resolution. i think i have identified some of the problems. i hope i have in the book. i also have tried to identify some simultaneously some of the sources of recovery, some of the assets that we have that we could explore more effectively. and i think drawing on those is the way to go. and that brings us back to some of the discussion that we engaged in earlier, namely the great deal of the problem rests on the fact that america while globally engaged as a society is remarkably self isolated and we have to overcome that. we have to understand the world better and more clearly. one of the purposes of this book is not so much as to provide a prescription for the solutions, but it's to provide a perspective on the bottled that will be healthier, more historically relevant, and thereby also facilitate some of the needed domestic accommodations. i don't want to exaggerate the potential for that but i hope
the book contributes to it to some extent because a great deal of the public discussion today in the united states, either about the domestic amendments or about our foreign conundrums reflects extraordinary simplicity of false and kind of extremist positions, get rid of the government, free america from the clutches of washington and stuff like that. what does it mean? what does it mean to the family whose team members are ill and has to have some medical care? what does it mean for people who've had jobs for 20 years and are displaced and cannot find alternatives? it is some of the basic problems of the human existence in america is the basic self. host could you see it as more vulgarized or polarized as it was in the late 70's leading up to the era of ronald reagan?
obviously there was a very tough fight between reagan and carter, different views. >> guest: i think there was less of the total cleavage, and the discussion for all of its shortcomings in the discussion is a kind of simplification and generalization. i think what is frankly in the higher level than some of the discussion that we've been listening to recently. where everything is presented literally in black and white and the president is accused of not being born in the united states are being a marxist or socialist. we didn't have that. even in the debates between ronald reagan and carter or even between mcgovern or nexium or between cold water and johnson. >> host: in the final moments here i would like you to reflect back a little bit more on your time as the national security adviser in the carter
administration held that informs your thinking now. you were involved in the peace process in some ways of the camp david accord that you were a part of were i guess the last successful u.s.-led negotiations , and doesn't understand, president carter was very fearfully for president sinnott's health. i believe he said he bought at one point in your pajamas to make sure that that was okay. could you just reflect on that a little bit briefly? >> guest: there may be some movement that he wanted peace among the more extremist elements in the egyptian etc, but the basic lesson that i learned from that on that specific issue is the palestinian problem will never be solved alone for different
reasons. they are weak and divided. the israelis are strong and entrenched. there is simply no point for compromise. week after week to compromise, the strong are the strong to be agreed with compromise. so, if there is to be a resolution, it has to come from the outside. from the outside it's still the united states put on the united states that is then determined and clear and fashioning what would then become acceptable in the party is and in the historical perspective and a gift justice and self respect to the palestinians and self-determination as well and gives security and self-respect and the permanent constructive role in the middle east to the israelis. in fact, my judgment, if there was peace, and intelligence peace pushed by the united states, israel and palestine would torian