tv Book TV After Words CSPAN February 5, 2012 11:00am-12:00pm EST
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you wrote that america is not only the first as was the only truly global superpower. you wrote it is also likely to be the very last. is this book in some way, here current book a sequel to that earlier book in a sense that we now have what you call a crisis of global power in your subtitle? >> guest: unavoidably it is. to be perfectly frank, i thought america may people have come
commit that they would last longer. we are moving in h. and which in part because the thermostat, but in a larger measure because the changing global vision, the book is no longer suspect that will to domination by a single power. >> host: and this book, you talk about the product shipped to the way from a 500 year long period if domination of the atlantic powers, starting with europe, sort of ending on the other side of the pond with the united states. the shift towards asia and the end of the era of the west global supremacy. you talk about the need to quote unquote in large concept of the west is the way of them know you're reading the effects of
this change. can you elaborate on that and what you mean when you say that we don't follow policy, dire consequences could ensue? >> guest: is not only a question of power. it's also a question of philosophical, ethical moral content. if we are to have a world in which people eventually manage to cooperate to self govern themselves on a global scale, we have to have a world in which there is to some significance a degree, a universal political culture. and i do believe the west for all its historical shortcomings, they have to be admitted, for the shortcomings, the west still today represents the most acceptable and workable universally workable political culture, which is respect for
others, self-determination and constitutionalists a, respective lives, acceptance of certain asic rules based on certain universal predisposition with what is good and what is that. that is a central message of the west and the tech or logical initiative innovation, preeminent in some respects power. so my argument is the west to maintain itself to preserve what is valuable about it has to play an imminent roll up the tableaux justified by the need for the west, but that the west to perform the also has to become brighter, whiter and embrace others but not yet part of the west. i specifically focused very much not only on the american european relationship, but the
heart and core of the west. on europe and america to critique and that enlargement through inclusion cooperation and time. no illusions about this at both russia and your e. in the west and maybe some adjoining countries in between. but that is part of the strategic message. the other strategic message is that the united states in the west particularly the united states, should manage its relationship with the other half of the world, which for some time to come this click the to be centered preeminently in the far east and to some extent in southwest asia. >> host: let's talk to his back in a moment. i'd like to hone in on the west enlarging what that is. during the cold war period, the west was more or less made
though, form alliances, defense treaties. do you mean that the way should be enlarged in this sense, some sort of an alliance structure or a power pop? or is it much more as a conceptual expansion of value systems are referring? >> guest: is something else altogether. the fun things you mentioned the beginning that has two be just one of them. in other words, i can envision the west being composed of everybody being a nato. but i do think nato is needed. so some parts of the west can be united in an organization that enhances the security in case recognition to the importance of security. he would have a west which simultaneously is based on enlargement of financial and economic arrangements. but again, not necessarily to disintegrate to all parts of the
west. think of the euro zone and think of the other members of the european union that are not in the euro zone. and so forth. >> host: with that potentially say russia is a part of nato? >> guest: i don't expect that to be soon. you may have a lot of steps in between. eventually if russia wants to be part of a larger security system, fine. but without it being spelled out necessarily in some sort of arbitrary fashion, russia also has to prove that is part of the west by the fundamental standards, which defined the west. >> host: and they should be accomplished, should be promoted with an eye towards happening in the east, in asia. the rising china. and here you talk about what you think should be there to ogle of the united states in the future.
in the west, the u.s. should remain as a provider and guarantor of crater, cracker community. and it used to distinguish america's role saying we should eat the balancer and conciliator between the major powers. can you explain more why pc to be be separate roles? >> guest: because in the case of europe, and two world wars we had to be engaged in these two world wars because these two world wars worse though thought on the premise that big two would dominate the world. and i think it is correct to say and morally right to say that the worlds wouldn't be better off if there was hitlerism. today that is no longer the issue. the issue is not going to dominate the world.
the danger today in my view is that if we do not do the same if a fan made up and am thinking of it strategically, though, to crater and greater is not only composed of competitive states if possible composed and nature historical continuity. it is composed of what i call global political opening. it is politically conscious. it's politically restless. it's politically resentful. it's historically angry in a much more complicated process. and particularly in the fiery should be tried to can fill the eight, the two balance between the major protagonists without what we did in europe, becoming
directly involved. >> guest: >> host: you have been given a good deal of credit in the last year for your price pisceans and receiving this global political awakening because it seems to have been expressed in the arab spring is meant. and he talked about that i believed in an op-ed piece he did in 2008. >> guest: and even earlier in my books. >> host: yeah, how far do you think that spreads now? it could be spreading to russia even now with what we seem to be seen as the rebellion again vladimir putin. >> guest: is a phenomenon. it's a universal phenomenon, which nonetheless manifested out with different degrees of intensity in other places depending on historical circumstances which stimulate the awakening.
in some places like in russia right now, we are beginning to see the emergence for the first down which is genuinely called a civic society. that is to say part of the middle class currently by the younger people in the middle class, people who are now to some extent physically comfortable and people who are now part of the world because of the internet, but even more importantly because of travel and education, we don't have that yet in china. and they come. in fact, i argue in my book, the debt it will take more time in the chinese government which has different values and different priorities than the ones i've spoken on. unlike the soviets or even like
putin it's an intelligent government. it's more sophisticated. it's more skillful and very important economically successful. it creates a greater degree of stability and also continuity and also capacity to resist the process of change. >> host: let's talk about that a little bit because you do make a point of contrasting a rising china with the two major powers in the 20th century that she say got caught up in the dilution about how powerful they were. one was not the journey and the otherwise the soviet union. >> guest: excuse me for internet team. there was a third was deluded itself, but equally wrongheaded way. that is to say the united states proclaimed for the 20 years. the entire 21st century of
sars. george w. bush was saying that i'm a match that with unilateralist and that became soft start to himself isolating. >> host: but china, okay, fine. they seem to be cautious in their strategic approach to the economic rise. but isn't it natural, particularly when you have the rapid rise of the power that the hubris self-delusions that fan, perhaps it's too early for china to reach that point, but should you talk in your book about the pitfalls of a rising china. so describe that. how long do you think they can remain an intelligent rising power? >> guest: i'll be persistent to respond nonetheless. i have two tendencies in a review of china today. one is to demonize them. out of concern. and i think were over doing that
already. and the other one is to take refuge in the assumption that automatically china is going to fold and status a challenge, that they're going to bet themselves. maybe neither will happen that much. but there's no doubt there is a tendency in china, which can be perceptive. and i argue cautiously that russia may be an example of that china may be able to avoid for a while and postpone, and i cannot entirely evade. yet it's also a dana leaked that was perpetuating itself and over time because it's an arbitrary relief and getting itself in power by force, it is an elite but also soldiers a gradual degradation.
i think the chinese face that danger. they are aware of it. for example, they've reached the systematic regularize shift every four years. it's very good. it's going to give them more innovation within the leadership. but to the extent that it is self controlled and arbitrary, it cannot entirely avoid the risks of a gradual to climb of quarantine because it doesn't live in a certain source of innovation alternative modes of thinking, new ideas or whatever. >> host: and you know, a number of observers, china observers said just that there will be some kind of a reckoning, particularly with their political system in the way that you describe or something worse. but it does seem to -- the current policy of china does seem to be -- i wouldn't call it
humility because he talked to various east asian leaders. the chinese do that to throw their weight around under the regionally, but it does seem to be rather restrained in terms of projecting themselves a global power. and your book you say that the global calling card is determine as china's extraordinary gdp growth. but it can, i wonder what that last. right now we haven't seen too much of an assertion of the china model -- alternative model to the west even know when here's the term beijing consensus occasionally. do you think we will see that no? >> guest: were beginning to see that. i cite in my book and examples of chinese triumphalism of kindness pounding their chests and they how well they're doing and how bad you guys are doing.
as more and more of that even though they very explicit at monash chinese and a way that we can create, but which contain an admonition to be honest and to be restrained not to take too much credit and to be patient. there is still a great deal of patience, but also some triumphalism and that its adherents in the situation. nonetheless, let, china has been a state for 6000 years and for much of its history with successful. the last century was extremely bad for china, perhaps the worst because in addition to occasional disarray like before, they were humiliated from the outside is a cultural shock, which was to be sent to the state literally and provoke them to iraq by the way. and because of that, i think the chinese are going to be very deliberately self-conscious
about how well they are doing, how badly they are doing and maybe they will not take these mistakes, which some of us at least, self-serving they tend to anticipate because they think the thought is that if the chinese solitaire, but what kind of relief of lack of success. >> let's go back to the question of how the u.s. is there is not managing this crisis of global power as you term it. at one point in your book, you criticize president obama because as you write, has failed to speak directly to the american people about america's changing rule the world of implications and its commands, unquote your can you explain why you still to do that. and >> guest: what i meant is to have it done at sufficiently because i do it because of the early phase than it presidency.
he does a great deal of the crew at the company in what this in the world and how it's changing. he discovered that the implication of doing it is to insert things which may be difficult or unpopular and therefore is held at. and he faces the additional difficulty that in my judgment the american public is so woefully ignorant about the world that this is a monumental task, which is far beyond even the president. yet the president has to take the lead, but we also have to think very hard about our educational system and our informational system because today, and i demonstrate this with statistics and facts, the american public was just appallingly ignorant about global geography or global
history or international affairs or significant event for broad. most americans live in a world in which they are forced first of all to make a living and secondly in which they escaped from the difficulties of struggling into a roadmap of information, but of entertainment at the lowest level. >> host: could you elaborate a sort of unpopular things with ice and obama are one of his successors, the need to do now that they are not doing to prayer air america for this new role? >> guest: i think i talked about it. one is to this educational word. i'm saying if you are to do it. you've got to be system, which encourages the responsiveness, which means an educational system for the geography of the world of the geography implies. i've statistics in my books
which shows americans could to a significant degree identify the pacific ocean on a map. during the award in iraq couldn't located on the map. and we have an educational system which gives americans little perception of what the outside world is about, which makes people susceptible to demagogy after 9/11. that kind of tendency to identify horrible events with the world of islam, the first of all rules actually. second of all it dangerous and damaging. those are the examples of what happens to be overcome on a systemic scale. not just a single individuals, but by presidency a national awareness and particularly through a process of cells awakening that if we are to live in a world which is increasingly interdependent and people are now assertive, not just me, but
the rest of the world, we have to learn how to relate a world by knowing what it's like and how his problems are our problems in how our problems can be made to be their problems. >> if america does go into a long-term decline, does not damage its internal problems that lead to to go into some detail in your book about what will the consequences be? you talk about a number, as you call them, geopolitical the terms of this process, can you talk about that a little bit? with the biggest victims be? >> guest: that may make a general statement. i think the result is not a world dominated by chinese, but the world is going to be increasingly chaotic because i do not see in the next 20, 30 years, any country, even a successful china being able to play the kind of role we thought
we could play, we tried badly to play in last 20 years and i don't think that can be undone. it goes back to up we started back in the morning. and so far as a sort of dealing with the question of eminent threat is concerned, there are a certain countries of folder crimes between the major powers that would suffer an image than the 10 in georgia or example with you one example. that is not just a small country. it's also a country which provides a major source of independent energy so they are major consequence is geopolitically, deprived of its independence. if ukraine gas produced by russia, russia will move much more slowly and less likely to take place. >> host: this to happen is a process of russia filling power.
>> guest: south korea could invade china and north korea and take advantage of the resulting uncertainties. it could be any number of other countries. it could be eventually even his real if we are pushed out of the middle east in part because of our own mistakes and the israeli and palestinian conflict is on that tonight takes us out of the picture. what are the long-term prospects? these are uncertainties that arise for countries that follow the endangered species and endangered state. >> host: how much will the military power departed the equation, particularly when it comes to asia quite a number of astronauts have spoken to officials recently about what is described as a reorientation of
u.s. power towards the asia-pacific tonight to a rising china and the wake of the withdraw from iraq in a canvas and. i think president obama sees it as something is a correct as, too much focus and too much application of resources to the middle east. and there is evidence that even some end of an arms race going on between the u.s. and china and very much in the changing role for what has traditionally been protection of u.s. power in the asia pacific and south china sea, where u.s. carriers are now vulnerable to being increasingly impressive technology, chinese ballistics and so forth. so it's a very complex picture. can you started out as a bit quiet and do you address it in your boat. >> guest: let me first of all say what i do thing an american
engagement in the far east, across the pacific is a natural thing for us to undertake. i do not think the way to define it as somehow to related significance for us to the decline in military will of the united states and southwest asia, specifically afghanistan and iraq. i don't think it's particularly perfect over persuasive to announce we will deploy 500 marines. i think that is frankly on the verge of absurdity. what it implies a larger sense i also disagree with because it would imply we are going to do in asia what we did in europe. in our earlier discussion i do the difference between what we have to do in europe with what is today needs to the far east because we are not going to dominate the far east.
we don't need to engage in some sort of a cold war with china. if we are smart and china needs us, just as many china, we will do much better by doing what it did in europe during the 19th century, which strikes a balance between the major asian powers. the hope is thereby maintaining the situation when i went sees itself so powerful that it can use for us and we at the same time do we can to promote what we have to promote in europe. we hope to promote in europe german reconciliation. that in turn is determined polish reconciliation. polish russian reconciliation might be next on the agenda. i think we could do a great deal while protecting japan and remaining an ally to protect the japanese and chinese reconciliation and the chinese might come down.
he could do the same as the between and india. but the last thing we should be doing is signaling that we are now going to be in halt militarily somehow in maintaining the nation balance among asian powers that are rising, that are likely to be very nationalistic and could be easily provoked into intensive wars or to each other and we may even find a asia city derby lives the tragedies experiences in the 20th century or find ourselves drawn into conflict with parties, conflicts on the asian mainland. i find it hard to imagine anything more solid destructive for the night states the map. >> host: from the thing i understand, the pentagon is planning for some kind of military contingencies in asia and asia the thick air sea
battle. >> guest: depends where and for what appeared are obviously engaged to the security of japan. we are committed to a freedom mitigation. i don't see the pentagon planning for a war, either involving korea and china, to him in some fashion or involving india, pakistan, china and some other fashion. >> host: udc new book the u.s. should not allow itself to be drawn into wars. you say say for security treaties with japan and korea. but what about taiwan quite were still somewhat bound by love. in fact, the taiwan relations act. >> guest: i also addressed that issue in the book essay is a matter of common sense, we have to face the fact that we as a country have recognized that president nixon and secretary kissinger tape notion that both taiwan and china say someone i
would also have to face the fact that we want to have a stable chip with china. we cannot indefinitely keep arming taiwan so they can remain separate from china, even though the same time taiwan is increasing its links with the mainland and vice a versa come of this rapidly growing trade, born portman movement of people and hundreds of thousands settling in china on the name and near shanghai and had some process of reconciliation between them is likely that we should not obstruct it. we should anything try to facilitate it. there aren't formulas to check every detailing the book, which may make that available to everyone to. not just the subordination of taiwan to china, budget management whereby there's one state, one country, china said this the, but different systems.
>> host: argues an extension of the atf you had when you were carter's national security adviser? obviously diplomatic relationships were established during your time in office. do you see this as a natural extension? >> guest: to some extent when i was engaged in a secret negotiations with chinese on unification time we talked about china as part of protocols. i told him, look, don't expect us to expect or demand that we will not sell arms to the taiwanese. we cannot do that because if we did that. be people in the area. that would not permit the stable relationship between you and us and you could even draw us in the sensory of conflict. that is except the principal. let us accept the principle that this would be to some extent government governed by a process of historical change and history
will resolve it and we have party except to under our predecessors nixon and kissinger's notion is one china. so this will work out, put a tray to accelerated to the point that it backfires. but in the long run, why not. and later on when i visit china, the private citizen, deng xiaoping used it quite literally to have himself for talking initiative statement which accompanied the photograph to the effect of china henceforth with propagated notion of when china to systems. the news that ford's relationship with hong kong. that includes an aside a great deal of autonomy for hong kong, president. i have been started articulating the point of view which i shared with the chinese on a number of
occasions but that falls into one china, several systems. another is, china and hong kong one arrangement. china and taiwan, another kind of arrangement specifically in my case, excluding the deployment of the chinese people's army on taiwan. >> host: and have they been reset it to this? >> guest: is a process. it's an historical process. and if you haven't historical prospect to accommodate you and clichéd. it existed 6000 years, week 200 years. and it's going to work out. you draw a sharp lens aren't just on immediate change. neither will work. >> host: 's remake the 102 system model seems to work and hung on. seems as if the hong kong economic system has been allowed
to -- >> guest: i kind of thing keeping to my formula one china series is. >> host: let's just talk a little bit more about what the u.s. should you doing or perhaps doing wrong now. you made reference to deployment of u.s. marines in australia summit to massively. as i understand, this is part of a very concerted effort of alliance building by the obama administration in asia, renewing ties with the philippines. even hillary clinton visited to me and mark him as the first to that country under its military junta recently was described to me as part of an effort to build a ties with a circle of
countries that it has somewhat rocky relations with china. the chinese have not reacted well to this official and semiofficial press. they see as the equipment and contained. do you think this is not a wise policy being pursued or do you think it is -- could be conducted at her? >> guest: i would say it is an actionable policy. it does not authorize by word, which give the connotation, which are in my judgment not in our interest and probably not implementable because i frankly don't see whatever our intentions are good if we could engaged in a ground war with china to defend burma or hanoi for that very. and so, i see no point in mutual
aggravation by using words or teaching symbolic action that can be intentions. or not intentions that really serve our national interests. the united states is not going to have the power to be the assertive arbiter even though could be in western europe. we can be a player, do we have to be a player much bar sophisticated and europe in the 19th century and that's an argument for. >> host: and you think the u.s. administration could clarify better what they will -- what they would not do in asia terms of actions might be taken outside of the binding treaty relation? casco i think perhaps the strategic object is not hasty
theorizing about particular military strategies offshore hedging and staff of the sort. and i think we probably will have to ask ourselves for how long will the chinese so comfortable, which they no longer do in any case what the american overflights right on the edge of their territory. how would we like chinese plane on the edge of california? or necessarily with demonstrable naval president and the immediacy of their key seaports. how would we feel this was reset repeated? in brief, we have to have a notion that is changing the world in which it is no longer possible for anyone power, us or anybody else to be traditionally dominate, how do we define a
rule more sophisticated and intelligent passionate? >> guest: as chinese become more sophisticated military tech knowledge he then includes long-range ballistic missiles that can reach as far as 1700 miles away, apparently right now and and a cyberwarfare, either in that it would be wise for the u.s. to pull back even more. >> guest: we afford to do that with russian. what i say about us in the chinese is in no way different from what we have learned and i reciprocal relationship with the russians that they could destroy almost all american cities in the course of six hours. i have to be without it my official capacity i have to be responsible. we could wipe out all of russia six hours and more efficiently than they did us.
and yes, if we continue to maintain the kind of competition that was carried touristic of the 20th century, we'll end up with the chinese and us in the same position. >> host: we may be entering one right now. >> guest: we may be. >> host: in your book you talk about the new concept of global stomach rivalry. explain for me what you mean by that. >> guest: it's interesting you pick that because when i wrote this i said to myself, and away it was a surprise to me. sag, other people must've thought of this before. i looked around and didn't find in the indication. namely today when you talk about america and china or america and russia, whatever, you can almost instantly biostatistics and compare concerns of her site to release an efficiency if, crying
, corruption, armaments, per capita incomes, longevity and so forth and you have an stints with the comparative data, which at this progress standings and rivalries of those words. it dawned on me that that was absolute league not the case, even as recently as 150 years ago. maybe it's reasonably have found the eve of world war i. people were not aware of these dimensions. to the ap in a world which is now so interactive that you can pair in ourselves measuring ourselves precisely. and in a way, it's a good thing because this kind of systemic rivalry puts much more at the same son who is higher, who was lower child mortality. but his longevity in respect to countries? what our standards of living? with levels of education?
how was it dispersed and so forth? is much more sophisticated notion of competition and a world in which everyone now claims the rightful share to a decent life and is keenly aware of the debt rotation by watching every day this place of great wealth, self gratification, extraordinary greed in some parts of the world. >> host: and leslie toy gets nowadays compared to as you say when the empires lied with each other, great powers of the question of how much you had in your treasury and how good your military prowess was. now we have entire social system competing. but i also wonder whether as a sale in the world together and there is more similarity between
political, economic and social systems by setting aside the chinese political system for example, but with the enlargement of the west, whether perhaps not unlike the earlier year when was the question of how much you have the tertiary how could the military was, nasa could have how good your education system is. >> guest: the chinese are the first to have produced a global comparative analysis of the universities of the world that they produce the leading 500 universities in the world. it is a reasonably good report without any association the first 20 p. with two exceptions. and they don't posture the achievement, but they do convey a sense of awareness that these disparities are significant. and i think that great. and incidentally when you said earlier, apart from the chinese system is more or less
universal. i think most american business trip shanghaied feel that it's very different from u.s.a. except if they were part of the chinese structure themselves. >> host: this is another reason why we have to leave antiquated notion of hegemony and military superiority and the old imperial jostling behind us and look at it in a very different way. >> guest: yes, i do what do be accused of not, but maybe that's coming of age. yes, military security. or we have to be very deliberate to what i consider to be my security, could be a source of threats to you and vice versa. that's the name of the game. we start moving that direction in the 1950s with concerns about nuclear weapons, efforts to maintain the whale is nuclear
weapons and has now become more comprehensive. >> host: i would like to go back to your career that obey. he related to question of not having been accused of being a pacifist. indeed during the carter administration, you were seen as the hardliner in the soviet union and vying for influence the secretary of state cyrus vance. it was considered -- >> host: i wasn't buying for influence. [laughter] >> host: fair enough. but it is interesting you did take a line that was seen as different from kissing here that perhaps wasn't always a precursor to the approach the reagan administration later to everything question about viability of the system. you promoted the final accord and focused on human rights great deal and of course the
later history of the decline and collapse of the soviet union indicates that was a very significant factor. that many of these groups and the soviet era begin to embrace human rights in the beginning of the end. you know, i am just curious whether this day, three decades later you feel you are vindicated in your views during those early discussions of the cold war was still going on? >> guest: you know, at the risk of sounding self-promoting, i have to say yes i do feel that way. and i don't think that in any way i deplored the fact that reagan won four of my program and nixon's notions regarding the talent. nixon had the talent which is basically status quo. you keep what you have, we won't let alone yours, you don't
meddle in hours. my view is totally different. i viewed as equally horrible secularism and i was always the soviet union had to be transformed or encourage to disintegrate. and make no bones of the fact that i favor encouraging these to disintegrate and help the process along. the fact that the end happened peacefully was a great theme and could avoid the horrible explosion. i think the world became immediately much more safe at the collapse the soviet union and i think global conditions today in the world are such that that kind of competition with the soviets in the not these is no longer relevant and therefore we have to have the kind of approach you and i have been discussing over the last hour. >> host: that was my next
question. is there any way in which those experiences you have it national security adviser under president carter informed think you missed the desert dust in the conclusions of this book as you suggested are very different in approach from the hard-line approach to ascribe to have during the carter administration. >> guest: i think the nature of the challenge has changed. and the carter administration were facing the soviet union, which was buying the notion based on the division was at the same time proclaiming it would replace a and push us out of the game and dominate the world. and that kind does zero-sum game, i felt we ought to exploit the advantages we had an exploit the weaknesses from which they suffer. i think today the issues no longer whether we will dominate
the world or whether the chinese will dominate the world if we don't. i think the issue we we can all be consumed by mounting global turmoil, which will unleash the residual forces of hatred to historical animus that dominates so much of human relation and therefore be much more intelligent, much more prudent to return to our initial discussion which is so much more conscious of his promulgating successful values for some day we moved in a genuine global community that is based in the shared universal political culture with humanistic overtones. >> guest: >> host: another aspect of that is the question of dealing with rising radical islam, something again as national
security advisor you were witness to in the early days of the islamic revolution in iran, dealing with the ouster of the shaw and of course we still confront radicalized and potentially nuclear iran today, one that could truly a sad the balance of power in the middle east. can you talk about that a little bit? i know you addressed it in your book about how that should be resolved based on your past experiences. >> guest: the larger issue of the extremism of our moderation and more narrowly the issue of iran, although the two aren't related. we alluded in our discussion namely i think islam is extreme as it has phenomenon, but it's a world, says a minority
phenomenon can be some significance that are not careful. we should be very prudent in stimulating anaconda black-white confrontation with islamic fundamentalism viewed as a shorthand definition of all of islam and my judgment is conquered to. it's also the civil rights of many american muslims which is something will come to regret because we have been trading some of them very, very badly. but on the geopolitical level, we have to rather work with the mantra forces in islam, which are by far predominate forces in islam and that ranges from morocco all the way to venetia and almost every place, the fundamentalist extremists are a minority that requires having a diplomatic intelligent approach to prevent them to stop helping them become the majority. on iran, we have the precedent that dealing successfully with the soviet and chinese leaders
to, which is far greater and not much larger. i don't think are going to war to prevent from having it. and if there has to be a showdown with iran or for iran acquiring a nuclear weapon, 157 and they really are acquiring it it is still somewhat unclear whether they are seeking it or whether they want to be close to having it, but not getting it, if we go to war we have to do it with others. absolutely. it's not to be a repetition of iraq or afghanistan. if we go to war alone, will suffer all the consequences in those countries that could wish to be arrivals and we have no special interest would take advantage of it. russia, even china, india. i think the world would be laughing at us if we got involved with the war in iran to prevent iran from having a
nuclear weapon. when the iranians have survived 3000 years. they are intelligent people come a situation with the defense minister of israel says the iranians the moment they have their first bomb, they're going to attack israel and therefore they are not an existential threat. to start a world without whitney to engage ourselves in the prolonged conflict and take advantage of those could not wish us well. >> host: what more can be done? this arty evidence there may be a covert war our series of covert actions taking place from which the u.s. and israel together may be to some extent responsible for. >> host: would have to be careful on that because if we are not coming who accuse iranians with iranian nationalism and not in our interests. our interest is to separate the two because eventually many of the precondition for democrat revolution of iran declines that
turkey is experiences there, but we have to pursue a policy which either limits the fundamentalist to be a threat or encourages even their physical political displacement. if we engage in activities, which we would want others to pursue the cbs which means assassinating people, interviewing and so forth, we perpetuate the regime and make it stronger. >> host: yeah, let's talk a little bit more about what has gone wrong with the united states in the closing minutes here because you do go into some detail about that in your book and it's interesting there was another pastor of the earlier book about the koran chest or that came back to where you talk about as we become increasingly multicultural society that is more difficult that it will be to fashion a can of us on
foreign policy except overly dramatic and massive foreign threat. it is interesting that since then he wrote that in 1998. since then we've had 9/11 and yet we have this deep disagreement in this country over the com of the response to the 9/11 threat in the iraq war. we seem to have if anything a great sense of division now than we had when jimmy carter was running for president against ronald reagan. talk about how serious you think those problems are and how to resolve them? >> guest: i don't have recipes. i think i have identified some of the problems. i hope i have enough. i've also tried to identify some of the sources of recovery, some of the assets we have to exploit more effectively. i think drawing on this asset is
week ago when princess to the discussion we engage in earlier, namely a great deal of problems rests in the fact that america will lawfully engaged as a society is remarkably self isolated and we have to overcome that. we have to understand the world better and more clearly. one of the purposes of this book is not so much a prescribing domestic solutions, but provided respect around the world that will be healthier, more historically relevant and thereby facilitate domestic accommodations. i don't want to exaggerate potential for that, but i want to contribute to some extent because a great deal of the public discussion today in the united states, either about domestic alana were about our foreign conundrum reflects extraordinary the extremist propositions, get rid of the
government. free america from the clutches of washington and stuff like that. what does it mean? as key members have profoundly l. to have some medical care. what does it mean for people who have jobs in the areas of design alternatives? it's not responsive to some of the basic problems of human existence in america. it's about basic social dilemmas. >> host: juiciest moral folklorist, were polarized than in the late 70s leading up to the era of ronald reagan? i mean, obviously was a tough fight between reagan and carter, very different views. >> guest: i think that was the last. the discussion for all of the shortcoming was a generalization
i think is a higher level than in the discussion we've been listening to recently, where everything is present at and the president is accused of not being bored in the united states have been a crook of marxists. we didn't have that, even in the sharp debates between reagan and carter were even between the governor and xm or goldwater and johnson. >> host: in the final moments here, i would like to just reflect back a little more in your time is national security adviser with the carter ministration, how that forms your thinking now. you were involved in the peace process in some ways the camp david accords, which you were part of or i guess the last successful u.s.-led negotiation and as i understand it,
president carter was fearful that the president that powell. i believe you since you at one point in your pajamas to make sure that was okay. could you just reflect that a little bit? >> guest: all just mentioned the concern was may be some movement since sadat wanted peace among the more extremist element to perhaps doing something to him, et cetera. but the basic lesson i learned from that on that specific issue is that the palestinian problem will never be solved alone for different reasons. the palestinians a weekend. israelis are strong and entrenched. there is some way no point for a compromise. the strong are too strong to be agreeable to compromise. if there is to be a revolution,
it has to come from their side. it is still the united states. but on the united states, that has been determined in clear and fashioning all them become except to go and is reasonably fair and the historical and enduring the justice and self-respect to the determination of file and give security and self-respect and permanently constructive role to israelis. in fact, my judgment if there was an intelligent piece pushed to the united states. israel and palestine would join the president of singapore in the middle east instead of destroy each other gradually in the short run, the palestinians suffer more. and the longer run, i fear, profoundly israel will suffer more. >> host: well, dr. zbigniew, thank you so much for sitting