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tv   Book TV  CSPAN  November 11, 2012 1:20pm-1:45pm EST

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which is an interagency group which sends out interrogator's every time a high-value detainees captured and is also a research unit that is stood up to study best practices and with the spin them out into the journey academies, best trade practices of interrogations, and that has been up and running for a few years and has already, i know, improved training techniques. >> michael skerker is a professor at the u.s. naval academy, and he is the author of this book, "an ethics of interrogation." here it is. this is book tv at the u.s. naval academy. >> is there a nonfiction of your book you would like to see featured on book tv? send us an e-mail. or tweet us. talks about the history of the office of strategic services in china and the successes and failures the organization had.
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this interview, recorded at the u.s. naval academy in annapolis, md., was a part of the book tv college series and is about 20 minutes. >> on your screen, a professor at the u.s. naval academy, also the author of this book, al ss in china, a prelude to a cold war. professor, if you would, start by briefly describing china's role in world war ii. >> china's role in world war ii is very complex. first of all, china entered the war first. most people in china would agree that china entered the world were to way back in 1937, july july 1937 with china and japan went to full-scale war. that fact, of course gile was not recognized by the mainstream western scholarship because most people think will work to start the september 1st 1939 with german panzer is rolling into land. so in that sense china was into
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the war much earlier, so it lasts longer. on the other hand, well or to was basically a fully mechanized and large component style war which really did not happen in china perce. the war in china was important to much larger parts of the world only after pearl harbor. so when the war in china, which had been going on for the good part of for years suddenly became part of the global war, and when china officially became allied with that on the great britain but also the united states was prominently. so there is sort of a axes of democracy against the axis of evil turn we will work to. so that is the issue. however, china's role in world war ii, in theory, should be
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very important because a pro harbor because china, as well as the united states, faced the same asian enemy. sir u.s. strategy should have focused on asia, but because of britain's persuasion and roosevelts strategic thinking and u.s. and allied overall adopted a policy of europe first is the second strategy. that dramatically reduced the importance of the china theater which have become a major issue term world politics.  china constantly tries to justify its importance in the overall global strategy while most of the british tried to downplay of rome. and in retrospect both sides ha validity in the arguments. by that time china became very important toward the end of
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43-44. the nature of were changed because the u.s. original strategy was to drive japanese to the western pacific to the edge and then went on china for china to go north and go thro the japan homeland. by the end of 1943 in the beginning of 1944 particularl from the philippines, as much better way to go after japan. so the land route, which was original plan by way of china becomes much less and significant. so that is why chinese there is very complex. >> professor, wide japan attacked china in 1937? >> that is a long story. both japan and china were modernizing militarily, politically, and economically i 1930's. and japan has the -- a very
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different national psyche than the chinese. china must pay, divided, and deeply torn between the communist movement and the nationalist movement. japan is much more unified and is really much more insecure because of the size of the??? nation and also because of its ambition, which is baked. said japan also have very stron  well, the impact, the german experience in world war ii. so they believe that germany wa defeated in world war one because it lacked a lot of territorial positions overseas which were providing the industrial machine with raw materials and markets and things. japan wants to basically prepar for the next surge of superpo? position in asia, and that's on?
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reason. >> what was the zero ss????? >> office of strategic service which was ?created in july 194? ? the executive order from fdr? it was the predecessor to the?? ?a.??????? so you might say the zero ss is to the cia what the count now congress is to the u.s. government after george????? washington became president.?? it has the major features and a? major mission features of the? centralized intelligence.???? the os us was very unique because it? was the first?? national intelligence service responsible to one command, and that is the president's. before that, before the zero ss was created, they had always been departmentalized. highly technical. you have the u.s. army, u.s. navy, the state department, the
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fbi, treasury, commerce. every major agency of the u.s. government had its own intelligence service of the specialized nature. so it was created to nationalize or centralized that intelligence existence, which is something that the model after the british . which is also very controversial nature because people always blame to pro-british. so it was a very interesting experience because of world war ii, the prime opportunity for the proponent of a centralized intelligence to prove its worth. and that is why the experience? was fascinating, and generally a lot of arguments for the
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eventual purpose of providing legal justification of its??? worth.???????? and the chinese? theater becam? very important proving ground?? because all the existing???? military generals or admirals' did not really like having an overarching intelligence service working in them because they're with the local boss. and only in china, that china theater, the command structure was a mess. no unity of command, and the creator, director of a less a saw the opportunity, so he invested very heavily in the chinese theater, tried to thrive on chaos, which succeeded to some degree. i read this book because i thought this was a very important ankle to illustrate a important aspect of how the u.s. intelligence bureaucracy and how the u.s.-china relationship was formulated, some very complicated land rents a
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bureaucracy and enter service rivalry. >> professor, the oss role is and during world war ii. >> that oss role in china was, again, very complicated story because oss went to china initially with one single most important mission, to establish an independent intelligence operation free of control by no only the chinese, but also by?? other major players of the u.s.? government, namely the big four? the state d?epartment, the arm, navy cmdr fbi. so it was to prove that he can actually coordinate all the intelligence services above the different departments. so they go to china to do a lot of things. and essentially it did not work that way because of a complex
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command structure in china. the army and navy did not get along.?? the american military command, chinese nationalist leader did not get along, and there was communist forces, nationalist forces. so a total mess. and they try to establish a niche, space in china. and essentially they succeeded somewhat, but they also have some big lessons to learn from. >> would you describe during world war two semi allies to back. >> in rhetoric only because the two political entities, the chinese a nationalist. since they have a very different political vision for china. and there are motivations -- >> they all want the japanese out. >> they all one of the japanese out, but the japanese, to a lot of people, some people in china, for example, the nationalist, it is the purpose of itself. kate japan and china will be
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unified. for the communists, to a certain degree, it actually is not. it is a means for which stuck to overthrow the opponent. so that is why the communist attitude toward the japanese was much more ambivalent than the chinese nationalist. and that's sort of ambivalence was never clearly explained during wartime, and during the time after war and people were beginning to say this, but it not get into the political debate in u.s. politics in particular. as to the real mission of what they actually did in world war two and how the u.s. military and the u.s. government officials failed to see that part of the chinese communist ambivalence. that debate has been ravaged for decades. >> so, was the oss successful in
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achieving anything in chad during world war ii? >> yes. they were successful in some -- several aspects. one of the most important things, what the first american intelligence organization that actually hired original experts of the intelligence officers. they added a very strong aspect of intelligence analysis into intelligence service. that is the incredible contribution of the u.s.s. the intelligence becomes much less technical buy more strategic. it is much more holistic, and i considered that have very big success. also established its work in some aspect of that. for example, offered the most successful u.s. special
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operations in china, burma, india theater. and you can say, special operations started with dos as experience in china during world war ii. and oss also established some of the intelligence from work, the approach to china, for example, the file data system, there training of the young your experts, and those people after rld war to become the leading authorities of maritime intelligence as well as government policy. so those are very big contributions. also some other lessons and some big blunders as well. >> what is one of the blunders? >> well, one of the things is i will say, oss in trying so hard
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to establish itself as legitimate, tried to prove to others, always constantly trying to prove to others it's worth the importance. in doing so, sometimes the sacrifice of the original mission. for example, its independence om the british intelligence, true reliance upon the british intelligence. the other thing is, oss success of the intelligence analysis and intelligence service is also a flaw. it's a bit ironic. it works both ways. once you add this analysis to your service you make intelligence very -- let me see, the radical. in other words, intelligence is not just to inform but also to
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predict. and not create a presidential reliance on intelligence services. so before oss was created, for example, fdr had so many channels store in every day from different interpretations of the same intelligence objects. so the president had to make his own decision as to what is the best way. so analysis took place in the white house commend the president's mind. he made the decision. but with oss, with the analysis into a, the national leader, every day, has to listen to the briefer. the briefer will tell him, this is exactly what will happen. so the president becomes kind of lazy. his own position. that can be particularly very dangerous because you created this intelligence monopoly. and keep in mind, oss is the best and the principle of
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centralizing the intelligence service. all nations that have it any time is a national as astor, we always try to centralized bureaucracy. the same thing happened after pearl harbor. the same thing happened after september 11th. so centralization can lead to monopolies. monopoly of access to the president, and that is good because unified command. it has one voice. but sometimes world affairs are not really measurable exactly, so you must have authoritative interpretations of information? a centralized system, you do no? have that normally.??????? actually, in turns, creates partisanship within the intelligence community. something that can be very harmful to our national security. you can see that. r september 11th, people bate over the same tax. so that, i think, is the bigges? flaw of that oss legacy which??
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has nothing to do with the oss itself but has to do with the nature of intelligence. >> maochun yu, a professor of history at the u.s. naval academy. this is his book. prelude to a cold war. professor, where you from originally? >> i originally came from china. i grew up, the wartime capital of china.???? that is where all the major? players in the book state.??? and so since my childhood, the mes in the book, i'm very familiar. intreat. now, the wartime intelligence office. the reason why i could write a ok like this was because in the late 1980's bill casey, who? was cia director under ronald?? reagan, also at oss veteran and? a history? buff, decided he??
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wanted to open up the oss???? ?erations filed.?????? ? one in the world had done?? that.??? you open up your own?????? intelligence agency in tire??? operations filed.???????? that's amazing.?????? so now it's at the national??? archives in college park, md.,? known as record group to 26.?? it is a gigantic record file.?? has, last time i checked, but a? thousand cubic feet a files.?? so i delve into this.?????? i've? found some fascinating?? stuff.???????? so i d?ecided to write a book.? the book was first post-1997.?? the cma.???????? so september 11th happened. an interesting intelligence organization and u.s.-china policy, all of the things that pete, but then people, overwhelmingly interested in re now.
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immediate affair stuff. so a few years later this topic became sort of of interest to allow the people. in the u.s. institute had a goo reprint of that. original was published by the p?iversity press.p?p?p?t? >> how many american personnel were in china during world war ii?  comparatively speaking, very few. but the pre-eminence of china given by the american politicians, by american soci was proportional to any other area in europe. that's because america had this emotional ties to china. missionaries, college professor , and ventures.
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so there is this special relationship. there is also the rhetorical requirement for putting china and a higher place because to my after all, if china collapsed america would have a major problem dealing with that. said u.s. policy has always bee? , during world war ii, said keep china as one of the big?? four.????????? so in reality because of???? logistical problems, strategic? perris, your first amazes'??? second, china, in reality, was? pretty low.???????? one very good indicator was our? ?nguage materials.?????? the hallmark america contribute? to world war ii.???????? over 60 percent of these??? terials went to britain. somewhere around 25% went to th soviet union. ring the entire war less than
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2 percent went to china. so you see, china was very important, but in terms of material support, very small. and that was very ironic. it had a lot to do with the enter service rivalry, policy, priority, difficulties, but overall some national policy, ry important that we -- the japanese, with chinese help. but then it does not work the chinese way. when the american family decided to go back, that janet dieter importance was reduced, as i said earlier. >> how many chinese died? >> the numbers vary. the most except number during this same year, a years of work. world war to last longer in china.x?x?x?x?x?x? 15 million.x?x?x?y?x?x? >> 15 million.x?x?x?x?x? >> 15 million. that is on par or x?close to wht
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the soviet union lost. >> of the union lost more. soviet union lost more in a more concentrated way because german policy on the eastern front was much more brutal than other areas. >> japan lost. >> oh, yes.????? most of? the 50 million casualties were civilians in china. so that is the accepted number. >> professor. what do you teacher at the  academy? >> mostly the military history. world war two. modern china, east asia. we have of very strict curriculum. i also teach u.s. naval history so it is fascinating. been here for 18 years. it's been a blast. >> here is the book. "oss in china: prelude to cold war". this is book tv and c-span2.
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>> every weekend book tv offers 48 hours of programming focused on nonfiction authors and books. watch it here on c-span2. >> it was almost two years ago when i decided it was time to write a fact-based primer on gay-rights, specifically targeted to right of center voters. has the subtitle of the book. doing two things, number one, a challenge the religious right on its own term and to show that what -- that much of what is derisively are what they derisively called the gay agenda is actually consistent with fundamental republican and libertarian principles. number two, to show center-right voters who believe in social tolerance that not only are they not a voice in the wilderness, they actually represent a majority of rank-and-file republican voters. so the book has three major themes. the first one i just alluded to, that many on the right simply
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don't understand that properly understood, gave rights are, in fact, perfectly compatible with another republican principles of limited government, individual rights, and equal protection of law. the essence of a classical liberal libertarian philosophy is simply one of live and let live. all people are created with certain inalienable rights. the government does not allow rights depending on what religion you are, what economic class iran, what your gender is, work directly, at least, what your sexual orientation is. at least that is the way it is supposed to be. certainly most libertarians already get that command at think that is why they have a special obligation to teach fellow conservatives and right of center voters why gay and lesbian americans deserve the same rights as everybody else. the second main theme of my book is that because of this constant over the top rhetoric that we


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