tv Book Discussion on Treasurys War CSPAN October 14, 2013 6:00pm-7:01pm EDT
the presiding officer: are there any senators wishin senators wir wishing to change their vote? if want, the yeas are 90, the nays are 0678 thnays are 0. the nomination is confirmed. under the previous order, the motions to reconsider are considered made and laid upon the table, the president will be immediately notified of the senate's action, and the senate will resume legislative session. the senator from vermont. mr. leahy: mr. president, i ask unanimous consent -- the presiding officer: the senate will be in order.
mr. leahy: mr. president, i ask unanimous consent the senate proceed to a period of morning business with senators permitted to speak for up to 10 minutes each. the presiding officer: without objection. mr. leahy: and, mr. president, with that, i ask for -- i suggest the absence of a quorum. the presiding officer: the clerk will call the roll. quorum call:
mr. reid: mr. president? the presiding officer: the majority leader. mr. reid reid: i ask unanimous consent the call of the quorum be vitiated. the presiding officer: without objection. mr. reid: we need order, mr. president. the presiding officer: the senate will come to order. mr. reid: mr. president, we know this has been a difficult time for everyone. and senator mcconnell and i have been working diligently the last few days and we're together
in trying to arrive at a culmination of the efforts that have been ongoing for quite some time now. we've made tremendous progress. we are not there yet but tremendous progress. and everyone just needs to be patient. we'll have no more votes tonig tonight. and we hope, with good fortune and the support of all of you, recognizing how hard this is for everybody, that perhaps tomorrow will be a bright day. we're not there yet. we hope it will be. mr. mcconnell: mr. president? the presiding officer: the republican leader. mr. mcconnell: if i may, let me echo the remarks of the majority leader. we've had a good day. had a good day yesterday. had another good day today. i think it's safe to say we've made substantial progress and we look forward to making more progress in the near future. mr. reid: mr. president, i would just close by saying this. we're doing our best to make everybody happy but everyone knows we're not going to be able to do that. so everybody understand we're doing the very best we can with
all the frailties that we have as people and legislators. so, mr. president, i ask unanimous consent that when the senate completes its business today, it adjourn until 10: a.m. tomorrow morning, october 15. that following the prayer and pledge, the morning hour be deemed expired, journal of proceedings be approved to date, time for the leaders be reserved. and that the senate recess from 12:30 to 2:15 to allow for weekly caucus meetings. the presiding officer: is there objection? without objection. mr. reid: if there's no further business to come before the senate, i ask that it adjourn under the previous order. the presiding officer: the the presiding officer: the
every two years. the oral argument runs about an hour. we'll hear argument this morning in 12536. mccouchen.. nay please, the court. the limits are in an impermissible acement -- to participate in the political process. by prohibiting contributions that are within the modest base limit congress has already imposed to combat the reality or appearance of corruption, these limits simply seek to prevent individuals from engaging in too much activity. the limits cannot be justified on circumvention ground. the high poted sizes are addressed multitude of more direct anticircumvention measure. >> how is that? >> it imposes numerous, for instance we have the provisions on earmarking contributions a
candidate. we have coordination restrictions on expenditure with the candidate. there are proliferations restriction on creating multiple -- packs that are designed. >> they are all there but for one. and i guess the court thought something could happen like the following: candidates miss -- only give him $2600. he has a lot of supporters. each of them -- each of the 40 puts on internet, a little sign that says "sam smith. this money goes to people like sam smith." great people. now we can give each of those $45,000 they aren't coordinated. they're not established by a single person. each is dependently run.
we know pretty well that total of 5-,000 times 40 go to sam smith. what does it violate? >> there's a couple of problems with that, hypothetically. there are base limits what can be given. >> $5,000. >> and what a pac can give. >> $5,000. all we have is my $5,000 going to have pac and there happen to be 400 packs. so 5,000. five times 40. five times 400. how much is that? i'm too good at math. >> without doing the math i'll tell you earmarking en-- >> there's no earmarking. it requires that you write in a check or in a company letter that you want the money to go to something. >> actually it does not. earmarking -- the fcc earmarking regulations are broader than that. if you have a pac that is going to contribute only to one candidate, you're not -- >> they'll contribute to several. they'll get more than one
contribution. at that point you don't have the kind of traceability you're talking about. there's more coming in than can find the way to any one particular candidate. >> i would think if you name the pac after a particular candidate as hypothetical assumes, i would be surprised if the federal election commission wouldn't come am you for rearm. >> let's say this one. you have 100 pacs, and each of them -- >> that's not right. >> support the five -- the dpief candidates in the most contested senate races. there are really only five contested senate races and 100 pacs say they're going to support those five candidates. so they give $5,000 to each of those 100 pacs which support those candidates, the pac divides up the money. $1,000 goes to each candidate. the total all of those pacs,
$100,000 goes to each of the senate candidates in the five most contested races. twenty times when the individual contributions limits allow. >> a couple of responses to that, you know. we're talking about scenarios there isn't coordination at all between the first person who makes the contribution and the candidate later on that receiving it. >> the candidates knows all of his $100,000 donors. there are no that many of them. he can keep them in the head in the mental roll decks. >> they're not actually donors to him. they're contributing to a pac in your hypothetical contributing to multiple different candidates. >> five most contested senate races. >> a person gives $100,000 to each five candidates if they win, become the five senators that are most attuned to donors. and he knows who is given him $100,000 each of those five senators who gets in on the --
of these contributions that are twentd times what the individual limit allow. >> i don't think it works as to think of them as direct contributions in excess of the base limits. because the pac is limited itself in how much it can contribute. so you would have to -- >> what we're trying to do it's hard to do it in article argument. what we're trying to do in both, i think, our cases is that we look up all the rules and the regulars in my law clerk did. what she discovered, it may be wrong, i'll look at it again. is there has been no significant change in the earmarking rules at any rules you're talking about but for one. change -- one change the one change is that the change all contributions made by all committees is financed or maintained or control by a single person will count as one. what you're seeing in these
hypotheticals is simply the construction of precisely the same situation that existed. while being careful to have not one person control the 4,000 pacs. which is pretty easy to do. if you want to say it's a reality, turn on your television set or internet. because we found instances without naming name. >> two responses. there are changing in earmarking more than what you've suggested. the restrictions that the fcc has gotten regulations are -- they cover more than the statute itself. and specifically they cover the instances of a knack is only contributing one candidate, which is a lot of concern comes from. >> i want to be clear what your answer to justice kagen was. her hype hypothetical. is part of your answer it might -- hypothetical she gives contravene earmarking? >> that's --
it can pose earmarking concerns and proliferation concerns if you're talking about something -- if we're talking about a pac. >> is part of your answer to her that the hypothetical isn't real or isn't going happen or -- >> yes. >> can't happen under the existing -- that's your answer? >> that's part of the answer. i don't think it's particularly a realistic scenario under existing regulations. >> would the other side concede it's true? >> i doubt they would concede that it's true. i think if you look at it, if you have a bunch of pacs that are getting contributions from the same group of individuals you're bargain to run in to earmarking and proliferation restrictions. >> i can't imagine when you have a pac which says we're going give money to smith. that's bad. when you have a pac that says we're going give automatic the money you contribute to us to smith and jones. that's okay. or smith, jones, and three others. it seems to me that's earmarking. exactly. if the earmarking.
if you know -- >> if you think it's earmarking to have a pac that gives money to the five most candidates and the five most contested senate races, i just don't think any fcc would say it's ear heart earmarking. >> i would -- i don't know if i saw 100 pacs rise up and all of them said exactly the same thing. we're going make contributions to the five most contested candidates in the five most contested senate races. i would be suspicious. and maybe the fcc would also be suspicious they didn't just all spring up independently. >> i think that's absolutely right. i think the fcc would -- >> suppose a number of pacs. i forget the number. said we're going give to congressional who want to cut down on governmental spending. we know there are only about four people like that.
[laughter] >> that the point, you know, i think the other saying not any certainty what they're going. it's not something you have to target there. the pac might be spending money in different ways that are not operating as a con due wit for circumvention. i think it gets to why if doesn't have the coordination you need. [inaudible conversations] >> there are 150 house candidates with completely safe seats. all right. and there are maybe, you know, 30 or 0 or something like that in their party who strong safe seats. the 150 gets together and said we're going run a joint fund-raiser. anybody can contribute $26 00 to each of these candidates. 150 of them. right. so that makes about $400 ,000. then these 150 candidates would completely save seats transfer
all the money to the one person who doesn't have a safe seat. that's about $400 ,000. double it for a primary in a general election, that's about $8 00,000. that all goes to one candidate from one donor because the ability for candidates to transfer money to each other. >> that's not legal. they don't have the tonlet transfer money to each other. a candidate can transfer $200,000 per election and -- contributions. >> and that's a hard contribution limit on how much they can contribute. but i think all of these also gets to another problem there's an overbreadth problem here. if you're talking about the scenario in your scenario, there's only one person who can make a contribution at that point after the first $26 00. >> you're exactly right. one person can make an $1 $8
00,000 contribution to a house race or $8 00,000 goes a long way. then what the 150 candidates can do is for every single other candidate in a contested seat. so take your 30 or 40 house contested seats and it becomes a con due wit for a single person to make an $8 00,000 contribution to a candidate in a contested district. >> i think even if you accept this scenario where all the candidates are independently deciding to give all their money to one candidate. you can't have a law designed to prevent one person from circumvention by prohibiting everybody else from engaging in contributions that don't --. >> everyone else. can you give us an idea of whose expression at -- most people couldn't come even near the limit.
so what percentage -- is there any information on what percentage of all contributors are able to contribute over the aggravate? >> i continue have a percentage on how many are able. we are talking about a large number of individuals. we certainly are talking about more individuals than the first amendment rights imply -- implicated. >> a law that only from hints the speech of 2% of the country is okay. >> absolutely not. and -- [inaudible conversations] >> miss murphy, we haven't talked yet about the effect of thing a -- to give the money him amount to many candidates as they want. the effect of the aggravate limits to someone's contribution of a maximum to about 9 candidates; is that right? >> that's right. >> is there a way to eliminate aspect while retaining some of of the aggregate limits?
is that a necessary consequence of any way you having a aggravate limits or any way of enforcing it that don't have that consequence? >> it's certainly a consequence of -- distincting aing a blank they are going to have the effect of prohibiting people from giving contributions that continue themselves give concerns and that's why if the government is really concerned about the things it's talking about. there are narrow avenue to get at them. if the concern is joint fundraising committee. >> i'm now a little confused. okay. i'm confused because we're talking in the abstract. this decision was based an motion to dismiss. there's a huge colloquy about what happens. i can go to the newses a justice
breyer suggested. it's hard to think that any candidate doesn't know the contributor who has enough money to give not only to himself or herself but to any of his or her affiliate that are supporting him or her. it's nearly common sense hard dispute. so you're saying it can't happen but i don't see charges of coordination going on that much. i guess i'm not sure what you're talking about happening. it you're just talking about knowing that some individuals are making contributions to other candidates or state parties who are not going share those contributions to a particular candidate. i don't see how that gets rise -- >> here is the actual i won't name the candidate. you see a picture of the candidate. there's a sign that says smith. that's what it says. and then it says make a donation
to help smith pac support republican you like or democratic candidates. period. have an address. all right, it doesn't take a genius to figure out what they're going to cothe money and smith will get a share of it. if smith has 400 people who figured this out. he'll have 400 times 5 sthowrks times one person. you say that really couldn't happen because the designation. we haven't found a designation rule that would stop it. then justice sotomayor is saying i don't know. i don't either. because there's been no hearing. there's no been no evidence presenting. there is nothing but the dismissal. >> first of all, the case was on cross motion and relief. if the government had an opportunity to make a record -- treat it as a legal case. >> do we need a record to figure
out issues of law. that's my second point. >> i agree with that this campaign finance law is so intry candidate i can't figure it out. it might have been nice to have the, you know, the lower court tell me what the law is. but we don't normally require a record to decide questions of law. >> and you shouldn't need one here either. the limits limits are over and under inclusive. they are not -- >> you're taking a position that the law stops corruption. and you're suggesting that the government is incapable of showing that the law doesn't work. [inaudible conversations] don't you need facts to prove that or disprove that proposition? >> even if the government could prove the proposition there would be an over and under problem. if i may i would like to reserve the remain of my time. >> counsel?
mr. chief justice, play it please, the court. senator mcconnell agrees that the limit does not exact scrutiny. senator mcconnell believes that all restriction of the nature should be reviewed under strict scrutiny. to begin with, this is a severe restriction on political speech. >> i would like you to address this question about the restrictions on speech. it has been argued that these limits promote expression, promote democratic participation. what they require the candidates to do is instead of concentrating fundraising on the super affluent, the candidate would then have to try to raise money in the lek trait.
so that by having these limits you are promoting democratic participation and the little people will count. and you won't have a super affluent as the speakers that will -- elections. >> i disagree with that for this reason. first of all, this limit -- thinging a gray gait limit places like-minded political parties in the position of competing against each other rather than collaborating. all the national political parties on the republican side compete for an artificially limited pool of must be from each contribute per. same is true on the candidates cease side. they compete gins each other for the artificially limited pool of money. even though each individual contribution to the candidates or to the party is limited by the base limits. the federal election commission regulation and justice breyer, i would propose you look at section 110.8h which
specifically prohibits a pac of the nature you described if the person contributes to a pac with knowledge his contribution is going to a particular candidate that's an earmark under the federal election commission. >> is it correct that the consequence of this provision has been very severe with respect national political parties? >> it is, your honor. particularly in the current environment with the national political parties are being -- >> much money that needs to go to them now goes to pacs. isn't that what has happened? exactly right. it's really, you know, turning the dials on regulating elections. i ask myself why would members of congress want to hurt their political parties? can i answer it? i answer to myself.
[laughter] well in order theirly the national political party will devote their money to elections in the state with the incumbent has a good chance of losing so in fact if you're in an incumbent who cares about political parties? i don't want money to go my opponents. and if you turn down the amount of money that the national political parties have, that much less money that can be devoted against you. if you're challenged in a close race. isn't that the consequence of this? >> let me see and raise you one. there are separate limits with your honor, for candidates and political party. the effect is to insulate the incum went from competing with the political party for the dollars. and by imposing a cap on the candidates on the amount -- candidates can raise the incumbent realize they're the favorite class among candidates
who are getting the contribution. >> is that a surprise. is has it worked out that way in practice? there was one brief saying that is wrong. in fact, it's a challenging who are aided. well, your honor, i think it is -- it is there's a hard cap on the number any contributor can give to all candidates and a separate cap that on the amount that contributors -- >> so -- in one summer before i spent weeks reading the record before the descrict court on the less than think case. it was filled with testimony by senators in congress. and a hand full of people can give hundreds of thousand of dollars. they know who the people are. and those people do have undue influence. which means in first amendment turn -- terms the individual who in fact has wonderful ideas and
convinces others even by paying 3 cents hasn't a shot because it will influence people not idea of the money. now there was a record on that. here there is no record showing whether the aspect does or does not have the same tendency. that is why i ask how can i decide this on the basis of theory when the record previously showed the contrary of what has been argued and in fact at least might show that even in aren't to these limits. we are -- your honor this case comes to the court as an applied challenge. mr. mccouchen didn't want to go through the committee you're talking about. he wants to write checks directly to the candidates and the committees. he is constrained by thing a gray gait limit. he can accept to everyone that he wants to write checks to just he can't give his special number
of 1776. if he wanted to give a contribution to every candidate running for federal congressional seat he would be limited to $86 or something like that. >> it would be something -- he identify 12 more candidates he would like to give it to. he could give each of them the $4 ,000. >> you're honor. he could. but again you're diminishing his right to associate in the intensity of his association by applying this limit. >> the limits. people will be allowed to put together the national committee and the state committees all the candidates in the house and the senate. it comes to over $3.5 million. i can write checks totaling $3.5 to the republican party committees and all the case or to the democratic party committees and all its candidates.
even before i start writing checks independent pack pacs. having written a check for $3.a million or so to a single party candidate you suggesting that party and the member of that party are not going owe me anything? i won't get any special treatment? because i thought that was exactly what we said in mcconnell that when we talked about soft money restrictions we understood that you give $3 % 5 million, you get a very, very special place at the table. so this is effectively to reintroduce the soft money scheme of mcconnell, isn't it in. >> no, your honor, it is not. mcconnell dealt with the situation you were not considering the base limits. the soft money by definition was not subject to the base limits. to take your example of the joint fundraising committee, the joint fundraising regulation which consumes more than three pages in the federal code of regulations pho 102.17c it
specifically reaffirm the base limit. it specifically confirm the antiearmarking. and said they must inform all contributors of the restrictions. so again is the situation with the money leaves contributors' hands. he loses control and the person. >> -- the money goeses to a single party. indeed i could name worse. i could say let's say the speaker of the house or the majority leader of the house. solicit this money from particular people. so solicit somebody to anteup the $3.6 mlt and justice kennedy said in medicare connell the making of the solicited gid is a kid to the and the one who solicit the payment. the speaker and majority leader can solicit $3.6 million to the party member. you're telling me there's no special influence that goes along with that? >> we know from the citizens
united decision, your honor, that gratitude and -- ic that's what you're talking about. that is not the sort of corruption that would sustain this limit. especially in light of the severe restrictions on speech and association that it imposes as the political party's compete against each other and as the candidates have to compete against each other. >> the court sustained what has changed? >> your honor, the statute has changed significantly to impose base limit on the parties to im-- on the state and federal parties. it's changed to prohibit proliferation of political committees. one of the concerns in buck lee was the dairy industry which contributed to hundred of pacs supporting president anybodiesson's reelection. that's no longer possible. >> that's create bid the nixon campaign or the dairy industry? >> as i read the lower court
decision in buck lee, that's correct. in addition you also have -- [inaudible] >> you have a thick volume of code of federal registrationlations of the federal election commission which didn't exist at the time. >> thank you, counsel. >> thank you, your honor. >> mr. chief justice, aggravate limits combat corruption. let me start by ebbs planing exactly how. ing a -- by blocking circumvention of contribution limit and equally fundamentally by serving as a campaign finance system dominated by massive individual contributions. which the dairnlgts of quid pro quo corruption were obvious and inherit and the cro -- would be overwhelming.
that's not what the case is about. the apellet are not arguing that the aggravate limit is drawn in the one place. they're arguing there with be no limit because the base contribution limits do all the work. and so what that means is that you're taking the lid off the ag grate indicated that means that an individual can contribute every two years up to $3.6 million to candidates party, party national committee, -- >> it's because they can tran for the funds among themselves and the particular candidate.
the current system he's got choose. is he going express the belief in environmental regulation by donating to more than nine people there. or is he going to choose the fun control issue? >> i want to make two different points in response to the question. the first is that restricting strays fors would have a baring on the circumvention problem. wouldn't eliminate all but have a bearing on the problem. there's a more fundamental problem here. it's a problem able gus to the one that was at, soft money in mcconnell. which is the fact of delivering the $3.6 million check to the
whoever it is the speaker of the house, the senate majority leader. whoever it is that solicits the check. the fact of delivering the check creates inherit opportunity for quid pro quo corruption exactly the kind of risk that the court identified in buck lee. only apart where the money goes after delivered. >> what is the framework for able lidsing -- i agree with you on thing a gracious. it has the consequence with respect limiting how many candidates the individual can support. within the limits that congress has said don't present any danger of corruption. what is the famework for analyzing that? give your argument with respect to the transfers and the appearance there, but it does have that other consequence on something we recognize as a significant right. let me make a specific point about that and work to the frame work. the specific point is this. the limit would the effect of
restricting the ability of a contributor to make the maximum contribution to more than a certain number of candidates. that's true. we can't help but ak knock that. it's math. that doesn't mean that the individual cannot spend as much as the individual want on independent expenditure to try to advance the interest of the candidates or the cause of the candidates stand for. can spend as much as his fortune as he wants on independent expenditure advocating the election of the candidates. >> that does not evoke any gratitude on the part of the people? be if gratitude is corruption, you know, don't those independent expenditures evoke gratitude? and it is not the evil of big money $3.2 million? an individual can give that to an independent and spend?
>> saints not that it's not stopping people from spending money on politickings. the foundation of this jurisprudence in the careful line between independent expenditure which the court held repeatedly do not create a sufficient risk of quid pro quo corruption to justify the regulation, and contributions which do. that line eliminates some of the argument which are made here. which are arguments against money in politics. big money can be in politics. you can start your own pac. that's good. i'm not sure it's a benefit to our political system. well, i do think we have limit on contributions to political parties in addition to limits on help establish the point here. craidz not sealed off from each other. parties are not sealed off from
candidates. you know, they're all in the same team. and we limit the amount that an individual can contribute to a political party as well as the amount that individual can contribute -- that's -- that does very much -- i'm look for an answer here. it's not that i have one at all. it's rather basic. the point i think is being made now. as i understand it, the whole reason -- it is no doubt that the campaign limits take an ordinary person and say you cannot give more than such an such an amount. there are apparently, from the internet, 200 people in the united states who would like to give $117,000 or more. we're telling them you can't. you can't support your belief. that's a first amendment negative. if the average person thinks that what he says exercising his first amendment rights can't have an impact through public
opinion upon his representative. he says what is the point of the first amendment? that's a first amendment point. so that's basic, i think. now once that so, congress has leeway. and you're saying -- i've sign all over the place that is why we don't want those 200 people to spend more than 117 or 120,000. the average person thinks that the election is after the election all the actions are effective by the pocketbook and not by the merit of the first amendment argument. >> okay. and now you say the person can do the same thing anyway. call it independent. and what independent does he can spend $40 million. he can spend $50 million. all it does is mix up the messages. the parties can't control. that is, i think, the question being asked. i think that is a very serious question and i'd like to know what flows from it. is it true? so what? what are we supposed to do?
what is your opinion about that? >> i have the same question. you have two -- two persons. one person give an amendment to the candidate is limited. the other takes out as uncoordinated costing $500 ,000. don't you think the second american has more access to the candidate to one of the candidate successful in the first? i think that was of the root of justice scheeg -- scalia's question. >> let me answer this, justice kennedy. i think the right way to think about this. somebody think the sec taif defense is doing a great job. they can take out an ad in "the washington post and spend $500 ,000 on the ad saying secretary of defense has done a great job. and they would have an undoubted first amendment right to do that. nobody could think it's a content -- hard imagine a content neutral
justifies for prohibiting the speech. if the person wanted to express -- >> it would be an independent expression. if somebody wanted to expression their view that the secretary of defense has given done a great job nobody would think there's a first amendment ground that could be invoked. we're talking here about campaign contributions. isn't it legal for a candidate to take campaign contributions and use it to buy a maserati? yes, it is. >> but the point -- >> i see how -- again, i think it does, if i may, justice alito, i think the point is that the rule against gifts the conflict of interest rule, they exist to advance a content neutral government interest of the highest importance. >> that's your argument. about the district court's
opinion. what i see are wild hypothetical that are not obviously plausible or -- and certainly lack any empire call support. you have choose ton use the same hypothetical the direct court used about the $3.5 mlt contribution that would be -- that could be given by coordinate -- with all of the parties national party democratic national committees plus all of the state party committees. that's how you get to the $3.5 million figure. >> yes. >> how realistic is that all of the state party committee, for example, are going to get money and they're going transfer it to one candidate? for 489 of them it's a candidate not in their own state.
and there are virtually no instances of state party committees contributing to candidates from another state. the other part that seems dubious on the face is that all of the party -- all the candidates for the house and the senate of a particular party are going to get together and they are going to transfer money to one candidate. really, you cited in your brief the best example, i take it, of contributions from some candidates to other candidates. they are very small. isn't that true? >> yes, i think there are two -- justice allee to, with all due respect. the point your honor is making confusing two different ways in which the laws combat the risk of ropings. -- corruption. the first is the handing over of the large check whether it's a $3.6 million check for everyone or $2.2 million for the house candidates or $1 million for the state committees.
the -- just as the court found in mcconnell with respect to soft money contribution and the inherit risk of corruption there. there's an inherit risk of corruption. we have limits on how much we can droibt a political party. >> unless the money is transferred to. you have to get it from the person who wants to corrupt to the person who is going to be corrupting. unless the money can make it from a to b. i don't see where the quid pro quo argument. >> i think that the -- i think that the way the joint fundraising committees work is you hand other a single check to a candidate that solicits it. it could be any dhaid sets up a joint fundraising committee. give to me and the rest of my team. that sort of handing over the check to the candidates, it seems to me. creates a significant risk of indebtnd on the part of the candidate. even though it's -- the party letters -- leaders are going the one that solicit the cron try biewtion and have a particular indebtness
to candidate. their power and authority depends on the party retaining or gaining the majority and the legislature they're going feel a particular sense of indebtness they are helping not only them but the -- massive amount. >> i'm sorry if i may make a point. the third point, i think every candidate in the party is going to be affected by this because every candidate is going get -- every candidate is going to know the person who wrote the check has helped not only the candidate but the whole team. that creates a particular sense of indebt. and every member of the party is -- every office is in the party is likely to be leaned on by party to deliver legislation to the party. >> they might not stand or fault together. if you can take a minute and walk me through it step by step. u yo have somebody who wants to corrupt a member of the house. and the person's strategy is to make contributions to multiple
house candidates with the hope the expectations, the plan those candidates are going to transfer transfer the money to the member that this person wants to corrupt. how is that person going accomplish that given the earmarking regulations and the limits on how much one member can contribute to another? so, you know, i think that -- i think it's possible, but i think if somebody had that goal that circumvention goal, by far better ways of achieving it would be giving significant -- you have taken the -- it would be making significant contributions to state partyings and national parties free to transfer themselves without restriction. and making contributions to packs. it your not going to defend it the application of the aggravate limit in the -- doesn't apply to the situation
these are. >> i don't think so. i think it -- first of all, i think it could happen in the situation. i think it's -- likely to happen. >> explain to me how it's going to be done. the person gives to member a with a hope that member a is going to give it to member b. if the person even implies when when making the contribution to a if person wants to go to b that's earmarked. how is it going to be done? >> in mcconnell and colorado republican to the court said that earmarking is not the outer limit of the government's authority to regulate here. the reason the court said that. a lot can be done with winks and nods and subtly. so i don't think it's a case that earmarking would work to prohibit that. but i also think when talking about aggravate limits there a part of an overall system of regulation. and i think that they work to keep the circumvention risk in check and work to make our you
don't have the kind of problem you identify. >> what would you think? because listening to your lielg and you heard this is pretty tough. we try to construct some hypothetical and the counsel said i have that part wrong or this the other one. they may be right. we can't do it figuring out the factual thing in an hour, frankly. ..