tv Key Capitol Hill Hearings CSPAN December 3, 2013 10:00pm-12:01am EST
>> people have great ideas how to do that, and this is something that i think should be shared with other countries because it is working, and what works should be copied. >> you mentioned the free trade agreement from a year and a half ago. was there discussion today on with president obama how that's going and whether anything should change with it? >> yes. we came to conclusion that the free trade agreement is working quite well. the u.s. is exporting more to colombia and vice versa. there are some specific issues where we have mutual, not
complaints, but mutual efforts to -- obstacles to overcome, and they mentioned something with the labor, some issues with the labor situation in colombia. we addressed the issues very clearly on what we are doing there. i wanted the u.s. to be more helpful in lifting obstacles that would allow us, for example, to export our avacoados to the u.s. because i was giving in the white house jew dish solid, the first plate in the lunch, and there was an avocado, and i said it's not clommian because we have restrictions. they need to be lifted. those types of items are the subject of the ones that we
shared, but in general, we are very happy with the way they are performing. >> there's been concern about the protection of workers under the free trade agreement. are workers adequately protected? >> yes. we still have to go further, but the difference for the protection of workers in colombia and in the last two to three years was -- what it is now, is a major difference. again, i recognize we have to go further. the progress is there, the facts demonstrated. >> what's your take op the protests by farmers and other workers in rural areas, to what do you attribute the protests and what resolution do you see for the future?
>> the rural areas neglected not for yearings, but decades, and even centuries where the poverty and inequality is concentrated more than the urban areas, and what happened there is because of the commode di crisis, for example, the price of coffee went down from $1 per pound in the international markets for people, and how they are out to protest. what are we doing to protest the problem? as i mentioned, the peace process has one of the first items this mission of shared vision on how we can give more importance to the rural areas. we are increasing the budget in
rural areas. this year, we approved for next year, 5 billion pesos, that's a huge amount of money comparedded to what they received before, the rural sector, but more importantly, we are constructing a long term policy where the rural areas with the participation of everybody, especially the pes cants, for them to be on the locomotive, not on the wagon, the train we think are extremely useful for common ya in the world. the world is seeking more and more food, and colombia's one of the few countries that can expand in a short period of time, the production of food, and so there we have an opportunity, and that's what i'm trying to build through different policies and different
discussions, this overall policy that will help the rural areas to develop at a faster rate. >> if an agreement was reached two weeks ago, why are protests continuing? >> sorry? >> why are protests continuing if the agreement is achieved? >> several reasons. some coffee growers argue the help had not areiched to their region, but this is a gray margin of protests, review, analyze the protests that we receive today compared to what we had some time ago is completely different than what was happening before. >> do you think that conditions for colombian farmers will happen when only a peace agreement is reached?
>> i hope it will improve. with or without agreement, what i've said is wife a set of outives that are not dependent on an agreement with the farc. we have to invest in the rural areas regardless of agreement or not. we need to take public goods to rural areas, roads, schools, hospitals, regardless of the agreement with the farc or not. what i've said is we need to establish a policy that is shared by everybody, and with that policy, we have to find the resources to finance those projects. >> in your talks with president obama today, did he give support for the peace talks with farc? >> definitely, yes, and i appreciate that very much. he has been supporting the peace
prosays. he was one of the first ones to know about the peace process when there was a secret and nobody knew about them. i shared that secret with him when he went to colombia during the head of summit, and the whole government is extremely sportive of the peace process. >> today, the farc call for an international conference to incomes the u.s. and europe. what is your reaction to the request? >> the discussion on the fight and war against drugs have been on the agenda for a long time. as a matter of fact, we put this on the agenda in the summit, which approved a mandate to the
oes, discussing with the oes today about this spesk issue. we made a big exercise and analysis and scenarios that happened. they take different actions. these scenarios should be used as an input for worldwide discussion on this issue. the question is are we doing the best we can, or can we do something more effective, and this is something that the world needs to discuss, and we've been proposing it for a long time, and we've been receiving increasingly amount of support, including the u.s., because they approved the mandate on this issue, and i think it's useful and positive to re-examine the whole issue of the war on drugs, and it's multilateral world
problem that affects everybody. >> you said a one year time frame with the talks with the farc, and, of course, closing in on the year, and you've gotten to point three. how long are you willing to extend the time frame for the talks? >> when i mentioned a year, it was simply because last november, they asked me how long would you like to have the talks? i said, i would prefer that these talks last months and not years, and so everybody started making the arrhythmia tick because months go to november, december of this year, which we are right now, and, of course, i would have liked for this to advance faster, but i think that we had made enough progress to maintain the optimism, and i
don't know how long it will take to finish the agreement. i hope it will not take too long, but it is completely counterproductive to put on the process like this, fatal deadlines, and so i don't have a fatal deadline, and i'm not putting a fatal deadline on the agenda. >> some sort of deadline important or willing to continue indefinitely with no deadline at all? >> no. of course nobody comets indefinitely, and the processes were out, and the support wears out, and i think we're all conscious of that, but i prefer to say we hope to finish as soon as possible without putting a deadline because the experience in other process, when you put deadlines, they are counterproductive. a questioner asked you to describe the agreement on point two of political participation.
questionnaire asks, what role does the farc have in the democracy, and have they been guaranteeded political representation? >> well, of course, with the process and by giving certain guarantees they will have this space, or they will then be stimulated to change their arms roles and change their way of doing politics or achieving what they want to achieve through violence and do it through legal means, and the answer is, yes, we have given them the sufficient conditions and
guarantees for them to be able to participate in politics. that's what the process is about. >> you mentioned that your talks are coming after 50 years of strife. it's not something new for your country. how do you tell us that your negotiations differ from previous peace talkings, for example, under the president. >> well, the conditions are completely different. the country's completely different. the military correlation of forces is completely different. the conditions that we put to start negotiations are completely different. the clear -- they cleared an area the size of switzerland for the farc to be there. i decided, and i said there would not be one sent meter of our territory tiered to them
because we had a very bad experience with that example. i said, there will be no cease fire. i said we will not -- we'll negotiate under the principle of nothing is agreed until everything is agreed, and this has been a very well-planned process compared to others that would not as well-planned and the results are there. >> you referred to your predecessor, of course, has been critical of your administration, especially in the dealing of farc. can you please explain your response to his criticism? >> no. i prefer to dedicate my time to better things. [laughter] why are the talks held in havana? why cuba the venue rather than panama or any other local you
could have chosen? >> cuba is -- gave our counterparts more confidence. they were extremely worried about their own security. when i said we will not negotiate in colombia, cuba seemed to be a good place, and the cuban government has been extremely helpful, and since the beginning, they said we will help to host these meetings, and i think that we made the correct decision. >> questioner says, you know where the farc is in the jungle and where their bases are, and we have a will the of oversight surveillance and intelligence on the topic. why have you not just bombed them out of existence, and are you afraid of repercussions? >> we have been bombing them
quite frequently, and that's the truth. the thing is they have lerched how to hide and how to protect themselveses from intention. they learn very fast. believe me, we continue trying. >> will the peace overtures make antidrug efforts more difficult? >> on the contrary. i think it makes it much easier. again, can you imagine the farc is accused of being the biggest cartel in the world, now, on our side, helping to stot a cocoa plantation and other crops and helping us identify the roots where drug traffickers move their drugs.
this would be a major achievement. >> they go to mexico to get to the u.s., and what are you doing to get them to stop the flow? >> close cooperation with mexico. we've been training many of their people in colombia, and we have a permanent realtime information sharing, and we have the two police corporate among themselves. there is a very strong cooperation within the countries. >> do you see a colombia free of cocaine someday? is that possible? >> well, i dream about it, yes. if we reach an agreement on this issue, at least we can see a
cocaine diminishing substantially in colombia, which would be a great, great achievement, the country that suffered the most in this world on the war on drugs losing the best politicians, best policemen, our best judges, our best people. a lot of blood has been spilled, and we'll continue because it's a matter of national security so anything to improve the situation in effort to eradicate drugs would be extremely, extremely beneficial for the colombia site. loosh b -- looking to other concerns to the u.s., have the national security agencies had relations between the colombia and the u.s.? >> we have been sharing
information on this for a long time. colombia's very particular country in the sense that we share with the u.s. and other intelligence agencies, all the information, and, therefore, we have spied on our common enemy ies. it has been done with a cooperation of the colombia authorities and the u.s. authorities. now, i don't know of information of spying outside that sphere of cooperation. if i knew about that, then, of course, i would condemn it immediately. >> some of your neighbors in latin america, of course, have
been infuriated by revelations of u.s. eves dropping. is their anger justified? >> well, nobody likes to be spied, and i think, yes, nor somebody spies on you, you have all the right to get mad, and so they have all the right to get mad. they are spied without commission. >> looking to china, china's investment in latin america, of course, continues to grow, and the country signed more than 50 bilateral cooperation agreements last week. tell us more about the colombia-china economic relationship and do you see any effects there that it may have on u.s.-colombia economic relations? >> we have a normal relation with china, good relation. our biggest commercial part
there in the u.s., the trade with china increased, but not dramatically, and, of course, china is now a big player in the world's economy. i have been sharing with many of the persons i've been talking to a situation which i think there's an opportunity for latin america and the u.s.. there's a new concept that is becoming a very important concept, the concept that is referred to as demographic dividend. the source of growth in the world that was -- that china was some years ago, started to diminish because the negative democratic -- demographic dividend they are having because of population is not increasing. on the contrary, it's
decreasing. you have that problem in europe, and you have that problem here in the u.s.. one of the few areas in the world where you have a positive demographic diff depped is latin america where you have young populations, and there you have a tremendous opportunity if the u.s. sees latin america with those eyes. there's a tremendous opportunity to increase the cooperation between the two areas, and even you're going to use -- you're going to need immigration sooner or later if you. -- if you want your economy to continue growing, and that immigration will probably come naturally from the whrat tin america, a political dividend here, and there's a tremendous opportunity for the u.s. in latin america. of course, china is always very interested in latin america's energy resources, in our water,
in our biodiversity, and if they want to invest, latin america will welcome it. so be it. >> thank you. we are almost out of time, but before asking one last question, a couple housekeeping matters. we have our upcoming speakers. december 10, we have the honorable anna parker, mayor of houston, texas, dan acerson, chairman and ceo of general motors, and on december 19th, skaggs, bluegrass ledge. second, i want to present the guest with a press club coffee mug to be filled with colombia coffee. [laughter] >> thank you. >> thank you. [applause] and -- [applause] and for the time question, you mentioned the property pegs, 5 enthe u.s. team is looking for a
change. how do you see the prospects in the world cup? >> well, i told president obama this morning that i wish our teams not meet in the first round because it would be very disrespectful to eliminate the u.s. soccer. [laughter] diplomatic, thank you. thank you, of course, for coming today, and i thank the national press club staff like the journalism institute for organizing the event. find more information about the national press club on our website at www.press.org, and please remain seated for the closing remarks in spanish by president santos. thank you. we are adjourned. >> thank you. >> thank you. [applause]
>> i think our republican colleagues learned a less son when they shut down the government on october the 1st, and realized that the american people are not interested in that kind of political shenanigans because americans are affected, over 8,000 americans could not go to work of the republican shutdown of our government, and i believe we all saw the cost, over $20 billion in cost by having republicans decide they wanted to shut down the government. i certainly believe that everyone is taking the attitude in the budget comp that we have to get work done. the difficulty seems to be that our republican colleagues have put real obstacles to getting a big deal done to take america to the next stage, next level saying they won't consider this. they won't consider that, by
taking so many things off the table before the negotiation started. having said that, to the agree that a deal a possible, we hope it's a deal that's in the interest of the american people, not in the interest of special interests, that it protects the american public trying to go to work, and not protect those with tax breaks to help them continue to live off the public trough. we hope that the budget conference understands that the american people are looking for us to give good direction, and american business is looking for congress in the conference to give stable to business knows what it can do to invest, to create business opportunities, to expand its operation. w4r we end up with a -- whether we end up with a deal or not, i believe the republican shutdown of the government taught a lot of politicians a lesson, and that is don't tinker
with the livelihood of the american people, and so i'm more optimistic a deal can be reached. unfortunately, i think rather than get to a point where we really get a good deal for the american public that helps launch the american economy and create more jobs, i think we'll end up with something modest, and the american public wonders why, again, we continue to have this psyche of failure, obsession of doing things that go nowhere rather than do the work of the american people. i think if we have modest sites on what could be accomplished, we get there, but i think america's ready for a home run, not just a walk.
>> from age eight, she wanted to do something with dance. she put on -- had skits and plays and that led to benington, vermont where she studied the school of dance. these are some of her note cards from there, the spiral notebooks where she kept notes. this is her organizer. she carried this with her to vermont, to dc back to grand rapids, off to new york where she studied with martha gram and work for the powers modeling agency, and then back to grand rapids again, so in it, you'll find a whole host of things that you would find in just about any organizer. there are protection of brochure costumes, a sketch of a costume for one of the dance routines shemented to put on. here are, again, choreography
notes that she made, and so there's a whole wealth of material in here that talks about her love for dance and how deeply she was involved in it, especially in the early years. >> watch the program on betty form at c-span jr..org or watch it saturday at 7 p.m. eastern on c-span, and the series continues live monday looking at first lady rosalin carter. >> the cia and presidential clinton library released more than 300 newly classified documents on intelligence and presidential policymaking in the bos kneian war. a look at the decisions made in the 1990s including commenteds from former president clinton, former secretary of state albright, and retired general
wesley clark. >> good afternoon, everybody, and welcome to the clinton presidential center. i'm stephanie street, executive directser of the clinton foundation. thank you for attending this historic conference. this event is a first in several respects. it is the first time a president has participated in a declassification event in a presidential library and first time a presidential library opened a large collection of documents who had the automatic declassification date. it is most appropriate we are here today at the clinton center because the work in the classification area that has taken place over the last 18 years is a direct result of executive order 12958 signed by president clinton in april of 1995. today, the cia and the clinton presidential library are
releasing 3411 documents that will shed light on the role intelligence played in the clinton administration's policy decisions during the 1992-1995. these documents tell three important stories. first is one of presidential leadership. armed conflict broke out in bosnia after declaring independence from yugoslavia in 1992. the documents depight a newly elected president eager to address the intensifying conflict which showed no sign of resolution. in 1995, they led to the dayton accord that led to ending of fighting in the region. the second story is one of intelligence support. in june 1992, the cia created the dci bulkan task force under
rapidly bulkan conflict. the clinton administration informed by the bulkan task force chartered a strategic policy melding humanitarian aide, economic sanctions, force, and diplomacy, but the path to peace, as these documents make clear, was treacherous, and the administration relied on accurate intelligence to make difficult choices. the last story is the uniqueness of the documents themselves. this collection has a portion of the bosnia wars, the youngest collection ever released in the 20-year existence of the cry's historical review program. now, before i introduce the first speaker today, i'd like to recognize all of our conference participants. dr. madelyn albright, former
secretary of state, and former ambassador to the u.n.. dr. albright. [applause] sandy burger, former national security adviser to president clinton. sandy. [applause] leon feater, former national security adviser to vice president gore. [applause] nancy sotoburg former deputy national adviser to president clinton. [applause] and general wesley clark, former supreme allieded commander europe and director of strategic plans and policies for the joint chiefs of staff, general clark. [applause] i'd also like to recognize terry gardener, the director of the library. terry, thank you. [applause] joseph, the director of the cia information management services.
[applause] skip rutherford, the dean of the public school of service. [applause] bruce lipped see, chairman of the board of the clinton foundation. [applause] former secretary of transportation rodney slater. [applause] and governor jim guy tucker. [applause] it is now my pleasure to introduce this. he was the deputy director intelligence of the cia. he was chairman of the national intelligence com and served as a assistant director of central intelligence of analysis and production. he led the establishment of the dci interagency task force, headed the white house team and the department of security planning office, and was the staff director of the house of representatives committee on homeland security.
in 2004, the president awarded him the national security medal, the nation's highest award. please join me in welcoming dr. john gannon. [applause] >> thank you very much. i would also like to join in thanking some of the wonderful folks who helped us get here and supported us since we have got here. terry, director of the clinton library, joe, the directer of cia's information management and services, and david, who's been our right-has been hand supporter for several weeks on this coffers. also, rob simmons archive is
here, the library has been so very helpful, and we very much appreciate it. honor for me to be back and be seated again with people like secretary albright, nfc prominent like sandy, nancy, and leon, and, of course, general wes clark, supreme allied commander of europe, but also very active in dispensable member of dick holburg's team before and after the negotiations, taking place at the end of 1995. my key message here this afternoon from the intelligence community and having watched the drama of the bos kneian conflict unfold over three years it was most intensive, is that the bulcan task force was a success, but only because it was in two-part harmony with intelligence and policy. the intelligence policy
relationship was manage responsibly and productively on both sides. let me tell you there's a lot of rumors or myths about the intelligence communities that i didn't want to address as we proceed here. first is intelligence is best produced and assessed at a distance from policymakers so that you -- the intelligence amists are not corrupted by the influence of policy. i think that is moorings, and if you look at the documents released, the constructive relationship with policymakers was the only way possible of the outcome in bosnia. the other is a more kind of popular notion on intelligence and that is it is intelligence like a doomsday science that wallows in pessimism. they recalled when they describe intelligence, he evokedded memory of when he was milking a
cow on the farm down in the river as a young nan, and he said he would get the basket still with pure milk, and the cow would relieve itself in the milk, and president johnson said the release, and he meant that in a bad way, that was intelligence. so you -- [laughter] you can imagine how that hurt our feelings. [laughter] there's another metaphor that i hear, the famous comment that we, in the intelligence community, like to provide options to policymakers, and so we look out at the world an say we are at the cross roads. one path leads to death and destruction, and the other path leads to total annihilation. we hope you policymakers will be able to have the wisdom to choose the right course. [laughter] in fact, in my experience and
experience i think we relate today on the bulcans is it is when it works well, a collaborative enterprise with vast capabilities to bring to the fight, but also with clear limitations to be understood by leaders who know they can ask a lot, but not too much of the intelligence business, and by intelligence leaders who know they can't promise too much. this has to be worked out among reasonable people, and we had that in the bulcans. as a teacher in georgetown, when i render a compliment, there's a historic backdrop here. when you look at other issues like the cuban missile crisis, high marks, arab-israeli war, 1967, again, the gold starp, not
so much on vietnam or battle of the crisis in the dominican republic. the nixon administration is actually easier to have successes of the relation of the intelligence because there is so few than there is to talk about the failures. the israeli-arab peace process, tremendous achievement there, less so on iran. reagan administration, very positive reviews on its soviet policy, not so much in the middle east or iran. the george hw bush administration on -- i think, very impressive relations with the collapse of communism there on the the ussr, beginning of the implosion, in the middle east, where they revived the middle east peace process, and germanupification, a tremendous
agenda done well. i hold the fire op the george w. bush adds mrgs because history has to review that, and i'm not confident that grades will be high there. the task force was established in 1992 for a very simpt reasonment if all of you ever made a phone call to the intelligence community, there's a bunch of technical agencies, analytic agencies, and if you have a pressing need, and you want to get that intelligence community to help you, you got to know how to make it work, so that when we talk about establishing the task force, we knew the complexity of the issues that were unprecedented in most of our experience. this was going to be a tough road to hoe, so we wanted to simplify the relationship with the policy communities. if you made a telephone call, you need a service right away, call, get that nice electronic
lady telling you, we will give you six options, you pick one, and six to seven buttons you push, you may or may not get help. we wanted to eliminate that and make it personal so that a person could call the task force and get a response. we does covered the effect within the intelligence community was there our analysts were much more aware of the mission that our policymaker had, the broad issues they had to cover beyond the narrow disciplines the folks came from, and it was really a delight to watch on the collection side where a policymaker would have a critical issue where they needed help from a technical collector, and one of our bulcan task force folks could quit the person in contact with the collection agency to refine the requirement so policymakers get what they
needed. again, bringing all of this into a collaborative relationship, i think, was the beginning and ultimately the maturation of the progress ultimately responsible for the success that we enjoy, but i do want to emphasize this -- and i always resist in talking about the intelligence community in isolation. none of the success would have been possible without the engagement on the policy side, so i've -- dick holbrook was a strong influence on a day-to-day basis in what we did, described dick as the wind in our sails, but sometimes the hurricane at our picnic. [laughter] he was usually ahead of where the intelligence was and wanted it to go further, so he was a great of intelligence, i wish he shared more information from hid side than he did, but i understood there were reasons
that he held back. the rest of his team, dick was a bit flamboyant maybe in conducting himself, and i don't mean that negatively, but he had a team that was really a bunch of modest workhorses, and people like bob frasier, and nelson who joined dick's team, and beyond that, dod, and chris hill was a part of dick's team, and within the national security team, tony lake, sandy, nancy, these were all folks who made it very -- not to say they didn't demand us or not to say they were not critical of times of what we delivered, but they were always collegial, respectful, and they
made it work better than it otherwise would have. leadership is so critical to making that intelligence policy relationship work, and we had that leadership from the national security counsel in the clinton team overall. the production that the task force put out went across a range that was almost unprecedented in my career. we had to follow the state of conflict, great interest to people, but we had to assess a very complicated set of leaders, and probably the best known of the three, and very difficult personalities, very difficult relationships, and i think right down todayton, it was extremely difficult for the policy side to deal with the leaders and for us to provide support. working together with that reasonable group of people on
the team and the national security counsel team i think you'll see in the documents that have been released thus far, a great deal of mutual support and collaboration. we had also had to deal with particular relationship of countries like russia, hungry, turkey, and greece, and that was a complicated challenge to deal with. we started off with a dismal order of battle situation that we had to mature, and that did a god job of doing. arms embargo, econ financial sanctions, and we had to provide support for mapping, and we did actually produce good graphic technology to help with the effort, and even on meteorology because in the humanitarian support area, it was so important to predict whether -- and we tried -- sometimes we got criticism for the science behind it, but it was helpful. i can even residential trying to
determine with the humanitarian would be, we actually used imagery to look at their rooftops as the winter came on and made the determination where the rooftops showed melted snow, there were probably people living there, accrued measure, but we used every tool we had, and that was just one of them. the -- if you look at the documents that had been released, and my own recollection of the work this we did, it -- there tends to be a guarded and kind of skeptical regard. it was not president johnson's soiled milk, but it was cautious, and the issues were that difficult. caution was called for in almost every case. we looked at the launch of the u.n. protective force in 1992 to the monitoring of the arms
embargo in the cease fire, sphormer yugoslavia, economic sanctions imposed in may of 1992 to the e.u.'s peace plan in 1992 to the advanced peace plan a year later to schemes of the delivery of relief supplies constant source of discussion, and within the policy arenas, and u.n.'s declaration in 1993 of the six muslim safe areas, sarajevo and to the contact groups. the u.s., u.k., france, germany, and russia, the chances of their plans for restoring peace process in 1994, when you look at all those things we covered, there was a skepticism because we reflect real obstacles that policymakers were facing. i want people to know, as i do, that the task force and people running it pulled out all the
stops to bring all the capabilities and intelligence to help policymakers to overcome obvious calls. we may have reputation for skepticism and everything we can to defeat those who are skeptical. i want to mention quickly two papers done, and national intelligence estimate on the national intelligence counsel that i had the privilege of heading later on. yugoslavia would cease to be a functioning state within ultimately to years at which -- and that was a kind of controversial -- not controversial statement within the intelligence community, but it did generate some conflict on the policy side, but not much because the bush administration was really not -- i did not notice it, the bush
administration was determined in any way to intervene for the few months they had remaining in office, but it had a second key judgment which said there is little the united states in its european allies do to preserve yugoslavia's unity, and that is where i was interviewed by a study done on this back in the early 2000s, my commented is that the is statement we need to look at carefully as it produces intelligence because, in fact, it was wrong. the united states did intervene, and the united states did -- bosnia is an independent state today, and it would not be, had the united states not had intervened with european assistance in the way that it did. we did not really look at alternatives in a serious way, and partly because we were not asked to do so by an administration that was not going to intervene so the key issue for us has to be that we need to look at those, and i think we're doing it much better
today because there were issues of spillover that we didn't really look at. if we just left yugoslavia alone, it would have had impact not just on the -- the six republics of yugoslavia, but into hundred -- hungary in a time we dealt with the restructure of europe, but border issues would have been affected. you would have seen the countries of the region and the european region affected by the disaster that would have occurred. the intervention ended up being a very constructive policy to take in. we should up -- i think we do now look rigorously at alternatives, but a second one i want to mention is a case of when i was director for european analysis. one was an imagery analysis that was before the nga was established and civil war -- closely associated with us and the directer of intelligence, and ted holt was hid name, a
very dead at a cayed im-- dedicated image ray, went through all the archived images of bos bosnia with the goal to e what it would tell us about the accountability for ethnic cleansing, and when he finished or they finished the work, it showed that if the pattern going through several hundred villages in bosnia was the orthodox churches and constitutions preserved, muslim, some cases catholic institutions were destroyed, and the result of that was that we assert the 90% of the cleansing was the responsibility of seshes. now, within our own community, some people said, hey, we know this. this is not news, but there was a great impact because i was
getting calls and complaints, some from the military side from others also, and there was -- if you look at the state of debate, there was a view of the plague on their houses, the historic patrons, we can't do anything about it, and we shouldn't be intervening. this was -- image ri was circumstance evidence, but per sweysive to a number number of - persuasive to a number of people like holbrook. when i brought the study to him, when it was in slides and some talking points before he actually published it, i mean, dick brought us into the conference room in the 6th floor of state, took down some paintings in a dramatic fashion, and call everything in because he knew where it was going. he saw that not at brilliant analysis to be useful this a debate, so he said to me, and i
remember it precisely, said to me, john, i know what you got here is true, but i want you to take it over to the pentagon. we did take it over to the pentagon. of course, they were receptive, and i remember joe, highly complimentary of the works done there. this was not a dray dramatic piece of work, but very much a hear and now look at where we are by doing it with the benefit of image ri in a way that really i did think, at least infliewpsed was o positive influence that led to resolution in bos knee that. the -- i want to say that probably the -- there is no story that tested the intelligence policy relationship more than the u.n. imposed sanctions regime, serbia, and that was in may of 1992 and
lasted through the dayton accords in 1995. the unrelenting challenge to policymakers to monitor and enforce this complex economic and financial sanctions regime and transfer it from a struggling marginal influence in outcomes, really, what it was when the clinton administration came into power required sustain intelligence support at every turn. i want to emphasize that if you talk to, as i did, to our analysts and to a lot of folks on the policy side too, in 1992, there was not a lot of confidence in sanctions that we are able to make a difference. in the ends, they made a tremendous difference. they were a huge lever to get them through the conference table, and he wanted oil and gas and belgrade at the b end of ?aif, and i -- 1995, and if you read holbrook's
memoir, he wanted release from sanctions more than he was committed to the greatest, sesh -- serbia and croatia. the success of this sanctions effort on the part of intelligence was due to leon ferth, the very rigorous patience sustained effort he had on a daily basis. we had daily meetings on sanctions, and the way he structured the response, and most structured the effort. he had published a task force including state treasury, dod, commerce, cues -- customs border patrol, and cia marrying nicely with the task force bringing together the intelligence assets. it is -- i will tell you that it did require the leadership of
someone like leon to get it to work, but this, for the intelligence side, it requiredded a full scale, what we call multihint, that means all your collection assets and all analytics with regional analysts, economic analysts, financial analysts together on a daily basis to bring out and about the results achieved on those sanctions, and they became a model of success, and i think, actually, change, in my judgment, the change the view of a lot of our policy community about the potential effectiveness of sanctions. i just want to say something briefly. i think we took some hits, and this is just -- 1995 was a year of what i call a year to the convergence of try m of and tragedy. one of the great tragedy was the
assault on the security where about 8,000 muslims men and boys were killed, and over 20,000 women and chirp were expelled, and just a brief period, really, for over a week from 1995. there were questions about, you know, how could this have happened? why couldn't intelligence predict it? i will leave others to speak, perhaps more knowledge than me, from the policy side about this. my view was that, well, i can say with photo confidence that we produced intelligence as we had it, and we were dealing with the dutch peacekeepers there who played down the threat, but the simple fact is that when it came time to -- when we saw the impending crisis coming as i saw it, i thought our policy side works overtime to try to get collaboration among europeans to do something about it.
when i saw on the intelligence side and open the policy side, was people who were working furiously to try to deal with that situation. we simply didn't have adequate intelligence on the ground. we did not have an international network ready to increase support to the safe areas. and that vol ?ecialt was exploited. then it was an interesting case in in august. few days in august when expelled in living that part of croatia. that was an interesting debate with dick. dick was insistent on the need to encourage the -- i'm sorry the croatia to proceed
with that. what i'll say about the intelligence side and this is just to show you the conundrum we get in to. on the intelligence side, we saw a sesh military capability. it was long actually. and around the area that would actually repel. that would fight against the ceo yai shans. that didn't happen. it ran furiously out. we also were concerned about the using -- yugoslavia army coming in. we were concerned they might have some missiles that might be used to assault americans in places. so this was a case and dick mentions in his memoir twice we failed to predict this. but from my perspective it wasn't prediction. it was risk assessment.
what we said and he said were weighed by the policy side and the decision was made that and his argue. this would clean the map up in a way that lead more rapidly to peace is probably the right decision. but looking back sometimes you can't find better way you would have done it yourself with limited intelligence we had. i think the warning that we articulated at the time was appropriate even though we were wrong and some of our judgments. then let me talk briefly. iranians and other forces that came to bosnia. it was covered very well from intelligence from early 1992 period through 1995. we made an effort to distinguish among the fighters who had come to bosnia. we wanted to identify the
iranian army guardian of the -- so. really tough guys. and iranian intelligence officers versus military force. i think we did a good job of that. but, you know. why didn't we -- and we got that from congress really toward the end of the conflict not during it. i think the issue was partly it was actually assisting the boss knee began muslim in a way to helping balance the power with other forces that actually was not in violation of u.s. objective at the time. and also when we look at the order of battle we judged that they were never a decisive force in the conflict. and of course but there was a very wise policy decision and the date of court to require those fighters be removed as a
condition of the accords. and president pledged to do that. we did monitor that with total satisfaction. but we monitored it. the last thing i want to say is on the war crime tribunal inspect is a, to me very issue. if you look at the war tribunal. it's not difficult to understand this reality notwithstanding the intelligence community can provide outstanding support for the largest effort on war crimes. david with whom i had considerable contact with secretary albright's choice in 1993 to lead the effort to establish a war crimes tribunal
for the former yugoslavia. me eventually became president clinton's ambassador at large. he's written about his great frustration initially in getting cooperation across the government including the intelligence committee. he concedes -- help from then deputy director george. i can say having watched the people. i mentioned they pursued that, total professional commitment and in many cases a passion that really did deliver, i think, some very positive results. in conclusion, let me say the ball kin task force represented an major effort to -- an lettic capability for the benefit of policy makers dealing with what we saw a high level of complexity and uncertainty and rapidly deterring conditions.
also provided an innovated platform for continuous real time policy input to drive intelligence priority and define the requirement. the btf coming in the wake of the iraq task force which was more controversial in term of the performance in the first gulf war. actually was asking for a level of collaboration across agencies unprecedented in the history of intelligence community. a lot of credit goes to the folks that work with us. that level of collaboration, in fact, was achieved. the bts relationship policy makers remain strong. even when there was clear disagreement on the issue like innovation in 1995 and other issues that came up. because people were ready to collaborate. the early investment in collaboration on the part of the policy makers of the clinton administration and the intelligence community paid off
in the resolution of miner difficulties. before they could become big problems. and the btf, as i look back now and evident in a lot of documents you're going read remain committed to helping policy makers develop options and reduce the uncertainty they make in facing decisions. the btf, i'm proud say, awe itself as an integral part of the u.s. government team. now it is stopping my own comment. it's my pleasure to introduce nancy. who is the deputy national security adviser. number three. but actually if you're number three she was actually number one in term of the people who liked people from the intelligence side. nancy was unflappable, always cawfm. she could levy some pretty heavy requirements. she did it with such class and sympathy for the work of intelligence folks. she went on to become u.s. representative for special
political affairs. and rank of ambassador she did some very important work on northern ireland. she was a foreign policy adviser to both ted kennedy and mayor bloomberg. she has written a couple of books. and networking on the president's declassification efforts. she knows a lot about those documents. so welcome, nancy. great to be working with you again. [applause] >> we have an exciting panel for you to give you fist hand chance to hear from those authors of the many documents that you've had out here. we're going have a brief
discussion from madeline albright, sandy, and leon. they have already been introduced. we're going to have hear from each of them. have a discussion with them, and take a few questions from the audience. and then wrap up around 3:00 and the president will come. let me invite the panel to come up. [applause] m. >> this an on? first i want to thank the clinton library.
it's great to see so many old friend. i think the date and peace process is something we are all very proud of to have been part of and stands as president clinton's one of his many lasting legacies. and the legacy is today bosnia is a moment ethnic and democratic state. i think the team here on deserves a large chunk of the credit. but the unsung hero is also the intelligence community. if you look at the 2,000 pages release. hat off to the historical collection of the cia. it's easy to do what you have done. i want to give you a round of applause for what you've done. it's extraordinary. thank you for that.
i would ask him to stand because he's really deserves the credit for today's conference. [applause] this is really stefanie mentioned it's the youngest collection of documents ever released. and that makes us feel a lot younger since it was almost two candidates ago. what you heard from john is how hard it is to do. sporing the policy makers and policy makers to have distribution and conversation with the intelligence community when they worked together. it really makes a huge difference. in the corner of the 1992 campaign with the headquarter
were not far from here. i remember distinctly the candidate clinton and actually candidate vice president to be gore calling to the headquarter wanting to do more on bosnia. the i think stict of the president and the vice president we inherited a situation where the u.s. had real interest. the previous administration had said we don't have a dog in this fight. while the president absolutely thought we did. and worked from the day he took office to move that forward. so what i wanted to do today was walk you through the participates on stage with me. both to try and put the united states in a stronger leadership position. how the president did that. have a senior officials did that. i want to start with sandy who is deputy national security adviser in the first term and national security advicer in the second term but one of the first people on president clinton's '92 campaign.
he saw the evolution from well before even the president had won election. and he saw it firsthand how the president wanted to lift the embargo, get involved, have u.s. leadership. and reading through the documents they are fascinated. they talk about how do we have next steps early on. and the possibility of a serbian began conditional yes. and what would we do if it happens? would we put troops in if succeeds. the good news if it succeeded great. the bad news we had to put troops in there and all sort of debates with congress about lifting the arms embargo. i think probably the most interesting for me are the leadup to the boss knee began end game where it leading up to until july of 1995, where the president finally decided he's going it take charge and drove process of the marriage diplomacy that ended up in the date.
in july of 1995 you write to your colleagues including madeline and leon. eyes only memo. in other words they weren't able to make copies to their staff. it's extremely sensitive. it's one of the crown jewel of the intelligence documents. right after the where we are talking about perhaps before the u.n. operation would collapse in contemplating air strikes. pick the story about what happened and how leadership was a key element to the win at the end. it is interesting and quite relevant as you read it today. maybe before 1995 useful to put it in the context what went
before. because it only makes sense, i think, in that context. as a candidate in 1992, governor clinton quite a strong posture on bosnia. as nancy said, the bush administration coming off the gulf war basically said had no dog in that fight. president then governor clinton thought we did. both for humanitarian reasons and because he thought we had strategic interest in a conflict in the middle of europe. he gets a weapon. there is a rather intense debate, which the colleagues up here within the administration about the proper courses. our military folks were quite opposed to a robust posture. they did not think that it could
be used for limited purpose. the overwhelming force that was prevailing at that time was not allowed for this kind of activity. he would send him to europe to try to convince the europeans to lift the the arms embargo against the boss knee began and use air power to strike again the serbian. the europeans they said it's a european problem. go away. it's not an american problem. stay out of our business, certainly for the next two years, it was a very frustrating situation. with on again off again negotiations with the six instances where air power was used in a limited way for
pinprick strierks. it various peace plans that were never viable. growing brutality from the serbians, atrocities, and are not really being able to push the process forward. it lead up to the moment that nancy set up in the question. in july of -- i should say right before this moment. and i know madeline will talk more about this. john did as well. serbians went in to one of the so-called safe areas in bosnia. supposedly safe area. the dutch were protecting it. the dutch fled. -- they got there three dais later. and destroyed two tanks.
and 8,000 bos knee begans were mas considered and thrown in to mass graves and madeline, i hope will pick up the story when she speaks. sthfs more than we can bear. i was in my office in mid july and the president would like us to be on the putting green. that was disconcerning. i didn't the he wanted to challenge me to a game. so i went out and nancy was there and mike. and that morning the day before they proposed a 10,000-person rapid reaction force that should go to bosnia and rescue people. it was totally impractical. but it was action. it was proactive. and the president said to us.
why don't you give me better ideas? why don't i get new options? and this accelerated this process. and the end game strategy was essentially was that the united states and president clinton would take over the boss knee began enterprise in a word. it involved one last high level negotiation an offer on the table. take or leave it. if they turned it down we would got u.n. and push a u.n. force out of the country. we would then lift the arms embargo, arm the boss knee began, train them, and use the
air power. you have to understand something. that the point, 3% of the american people thought that bosnia was an important foreign policy interest. and the president's approval rating on foreign policy was 34%. this is not an expedient decision for the president. he believed we had to act. he also flipped the decision making process on its head. usually you move the decision up from the deputy and the principle of the president. this turned it upside down. the only principle that approved this is madeline, leon, and the
nfc folk. not anybody else at the time. we dispatched them to go to the european with a different posture which called tell don't ask. and the posture was we're going to do this. with you or without you. and the europeans said with us. and -- a few weeks later he uponned it and what began was operation delivered force. 11 days of intensive bombing of syria. 3,000. 60 targets. at one point the u.n. asked us to pause the bombing.
the bombing continued and after 11 days -- agree to ceasefire and two weeks later peace conference patterson air force base where whole brooke, and general and others an extraordinary brilliant negotiation hammered out what became the peace accord. so the basic lesson here it seems to me a lot of lessons in term of lashing force the diplomacy in contradiction to the posture that some people have taken in the beginning of this process. it's also a lesson about american leadership. where we lead generally
countries follow. we are the big dog. and that leadership starts with the president. president clinton lead here. that leadership, i think, lead to ending the war in bosnia, i think is an extraordinary legacy . >> just before we go to leon. i wanted to ask you to comment on the role of intelligence through that process. >> this is the best example in my eight years of clinton administration. four years of the carter administration of the intention committee working with the policy makers. it was really seamless. and john you understand, i think. you know, it works best when the policy makers ask the right questions. and the intelligence communities is close enough that the policy they know what policy makers
need. it's more a daily video conference at the working level. and whether the whole range from understanding extraordinary complex dynamic of bosnia. the religious, historical, dynamic to monitoring the flow of arms and people. to the economic embargo, which leon was like a puppet master. a brilliant exercise of using sageses to squeeze at the microlevel.
it was all about maps. and meteorologist we were able to know what it was going to look like in bosnia for humanitarian reasons. john spoke about the iranians that were infiltrated in to bosnia. getting rid of those. it was really extraordinary. and, you know, to me it's the classic case of cooperation. it really drove sanctions policy to a level never matched before or sense in term of garperring the international effort to try and have actions.
take a bite and to make sure that our policy work. and his work really did change the course of history in the ball kins. i don't think history has been told well enough. i don't we have a change. ambassador richard calling sanctions the crown jewel of the policy. this is the king of sanctions. it was a quiet man and only speak when had something interested to say. saying the sanctions enforcement is gradually degenerating. it's whether makes sense to strength --
to push toward the end of an negotiated settlement. you remember the talk about problem areas like flagging european support for sanctions. so talk to us about how you did it. and drove the most important sanctions enforcement ever. change with it to make sure that the sanctions were as loophole free as possible.
my first assignment as a foreign sf officer because the u.s. balance of payment were running in the wrong way was to be assign to the bureau of intelligence and research. in the state department while the unmarried offers from my class were sent to vietnam. i learned a lot about the craft of intelligence from the work they had to do in that office. later i wound up on the staff of house select democratic national committee on intelligence. and learning a lot how the system works and how to draw it farred in term of willingness to collaborate. then wound up fast forward another decade or so.
with a mandate the principles gave. and without that mandate everything else would have been possible. i remember vividly showed up for routine morning meeting and all of you were present. i was informed you wanted me to take over the job of trying to improve the effective p of the sageses and the u.s. government and other country. i asked if you may remember this. each communicate with the secretary. twhapped meant instead of taking two, three, four, five days to coordinate a cable. it took a couple of hours which suddenly moved to the point where we could get ahead of the
game that others were playing. but our ability to understand that game was driven by what we were given by the intelligence services. making these things work. we have the term in the form of intelligence data. and we have full collaboration all the way up to the level to respond rather than to watch people run circles around us as i move money or other kind of material in to the serbian war effort. that's really the secret of how that worked. the other was to realize that until we were ready to use force this was the cutting edge of the
american response. and only struck me on to. of or behind all of the technical element of the gait in the foreign policy and national security issue. there was a group of distinguished americans americans in room. they were wrestling with what was right do in the name of the american people in the presence of something we felt was not acceptable. those are the ultimate drivers behind them. the effectivenesses. the other was the nature of the collaboration with the intelligence services. the basic rule that i learned throughout all of my contacts with that is that the quality of the intelligent you get is a
function of the quality of the questions you ask. the relationship between so-called consumers and producers of intelligence is to not be passive the best it can be. it has to be active. it has to be understanded a a i dynamic and creative art. we coshed and the result was a highly motivated intelligence system that went out not only
waiting to be told what to look for but out there foraging for what it already understand we were going to need and producing them. very often had ahead of time. these are human dimensions to a highly complex and technical process. searching ahead of the policy to reduce the information out of which you create new solution and recognize the way in which problem are e volving. after that last point. i think. to tell us when the tact i think were changing so we put could adjust we were doing in order to be able to jump ahead of the curve and make the sanctions work as a means to pressure
dropping his policy and finally negotiating. this is how leon was in meeting after meeting. i don't remember and all five points. let me turn to general westerly clark. who was a key military advisers throw the period. he was a recipient of the best conducting over 10,000 air strikes against the targets and organization allied force. really saved kosovo. and any time he wants to run for president, he can do kosovo hands down. they loved the president in kosovo and particularly west clark. but for 78 days it went on.
not fatality. it's stunning example of his leadership in the force diplomacy to save lives. but take us back to bosnia. you were at the pentagon at the time. and then and with the team that was actually is sandy here? can you please stand up? this is his wife. and those are three very much in our mind every time we think about this valiant effort to restore peace there. but west was on the trip. and understands from the difficult periodings of leading up to the end of the war on
bosnia. how important from a military standpoint the intelligence was. and we like to hear from the military perspective of both the needs for leadership and marrying force and diplomacy in the bosnia conflict but also a military standpoint how important the intelligence peace of that was. i heard about washington and so forth. it was intimidating to come in there. >> explain what j5 is. >> one of the eight staff officers work for the joint chief of staff. he was the real brain.
i want to say they were two real leaders who are possible for so much of what the success of the policy was. he set the tone for civil military relationship. they was born in poll land. he was a bit of an odd duck. he was unpronounceable and unspellble. he spoke with an accept and seemed very smart but wasn't part of main stream. people were shocked all the sudden he was picked to be the chairman of the joint chief of staff. he wasn't a good old boy. thought about thing. he really did. he tried to make it work.
what the president did he not only said what the military view is. he took the thoughts of the principle. s and worked with those thoughts and tried to craft military support. g on to immediatings i went to countless meeting. we came out of sam and we don't like wars. and in the united states army especially. then we went to the gulf war and we had to forgeneral -- to take seven and so we ended up with 500,000 troops there.
then we come to bosnia. there's people fighting and you can't tell the good from the bad and you can't spell the names. they don't have any vowels, you can't pronounce them. and so as barry testified, my predecessor take 400,000 troops to deal with this problem. and that wasn't terribly helpful. nobody on my staff had ever tbon boss knee imrap they didn't know what they were talking about. and i got a lot of information from it. but nobody could tell me what
the military dimension was. so i talk to my buddy because he was actually doing most of the -- i would like to go there and learn this. so you to unit. anybody who gets involved in bosnia. it will ruin your career and probably get fired. so not only did you have the problem in the pentagon of wanting to use at lough force. you had a lot of people jumping tbrak the problem. it was a rocky road. ly say that. it was funny. they told me about a month before i left he was complaining one day any time you want to do
anything this this town you have to take the heat for it. forget about congress it was all over "the washington post. i would never disobey anybody's direction like that. as we move through the process, we came to the summer of 1995. and they asked me for some input to this secret lake thing. you never hear about what is really happening. you gate snatch of it. tony is going do something on this. what do you think about such and such. and i went open the trip with to be any lake. at the pentagon wet richard might be taking over the delegation, and he was known a diplomatic who loved to use the
military. you have to stop him from bombing. he wants to bomb things. he wants to bomb. so i volunteered to go to be the stopper. on the foundation. [laughter] and it very long before i realized what an incredible genous he was at using this. we went through these negotiations together. i was the his sort of right hand guy. i have like the puppet. i was on the puppet masters knee. he would tell me what to say in the negotiations. i would say it. he would say be careful. hef trying to use you. i was in uniform. he didn't like him. he was tricky tricky guy. it military is like dog. smart, not too smart, but
loyal. [laughter] you can see him working in the delegation. we worked it through. we had some interesting times. dick was very good at using the intelligence. i think you gave him personally. i'm not sure i got the intelligence. when you deal with it you never know what you don't know. somebody else has something educational that, you know, you look up and how does he know that? because, you know, he got limited distribution intelligence. so dick was very, very good. a couple of incidents that illustrate this. we were when a bombing was occurring. we -- we landed there and took us to a hunting lodge and said let's
take a walk around the lake. so we took a walk around the lake and the said the bombing must stop. it's bad for peace. that's what lead to the letter. it was obvious that we had him right where where we wanted him. where you have the adversary claiming so you to stop the bomb soggy he can negotiate. we go wack the next time and says i have a special surprise for you. maybe a cake or something. he produces -- [inaudible] the two indicted recently indicted war criminals. this is a time to make peace and stays, please, gentlemen, you must agree among yourselves to make the peace and make the bombing stop. we're sitting an the room in the
hunting lodge. before i know it -- [inaudible] before anything is said and dick gets up to leave. and before i know it, i'm left with them. and i'm not a trained lawyer. and to be honest with you. they never taught me how to write a crease-fire agreement. and i didn't know how to write a ceasefire agreement. it was the second night without sleep. one night across the atlantic. one night at pamela's residence and the third night without sleep. and we wrote this ceasefire agreement. and so it was what, you know, dick wanted. and he used it and he was very effective. because he let me take the heat for the ceasefire agreement and he could backstop me on it. because if he had done it himself, it would have put the delegation in jeopardy. he was very smart about how he
deployed assets. it if stop the fighting. it sphopped the bombing. and opened the door for the peace agreement. so we couldn't have done any of that without great intelligence. i want to say tap i want to say -- i want to reinforce what he said about the difficulty of this. because you have to got get the military organization on the ground; correct. we had no military on the ground. so you're saying we're saying what company is that? what battalion is that? we have u.n. units from different country. we have serbians, must mu.s, para military in there. they're all jabbering and we're monitoring some of it. and hearing it freer -- from other people. it had to be kept straight. you had know the command ands the political level and know the other nation's level. it was a huge intelligence load on that. and the only suggestion that i had after when i come back on it. i don't know if we're doing it any better. but we're not very disciplined
in the pent gob at least about collecting information from people who have gone out. and we should be more disciplined. i mean, somebody should have made me chained me to the desk when i came back and said write down the name of everybody you talked to. every personality. tell me the five most important things and give me a strength and weaknesses. i believe that the chinese do this. the soviets did this. the israelis do this. and for some reason. i think the state department does it. for some reason in the military, we don't. we just want to know about -- >> joe will take you up on the offer. >> yeah. we want to know about weapon and stuff. we don't get to the personality and detail. we don't keep track of it. it's the only suggestion as i'm thinking back on the whole rep sewed. it. we could have done it with everybody ever met the guys we have a library. it would supplemented the
current take on the intelligence. >> thank you very much. >> now to madeline albright. who was both a cabinet member and u.n. ambassador in the first term. and of course our secretary of state in the second term. so very aware of how important the intelligence is. and how important u.s. leadership is. i think history is proving clearly he was she was on the right side of history. and the documents that have been released today, the document how she was pushing and push and pushing. there was one that in february of ?ie. so we had been there maybe a month. she's in a principles committee meeting which is the cabinet level interagency meeting saying the policy was legitimizing ethnic cleansing. it's a woman that does not mince
words and calling our policy palate. there's a wonderful quote in these documents. she was trying to keep the pressure on the need to recognize an ending the again side at the forefront. i want to start with your role in the crisis a little bit later. and the role at the u.n. and how important the role of intelligence was in shocking the world of the conscious. >> great, thank you. and it's wonderful to be back here together with the whole team. we really were a team. it's great to see so many people
and it's great to see you here. , you know, people ask me what i miss most. it's not the airplane. it's the intelligence. because i really do think that having that opportunity every day to have the kind of intelligence that the intelligence community can put together is totally amazing. probably when i first began i didn't understand why my briefer would sit there and watch me read. and i thought i wondered if she was watching to see if i moved my lips when i read. mostly in order to be able to then get the questions then begin to move the process forward. before i get to -- let me say this. it's interesting in listening to my colleagues. i think it makes a difference what your background is. what your history is. everybody told a little bit of theirs. mine is completely different. i was born in czech.
therefore i understood -- i knew what the area was about. i understood the ethnic things. it's a pure accident of history that happened. that would have been the major issue that was out there that in fact we had to deal with. along with the iraq sanctions we had to deal with that. and i came, most of my colleagues are younger than i am. and they are very much a part of the vietnam generation. i am a product of muting when why should we care about people in far away places with unpronounceable names. we come with our own background. i think that it is important as one studies history and decision making what is it that you bring as an individual to the role of the individual really is different and i think matters. the other part i think matters in decision making and these documents really show it is very
-- we all argued. that's actually what it's supposed to be about. principles committee you shouldn't have everybody there saying yes, sir, yes, sir. but a really good national security adviser, you know, nancy has been through all of it. sandy was a brilliant national security adviser. he made us break the eggs in order to really understand what was going on. and that it was okay to disagree. that was the whole point. and if you look at these particular documents, you can see us disagree. so i disagree. and i came at it from a very different aspect. not only my background but also being at the u.n. where every -- i saw more different diplomats than any other american diplomat. you mentioned pamela she saw more french people. i saw more different diplomats. and every single day people would come up to me and said your president, who has
candidates said we were supposed to do something. why aren't you doing something? what is it and we talked about the safe area and we talked about who was doing what. so that was going on on one level. then on another level, the europeans were completely obnoxious. because it was in europe, and they, one of the at the same time saying why don't you let us do it and didn't let us do it. ..
>> there were photographs, images, that show what had happened. first, a lot of people in a field, in a stadium, then there was an empty area, then an area where all of the sudden you could see people all over the place, and there were tracks taking the people out of it, and so i managed, through all my friends here, to get these images declassified, and i took them to the security com, and there were discussions had it happened, had it not happened,
what had the dutch been doing? i passed the pictures around the security counsel, and it was silent as people looked at the pictures, which told the story and matched the story of the interviews that the young man had given, and it was chilling to everybody. it was an amazing example of how you can use intelligence really to push something forward. it was kind of my stevenson moment, but it was a perfect comample -- example of how policy and the intelligence came together, and it has to be visible in some particular way, so i think that was very good. the war crimes tribunal, you talked about that too. very important. i'm proud of many things i did at the u.n., but one was one of my early votes to create the war crimes tribunal. david shepherd worked with me, and part of my -- i have to tell you i'm usually multilateral, but that's hard. it's also -- americans don't like the word.
there's too many sill balls and ends in an "ims," but mostly it's partnership to get others to go along. the u.s. is difficult, no question about it. i think trying to get the countryings to agree, the russians are not usually helpful, and we're protecting the seshes in any number of ways, and we saw that in kosovo, and basically, i think that the question is how you them mobilized, and so the war crimes tribunal was an important part of a really new step in terms of getting those perpetrating the crimes different from the surrendered power. we knew that people talked about that as the model, whereas the war crimes tribunal for the former yugoslavia was different. it was an early vote we took. then the question was, how could we prove what was going on?
i think that the way of supplying of our intelligence information to them in order to get indictments was the important part. the difficult part was not all u.n. systems trusted -- or they liked intelligence or were not true, but wanted to use our intelligence, and so i think that became a very important issue, but i do think that ultimately the combination of the sanctions, and i have to say leon and i really -- you look for allies within the committee, and leon and i were well allied on this, and the sanctions, i think, were very important, that the indictments were also from the war crimes tribunal, and that combination of assets and the bombings, and, by the way, it was very interesting, i have to say, i admire general powell incredibly arguing with him is difficult as a mere mortal female civilian -- [laughter] as he testified in his book he
explained that to ambassador albright our soldiers were not toy soldiers, and i called him after the book came out, and we used force positively after he had left, and i said, patiently? he said, yeah, patiently you understood nothing. [laughter] he sent me his book, and he signed it with love, admiration, patiently, colin, and i wrote back a note saying, with love, admiration, ect., forcefully madeleine, but i think that sully really did bring a different approach, and i also think that as you said, wes, some was his background coming from a different kind of -- and there was a time that we were standing in front of the situation room, he in the uniform, me with me pen, and bob reuben walked by and said, force and diplomacy, and charlie said, which is which? we were very good partners in
this, and as sannie said, force and diplomacy go together, and i think those are the lessons with the addition that you can want do it without the intelligence. i think that the task force has been an amazing model, and i feel really as somebody was able to use it, in a way that maybe others couldn't in pictures. it really proved the point and i think made the difference. >> one of the favorite moments in the situation room with madeleine as general powell when he was making the argument we have to have a half million troops to go into bosnia, and why do we have a dplor yows army for if we can't use it. i almost had an baa lism. >> patiently, patiently. [laughter] >> let me