tv Key Capitol Hill Hearings CSPAN June 17, 2014 6:00am-8:01am EDT
it's a very, very important. that again, i just thank you and the committee and all the panelists for engaging this topic which is critical, not only to the future and your children and to our country, and make no mistake, the decision to reauthorize will have a definite impact on our schools, our hospitals, our economy, our military and our homes.
and most importantly our kids. i thank you for this time. >> thank you very much. dr. cook? >> thank you very much for the question. i find it a persistent question we get a lot as i can presentation but sometimes it's what's the one thing i would do if i could do something would be to get everyone to realize there is not one thing you can do. everything is part of the problem. each one of the strategies and proposals represents 1% of the solution. it can't be left off. it's not the magic bullet. so we need to include all of it. we need to think global and act local because that's were i find like a lot of change occurs, it occurs at the grassroots level where it can take old and have that local relevant context that's really important. so i thank you for the question and just to conclude with obesity and with hunger, we discussed this a lot. i think it's important obesity has come up as a disease but it's probably the one disease that still exist that doesn't carry the dignity of other chronic diseases.
that's even more so a problem for children and adolescents. so i think it's important to make this about health, about health at any size, and promoting health across all children and our families. >> thank you very much. >> thank you, chairwoman. we've mentioned a few times today how the schools are really on the front lines. i thank you for this opportunity to share my thinking and my experiences with our school and my school system. the partnership is definitely something that i would say let's continue this conversation and think about what actions that we will take and that we can take back to our schools and our school districts, continue opportunities to increase the education for parents. just one principal schoolhouse, i often find that we struggle with funding to have different events for families, afterschool events. it does take money to put these
things together. so at times we are robbing peter to pay paul to make these happen for local communities. if we can think about opportunities for these partnerships with universities as i mentioned earlier, for increased funding so we can have after school, so we can have not only the nutritious afterschool program and sack program, -- snack program but also physical activities and clubs students can be a part of so they're not sitting in front of the screen at home. so i think this continued conversation, this conversation doesn't need to stop here. getting feedback from other principles and schools would be a great welcome to different educators and all educators. thank you. >> well, thank you to each of you. this discussion does not stop here. this is the beginning and it was important to me that we start with the big picture of why we
have these programs, why should we care about this. we are going to be hearing from all perspectives and working with everyone to make sure that the way things are done makes sense and are workable. we certainly want to move forward, not backward. we don't intend the backward so we will move forward. but we think it's very for important that we talk about as the country, why as a community, why as parents and family members that we need to care. so thank you again to everyone. let me just remind colleagues that any additional questions for the record should be submitted to the committee clerk five business days from today. that is 5 p.m. friday come june 20. and the hearing is adjourned. [inaudible conversations]
>> up next on c-span2, a look at the potential threat that russia poses to european security. then we'll hear from former hhs secretary kathleen sebelius making her first public appearance since stepping down as health secretary. that's live at 8:30 a.m. eastern. the u.s. senate is back in and will vote on a number of judicial nominations. live senate coverage here on c-span2 at 10 eastern. >> president obama's choice to be the next housing and urban development secretary, fully ann kuster from will be on capitol hill this morning for a confirmation hearing. he will take -- julian castro.
live coverage begins at 10 eastern on c-span3. wednesday on c-span3, the head of general motors will testify about the company's investigation of ignition switch problems and subsequent recalls. the detroit-based automaker announced the recall of another 3 million cars on monday. you can join the conversation on facebook and twitter. watch live coverage at 10 eastern. >> former u.s. ambassador to ukraine steven pifer says western sanctions have not had an impact on russia's actions in ukraine. we'll also hear from former national security advisers on european security and russia. >> good morning, everyone. find a seat. okay. good morning. i'm jane harman, president and
ceo of the wilson center. and as i was a, a recovering politician. it is not a 12 step program but i'm very happy and fortunate to be in this role. i do want to recognize u.s. ambassador to egypt robert beecroft. i think he is here. there he is. welcome, sir. and to underscore the title of today's event which is mutual security on hold? russia, the west and european security architecture. this conversation could not, at a more important time with events in ukraine looming large on the global agenda. i was thinking about it earlier and i suppose one piece of good news about the assault of the isis extremist organization in iraq is that rush is distracted. what is russia distracted by? ukraine.
and the disintegrating relations with europe, it's disintegrating relations with europe and the u.s. the downing of a military transport plane in east ukraine on saturday has greater outrage in key of, the russian fantasy their was substantially damaged by an angry mob. fortunately, the event was defused by the foreign minister of ukraine, although comment he made there has obviously gone viral. at any rate, no one really believes that rush is a meddling and foaming at the institute in eastern ukraine and that makes it much harder for petro poroshenko, the recently elected president to stand up and effective transparent and corruption free -- let's try that -- government for the first time in ukraine's history. i observed the election of the national democratic institute in
the eye delegation led by madeleine albright and had a chance right before it -- ndi, to meet with the leading candidates and poroshenko certainly said the right things about the leadership he hopes to provide for ukraine and it is my personal wish that he is able to be successful. today's event is really, although ukraine will be a focus to celebrate the role of the munich security conference and other workstations like the osce and the wilson center who pay careful attention to russia and other major security challenges. the wilson center has invested in these issues for 40 years. ambassador george kennan and others found -- on of institute in 1974. it'that's the center's oldest programs are our global your program led by christian ostermann who is on today's panel or i guess moderating it, is the home of our new distinguished scholar who was
the co-moderator of the osce ukrainian national dialogue, ambassador. we have 1400 scholar alumni worldwide from our institute in 100 of them are on the ground right now in ukraine. in fact, i met several of them, and three of them work in a small office that we still have in key of the. so who better to keynote our program then someone who knows a lot about this region, ambassador to the big zabriskie. civic and i worked together. i didn't work for him but i worked -- he was a big shot. i was a small shot in the carter white house in another century. when some of the problem seemed a little easier other than hostages in iran and a few other things, but as a big -- zbig has continued to think carefully about the strategic challenges in the world and has in my view written some of the most important books that give the
rest of us tools to think about those. during his tenure in the carter white house, he managed the normalization of relations with china, the signing of salty, the brokering of camp david accord, encouragement of dissidents in eastern europe, and the fallout from the 1971 iranian revolution, although that didn't resolve until immediate after president carter left office. he is truly the senior research professor at johns hopkins, but i actually think he's the second most important member of his family. after mika. after zbig's talk, former u.s. ambassador to ukraine, steve pifer will make some comments. steve and i testified together a few weeks ago before the senate foreign relations committee which is focused intently on what strategies could be successful in ukraine. but before any of that happens let me introduce wilson scholar,
ambassador wolfgang bissinger who will talk a bit more about the munich security conference most recent anniversary volume. wolfgang has chaired the conference since 2008 following a very successful career in germany's foreign service where he was a deputy prime minister, ambassador to the u.s. during the 9/11 period and then ambassador to the uk. the book he produced which was released at this past faber's conference includes chapters written by various folks. i was honored to write the chapter on nunn-lugar, unless should be involved in a celebration of senator sam nunn enormous contributions in the area of nuclear security. the conference each february is the security event in the world. are congress and the major delegation.
one last thing about wolfgang before introducing, among his other extraordinary accomplishments, he is of course a grandfather but he's also a father of a nine year old. so i've been waiting come wolfgang, to wish you happy father's day. please welcome ambassador wolfgang. [applause] >> thank you so much, jane. and thank you, zbig and steve, and, of course, christian, for allowing us to have this session here this morning. both jane harman and zbig zabriskie were of course for dissipating once again after many previous sessions at the munich security conference earlier this year. and i remember that you, zbig, participate in a session on ukraine at a moment when many of
us were still considering ukraine a problem of ukrainian. of course, now it has become a problem of not only europeans, it will talk more about that. so thank you for allowing me just to make a few brief remarks. i want to sort of cynthia this book. that are outside in the hall a few copies of it and there's also a sheet where if you want a copy you can order a copy from a u.s. distribution company. it's actually, if i may say, very modestly, a really good book. i know of very few other collections of essays that offer such a comprehensive overview of
foreign policy and global affairs. we have in this book contributions from, and i'll just give you a few names, from igor even off, chuck daigle, john kerry, helmut schmidt, bill cohen, senator mccain, sam nunn, joe nye, jim hoagland, nato secretary-general rasmussen, but also, you know, not americans karl built, and, of course, most importantly jane harman. so buy the book. it's worth reading it. there's really some real gems in the book. and i'm proud we worked on it
for almost a year to come up with something on the anniversary. for those of you who have not had the chance, let me make one comment about the munich security conference. it is at its core the transatlantitrans-atlantic even. that are not many events around the world annually where you will find up to 10 active your senators and a number of members of the house in one place for two days altogether. that's a rare thing to see. i've checked with many of my american diplomatic colleagues, and it's something that doesn't happen very often. so there's a strong participation, not only by all u.s. administration since the 1960s, but by the congress, by
those in the congress who lead on foreign policy, is a huge asset for the conference. the conference was founded, for those of you who don't know who he was, he was until he passed away last year the last surviving member of a group of people who tried to assassinate adolf hitler in 1944. and he had quite a story to tell about how he escaped death and now, unfortunately, the attempt in 1944 failed. just one or two words about our topic beforehand over to our keynote speaker, dr. brzezinski. i had this opportunity to spend a few weeks in ukraine on behalf of the osc chairman during the month of may leading up to the
presidential election in ukraine. i have to tell you that i do not need many separatists and i tried very hard. i went all over the country and i found that there was huge dissatisfaction, enormous dissatisfaction by many citizens with the conduct of their own government over the last decade or so. because corruption, because of lack of unity, either with somebody from the east running the country from the eastern point of view, or there was somebody from the west running the country from a western point of view. but i did not encounter great deal of support for the idea that ukraine should be carved up. neither, by the way, did i find a lot of factious and/or anti-semitism which is something that russian propaganda has tended to suggest over the last beauty. the we need to be careful that we don't let ourselves be driven into the wrong direction.
second point, my view, and i expect that dr. brzezinski and ambassador pifer will hopefully correct me if i'm wrong, my view is that russian action on ukraine has not been an action motivated by its strength and strategic, a strategic sense, but more out of weakness, and it the way almost out of a sense of panic. certain things were sort of drifting apart that russia thought was important for them. my russian friend, dmitri, who represents the carnegie endowment in moscow, has recently said russia has three options now. unfortunately, the only good option is the least likely one. he said the first option the russians have is
self-improvement, self-reliance, more democracy. that's not very likely. the second option is that russia will rely more and more on some of military options, serving not a big war but fomenting unrest come continue to foment unrest in ukraine and maybe in other crisis spots in europe and beyond. and a third option for russia as dmitri put it, is for russia to leave the west and to go towards china which they've already tried in a certain way. but that would be tantamount to russia surrendering to china. and would also not be such a good option. so i tend to agree with dmitri. russia has a problem and has created a problem by the very behavior which we have seen. finally, let me say that
trans-atlantic coordination on how to deal with ukraine on the sanctions issue and beyond has actually been relatively good. we have stayed together. on the day i left kiev, i asked the prime minister of ukraine what, if he had one wish, what would it be from the west? and he said to me, and i think am authorized to quote him. he said, ambassador ischinger, there's one thing you need to do. make sure everybody understands that what we need is western cohesion. don't allow you yourselves to be falling apart once again, within europe and between europe and the united states. we've actually been quite good at it but it's not been easy. one of the reasons why it's not easy, if you look at certain elements of the german and european public is the loss of trust created by the
quote-unquote snowden-nsa affair. that is a handicap currently. and i keep saying it while i'm here in this country, you shouldn't think that it will simply blow over. it continues to be a serious handicapping factor for european governments trying to work with the united states in handling these types of emergencies. last point, you might think looking at ukraine that this ambitious title, toward initial security, was, you know, maybe an illusion. i believe, and i'm interested in hearing what our speakers will have to say am i believe that even if this is now a vision that is more remote than we saw two or three years ago it would be, it's still an appropriate
addition for a future where europe is not going to be as divided as it is currently between the west and russia, but where we will have a europe whole and free, including with the security architecture that works and with the kind of relationship of mutual trust that would help us to renew relations with russia in the months and years to come, hopefully. with this, i stop and hand over to our keynote speaker, dr. brzezinski. [applause] >> president harmon -- that sounds pretty good, doesn't it? distinguished panelists, it's a pleasure to be here. let me try to discuss the
implications for the european security architecture of what wolfgang ischinger just discussed. namely, the relationship of russia to the west and ukraine. what we are seeing in ukraine, in my judgment, is not a geek but a symptom -- at peak. namely, the gradual but steady emergence and russia over the last six or seven years of a quasi, mystical chauvinism. putin has taken -- and it has a great deal of content that is significant for the totality of russia's relations with the world and the west in particular. recently, the russian
international affairs council, an institution in moscow, composed a very reputable and significant scholars, not dissidents, but independent thinkers, and these do exist these days in moscow, has come up with a report on russia's national identity transformation and the new foreign policy doctrine. and it reports in some detail on the process of creating a wholly new conceptual framework for defining russia's relationship with the world. a relationship that the russians feel is needed because of the collapse of the soviet union, and the partial disintegration of the long established russian empire. it's a longish report but it's worth reading for those who are interested in international affairs. it deals particularly with
several key concepts that this new view of the world contains a view of the world created by the indeed the russians around putin and put himself have felt for a more comprehensive and trepidation of what is the nature of russia's position in the world and its relationship with the world and the west in particular. and it's in this context that the ukraine incident comes in. the key concepts are, this report written by a group of people with some problem progren moscow, involves four basic concepts. that have come and i quote, a divided people. secondly, the theme of quote protecting compatriots abroad unquote. then more broadly, the russian
world, and the importance of acknowledging and sustaining, embracing and promoting quote the great russian civilization. i mention this because i think it would be an error to think that crime you and ukraine -- crimea and ukraine are just the products of a sudden outrage. in terms of timing it would've been much smarter for russia to have what has been happening, happened about 10 years from now when russia would be stronger, economically more solid. but it happened. these concepts are imported. a divided people is a form of departure from chauvinistic play that russia's sovereignty embraces all russians, where ever they are. and that has, for anyone familiar with european history, some ominously familiar signs
prior to world war ii. it leads, of course, to the concept of protecting compatriots abroad. and that has special meaning for those countries which do have russian ethnic nationals living in their society, and who border on russia. the divided people and the protecting compatriots abroad then raises the question of the russian world. the notion here is of an organic integral unity between all russians, irrespective of their territorial location. and there's that territorial location can be favorably in reuniting the russian people. think of the baltic states. and last but not least the conviction that russia is not part of the western
civilization, is also another part of china. it was not part of the muslim world. russia itself is a great civilization, a world civilization, which emphasizes a set of principles some of which are not unfamiliar to our own society, such as, for example, strong commitment to a particular religion but much stronger than in the west where religion is part of the moral complex in social arrangement, the notion that the great russian civilization stands for certain basic values, not only religious right in terms of interpersonal relationships, to some extent for example, condemning some of the changes in the relationship between the sexes and within the sexes that are not taking place in the world. in effect, russia protects the integrity of certain basic beliefs that have characterized
christianity but in the russian view, christianity is now betraying or permitting to slip away. so this is a comprehensive outlook, and an ambitious outlook and outlook would justify the conclusion that russia is a world power. nothing has hurt putin lately and some of the international dialogue with the west than the words of president obama, which credited russia with it being a significant regional power. he didn't have to say more in order to score a point. that hurt. that is, therefore, is an important point of departure for dealing with the ukraine issue. the ukraine issued is not a sudden peak, but a symptom, as i've said, of a basic problem. the emergence of the policies packaged within the larger
framework which i described. what can we, therefore, expect if ukraine, in fact, is a manifestation? that problem will be difficult to resolve and i think it will take time to resolve. but, of course, resolution of it need not be a unilateral solution. if the west has a stake in it, and the state has to be then crystallized into meaningful policy. the ukraine problem, if it is contained, and especially if the russian increasing the cosmopolitan middle-class which is surfacing but not currently, becomes politically more important, perhaps we've held by a sense of vulnerability and disappointment in putin, and at some point assumes some more significant political role when putin has passed from the stage.
but when? there's no way predicting it. it could be soon. it could be a long time, but also a great deal will depend on whether, what ukraine has become as a symptom, becomes a success or failure from putin's point of view. so in brief, the stakes are significant. in the most immediate sense, the state involves, of course, the issue that the use of force in crimea and the ongoing and sustained effort to destabilize parts of ukraine poses a threat to the post world war ii notions of international arrangement, and particularly the exclusion of the use of force in resolving territorial issues. that has been a cardinal assumption of the european order after world war ii. and russia has been part of it, including the treaties it had
signed. but it now is challenging that. that is a significant threat in a broad sense and an immediate threat, psychologically i believe, but potentially in view of crimea militarily, to the baltic states, to georgia, moldova. and more vaguely him directly but perhaps potentially more successful than the others, belarus because belarus does not have any external protection. the others i mentioned do in varying degrees. it follows from what i'm saying that the ukrainian problem is a challenge that the west, by which i mean the united states and europe and nato particularly, must address on three levels. we have to effectively deter the
temptation facing the russian leadership regarding the use of force. we have to deter the use of force more simply put. we have to, secondly, to obtain determination of russia's delivered efforts at the progressive or continuing destabilization of parts of ukraine. very hard to judge how ambitious these goals are, but it is not an accident. i think that's one single portion in which the russians actually predominate one single portion of ukraine in which they actually predominate. the use of force has been sophisticated. participants in the effort have been well armed, even tanks, certain effective antiaircraft weaponry. all of that is something that even disagreeable, disaffected
citizens of the country to which they feel they do not belong would be storing somewhere in their attic or in their basement. these are weapons provided in effect for the purpose of shaping formations capable of sustaining serious military engagements. it is a form of interstate aggression. you can't call it anything else. how would we feel if all of a sudden, let's say, the drug oriented games in the united states -- gangs, were armed from abroad, from our southern neighbor by equipment which would permit violence on that scale, on a continuing basis? so this is a serious challenge. so that is the second objective. and the third objective is to promote and then discuss with the russians a formula for an eventual compromise, assuming that in the first instance the
use of force openly and on a larger scale is deterred and the effort destabilized is abandoned. that means the following, and i will be quite blunt regarding my own views on the subject. ukraine has to be supported if it is to resist. if ukraine doesn't resist, if it's internal order process in its incapacity to organize effective national defense, doesn't transpire, then the ukraine problem will result unilaterally. but probably with consequential effects that will be destabilizing with regard to the foldable states and to the totality of the east-west relationship, for the forces of any sort of world self-definition would become
more strident. and they did represent the most negative aspects of the russian society, a kind of thirst for nationalism, for self-fulfillment, gratification of exercise of power. something which is not pervasive in the new middle-class which is the long range alternative, but certainly not on top of political enemies. if ukraine has to be supported so that it does resist, the ukraine's have to know that the west is prepared to help them resist the and there's no reason to be secretive about it. it would be much better to be open about it and to say to the ukrainians, and to those who may threaten the ukraine, that if you resist, that you, ukrainians, resist, you will have weapons and we will provide some of those weapons in advance of the very act of innovation because in the absence of that, the temptation to invade and to
preempt maybe, overwhelming. but what kind of weapons is important. and in my view these should be weapons designed particularly to permit the ukrainians to engage in effective urban warfare of resistance. there's no point trying to arm the ukrainians to take on the russian army in the open field. thousands of tanks, modern army, well organized for some purposes, overrunning force. but there is a history to be learned from urban resistance. in world war ii, and most recently in chechnya, which resisted for three months and house to house fighting. some moving example someone would do which i do not read to reiterate. the point is, if the effort to invade was to be successful politically, it would have to
incorporate taking the major cities. if the major cities, say kiev, were to resist and streetfighting became a necessity, it will be prolonged. and costly. and the fact of the matter is, this is where the timing of this whole crisis is important, russia is not yet ready to undertake that kind of effort. it will be too costly in blood, paralyzing only costly and finances. and will take a long time and create more and more international pressure. so i feel that we should make it clear to the ukrainians that if you are determined to resist, as they say they are, and seemingly they are going to do so but not very effectively, we will provide them with antitank weapons, hand-held antitank weapons, and delta rockets, weapons capable for use in urban short-range fighting. this is not an army of ukraine
or some invasion of russia. you don't invade i country as large as russia with defensive weaponry. but if you have defensive weaponry and jeff access to it and you know it's our right thing, you are more likely to resist. and that in turn can permit them more effective operations to terminate some of the violence that is being sponsored from the borders between ukraine and russia. that i think would help in any case to contain the risk and the temptation to resolve this issue by force of arms. on the russian side in the context of a move of great ecstasy over the crimean success of which was quick and decisive, and which encountered no resistance. the temptation to seek its reputation can become quite strong and appealing to a political leader who desperately needs a major success. but at the same time, we have to
engage in some exploration of possible arrangements for a compromise outcome. especially if it becomes clear to the russians into mr. putin that either destabilizing ukraine are taking it by force poses great risks and may not be attainable. that has to be accompanied, therefore, by dialogue. what should be the formula for such a possible compromise? i think it's relatively simple, in fact. ukraine can proceed with this process, public endorsed by an overwhelming majority of ukraine people of becoming part of your. but it's a long process. they have been promised that outcome and they have been engaging in that process. already for 60 years. in other words, it's not done very quickly. therefore, the danger to russia is not imminent and the
consequences are not so destructive. but at the same time, clarity that ukraine will not be a member of nato. i think that is important for a variety of geopolitical reasons. if you look at a map it's important from a psychological strategic point of view. and ukraine will not be a member of nato. but by the same token, russia has to understand that ukraine will not be member of some mythical your ration the union that president putin is trying to promote on the basis of this new doctrine of a special position for russia in the world and special claims outside of russia, vis-à-vis some of its fellow natives. ukraine will not be a member of the eurasian union our ukraine can have a separate trade agreement with russia, particularly taking into account the neutral benefits of the fact that certain forms of exchange
and trade our mutual beneficial. agriculture products, for example, from ukraine to russia, industrial products that russia needs are now being produced in ukraine. not many people realized that some of russia's best rockets, most of the engines and some of the rockets used by the united states, are produced in ukraine. and that, therefore, should be continued under an arrangement whereby ukraine and russia have a special treaty. i think something like this might actually at some point become appealing. and it should be surface but it should be surfaced in the context of an open, not covert what an open action designed to convince the russians that any use of force will have negative right enduring consequences for russia itself. not involving a threat to
russia's security bug involving rising costs of the association of russia's power and the cost of ukraine's independence. in my view in the context, nato should also act somewhat more a sort of late in reducing the insecurity of those nato countries that border on russia and happen to have on the average about 25% of its population constituted of russian nationals. i speak specifically of estonia and latvia. america has committed its presence there. i would think it would be very productive if in addition to america, some leading european states, notably germany, france and great britain, deployed some symbolic forces in these three countries so that they are there, and not just americans. on a regular basis, on a regular basis. so that this would reaffirm the fact that nato stands in the
context of this problem together. in international politics, symbolism is as important as decisiveness, and symbolism can overt the necessity for extreme measures. given the current consequences of the very massive expansion of nato in the last several decades, the 28th members, it might also be appropriate in the light of the ongoing experience that we're in the process of assimilating to take another look at the structure of nato itself. i have in mind particularly a review of the historical paradox involved, and it's not much mentioned but potentially very important article v. article v is the article which provides for the procedure that the alliance follows and
undertaking a military response to aggression directed at its general or at one or two or more of its members. recall that article v has a provision that decisions to engage in hostilities by the alliance has to be unanimous, which in other words, means that a single country has a veto. it was the united states that insisted on this provision when nato was first formed, and it insisted on it in order to obtain popular support from it in the american congress from the isolationist abortions of the american body politic, which feared that an alliance of this sort would violate american tradition of no foreign entanglements. this gives america what it needs to avoid a foreign entanglements. unfortunately, today with 28
members, of varying degree of capacity for participating in military action, and, unfortunately, of some varying degree of genuine political commitment to some of the security sanctions of the alliance, the situation has become reversed. it is some of the new allies that may be tempted in some circumstances to invoke article v. not entirely preventing nato from responding, because i'm convinced if that were to happen, after some prolonged debate, much resistant, internal threats, the country that was trying to prevent nato from acting would be persuaded to join, or de facto, take it out of the alliance. but i think it would be wiser to review this provision in a more patient atmosphere, in spite of the circumstances that prevail today. one possible solution might be
simply the adoption of the provision that there would be no veto right in the alliance for sustained, enduring, underperformers of jointly agreed commitments. some members of nato don't meet their commitments, even by some remote approximation. it does not enhance their membership, a free ride altogether. why should a member that doesn't meet nato commitments practice in total, then have the right to veto the members, the other members right to engage in collective self-defense? it's an anomaly, and potential source of gridlock and confusion. as this crisis is gradually resolved, i hope nato will take
another look at it and will also look at the issue of additional new members in nato, more critically. it doesn't follow that the country in whose security nato has an interest has to be in nato. nato can have an interest in its security that without having it in nato and have th a bright of understandings regarding how it might respond. there is some talk of new members in the eu, and perhaps some of these will seek nato membership. in the recent years some countries have obtained a nato mentorship by being territorial remote from the possible conflicts on the east-west dividing lines. i think more discretion here maybe actually beneficial, and some reflection on this subject might in fact enhance nato credibility. and create some pressure on those members who wish to be active members in nato, to do more to meet the commitments they have formally undertaken.
finally, and looking much further ahead, i think that one way or another with or without a compromise solution, i mean is going to become a serious economic burden for russia. there is no way that the kind of economic activity in which crimea has been able to engage in quite probably, a major source of tourism and visits and international on a large scale coming to its ports and foreign tourists engaging in trade, collection of souvenirs and so forth, can be sustained, as long as international community doesn't formally recognize the formation of crimea into russia. it means that exploration of the underwater resources within crimea's territorial confines of the sea cannot be undertaken by international companies because
they will be subject to suit from a variety of interested parties. in brief, russia faces the prospect of the necessity of subsidizing on a significant scale economic activity in crimea to the benefit of its citizens. prices, consumer prices have already risen threefold since the incorporation of crimea into russia. this situation creates a potentially serious liability for russia which already is in a relatively weak economic position. beyond that, there is the potential reality which i think will become the second fact as ukraine succeeds, not russia in the process has created the enduring reality of hostility towards russia on the basis of some 40 million people. unlike many other, ukrainians
have not an anti-russian historically. and certainly there's no comparison between its attitude traditionally with russia and that of the polls next door. the polls have repeatedly fought for the independence against the russians. and those strong feelings are enduring feelings on the subject. it's becoming very intense and the entire new generation of ukrainians born in freedom and national sovereignty reflected the strongest. ukraine, therefore, will evolve -- but the permanent loss of a huge swath of territory, the greatest loss of territory suffered by russia in the course of its imperialist expansion. this may in turn eventually begin to work against this new mythology regarding russia's place and role in the world with which i started my presentation. it may be refuted by realities,
and this is why i am increasingly hopeful that the new emerging russian middle-class realizing that the kind of mythology that putin has adopted and which a significant portion of the less educated, more chauvinistic russians have absorbed and embraced is a road to nowhere. but the real place to russia as an important country is in you, as a major european country. they will be reminded of that every time they look to the east and ask themselves what does that mean for the future of russia. thank you. [applause] >> thank you, so much, dr. brzezinski come for these brilliant remarks, very clearly laying out your views on russian motivations and western actions.
we now have the privilege to have comments by, ambassador steven pifer who is of course the director of the brookings arms control, nonproliferation initiative, served for 25 years in the state department including ambassador to ukraine from 1998-2000. ambassador pifer. >> thank you very much and thank you to the woodrow wilson center for inviting me here. it's also hard to follow dr. brzezinski when he covers such a broad bit of history, or current history. and he does it in such companies that such terrific terms. so some of my comments may be underscoring points that he made. i would agree completely that the think of the west needs to do is support ukraine. it seems to me that the best review to the kremlin's policy of the last six months would be if three to four years from now ukraine is looking each day more and more like poland. a normal democratic rule of law
european country but and i think the west can do things to help make that happen from including terms of economic support, advice on things like energy diversification which is going to be a real issue today with gas pumps decision to reduce the gas flow tigre. i would second his point about provision of military assistance to ukraine. certainly nonlethal assistance makes sense, but light anti-armor weapons and man portable air defense weapons make sense in terms of making sure the russian military which i believe is not eager to go into eastern ukraine. i think they were precisely about the sort of urban fighting that dr. brzezinski described and they're not eager for that. but we ought to be providing weapons to ukrainian military to, in fact, affect that calculation. and particularly in the case of man portable air defense systems is almost an obligation for nato which over the last 10 years has been learning programs to destroy stocks of ukraine in
manpads. a second direction is the point of assuring me the country, particularly those in central europe who today are much more nervous about russia, russian policies and russian actions than they were six months ago. the u.s. military has deployed companies wanted fugitives each to poland, lithuania, not the, estonia but i think that is a good response competitive that is persistent, that they will last for up to a year. i think of a ground force like that which cannot have heavy equipment do not have significant capability but our tangible signal of america's commitment are important i would agree with a useful to have them join the european forces. for example, a german company but with the american company in lithuania, a british computer with american company in poland, a dutch company paired with the american company in estonia to make clear to russia that the commitment is a native commitment but it's not just an
american commitment. and again i think they can be done in a way that would not be provocative. very much like the berlin brigade and its british and french counterparts for 30 years vastly outnumbered by soviet and east german forces, still managed to keep west berlin free by their presence. the third and i think the west needs to work on and perhaps needs to work a bit more on this is the question of sanctions on russia. and the goal of these sanctions should be to change russian policy. and there's evidence that comes in now that suggests that the sanctions which to date are relatively modest, have had an economic impact on russia. for example, russian companies in 2013 were able to sell foreign currency bonds worth about $43 billion. in january and february they sold those bonds for about $6 billion. since march they have sold zero. so i think the sanctions are successful, but they have failed in their primary political
purpose which is to affect a change in policy in the kremlin. and i worry that the west has not handled the sections -- sanctions process for. the last day in which the united states and the european union announced sanctions together at the end of april, the russian stock market gained 1.5%. i would suggest that's not a positive signal for the effectiveness of sanctions. on may 2 president obama and chancellor merkel said that if rush interview with the me 25% elections they would be sanctions. a substantial portion of ukrainian electorate could not participate in that election because of activities by armed separatists supported by moscow. we have not seen any punishment for that. and in the g7 when they met in normandy thomas said that they would be additional sanctions over the course of the next month if russia stopped being part of the problem but again i think we've seen continued problems including introduction of heavy weapons on the part of this tanks, missile launchers and i think fairly sophisticated
air defense as evidenced by the shootdown of ukrainian allusion and 76 on friday. so i think the west needs to be tougher in terms of imposing costs if we're going to try to encourage the russians to shift their policies. the last point i think, it does seem to be that the russians are prepared to be a part of the solution. you can see the elements of a compromise. the government in kiev has talked about decentralization of power, decentralization of political authority which makes sense. governors in the region should be elected not appointed by the president. they have talked about some status to russian language which addresses some of the concerns expressed by those in east. there's talk of early parliamentary elections which would be a good step. it would revalidate the democratic legitimacy of ukrainian parliament in a way to make 25 election gave the president a new democratic
mandate. as dr. brzezinski suggests i think you can see the element in terms of ukraine orients itself in terms of foreign policy. drawn closer to the european union, but not pursuing nato. i could try to craft some language there, not ask ukraine to say no how, no way ever but you can certainly finesse this issue and make clear to the russians that nato is not on the agenda for the foreseeable future. and most importantly, ukraine would want to pursue that is not a foreign policy reason but that would be usually controversial within ukraine. president poroshenko's trying to find a way to many internal divisions but does not need the controversy that nato would provoke with eastern ukraine. so i think those are the elements and i would agree on the case of crimea, perhaps the weight and a the weight and the crimea is to set that aside, it's not going to be addressed early on. my own analytical judgment is it's very hard to see a scenario in which ukraine is able to regain sovereignty over crimea
but that does not mean the west should accept it and the west should continue a policy of nonrecognition until such time if and when the ukrainian decide use something other was the second issue perhaps put down the road. the other piece here might put together a basis for a confirmation that would help mend the divisions within ukraine, and the thing could be an acceptable way forward. i think the big question here is the end of the day is a still acceptable to russia? i'm not sure that the russians are happy just with ukraine saying no nato. i think the russians double, are happy with the idea that ukraine was to draw and this is not just the president but it's also the parliament and i think budget of ukraine people hav that they wao draw closer to european union. when you look at the association agreement and without agreement does, if ukrainians were to implement it, if ukraine and puts the eu association agreement, it is a retrievable out of moscow's jew political