tv Key Capitol Hill Hearings CSPAN November 13, 2014 11:30pm-1:31am EST
to spend more than you take in that is the spending sensibilities for the congress. >> host: for maryland go-ahead quickly. >> good morning. they you but help will support it has been opposed by several members of congress. that was practical the to that perrier's him as a state -- a subsidy but china's benz for a bid dallas fed is the great benefit to and though but to
get into the water supply is very large -- harmful. but it is cheaper than gas and brings down the price. i support it. >> host: so as we talk on capitol hill the congressmen are getting their orientation today. guest: one ofs and learn are the ethics the traps that surrounds you all the time. if yous normal behavior are a businessman or something as aet you in trouble member of congress. oft is the first thing most these guys come out of their scared to death, why there are all of these ethics things. you -- it- they make
changes how you live your life. host: you referred to them as traps. you either have good people in congress that have al standards. more mousetraps you have, more people will get their clothes caught in it. those types of things. in my view, some of them get petty. host: did they existed during your time as speaker? guest: some of them were laid on right after i left as speaker. is that perspective solely because of the job you do now? guest: you did what you had to do. the more rules, the more laws -- sometimes law
tells you to do one thing and another law tells you to do something else. host: what would you advise going forward? guest: elect ethical people. not on the ballot, but that is why you have elections. crucible to elect good people. people thatonly have to look at parties and philosophy, but who that person is. host: dawn, claremont, california. don, claremont, california. caller: i am surprised you'd look the question when they asked if you are a lobbyist and you said no, you are not. i think of all the people that represent the 1% ours. -- the one percenters.
there is a whole thing set up where the 1% are dictating how we are going to be. you have this immigration system and other people pushing -- asese guys to have poor as they are, they are being used to keep down wages. listen to the people out here. the democrats and republicans this whole idea, pushing immigration is not needed right now. thats this a big thing obama has to push out and violate the constitution just to prove he is the king and he can get what he wants? guest: the immigration issue has to be handled. -- theppens today is reality is you have millions of people that are here that are
undocumented. themhad been here, some of have been here since world war ii. they came here because we needed working on the railroads and the foundries. they have become part of the society. they have children and grandchildren. their families are here. that is a reality. you have to deal with that. you also have to deal with that by making sure everyone else that comes -- the process. caller: i have quit questions. what about the millions spent jobs to hisbag gave friends and the military-industrial complex so that there is fencing, whether they completed it or not is another question. duringout the fact
reagan's time there were little bills attached to the big bills mastersowed the puppet in the background to offshore ship our jobsd to overseas. that is when this started. next turned our health care over , to make insurance judgment as to who could be covered. guest: you asked a lot of questions. i am not sure if they are all valid. you and, along time before i was involved in politics, he did create medicare. a long timeixon, before i was involved in politics, he did create medicare.
, when you talk about jobs going overseas, quite frankly, a lot of jobs did go overseas. we created jobs in this country because of our technical side and what we have been able to do is far superior than any other country. you have to go with where the trends are. we do not make as much steel as walked downbut i the streets of my hometown and i see cars with labels on them that were not made in this country, but no government is telling people to buy those cars. people make that choice. you have a free market. people decide what they are going to purchase. i drive an american car because i made that decision. that is what the free market is. thate going to buy a car
is made overseas, jobs will go overseas. what we need to do is make an effort, i think there are fiscal issues we have to address. i think to get back to regular , and not to overspend and get everything jammed in the end , and have the senate ad things on an overspend, i think there needs to be a process. approacha common sense you can take for immigration. you have people here. you need to strengthen the borders. not everybody is going to get everything they want. whole idea. working together and finding agreement someplace, where you can work together and find a place where you can trade often they can trade-off and both sides get something.
>> one of the most important for the 20th-century. he was a performing governor. and was the united states senator recognized by his peers in the 1950's from american history. from world war i stood his ground from free speech. he was about the people. in the 1890's he would give speeches all over wisconsin. if you wanted a speaker for your club, bob would give the speech. he went to county fair's for
every kind of the event that you can imagine. by 1900 he was ready to run for governor advocating on behalf of the people. sitting in the first studio and in wisconsin was not too far from your and the family went to massachusetts then they went to madison. but very briefly before he decided to come down to this part of the country where her family was. and spent his summers here.
[inaudible conversations] >> ladies and gentlemen, good evening name was john hopkins university applied physics lab. welcome to the third session in the 11th year of the seminar series. this year it is sponsored by a johns hopkins applied physics lab. each year the seminar focuses on an aspect of international security issues. my seminar team this year is rethinking global security constructs and threats and responses. specific topic areas to those strategies to over the next few decades. when howell and should united states engage militarily. u.s. leadership and
international organizations and multilateralism and finally the economic trade and security relationships between the u.s. and east asia. a couple of quick announcements all similar talks are videotaped. additionally we do publishes the notes for her presentation items and are presented to us. the second announcement is to videotape the event we use wireless microphones and unfortunately your cellphone or anything the uses wireless directly interferes so please set this time shut off all wireless communication devices. ambassador gallucci is a
distinguished professor and of diplomacy at georgetown university and previously he had served as president of the macarthur foundation, a dean of foreign service at georgetown, ambassador at large special envoy. in the latter position and he dealt with threats posed by weapons of mass destruction and was the chief u.s. negotiator of the crisis of 1994 and served as assistant secretary of state from political military affairs and deputy executive chairman to oversee the disarmament of iraq. for that rethinking seminar the ambassador discusses proliferation and iran in the nuclear program north korea and on strategies to prevent proliferation and his views. please join me to give though warm welcome to
ambassador robert caliche. [applause] >>. >> thank you. i know it is required for me to say this but i am happy to be here tonight. and though you voted with your feet so i ungrateful you are here in happy to have that opportunity. some of the truth about my remarks are not exactly as advertised but close. as said, for the last five
years have not been doing things related to international security very much. and in my role there i was concerned was reduced mortality in the united states. the juvenile justice reform and biodiversity and of course, we're busy finding those geniuses that we announce every year. wasn't thinking about international security that much. so when i left macarthur in the summer and went to georgetown, by necessity i was reading in that area.
and i was struck by something. by the fact it would be nuclear weapons, and i was surprised by that frankly. not by the area of expertise but i thought there was a progression downward but like to do if you would bear with me, to go through to get a better appreciation of where we are. and i mean up with like to take you on a horseback ride through 70 years of thinking of nuclear weapons, the theories of the vulnerability is of credibility. i don't think the
appreciation for the historical context is best able to understand where we are to day given the complexities of the current situation. so i assaying cut me some slack. i will do it by a decade to make it more packaged as a presentation. still beginnings and in the 1940's. this was a period marked by a full durability and deterrence. and as you all know where those two things that came together, one was a delivery vehicle and it became claire
that the missile could get through. the ballistic missile does get through and one could argue it still gets thorough if there are enough certainly. and second was the atomic bomb. these two things together is what the 1940's meant to us was of vulnerability that the nation had never seen before. but it goes through the 19th century and early 20th century and at that point we recognize its we had no way to accomplish what the strategists have called denial. we had no way to deny
access. the ballistic missile will get through and the atomic bomb one story or one launch = one city. and the united states had been projected as a state could dominate to the south or friendly to the north or ocean its line either side. but with that setting that made the involvement controversial was no longer the setting in which we've lived and that is the message of the 1940's. it meant it was by denial so we were accomplishing defense by deterrence.
we had that before, but it was deterrence by denial. by having a substantial defense so anybody that presumed to attack overcome that defense by the cost-benefit analysis did not make sense. is also the fifth area of defense that they cannot accomplish absolute denial that they could raise the cost. this is a different kind of deterrence by punishment. conceptually a critical difference that meant lee could not accomplish it denial with no cost but but they could accomplish punishment. it is a psychological concept and we were treating
an awful lot ships and armey said davis a physical defense and exchange for nobility to deny any. that is an act on the mind. that is with the 40's meant. another element of course, is the possibility to know when this works. if i presume to dieter from attacking me then i will survive sufficiently to
stand and punish him. as i will send a tearing down again. i have just returned them or i haven't put that proposition then it would have happened but that is not true. so i only know lee goldman deterrence fails. i never know when it succeeds. i can claim that they cannot prove that. presence of the elements of deterrence you could call it the dullest year's market by the words credibility and
stability but and the thermonuclear weapon of the '50s and orders of magnitude here as the nagasaki weapon was close to the 20 million tons a year now moving to a thermonuclear weapons let it was 100 times greater. so if you remember those pictures of hiroshima though stone things have survived maybe 12 kilotons the multiplying that by 20 lee c. head different concept as levels of destruction. in addition of course, many more ballistic missiles we
hoped these weapons would allow less to put out a doctrine or a policy of massive retaliation in with that statement we could teacher everything in maybe even compel something over a period of years the truth the merged we could compel the thing and only be confident of deterrence of an attack on the homeland. we wished to help the french certainly nuclear weapons would not do that. may have wished to do something about the russians in hungary but the weapons
had nothing to do with this. we could claim they were a deterrent but remember what i said without knowing if the deterrent is working or not. it was the proposition that we were not sure. there was also the realization that the claim for extended deterrence we could extend the nuclear umbrella to the european states to receive stage show or japan or south korea. . .
which we could not stop with conventional forces so the proposition went. so the tactical weapons also brought us to a new place not only was this the deterrent massive retaliation but now we were deploying weapons for actual use for warfighting tactical weapons being the first one for that. then there was the concept of stability as it emerged. initially it was a very simple concept. we have heard the metaphor to scorpions in a bottle, us and
the soviet union. one scorpion bites the other scorpion and the bite deep bites back and they are both dead. it doesn't take a bite anybody now situations everybody is deterred and there was this happy concept for a while. then the truth of the situation was captured in the influential piece written by will tschetter called the delicate balance of terror and everybody began to understand that the stability, the third word come the stability of the strategic relationship depends upon the survivability of your capacity to strike back for your second-strike capability. just about one that is sinking in for a mindset the russians orbit this basketball sized entity sputnik and the wonder of putting something in space is
surpassed by the four that they could put something in space or they could put something anyplace on the ground in the united states. so we leave the 50s with an appreciation for the limits. we leave the 50s with an understanding of the difficulty of sustaining credibility of the fragility of stability. it was not a happy place to be at that point. remember there were something important in the election. the missile gap which was very big just before the election completely disappeared after the election. it was a myth in fact. so the 1960s and by the way what you should be thinking about here or holding onto and i find interesting history. important is the relevance to the situation we now have a northeast asia with north korea,
south korea and japan and south asia india and pakistan and the middle east with israel and iran and perhaps others. so in the 1960s which might be called the mcnamara years we are again dealing with conceptually with deterrence credibility deterrence with the concepts ability in the concepts of vulnerability. mcnamara offers the phrase flexible response and it actually is used in two ways at least. one is in conventional forces a more flexible response but it's also used to cover the topics we are talking about which is our nuclear weapons establishment. and what mcnamara says we need is a strike capability which is not limited to a spasmodic response that destroys the
cities of the soviet union, that this is not credible to do that. what we need is something that will be more precise, that will be more limited and he propounds the concept of second strike counterforce. we have always had before that second strike value which is horrifying as it is to say it out loud meant that we were planning to incinerate roughly 50 million innocent soviet civilians and i say innocent because i don't think they voted for the people who are conducting the policy so we make them innocent of that policy. but 50 million was a nice round number and he said this was wrong. we would in fact be better off with a more ethical moral posture of attacking their forces, their military,
something other industry and a lot of collateral damage with it and that became one of the first important insights of the mcnamara era. the second-strike counterforce. it was supposed to be captured in something that was born in 60 or 63 i thank come the singly integrated operational plan of this buyout which would have all the targets and match targets with their weapons system so that when they were put before the president in a critical moment mr. president we are under attack and we have a launch under attack posture, just push this button here and we are good. well there was a problem with that and this did not match up with flexible response. it was essentially the same spasmodic response. eventually the sigh up, the sigh up was a round for a good 30 years.
actually 40 years, it would begin to reflect a certain flexibility but for the first 20 years it really didn't and it really was quite spasmodic. enormous civilian collateral damage in the soviet union if it were ever executed. the second thing about flexible response second strike counterforce is it didn't take long before the soviets came to understand that the united states of america was expecting its forces to survive the soviet attempt to destroy them in a first strike and have residual retaliatory force which we could deploy flexibly, targeting their remaining forces and their conventional forces and their industry it was highly likely we have the capacity to do that damage to them if we struck first in that we had what
started is called a first strike capability. that is to say we could destroy their offensive forces such that they had no means to punish us to retaliate meaning they had just lost deterrence. that was a deduction of the soviets and i would suggest to you a correct one from the mcnamara strategy of the 60s. we dominated the, overwhelmingly dominated the soviet union in terms of our strategic forces. the russians in the 60s were very unhappy. the second thing that made them unhappy is something that sort of rhymes with what happens these days. it was mcnamara and his colleagues enthusiasm for defense. it meant that we explored the aba. we did this with a number of
what i now call architectures. the first was sentinel it was called and that evolved into the safeguard system. it was not designed to stop a full soviet attack. it wasn't defense by denial. it was intended to stop accidents, maybe unauthorized launches and then eventually hit upon the chinese. it was designed because the chinese might attack us. they are so weak this might actually deal with the chinese threat that the actual architecture was not appealing to everybody. they involved two missiles. both of them with nuclear warheads. the first was called a sputnik missile and the idea was that if we detected a launch by the soviet union which would come over the polls and attack the united states of america we would launch a missile that had
a five-megaton warhead. of course there were a bunch of these and it would detonate and the warheads that might penetrate five-megaton detonations there was another miss on the ground called the sprint and it would go up again getting those missiles over the polls and get the remaining missiles with the yield warhead in a kiloton range. still city busters. among the people who did not think this was such a neat idea what the canadians which you can appreciate. [laughter] so we left the 60s with the u.s. dominant position. the soviets concerned and building fast having had a romance with ballistic missile defense at the time. going into the 70s, the decade of the 70s was a decade of
slow censure, a decade of brown's secretary of defense and these were the years i would call the search for credibility. that word again. it began early in the 70s with arms control and the first major strategic arms treaty salt strategic arms treaty which i did -- guess you could say --- aping the competition and offense of forces and a compan company -- accompanied by an abm treaty. cowher intuitively limiting the extent to which either side could defend itself. it was counterintuitive because people said was wrong with defense and later that's what zakhilwal reagan would say that people understood what vulnerability meant. the strategists were saying our vulnerability is an insurance to the other side that they can always punish us.
we can always punish them and therefore deterrence is firm. therefore we have a stable strategic relationship. not everybody got that. the abm treaty committed both sides to deploy change. eventually a system of their choice defending one area and the soviet union chose to defend moscow's. where did we choose to defend? where? washington. no. north dakota and montana naturally. not so naturally not people didn't get that. maybe you are thinking washington maybe not new york possibly their hometown that they weren't thinking montana and north dakota. but that's where of course we had icbms deployed and what we were doing was making sure that her retaliatory capability survived. we were really thinking like strategists. unfortunately as we were doing
all of this wonderful strategic thinking, designing this very complex trading and the abm treaty in the arms treaty we were working on technological innovation which was arguably the most destabilizing of any technology we have developed and put on the ground and that was the multiple entry target vehicle murder to put a number of warheads on one missile would it be a submarine missile or an icbm and that meant one missile could destroy multiple targets. all of a sudden what is called a missile to target ratio switched. it used to be if he wanted to insure taking out a target you needed to use two or three missile so there was an advantage in not striking first. that is called stable. once you put several warheads and one missile you get an advantage to striking person that's called destabilizing.
we deployed mirv's for tim and others to play the mother being the soviet union. this was a period in which this the slush and her brown period in which we went through arms control and went through defense and interestingly in what's called national security decision to 42 we focused very much on warfighting. we were moving away from and this is a very important concept for later in our lives in south asia in northeast asia in the middle east. instead of thinking of nuclear weapons is the weapon of last resort we would never use it was a deterrent weapon. it was a minimum deterrent weapon. no we were moving to warfighting with our weapons. this was a function really of looking at these weapons as being used. in other words thinking of what is the were going to look like? how will it end?
who will win the war? these were not concepts that we have been comfortable with before but we started thinking in that way. we started thinking that way to add credibility to our posture the theory being that the credibility would then buy/enter as his period as secretary of defense. when brown became secretary of defense in the carter administration he had a presidential decision pd 59 in which the countervailing strategy was framed. we were aiming at this point to be sure that whatever does the soviets valued we could target. there was no point in us having as we did in psyop and from the first day of nuclear weapons we had three targets then, we were
imagining what it is a would take to deter the soviet union. we started getting extra insight during the carter frustration because we were watching the soviets build some very deeply buried bunkers or their leadership and it became clear what the soviets valued the most was themselves in the leadership. so we worked very hard at being able to target that leadership and to make sure that they knew that we could. very heavily counterforce. lots of emphasis on precision, lots of emphasis on the capability to do so with confidence. we moved by decades now into the 1980s and the reagan years and this is really the highpoint in nuclear weapons deployment in terms of numbers and capacity. we were deploying on both sides
roughly 30,000 strategic weapons on each side. that was probably enough. there were over 16,000 targets in 1983 in the psyop that we were thinking we had to deal with to deter the soviet union. the soviets of course were going heavy. they were moving from a big missile at 92 bigger uglier the soviets 15. they were increasing their accuracy and having high number of fractionation of warheads per missile and there was a great intensity and concerned of what all this offense of capability meant for us first strike capability on either side, for strike capability many in target the other side's forces and
destroy a sufficient number such that they cannot retaliate in a second strike and cause the striker on accessible damage. i know that's a but that's how it goes. gorbachev and reagan meet at reykjavík and they hit it off. there's a new book by ken adelman about that day at reykjavík and i recommend it to you. the atmosphere is very good for these two gentlemen eventually and much of the of both it looks like they are going to agree on serious reduction of nuclear weapons. but there is one enormous stumbling block. ronald reagan is deeply committed to defense. he had been briefed on star wars trade he now is aware that there are other physical principles. there are architectures and
physical principles he can imagine but the idea that he can and nuclear weapons and instead deploy a defense is just incredibly irresistible. he does not understand he claims gorbachev's reluct to be so enthusiastic about this. gorbachev is thinking up we do this of course they will not have an ability to deter us. we will up we decide to strike them disarm them and arab whatever residual forces they had left would not be able to penetrate the impenetrable star wars defense. don't laugh, it was serious. it is laughable though in a way. one of my colleagues are -- al qaeda cell that some of you may know in this room said at the time that through the mid-80s
the soviets were panicked over star wars which got a lot of press and they kept deploying ever larger icbms in response responsive united states supplying ever more colorful ballistic missile defense which we did not have. by the end of the decade you may know that they went broke in the soviet union falls. the soviet union failed because we cause them to build themselves into oblivion but there's an argument that goes something like that which is not actually a trivial argument. so the decade of the 80s and in huge competition and with it at that time. we find ourselves in the 90s in a whole new world. the decline of nuclear weapons. we have an arms control street he -- treaty start one of the beginning of the decade. we have the international structure which is no longer
bipolar and could be called unipolar. we have a phenomenon called globalization that has various pieces to it but it appears to be part of a fundamental new world order greater love that phrase. it has the imagery of military force still there but not nuclear weapons. economic measures of power were going to be so much more important. it was a prediction of the decline of the nation-state and the concept of national sovereignty where international commerce and technology would replace those. the book that captures it of course was friedmans all of tree and eventually the world is flat and the academic literature matthews wrote a piece in foreign affairs that was very influential that predicted this new world we were moving into. military power was still relevant of course.
the decade began with iraq one, the war to throw the iraqis out of kuwait but really there was a huge huge unilateral reduction in nuclear strategic forces. nato no longer have to contend with the warsaw pact. we were not worried about the soviet union. it was gone and russia's war power partner. thus begins the first decade of the 21st century. it is the bush obama decade. force remains relevant and immediately becomes relevant. on september 11, we discover a new kind of terrorism. we are involved immediately in afghanistan and then iraq to. military force is definitely on the table but it is conventional military force that we emphasize. it becomes clear to the world that the united states of
america has unique capacity to project force with incredible lethality and precision. modernization occurs but not in the nuclear nuclear weapons nor their systems as i've been describing. modernization really comes with the improvement in the delivery of that force projection. we embraced now an ability not only to project force precision lethality but to do it more quickly. so we have prompted global strike instead of days or weeks sometimes to deploy forces in order to do this damage with cruise missile aircraft or whatever. we want to build to do it right away within hours. ideally within 24 hours. initially we hit upon the delivery systems nuclear weapons in more than one strategist believes the best thing to use with the conventional weapons now that we are deemphasizing
reliable icbm and then it becomes clear that many people feel that this might create ambiguities in the minds of the russians and the chinese and maybe we shouldn't use strategic systems to deliver conventional munitions. we have been thinking of other ways of accomplishing that objective. it's still conventional and not nuclear. there is a doctrine to go along with this. the doctrine was one of preventive war but masquerading as preemptive war and we argued that of course we were engaging in preemption when we in fact were not. iraq was not about to attack us, not in the way that one understands. while this was going on nuclear weapons numbers had jobs to one tenth of what they were in the 1980s.
from 30,000 to a few thousand. sort the bush administration strategic gives way to new start in the beginning of the obama administration the first of administration in 2010. we are down to depending on how you count, roughly 1500 deployed strategic nuclear weapons. much diminished nuclear weapons. there is also a deemphasis and i would say the popular press. the four horsemen article if you recollect this. henry kissinger, george shultz, bill perry, sam nun write a piece about zero nuclear weapo weapons.
the interesting thing is they say we are not kidding. this is not just the mpd requires us to commit to this goal. they meant it. they said that's where we have to be going. that's the only safe future for the world. now that's what they said as a group. obama at prague makes a speech in which he says zero nuclear weapons. maybe not in my lifetime he says that that's where we are heading and he says this is not just rhetoric. he said we were going after the comprehensive test ban treaty. he said we were going after the fissile material cutoff treaty to stop production of fissile material. he said we were going to deal with the nuclear pill cycle problems which impacted the proliferation will -- proliferation problem so we wouldn't have to have uranium
enrichment and they would be more reductions that we would accomplish laterally -- unilaterally if necessary. i was the first decade of the 21st century. we are now at a midpoint of the second decade of the 24th -- 21st century and a big thing that happens now the best i can tell a cycle back to georgetown. [laughter] that's clearly the news here. north korea. we have been dealing with north korea for decades. but if we look at north korea now halfway through this decade north korea has not been dealt with. north korea is following the classic pattern of plutonium and highly-enriched uranium as fissile material for their nuclear weapons. they are developing it for a gift delivery vehicles including interestingly a weapon is a tape
of dawn variant of some kind reach the united states pretty soon. it will have a circular probability the size of ohio but we still not will be happy about the development with north korea. plus north korea has been engaging in transfers, transferring ballistic missile to other countries. the pakistanis their mainline medium-range ballistic missile is a gory and it sounds very pakistani but it's actually a north korean no and the mainline medium-range ballistic missile that iran has and has deployed as a shock three which is a north korean no. you may have heard that in 2007 at north korea and were discovered to have built in
syria, you remember syria, they have built in syria the plutonium production reactor identical to their plutonium production reactor at pyongyang. i used to rail in nuclear terrorism talks to concern about the transfer of fissile material from one country to another. very often critics and i have some on the subject of terrorism exoterrorism would say you have been watching too many movies and reading too many spy novels. it's not going to happen. in saying that we would catch the transfer of an amount of material that would fit in that coffee cup if it were plutonium for phenomenal nuclear fission weapons. we did not catch the transfer of that plutonium production reactor to syria.
there are all kinds of explanations for that but they told us and then the israelis pursue their version of the nonproliferation policy and flattened it. otherwise in the situation we have a serious they would have a plutonium production reactor there. it doesn't require uranium. this is a nuclear weapons situation that has evolved to where it is today. it's quite different. we have a country that is itself provocative to japan and to south korea threatening our extended deterrence and credibility. we have a country that is transferring the material that production capability to make nuclear weapons and when i have a country that within a matter of months and years can put a nuclear weapon in the continental united states of america. this is new and it is with us
now. and that is north korea. take iran, please. iran also is following the classic route of both plutonium and highly-enriched uranium. highly-enriched uranium has gotten more attention of the centerpieces of the sites. yes we have heard about the reactor also a heavy water moderated fuel reactor may have a heavy with -- heavy water production facility and that would produce a run-up in normal conditions in normal power range. that would produce ideal plutonium for nuclear weapon. it is i would say another larger plutonium production reactor to go with the uranium program. they have completed the work necessary to design and
manufacture the triggering package for the fissile material which they don't yet have cap but could have relatively quickly. yes there are negotiations. yes the 24th of november is an important date in these negotiations. they could fail or they could succeed. either way iran is going to have a nuclear reactor and it's going to have some enrichment capabilities. exactly how much i don't know. either way the negotiations fail or if they succeed israel will not be happy. israel has not been happy with other countries and watch what has happened in iraq and syria. i'm not now predicting anything. i'm merely making an observation. this is not a good situation. this could be another nuclear weapons state and we could have a very complicated situation. the saudis and egyptians and
others have just about promised us that if the iranians proceed with a genuine nuclear weapons program they will not stand idly by. this could get very complicated in the middle east and very quickly. pakistan for about 20 years had sort of what i would sometimes called the recess nuclear weapons capability. in other words it had the capability in the late 80s to manufacture nuclear weapons. it didn't we don't think at that point. it did certainly in the late 90s when they tested a series of tests after the indian series of tests but things have changed. it's no longer recess. it's no longer possible for the pakistanis to maintain a minimum deterrence capability just enough to deter the indians. nonsense. that's not where they are now. they are adopted american policy from the 50s. they have built and are
deploying tactical nuclear weapons for warfighting purposes. they have very set delivery vehicles that include aircraft fighter-bombers that include various range ballistic missiles and will eventually include a naval platform a triad if you will. right now they have the fastest growing fissile material and nuclear weapons material in the whole world. there are probably some place in terms of current stockpile nuclear weapons in the 100 to 150. our best guess in terms of fissile material production as they are aiming to two or 300 nuclear weapons which puts them in the range of france britain and china by the way. pakistan, you all know what pakistan is like, don't you? watch homeland or something and you have been watching that
situation in pakistan which is at times not as stable as we would like. india. if pakistan had recess returns for 20 years india has had it for 40. then deterrence was their policy. it isn't anymore. this is relatively new for india. it is now also i would say moving into warfighting because they are responding to the pakistani program into the indian program. they want to be able with their ballistic missiles to target indian targets cities and population centers on the east coast of china. they also are deploying a triad ballistic missiles cruise missiles and aircraft for delivery of nuclear weapons. and what had constrained india for decades no longer constrained india because of
what we did. we did a deal with india in which we took india off the list of countries other countries couldn't do nuclear business with. the preposition is not the end but you get my point here that we did a deal with india which allows india to legitimately under the terms of the nuclear suppliers group to buy uranium. what was constraining their program was uranium. it doesn't anymore. they can buy uranium for their nuclear power program and use their indigenous uranium for their nuclear weapons program, thank united states of america for doing that for them. that program is off and running as well. china. we had in the business i think fair to say marble that china's restraint for a very long time
since the 60s. day, the chinese at various times characterize themselves as having been in deterrence. i would offer that that's questionable whether they really had the capability to deter the united states of america. i'm not sure that was true. whether it was or not it's a startling question because the chinese are no longer there. they are building, modernizing their forces so their ranges have increased so they can cover a state. they gone to the concept of mobility increase survivability of their forces. they may be m.i.r.v. inning unclear to me so the chinese program is much more robust in this decade than it ever was before such that it even troubles now the russians as well.
their resistance to this argument we come to russia. as you may have noticed the russians are tanned, rested and back. we have georgia. we have crimea and eastern ukraine and on any day we have the baltics with the russians. the russians have noticed from the very beginning actually from the 90s that there are now conventional force asymmetries between them and us. what it used to be with the warsaw pact and nato had switched. they do not have the conventional forces to defend against nato should they go get up one morning and decide to invade russia. plus they have particularly as well as the chinese by the way impressed with our prompt global strike. they have been impressed with our continued enthusiasm for
various architecture of ballistic missile offense and we believe there could be circumstances in which their territory or their forces were threatened by capability. this has led them and this is in the open literature, this has led them to explore apparently concepts of de-escalation, de-escalation through the use of nuclear weapons first in the conflict against u.s. forces allies assets all around the world including the continental united states. if you didn't get that means there would be circumstances in which the russians would put the bacon de-escalate decompensation by attacking his first with nuclear weapons. trying to limit they would be concerned about collateral damage that this is new.
and massively troubling. then there is off. the phrase might be we have met the enemy. they are us. there is us. we are modernizing our strategic nuclear forces. minuteman iii and trident submarine-launched ballistic missiles. we plan and new ssbn to replace a boats. we planned upgrades in b-52s and b-2's we planned refurbishment of our warheads and modernization of the warhead manufacturing complex. all this would be consistent with reductions i point out and indeed that the administration makes that point. not always interpreted by others as you would not be surprised to hear.
there is a new need we have failed to reassure our allies with the credibility of extended deterrence and we have been doing that you may have noticed. we have had to do that in europe. we have had to do it in northeast asia. we are continuing our pursuit of ballistic missile defense at the strategic level at the theater level and at the tactical level layered defenses of various kinds. notwithstanding what the president had said in the last decade there will be no ctbt there will be new as cct there will be no fuel bank and no unilateral reductions by the united states of america and its forces. so in 2015 midway through this decade issues of credibility, deterrence, extended deterrence and stability are all back with us.
for the u.s. and russia but also for northeast asia, for salvation for the middle east. and those relationships are locked by a new complexity greater than what we were familiar with in my horseback ride through history. we have multiple actors in this case. it's not just two countries and conceptually that raises all kinds of problems. plus there are new theaters to worry about. there is cyber. there is space. where concepts of deterrence are not easily transferable from the nuclear area. we need new concepts. we still need to worry about accidents and we still need to worry about unauthorized use, unauthorized launch. we need to worry about terrorism and the use of nuclear weapons and terrorism. the improvised nuclear device is made as a result of the transfer of fissile material or the leakage unintended transfer and
we continue to have to worry about nuclear energy. they are still enthusiasm for an richman out there. they're still enthusiasm for the use of plutonium as a fuel into plutonium recycle. you'll hear about that very soon when the republic of korea and the united states of america announced their new arrangement for the one to three or 123 agreement. all of this says to me that nuclear weapons are back. there are salient in the discussion about our security and the security of other countries and their something for all of us to worry about and i hope you all have a very nice day. thank you. [applause] >> as we did a q&a a couple of things i would like you to all do. first please do wait for the microphone because we are recording this and we would like to be on tape.
the second thing is pleased to stand on the microphone is brought to you and do state your name and tell us where you are from. we would like to get one question in. and now that everybody likes to put their question in context but if you can keep that context short and actually ask a question that would be great and then finally hopefully your question should relate to tonight's talk. >> hi i'm hank gaffney 28 years and lsd. i just wanted to comment that first evolved mcnamara lasted a year on counterattack. when i got into it in 1962 he was on to assure destruction and that kind of thing. secondly, working on nato nuclear weapons i never heard the term extended deterrence. i've only heard in the last 10 years. so it was a bit cartoonish there are. would you cite a good source of
history that goes through all of these things? first a flexible response by mcnamara was about conventional. it was about mc1433 was not about nukes and it was wasn't sure who got into that because i knew about it and i got deeply involved in this on 242 on that subject. so what is a very good source for all of these histories? >> i'm going to beg for for consideration and two points and i said this at the beginning. one when you do things by decade if not precise. thank you. but the first is this is not precise however i want to push back on the response. when maxwell taylor talks about images what he said and that was
an appeal to kennedy. that was put up with the green berets about and that whole period was one in which conventional forces was focused. i'm going to assert to you and i'm going to hope that if you go to the book whose author is a brit who is at kings college who has done a revision on the basic book on nuclear strategy and runs through all this i think you will find one could even say the flexible response properly ghosted conventional. it was used by many to cover the development of the counterforce capability as opposed to a response understood to be largely counter value. i don't have text in front of me but i believe that to be true. [inaudible] >> okay well i would say we are going to have to stay on unclassified sources.
these are about as good as it gets but there are others. maybe off-line we can talk about that a little more. you have a second that you mention. >> hi my name is peter mccann and i'm a retired engineer. you talked about counterforce and counter population and industry and so on but russia likes deception or other approaches. there are a lot of other players attacked by high altitude emp is a particularly attractive attack if you can bring a ship and close and launch a missile or two from them. that could be pretty effective
which you have no residue or anything to find the source. what is the answer to that? >> i don't know what the answer to emp is. we have been obviously aware of dmp and its impact and i'm aware of work that has been done to shield against the consequences but i have no expertise to tell you where we are in terms of the ability to deal with emt. you are absolutely correct it is one of the results of a nuclear detonation and one can imagine a situation in which you have either a combined attack of bmp as well as looking for a kinetic impact or justin emp result. i'm sure people are thinking about that but i actually can't offer -- to you.
sorry. >> hi i'm steve from nasa. as a historian i appreciate your horseback ride to the decades of history. let me ask you what specific aspects of that history would you draw upon to think about what your policy prescriptions would be for dealing with iran right now? >> i think -- the question was good on you for doing history history so how do you make the history relevant to a prescription for dealing with iran. i would say that we have experience with countries that pursue nuclear weapons for more than one kind or reason. generally people start with for security and with most countries
that have nuclear weapons that seems to be a good answer but the point is and the answer to your question is that is just the beginning of the answer in dealing with this case because after you deal with the security issues and you provide reassurance and nuclear umbrellas why do we have essentially nonnuclear weapons states in the world today not 90? is it because the technology is unmanageable after 60 or 70 years? that is not it. it's a variety of reasons countries have decided their securities needs are best met without nuclear weapons and the idea when you're dealing with north korea and we did that for a little bit or when we are trying to sway pakistan now trying to sway iran can you persuade them. in the first instance they don't have the security needs or the security needs are best met by other means. but right away you recognized
that is not all that this is about. this is about sanity. this is about self-perception of one's position in the region where there are perceives to be an israeli nuclear weapons programs and its perceived clearly there is a western nuclear weapons capabilities sometimes projected into the region. there is a desire on the part of iran to be the dominant power in the gulf as a regional power and a hegemonic power somewhat safe from the arab side. that would be the person hegemony over the arab region. how would that be addressed to the extent that that's a driver and then there are domestic considerations. you will see that. i think the profile domestic considerations when we look at whatever it is that suffered up to us by negotiators from iran and the united states. some is going to be there
because of domestic pushed it is not going to have a lot to do with iran security needs. i think we get that from other countries we have dealt with. there was a time when south korea had a secret nuclear weapons program. it was a time when taiwan had a secret nuclear weapons program. there was a time when south africa had a secret nuclear weapons program and disassembled them. there was a time when we believed there were nuclear weapons programs in brazil and in argentina. so we have been around in the history does inform us. easy thing for me to say is what i'm arguing now. one of the things we learned learn from this is that simply addressing what looks to us like their security needs is a great start but very often the motivation here is much more complex and even goes down to domestic policy.
>> thank you ambassador. i really enjoyed your talk. a couple of days ago i read a report that one of the jihadi sunni groups in syria killed for syrian nuclear engineers, nuclear scientist and an iranian nuclear engineer and nuclear scientists. what do you think they were doing there? not the jihadi group that the nuclear. [laughter] >> actually just told me something i didn't know and b i probably could make something up but it would drive to have fully on my -- and i wouldn't do that. actually don't know in what you are suggesting actually in the intelligence community does is talk and try to understand what national interest are and what
countries may be trying to do. this is a very intelligence terms of very tough target. in the back there. >> hi. thank you ambassador. kathleen reidy and anthropologist with iran. i wonder if he could go back to the iran topic. would he think a response from saudi arabia and egypt would look like? >> the proposition that is out there is that if negotiations fail and there is a nuclear weapons program in iran notwithstanding iran's assertion that they have no interest in nuclear weapons and they just want their rights as a nation as part of the mpt to develop peaceful nuclear equipment.
so if this turns out not to be true among the countries that will not be surprised with these saudi arabia and egypt. the saudis have a special relationship with pakistan it is clear. it is possible that relationship would facilitate a transfer of technology from pakistan to saudi arabia on a turnkey basis. the saudis might have instant nuclear weapons. that is one scenario. i know nothing in detail about their relationship and i can't give any texture to that but that is one model. the egyptian cases tougher i think for egypt both because of
the political situation. egyptians are apparently experiencing because to the best of my knowledge they haven't moved down the fuel cycle route yet to develop their own capability in terms of the enrichment route or a reactor in your processing route to produce plutonium so that would be some years away, a decade is a nice round number and it would be questionable to me as to why egypt would do this. but egypt has one thinks of the leader of the arabs world when the arab world looks at iran and sees iran as potentially a persian hegemonic entity in their region of concern. the saudis are a lot closer. they certainly have no indigenous capability to do
this. they have some delivery capabilities if they had had weapons that cannot but provided principally by the chinese. so that would be a concern right away. i would say also we would be looking up we are thinking as you are about dominos that my fault. the turks even though a nato member becomes a geographic location would be a country to be concerned about and perhaps it is. right here. >> edward levine retired from the staff of the senate foreign relations committee. 20 years ago you briefed a set of committees on the nuclear framework with north korea. he did it masterfully but the agreement still came under a lot of fire.
if there is an agreement with iran what would you recommend to the obama administration with regard to handling congress? >> kevlar. [laughter] ahead you have undoubtedly observed the agreement is not an agreement and is under full attack. it's under attack by those who believe they are friends of israel and the israeli position is understood by many. iran doesn't have any enrichment capability operating in iran and that's a tough thing to negotiate with iran. i can imagine these negotiations advance successfully from the
perspective of the negotiators will end with zero enrichment capabilities so i can perceive clearly there will be critics about that. there will be critics on the hill that will go after whatever the provisions are that require iran to clarify history. i don't know what the deal will be in that area. there will be those who will be unhappy with the verification which is going to be very important as to whether they support enrichment facilities in urls or stockpiles anywhere else. so there is lots of room here for a critic to point out about the deal if there is one that is similar to the framework 20 years ago, by the way 20 years ago just three weeks ago because it was an anniversary that was celebrated in a limited way. it's just that any deal will be open to criticism because they will not be perfect.
when i was testifying before your committee i very often said what would be your plan and when i heard their plan it was essentially that we would get everything we wanted and they would get nothing they wanted. i said well next time i buy a car i will ask you to do the deal for me and i can get it for free. so this problem is going to be there. this is not going to be easy. it will not be fun. the elections at the midterm in the clinton administration because 20 years ago it was right before the midterms in 1994 and as you were called the democrats lost both houses. all the friendly committee chairs i was dealing with were gone in a whole bunch of new committee chairs couldn't wait to meet me. so it's going to be hard.
>> thank you so much for the presentation. i really enjoyed it. he basically named and talked about all non-western basically either countries that have nuclear weapons or are suspected of having a nuclear weapons program except israel. you did not talk about israel and the history of how israel has -- and so on. i was wondering first of all y. and secondly would you elaborate on the role israel could play her would have to play to make not a nuclear zero but a nuclear weapons free zone in the east? ..
and then do a and have the israelis have a deterrent. and you can see where they were. >> adult lee the iridium program is given. i have talked about a lot in the middle east. and i don't believe to reduce another negative in the sense it is not clear to me it would have been the impact of low was happening right now. except the rhetoric would not be there.
bipolar world and as that technology has spread so has the weapons behind it. but my question is with iran she has neighbors to the store to the west and then funded through saudi arabia in there is speculation in the open source literature that they already have them. that the saudis already have nuclear weapons from pakistan because they funded them to begin with. but it would make sense for iran to go after nuclear-weapons from security among other things
as far as hegemonic. but considering what is going on in the middle east indies think that aq khan was taken down because it seems to pop up again. >> so everybody knows what the aq khan was sore still is, i don't know if aq khan is still under house arrest or not, but he was the father of the pakistan a nuclear weapons program. he was into the dutch program the what was left with him of the centrifuge so that project managers
secretly in pakistan. so with that centrifuge and the nuclear weapon designs. and reading to iran and north korea. that proposition is setting arabia. his downside know less about that connection then you do not the were wrong but i just don't know. but i cannot say it is not. i don't know if that network still lives on and is active.
ben innocence is the most dangerous country in the world not that the government is out to get united states but the situation overall in pakistan has a fuller abilities as the rose of the most radical interpreters of islam to have an attack on facilities that what leads us to be concerned about the fast growing nuclear weapons program. but what exactly is still going on with respect to a transfer? because they attended that. leakages what could've have
i find that extremely unlikely. no. i don't think it would. what i cannot go much beyond israel is not south africa from and there is a famous crashes in the south atlantic with the possibility of africans at the time with a component of a nuclear weapon in the atmosphere. that is the only sharing that i know of. that was in the open in literature. so it would help the era of neighbors acquire nuclear weapons. to make it impossible to
imagine for me. i am from harvard and you talked earlier to eliminate that nuclear threat by the counterattack, and thus. >> not exactly the the theory as i understand it that they could a kid into a situation that the asymmetric advantage from the conventional forces with the debt situation that to extend either the territory in this circumstance of dire straits. and rather than seeing that situation and escalate if
they reduce tactical nuclear weapons designed to limit collateral damage to moody escalate the crisis by demonstrating their seriousness. >> coming in with your close personal friend who has always argued that counterforce attack is responded to by counterforce attack from the united states. sold the empty silos would it not be attacked by us? i'd only address this is the essence of iran and israel. and then to do any damage to the iranians with counterforce.
but it has the possibility to be a deterrent threat of counter value. it would be sweet to see them publish that to identify the downtown shopping areas to be destroyed. for that counter value. >> you have unintentionally confused me massively. [laughter] hold on. strategists generally generally, reserve the phrase counterforce for a strategic strike. i am talking about the demonstration of a limited
attack on u.s. forces where they would have an impact on population. this is scary stuff mostly for me because it continues lee misreads the likely american response to any use of nuclear weapons against us and, our allies are territory or forces that if they honestly believe they said the escalating crisis from nuclear weapons we are in trouble because we have been misread the floor about countries this is the big horrible mistake on our part. if we talk counterforce i hope and pray that our
retaliation could go completely counterforce to a rat determination to shut down the conflict. one of the things of nuclear weapons being back with the undergraduates next semester and what many of us know what nuclear weapons do is lost. but i did. i worry a great deal that a lot of people in this country don't understand the magnitude of the destruction we talk about so that i deem it to do anything other than
counterforce or to strike back to disable the conflict is so reprehensible to me i cannot begin to express it. >> unfortunately we have the same idea. was of the concepts was repeated to let them know what kind shape our conventional forces were in so they'll understood our only viable response to the soviets may quickly include the nuclear tactical weapons but i am right about the influence across the world if i was the soviets in reading his statements or comments the close personal friend there is a counterforce attacks'' responding counterforce is not sufficient. and he has every reason to
the you cannot win. the last thing he wrote before he died was a piece as foreign affairs about why iran getting nuclear weapons would be a good thing for the middle east. and then probably should say that. >> i am part of the consultants. with a nuclear weapon in states this distinction restrained thereunder nuclear weapons.
>> if you exclude the declared nuclear weapon states like u.s., france, england, of the five. between thermonuclear weapons is important. >> it is important but that is somehow deterrence will work. with the order of magnitude. it could be more depending on the size of the nuclear weapons. but the death and
and i was approached by the general counsel. and then those comments from the progressive magazine from howard. for the first time in history should they attempt prior restraint? it to have the civil liberties your instinct was absolutely not. at that time but i would not have had clearance with this kind of stuff. and we knew how long and
then renew there are other countries out there. and then it was put out in the open in literature. but it has happened a few times and has claimed it has detonated a thermonuclear weapon. but i.m. happy about that. because that level of destruction can be so much danger the difference makes the danger. i would say not much
>> i had arrived late at night september 11th in the morning. a woken up at 6:00 a.m. to see the second airplane hitting the twin tower dive. and i was traumatized. because that is when i knew i wanted them to come for me. and some of the terrorists were from cairo the same city that i came from. i called around eight people do say the same thing.
>> everybody take your seats please. the committee will come to order. welcome back. it is great to have you back. i appreciate everybody joining us for this full committee and oversight hearing today i will ask unanimous consent that several of our colleagues be allowed to you join us representative murphy and from california and, have passed to join us when of lamp was everyone that sits around the diocese to day is aware of the seventh of august on the president that sits club the accountability act of 2014 it is now public lot. it was carefully and thoughtfully crafted after months of aggressive oversight by this committee
to address the unprecedented scandal that engulfed the department of veterans affairs following allegations first uncovered in this room that some of v.a. facility leaders were keeping a secret list to insure their own executive policies. we are here today to evaluate the progress the v.a. has made to implement this lot in accordance with statutory requirement deadline sand congressional intent. this includes the effective and timely implementation of the veteran choice program that was designed to provide relief those that live 40 miles or further from us v.a. facility are cannot get a timely appointment. also the independent assessment of the health care system which in my opinion should have informed
decisions about staffing and infrastructure to be made under the law. finally, it it -- and includes accountability that i will focus my remaining a mark -- remarks. section 707 authorizes the secretary to fire or demote senior employees for misconduct or poor performance. which should go without saying it to the veterans deserve the best leadership our government has to offer. yet the events of the last year have proven too many senior leaders have wide, manipulated data, or simply failed to do the job for which there were hired. is also clear the attempt to instill accountability for these leaders has been nearly nonexistent with self-inflicted roadblocks to the reform that each of us expects.
when i drafted this provision that it could provide secretary mcdonald with the tools he wanted and needed to hold leaders accountable. president obama signed into law and agreed by saying if you engage in the unethical practice to cover up the serious problem you should be fired. period. it should not be that difficult. ''. made on those statements i am perplexed and disappointed at the pace at which employees have been held accountable. eva van more worrisome is what the secretary said womack the new power i was granted is the appeal time for senior executive