tv Key Capitol Hill Hearings CSPAN March 31, 2015 4:00pm-6:01pm EDT
as you all know with the security and strategy program here at smu and, i think, has really turned smu into a power center and go to place. we we should thank josh for his amazing job. [applause] the history of the nuclear age is marked by a puddle. a puddle. german nuclear weapons are monstrous, potentially civilization ending weapons whose use would not only be in moral but increasingly unthinkable. yet we into it that it's
very destructiveness of those weapons that predicted the deterrence of great power war since 1945. why? great power landlords had been the scourge of eurasia for 34 years before the united states dropped atomic weapons. wars that it can to have killed tens of millions on the battlefield and tens of millions more through disease and political upheaval. seventy years ago most responsible people expected a third world war to follow the 1st and 2nd with consequences far worse. thankfully that war never came and to misuse the title from a famous book it has led many people to proclaim thank god for the atom bomb. a nuclear weapons prevent world war iii and do these weapons have the intended effect of stabilizing world politics but making great power war unthinkable? this powerful notion is that the foundation of what we
have come to call deterrent. our deterrent. our whole way of thinking about nuclear weapons is centered around this concept much of policy has been driven by the fact that an attack in the on the united states or its allies might elicit a nuclear response, and we have come to take this posture so for granted we have long since forgotten how novel or unusual given american history such a strategy is. think about it for a moment. the united states has entered no permanent alliances almost completely demobilized can't pursue strategies that allowed hitler to mobilize. that mobilize. that is how the united states fought the war and plan strategy. the strategy allow for power too to the powerful civilian
control over the military and story executive oversight over the executive branch while paving the way to relative isolation and world affairs. the nuclear revolution and the strategy the united states adopted to deal with it demanded something. permanent alliances, forward military deployment in and opted preemptive military strategy that left enormous discretion in the hands of battlefield commanders and permanently shifted this power to make war with from congress to the president. the strategy the strategy is premised on the idea of deterrent, the promise of awful retribution if attacked the united states relatively safe and the world relatively stable for decades. most importantly, widely believed to have prevented nuclear war. but do we know this to be true? how can we be sure that thermonuclear weapons and the deterrent that flow from them people? we cannot. the problem is that we are trying to understand something that thank god
that, thank god never happened and we hope never we will, thermonuclear war. we have an almost impossible time understanding the causes for things that did happen as many unresolved arguments over what caused the 1st world war demonstrate. trying to understand why something didn't happen, why we did not have a thermonuclear war is a methodological nightmare, a situation that he leaves eludes answer from even our most powerful and sophisticated social scientists. one can imagine other explanations. the scholar john mueller once positive nuclear weapons were unneeded to keep the piece, the world had tired of war that the overwhelming conventional plight of the united states was enough to scare any possible rival in a great power war like slavery a cultural practice increasingly seen as insulted and not to be pursued. my other explanation for
centuries land had been the source of power. a variety of factors massive increasing agricultural use, arguably too much food, not too little to flattening demographic trends and the development of post-technological driven economies have made conquests too expensive. in other words, who needs land when it is far better to be singapore than the ukraine. my.is, there are lots of other explanation to explain the absence of great power war. the simple fact is, we don't know what. for myself i strongly suspect deterrence made an enormous revolutionary difference, but i cannot prove it. people will tell you they can, but certainly on this question it is impossible. why does this matter? there are two crucial trends
shaping the nuclear world pulling in different directions and how you assessment depends on how you think about the question of deterrence. the 1st is the so-called global zero movement with just explained, the idea that the world should move toward eliminating nuclear weapons altogether. this is actually officially an american aspiration laid out by president obama in his 2009 speech. presidents diverse as ronald reagan and jimmy carter also shared the school. the other strand reveals that nuclear weapons are playing an increasing role in world politics. we all know about the negotiation over iran's nuclear program. less well known as the significant expansion and modernization of the nuclear programs of russia, china, and pakistan. the the united states is also going through a multibillion-dollar modernization program as
judgments and. one strand moves the world toward delegitimizing and eventually terminating. the other strand the other strand pulls in the opposite direction, highlighting the importance of nuclear weapons for achieving the national security of foreign-policy objectives which is correct. these worldviews and the policies that flow from them are enormously consequential command we need to vigorously argue and debate over them. the debate must recognize that the answer to the most important question, the one that matters more than any policy question in the world today, how to avoid a nuclear war will never be known with certainty and must be both rigorous and humbled to explore. of course, the right course also turns to another number of important questions that are as elusive as they are consequential. consequential. i am a historian, and historians love to deal and puzzles. i want to present three very
briefly. depending upon how you think about these problems, how you answer them understand the paths will help shape how you think about contemporary and future nuclear limited choices. they they should also get the fundamental questions are running nuclear weapons. the 1st important question how close did we come to thermonuclear war during the cold war? there are at least three ways to look at this. first, through the course of the cold war did nuclear weapons and strategies of the superpowers make great power war and nuclear exchange more or less likely? second, how did nuclear weapons affect the behavior and the risk of nuclear war during sharp political crises? in other words, did nuclear weapons make crises more or less likely and was it
easier or harder to exit these crazies without the risk of war? third, how high was the risk of an accidental nuclear launcher accident? now, now on this question nuclear weapons clearly have contradictory effects. the fears and horrors of thermonuclear war no doubt gave both soviet and american leaders pause during stable times and crises. that. that said, one cannot read this history without some feeling of terror. command-and-control joins other boats in highlighting the states, accidents, and and near misses that plague nuclear management on both sides. reading documents from both sides of the cold war during 1958 to 1961 berlin crises 1962 cuban missile crisis, a set of challenges during missile crisis, a set of challenges during the 1983 nato naval archer exercise give one pause.
perhaps more importantly the most important and dangerous crises of the cold war were generated by the very existence of nuclear weapons. in other words, if one tries the counterfactual of the world without nuclear weapons, for example, the cuban missile crisis makes no sense. even the crises of our west berlin if they were as we now believe initiated by the soviet union's anger over the united states moving to arm west germany with nuclear arms, nuclear weapons is nuclear to the core. the crisis of the euro missiles in the 1970s, the soviet fear of a nato for strike in the early 1980s. it is hard to create a counterfactual where these occur in a nonnuclear world. could it be that in a nonnuclear cold war the united states and soviet union and nato and the warsaw pact balance each other perfectly grudgingly accepting each other's sphere of influence and avoiding major crises? who knows but is a scenario at least worth thinking about.
the 2nd important question, why do states pursue nuclear weapons, and why have far fewer pursued them than anyone would have predicted it and internet 1965 and 1995. is the less nuclear eyes world will be expected a product of the 1968 nuclear nonproliferation treaty? remember, the remember, the 1960s people predicted 20, 30, 40 nuclear weapon states by the start of the 21st century. is this low number of relatively low number because of an emerging norm, even taboo? is it because of the demand of being an open, politically liberal capitalistic state conflict with the goals of acquiring nuclear weapons as some a at some a -- as some scholars have claimed? or has it been american nonnuclear proliferation efforts, norms, treaties threats, sanctions, even considering preventative military strikes to strong alliances and security agreements around the world?
has that been the key factor keeping the number of nuclear weapon states in the single digits? again we don't know and can't be sure. one interesting surprise that i we will.out is that the united states went to great lengths, greater length than we perhaps realize in the past to keep his friends and allies nonnuclear than it did even its enemies, countries ranging from west germany to japan to south korea australia, italy, sweden the list goes on and on and shows a willingness to work with its adversary the soviet union, against its allies to accomplish. the 3rd important question is an age-old one how much is enough? in other words, what are the force and strategy requirements for nuclear deterrent, and are they different than the requirements for assuring allies? can a state achieve meaningful nuclear superiority? if so what are the benefits of achieving such?
this is a complex question, but during the cold war they're were two leading views. many of the academic and think tank analysts are now thinkers like bernard brodie, robert jarvis, can waltz believing that once a state possess survivable nuclear forces, in other words, enough nuclear weapons that even an attack upon them allow them to unleash unacceptable damage on the enemy and once you achieve that it was really no.in building more forces. strategic stability was been achieved and building more larger and more accurate strategic nuclear forces or spending money on things like missile-defense was a waste and potentially destabilizing. many american decision-makers did not seem to affect this logic, and the united states continued
seemingly enshrined in the 1972 strategic arms limitation treaty and anti-ballistic missile treaty to seek faster, more accurate, stealthier nuclear forces, multibillion-dollar programs upgrades so the missile defense and massive investments in anti- submarine warfare all systems by the way, counterforce and if one follows the logic affect system potential 1st use revealed the united states sought nuclear superiority. what did they think they were getting for this massive investment, the systems that arguably according to some analysts undermine strategic stability? and did they get what they sought? there is a limited but quite revealing bit of evidence that the soviet side understood that the americans were trying to acquire meaningful superiority in the 1970s and 80s based upon capability russia never had the technology or economic resources to match ended worried them quite a bit
which is an interesting contrast to what appears to be a much different attitude in china today where despite an increasingly vigorous foreign policy and military expansion based upon an impressive economic and technological base the people's republic of china seems relatively sanguine about being on the short end of the nuclear balance with the united states. answering these three questions would go a long way toward helping us navigate the nuclear treatises we have in front of us that josh so eloquently laid out. i wish i could provide you with concrete answers to these and other important puzzles. historians traffic in uncertainty and are far better at asking hard questions and throwing cold water on those that would provide easy answers which is probably why i don't get invited to more terrific events like this. [laughter] hard to get excited by a speaker whose conclusions are, it is complicated or it
all depends or we can't really no. that said i look forward to discussing these and any other questions you might have. thank you very much. [applause] >> suddenly stopped talking in the middle of a sentence it is because i'm going paperless tonight and my screen has just gone completely blank. give me a moment. let's see if i can make this do something that it is supposed to do. there we go. thank heavens, heavens, i can say something now. thanks, doctor josh rovner for inviting me to the center. i enjoy center. i enjoy coming to discussions like this, particularly when the audience is filled with a mixture of people like it is tonight to include a fair number of undergraduates. i am gratified by seeing so
many undergraduates here because i think that these issues in particular while used to get discussed in many places through the cold war at the end of the cold war there was a tendency to not discuss these issues and it is the conversations we have now want overdue. the 1st time i visited smu, and and i must say it is a beautiful campus. how lovely it is. i wish i could spend more time here. i promise i we will come back and see the things that some of you have told me about that sounds so delightful. i am also pleased to be on stage with professor gavin. i am fascinated by his review of the background and history of the us arsenal and the questions that he posed and the puzzles that he talked about i think, are spot on, very, very interesting conversations and very necessary conversations. i might yield a little bit of a a bucket of cold water here myself in just a moment
because i we will speak with what sounds like a little more certainty but i we will say that i think he raises fair points about how certain we can be about some of our tried-and-true assumptions related to nuclear weapons and nuclear deterrent. that is a that is a great set of subjects for many of you undergraduates to study. as you heard in the introduction, introduction to my server for almost 39 years in uniform much associated with the strategic forces, so the opinions you will hear from me are mine and will have a decidedly military flavor to the. as you heard, i am going to take a minute and piggyback on what professor gavin professor gavin said because i think that his points there repeating. so let me do it with a little bit of my own military slant. no question about it nuclear weapons have occupied a unique place in global affairs since august
of 1945. i assert that while nuclear weapons were conceived to win a war, shortly after there used it became a critical tool to prevent war and in my humble view that was their great value and remains the great value today. we can debate how certain we can be that that is what had happened, but i think that there is some evidence that would suggest that, in fact, nuclear weapons have been -- obviously they are unprecedented and their potential to inflict enormous distraction over a very short time with long-term physical and psychological effects that could be global in scope. nuclear weapons were woven into the fabric of our national security strategy is the ultimate guarantor of our security and that of our key allies and partners nuclear superiority became an affordable means to compensate for conventional inferiority for the united states and its allies.
more on that later. but if you read anything about the cold war there was a large conventional inferiority on the part of nato vis-à-vis the warsaw pact. deterrence was the objective behind having nuclear weapons and the weapons policies, strategies, and employment plans were all designed to convince adversaries that they were not achieve goals by attacking us. they would pay too high a price if they tried. that is the impose cost. nuclear deterrence fit with the cold war strategy of containment. to be sure nuclear weapons do not eliminate all conflict, nor will they ever the threat of nuclear war
impose limits, compel caution and forced leaders to stop and ponder the consequences of escalation before acting. i think that the evidence of this is clear in korea berlin, cuba, vietnam, the middle east, and elsewhere. the notion of war between the major powers has war between the major powers has changed since 1945 and while i do not believe it needs a long time of peace, that is what we have seen. certainly the world has not seen a hot war between the major powers since august 1945. it would be speculation, for sure and i completely agree with the professor it would be speculation to say that it is because of nuclear weapons. prior to 1945 when conventional deterrence was attempted a number of times to the great powers whether through great white fleet's, battleships, whatever form it took it never lasted and
the world found itself with large global conflicts that were increasingly violent and increasingly deadly as time passed. but so i would argue from my perspective nuclear deterrent worked. there are interesting questions. today some people would say, okay. if it worked then, that was then. the conditions the longer exist today. nuclear deterrence and therefore the weapons create more risk and benefit to our national security. i don't think that is true so let me take a couple of minutes to explain. for those of us who served in the cold war it does not seem like much time is past yet an entire generation of men and women have now served in the us armed forces since the cold war ended. some have completed an
entire 20 year career might actually 24 years if if you count 1991 as the end of the cold war. for for the last ten to 15 years or so while i was on active duty i would occasionally slip and is a cold war example to describe something to the younger troops and get a blank stare at her. an army an army friend of mine is part of this recent return as a demonstration of the fact that we could reinforce nato if we had to. famous examples. they were called we forge or exercise, an acronym for return of forces to germany. a friend of mine and colleague said he was talking to his troops about this is just like we forger and they look at him like, grandpa i don't i don't even know what that means. the cold war has been over for a long time command i believe today's men and with
often use weapons designed and built during the cold war, but there experience is shaped by iraq and afghanistan and libya and kosovo in the global war against violent extremists not a face-off over an iron curtain in central europe and the threat of large-scale nuclear war. for me me, the cold war ended in september of 1991. i was in command of an icbm unit president george hw bush ordered all nuclear bombers and supporting tankers and half are intercontinental ballistic missiles off of cold war alert status. in status. in short order he implemented other nuclear initiatives that have dramatic effect on the us nuclear posture. we still retain a nuclear deterrent force ballistic missile submarines and intercontinental ballistic missiles on alert, but for those of us in the field, the cold war was over. where we had hoped for a
peace dividend the 21st century has brought new challenges. today strategic threats are more complex than the singular existential threat posed by the soviet union in the 20th century. today's threats includes today's threats includes hybrid combinations of strategy, tactics, and capability include nuclear weapons, cyber weapons, cyber weapons, long-range ballistic missiles traditional conventional and nonconventional weapons that can be wielded by state and nonstate actors like. uncertainty and complexity dominate the global security landscape today. violent extremism remains the most likely threat that the us faces. the marriage of such extremists and a nuclear weapon, the most dire threat of all. but that is not the only threat we face. adversaries and potential adversaries continue to pursue capabilities to conduct strategic attacks against the us and their allies as a main component of security strategy.
such attacks are defined by the effect and not the weapon used and could involve nuclear or conventional kinetic or non- kinetic weapons and such strategic attacks that arrive at our doorstep through his base or cyberspace are in a nontraditional way, i would argue the attacks of september 11 were strategic attacks on the united states the likelihood of a massive nuclear attack on the us has receded thankfully russia, china, north korea all have the capability to inflict terrible casualties and damage on the us and our allies over the course of several hours with nuclear weapons. russia and china are pursuing aggressive nuclear modernization programs, and both have included nuclear weapons in the strategic doctrine. senior russian leaders have recently restated their commitment to nuclear deterrent. quite frankly deterrent. quite frankly, i have been surprised by the amount of nuclear saber rattling that
the russians have been doing nuclear weapons still form the basis of deterrent in india and pakistan. north korea openly advertises its possession of nuclear weapons and continues to work on ballistic missiles that can deliver the and overly threatens to use them as they most heinously did in 2013. negotiations continue with iran. others to include some allies and partners acquiring nuclear weapons due to the behavior of their neighbors and a us guarantee. there is a reason why adversaries and potential adversaries see nuclear weapons as essential to there security. these and other potential adversaries are looking to compel the us to restrain action or in the crisis or conflict to restrict options and intimidate allies and
coalition partners. it is the cold war in reverse. others threaten nuclear use. in short, i do not see a world without nuclear weapons on the horizon anytime soon, something president obama acknowledged while strategic attack in the 21st 21st century could take many forms, a nuclear attack remains absolutely the worst case scenario. therefore deterring strategic attack including nuclear attack must remain the number one priority for the department of defense. twenty-first century deterrence concepts still sound familiar. denied benefits and impose cost credible forces, and a range of options for the president to use everyday commitment to assure allies and partners by extending deterrence. they do still rely on that guarantee and it sounds
familiar. how how we apply those concepts in the 21st century is very different. 21st-century deterrence must be tailored to a wide variety of actors and scenarios. 21st-century deterrence demand flexible application of a full range of complementary military capability strong conventional forces, forward forces go forward presence so defense, resilient space and cyberspace capability effective command-and-control and, of course, the ultimate possibility of a us nuclear response in extreme circumstances with vital national interests at stake. we know longer have to threaten nuclear used to compensate for conventional inferiority but no combination of capability can hold that risk the full range of things i value the most.
so in a future crisis or conflict, nuclear options will continue to provide the pres. with the ability to hold in them is most critical assets at risk, risk, compel an enemy to consider potential consequences of actions in ways no conventional weapon can do and prevent the region from escalating by threatening a nuclear path. allies and partners will continue to rely on the security guarantees are nuclear forces provide. from from my.of view absent some unforeseen change in the international security or until a suitable replacement comes along nuclear weapons will contribute to our national security and the security of our allies for quite some time and will do that by providing the president with options underwriting our freedom of action and compelling caution on adversaries and maybe fewer in numbers certainly need to be focused on our highest and strategic assurance and
must be woven into a doctrine a doctrine that contemplates use against highest valued military related targets in extreme circumstances, again, were vital national security interest is at stake and must be seen as a complementary tool that include conventional and non- kinetic weapons must be under the strict it positive and control the president of the united states, modern and sustainable the me to my final. i used to get asked the question. we happen to be in the worst place at a bad time. we find ourselves in need of modernization of our nuclear arsenal at the very time that budgets are declining. here we have weapons that still in my humble view play a vital and enduring roller national security.
others are modernizing arsenals. our deterrent, to include the stockpile of delivery systems delivery systems in support command-and-control and communication system has reached a critical time. many of the weapons and other industrial base things that we have to they were acquired during the reagan defense buildup and are now over 30 years old. at the newest b-52s were built in the 1960s. 1960s. i flew in akc 31 tanker some years ago. two captains who were youngsters compared to everyone else. and i said to them we were doing that thing that generals do in the middle of the night flying somewhere over the world quiet and called. i went forward to chat them up in the cockpit doing what generals do. they were doing what young crew members do, pretending as they were interested. i happen to ask one of them
when did you come on active duty. to to make a long story short the airplane we were flying in was made before he was born. i didn't feel -- that did not bother me a lot other than to say at some.where these systems have to be modernized and upgraded. i i think that the way ahead was well outlined. it it was clear about our need to sustain and modernize the deterrent systems including weapons that deliver platforms in the supporting command-and-control and said we ought to retain the triad of nuclear forces and i'm happy to talk about that. we are to maintain a modern physical infrastructure, recruit and retain a highly capable workforce. some of you need to be part of that workforce whether working on policies and public policies associated with it or the engineering it is behind it, we need you and to pursue a viable strategy a viable strategy that continues to reduce the
overall numbers and types in the stockpile while ensuring the reliability of the individual weapons remains high. twenty-first century concepts. let me just say in conclusion that i think our nuclear deterrent has served as well and i think that it will continue to play a vital role in the fabric of our national security for a long time to come. thank you for inviting me command i look forward to your questions. [applause] >> we will go will go into q&a, but i we will take the privilege of asking the 1st question. i would like to ask a question of both of you 1st for professor francis gavin.
it is a hard question? we have a room full of people who want to know more so how do you approach the subject? you do this for a living. you study this issue deeply have read books about it. how do you how do you start to answer what is essentially an unanswerable question? and for the general, i was taken with your description of the changes from the cold war and the present security environment. the world has the world has seemed to become more complex, a greater variety of threats, instruments but you also said that us nuclear weapons would only be used in extreme circumstances against military style targets when they are of vital national security interests at stake suggesting that nuclear weapons are reserved for great powers who could do great danger.
if. if i am right and the conditions are that narrowly constrained why do we now look to the cold war for lessons rather than trying to craft knew strategies of deterrent? >> terrific question. and i certainly humility should not necessarily discourage someone from curiosity. the 1st thing i see the students. my attitude developed because i started learning about these questions at there age the cold war had yet ended. and the sort of very learned materials that we read were from great scholars and thinkers that come from places like grand important
universities in the united states and is incredibly sophisticated methods like game theory to sort of explained what they thought should have happened given the consequences of thermonuclear revolution. and as and as i became a historian and started looking in the record i was surprised and stunned and humbled to find the gap between what the theorists postulate happened and what policymakers actually did.
>> the paper he wrote about during the berlin crisis recently suggested the problem with nuclear weapons is you need to credibly show that you can use them. the wanting a president to do in a crisis was fire one shot over the middle of ukraine to show the soviets that we meant business. you get the impression the document was circulated around. what what is this? no person in their right mind would ever think this way. the logic of nuclear weapons was such that the level of responsibility of thinking of using a demonstration shot. so what struck me was that there was this gap between
the way strategists and intellectuals thought about this question and the way that the day-to-day diplomacy and crises and management of international relations intersected. and, in fact, a few things became clear. there is not one president with the possible exception of nixon. if they could have pushed a button every one of them would have pushed a button to make them all disappear. they disappear. they found the burden of responsibility terrible, understood the arguments on behalf of deterrent, but there was a palpable sense of notches responsibility but almost beyond the realm which is interesting. it is not the way we learn about this. there were there were a series of things like that that made me realize that it was one thing to talk about
this theoretically and quite another to talk about them as the president is thinking about using them. one of the one of the best places you can get a sense of this listening to the presidential tapes, kennedy tapes. one gets the sense of the loneliness of president kennedy having to make this decision and how frankly unhelpful much of the information he was getting and what a burden this was. and that is not to say there are not smart things that could have been helpful, but many people who write on the subject bomb iran don't pomerantz, do this, don't do that speak with the certainty that has no justification in historical record. it does not mean they were not necessarily right but
the more you know might lead to a a little more nuanced thinking on questions with such extraordinary import. >> before i answer the question that you have post let me piggyback. military people do not like them either. i think that this is not about liking. this is about at least it has been for me not about liking them but understanding the world that we live in has them and they have national security implications for us. so therefore we have learned how to deal with them which leads to the question, what does that mean now? it is a bit of a chicken and egg discussion to say that the cold war shaped nuclear weapons and vice versa.
good hitting defeats good pitching and vice versa. i think there is something to that here as well. but i do believe that the way we talk about them the way for employment policies were written disclosed i think the evolution of massive retaliation to flexible response, all of those things that happened were uniquely suited to the cold war. this is no longer a cold war world. so i am always a little leery when we try to make it like the cold war. i think an understanding of what assurance and deterrence mean is a precondition for understanding how and why we
continue to need nuclear weapons and how we should use them if you we will. we friend of mine says i have had military friends over the years. we use our nuclear deterrent every single day. i come down on that side of the fence. but when we have a cold war with the soviet union we viewed that as a model of believe we understood how they made decisions, believe we understood who made those decisions therefore when we were trying to construct deterrence strategies we thought we knew who we were trying to influence and what mattered to them. we need that kind of understanding for a far a far broader range of adversaries now or potential adversaries. who makes who makes decisions and some of the places where the greatest unrest is?
how do you determine? what combination of things would deter them and how to nuclear weapons play in that combination? i think that is a different way of approaching our nuclear deterrent in the 21st century. it plays great difficulty with the intelligence community. if you go to the intelligencegreat difficulty with the intelligence community. if you go to the intelligence community and say, i say, i need to know who makes decisions in this place over here and how they make them and what they value the most that is a tough problem. it took us a long time to figure that out with the soviet union if we ever really did. be careful about be careful about talking with certainty here on any of these subjects. i clearly believe that we have got to understand the world that we are in now. this is a different international security environment than we have faced in the last century. the compelling security problems of the last century
imperialism fascism, nazis, communism have largely been relegated to the history books. some of it echoes, but largely relegated to the history books. it is a different world today command to assume that we would be structuring our nuclear deterrent the same way that we did during the cold war is a big mistake. understanding this notion of taylor deterrent what combination of factors will be the most effective in deterring any given country and then understanding that us policy only considering using nuclear weapons in extreme circumstances. does that limit to other nuclear powers? that was the negative security guarantee provided in the nuclear posture review of 2010. but by the way i think that is a worthy goal deterring nuclear use by those that have. i think that is a worthy goal.
again, we are sometimes talking about the enormous destructive potential in any individuals, or one of our individual ballistic missile submarines talk about being able to unleash the equivalent of world war ii out of one platform, that is only half of the description or the other half is you can do it in 30 minutes. these weapons are unlike any other weapons command as long as we have in my view is we better understand how they fit in the grand strategy of deterrence that has to be tailored to individual actors in today's world. >> we have time for q&a.
>> thank you. i really enjoyed this. general, to allocate what you have said in looking at deterrent if you were president of iran say it's pretty much the same thing. and how would you evaluate the nuclear posture the potential use of nuclear weapon that they would launch a strike on israel which would lead to the use of deterrence. >> a complicated question. i demand is your questions. first of all, i don't know that i can speculate what
the iranians would say i read in the that they have considered acquiring for their own national security interest. i don't know that they have made that decision whether or not to acquire the. when i left inside conversations a little over a year ago i thought that they had made the decision. i don't know what they would say exactly. i can tell you what others have said. the russians have been clear that they see their nuclear deterrent as offsetting not only our nuclear arsenal but our conventional capabilities as well. they have been concerned and have written about it publicly since desert storm, what we were able to do conventionally. they have a name for it.
it is this marriage of satellites and aircraft and other things that results in precision strike. so i think countries will pursue these weapons or retain them for their own national security interest. i think that is part of our deterrence being able to understand what those reasons are and i am not sure that we are clear about what those reasons are. >> thank you. thank you so much for coming so i am very interested in what you have said. the deterring policy no.
they have not. >> it is a great question. i guess of the credibility. one of the reasons that that we have taken a position that says nuclear weapons need to be only one tool in a deterrent get because in some cases i would argue our nuclear deterrent would not be a credible deterrent to tear certain acts. so how does our nuclear deterrent work today in the context of those kinds of threats and the emergence,
if emergence, if you we will, of some very sophisticated conventional capabilities and perhaps non- kinetic capabilities as time passes. how do we put those pieces together to put effective deterrence strategies together is a critical question. once again i will cite professor gavin's issue, there is not a great deal of certainty. there is uncertainty associated with all of this. i we will say that the threat of violent extremists with a nuclear weapon has been taken very very seriously. you can look you can look at not only the nuclear posture but other policy documents family this a ministration were several administrations that have talked about elevating to the top of the agenda. that drives the non- proliferation and counter proliferation efforts.
we're taken that challenge seriously. i would put the right mixture of deterrence factors together. causing a lot of my colleagues. >> to piggyback off of that question and ask you both a comment on the likelihood of a nonstate actor or terrorist actually getting a hold of nuclear material. and then my question would be could you talk about some of the regimes in places where you think they might actually be able to act on those materials. worry about pakistan.
>> it strikes me this has been a priority for several years that something from the outside has been a success. obviously a great concern after the september 11th attacks and it is striking as an outsider how many national security initiatives, how much intelligence sharing cooperation has been on the international front to deal with this absolutely critical issue. i do think that there was a time of four particularly immediately after september 11 were perhaps the threat was overstated. and i think partially the threat was overstated personally some extraordinary policy international cooperation.
clearly if you're the president of the united states the most important thing you have to worry about. the obvious places in problems you would worry about korea, pakistan it is striking the kind of things we worried about 20 years ago a lot of the nonnuclear initiatives seem to have gotten an extraordinarily good job. certainly i would imagine. >> and i agree with that completely. it will never not be a concern. it will always be a concern. >> this is one of those things where the academic policy divide is at its greatest because of an academic like myself to citizen 99.9 percent chance
it won't happen. catastrophic consequences are so much. you talk to any policymaker few that you run into the do not say this is on the top of the list of things to worry about. you to an academic conference most of my colleagues in josh's colleagues would say it is not a high probability event and certainly risks are far lower than they were during the cold war. i do not think i have come to the conclusion that it is not helping much. even in this low probability consequences are still catastrophic and unthinkable that he have to spend an enormous amount of time thinking about it and worrying about it. >> consequences are so great that we can't ever take that from its rightful place which is at the top of the agenda.
a lot of work has been done and a lot of workers on now not a lot of people who get up every day and go to bed every night worrying about this problem, and rightfully so. is one that i do not believe we can ever take focus off of. >> so the conversation has entered focus recently threats the use of nuclear weapons most recently. mass distraction. how does that conversation now fit into the us nuclear strategy to build tons of weapons.
>> yes, it definitely factors and. if you go back i want to say it was released in 2012 although it might have the date wrong. every president sometime during her term issues new guidance to the military about how we would employ nuclear weapons of deterrence. there was an there was an unclassified fact sheet released and the report to congress. the congress the congress asked for an unclassified report, and there was one given as a result of president obama's nuclear employment. and it specifically, unclassified realm, it specifically mentions the possibility potential for small, limited uses as part of a regional conflict. it's a planning problem is the motor has to do with. it is one that also occupies a lot of deterrence
thinking. at the end of the day this is really about deterring that kind of use making sure, as i said earlier that earlier that we understand what would compel an adversary to do that who would make the decisions what do they value most how we put the right combination of deterrence together to make sure that it could not happen, but it is a planning problem for us, something that the report to congress said was a possibility the likelihood of a massive exchange had receded. prepared for that as well because of the deterrent aspects of that. but i think there is a recognition that we have
listened to the russians talk about their new doctrine and part of the doctrine is that perhaps they would use nuclear weapons early as opposed to light. [inaudible question] >> no i would not want to speculate on that. other than i would say i think my job certainly as the commander of strategic command is to make sure that the president always had options. [inaudible question] highly unlikely to have a terrorist attack. things that are needed elsewhere.
>> you have asked another very difficult question, and it is about priorities. you know, again the statistics of whether or not you will be the subject of a terrorist attack is only part of the story. the issue is that when it occurs we have people who are killed and injured. look at boston marathon as an example. ..
you need to do many things at once and the question is how do we pay for that. we still maintain our economic strength, which is national security as well. >> i would like to question -- [inaudible] data as it seems we should just worry about the use of nuclear weapons and not have to worry about conventional nuclear weapons. how would you respond that we just have to worry about the use of nuclear weapons and we don't have to worry -- [inaudible] >> you know, that is a very interesting question.
most of our academic studies focused on possession proliferation, what states want these weapons, why did they want them and what will they do when they have them. that is why how you answer that question. there is a large body of things. nuclear weapons are not very good at getting these things. you can't take territory with them. they are very bad offensive weapons. they are defensive weapons. so therefore when a when i say once been typically, so the argument goes, it would be to prevent others from interfering in their lives. and if that is the argument, someone might say i don't really have to worry about it that much. in fact general kehler
mentioned some states might want to prevent the united states from interfering with this. that is like if the argument that these analysts say that they preferred the united states not interfering. now there is another way of looking at this nuclear weapons might embolden leaders. they might encourage them to engage in blackmail to manipulate the inherent certainty of the situation. one of the things when i look back to some of my crew chef in the late 50s, he has far fewer nuclear weapons in the united states and was probably a first strike. he was willing to engage an incredibly risky behavior. when one works closely you can see him making that the united states would be responsible and back down.
therefore nuclear weapons in certain hands, you can exploit people's very responsibility to get things that you want. this is something that thomas schelling did point now. khrushchev, when he had a conversation with a sunset we look at what we want are a living. where do we go? we will try something else. when you are talking about explicit nuclear test what khrushchev did come is terrifying. there's two completely different arguments and how you answer that. again, it depends on the state in question. it's fairly clear that if you were a state like france a status quo power you probably want them for your own deterrent purposes. that is why sweden wanted them. that is why australia wanted them when they wanted to. other countries like north korea that it is not clear that they just want them for
deterrent purposes. the debate centers around are ran. if you think are you think a win just once and for deterrent purposes, you prefer them not to have it, but it's not the end of the world if you think iran will behave more like khrushchev for more like north korea that makes it far more dangerous than far more worrying. i am of the belief that they would be more likely to happen for deterrent purposes. again, one can't know. you are absolutely right. it all turns upon general kehler was absolutely right. these are used and how they are threatened with purposes of blackmail coercion is what makes them so terrifying. >> hi i have a couple of questions. the first is a follow-up to a
previous question you mentioned the boston bombings might be. how would nuclear weapons deter acts such as the boston bombing. that is my first question. my second question is you are speaking of the arsenals and our state is modernizing it. and how are we to do that with a new arms race? >> well, i will take a stab at both of those. i think it is a stretch to suggest that nuclear weapons would deter someone who is going to do something like the boston bombing. but that gets to my point. my point is that when the 21st century, with the variety of security situations that we face, i think understanding how nuclear weapons play in our
overall deterrent calculation is very important and there's a lot of work that still needs to be done in that regard because we find ourselves in this very interest in very challenging, maybe unique time in world history regarding national security. i think it is hard to know sometimes who is deterred from doing what i wanted. i think that -- it is hard to know perhaps. he gets back to professor gavin's point from earlier. it is hard to know under what circumstances beasties play a -- they do play a factor. they do in this new security environment beyond just the traditional view that we have had. i just don't know where that is and that requires a lot of academic work to tell you the truth. i have made that appeal before
academic institutions like this. that is one reason i wanted to come. i think the simulated conversation in a place like this were you all take this and have these conversations and look at this in an academic sense is very valuable and very necessary. the second question about an arms race. we are a different place they are, too. there is no saying you can't have another nuclear arms race somehow. and i am disturbed when parties say they are going to walk away from treaties. i think the inf treaty, in my view, my personal view i think our arms control treaties as they have been gunned in a mutual way and may have been largely verifiable, i think they have enhanced their security. and so i am in favor of enhancing our security in whatever way we can know about that. arms-control has a piece of
that. we are in a different environment here today that maybe we were in the cold war. but modernization in and of itself does not comment in my view stimulate the new arms race. we are doing the modernization within the box these days. we have a policy box that we are operated in, do we have self-imposed. that policy box describes how we will go about doing life extensions under existing weapons, not the new weapons for the life extension of existing weapons. i think because we are in the new s.t.a.r.t. treaty era we have a box in which we have limited the numbers that we can't exceed and i think that put another layer of control at the wheel and whether or not there could be an arms race. i think they are economic limiters on what we can actually do. but the fact that the matter is
that if you look at the three legs of what we have always called the strategic triad, the ballistic missile submarine at some point will not be safe simply because of the mechanics involved. submarine tubes can only go down and up so many times encyclopedic pressure changes so many times and then you have to build a new tube. that is the way it works. i am not a navy guy. i'm not a naval architect, but i believe them when they say that. regarding the farmers, the idea for a replacement for a bomber is actually more of a dual capable platform. so the kind of platform that we would use in a conventional sense, like the b-2 for example, during their entire adult lifetime. they were conceived as a nuclear bomber. they have been used that way, but they have been used as a conventional platform and that
is why we see the realities of the world out there to suggest that there is still a need for a long range penetrating platform. so i think the dual capable nature of the bomber -- we would need to bother even if for some reason we said we wouldn't. we wanted the bomber because of the payload distances we have to be concerned about. that leads us to the icbms and i think we can still get a great benefit on the icbm force. do we need modernization or upgrade there will be required as well. we find ourselves at a bad plate at the worst time. we find ourselves needing to invest while we are in a period of declining budgets. so that is the trick and that is the difficulty they struggle with in washington and honestly i am glad i am not in that mix every day. even though i lived there, i am not part of it. the >> so i wanted to zoom out. i am keeping in mind that during
the second -- >> icu now. >> that terrorist -- modern terrorism and the war in afghanistan and being able to recruit a lot of the guys that want to get russia out. then i started thinking about the u.s. has wanted the biggest armed headquarters and how big these weapons have been stopped by a period and then i start thinking about how much does corporatism and corporate policy -- [inaudible] so i guess i asked for the responses to is it feasible to limit our exporting and the
whole that these corporations have that would create a lot of the resentment and frustration i mixed. is that a lot of these numbers and terrorist groups say of complex problems. what is your response to that? >> my response is that it's a great question for a professor. [laughter] >> and i would say it is a great question for a general. [laughter] there are two separate questions there. one is the influence of corporate interest in the u.s. national security aide. i look at lots and lots of documents. this is one of the subjects that i think that i find almost no evidence that any major national security decision was influenced by this desire to make money or to satisfy a corporation.
i think this is one of the great mythologies of american foreign policy. i would be open to it if i saw in the document. but i think i have been struck and this doesn't mean extraordinarily bad decisions can't be made our mistakes can be made for revamping skimpy and downright problematic. i see very little example of national security leaders saying well, in an ideal world we wouldn't do this. but lockheed martin wants us to come is a way better. i think it is kind of you know, sort of a pleasant ciampi asks trope, but i don't think it is true. but the second part i do think arms exports, there are ritual of u.s. national security policies and they certainly open as you suggest to criticism. i think that one of the many tools that the u.s. national security decision makers have is to provide arms and weapons and
support their allies and at times those signs have been used, perhaps not for the best purposes. they have fallen into bad hand. i think it is completely legitimate to critique on a case-by-case basis whether or not those arms export policies have been effective. there are cases where it has been. there are places where it has not been. the point about afghanistan, at the time it appears very, very wise and was probably an important policy countering the soviet union worldwide. it had unintended consequences, most complicated policies have unintended consequences. so you can assess that they stop now. but i would separate those two
issues. [inaudible] -- we need to modernize the definition of insurance. you could parallel -- [inaudible] if you could talk a little bit about that as far as the modern enemy and what is going on for the modernization of nuclear weapons. >> that is yours, general. last night the -- [laughter] >> well, let me separate the terms. those are related, but the shorthand for that is in deterrence, it is about an adversary. and assurance it is about an
ally. so we use those in the same sentence, but they are not the same thing. what assures an ally are not the same thing. we have to be mindful to both of those needs when we are structuring our fours when we are dealing with all kinds of factors that go into our calculation. the second thing that i would say if there is no question in my mind that this notion of what some have called tailored turns where you are looking specifically at adversary by a adversary or actor by acts or and which you are going to reach deter and have some confidence that you understand how to go about it requires a very very deep understanding of who they
are, how they think, what they do, how they decide, who decide all of the things that go with that. we didn't know that right away in the cold war about the soviet union. that took a long time. the cynic will challenge for the intelligence community today. although they have some tremendous tools as you know to try to nurse and these things. by the way one of the interesting things today is everything available in open source. look at all the stuff that is out there. in many cases, adversaries tell us what they are doing. but we can figure out which twitter account they are using. i don't even know what twitter is. someone told it is important. i am joking, but i think there is a tremendous -- we are awash in the information out there that nobody really had to go collect covertly.
there is a lot of information out there. how do we use it? how do we understand what is and it? all of those things are big challenges for everyone in the insurance community. they struggle with that. my hats off to them. they do a remarkable job actually. i do think that this need to approach something called tailored deterrence is putting an even greater demand signal on them that requires them to establish priorities just like everybody else. we can't do everything at once all the time unfortunately, but we can't. even with the tremendous resources the united states brings to bear on these things it is about priorities and choices. i was pretty confident that we were getting a handle on a number of these tailored deterrence ideas. i thought certainly be worse argument zero. like any military commander i always wanted more intelligence
always and i think we've got a pretty good demand signal on them. >> i have two questions. the first one is -- [inaudible] [inaudible] >> yeah i am not aware of anything she tried to provide a defense against a nuclear armed missile for example, other than missile defense. so i am not aware of any other.
that doesn't mean there isn't somebody doing something somewhere, but i am not aware of anything that would offer a sort of a golden beet to deal with nuclear weapons. >> so on china's capability. the >> so, china does not have a large arsenal, but the arsenal to have wished they would always structure their public doctrine that they would always use it as a second strike, that they would never have urged use. i am not sure if they have said anything different about that recently because i haven't been paying a great deal of attention to that part of trying to hear it over the last six months or so. so my view is that they have a very capable force. in terms of size, it is not a huge fours. they are taking their missiles and making the mobile.
that combined with a very expensive underground system of shelters and things i think makes that a very difficult problem because i think that they have looked at it as survivable and they are able to survive. they have taken what they believe are steps that they need to take. they are about to go the ballistic submarines -- missile submarines. it will be interesting to see how they operate. were they always be at the way how do they intend to use the platform? that will open up a lot of questions. before i retire, we are trying to work through the pacific command and other engagements that were being held in the military realm to try to make sure that we understood that better. i would personally like to see more transparency with the
chinese because again, one thing that arms control did between the united states of the soviet union and russia was we have to get a pretty good feeling for how they operate, how they secured their weapons, whether safeguards were. all of those kinds of names of a military commander would've made me more comfortable if i knew those things about the chinese. i believe in the need to my colleagues be publicly recently, that is still their is still there requested they would like to know more about them so we could share information and not have a lot of friends urgency. i think that helped the stability in the long run. >> i have one question. so, the reason we were at odds with the soviet union --
competition with the soviet union certainly have an economic component but it also had a very strong geopolitical competition over the future of those in europe and east asia and also ideological competition . nuclear weapons were deeply enmeshed in the competition. i think it would be wrong to make a direct parallel to the u.s.-china relationship. as he pointed out there are certainly many areas of competition, but there's also many areas and independence. i think that writ large you can actually look at the u.s.-china nuclear relationship as a access to a certain extent. there is modernization going on. if you were to have predicted
china's capability is based on their economic and technological base and assume that they were rivals, one could imagine a counterfactual world where they have built far more than they have. they are certainly modernizing. but it's far less they are certainly capable of. my sense is absolutely one wants more interaction. in some ways you haven't seen the action reaction cycle in the u.s. and china that use of. to your question there's lots of people working on how low can you go? what deterrence of low numbers. so what is -- what is the minimal amount. there is a big debate about this. i would say how you answer the question depends on how you answer some of the questions that i laid out in my remarks. there are various views and some
people think we have reduced? significantly over the last 24 years and that we are getting to a point where going much slower might be problematic. there are others who can go much further. it is sad. that may push back on something that you said. let me push back on two said a little bit. when you said that the contest between the united dates in the union was about economics, if what you mean by that is the ideological struggle that was inherent in communism i will agree with you. if that is not what she meant, i don't agree with you. anyways that is the context. the second thing you said was nuclear weapons or expense it. actually through their history that is one of the reasons why early on in the cold war they were chosen as the outset for
conventional comparison. so as it turns out the problem here with the investment as we find ourselves having to address a lot of different things all at the same time. there is a byways. once you feel these questions they are not expensive to sustain and operate, which has been one of their virtues if they have virtues. they can describe it that way. the question about -- and i'm not then amazing that the way the extent is involved in modernization or extension in the case of the warheads. not modernization, but life extension. you know unfortunately the facts are that the systems are going to wear out and we are going to need to invest. then the question about how many do we need. there is clearly a rigorous debate about that. there are a lot of facts a lot
of facts that go into the answer the question, how many do we need? one of the factors is how many object to is that the want to achieve it deterrence fails? that is a force sizing question. that is a military question. if a deterrent fails i want you to do the following thing. here is how many weapons that date. that is one of the factors that goes into this and it was always a starting point for me. i never started with here is how many we think would be announced. i always started with you is how many it takes to achieve these objectives. like any other military planning problem, that becomes the military planning problem. but in this case you also factor in arms control. and so there is an arms control shall around this conversation as well. both the new s.t.a.r.t., which is the treaty in force right now and the question about what a
further negotiation might look like. so there are a lot of factors that go into this and other to how many do we need and it isn't just a question that some would like to pose about whether minimum deterrence -- anyone would be deterred by ex-number. maybe, maybe not. i think that gets back to a lot of factors and ultimately it was based primarily from the military sent based on the objectives the deterrence objectives that we are asking to achieve. ..
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resort -- federal reserve board chairman ben bernanke, go to www.c-span.org. we >> we turn once again to the iranian nuclear negotiations hours before the deadline that has then set by the party although coming out to cbs news the deadline could be extended. but for the next hour or so we will be discussing this issue and the phone lines are open. we are joined by a mark dubowitz foundation a defensive democracy and an author and former official of the state department department, hillary mann leverett. if the deal does come together why should the west
trust iran? >> guest: that is not have relations have been. i think ronald reagan famously said the trust but verify and this is the enormity of the opportunity. it is the opportunity for the united states to have exclusive monitoring with the mechanism that leads to with the negotiation with a vested interest and they think that is the only thing that can work. what we tried with iraq with israel now we have that disaster. and it went badly not just because of the invasion but we were forced to trust washington but if you don't
have verifiable mechanisms we have to trust those in washington. we don't have that. >> host: trust but verify. with that piece on the front page to say trust but verify with the history of noncooperation. >> i think obama and john kerry is set better motto from the republic of iran with a decade-long track record they have been hiding the program and a engaged in weapons asian activities to come clean with the international atomic energy agency and the allies still believe this is what they can trust they want to build a nuclear deal with the verification inspection
regime that diminishes the possibility of ram would have nuclear weapons. >> host: with hours to go if the deal does not come together the consequences? >> remember then a deadline of march 31st is set by the negotiators themselves they actually until the 30th so they still have a few more months is an 18 month process engaged with the obama administration but it has really been a 12 year process with iran. but we try to get them to make those compromises to ensure there will not build nuclear weapons that would be a disaster for the middle east. >> host: t want to talk about the consequences of failure from the iranian perspective hillary mann leverett? >> i think it would be catastrophic the policy from
afghanistan the viet iraq and the am and we are in a freefall deal the way we can recover the is with the islamic republic of iran. so as kissinger talks about china to get out of vietnam with the disastrous free-fall if not we will continue to see policies lie deeper and deeper with the commissioner on the world to suffer. it is as important as to normalize with china to minimize what was back-and-forth that he lost in a congress that would be a disaster i think they would metal through but it would be difficult.
>> host: so why america must accept as a republic. >> when going to beijing. with the strategic choice to cover america's position in asia. as a more stable political and economic environment. if we keep ourselves tied to all a savimbi's saudi basket we will continue to seek strategic disaster. queeney to do with iran and its own interests. you can see that in the opinion polls most americans want to deal with iran but they don't trust they will come through on the nuclear issue. the problem is they want a
different relationship but if he argues on a nuclear issue or the science because they will never be trustworthy. we will never liked them enough for never like the chinese enough. it isn't about making the systems of facing reality america's strategic freefall in the middle east. >> host: we're with hillary mann leverett and mark dubowitz working at the national security council third 2005 and as the foundation of the events of democracy explained that group. >> guest: we are a think tank focusing on national security issues and on the middle east public to respond to those points but the lesson of history sometimes there is no lesson and you can be diluted by
false historical analogies to talk about china and the rapprochement with kissinger but the fact is the supreme leader is not now. -- because mao saw the soviet union as the greatest threats and he did deal with the united states but the supreme leader sees them as our critic strategic threat but it has changed as he has said in a speech a couple years ago that reflects tactical flexibility to make technical changes and show flexibility on the nuclear side. i think the administration has been upset but in the interim the iranians have a engaged in the regional breakdown with assad who has killed 200,000 of his own people taking over yemen
yemen, with the shiite militia they control lebanon hillary is right. the policy is in a freefall i don't think the solution is to engage with the man who still believes we are the great satan and death to america is the slogan for the creed. >> host: we want to know what our viewers think. starting with rhode island good morning. >> caller: hello. thank you for taking my call 35 years in this country and
i see our country is declining. mr. mark by don't know of all these radicals it isn't the answer it is time for netanyahu to come back with the peace party. i saw all of these in the year so why aid to be attacked israel? are we supporting the sunii? and the arabs and the claims we are supporting catarrh and all the criminals. >> host: would you like to respond?
>> guest: absolutely not i supported the engagement since 2009 and strong support of these a negotiations to of the top u.s. posture with a verifiable deal to constrain the nuclear weapon breakout that is what most americans want according to the opinion polls they don't trust the iranian red machine -- regime. it is important when dealing with the country that brutalizes his own people and murders and tortures and so on women and it is an enemy of liberal democracy we have to engage them we have no choice to cannot pretend they will go away but we have to reach a nuclear compromise that constrains their programming. >> it is noble disingenuous
because the sanctions from more than a decade with the first years against iraq killing half a million children was a disastrous policy with those that were killed due to sanctions it took the all-out invasion by the united states for about it when they started to push sanctions in 2003 they had 164 centrifuge today as a result of his policy they have 20,000. so we know what sanctions give us. but yet of another war. >> what about the argument made that brought them to the table in the first place? >> that is the social fact not based on reality.
whoever would kong to the table the started back in 2003. they have refused to come to the table even until 2008. and only recently that sanctions not only hurting iran but the united states eroding american military power to see the dollar. >> host: to bring up the polling. near the with the two / one margin striking a deal that restricts the program but few americans are hopeful such the agreement would be effective but six other than said they are not confident
and we're talking about this year at the "washington journal". fine for republicans good morning. >> good morning. thank you and thank you for taking my call. mrs. hillary mann leverett i have read your material and gore were also mr. mark dubowitz. first of all, is very important to establish the fact mark dubowitz is with the israeli organization national foundation for democracy like another think tank is the israeli organization. >> host: let's let him respond.
>> guest: i don't work for the national foundation so we are an american think tank supported by americans we take no money from foreign governments and we're committed to defending the security but talk about hillary who is a courageous but lonely voice. with the position on sanctions contradict not only the obama administration and but the bipartisan congress with the entire community that believes they are brought along to the table but they fear coercive power of these sanctions will make you believe you can come to the table to these hardened and with the just mere engagement of decades of nuclear infrastructure with the program put together through billions of dollars of investment anybody who is
engaged in international diplomacy buying a used car or a house are negotiating with your kids knows there has to be a combination. >> the administration has said repeatedly it there is no deal if there will work with congress to push for new sanctions package they have to make a fundamental strategic choice to abandon the hatred of the united states of human rights abuse to come together in a rapprochement that hillary is looking for with common interest instead of common values but with added deal that constrains the nuclear weapons capacity the restore parchment to begin with. >> host: so your day to day is five hurdles lifting sanctions but from the
discussion how they should be lifted what would be the of recommendation for those last hours? >> to negotiate for the government including the current foreign minister. and with incredibly effective negotiations it helps not only to overthrow the taliban this set up of government in afghanistan. i know from experience so to bludgeon them switch brings us to the current round of sanctions. en then to bludgeon them
into a rapprochement with the united states. that will not work with iran. they have not changed their position and what is in it for them to have the lifting of sanctions with the new relationship with united states with constructive order in the least. >> through november 2013 with the interim agreement that corner bar again is there is a comprehensive listing of sanctions in exchange for constraints. they have done many of the things they have put on the table but we have the two experts underdoing that but it is sanctions in exchange for doing abc they want them released.
>> immediate sanctions relief? >> with their agreement to have the constraints on their program we need to agree to lift the sanctions that is the core bargain and if we don't we will accelerate our loss of leadership with the international economic order in. >> host: new haven in connecticut for the democrat line. >> caller: how is everybody at the table? i simply one to say this to mr. mark dubowitz hillary or anybody else does not tell me how to think. i of an independent thinker. with the face-to-face meeting that trump's
anything with the negotiations. but he says the car here. having a son or your brother or a father go to war to face the front lines that trumps everything but as far as nuclear-weapons i'm not sure how many have nuclear weapons including israel. the subject of israel why wouldn't anyone? everybody loves peace. that is the main force.
dimension is. to have fundamental problems because they refuse to ring knowledge in weaponization activity. was that proliferation on the northeast and then to have nuclear weapons with nuclear disaster were bought in this calculation with the nuclear fuel stockpiles should we cut a deal even if they refuse to give up the enriched uranium? >> it is sent of question
but what to do with the stockpile. there are three options on the table. one is that they could get rid of it. but that is the of preference then dealing with the issue of the stockpile into usable fuel to send some of that to russia but if they could discern those technologies and science from the russian counterparts to bring that back to use to have been more confident program inside iran. but the deal depends on sanctions. november 2013 then there is
a lifting of sanctions. then i see if you will see iran not deal with the scientific issues so each of these issues whether research and development whatever is is basically a two or three different ways and the areas have there's. if we don't come through on our end of the bargain that will be more to the preferences to address the issue. >> host: we have the line for texas for independence. :ted. >> caller: good morning. with those perspectives so
cannot afford to give than to the isolation mindset. >> host: talk about the history. >> but talk about right now with nuclear infrastructure with security council resolutions there are at least seven chapters that have been supported by russia and china and united states to stop enrichment him processing and come clean with the dimensions of its program stop building long-range capable warheads. and they have spoken as the international community has spoken and that is the current reality today. then to deal with occur reality there is no doubt