tv Key Capitol Hill Hearings CSPAN June 3, 2015 10:00pm-12:01am EDT
is a the legislature where the terrorist incident occurred and i will congratulate you on your firework with the reports that was linked with the ongoing investigation and to the on going recruitment for the internet i looked at those things and i understand the importance of information sharing. but we concluded with the boston marathon bombing with the local stadium and federal government to share that information and want to congratulate you to move that forward to improve that situation. it is very clear although not at this moment but in terms of actionable threats of the incidents that have
occurred every half to understand local state and federal government and international because it is just a matter of time before many materialize in a concrete fashion. given the fact it is for areas we understand the difficulties with our allies not moving forward with passenger knee records that we take for granted here. and porter security even on the exteriors european borders. that is not moving the way it should or as quickly as it should or the technical support that we offer tears some of these countries how
to do deal with it not being utilized for:i still think we can work together with the country's comment on how we are dealing with the information sharing local state federal and the individual countries because we found some are more receptive than others in terms of information in sharing not just their but here at home. with the idea that we're doing a good job to swat mosquitos. but we try as much as recant her coquettish comment on that counter message?
through the internet with those competing messages and what more could be done? >> i will jump in on the first piece with regard to my colleagues are better at pushing the information but we are consciously trying to push the knowledge gleaned down to the local so they're more fully informed and we have to keep pushing that on the international peace at times it becomes on a real play as say multilateral issue to establish close bilateral in for rick -- relationships. but the challenge is if you try to address these challenges in the efficient
way you need to air insurer a broader range behalf of the equipment so that is a longer term objective. in terms of the overall counter this is jane, our federal government has a interagency process that works at the speed of government and as you understand it has constraints and the real secret will be to broaden the messaging so they can participate in the process. >> first this committee has been very clear to me in my role as the undersecretary of intelligence analysis that the core customer for the intelligence me do is we have worked very hard to
transform how we approach the dissemination to state and local partners with the colleagues and the fbi and in ctc but specifically focusing to get relevant information out quickly to state and local partners for :i know how many bulletin's we have done but it is a record over last year. that is our commitment to receive information to get into the hands of first responders estate local federal trouble private sector. when real talk about our foreign partners you mention the e.u. that is reluctant to use across all the e.u. and rehab individual dialogues merit
certain in countries are moving forward but with their own country but tears talked-about the resolution in 1267 per grey think there's more pressure and rigo continue to press to get but to also emphasized all of these waiver countries have been dependent bilateral agreements on information in sharing with the intelligence service, fbi or law-enforcement their robust agreements we continue to press for the exchange of that information and. it is not perfect for the state and local partners and also the of foreign partners
to improve on a daily basis. >> thank you for being here of all the hearings we have had i think this is the most productive and informative i have sat in on. one of the things we're doing away offices this is a with local law enforcement within the district because what i see with though long wolf attacks:for those already in the u.s., with the recent attacks it is a reminder to all of us they are not against us as individuals or citizens but by those were threatened or diametrically opposed to what we are as a people and the freedom that we have freedom of thought, ideas come religion it in the case of garland texas was the freedom of speech.
that was really what was attacked. with that in mind, the america freedom of defense initiative and the contest seems to be that they incited the attacks nobody is cited those attacks but it would leave us to believe it is a potential target. how far in defense of the event did the counterterrorism no this event was happening? was their coordination? >> we knew about it several weeks in advance and more specifically as he has the last friday and every event like this redo go to those organizers and individuals to lay out the threat.
of course, we don't try to take them out but we knew several weeks in advance. >> you knew they were coming. hall about the local law-enforcement? >> it is multifaceted. 2.0 the joint intelligence bulletin that lays out the week ended vance and in this particular case we pushout the communication tool that collection emphasis message that asks agencies to collect intelligence on the threats and the event to put out tactical reports. with the size of the event of preparatory meetings to identify who has crowd control, emergency restored -- responses a wrought-iron their approach.
>> the question is do we have 15 years to track terrorists and their activities or their threats to the chatter? we got to where we can filter through what is chatter or valid threat. of responses to that threats ? do they take them seriously? >> yes. we spend a lot of time pushing that message at the local level have the field offices as well as the executive level. two weeks ago we had of video teleconference led by the director of komen security to lay out the threat. redo that periodically so there is multiple levels of the engagement. >> i would add we have
created a network across this country there is the impact on my community with the intelligence network with the fbi. though local law-enforcement partners understand the primary responsibility to protect their communicant -- trendies then the risks and they're hungry for information that is what we try to design is what information we can get out to them to take appropriate action. >> if more of these questions are in a classified nature we can respond to those later but of the communications that we know that happened
between the attackers and bad players how much of that torino before verses forensic information and how much plays into the warning that recent to the locals price limit or three happy to answer that but not in this setting. >> and the reverse flow to rehab their channels of communications for intelligence gathering from local law-enforcement? because this was the national event for you could have a local event that could be a high threat target. >> is a great question and under the direction from this committee, and reworked to expand local intelligence gathered and reported relevant to the icy but the
fbi that is working independently with the center is in the field but we created up process called field activity reporting where they will do reports from the state level perspective so we have created that opportunity but to share the information on a continuous basis. >> i will highlight that. the reason we push that out is to make use of the 400,000 state local tribal offices. there the first response going to the first responders will be for any of us see it. it allows for reporting of
information quickly into the fusion centers to act on that. that is the foundation of the process. >> they give for your testimony today as your task force and we have had conversations and classifying settings. with the recruitment of women and girls from our country that their active the recruiting and i can imagine the draw but here we have american girls with of
life of rape and slavery. with a 200 americans and flowing to the region thought. what about those efforts and with the targeting of women and girls. >> but fivers six years ago those is almost nil. it is a good ballpark but the fact it went from zero to where it is no is a significant uptick. so the reasons why individuals are recruited the specific a young adult males and females what draws them? that is a process to understand the motivation of radicalization and we see a wide variety. to motivate the young women
to take a chance to go overseas. >> to engage the community you will be in slavery and repeatedly raped and to counter that with the graphic reality of what they are recruited for testimony of individuals that have experienced this you counter message with a stronger message. we are doing that at the local level as well? >> yes. through the fusion center we are reaching out to the communities because of the dangers to be on line because of pedophile's or cybercriminals or fear of recruitment. >> with the use of social media for fund-raising could
you comment? anything to raise funds and crowds nursing and law in dash crowd sourcing are you working with the department of treasury offices whole successful have they ben? is an arduous process to rebuild our understanding that is inflated caribbean would also played down - - point out in the expansion of the caliphate they're taking possession of a number of resources to exploit that so they can draw on those resources for financing and funding but nevertheless because of the
fact they are the extended organization they have to manage that infrastructure that intelligence effort that is under way. >> it is minuscule i know black market and the region but those that we're focusing on but specifically on line fund-raising. >> i don't think we see the same degree of on line fund-raising that we have seen in the past. >> by word to concur. >> isis tries to motivate people but obviously i was is the military those are the most secure areas with softer targets they could go after but if you -- save recruit to someone who has a base we could have a major impact from the and are you
working with the department to counter that? billerica's gentleman mentioned said department of defense takes this very seriously and how it might manifest themselves in the country. it is a secure place but to identify people by addresses to work with the military on strategies for individuals to protect themselves at this point but to try to derive a military engagement is to you draw that croatian
speeeight. >> good afternoon. i want to give you an update on the dot - - year deal laboratory review a very low concentrations sample of live anthrax to the three foreign countries i will open up for couple of questions then turned over to the experts who can ask day follow-up question. for the past 10 years the department has shipped and activated or killed biological material to other private partners with the biological countermeasures so to have a field detector kit to telesis and faxes in the area will we do is work with labs and partners so they can develop what would
help the men and women to encounter this. may 22nd the department of defense was notified and we have a number of the cdc here. but they told us a private lab was working with the department of defense detected the growth of life anthrax from the sample supposedly inactivated that they felt was the safe shipment but it turns out not to be the case. that immediately started the wheels turning and as of right now there are 51 laboratories in 17 states
one with the district of columbia. that we believe had received a suspect samples i will tell you we will say more about this today we expect the number may rise because of the scope of the investigation and we will update the numbers daily until the investigation is complete for i will emphasize to everyone watching there is no suspected or confirmed cases of anthrax detection among any workers or labs over the last 10 years as we continue to work with the cdc to make sure all possible safeguards start taken to prevent exposure and any worker that had the risk of exposure are
closely monitored. there is a risk to the general public the concentration is too low to affect the average public individual but as a cautionary measure it did but advises any laboratory there received any shipment of inactivated anthrax should stop working on that a lot until further instructions are received from the cdc also the laboratories to maintain the repository for these anthrax samples to test every previously activated anthrax sample that we have to ensure that it has in fact, that is why the numbers may rise we have a number of
lots we need to inspect and verify and it takes time to grow and do the test. saboorian in the midst of some of these. furthermore after consulting with secretary carter i ordered a review of all duty laboratory procedures process them protocols to kill the live anthrax but it is the same as iran eating cancer cells that we will kill goliath spores. those who have more to share with you in just a moment is leading the department's review on my behalf and will report the results no later than 30 days from now. we will look at five things
in this review. number one. what is the cause for the incomplete and activation of the anthrax samples? why didn't we kill the spores when we put them through a protocol that would? second after you kill the live scores reduce stability testing to verify that we killed all of this force those did not detect the presence of live anthrax and we need to know why. with all existing biohazard cd protocols and procedures we will ensure and inspect them every dod laboratory with the protocols to identify any systemic problems to take whatever
steps necessary to fix them. this review is separate from the on going on-site investigation and is expected to last several weeks after the cdc investigation is complete the department will conduct its own investigation within elapse to ensure a proper accountability secretary carter and myself me, everyone in the department of defense takes this issue very seriously it is a matter of public health with all of the members of our department. reacting with urgency to be directed that we will do it and tell everyone is complete we are going after
is there any evidence thus far of any deliberate human action and any sabotage or action mike that? >> let me take a second one first if i can. there is absolutely no indication that this was, this happened as a result of somebody deliberately doing this at this point. again we will continue the investigation but as of this point there is absolutely nothing to indicate that this would be somebody who is trying to do this deliberately. this has been going on for 10 years. we have followed these protocols for 10 years and this is the first time this has been brought to our attention so we obviously need to get after it. the first part of the question? >> the public health. >> the public health.
we don't like to assign percentages to this. we just know that the concentrations are in liquid form, not in dry form. the dry form is more -- so you can be infected more easily with the dry form but these are liquid samples and i'm going to let the experts talk to you but normally all we say is the best we know is these concentrations are so low that they would be below the level that normally we would expect to cause any infection in a healthy individual but we don't like to assign any percentages or anything like that. maybe the cdc will want -- so you can follow-up with the cdc when they get to that point. >> if the department is so concerned about public health or communicating concerns about this effort why did it take the pentagon more than a week to come out publicly and talk about
this matter for the first time given the level of concern? why so many days before you talk about it? my second question is more than a week later several days, more than a week later how concerned are you that you still don't know the full scope of the problem, and is still correct that you only have one life confirmed sample from the lab in maryland that reported it to you you? i become up with any other because the cdc counts that there are more than 30 people on protected medical care. >> i think it actually happened very quickly. first of all it was reported from the cdc and the first thing that happened was an initial investigation. what is this? where did this come from? what laboratory did originate from, where did it go and as soon as that happened it was
briefed to me but i knew on the second day i believe i was told that we had an investigation ongoing and after we met last wednesday i ordered a review after talking it over with secretary carter. >> why didn't you come out publicly and tell the mayor can people about it? it was more than a week. why did you wait so long to come out and talk to the american people about this? >> you mean today? i ordered the review on friday and we had a debate on whether or not we should go out on friday and at that time the numbers were bouncing all over the place. i made the decision to say let me get a little bit more understanding of what the issue is. we have already notified everybody in the labs. we put out a blanket call and said everyone who has these stop working on them. find out where you sent them to. we believe we have it very well contained within the dod
laboratory and so i made the decision to take a couple days and the numbers have gone up. until we have a number of he won labs. >> the numbers keep going up so how concerned are you that you cannot nobody can give you a fixed on the scope of this problem. it is still one life sample? >> right now there are two different samples that are involved, for batches, to two different samples and what we are doing as i ordered a test on every single spore producing anthrax sample that we have in all four laboratories. these are possibly hundreds of different lots so that's why i do believe the numbers may go up up. i don't know how many but again they are very concentrated in dod laboratory areas or areas that work in a biohazard facility so the risk to the
public i believe is extremely low. if i had thought that there was a chance that there would have been a proper problem with the public eye that would have immediately come out but working with cdc essentially because it was in dod laboratories or laboratories that work with us on a constant basis and because they have forwarded to laboratories that work and biohazard areas we thought it was very well contained and we had no reason to believe that there was any help to the broader public so when i save public safety i'm focused on the public safety of all the people to work with us on these boards. i have no reason to believe that there is any danger of this causing any type of outbreak outside laboratories. and i don't believe that we will have anybody infected. we will be waiting to find out. i'm going to turn it over to the folks who really understand the
science of this issue. i'm here to indicate secretary carter and i are being personally informed on the investigation. we'll continue to do so. let me just say again barbara i want to reemphasize this. as far as we are concerned as of this point we see absolutely no danger to the broader american public but for the people who work on the samples obviously we want to make sure that there is no problem with the people who are working on the samples in the labs and the labs that work with them. [inaudible] >> i can get that answer for you and i will have courtney get it to you. i just don't have the number right now. but we work with a large number of laboratories. again all these laboratories are labs where people really understand how to work with these dangerous subjects,
dangerous substances and the cdc works with them to establish protocols etc.. >> isn't all 50 states? >> virtually, not every single one. >> again we will verify that for you. >> we started with nine states. now we are up to 17 states the district of columbia in three countries. why does it take so long to figure out where it tightly controlled substance like anthrax was actually shipped? >> i want from us to explain once you activate them it will explain how they are shipped and where they go to, where they can send them on in right now what is causing the problem if it takes days and in some cases to determine if any lots that we are testing testing have any live
anthrax in them so that's what i believe the numbers may go up but i just don't know at this time how many that might be. i would like to thank you all again for being here this afternoon. >> was potentially live anthrax brought into the pentagon building and if so where exactly was it taken and if so why would he be brought anywhere near the pentagon? >> it was given to the pentagon force protection agency. they obviously do the protection of the pentagon reservation. they would be the ones who would be testing testing. the testing did not occur inside the pentagon and i will allow franca to give you a follow-up. thank you very much. >> on the locations can you make that public and how many in this population you are concerned
about are undergoing protected medical treatment? >> right now my understanding is we can give you all of the individual states, the individual locations. i will defer to our experts here. i really have to go and again most of these questions are going to be better answered by the people who are dealing with this and understand the mechanisms in the investigation. they have been working essentially round-the-clock since last week. [inaudible] >> the three countries. some of the people who are on the airbase are under precautionary measures but right now we know three countries. thank you very much. >> before we get into more questions are subject matter
experts here will frame this and we will get into more extensive questions if you have them. >> thanks mike. as the deputy secretary stated he has asked me to conduct a conference of review of dod laboratory procedures and protocols associated with the anthrax samples used. summoning a team to examine the activation process. the report of findings and recommendations in june. the final report depends upon the completion of the cdc's investigation. they will focus on the things that the deputy secretary mentioned, the root cause for the inactivation update anthrax samples weiss garrell of the testing did not detect the presence of live anthrax existing dod biohazard safety protocols and procedures dod laboratory procedures and
protocols and application of systemic problems and steps that should be taken to fix their problems. i've been in close consultation with the director of the center for disease control under tom frieden regarding their investigation. the cdc is leading the investigation in what we believe are the two technical questions surrounding our review. why was there in complete inactivation of this anthrax sample and white testing mechanisms to ensure the inactivation of the anthrax fail. the director of the office of public health and service and response is -- for the cdc. let me talk about the context here and amplify what the deputy secretary said and i will ask commander johns who is at ph.d. microbiology medical director of chemical and biological test programs to give you more background. first a little bit of content. the small anthrax samples
shipping are -- as part of the processes by the department's chemical and biological defense program to develop capabilities to detect and protect the public and men and women from chemical biological threats. across the country there are hundreds of labs that work with anthrax. as part of this mission dod sent an activated or dead samples to laboratories as well as industry academia and federal laboratories to develop countermeasures. the inactivation process requires the samples to be irradiated and then check to make sure. the cdc investigation is examining why those two steps failed. as part of dod's review of these processes we are testing over 400 labs to determine how many lots were affected. so far at least four batches were found to have live spores
present. because it takes 10 days as was said earlier to be certain there are no live spores present we can't eliminate the other batches yet. we have to wait to make sure there are not additional live spores. the expectation is that there probably will be of more live spores. the departments for many years with -- work with over 100 labs in the country and internationally. as we identify lots that were not fully inactivated their received samples from those lots. this process takes time so the numbers are likely to change and grow as we know more. again we are still in discovery phase of this activity. the numbers of recipients will likely change until we understand the entire scope of the problem. i want to conclude by repeating our top priority is the safety of all workers and the public good they are committed to total transparency over the course of our review. commander johns will provide more background for how these were shipped. i want to make one more comment
before he does that. basically a number of tight player player controls on these lab samples and to the labors -- have failed. the way they are shipped in liquid form instead of aerosol form the low concentration mitigated against this so there are number of other layers. that's the reason we are not worried about public health policy. >> good afternoon. i'm commander franca jones and i'm the director of medical programs for the department of chemical and biological defense program. a program develops medical and physical countermeasures to protect the warfighter in the nation from chemical and biological threats as part of an integrated layer of defense. specifically we develop vaccines drugs diagnostics for medical use and personal protective
equipment such as masks its gloves and decontamination equipment and detectors. we also served as mr. candles -- for the department. in order for the dod and other parts of the federal government to achieve its goals to protect civilians from biological threats it's critical we work with the commercial and academic sector to get the best technology for national security. the dod was instrumental in the u.s. government ebola response effort making diagnostic test that we developed and made available throughout the nation's hospitals and in west africa. many of our vaccines and drugs for ebola were transitioned in the clinical trials in west africa. further the dod developed the anthrax vaccine which is currently part of the strategic national stockpile and available to civilians and military in the case of an anthrax bioterrorism attack. in order to achieve these goals
the dod and other government agencies regularly ship live than dead biological materials for countermeasure development by academia and other federal laboratories. we have been shipping deactivated anthrax as part of our program for 10 years. what i would like to do is walk you through the process of inactivation of anthrax and the testing that is completed to determine if the agent is killed or they believe we have a slide that may be projected. first we start with bacterial samples in a petri dish like you might find in the hospital and i want to make the point that as was mentioned earlier there are over 300 laboratories in the united states that are authorized to use the organism anthrax in research and development processes. the dod only has nine of those laboratories. those organisms are irradiated as you have heard with a gamma
irradiated or in each organism special. each organism needs to have a certain dose of irradiation as well as they need to be irradiated for a certain amount of time depending on the properties. so after those organisms are irradiated they are cultured once again to make sure that the process was successful. those organisms are grown for at least 10 days in an incubator and are secured just to make sure that nothing grows after that period of time. if nothing grows we actually issue a death certificate that says this organism is now dead. it survived the parameters in which the inactivation was performed and it's signed by multiple individuals that the process was successful.
then and only then would a sample be put into a shipping container and sent anywhere to any labs throughout the country. so now that you have seen the box on the television what i would like to do is give you a demonstration of the packaging and shipping process. the reason why i would like to do this is i think there has been a lot of confusion in the media and in the public with regards to how we ship in activated materials throughout the transportation process. let's start with a one millimeter file. this was one millimeter for liquid. that's about one fifth of the teaspoon. i'd like to show you that this vital has a rubber seal on it to ensure that nothing can leak out out. just to make sure we put it in a ziploc bag and close it up as
another layer of protection from anything that weeks. as another layer of protection we provide absorbent material that would be sufficient to capture the amount of liquid if it were all to leak out of the vial. we wrap it up and we put it into another container. again as you see another seal to make sure nothing can leak. this container is a polycarbonate container. it's not going to break. and then we have dry eyes. we put it in another box. so i think you are getting the point that one milliliter of lakewood is going to have a hard time getting out of this
container. we must ship it on dry eyes because the material is frozen and we want to make sure it's intact when it gets to its location so our developers and technologies can have intact material. we close it up in the dry eyes and we close it up in the box. so that is what we do for life agents and dead agents. there's nothing different there. the one difference is in the labeling. whether it's live or dead we have to label according to the hazardous material because we have dry eyes in this box. if it's inactivated we will not have the label that says infectious substance. so the only difference is in the infectious substance labels only talk about the rest of the public and what's happening with this box and workers that might have handled this box in the transportation chain we believe that the risk is the row for the
general public as well as for the people who handled this box. one milliliter of lakewood is not going to come out of this box. where we believe the risk to the potential but extremely low is at the initiation of the packaging or at the individual who has received it and i know you are concerned on the laboratory workers who may have handled this material and we can talk about that in a little bit. so finally we understand that there is public concern around the incident. i want to assure you that samples in question were tested using a food protocol by the method that i just described. no live anthrax should have been in those boxes at all but as mr. work and mr. kendall have already described we are investigating to understand how
that could happen so i look forward to answering your questions. >> starting right here. >> were all of the samples the live samples sent and also is there a two-person rule as far as working in lab said doug weight and are there video monitors inside the labs collects. >> there are for labs involved. the only one we have identified our dod labs. the only one we have identified in the samples that contained live for active spores the other labs are for dietrich and the navy medical center so we are checking everything. we are checking all of our labs to make sure we don't have a problem anywhere but so for the only confirmed is -- >> all of the labs in the united states have to adhere to the
handling of this kind of material. all of the labs that are part of that program must have a personnel and a physical security plan based on a site-specific risk assessments of each and every site must develop those protocols read create some of those protocols may include video thalmann -- video monitoring. some of those may include -- i cannot comment on the specific parts. >> one of the specific things and we will at is the protocol in various places and why they are different. that is definitely going to be a subject of my review. >> as you describe this the first alarm bell on this came when the laboratory maryland produced live spores from the sample they received and you described how these examples are used in developing biodetection. what was the lab doing in maryland that prompted it to culture the sample to produce
the live spores? >> what happened in that case was these were supposed to be dead spores so they were used as dead spores to verify -- capabilities. in that case they culture supposedly dead spores. why they did that at this point i don't know. >> one of the things i'm trying to understand is we talked about the reasons this poses a small risk because the liquid form and the low concentration but help me understand it you haven't taken this process and laboratory where you cultured it to produce a live spores there also a minimum risk in this form where it is supposedly dead but
apparently not totally dead? i guess what i'm saying is unless you culture it is there really a risk to this material that is not fully inactivated? >> because of a low concentration that's generally not a sample that is large enough to place people at risk. for a person who has a healthy immune system it takes a certain level of spores for them to contract anthrax. that is 11 of things that mitigate against it. when the things we are trying to find out is what the history of this is in terms of whether we have an isolated instance here. we know it's not just one batch. whether it's other places and how long this has been going on and that is what the cdc is investigating as well. we have a lot to learn about the root causes of this particular
incident. >> the danger comes after it's been culture so for instance he received a sample presumably use it to calibrate equipment. they wouldn't have put it in a petri dish and grown it for 10 days. i'm just trying to understand if that's where the danger comes from. >> i understand your question but the material inside the vial is still alive so whether you are culturing it or not it's still alive. culturing however gives the ability to grow more so certainly your risk increases if you grow more of the material that is just in the vial. importantly to get your question we have already reported here today that we have found material dating 10 years back. people have been working with this material for 10 years and nobody has contracted anthrax from the material which gives us
more confidence that the risk is really low. >> if i could just add to that. we have to be careful as we speak about this and we are trying to do that to not maximize or minimize the degree of concern here. we think there is a minimal degree are virtually no rest for public health. there is some degree of concern for lab workers and that is why there is 31 deployment will select six program because of possible exposure. it's a serious matter but it's not a matter for widespread alarm. >> going back to 2005. >> we have lots from 2005 and i'll have to get the actual number but i believe the first shipment may have been done in 2006. >> how many overseas military bases in the u.s. defense facilities receive anthrax is a part of these bio detection programs?
>> a ballpark estimate? >> i believe it is more than one. right here in the front. >> the forecasters that tested positive over 10 years how many total batches were produced during that time? >> the total number of testing testing -- to. >> at all for laboratories we are testing at least 400 probably over 400. >> what i'm trying to figure out is how many of the four batches how many total batches in the same period of time at dugway? >> as i stated earlier it takes at least 10 days to determine that something is negative so we can now only tell you what so far is from positive but can't tell you the percentage of all of them because until we can determine how many are negative
we cannot give you the denominator. >> only a few have been to the protocol testing so it's early to talk about numbers that have active spores. we can probably get you the number on whether those batches came from dugway but i don't have the number right now. >> one more question. he said the 51 labs those all ones from this four batches because you use the word suspect samples. >> those are the numbers from those four batches. >> i was looking for international debate. it's australia canada north korea, right? is there any indication of believe that those suspected samples may be in other countries or have been sent to other military bases? >> we do not have the answer on that. individuals in the labs were
doing inventory to track down where they were sent but we don't have information on that now. >> the batches that were sent outside? >> we don't have information on where things were shipped because we are we are still trying to identify all of the samples. we are testing all the batches. >> can you give more specifics on the irradiation process. the aliquots 88 what percentage are you taking? his aliquots the sample you determine whether it's been eradicated or not? >> we have protocols as part of the undersecretaries review now. i knew standing if we take 5% of the solution and based on scientific literature. i can answer for you right now. >> most put between 10 and 20%. you know who put it at 5% is an
adequate number and why some of them came out eradicated? >> i can't answer specifically your question. >> that is an area that the cdc is looking at. >> information you are reporting on israel. >> one of the things that secretary work talked about was the need for transparency and you are not saying -- [inaudible] is there cause for concern for people and some of these labs that don't know if they are infected or not? >> i don't have a good answer to your question. i don't know how we couldn't publicize that. we don't want to spread alarm because we don't think there's a general cause for concern. we will look into that.
>> we can tell you that all of the labs that we know that have received the samples have been notified directly by the cdc and by the department of defense so leadership should be sharing that information. >> but that there is a public health risk we would certainly be sharing that information. [inaudible] >> you had mentioned that there were 400 batches with live samples. how many have gone through the testing? >> those four have gone through the full 10 days of testing. we do not have any -- we have not done any others at this time. four have gone through the testing. there are others that have not
completed the full testing testing so i don't have the number for you today. there have been negative's but they are maybe at day four or day six or day eight so the way that this works and this is for clarity, if you have a positive sample you will know when 24 to 48 hours if it's positive. in order to really say that it's negative we want to wait for 10 days to make sure that anything that was irradiated isn't able to somehow regenerate itself and ultimately result in growth at the 10 day mark. >> just to clarify 400 are currently being tested at this time. 400 are being tested in four have come back positive. the others have not given a positive yet because you have to complete the full 10 days to know for sure. also a follow-up there was mention that to samples, we know
one in maryland and what is the other live sample that is come back? >> let me clarify that. the one sample from maryland was the initiating sample. the cdc requested the labs that received the samples sent it to the cdc so each one who received an aliquots send it back to the cdc and the cdc to the testing. nine of the nine of the original samples tested positive so from nine of the labs in that initial investigation have come back from the source material at dugway. the laboratory that reported a positive on may 22 and 9 additional laboratories that received the same sample. we sent this to the cdc and those that tested positive. >> would have secretary work mean when he sent -- said four
batches, for simple -- samples. what was he referring to? >> i'm not sure what the two samples were. there were four life the tested positive and there was one sample the initiating sample on may 22 and the cdc is collecting i believe it's altogether 19 samples from the labs that received that initial material. nine thus far of those that tested positive. the other 10 will be tested in the next couple of days. remember initial reporting we reported i've don't remember, 19 or 24 but brief reported an initial tranche of laboratory so there are 19 that are sending samples to the cdc. nina been received by the cdc nine have been tested and are positive. the other 10 from that initial
19 are going to be received. they have not yet been received. they will be received at the cdc and they will do the testing and determine whether those tenor positives altogether 19. >> just to get the number right does that mine include maryland or not? >> i would have to check because there are several samples coming from different places. let us check. >> more labs -- did you say 19 labs? >> you have to accept that these numbers are in flux and changing constantly as we get more results. i would have says about the numbers at this point because they are going to change in one of the reasons the web site posts updates is because of that fact. we will have the numbers as they
come and on that web site that they are going to change every day. >> are the nine lots from different states that tested positive? >> we had this may 22 event and that caused us to look to see what additional labs may have received the sample so the original sample and the information that came out of maryland and then there were additional states that were identified that have received that material and we went and found those and we found more so we did a complete trace forward of the labs that received that original sample and i believe when we came out with our initial report that was the first and i am calling them charge of samples to include the number of labs. we been initiated culturing of other lots so you also have to understand that this -- so they
started culturing other lots from dugway and that is how the numbers have continued to change over time. we are going to be culturing more lots from dugway and more lots from other laboratories and these will continue to change. again why mr. kendall said what reported today with a number of labs the number of states, the number personnel by prophylaxis is the active number for today and we can move forward daily with updates for you. >> for the last 10 years there have been samples sample sent out. are we talking thousands of samples across the u.s. are we talking hundreds? what is the scope you are looking at? >> we reported today that we are culturing at least 400 and that is the bottom lot.
>> you are sending samples out to labs. how many boxes of files are over 10 years? >> i can't give you the numbers today. that's part of the investigation looking into how many lots there are how many samples were shipping to do. let me make one more point if i can. there are a limited number of laboratories in the world that do this kind of work and some of what we are finding is that while we may have made multiple shipments of different strains we are finding many times these are going to the same labs because they have a once developing these technologies. so i don't believe we will find labs that will have received this material. we went from 24 to 51 because we found one lot but many of those were repeats so i think we want
to make the point that we will find more labs. we will find more lots but we have an understanding of the community of interest here and i think we will have a boundary on that. >> two more questions. are they all from the a.g. one batch? >> no come again when we talk about tranches the original tranche was from a.g. one and one we worked on culturing more material we found new batches of new strains so we have a canadian strain in our repository. we have a jamaican strain in our repository. we have the aim stream in the repositories that a.g. one was the bacillus and traces strain. as we cultured these other lots
we will have multiple different strains in repository and we will know who that strain was sent to as is part of our trace forward protocol. [inaudible] >> that's a very good question. there is no difference in the tests. >> that is one of the questions we have. >> question number one is he said the protocol change 10 years ago. you don't know do you know any details about how the protocols to irradiate these changed at all and what might have worked in the past that doesn't work now? >> the cdc may want to comment on this. the protocols are not always the same in every lab. there is no one defining national protocol.
there's general guidance from cdc about how to do this. what are the things we have to look into is what protocol was followed in this case and how might that differ from other cases. >> military-to-military? >> i would just agree with what you are saying that the tests and the methods that are used to and activate these estimates there are several different methods. laboratories can pick the method that they wish to use. they develop that based on the scientific literature and then there was a check. what we know now is the irradiation method and the method to check that the irradiation had been effective failed. in terms of the long-term questions those are the things that are being investigated. >> are civilian labs able to
furley distribute these samples and the subcontractor that worked -- and two is the cdc any closer to making a decision on the list of labs? >> the information we have is from dod so in other words the question is these laboratories they receive specimens received them from dod. because they are presumed to be dead inactivated they are not regulated so they are able to be sent for data. as part of the trace forward that the commander described. >> do you have any idea the failure rate we are dealing with here? on the one hand you had for positive out of 400 matches 1% on the other hand you had one batch that was 100% testing positive. they know failure rates at 100% 100% -- do you have any idea
where we are on that scale? >> that is one of the things we are trying to determine. is it isolated to dugway and irradiation and air quality control or is there wider spread than that? those are one of the things we are checking on. c you have a sense of it even at this point? >> i don't think we do at this point. >> that is the work that commander jones described to do cultures of all these lots to be able to answer that question. >> we are waiting for those cultures to go to the full protocol. not that the commander described. i don't think the timeframe to have other data is based to a week perhaps. >> i think it's going to depend on the number of lots and how long it takes to cultured these 400 lots. >> in a ship active samples?
>> i don't have that information. >> what% are you using now backs are you still using 5%? >> i can't comment. i'll have to get back to you. >> we have basically stopped the investigation. >> to determine if they are positive or not what percentage are you using? >> are we talking civilian lab workers, are they active duty lab workers, are they in united states? i what's going on with those and it is such a small risk why are they on prophylaxis? >> it's a mix of dod employees and civilians. i don't know if their active-duty or dod employees. do you want to say more?
>> and i have my question answered first. >> there are 22 people at the airbase better on postexposure prophylaxis. i don't have the exact number but some of them are dod civilians and some of them are dod contractors. what was one individual in maryland at a dod lab who requested the exposure prophylaxis and we have abided that. then there are our seven others in the united states in the civilian lab. four of those were recommended by the cdc and their state public health officers to be on postexposure prophylaxis in one of the states determined that
some others within their state and their laboratories should go on postexposure crow for lactic. >> we will take one more question. [inaudible] >> before positive batches originate at dugway and are at the 51 laboratories that we have briefed earlier. >> that's going to be it. thank you very much everybody. >> we have already been here for an hour.
>> is one of the most important american writers of 20th century. she was given almost every literary award possible in her lifetime before she died except for the nobel prize. she was known for some of her masterpieces like the professor's house the lost lady and many others. in 1943 she had made a will which had a few restrictions one up which was she did not want her letters to be published were to be quoted in whole or in part part. she left behind at least 3000 letters that we know about now. the biggest collections are here in nebraska. in her will she left one other important thing. she said she left it to the soul
and uncontrolled discretion of her executors and trustees to decide whether or not to enforce her preference and they believe as educational organizations belongs to our shared heritage and we ought to know more about her. >> solomon butcher was a pioneering photographer out in cost per county in nebraska. he took photos from 1887, 1886 until the early 1890s of homesteaders and was able to tell the story of the important development in american history. i'm going to show you one of my favorite images of the collection. it's actually a photograph of the -- it's four sisters who each took a homestead claim in
custer county. the shows women homesteaders. it was the first time that women could own land on their own. it didn't belong to their husbands. it didn't belong to their fathers. single woman could own their own land and that was a really big deal with the homestead act. each of the sisters took a homestead. her father's ranch. they each build a small house on the homestead which is part of the homestead act and they would take turns staying at each other's house and working on each other's farms. the sisters really pulled together and made it in nebraska.
in april the p5+1 nations announced a framework deal with iran regarding the country's nuclear program. next, the senate or in relations committee examines the potential iranian nuclear agreement and implications for the u.s. middle east policy. the committee heard from james jeffrey, former u.s. ambassador to iraq and turkey and martin indyke former u.s. ambassador to israel. this is two hours and 10 minutes. [inaudible conversations] >> the meeting will come to order pay what you thank ambassador jeffrey and indyke for being here. ambassador indyke has a stop at 11:00 and we will turn on at that. his hearing is part of a series of defense that we are holding to prepare members of the committee to evaluating a possible or nuclear agreement with iran. we are not here today to focus
on the specific parameters. for edification last night we met in a setting with three of our leaders from around the country and the secretary of energy. it was a very technically focused breathing and as a matter of fact we had tremendous attendants and people were the most interested in the technical details. we will have similar hearings of people are prepared if an agreement is reached to really be able to assess that and not be starting from a cold start if you will. we appreciate you being here to help us understand some of the regional implications of the deal. this is intended to highlight some of the concerns of the administration is so concerned about reaching an agreement with iran. some of the regional alliances that we have are not being really looked at. some of our u.s. interests so
against the backdrop of unprecedented turmoil and the middle east the administration is negotiating a nuclear agreement with the archrival of many of our closest allies. instead of reassuring our traditional allies that the united states will remain a friend some would say the is implemented a string of incoherent and self-defeating policies and i know you all will discuss this back and forth. the support for israel at the u.n. while accommodating a nation that is dedicated to the distraction of israel. they have reviewed me -- for striking within isis in syria. they withheld military equipment from egypt by rain and qatar while asking them to join in the fight against isis. they have criticized saudi arabia while providing the saudis military assistance for
the same operations. so there's a lot of cross currency that is difficult for some of us to string together. and iraq, iraqi leaders are increasingly turning to iranian backed militias in the fight against isis and perhaps most tragically in syria the theory and contingent die at the hands of siraj -- assad. to be used against isis itself and i think you may have seen a communiqué that came from one of the leaders of the syrian opposition where they were asked to sign a statement. they are being trained and equipped by the united states but they can only use that potential against isis and not against the side. i know this and other communications saying they were going to stop the training and not participate. understand sometimes that's a negotiating point is somewhat alarming. as iran's deepens its influence
in capital from baghdad to damascus to beirut the perspective of many in the region is that the united states iran's air force in iraq. iraq recently did feel like supporting the personnel we have there it felt like what we were doing is helping create a better country for iran and iraq. even though again i support what is happening there. it's still very much that way with infiltration in the parliament and their tremendous efforts on the ground. as we begin to look at how to evaluating prospective nuclear agreement we cannot ignore the lack of coherent american leadership the region has left a vacuum that will continue to -- violence. without the engagement and to counter aggression to support
our partners the need for american involvement will continue to grow as conditions deteriorate. in your testimony hope you will touch on what i see is some of the puzzling claims from the best ration about what an agreement with iran would mean for the region. one of those claims is the apparent view of the administration that iran will become a stabilizing force in the region. president obama said in an interview that opening up iran's economy through sanctions relief in many ways makes it harder for them to engage in the behaviors are contrary to international norms. i know again that many of our allies in accessing $150 billion having a growing economy will have just the opposite effect and cause them to be more strident in the region. do you accept the view that the world state-sponsored terrorism in a nation that is directly could have been to the death of thousands of americans would somehow reform their behavior and for being empowered for
pursuing an illegal nuclear program. finally hope you will touch him at the administration describes as a choice between war and a deal. i think that's a false voice and again i look forward to your testimony today. i want to turn it over to our distinguished ranking member. i appreciate his cooperation and every effort and i look forward to your comments. c mr. chairman first of all thank you very much for convening this hearing. this is an important month and i think we have already started with the breathing last night in today's hearing in the right way to keep not only our committee but the united states congress very much informed and involved in what's happening in the middle east. as i explained to you last night after i left the committee briefing i went to the french embassy. mr. indyke was there along with 50 other people who are very
much engaged in middle east policy. the theme of the evening was a discussion about the middle east and there were many people who expressed grave concerns about what's happening for good reason. just about every country in the middle east is at war and there's a lack lack of stability in the region that affects u.s. interests. ..
at this particular month is whether we can have a diplomatic solution to prevent iran from becoming a nuclear weapon state. i just want to underscore your leadership with the nuclear review act signed by the president enacted into law. as achieving that accomplishment is a critical role. but to underscore to show unity here in our government that we are focused on a iran and not the flights of congress and for us to review a potential agreement reached from the david cohen plus one in that is what we should have done and i applaud your leadership and the work of the foreign relations committees so what
do we do this month? as the chairman pointed out we have a whole discussion in regards to the technical aspects of what the agreement needs to include and today we have two experts who can help us understand the consequences of the agreement with the rand as to the u.s. involvement in the middle east. and what will that agreement mean for the u.s. in the middle east? i understand the riyal agree to comply with the agreement with the ample time for the breakout to discover if they violate the terms of the agreement to take appropriate action not based on trust to keep iran from
becoming a nuclear weapon and stay. one last point. if we are successful to reach a diplomatic agreement we have removed one threat is a nuclear rand that is an important role for us to achieve. but what do they do next? to they join the community of nations in peace collectivities with non-proliferation? we hope that is the case but with the increase economic empowerment and how they best act to be sure the iranian activities of our channels from positive rather than negative and if we're not able to reach an
agreement to be prepared to make sure iran does not become a nuclear weapon and stay. i've looked forward to hearing from our witnesses. >> first we have the honorable james jeffrey with the washington institute. the ambassador previously served as a deputy national security adviser to president bush and ambassador to albania, turkey and iraq. we have the executive vice president of the brookings institution. the investor has twice served as investors to israel and most recently as the special envoy for the israeli palestinian negotiations. >> 84 the testimony. >> ranking member it is an
honor to be back here. in the regional context is och one of the most important issues but not the only one because we're dealing with the region, as she said with these interest in the region to combat terrorism and weapons of mass destruction with the allies and partners to ensure the free flow. with the action of the congress to have great importance but we don't know what it every bit with look-alike so for those
possibilities obviously based on verification questions what happens with the nuclear materials and the status of the infrastructure but in any case it is important to put this said in the context of factions in the region to look at the record or the destabilization with the agreement with a special status to have that nuclear-weapons capability but second and to publish
said peace in "the new york times" april 26 that iran is a revolutionary power and it is a country seeking to assert its dominance through the region not to play by the rules. in any must have this sobering thought in mind. to have the change of heart about the ultimate goals and not pass saying the judgment on the agreement itself when we knew the need to do that with iran as well. it to push back the air rand capability. the administration say there
is no alternative is tantamount that any agreement for iran to walk away from the agreement fadeout in general terms united states that those international sanctions stay on. but if we decide not to go one with an agreement on april 2nd it would be hard to keep the international sanctions that the other countries have put it on with another means to do this. but getting to your point with our willingness to use military force to stop iran from trying to achieve a nuclear weapons capability. to have that as its position
those that the military force will have no or little affect. it is unlikely you'd see iran or iraq. in to reassure the friends and allies. hasn't been focused only on conventional threats that is not what they are worried about but the infiltration of lebanon syria in many different ways. so to look at this agreement but use of force to push back throughout the region
those are the three that i think are crucial. >> mr. ambassador? gentlemen i appreciate the opportunity to testify today and i want to applaud all of you for the way as you have come together to draft the past legislation to make sure that you understand the technical the images that i could not come close to understand on behalf of all of us for taking this so seriously.
if you are presented with an agreement with those that remove sanctions is saw and iran but to be weapons free ted or 50 years that would leave them three months from a nuclear weapon under sanctions is a difficult choice and to make that choice you take account and said what he should be done to ameliorate the fallout from such an agreement in the region. and to be targeted for inspection and moderate -- monitoring to reimpose
sanctions should the irradiance be caught cheating if they are robust enough to detect cheating then the likely regional implications are not sufficiently negative to justify and given the state of turmoil to insure a new korean weapons free iran for at least does decade to monitor the program would help remove a source of tension to foster greater confusion in dealing with the other sources of conflict and instability everything that we are concerned about in the middle east has a much greater concern but one
question on the minds of a lot of people is that leads our allies that they should pursue nuclear weapons to give them the ability to crossover and that is fueled speculation that the saudis and others that turkey will go down the nuclear row. so that is to prevent a nuclear arms race. i actually do not believe there is a high risk of that
happening and to put it simply why would saudi arabia that has not embarked added nuclear program for which iran was pursuing one now decide to go for that nuclear program? with the deal to be placed on the program but i would have to agree that would be imposed as a result of this agreement. >> applies to the others with a program to have that scientific capabilities with those restrictions including the additional protocol that
seems to make it unlikely for that type of problem. >> what about israel? >> it has good reason to be concerned about the of leadership. so since this agreement turns the clock back placing a least one year away for the next tender 15 years so those concerns later on the way it could pave the way can and should be by the congress to give it gives the capability to defend and teacher of the nuclear iran
to be put off long into the future. >> we have lot of anticipation in we do have a hard stop but i may interject one into questions >> faq mr. chairman and to the witnesses. if we are successful to have an agreement to prevent them from moving forward there is many issues. after an agreement with of interference of other countries to make it challenging with the partners in the region. how do we influence the
every new calculations? in regards to their nuclear proliferation to bring them to the table to negotiate. what type of a strategic alliance should the u.s. be contemplating to affect the calculation iran is using in the engagement of lebanon and iraq and syria? day you have any advice where retry to develop that a strategic partnership? with those strategic partnerships to have very close relations to go to a of a difficult period and jordan has been a trusted
with the state institutions with a low-cost ground to bring parallel institutions to exercise considerable influence in these countries. if we do so we do so by taking advantage of the shia population that is open to their influence and of course, the iranian revolution that he was designed for that purpose. so that combination shows the great vulnerability in
great difficulty how to counter that with those to strengthen the institutions of government in that we don't usually do very well. cuts yesterday have to provide strategic reassurance we are not going to abandon our traditional allies egypt or jordan in or saudi arabia. that is the ad jumped to the deal. and the sunii arab states to build that capability to
bolster the institution with the of boulder ability. will the spokespersons say it is a long-term project. therefore escaping direct responsibility. we have to stop it in that context of the nuclear deal with the fear of abandonment which is highly exaggerated. it needs to be addressed to start the process of containing to roll back the destabilizing activities in the region.
>> to outline what the problems are with the short-term because long-term we can proceed doing anything in the world but what will we do right now? we have to restore the military credibility. to have congressional support or use of military support to have with that administration redline is that besides the impact of that it would have an impact in the region to make people think we will live up to our commitments. in terms of specifics we need to do more against the side -- assad.
to also basically ensure that the other side hezbollah and iran understand we will not let them win. to insure that place remains independent. there are various steps we can do to reassure these people not just physical security with the infiltration with the ambassador almost ideological religious movement. >> i have questioned as much as $140 billion in cash through the sanctions on
just will exports alone. president obama manchin there would be a signing bonus with as high as 50 billion. iran it has say potential capacity of $36 billion annually. that is larger than venezuela for go --. it's been 17 billion per year on the current military that seems awfully low but those are the estimates. so to have a cash windfall is the history to support terrorist around and though world. water your opinions of what we can expect? i don't think it goes to domestic programs. i would be interested in your points of view given a the windfall of cash with
these negotiations. >> to rethink this will flip iran into being a status quo power that will happen over long-term? with a religious role of the region under the current regime and if you expect that to continue we have seen this around the world with countries that have achieved regional power. iran problem is not different aside from the religious aspect. said it is hard to believe they will not use a part of that to further enhance from
lebanon to cause us to yemen so it is more of a threat because of that that dave will put that to the domestic side as well on that basis. >> bear in mind the cost to do the agreement of the of meaningful curb on the program to make sure that there are many folks we can ensure to put the sanctions back on. but if we go ahead with the agreement we don't have an option but to lift the
sanctions. that is the ideal your right to be concerned about the windfall and how it will be used. as said some of that will be used for the economy with a high expectation with the iranian people that this will show economic benefits than the regime will want to do some of that. i find a hard to believe to have that stabilizing influence across the region. to go along with an agreement to make clear they're not happy about. and it does not cost a lot of money for what they're doing. to boost that activity to be
problematic. they are hurting economically but were it day in views cash into the regime it would help it to hold on. there are other ways it could provide funding to the she of militia and iraq that would tilt the balance even further. for those debtor barely able to stand up. there are all sorts of ways it could become problematic. having said that, there are things that we need to do to prepare for that and to counter that. . .