tv Key Capitol Hill Hearings CSPAN September 2, 2015 7:00am-9:01am EDT
>> it's personal to me. i think everyone that works with me understand that. as some of you may know, i started out life in a rather modest way in a catholic orphanage. my dad and mom struggled. when i did, i was obviously a bit overweight. i can remember as i stand here today in fourth grade being at the blackboard and not being able to do a problem because i
was fat. i know how you feel about the self-image question. i know how it takes you off your game academically. i know what what can happen in e schoolyard. i don't want that for any child, and i don't think most americans do either. that's why it's a personal issue for me and i supposed that the people have similar stories in their life and family or friends. this is an opportunity to the country to reinforce work to expand on it, to solidify it and strengthen it. i'm here today to encourage congress to get to work, to get back to work as our youngsters are getting back to school. don't take a step back. lets take step forwards. that's what we did in 2010 and
that's what we should do in 2015. thank you. [applause] >> i passed the first test. i got up here without stuttering. >> yes, it is, a good test. thank you so much for your remarks on health nutrition. and i really appreciate your personal remarks. one thing we are facing as we go forward is nutrition. programs. i would love to for you to talk about it and what do you think we can do and can we get a message to congress on that? >> well, it is ill-advised because it treats in many cases
anything and the like. it's not impacted. it does impact the ability of u.s.d.a. and staff. you're not in a position to do all the work that you need to do. you're not in a position to provide all the information to a sponsor that might be interested in a summer-feeding program or interested in accessing, you are limited in the capacity to provide service. one drawback of sec -- and the whole focus on budget is that we have fewer people.
we have tried to deal it in a way which we can be more ective with -- effective with the dollars that we have. many folks in the field have not seen a dropoff, but we are asking a lot of the folks that work in federal government and we continue to do more and more with less and less. that's number one. number two, as we look at the cost of food, inflation rates, the sixth sense was effective and helpful. so we've been asking governors to focus on this. >> yeah. >> for whatever reason they refuse to do so. you need to support summer fieding programs, you need to
put together more resources for a project that gives folks a cart to access food in the summer. it makes it a hard case. >> you asked to across the country to share their story. for so many people like mary, the programs can be oasis in stormy times. as you know, they plan an important role, they play an important role in stabilizing families. how do you see these programs work together in addressing the needs of families? i think it's also really important because it's focusing on these, people think of the
programs as serving other people. my family relied on foodstamps. got us through difficult time. people think it's something helping other people. how do we breakthrough that? >> first of all, lets talk about the weight program and the fact that over 50% of america's children 5-5 are affected 0-5 by that wic program. the opportunity for scene of that accident and fruits and vegetables. i was talking to a young mother and she was talking about how her toddler was embracing fruits and vegetables because she had access to fruits and vebility ls. it provides access oh to -- to
particular things they never thought to buy it and now they have access to foods and vegetables that they might not otherwise buy and that creates a much more positive beginning to life. the -- the school lunch and school breakfast programs, it's fairly obvious here, with many food and secure kids that we have here, many kids coming with families struggling financially, obviously participants are benefiting from this and the fact that we are seeing increased number of free and reduced kids, it's better economy, you can't do the outreach or information about the program unless you have people to do it. the ability for us to deal with that after school, the ability to do on weekends and summer is
directly related to creating a continuing support. that summer program feeding is important in rural areas because sometimes it's hard to know where that meal site might be and the city might have 20-30 different options. maybe a problem. a kid in an isolated rural area and not be able to get access to that feeding program. the ability to have continuing support, enough flexibility to deal with the changes circumstances of a family is helpful. finally the snap program, the reality think is that snap has changed. hopefully an increasing numbers in terms of the number of seniors who are living on a fixed income, a very small social security check who are
reluctant to take snap because they see it other than what it is, nutrition assistant. they won't have the healthcare issues associated with nonnutrition. it's also important to know that 42% of recipients are children or working moms and dads, so when you add the senior citizens, the children, the working moms and dads and folks with disabilities who would love to be able to work, you have 70% of the snap population. which of those groups do you not want to help and which doesn't represent your friends and neighbors down the street? we're working on that to do a better job to provide employment and training, they may have
problems with child care, make it difficult for them to access the workplace. lets use the resources we have to reduce the barriers. >> thank you. i also wanted to talk a little bit about them in your speech. i know that children in rural areas, i really wanted to ask you about how many kids in rural areas need nutrition assessments. what are the forces driving that and why is that happening and that you're taking a particular step to address it? >> i think there are a number of reasons. you have to look at the economy in rural economy. certainly production agriculture is a critical component to the economy, but because we've seen larger and larger operations, we
have fewer and fewer farms. what we are seeing in rural cases an aging and declining population which makes it hard to attract economic opportunity. the folks that are still there have limited opportunity. they are trying to create a new economy, a foundation that takes advantage of the natural resources and conservation, a more sensible way to provide economic opportunities. part is understanding the programs there are. it's important to educate people of what programs exist and access to those programs. how do we get all of the programs that are out there, we know that there are a number of programs, how do we make sure everybody knows about them and access them? what we found in u.s.d.a. and
educate of the existing programs, they can take advantage of them. we've seen over $60 million invested in poor counties from u.s.d.a. based on that premise. they are looking at that same kind of programs. they all can be accessed in the communities with a greater awareness and reducing the difficulty of -- of understanding how to apply for all of this. they need technical system, they need help. and finally, the best way to use the programs. if we did something for mom and dad over here and children and they are not connected, we might have some benefits. but what if we decided everything to do everything we could do for the families, a two-generation approach t -- the
mom-and-dad program. i suspect we can and we will test coordinating all various programs and see if we could really, really make a difference. if we can't, that will tell us how more effectively and efficiently -- efficiently the programs that we have. >> yeah. you played a critical role on that. the important feature on that, a very important feature with the dapción -- adaptation of nutrition. as a mom of a kid with public school, i can count on it. i count on what my kids are
eating in the school. what can we learn about the programs with what's been happening. how can we strengthen that and not weaken that, and what are the -- what should we do going forward? >> we have the trust the experts that tell us we're on the right track. we have to trust the experts and we can't create a setback, we can't relax the standards, we can't remove the standards, we are able to provide flexibility where warranted. we can streamline the process where young people can apply. we are doing this internally, to the extent we can press and not take a setback in that opportunity for school district that is have high-poverty rates,
allow them to save administrative expense and treat all kids in the same way, make it much easier for them. i think it's important for us to focus time and resources on the time when kids aren't in school. there's an opportunity for us to strengthen our breakfast efforts as well, and i think, you know, frankly look at the integrity side of this. we don't want an opportunity for critics, because there's a mistake, we shouldn't promote. we see this in snap all of the time. 1.3%. most federal programs are not at that level. it's a little over 3 and a half%. the combined rates are less than they ever been and we are going to continue to work on those issues. there's an opportunity for us, i
think to -- to create more support and assistance, technical assistance, it started as a regional effort in the southern part of the country, mississippi has a wonderful center. they wanted to do a day and a half conference. we found schools wanted to spend a little time with the schools, what we are finding people are really interested. they're learning about the farming grant program and resources available for school equipment program. there are ways in which we can strengthen all the efforts in commitment with child nutrition across the board. >> i'm just going to ask one more question and ready for the
audience. putting, you know, limits on snap that are unrelated to the program. what can you suggest to us and others how we can make of what snap is really about and what are ways that you and others can fight against that? >> making sure people understand who is receiving the benefits from snap and it is a supplemental nutrition program. no one is surviving on snap benefits alone and that's a fiction out there that we need to basically attack, if you will. i think it is important to note as i said, 08% or more snap
beneficiaries are children. the folks that aren't able to work, we're working on trying to get states on hundreds of millions of dollars that we provide governors to find work, link those people that are on snap and ten pilots that were part of the farm bill that will glen best practices and perhaps encourage this. look, this is a -- this is also the snap expansion that occurred during the recession was a result of the recession and we are now begin to go see with the economy improving, we are seeing numbers come down. that's the way it's supposed to work. >> right. >> the other thing i would suggest is that it helps mitigate the impact of poverish. millions are taken out of the status of poverty by virtue of
support programs. >> yes. >> hundreds of thousands, millions of kids are taken out of poverty as a result. if people understood who is getting it and the important work that's being done to reduce that, the work we are doing to try to give economic to poll thaks want it, love to work if they can find work. sometimes it's a person in rural area that would love to work but they can't get to a job that's 45 miles away. they have a 3-year-old child. there's way that we can provide assistance. >> questions from the audience. identify yourself and we'll come to you. >> hi, penny star with cnn news, you talk about integrity. there was a study by the school
nutrition association august 2014, that 82% of schools reported more food waste in the school programs. i wonder what you're addressing in this issue. >> first of all, that was -- i think a relatively small sampling of schools. there are other competing studies that it's not as prevalent as the study suggests. food waste, 30% of all foods is wasted. it's a call for us to focus on food waste across the board. that's why we established us challenge, restaurants, associations representing companies all designed to figure out a way to reduce the amount of waste to begin with, that we can reuse food that's cable --
capable of being reused, food apps, they are fine for the central kitchen, the food bank and also the ability to recycle, we recycle over a ton a food a week, that's significantly increased. you will find a lot of information and steps we are take to go try to reduce food waste. >> a question over there. good. >> thank you so much for being here secretary, i'm lydia, reporter with the hill. you mentioned 22.2 available for schools, can you talk about how schools can access that money and take advantage of it and, i mean, how is it available? >> well, i'll pick up one state that i was aware of. the state of louisiana, for example, had not used a dime of
the money that was available. not a dime. so several million dollars. if i were a superintendent and a school that was struggling and looking for ways to provide and get some help, i would pick up the phone and call the governor's office, department of education and human services and say, hey, is there any money left over that we could use at our school in a creative way. there has to be many states where there's money left over at 28.2. there was about $90 million that was originally appropriated and now 28.2 is still unused. you know, when you hear that, you ask yourself, well, you know, before people start criticizing this and say that they don't have the resources -- >> yeah. >> we ought to have the resources available and fully utilizing the resources. >> somebody over there.
thanks. yeah. >> hi, i'm kate, i believe my question segues into what you said. you said about governors work with this or not work with this, i was wondering if there are any other factors for deploying the dollars for hunger? >> the governor for iowa for eight years, i'm not sure why my former colleagues and governor offices aren't taking advantage. one of the reasons is maybe they're just simply not aware. governors deal with many issues. it's one of the reasons why we took the liberty, communicating with states to let them know that you have this money on the table and to encourage them. when we began the effort, $45 million that was unspent and
now 28 million. [laughs] >> for folks, so part of it maybe that there's not an awareness and part maybe some kind of reluctant ton part -- on the part of some governors but they are probably 10% of america that we shouldn't have nutrition for kids. i don't understand why when we've got african americans 36%, hispanic kids 28-29%. female head of household. why wnt we want to help those families across the board to do a better job and doing what they want to do which is take care of their children and make sure they have a healthy start to
life. >> any questions? anybody else? >> dave, this is a question about putting the programs together and in -- there was a provision in one of the nutrition programs where each community that participates in the programs has to have a health plan in the community where they bring the resources together. and my question is, what is the status of the results from that program. >> i don't know the specific answer. i do know that there are a certify -- series of efforts at state and local level because there's a desire for overall
costs of chronic diseases. it's basically two edges of the same sword, if you will. the obesity, we know it's expensive diabetes, heart disease, totally preventible, potentially with the right beginning to life. on the other hand, we've got senior citizens who are living on very small fixed incomes. they have to chose unfortunately between rent, prescription drugs, they skip on the food and they don't get the nutrition they get and they end up having problems, complications that could potentially be avoided. if we are truly interested in reducing healthcare costs, then we should be all about nutrition standards, all about making sure kids get access to the healthy foods and snacks at school and
senior citizens that need the help get them. >> a question up here. up here. okay. >> yes, if the challenge passes, it would be a fantastic development. there are groups in the room that are trying to make important improvement in a child, adult healthcare programs and make improvement in summer food. do you see any prospect for new entitled money? >> i think there's a possibility to make the case. i'm trying to make the case today. if you spend a dollar today in nutrition standards for children and you prevent obesit among
youngsters and reduce 20% to 15%, there's no question that at the end of the day we are going to save money. we meaning collective we. if we make sure that senior citizens get appropriate nutrition, there's no question we are going to save a few bucks in tems of healthcare costs. we know that those healthcare costs are directly related to government spending. i think we to take the longview here. i think that's what's really important. one of the underlying issue is a transition on our policymakers from a short thinking to long-term thinking. >> yeah. >> that's what we should be investing in. that's the best utilization.
there's always the issues of the offsets and how you pay for it. we never have a problem figuring out to pay for more military weapons, why, because it's priority. you find the resources for priorities. i'm here to make the case that it's important long-term to invest in our kids and their health and nutrition. i think it's equally important. we will be better off as a nation if we do. so if everyone see it the way i see it, we will find the resources because you always fund your priorities. >> we'll take both of these. him first. >> thank you very much. i work with --
[inaudible] >> we work with the organic farmers and churches to bring this organic food available to the general public. the cost for organic food, specially fruits and vegetables is high. it's not really accessible to the people that are at the bottom, how can we reduce the cost, the farmers that receive a lot of help and support, how can we change that? [laughs] >> lets see, we have ten minutes left. sorry, ma'am, we are not going to get to your question because it's going to take me ten minutes to answer this question. seriously. there's a lot of support in
agriculture. a lot of the research to organic support, storage lones, technical assistance. it still represents about 1% of the land mass dedicated. it's going to take a while to get up to that scale. the challenge is not the pit forms of agriculture against one another, the challenge is to have access and make a choice. one thing we have done is take the ebt program t foodstamp program and we said, you know what, it should be redeemable at farmers market.
>> last question, very quickly. >> i have a very naïve question because i don't have children in school. is there any evidence, circumstantial or otherwise, that these programs are having a spillover effect to children or not participating? when i was going to school we used to ridicule dezmon briscoe -- ready to the children because the food was so terrible. i wonder things might be pushing in the other direction where children eating more fruits and vegetables, more whole grains are having a positive influence or so been stigmatized speak with you try to reduce stigmatization of all these
programs. by the way in which there calculated, by the way in which kids go through the line, by the way they are no longer segregated at the disco breakfast, so we tried to get ways to be creative about reducing the ability to say you are a free and reduced lunch kid, i'm not. secondly, the standards applied to the meals that are being sold and the à la carte items and snacks. snacks. any student who's basically eating in the cafeteria is going to the choices and access to relatively the same food. there is a spillover affect. there are several studies. i mentioned the university of connecticut study that suggested that are more fruits and vegetables being eaten, more entrées are being consumed so that reflects greater acceptance on the part of students. there's the harvard public health study that suggests that indeed there is less, shortly not more foodways. there's a cdc study that indicates young people are consuming more fruits and
vegetables. i think is going to take a while for that to essentially show itself in terms of reduced rates of obesity or reduce rates of food insecurity. we've seen a reduction in food insecurity among kids. and maybe a result of what we're doing to me also the result of an approved economy. we are seeing at the time of obesity rates with young children which may be the effort of week beginning to pay off. i think there positive signs but i would caution anybody that we're not going to see an overnight transformation. this is a slow and steady change. remember the school lunch program started in 46 because harry truman a we didn't have enough people consuming enough calories to defend the country. now we have retired admirals and generals saying the opposite because kids who are not physically fit enough to defend the country. it's going to take time. that's why it's important for congress to stay the course. why it's important to look for
ways to talk to you today, to improve the program, if not to take a step back on it. >> that is a great ending for this. thank you so much, secretary, for being here and for all you do. [applause] [inaudible conversations] >> [inaudible conversations] >> today on c-span2 a conference oon housing rights hosted by the department of housing and urban development. live coverage from loretta lynch and julian castro starting at 9 a.m. eastern.
>> thank you, everybody, for coming out here. i'm jeffrey mankoff with the russian program at csis and it's my pleasure to welcome you to our discussion of paul schwartz new report which hopefully you got a copy of on the weekend. -- on the way in. we are at a moment right now where as you all know relations with both russia and china are in a difficult spot editing a lot of us have been watching what that means in terms of developing bilateral cooperation between moscow and beijing. and that cooperation of course it is accelerated in recent months thanks to the crises in the south china sea and in ukraine but for some structural features of this, and he goes back in a lot of ways to before the start of these outbursts. one of the ways this cooperation
has manifested itself has been increased military military technical cooperation between the two countries. it's an area where there was a lot happening a decade or so ago and then dropped off a well. it's only in the last couple of years we've really seen it reasoning. and so it's been wonderful for us here in the russian and eurasian program to paul schwartz onboard as a nonresident associate to work on specifically the nuts and bolts of sino-russian military cooperation, and the first fruits of pulsed affiliation with us, first concrete proof of it is this report here. and so i hope you have a chance to read it and i look forward to the discussion we're going to have here today. i think what we are going to do is we will have paul discuss the report for about 15 to 20 minutes, go through some of the
data and some of the conclusions, and then we will have a little discussion up here. in addition to paul we have my colleague thomas karako is a senior fellow at the international 60 program and director of the missile defense project here, and then zack cooper who is a fellow with the japan chair and an expert on asian security issues. tom is going to talk about some of the political aspects, particularly as it affects the united states, and then cycle give all the more of a regional perspective, how asia as a whole use of sino-russian military cooperation. and then when they are done we will open it up to discussion and hopefully we will have a good back and forth for those of you here in the room. so with that, please turn off your ringing devices and alternative for over to paul
schwartz. >> thanks a lot, jeff. in 1996, taiwan then current president was up for reelection. heat three has made statements indicating that he favored greater independence for taiwan. statements that had greatly disturbed china's leaders, fearing that taiwan might declare outright independence if you are reelected, china's leaders decide they need to send a strong signal he was taking taiwan down a very dangerous path. in march of 1986 they began conducting a series of live fire missile at the sizes in the taiwan strait that disrupted maritime traffic. in response of the u.s. decided to act to dispatch it to carry task forces to the region. faced with such an old with such an album and display of force and lacking the means to effectively counter it, china's leaders were forced to back down
to accept a humiliating defeat. it was no accident that jus jusa few short months whe later they entered into their first contract for fans destroyers from russia. the sole remedy being designed specifically to attack and destroy u.s. aircraft carriers. nor would this prove to be a one-time event or would you be surprised to learn that there is, since the cold war russian defense assistance have been crucial to the development of china's service and anti-surface warfare capabilities? nor has this been solely and historical phenomena that recently, over the last several years and a few cases, russian defense assistance has continued to play an important role in the development china's maritime forces. today, i'm going to lay out a case for this claim by addressing three related questions. first, what kind of russian defense assistance, what kind of defense assistance to the russian provide for china's maritime forces?
second, how have those forces benefited from such assistance? and third, what has been the impact on china's an access strategy? we will focus on the specific ships, sensors and weapons systems that have either been transferred outright from russia to china, or develop by china using russian technology. we will first start with a little background on china's anti-access stretchy. many of you may be through with that, some quite some of them are brief recap will help set the context and explain the role in the strategy. over the past 200 years china has faced the persistent threat of attack from the seat. first of the colonial powers, then the japanese, and most result from u.s. navy. for most of the three china like to be effective means to counter those threats. it's navy remained underdeveloped. its fleet was an capable of matching up against an advanced naval adversary our maritime for
such as the u.s. navy. nor did it's fleet possess the capability to defend china's sovereign interest in its nearby cities. why? until recently china's fleet has suffered from three major deficiencies. first, it lacked the maritime -- needed to adequately protect the fleet against air and missile strikes from a superior adversaries such as the u.s. navy. this forced to flee to other close to sure where to be protected by land-based air defense platforms. second, the fleet also lacked a moderate anti-ship missiles needed to defend itself against well armed u.s. warships. without and it's fleet could have no hope of really stand up against the u.s. fleet and a force on force engagement are finally fleet lacked a robust anti-submarine warfare capability. this left its ships are vulnerable to attack by u.s. submarines even when operating close to shore.
to address the threat of u.s. intervention, china develop its now famous having access strategy. as has been suggested the strategy is designed to keep u.s. forces out of contested maritime regions in time of war. and he calls were dividing the western pacific into two distinct defensive areas as you can see a mature. inter- tier one sometimes goes out to the first island chain, distance of approximate 200 nautical miles. the outer tier extends that brimmer further out for total distance of 1200 nautical miles from china's coast out of what's called the second island chain. china's fleet is a scientific missions depend on what's involved. the nation is to prevent u.s. forces from intervening in a future maritime conflict such as one involving taiwan. also in that inter- tier it's fleet is passed to seek and maintain local sequence would allow for the conduct of
military operations over those waters such as would be needed to conduct an amphibious invasion of taiwan. in the outer area by contrast the nation is primary to be one of sea denial families for the moment, although that is starting to change as we see china starting to develop its blue water naval capability. its mission to keep u.s. forces from using that area as a base from which it can launch long range precision strikes against u.s. forces or against the mainland itself. getting the fleet to the public interest such missions has been a long and arduous process, required in near total overhaul of the fleet remained a much a work in progress. when the new strategy was first adopted china's defense industry remained technologically backward, underdeveloped, incapable of providing the weapons need to properly upgrade the fleet. china was forced to turn to external suppliers, and russia soon emerged as china's
principal supplier. why? due to the tiananmen square crisis back in 1989, china had been placed under comprehensive arms embargo from the west. it needed to find new sources. fortunately, for it at the present time russia defense companies findings and those cut off from state defense orders into economic chaos that followed the collapse of the soviet union had become desperate for revenue from arms sales to sustain the very existence. the net result, a long and sustained arms relationship with russia and china that continues today. you can see this on the chart. according to sipri between 1992-2014 russia's transferred over $30 billion in military equipment to china. that's probably significant understates the true amount, the larger transactions. take a closer look at russian contribution, start with surface warships and talk about anti-ship missiles systems and then we will close with air defense platforms.
among the first steps taken on china's long road to modernization, the purchase of four advanced remedy destroyers russia. at the time of their purchase it was far and away the best warship in china's fleet and it provided several important benefits. verse became equipped with russian sunburn antiship cruise missiles. these were the first truly modern astm's in china's fleet. they could fly supersonic speeds, strike targets at long range up to 240 kilometers and have great penetrating power. their proposed transfer great something of an uproar in congress when members bush administration to try to block the transfer which they tried but were unsuccessful. to guide the sunburst to the targets became equipped with russian and stand wic assistance. these advanced system provide over the horizon targeting capability for the sunburst and can surveil targets up to a range of 450 kilometers.
according to the naval expert norm friedman, edit options this by bouncing signals off the troposphere. it came equipped with advanced russian gadfly air defense systems which was china's first two air to air defense platform. although its range was limited to provide protection for chinese service action groups and convoys out to 25 kilometers. aside from the sodomy the chinese built all their warships domestic which is testament to increase self-sufficiency in its shipbuilding industry. at the stunning china's fleet has become totally self-sufficient. far from it. for example, according to dave of analysts keith jacobs, russia's forget reportedly benefited significantly from russian design and develop assistance provided by its design bureau. china's maritime forces also access a russian technology for both long range precision strike
and maritime air defense as well. let's examine these contributions closer starting with precision strike. we talked about the bandstand writer system which was delivered with the remedy. the chinese have now purchased dozens of these and they are widely shared across china's fleet including all of its latest and most advanced destroyers and frigates. in addition to the sunburn, russia's transferred several other advanced ascm to china, anti-cruise missile to these include the widely feared -- excuse me. klub sizzler, posted on submarines that were printed transferred to china. like a sunburn, the klub sizzler is a long range see skimming and to ship cruise missile and has a unique flight trajectory for most of its flight path it travels at sub sonic speed to conserve fuel but as it approaches the target, et cetera but do i supersonic speed of up
to block 3.0 making it difficult to pursue. reputable duty sources have limited encounter with the us has effective means to intercept this missile in flight. the russians have transferred sophisticated air launch cruise missiles such as the kh 31. this is a long range supersonic missile perfect for launching attacks from the air against massive u.s. warships. accordinaccording to sipri to cr just over 900 of these and continued to produce them under license from russia. more recently beijing has begun to develop a whole new generation of supersonic antiship cruise missiles of its own. according to experts, such as richard fisher, they all appear to be based on formally transferred russian cruise missiles. the first is the y. j. 18, clearly a copy of the russian klub sizzler which i just talked about and employs the same two state sub sonic supersonic
profile which is a strong indicator of its russian heritage. according to the office of naval intelligence this has not just been deployed in 2014 on china's most advanced destroyer company testament to russia's ongoing influence in the development of china's fleet. the second is the y. j. 12 which appears to an extended version of russia's kh 31 from the other missile i just spoke about. it isn't air launch cruise missile, i supersonic speed and other similar like characteristics. it will be deployed on china's long range strategic bomber giving the naval air force extended reach well up into the pharmacies of the second island chain. at any rate the emergence of a new generation of chinese antiship cruise missiles office on russian technology is an ominous developmedevelopme nt for the western pacific because as china starts to substitute these two missiles were some of
its existing enter your missiles it will result in significantly increased striking power for the fleet. what about russia's contribution to the fleet air defense capability? that has been equally impressi impressive. in addition to the gadfly, moscow is transferred to other air defense platforms. the first, the shtil is an upgraded version of the classified. it's installed on china's destroyer. more importantly russia transferred the gargoyle which is installed on china's class district this is china's first true long range naval air defense for able to strike targets out to 150 kilometers. it is by far the longest range air defense platform in china's fleet and is quite deadly against a variety of aerial
targets. more recently china has begun producing its own naval air defense systems like in the most important of these are all based on russian technology. the hq nine is china's first indigenously develop long range air defense system. it has a range of 100 kilometers, 120 for the upgraded which was released, short of the range of the cargo. it is reportedly draws heavily on russia's air defense technology. these new air defense systems are installed on both china's -- china has developed hq 16 which is a medium-range naval air defense system not only does a lot on russian technology, the shtil which issued earlier but also the product of a joint development project between russia and china. the hq 16 is installed on china's latest forget. in today's sunday may been thinking isn't some of this the
product of chinese reverse engineering? probably. still i consider this to be the direct result of russians that this is for a couple of reasons. personal it's not always possible to tell when a system has been produced under license or produce illicitly. as the two don't always talk about the situation in public. more importantly russia is continuing his to sell china advanced military equipment and despite its past record of reverse engineering, a strong indicator of russians passive acceptance of such activities considered part of their working relationship, expected part of doing business. having examined and surveyed the field of technology that's been transferred, let's take a look at how this technology has impacted on china's anti-axis capability starting with precision strike. according to the office of naval intelligence prior to russian defense assistance the best antiship cruise missiles in china's fleet was the y. j. eight, subsonic missile with a
limited range of just 65 nautical miles. today the fleet striking power has been radically improved and russian defense assistance has been crucial for russian -- that lies at the heart of china's anti-axis stretch. according to an expert, analysis of past naval and give them to the battle of midway demonstrates aside the strikes effectively first usually prevails the why? because the initial salvo was a day for the reduce the size of the enemy's fleet and all the attacker has to do to sustain is no superior firepower against the commission fleet of the enemy into either withdrawals or is it destroyed. the best way to strike first if of weapons that out range those of the enemy. that way the attacker can launch a stand of strikes from outside the defense umbrella with impunity, like bringing a gun to a knife fight. this is precisely russia is
given the chinese. as you can see from the chart, chinese antiship cruise missiles, like the sunburn which is a little pale but you can se, have much greater range and probably is systems like the harpoon on the right which is the longest range u.s. antiship cruise missiles today. russian defense assistance has been crucial to helping the chinese overcome the first of the three major deficiencies i spoke about. russian defense assistance has had a similar large impact on china's naval air defense capabilities. believes it -- as late as the 2000, china's fleet was ill-equipped for air defense, thus only a handful of surface-to-air missiles and all of those having very limited range. today the story is quite different. according to a 2009 office of naval intelligence report, for example, russian air defense radar platform such as tombstone
have been keep improving the plans naval air defense system ability. at the same time russian air defense platforms and the new chinese derivatives have greatly increased the capability and range of china's naval air defense platforms. having capable long range air defense systems is crucial because it complicates the task of you as a pilot seeking to strike chinese warships at sea. pay-fors supposed to make the decisions i've had to face since vietnam, eithe either into their engagement zone and risk destruction, or fire from greater range which greatly impedes the tax effectiveness. from the chart you can see china has been catching up rapidly for the u.s. in terms of naval air defense capability. while the u.s. maintained the advantage of to be sure, china has narrowed the gap considerably. keep in mind, prior to russian defense assistance the longest range legacy chinese naval and
defense platform would barely have shown up on the chart. russian defense assistance has been crucial to china to overcome the second of the three major deficiencies, its weakness, its inability to defend itself adequately against long range air and missile strikes. so having surveyed the situation, let's now re-examine my original claims. if i'd done my job correctly they should be evident russian defense assistance has been crucial to the taliban have china's warfare capabilities. the transfer of advanced destroyers, ascs like the sunburn have legitimate upgrade and china's precision strike capability. at the same time provision of advanced russian air defense platforms such as the gargoyle gave china its first true long range naval air defense capability. collectively to represent a great leap forward for china's maritime forces. more recently the development of new chinese supersonic antiship cruise missiles all based on russian technology represent
further large gains for the police precision strike capability. similarly deployment of new chinese air defense platforms incorporate a russian technology show that china is still in the process of absorbing the vast amount of russian technology previously transferred to. these systems are now making a real difference in the competition for naval supremacy in the western pacific. i don't mean to imply that the chinese remain totally dependent on russia. far from it. no one would disagree that the chinese have made up considerable ground in increase in self-sufficiency, especially in certain areas. but i would contend the chinese still have a ways to go into fleet could still benefit in substantially some additional russian defense assistance. for example, chinese and the suffering warfare capabilities still remain deficient. russia with its long history of developing at the suffering warfare systems dating back to the cold war could help china to
overcome this third and final remaining deficiency as well. another example, china agreed to purchase as 400 from russia. as 400 is russia's latest and longest range air defense platform. if the chinese purchased and able to which the tentative window by russian air defense platforms that could result in new for the doubling of the range of china's fleet air defense system. finally, russia is a standstill for it can to upgrade its existing platforms and developing new systems all the time. for example, russian is reported to be high supersonic antiship cruise missiles, a third missile which wasn't reportedly transferred to the chinese. capable of achieving speeds of up to mach 4.0. the chinese would be interested in such a system if they could. yogi berra once famously said it's tough to make predictions, especially about the future. but if the past is any indicator
of predict much of this new technology will find its way into china's maritime forces. thank you. >> thanks a lot, paul. let's move over to discussion of some of the wider strategic context, so turn the floor over to tom karako. >> very thoughtful and detailed analysis really up an important problem, including by the way intentions to these hardware matters. i think it's very easy to just collide over these things and the details and this is the kind of analysis i think there needs to be, to be a lot more up. as i was listening to paul and making historical references to the early '90s, i was thinking in a way even larger scale. these are the kinds of systems, the lower and sub ranges which
is to get a lot of attention. i think that's one of the things that makes this report relatively unique is that they are not quite as exotic as talking about the df 41 or the latest df five or something like that but they matter. i think one sense in which they matter is just the technological, commercial and chill political trends that have conspired and i think this report points to that, or conspired for increased global supply and demand of high precision, high velocity, and missile base strike delivery systems and the counters thereunto. in 1959, bernard brodie wrote a book strategy in the missile age, and i think is the it's the proliferation of these things. the proliferation as a matter of
policy in this case, the proliferation of these systems in the wake of contributing to a new missile age. so let me, paul had a number of these systems in particular and billy if you follow the footnote you recognize there just are not that many folks out there talking about these things, which is part of the problem. so let me give some context and some comments about systems at the edges which end of a go beyond the self-conscious scope of the report. first, the context. zach is going to get more into the regional but i think the question of what exactly russia's intentions are is there a stopping point, is there a tipping point before russia goes too far? or is it that the case come competitive the scope of this report, the surface warfare for the navy, chinese navy, does
that already point a way to russia's self-conscious limitations? it's not really katie by the door. these are precisely the capabilities they don't mind china having to counter the u.s. navy. so in the way russia is selling china the rope to help hang the u.s. navy. some of the systems of course that russia is also working on to make the news, whether it's the rs 26 for land-based concerns can we think about those in terms of nato but, of course, if you are russia looking to your pc or think about those in terms of china. i think the question is russia's just take the money that bad? paul, do you see this as irresponsible and shortsighted sales, or is it a strategic partnership admittedly a limited one for these kinds of systems?
i think another take away from this report is that we talk so much about anti-access aired another going back to my larger trends, this is going to be missile rich environment. so much of what goes into it is going to be and is of course missile base. china is pursuing a lot of these things and using masks to challenges. it appears they're doing so for three reasons. one, targeting u.s. fleet, what i think being able to target our u.s. allies, and three, u.s. bases. this again is getting beyond the scope of this report. i think it's worth raising the question what? what we do about this? the kind of system that paul is detailing the air defense as 300 perhaps more means of course yours is going to have to invest
in more standoff and penetration weapons. both sophisticated and presumably enough of them to saturate. this means, for example, the conversation about lsro and lsrb. the second would be the chances antiship ballistic missiles means i don't see anywhere around this we will have to continue to invest perhaps do a lot more for fleet and pointed missile defenses. missile defense versus chinese threats. this is not necessarily the most exotic longer-range strategic systems, of course and i think it's notable by the way, i think drudge report, paul, you didn't mention the word nuclear. what we are talking about is really conventional threats, but
i think in order to have the conversation, to pursue is a matter of effort, to the defenses against chinese missile threats. i think that something we should hear more about. you see, for example, the navy already deploying and continue to test for the standard missile six, having both cruise missile but this and terminal ballistic missile defense capabilities. that is a piece of it. you hear a lot of interest in directed energy, especially for the fleet, for example, looking at the message or talking about, paul. you need a lot of shots in quick shots. one thing faster than the supersonic sea skimming cruise missiles is a lazy. those are probably not the whole solution, and again pashtun laser. -- the safe thing to doctor isn't as bright shiny object of the directed energy.
even in his presentation a couple weeks ago in alabama, the head of northcom, he said we will need rockets to the rockets. probably think about directed energy or rail guns as the replacement for those probably isn't the right way to think about but rather a mixture another thing at the edges of this of course is a chinese investment in missile-based, missile boosted hypersonic's. they use is testing these things about once every three years or so. we've had mixed success. the chinese are testing about every three months. that's pretty remarkable. that's going to require some kind of counter are probably different kinds of counters, a layered counter for those kinds of threats. and beyond active defenses that i'm talking about, also passive measures whether hardening but also deception and dispersed
them. 's concept of -- comes to mind. a piece of that i think will be distributed defense. the idea that you are going to be able to get these things or that you want to plan on striking these things left of launch involves a lot of risk. and third i think we need to do this for our allies and for our partners in the region. we need to proliferate counters to these things. anti-ship cruise missiles much less sophisticated ones and the klub sizzler which is great commercial on youtube, proliferating counters to those. we've seen these in real life use against israel in 2006 as well as on other occasions. doing so is not merely to build on partner capacity but to alleviate strains on our forces. i think the degree to which the u.s. navy and the u.s. army is
stretched in terms of missile defense capability in particular in the area is only going to get worse. and a these requirements are here, and but we have right now or down the. likewise, the number of thadd batteries is nine. that kind of tension is likely to anybody unless we encourage our allies to do more of this on their own as well. i think i will take the their internet over to zack. >> -- take leave their. spent first, paul, let me join in congratulating you on what i think is a very important report on a subject that doesn't get as much attention as it should. i think it's wonderful work and i look forward to seeing the aired version and a lan version within the next couple of months, i hope. that's all right.
want to talk a bit about the political aspect. tom talked about the military once i think we all like to delve into those, those shiny objects, but on the political side there's some real difficult questions to be asked added to think we quite know the answers to many of them. i want to pose the questions and hopefully we can answer them during the panel discussion, and their many of you see in the audience here who have deep expertise so hopefully we can have a discussion with you about them. the first is that we seem growing evidence of chinese and russian ties for quite some time. it's in arms sales which paul talked about the it's the military exercises in the pacific and even the mediterranean between the two ministers recently and reported is going to russia and china may be attempted great some kind of joint database. there's clear evidence that there are growing ties between russia and china and that this
has been evident throughout the region. it's a great concern to many asian military. the question that many of them are asking is, is this a sign of a larger strategic choice by the two countries to come together over the long term or is this a short-term marriage of convenience? i think that's a really core question for how we deal on the policy side with both countries. the strategic logic, the long-term logic is fairly clear. both states if you're dissatisfied with existing status quo. europe have seen what this do this with russian efforts to alter eastern europe's borders, and certainly we are seeing this with isa and construction in the south china sea on the chinese side. baltic states appeared to status over the status quo and historically dissatisfied states often work together. they clump together in fact oppose the existing hegemon.
this is nothing you should be an entire surprise that at the autocratic states are finding defenses with a large democratic united states but has many democratic allies into their core region. both in europe and in asia. both russian and chinese leaders have openly called for an end to u.s. alliances in those regions. in recent years. so on the strategic side the alignment makes a great deal of sense. but on the other hand, we also see great long-term differences into outlooks for russia and china. china is a growing country, and despite its economic troubles we've seen recently i think most people would expect the growth rates to continue, whereas rush is struggling with its economic problems in the future demographically and on the energy side is even more troubling. so that's going to be a big challenge but so are more focused regional issues. how will russia and china work together in the shanghai cooperation organization, which is an issue jeff has been doing
quite a lot of research on. how have they worked together in the russian far east where moscow is increasingly worried about beijing's influence? in addition, as paul has a children is there going to be growing tension as china tries to steal russian military technology? will that eventually create a bit of a break or will that just continue a pace? in talking to policymakers not just in washington but in asia more broadly, there's this conundrum. russia and china is using similar techniques of hybrid warfare, trying to avoid u.s. treaty commitments by escalating just below those levels. so there's an effort, a desire to respond similarly to both russian and china in eastern europe and in the south and east china seas. but at the same time efforts to our response together to both
states is pushing them closer together. for example, there's been ports recently of the potential washington might use economic sanctions as a response to economic espionage in the cyber domain. not just against china but also against russia. with that pushed the two state together, forced them to work together to develop countermeasures? that's a tough question and it's not a question that is only applicable to the united states. many of my japanese friends have been struggling with this. how does japan manager russia when it still looks to engage in many ways without trying to allow the europeans to believe it's sort of walking away from its commitment to upholding the status quo? if japan doesn't stand up firmly and up to what russia is doing in eastern europe, would that have any effect on the european commitment to opposing chinese efforts to change the status quo in the south china sea or the east china sea? i think these are the questions come at a don't think we know
the answers but we are reaching an important inflection point, which is that as paul is mentioning at some point the chinese technological proficiency will start to outpace the russian proficiency in some area. and if these ties continue to continue to grow i think we will see, you can only believe that will mean, that they think there's a strong strategic rationale for the relationship. if we see the ties start to ebb and tension started to i think about the needs of this is more of a short-term marriage of convenience which, frankly, for many of us in washington would be what our preference would be. so i don't know the answers to these questions but i think there are important questions to ask, and i look forward to having a robust question -- discussion about them. paul, thanks again for having this debate. >> that was terrific but we've gone from very deep dive on some of the technical aspects of
sino-russian military cooperation to a very wide angle focus on what some of the bigger strategic questions of this cooperation entails for the region and for the united states. at that, probably the best thing to do is open up the floor to discussion if you have a question, please wish incredible technology. please identify yourself and please do ask a question. whwe have microphones, sorry. >> peter humphrey, i'm a former diplomat and current into endless. in addition to prc reverse engineering, certainly china is acting out the russian design bureaus, no doubt about it. you mentioned the two motors for russia. one thing simple of capitalist
greed, and the other perhaps a larger geopolitical strategy. i wonder perhaps if there's a third motivation in that china make itself already have created technology of interest to russia. so things like these coastal ballistic cruise missiles may actually show up in the russian arsenal. so arthur quid pro quo going from china to russia in addition to the intel exchange that you mention? >> perhaps i can take that one. the short answer is yes, you are starting to see signs of a shift where for the first time chinese military equipment and technology may be flowing towards russia. recently, for example, the chinese have attempted to sell russia their latest project, the one i spoke about, which is quite a capable system with advanced missile and air defense systems on board as well. part of the problem is that russia has been struggling to
build new ships because of the efficiency of its shipbuilding industry, also the cutoff of new ship engines from ukraine as a result of the ukraine crisis where russia was highly dependent on ukraine ships for the buildup of its native. recently the chinese apparently took one of the ships over to the black sea to damage it by the russians. we don't know yet if they are going to buy. partly if the decision to buy could be political as well as military, to fulfill every need but to also give some quid pro quo to strengthen the bilateral arms trading relationship between the two. like you see potential cooperation of other areas as well. the chinese are actually ahead of the russian in some area. drone technology is a big area. i.t., information technology, the chinese have embraced principles of warfare more than the russians have a have a
number of quite capable command and control systems, combat management systems for navy vessels that you could see the russians transferring some of those as well. the final thing which is recent emerge, not the first time but seems to gain a new impetus, is for joint research, development and production between russia and china. the chorizo reportedly initiated a project to codevelop air independent propulsion systems. these are submarine-based systems which allow a nonnuclear submarine to stay submerged for extended period of time by regenerating its battery, rechargeable expansion through chemical processes. they've already been introduced into western navies, the germans are very advanced in this particular area. the chinese reportedly used it for one of their new diesel subs but they are not satisfied with the. the russians have not yet been able to crack the code after
trying for some period of time. we could very well see joint development projects to develop new systems in this regard. >> wait for the microphone, please. [inaudible] >> -- using them in the same way that russians would have very highly developed pakistan keep the us navy. is there any evidence that chinese are doing that, command and control for reconnaissance system? certainly the indians -- [inaudible] have you seen anything about that?
>> district as a matter of fact, they have studied the russian doctrine, approaches that were to the to the cold war to a very substantial level. looking at specially how the soviets, when faced with the same problem which is why they are emulating the soviets to some extent, when faced with the same problem they wanted to study how others have tried to overcome that problem. so they look at the soviet method of using longer-range land-based maritime strike aircraft on what highly powerful supersonic cruise missiles, coupled with submarines and surface warships to a lesser degree, but submarines to try to launch strikes against u.s. carrier task forces from significant range away from china's -- from russia's coastline to prevent the u.s. from that point from launching nuclear weapons strikes against the soviet mainland. so you see the chinese emulating
this to a significant extent but they've also deviated from that to some extent as well. they have developed air launch cruise missiles, submarines launch cruise missiles but they also develop to a much greater extent than the base missile systems to supplement and complement the air and suddenly logicism that the soviets relied upon. so you see medium-range and intermediate range ballistic missile systems in china that can hit naval bases, replenishment to try to impact the navies of those assisting operations. been using the weapons like this and the ship ballistic missile which extends the reach of a ground-based missile all the way out to 1214 nautical mile as i understand. that is a very novel approach that the chinese have added to this capable. you also see them using a variety of systems in combination with one another to
be able to stress the u.s. missile defense systems, u.s. command-and-control systems. the catamaran which is a small missile boat at the chinese develop, produce about 80 that will produce a lot more. many people think this will be used primarily for operations very close to the coast by the outside the ability to move further out into at least in your cities region where you could have massive numbers of these launching multiplexes, multi-vector attacks against u.s. or other allied warships by firing missiles from all kinds of different directions, at altitudes, different speeds complement with air and submarine launched missiles to overwhelm u.s. missile defense systems. they are taking it a step further than the soviets ever did.
>> i run a small consulting company in northern virginia. feedings on this last question and response may be do not think the same thing we are used to. westerns when asked what game are symbols or talk about just the patients when asked what keynes resembles wart talk about go, where the objective is not connected it's the influence spread over about a the that might be what the indians are playing as well as the chinese were getting technology from the russian but also sharing technology with the north koreans, just about the only objective i can see that they would want in north korea is give us something else to worry about. can you talk more about the non-kinetic aspects of strategy that might be involved here? >> i think that's a wonderful point. you know, they coercion were singles with russia and china, it's not from the anti-access area to now kind of capability. it's a much lower level limited
power projection types of capabilities. so in the china context, the construction undisputed features in the south china sea, it does require an anti-access erie canal difficult at all. in fact, that they did the estaban use. maybe it's bee been threatened d maybe increased risk to u.s. forces and made some less likely that the united states with allies and partners will operate in the region i think the real challenger for the chinese is at some point if they want to change the status quo they have to change the kind of military posture they have toured the power projection sort of posture. at least within the first island chain. paul mentioned this in the report added think it's one of the more interesting elements of the report that is the chinese try and shift, development russian capability, some of them are suited for this but a lot of them are not. the kind of reconnaissance strike complex the russians, that the soviets created in the
'80s just isn't applicable in this long distance power projection that the chinese are going to increasingly try and do. so i think that's a real challenge for the chinese at the high-end. but i do think that the love and the reality is i take most folks in washington have been surprised by the risk-taking on the part of beijing, and that the administration has been challenged to take the same level of risk to respond to deter those kinds of action both in the south china sea and east china sea. ..
>> to a certain limited degree, you are starting to see a little more interoperability between russian and chinese forces. you see this in two areas. both of the members of the shanghai cooperation organization which was the quasimilitary security alliance. it is an organization responsible for providing some level of security in central asia. every two years since 2005 that conducted the peace mission exercises which has allowed
small-scale exercises, battalion level here to counterterrorism or a favorite regime but there has been some naval exercise as well use it to get together to plan that to coordinate activity. nothing like the u.s. does with nato allies to have that command and control and true interoperable systems at the level that we have grown accustomed to. recently, you have also seen in the far east, the chinese than the russian have been active military exercises every year and because of the large influx of russian technology in the chinese navy around systems that the bandstand radar system, many chinese warships use the same data links, data not works and
management system and so during one exercise, russian and chinese naval ships paired off. like connection group of a few russian ships along with the chinese ship in a few chinese ships at the russian ships and they paired off to conduct anti-arab or for exercises. they were able to reconnect very quickly to interoperate. we haven't really seen that level to come up with true joining us. >> hello, good afternoon, everybody. i will provide you comment relief because it is my first time for this defense system. last year with the u.s. navy. my question is this.
the simple question is i was interested in socioeconsocioecon omic sustainable development and stuff like that and i am a student so i can go back home and report. my question is that broke my heart for having one classmate classmate -- [inaudible] >> is there a question here? >> how do we know match these organized latinos are more ever i go, at least they provide -- the chinese provide food on the table in the countryside the ideology like every day of our life. how do you imagine that?
>> okay -- we need to -- [inaudible] >> thank you. any other questions? >> elrod then, my question is do we see signs of sino russian cooperation on any strategic conference? there was an article i just saw by an indian author who said they are beginning to see the signs of this impact is dead wish -- do we see it, for instance, towards japan in any way or towards north korea? in other words, is beyond the arms arrangement, are there signs that there plans to work together to deal with various
challenges? >> this is a great question. i would like to turn the response over to you because you are one of the real experts on this issue. i will just note i think people are looking for those connections. for example, the japanese have released data that shows they air scrambles in response to russian aircraft has risen dramatically and at the same time the chinese aircraft have risen and it's a real operational challenge for the japanese to meet requirements to scramble aircraft to meet rights both to the north with the russians into the southeast. one question is whether there is actually any coincidences and timing about when the russian
and chinese happen to do these types of operations. folks are looking at this but i don't think we have answers yet on those types of issues. i don't know if anyone else want to. >> maybe i cannot little bit there. you see some level of cooperation that the shanghai cooperation, russia and china although they have conflicting interests in asia, they both came together in recent years to use their influence to get the central asian countries to call for the ending of basing rights for u.s. military courses located in the region. they did join together to limit the footprint in that area. to that extent you have the cooperative arrangement having some real impact on the situation. more generally the two share a number of views as geopolitical
issues. they both tend to want to see u.s. power is limited, constrained, which is why they tend to support the role of the u.n. enforcing the u.n. to put its potential u.s. military activity. they tend to also oppose at today's -- actions that the u.s. which seem -- which tend to promote u.s. power, the development of ballistic missile defense systems, russia and china share opposition to the systems because they both tend to see those as working contrary to the interests and also working to benefit the military capacity of the u.s. itself. for that reason, china has tended to impose nato expansion unnecessarily for any alignment of interest or any desire to see
russia reassert s. hegemony and primarily because they do not want to see the u.s. military alliance gets stronger. you see those sorts of exercises and strategic influences. >> since we talk about coercion and political warfare after the u.s. alliance system. zach mentioned earlier the u.s. taken a strong stand is a good thing. since we talk about anti-ship missiles and other missile-based ways in which china is bullying its neighbors i will suggest, perhaps in the hope of a softer outcome, success there a softer outcome. i think one of those things china continues to say to its neighbors, you know, you're not going to get involved on missile
defense. the question is why not. the trilateral information sharing agreement from last december for the u.s. rok and japan. by the way that reflects to other nations in the asia-pacific that kind of stuff to be expanded further and it serves the basic military underlie, but also the political one, which as i said before, we have to articulate to ourselves that we ought to be taking steps to defend against chinese of this brand and we have to talk to our allies and partners that they need to do that. that is the first to. >> if i could just take a moderator's privilege to die than for his second on your question. a useful way to characterize it and this touches on the point paul was making before his u.s.a. necessarily high level sign of russian cooperation on
this global level and their vision of what the international order should look like, the role of the u.n., the role of the u.s. and its allies and that kind of. the real question in this gets to the point you are making a site they going be able to overcome what has been until recently approaches to a number of key regional security challenges in central asia comes out this asia, in the notion and i think until we have answers to those questions, we are not going to be able to answer the bigger question which is that this kind of a temporary alliance about both beijing and moscow are in a position where they feel under pressure or is this significant of a broader strategic shift bleeding them to institutionalize and cooperation. those are the places you want to look in the next several years
to see how the question will go. can they overcome disputes in vastly different perspectives on russia's relationship with the nam, for example so russia is providing naval capabilities to the chinese and most of the vietnamese into the indian. wow, does russia pull back from some of those activities in part out of deference to the chinese consideration. that would be a big issue to watch going forward. we have time for a few more questions. >> thank you. leander bernstein, sputnik international news. i have to take the bait on what
mr. cooper brought up with the sanctions threat for cyberrelated activity against both russia and china and ask the very question you put forward, is this going to move russia and china closer together and is it creating even more amity between the u.s., russia and china? >> you know, it is a tough question and part of what is hard is the authorities rd xs to take action against companies engaged in cyberespionage. the obama administration pursued these authorities over the last several years and they just have an exercise then. what i found interesting in the debate the last few weeks in the press here is my assumption heading up to president xi jinping visit would've been a very quiet. and u.s. chinese relations.
a lot of talk about cooperation between the two countries and not a lot of talk about anything that might seem to spoil president xi's visit here. i was surprised the last couple of days to see major news articles that had clearly been linked to major newspapers about the possibility the administration to put sanctions on before the visit. it really shows there'll be some people in the white house were frustrated with chinese actions in cyprus isn't feeling me to risk bond. do i think there could be a negative effect on the relationship potentially? i won't know because the u.s. doesn't do economic espionage in cyberrays it is not very vulnerable to u.s. firms that control u.s. dollars can't be sanctioned by russian or chinese
government that doesn't have the ability to influence dollars the way the u.s. does or the international financial systems. the sanctions challenge is one with the has a real advantage and that is part of what american policymakers are looking forward when they feel they are getting pushed by the russians or chinese in cyberrounds and can push back. sanctions give them an asymmetric edge so it is something to talk more about in the next couple weeks and months. >> the way i look at this also is vital inc. for cybersanctions is going to be the straw that broke the camels back to drive china and russia closer together. i think this would be a relatively low level issue. one of the issues of divergence between china and the u.s. will be managed because you manage similar disputes in the past over trade and otherwise. in order for the two to really
decide they want to give their strategic alliance, something else has to happen. the russians are very close having gone through the appearing cry says in some more exchange and scene and into the post-cold war attempts between russia and nato, u.s. and the european front to come up with some peaceful ways of coexistence. the ukraine crisis has demonstrated some real divergence and has driven russia to be much closer to china to try to hedge against a tear in relations with the west. china isn't there yet. there are still integrated with the west. their trade is six times the trade with china.
their economic integration, manufacturing, all of that is very tightly connected with the west. the financial relations in terms of buying u.s. debt. for those two to come together to be a shock in the western pacific, some comparable event and maybe something short of that, dispute that become to hostility. or something else that would cause the events that caused those two to come together. >> i would add for a lot of russians, china has slowed for many years like a kind of alternative to the west of the west both turned to replace all the things we would be losing out on. there has been a morag pursued
over the last year or so, but it also faces a lot of limitations because china doesn't have the same capabilities, technological or otherwise and they discovered the energy deals they tried to assign with the chinese. one the chinese will give them a discount and are going to negotiate hard understanding that the russians are in a difficult situation in china is not an endless galaxy economy slowing down in the chinese stock market plummeting. his last money available than anticipated for investment projects in that not only an issue in the energy sector. it is an issue elsewhere, too. the projects of chinese investment are going to insist on getting a very good deal of financial and nonfinancial
terms. on the technological side, again upon the energy side where u.s. and western companies have been sanctioned, looking at some of the offshore art projects, the chinese don't have comparable technology. it is not as if simply having been cut off from access to western technology to russians can easily go to china and get the same capabilities and i assume that is true in the military and other spheres as well. it is not as if the west and china are equivalent and russia does give something up if it cuts itself off from access to western technology, western capabilities and western cap will. -- capital. over here.
>> for mr. cooper primarily been anybody that wants to answer, one thing that was an address at all is the japanese naval capabilities vis-à-vis the chinese and one thing that perhaps could be addressed with a command-and-control officer training leadership skills, and battery. the japanese have a navy with considerable experience in the past 70, 80 years in the chinese don't have a tradition at the level of the are americans would have. they don't have the leadership skills. >> that actually explains why we see the chinese actions in the east china sea so focused on coast guard. so when the chinese operate in the east china sea, they will
typically send three coast guard ships around the same caucuses and they will match them with four or five. if they escalated to the navy level and you reasoned action groups instead, there is no question the japanese would be far more proficient, especially if you got into any kind of crisis or conflict which is part of why you see they try and ensure it anytime the japanese or the united states uses military force is and what was previously a coast guard encounter at the chinese will claim its militarization, the first thing they bring up because it's enough for to keep the game at the coast guard level were eventually given the rapid size so the chinese coast guard is building 10,000-ton coast guard ships. these are giant ships and they
are going to do it faster than the japanese can do it. the chinese know eventually they will have an edge of the low-level paramilitary coast guard level to push and push until the united states has to show up with military vessels. the good news is our navy and the japanese navy are highly proficient and they have a huge advantage in warfare that will not change anytime soon. it is not going to solve the coast guard on coast guard challenge and especially not in the south china sea for the southeast asian militaries are struggling to find out what the chinese are doing let alone match them. >> you are bright, the japanese have a quite formidable navy of their own right and it is very much on the minds of chinese naval leaders. i think the japanese have over 40 highly capable destroyers,
more than the chinese currently have in addition to some very capable of easily electric submarines. -- diesel submarines. the chinese do not focus on the u.s. that. they have to focus throughout the region. the taiwanese navy is still well developed having developed the capability to try to at least survive the early phases of an engagement with for quite some time. you are seeing what constitutes a military arms -- i wouldn't call it an arms race, but modernization plus in southeast asia for the amen malaysia and indonesia building a naval capabilities to address future disputes with the chinese as well. the vietnamese especially have brought a lot of russian technology recently. six-kilo class submarines with
the missiles i spoke about earlier. the chinese were not happy about the transaction because they are still deficient in any submarine warfare. ultimately, the chinese in terms of the ability to match war fighting capabilities and they know it. they've made strides in putting it together, but they are not up to the u.s. standard i am a stretch. part of the recent you want to engage is that the russians to learn from their big brother in that particular aspect. training come the chinese still rely on conscripts and they're starting to develop a mid-level nco type cadre of four there for us. the kind of experience better in the low-level military that could make decisions so the officers are controlling all of the activity from above too far away from the battlefront. they are getting there. at this they are conscious and
striving to move that forward. not entirely sure they can benefit that much of the russians in these areas because the russians suffer from the same problems. >> didn't russia also sell air defenses to vietnam? yes. >> i want to jump in about the japan rok, for example, both of those navy sent ships, but to tie them together and talk to each other and have the capabilities to not really about but defend themselves against these threats but also in terms of the capabilities against the stuff is the strike and it's not barely taiwanese looking at offense of missiles to strike mainland. the rok has gone from 150 to 300
to 500-kilometer missile arrangement with the united states but we sort of agree to permit, agreed to allow which means there is no limit anymore in terms of rok. they have embraced the kill chain in the building up a lot of offense of missiles themselves. this goes back about not really contending with the united states but all these other folks. offensive missile strike among those simple folks. >> may be one more question. >> re: coed ,-com,-com ma the atlantic council. if you extrapolate the logic of what we are watching here and what is in the back of my mind as a naval race prior to world war i and sort of walk for five
years, 10 years, do you see the ability of the naval clash in the pacific or do you see minds prevail where working outside security works, we are going to security and reassurance measures and regimes in stuff like that in walk away at some point. thank you. >> it is really difficult to see which way it goes. it is a rather close call i will say. the chinese that they continue to build their naval capacity at the rate they are doing, they are probably about 15 to 20 years of being able to field the kind of capable force that could match up well against the u.s. navy. they still have a number of deficiencies in their sleep. because of those deficiencies,
that is why they rely primarily on asymmetric means. long-range missiles, submarines, only recently that put the money to building up their fleet that they are faced to take a few detours along the path. they're starting to deploy for the first time an aircraft carrier they acquire from the russian. they are using it primarily to learn from and develop three more aircraft carriers going forward. to do that is to take money away from building up the surface fleet and in addition as zack has indicated tremendous competition of a resource with a coast guard because they see for the near term they will get a lot more mileage out of this white vessel fleet and they have in the gray colored fleet because the coast guard, what
they deployed to handle all the smaller scale maritime dispute that they have. ultimately, they look it over the hump on building three aircraft carriers. they will develop over the horizon capability and eventually field is true blue water forced to operate at significant distance from their shores, and maybe even independent in the open oceans. at that point, there's the possibility of the naval clash arising between the u.s. and china because allies will be increasingly less clear to them that they can rely on u.s. security commitment because they will have a visible capability to prevent us from moving forces up to adhere to those commitment, to fulfill those commitments. >> just one quick comment. i will try and keep this brief.
that's a look at the pre-world war i naval competition, there were two countries to look at. it is germany and the united states. and the u.k. but in terms of rising, those are the two and they do almost exactly the same thing the chinese are doing now. it takes them two to three decades. at the end of the day probably couldn't have competed with the british. the germans essentially make one major out for an amount of money was wasted. i don't think that lesson tells you how the chinese will act on the political side of my but i do think it tells you on the military side it takes a long time to catch up and despite the strained up who shamefully there'll be a lot of bureaucratic competitions within the military or the funding they would need