tv Key Capitol Hill Hearings CSPAN September 9, 2015 2:00am-4:01am EDT
even had a chance to vote on the agreement. . . this agreement. let me make four points about how iran can stymie inspections. first, throughout the term of the agreement, iran has the authority to delay inspections of undeclared sites. those are the sites where inspectors from the iaea believe that suspicious activities are occurring. inexplicably, the jcpoa establishes up to a 24-day delay between when the agency requests
access to a site and when access is granted. the former deputy director general for safeguards at the iaea notes that 24 days is sufficient time for iran to sanitize suspected facilities and points out that past concealment activities carried out by iran in 2003 left no traces to be detected. this is a long way from the any time, anywhere inspections that should have been part of this agreement, given iran's sorry history. second, no american or canadian experts will be allowed to be part of the iaea inspection team
unless these countries re-establish official diplomatic relations with iran. now, i recognize that the iaea has many highly qualified experts, but the exclusion of some of the most highly skilled and experienced experts in the world does not inspire confidence. third, and most outrageous, according to press reports, the iranians themselves will be responsible for the photographs and environmental sampling at parchin, a large military installation where nuclear work is suspected to have been conducted and may still be under way. iaea weapons inspectors will be denied physical access to parchin.
now, you know, mr. president, that i say according to press reports. that's because the actual agreement between the iaea and iran is secret and has been withheld from congress. as a member of the intelligence committee, i have been briefed on the agreement, but like every other member of congress, i have been denied access to the actual document despite how significant this issue is. the actual text matters because of iran's repeated efforts to exploit loopholes and particularly in light of press reports on what is in that document. fourth, mr. president, iran is
not required to ratify the additional protocol before sanctions relief is granted, if ever. the additional protocol allows the iaea permanent inspection access to declare and suspected nuclear sites in a country in order to detect covert nuclear activities. ratification of the protocol would make the a.p. permanently and legally binding in iran. 126 countries, including our country, have already ratified the additional protocol. yet, the agreement negotiated by the administration only requires iran to seek ratification of the
additional protocol eight years from now, in the eighth year of the agreement, and to comply with its terms until then, but if iran's past behavior is any guide, iran may never ratify the additional protocol and thus be subject to its permanent legally binding inspection regime. to prevent iran from cheating, the administration has repeatedly pointed to the prospect of an immediate snapback of sanctions as the teeth of the agreement. i will be surprised if they work as advertised. first, the rhetoric on the snapback of sanctions is inconsistent.
on the one hand, the administration says that the united states can unilaterally cause the international sanctions to be reimposed. at the same time, the administration repeatedly warns us that the sanction regime is falling apart. which is it? second, iran has already made explicit in the text of the agreement that the imposition of any sanctions will be treated as grounds to restart its nuclear program. included in the jcpoa is this clear statement. iran has stated that if sanctions are reinstated in whole or in part, iran will treat that as grounds to cease
performing its equipments under this jcpoa in whole or in part. mr. president, in effect, iran has given advance notice that if the united states or any of its partners insist on reimposeing sanctions, iran -- reimposing sanctions, iran can simply walk away from the deal. given their investment in the deal, i am very skeptical that any of the p-5 plus 1 countries will be willing to take that action. after the united nations security council endorsed this agreement on july 20, the iranians actually released a statement saying that they may reconsider its commitments if new sanctions impair the business and trade resulting
from the lifting of nuclear sanctions. this is a direct quote, mr. president. irrespective of whether such new sanctions are introduced on nuclear-related or other grounds. let's think about the implications of that for a moment. the iranians are saying a sanction is a sanction is a sanction, and iran appears ready to resume its nuclear activities if any sanctions are reimposed, even if the purpose is nonnuclear, even if the purpose is to halt iran's financing of terrorist groups.
that means if the united states reimposes a sanction in response to the iranians continuing to finance, train, arm and equip terrorist groups all over the world, iran, the foremost exporter of terrorism, according to our own director of national intelligence, iran can just walk away from the agreement that we are being asked to approve. third, according to the nonpartisan congressional research service, the agreement states that sanctions would not be applied -- quote -- "with retroactive effective contracts signed between any party and iran or iranian entities prior to the date of application."
end quote. this grandfathering clause will create an immediate rush of businesses to lock in long-term contracts with iran. iranian foreign minister zarif assured iranian lawmakers that the swarming of business for reinvesting their money is the biggest barrier to the reimposition of sanctions, and he is right. the state department insists that each case will be worked on an individual basis, but there is no guarantee that any case, much less every case, will be resolved in the short time period necessary. mr. president, there are
alternatives to the deeply flawed agreement reached in vienna. while i recognize that it would be difficult, the fact is that the administration could renegotiate a better deal. as the former lead state department attorney for nuclear issues recently noted in the "wall street journal," the senate has required changes to more than 200 treaties that were ultimately ratified after congressional concerns were addressed. this is not unusual. for example, the 1997 resolution of ratification regarding the multilateral chemical weapons convention included 28
conditions inserted by the senate. the treaty was ultimately ratified and currently is enforced in 191 participating nations, including iran and the united states. similarly, the senate insisted that the threshold test ban treaty with the soviet union have additional provisions strengthening compliance measures before it was ratified. of course, one of the problems with this agreement is that it's not in the form of a treaty which precludes the senator from inserting reservations, understandings, or declarations. but that does not mean that this agreement cannot be renegotiated
and there are so many precedents for side agreements or renegotiation of treaties themselves. more than 200 times. another alternative to this agreement would be to further wield our unilateral, financial, and economic power against those conducting business with key iranian entities. as juan sarrati, the first assistant of the treasury, for terrorist financing and financial crimes testified before the senate foreign relations committee, "we can't argue in the same breath that snap-back sanctions as constructed offer a real sword of dam d --damocles to be held
over their head for years while there is no way now for the united states to maintain crippling financial and economic isolation which helped bring the iranians to the table." every country and every business would have to choose whether to do business with a nuclear iran or with the united states. i'm confident that most countries and most businesses would make the right choice. despite these options, the administration negotiated a pact in which its red lines were abandoned, compromised or diluted, while the iranians held firm to their core principles.
the iranians have secured the following if this agreement moves forward -- broad sanctions relief, a u.n. blessed domestic uranium enrichment capability, international acceptance of iran as a nuclear threshold state, international acceptance of its own ballistic missile program, the lifting of the arms and the icbm embargoes, repeal of all previous u.n. security council resolutions and removal of the iranian nuclear issue from the u.n. security council agenda. accordingly, mr. president, i shall cast my vote for the motion of disal -- disapproval.
i believe iran will bide its time, perfect its r&d on advanced centrifuges, secure an icbm capability and build a nuclear weapon, as the jcpoa is phased out. it is time for congress to reject the jcpoa and for the administration to negotiate a new agreement, as has been done so many times in the past when the senate raised serious concerns. the stakes are simply too high, the risks too great for us to do otherwise. thank you, mr. president a
former national security adviser for president clinton. it's hosted by the international crisis group. this is one is one hour 40 minutes. >> i'm particularly pleased to be here this afternoon to host this event with the president who is here with us and we'll take part in the panel. the issue we are going to discuss today is among the most important that have come in the diplomatic forum in the last 20 or 30 years. actually when i think of the complexity of this agreement, i
think it compares only to those arms control agreements that were negotiated in the 70s and 80s, and the reason why it compares to those is because it's not an agreement which is just, let's say a statement of intention, statement of general realities, it is a complex contract not based on trust by verification, on detailed arrangements. that is what makes it in a way comparable to what we saw in the major arms control agreements decades ago. i think think in comparison stops there. i would want to share with you before i introduce our speakers, i want to show share two
thoughts with you that makes the agreement different than the arm agreement of the 70s and 80s. the first and major difference is that those agreements were essentially agreements between the united states and the soviet union. no trust between the united states and the soviet union. no trust between us and iran. tonight i say this is an international agreement and this is the final result, not in a way of making decisions but more accurately of some 12 years of engagement. it all started in 2003.
the date is interesting because that was the year of the iraq war and deep worries that saddam hussein could have weapons of mass destruction. that was the year when north korea withdrew from the npt so there was a sense that the nonproliferation regime could unravel and the only possible response was war. hence the initiative at the time of the u.k., france and germany to engage iran diplomatically. that was initiative where they became a big part of the engagement and let the engagement with the iranians. that came to nothing.
he became the president in 2005 and in 2006 you have thousand six you have a second stage of the issue. the security council was brought in. the security council had means of legal coercion and that did not exist before. so what we see today is the product of a very intense diplomatic engagement of the united states with iran. it's also a way of intense diplomatic action of a range of players. the european security council as well as china and russia. that is what is behind this agreement. that makes it, in a way, quite remarkable because today what we think of the international community, the word that most come to one's mind are unraveling.
it's not a time when we see the international community coming together. it's a time where we see international relations in a terrible shape being able to agree on most issues. the fact that this agreement is the one bearing exception to that trend toward an unraveling of the international community. so that is an important point when one considers this agreement. the second thought i would want want to share before introducing the panelists is not when you consider the arms control agreement they were achieved in the context of derivatives strategic ability where there was some implicit agreement on the status quo. this agreement, to put it in
have we consolidated the stability of the region or just open the time of calm --, i mean, nonproliferation but did not resolve the fundamental issue of the region which is the political were before us, which is read decadesdecade long effort that needs to be made. i think they're is going to be quite important to focus on the politics of the region so that the implementation on the one end is all the technicalities and on the other side there is the political context to make sure there's a foundation fora foundation for a different middle east and not just a nonproliferation agreement which is already a huge agreement. to discuss the agreement probably have an extraordinary path. tom pickering missed the plane and so he is not with us this morning.
he regrets it very much, but we have sandy berger. you have the biographies. i don'ti don't think i need to go into the biography of sandy, former national security advisor to president who we will speak to the national security interest of the united states. i would add one point. he is a distinguished trusting, and we are pleased to have him on our board. the president coasting this event, and world not expert on nonproliferation command he will speak to the implications of this agreement for the broader context of nonproliferation. and our own international crisis group analyst who has been engaged in the negotiation relentlessly, as
relentlessly as the diplomats were conducting the negotiation in the last four years and playing a very important role behind the scenes, talking to the actors because he has the better quality of understanding the technicalities of the issues which are numerous and at the same time the politics of them. without further ado, i will ask sandy to get us started. >> thank you. i am pleased to be here. i am pleased to be here. in many ways this is the eyes and ears and conscience of the world and constant the world. and this has been at the heart of the groups that are working to see this agreement adopted.
i am pleased to be part of this. abraham lincoln used to tell the story of a man who was lost in a forest on a dark night. vicious storm. every minute that would be a funders or of thunder and the flash of lightning. finally hefinally he looked up and said, god, i would appreciate a lot more like a lot less noise. i think that is an admonition that we could bring to this debate so far, a lot more night more noise in the debate. if all you are doing was listening to the congressional discussion,
you would think the agreement is somewhere between horrible and just good enough. and i think that is misleading because those who think it's horrible, but if you are a democratic senator and you have made a very courageous judgment to before this, you also have to than deal with all of the folks who are against it. it is easier to say i heard your argument. they are good arguments. this is a close call. i am for this, but i recognize all of the things he said. you have a discussion here which is somewhat skewed, and not very many members of congress want to stand up and be a cheerleader for this. we will see how the debate
unfolds. i am not sure that this is an accurate reflection of how congress really feels. i will say i think it's a strong agreement. from an arms control perspective, national security perspective. it's very strong. i'll let my colleagues to the left are experts on this describe the pieces of this. my top lines here are, unbelievable prevent iran from getting a nuclear weapon for at least 15 years , perhaps more. it eliminates a key threat to the stability of the middle east, and i think
it's verifications provisions of our ability to know what is going on our stronger than any arms control agreement ever. so on the positive side, i think we have a strong, strong case. let me focus on three issues that would be opponents are talking about and address those three issues. one is that we should defeat this and get a better deal, put more pressure on iran and get a better deal. it won't happen. it can't happen. and it can't happen for a number of reasons. number one, our partners in this enterprise have no interest in further negotiations. they think this is a pretty darn good deal, as does most
of the world. they're not interested in more sanctions. so we're not going to have them as partners. the outer rim of the sanctions regime, which has been china and india and south korea and japan, which is what made these sanctions work, with great credit to president obama and secretary clinton, they have no interest in more sanctions. so they're won't pressure. in fact, existing sanctions will quickly erode. sanctions worked. sanctions did exactly what they were designed to do. i cannot think of another case, except south africa, where sanctions it worked as well as this. the international coalition
was constructed, economic sanctions were imposed. it was a white coalition. the iranians came to the table. they negotiated a serious agreement. some people think that's wrong. but it's a serious agreement. the no one is interested. from the iranian.of view you have to imagine the following conversation because presumably during these negotiations for a better deal things have to at least freeze. you have to imagine president lonnie going in to see ayatollah and saying something later, i think that we should stay at this, continue to imply,
notwithstanding that the united states has no obligation, notwithstanding that horrible, the debate horrible, the debate you just heard for the last three weeks to five months. people take the high ground and stay with us. if you still in office, he then has to say, by the way, i think richard -- i think we should offer more concessions. i can't see how the iranians will do any better. i don't think there is a better deal. it is an illusion, a self-delusion, and we ought to get it off the table as quickly as possible. the 2nd proposition here is that iran, with all this new money that it gets will
increase its sponsorship for radical groups in the region , has below, hamas, and others, and that will cause turmoil in the region. i do believe that iran is a threat and region and that the intention is to gain influence over the region. one of the reasons i am for this agreement is because i would rather be dealing with enron it does not have a nuclear weapon rather than one that does and can use it to intimidate its neighbors, to try to keep outside powers for moving in to help that is the reason for the agreement.
iran we will have more money first is the vaunted hundred billion dollars. $56 billion. there are claims against it. some of it will come back. and presumably the iranian economy is healthier and will generate more revenue, and more revenue will be available to spend on external matters. this is just the concept. number one, this kids were demonstrating on the street not because they were happy to get rid of centrifuges but because they see an opportunity to have a better life. they see an opportunity.
suddenly the iranians ship all that money tucson. it is a repressive government. this is a very connected generation in terms of the internet. estimated to be half a trillion dollars of unmet domestic needs and iran as a result of the sanctions. if a lot of that money does not go to dealing with those needs, i think they will be in trouble. but they're we will be money , and we have to be aware of that and our regional strategy. president obama is moving in that direction to help our allies better determine defend themselves against iranian pressure. not only through arms through other ways.
the gulf countries now spend eight times what iran spends it is not really money that is giving iran an advantage. it's capabilities and other asymmetric amenities. we need to work with our friends to better position to push back a bit. the 3rd thing swirling around is that the verification provisions are not really effective because they said they would have anytime anywhere inspections and don't. joe probably knows he says that. i don't want to denounce something. it was unfortunate because no country anywhere would permit anytime anywhere. the only time that happened is in iraq after the invasion.
we were occupying. so it was kind of a false expectation,a false expectation, but i want to put it into bigger context. a big puzzle with a thousand pieces. we will have 247. monitoring of all of iran's nuclear program, stuff coming in, the mines where they mine uranium, the places where they make centrifuges and assemble the centrifuges. all of that will be viewed by cameras, seals, totally transparent. 99 percent, 98 percent is an open book.
this whole debate and discussion 24 days being too long is about a couple pieces of the puzzle. we don't no fair there, but we see something going on on a military base. the simple fact is that as we see it through our intelligence, and want to go in and see it. iea asked to. iran says now. we are talking about that subset of issues. in that case we can just go blaster way in. i don't think anyone is in favor of doing that. it's a process. it is a 24 day process. i actually think that is a good time period because
hopefully the pressure will build during that period to open it up involving the countries that negotiate and iran, but ultimately if iran does not open the site any country, any of the p5 plus one countries they go to the un and push a button and have the sanctions reimposed. we have the ability. that is the ultimate enforcement tool. the last thing i'll say, some of the critics say is too big of a tool, like having a nuclear bomb to do traffic control.
you will never use it. that is a pretty good argument. but there are alternatives. we have our own sanctions, our own unilateral sanctions we can impose if we can't get our allies to go along or think we're doing too much. we have a range of options to go after iran under those circumstances. i will stop there. there are a thousand questions and a thousand and one answers. >> thank you very much. it is our pleasure to join with the international crisis group and sponsoring this panel discussion. thank you for this opportunity to partner with you. we are dedicated to reducing and eliminating nuclear threats throughout the world this is why we got involved. we don't do the middle east.
we do nuclear. we saw iran is one of the greatest nuclear threats facing the world and tried to muster our resources to focus on this thread, to provide grants to groups working on this threat, to try to find a way diplomatically to stop iran from getting a bomb. a new war in the middle east. we are very close to achieving that goal. today we got 41 senators to say they were in support of the iran agreement painstakingly negotiated over these last few years. this brings us close to the possibility of being able to defeat, even without a veto, and a threat by the u.s. congress to kill this deal. we'll see how this plays out over the next few days. i am delighted that c-span is covering the panel. i want to thank them for the
opportunity. one of the most pleasurable addictions many of us have that is still legal. and it has been a source of great information for and against the steel, as this drama is unfolded. there are lots of things to say, and they are all being said today. if you are involved, this is like new year's day. you're not sure which came to turn into. this may be one of the few where we will dig deeper into what disagreement -- what this agreement actually is. so much of the debate has been dominated by criticism, what is wrong with it, picking at this with that part and stretching it out and magnifying the flaws so that they seem to be somewhere between a terrible agreement and barely good enough. the fact is, as a
nonproliferation expert, this is by far the strongest nonproliferation agreement i've ever seen and is more to stop the country from getting nuclear weapons to stop the region from getting nuclear weapons and preventing the rest of the from pursuing nuclear weapons programs and any treaty i've ever seen, and i include in that the nonproliferation treaty, the mother of all nonproliferation agreements, the core of the regime. this deal is stronger than the nonproliferation treaty. it is certainly longer. it is much, much longer than the original nonproliferation treaty. it had a week verification regime. this has the strongest ever negotiated. the us would have to physically occupy iran to get a better verification deal than this.
let me explain a little bit about why i say that and why in the nuclear policy world this agreement is noncontroversial. there is an overwhelming consensus of nuclear policy experts in favor of this agreement. ii was pleased to sign a statement by 75 of the world's leading nonproliferation experts just released a couple weeks ago praising this agreement and urging congress to pass it. you have to search pretty far and wide to find a nonproliferation expert who is against the agreement. there are those who have criticisms want to work on the verification regime, but opposing it, hard to find a nuclear policy expert against this agreement. when the us entered into this we had three objectives
, block iran's pathway to a bomb, put in place a verification regime that could catch iran should it tried to cheat and keep together international coalition that had allowed the strongest sanction regime ever placed on a country outside of war to be put into effect and allow that if iran should cheap wicked snapback sanctions nearly instantaneously. we achieved every single goal. this agreement shrink-wrapped iran's nuclear program to a fraction of its current state car wraps it in the toughest inspection regime i have ever seen, and it then freezes it for 15 years, almost all of the restrictions, as you will see any starts around me
last at least 15 years. some start to come often. some, we set up a special procurement channel so everything that they buy has to go through this special procurement channel. what country does that? disagreement -- this agreement mandates that. stumps -- some start to come off, but some are like diamonds, they last forever. iran is never allowed to build a nuclear bomb. the inspection regime is never allowed to and. even as some of these are relaxed 15, 20, 25 years from now, and eternity in national security terms, those barriers remain. no nuclear weapons ever and a forever inspection regime. this, for me, has implications far beyond iran
the steel tackles the most difficult nonproliferation threat we faced. north korea is difficult, but this one threatened to unleash a nuclear arms race in the middle east. if iran got the bomb, there was a high probability that other countries would at least try to get a nuclear bomb. you were looking at the possibility of a middle east nuclear arms race and the possibility of the entire nonproliferation regime, the entire interlocking network unraveling. for me this would have been a disaster, a catastrophic failure of our effort to try to contain the bomb. but with this agreement we bottle up iran's nuclear program. you have to understand what your talking about. i know you heard a lot about it taking 24 days to inspect
or that iran will self inspect or other, tiny parts of the argument that have been picked out and exaggerated beyond all meeting, but you have to look at what actually happens. they have to rip out two thirds of their centrifuges and put them in locke and seal and warehouses under the monitoring of the international atomic energy agency, take 98 percent of their uranium stockpile. remember the cartoon bomb the benjamin netanyahu brought to the un podium where he warned iran was at the point of that red line with a might be able to build a bomb within weeks, the steel drains that. there is no uranium left. they go from -- they have to eliminate 98 percent of the uranium, not even by
diluting it but shipping it out of the country. they are left with about 300 ki. you know what you can do with that? squat. you cannot build a bomb, make fuel. it is a token amount that is left. some of the real news is gone uncommented on for most of the debate. this deal completely eliminates the plutonium pathway to a bomb. iran is building a research reactor at the wreck site. this was a research reactor for peaceful purposes. the problem was the fuel it was using would,, during the lifetime of the reactor, generate enough plutonium to make a bomb. as that reactor if that reactor were to go in place it will be producing approximately enough plutonium for two to three bombs every year.
if you remember a few years ago that was the reason. israel saw that reactor and said that as a threat to us. we cannot allow that to go operational. that is how israel made his palms. most countries use plutonium, not uranium. israel built a research reactor in their country many years ago and said it was for peaceful purposes and secretly used it to make plutonium. so when they syron doing the same thing, they understood what that meant. and this is a proliferation path, what north korea did. israel was justifiably concerned. this deal completely eliminates possibility. iran has to take out the core, what is called the cauldron of its research
reactor, drill it full of holes, and fill it with cement. they have to completely reconfigure it. the new configuration will produce less than a kilogram of plutonium every year. that is a quarter of what you need one bomb. and even that has to be shipped out of the country wants is taken out of the reactor, and iran promises not to build any reprocessing facilities to do what israel and north korea have done, take that plutonium out of the spent fuel and build a bomb. as a nonproliferation expert i am excited by the provisions that set a knew standard for countries. maybe you havemaybe you have heard that it might set off a nuclear arms race in the middle east. it was a former saudi official said we want whatever capability iran has which led to fears that if you let iran keep even a token amount of uranium enrichment that saudi arabia
would say, well now we want some two. as a nonproliferation expert i say okay. if you accept this package, this deal and go enrich uranium, go at it. this is the knew gold standard for nonproliferation for how you contain and monitor a nascent program, build in the maximum tools for assuring that a peaceful program stays peaceful. it is not an absolute guarantee. a country could still breakout. what this package gets you is years of warning, years of warning. under this deal for at least 15 years if iran were to break out you would know it, and you would have a year of
a year of warning before they were able to make enough material for one bomb that is just to make the material. itit would take another year or two afterwards to manufacture a weapon. no country has ever broken out with one bomb. you have to test it. when you look at this package you really see the incredible security that it gives you for the potential for becoming a standard for the nonproliferation regime. and here's the kicker, you often here the phrase countries like iran and north korea. well, there are no countries like iran and north korea. these are the last two countries with programs of this type, someone vicious that they could either get nuclear weapons like north korea has goneon the on the threshold of getting one, which is what you feared. there is no one else with
the program this large. if you can stop the program and try to apply some of the lessons north korea and in these last two, you could be looking at the end of proliferation, the way that began after hiroshima 70 years ago one country after another decided they had to get nuclear weapons. that crested about 25 years ago. more countriesmore countries have given up nuclear weapons that have tried to acquire them. more countries have given up nuclear weapons programs and tried to acquire them. we are down to these last two. you have just taken one off the list. you have just taken one off the list. for nonproliferation expert this is a deal that is an historic breakthrough, diplomatic triumph, something that can make not just the us safer, not just israel safer, but make the
world safer. thank you very much. [applause] >> good afternoon, everyone. thank you for coming. you have heard a lot about this agreement in the past few weeks and will here a lot today. ii thought i would do something a bit different to make it more interesting. i will 1st visualize some of the things you have heard about the agreement in the past and then tell you something you have not heard hopefully that will make it a bit more interesting. so let's start with the visualization. as you heard from john sandy , this deal goes a long way in rolling back iran's nuclear capability. but what is difficult for some people to realize or visualize is what happens if
there is no deal, if we go to status quo ante? i want to show you a few graphs starting from that side, the number of centrifuges that iran had command i would like you to focus on three time frames. from the beginning to 2013 is what i call the period of escalation, and from 2013 to 2015 which was the period of negotiation, and from 2015 onward, that is the post deal scenario depending on if this deal survives or if it can no longer be killed at this point but is undermined in some way or another. if you look at the number of centrifuges, iran went pretty quickly from 2006 to 2009 president obama came to office to around 7,000
centrifuges, and from that point until 2013 when the geneva agreement joint plan of action froze the program iran went up to 19,000 i are one centrifuges. so than the graph plateaus between 2013 and 2015. if this deal comes into force we know exactly what wap. it will come down to 5,060 centrifuges and will stay that way for ten years. and i would actually say for 12 years because the total enrichment capacity stays constant until your number 12. now,. now, if there is no deal it is harder to predict what will happen. let's take the critics at the word and believe that if there is no deal the best
alternative is to start ratcheting up sanctions in the hope that we would put enough pressure on to make more concessions. that will take is probably to status quo ante with the previous pattern which was escalation for escalation. in that scenario iran, you see how the graph just goes up and up and up. by the end of this ten year period we will get to about 60,000, 50,000 centrifuges. well, the same thing will happen in the facility that is under a mountain and has the capacity of 3,000 centrifuges. iran installed 3,000 centrifuges but 2010. it did not turn on all the machines but installed 3,000 and was operating around 800
if there is an agreement, this number comes down to 1,000 centrifuge machines installed the 350 operational and would only enrich stable isotopes which are not dangerous at all, and it will stay that way for ten years. if there is no agreement iran can turn on all the 3,000 centrifuges that it has. now, these are the old primitive machines that were talking about. they also have more sophisticated centrifuges. currently it has about 1,000 second-generation machines that are installed ready to go. they just have to turn them on. it has a smaller number of more advanced machines. now, if the agreement comes into force, that number goes
down to one. for eight and a half years. from that point on iran can operate 30 machines. a huge reduction compared to where we are whereas if there is no deal they can turn at least 1,000 people to machines on overnight. let's come here to the side of the room and look at the stockpiles of enriched material. the stockpile 5 percent enriched material grew quickly from 2007 and went up to around 10,000 kilograms before the ga poa came into force. if there is a deal, this will be significantly reduced to 300 kilograms,
but if there is no deal the stockpile is there. if you project based upon the previous pattern it can grow pretty quickly, and instead of staying at 300 kilograms, it can grow up to 30,000 kilograms by 2030. of the same pattern with 20 percent enriched uranium, it went up to around 190 kilograms. by the way, prime minister netanyahu's redline was drawn at 250 kilograms. actually, the j poa already got rid of the stockpile or drained the cartoon bomb the prime minister netanyahu held up the un. it is already gone, but iran has the capacity of again producing it and based on the previous pattern if there is no deal by 2030
iran will be able to have not 250 kilograms but 900 kilograms of 20 percent enriched material. and this contributes to the breakout time than the amount of time needed to produce enough fissile material for nuclear weapons the breakout time came down quickly from 2007 to 2013 from 18 months all the way down to two months. since thesince the obama administration is come to office it has been below six months, and the joint plan of action already increased to around three and half of four months. if the agreement comes into force breakout time will go up to 12 months and remain they're for 15 to thought between ten and 15 years. and if there is no deal,
breakout time can actually shrink significantly almost overnight depending on which of these steps iran decides to implement to match the escalation it comes from ratcheting up the sanctions. by the end of 2016 we could go down to one month by the end of 2016 to zero, almost zero. now, i'm not using this as a scare tactic to say if there is no deal that will be a doomsday scenario, but it is important to understand the logic behind this mutual pattern of escalation. the iranians believe that if as a weaker country dealing with six world powers they change or are seen as changing their nuclear policy as a result of sanctions, than thethen the west can put pressure on them to change everything else, all the other
strategic decisions that they have to make as well. they want to make sure that the west does not get the signal that sanctions actually will change iranian policy which is why they try to match the leverage that the united states was trying to build with ratcheting up there own nuclear capability which is why i believe that they will escalate if there is no agreement. of course we don't know exactly how or if they would remain below the bedliner not, but if you compare the deal to no deal scenario we will be in a much more difficult situation. now, this gets me to the 2nd point that i wanted to make. imagine we come to the conclusion that we don't like these downward trends in the certainty that we give the deal and we decide we want to take the risk of escalation and see if we can
get a better deal. i would argue a better deal is more dangerous. imagine this famous provision with some miracle iran comes back to the table and goes down to a two hour notice for inspection of suspect sites, not 24 days as a challenge. let's imagine how that will work in practice. as soon as there is some kind of intelligence about suspect activity they have to show up, get access almost immediately without the iranians having an opportunity to study the evidence, discuss ways and means of making sure that the legitimate commercial or confidential information is safeguarded, and of course
we are mostly talking about military sites that are under the control of the revolutionary guard and the revolutionary guards are not a big fan of the agreement which threatens already the economic bracket that they have acquired in the sanctions economy during the past few years, and they are concerned about infiltration by western intelligence as a result of doubling the number of inspectors on the ground at any day and any time. so this will make the revolutionary guard which is already resentful very sensitive, very, even more opposed and it yesterday which does not make for a sustainable agreement in the long run. ifif you have every day of witchhunt somewhere in the country because we did not have due diligence or due process, it really does not
make for a sustainable deal. now let's get a look at another example. imagine that iran somehow accepts to get rid of all research and development. the single advanced centrifuge machines, they decide they don't want that. you have to remember that there are around a few hundred people if not a thousand people actually working in the research and development area of iran's nuclear program. these are scientists who already have that w's knowledge. if the program is totally shut down these people will be out of work and probably pushed underground and these are the kind of people you don't want to be unemployed and pushed underground. it will also have another
effect which is important to say and for people to remember, that we are talking about a proud nation which wrongly or for right reasons believes in this nuclear program as a symbol of national pride. an agreement that provides for unfettered access the same way you heard from our distinct panel implemented in a country that was vanquished and more, of course it will humiliate the radio nation. a hard time keeping up a deal like that in the next president will be in a difficult position. so the bottom line that i want to emphasize here is it is just not enough to get a good deal. a good deal is a sustainable deal, and it is only sustainable if it is sustainable for both sides. let me stop here. [applause]
>> there will be a question-and-answer period. >> i am happy to take questions after those excellent presentations. who wants to start? introduce yourself. who wants to ask the 1st question or comment? yes, in the back. >> it was mentioned that the iran nuclear program was at the top of his group's concern. where does israel rank in your scale of concern? >> there are three major threats that you face if your worried about a nuclear bomb going off someplace, worry about the new country trying to get it, worry about a terrorist group that
can get there hands on a bomb and then your worried about the nine countries that currently have nuclear weapons. there are about 16,000 in the world, and your worried that one could be used in anger of a miscalculation or accident. israel is one of those countries with an undeclared nuclear weapons program. people estimate somewhere between 10200 nuclear weapons. i think it's at the low end of the scale, so israel would be one of those countries where you worry that something can go terribly wrong, upon could go off whether they intended it to were not are that a conflict could arise where they might feel forced to use the weapon. it is not at the top of my list of countries. if i was to think about the country every about the most , that would be pakistan which for my money is the most dangerous country in the world with already
enough nuclear weapons, almost as many as israel, is racing past that, building nuclear weapons faster than any country on earth and is in an unstable situation internally and regionally. >> the ranking democrat on the foreign relations committee agonized long time and finally announced he would not support the deal but has said he is going to introduce a legislative package that will include more resources for israel in the event of additional terrorist activities on the part of a ran, aa pathway to additional sanctions if there are violations to the deal. one, do you think this is a good idea, and is there any prospect that this could
provide a different kind of coalition of support in the aftermath of acceptance of the deal that will move us away from what has become a sharply partisan issue. >> i think it is likely to have some other initiative. i think to be consistent with the treaty and does not initiate or trigger any provision of the treaty i personally have no problem with the. a number of those things are things the president has said are committed to. we'll be happy, but they have been instructed members when it gets to sanctions, i
noted i don't think further sanctions are going to be effective. let's stay on that for a 2nd. i don't think any other country in the world will for sanctions. calling in the ceo fae and saying thank you for the last several years. very strong. iran came to the table. we think it's terrific. the un approved this. we like to stay out of there for another three years. i can't imagine the conversation. in the sanctions area i doubt it will be effective. many folks are talking about what they call secondary sanctions. you choose.
you have access to iran. we have access to the united states. it is pretty powerful. i think that also is not sustainable. i cannot imagine the united states, german and chinese, indian companies and punishing them for violating sanctions that most of the world thinks are not legitimate and are inconsistent with the general global norms. could i see congress doing sanctions? yes. as long as it is not inconsistent with the agreement.
>> anthony garrett, thank you for your presentation. my question has to do with assuming the deal goes through, what are the implications in terms of the terrible tragedy right in the region with syria and iraq? >> let me start. >> specifically the implications of this deal. >> well, the easy answer is none. the administration's position has been that we are negotiating a nuclear deal and not going to mix and other issues,, and i think that was the right position for the negotiation we don't want either reality your perception that we dumb down the nuclear agreement because without syria might.
that has been the right position. i think it depends a bit on iran. as i said before, i am deeply suspicious of her on. iran can do things in both iraq and syria which would be very helpful. i don't see any evidence that iran has prepared to throw aside under the bus. if they want to be a constructive player, it would be enormously helpful. in iraq we have this strange little cat and mouse game in which we're fighting the same guys as the iraqi militia but don't go to the same restaurant. there we could have more cooperation on a tactical level.
i mean,, this could be interesting drama to watch unfold. what is the evolution of serious approach to the world? the hardliners would say syria is a revolutionary country is basically still embodying the view that it should dominate the region. i think the president believes that it is possible that iran will evolve and that this agreement to the extent it opens up the wrong will contribute to the evolution. that's a very important question. >> may i just add? this is not an agreement that solves all of our problems with iran. it does not cure cancer.
it will not help you shed those unwanted pounds. it does one thing, stocks iran from getting a bomb, but it does that very well. and that isand that is the position that the us and the european partners took at the beginning. russia and china agreed. this is what israel wanted. this is what saudi arabia wanted. if we're going to have a negotiation about regional issues some of our regional partners want to be in that discussion. real quick what it does do is, it is a gateway to those discussions. the biggest difference you had opens the way to conversations about these other issues, areas where you have overlapping strategic objectives. they both have an interest in stabilizing the region,
and interest in stopping the war in syria. can you get to those conversations? we don't no. if you did not solve the issue was no possibility of even entering the room. >> one thing, you come to the hill and breathe the air and start filibustering. [laughter] i don't mean to do that. a that. a very important point. the argument that we cannot enter into this agreement because they are causing trouble, sponsoring hezbollah and sponsoring us on and causing both to me is illogical. you have to flip that argument on its head because to the extent we can take the nuclear issue and while it off, put it out, were in a better position to deal with those things if iran is not able to intimidate its
neighbors. if iran is not able to intimidate other countries with nuclear threat i think we're in a better position to stabilize the region. >> the europeans are mostly supportive of the deal precisely because they feel they are on the receiving end of what is happening in the middle east at the moment. and they believe that, as was said, that deal does not solve that all the problems of the middle east. they have there own dynamic, but it opens the possibility and then we have the possibility of a more rational conversation between the powers of the middle east and the powers of the middle east and the outside powers. of course there will be a balance of power to mention, and one of the questions is whether the balance he ran,
it's all about more weapons, more firepower for the gcc countries or whether that has to be accompanied by diplomatic framework of engagement between iran and the gcc countries. at the moment, talking about the diplomatic framework seems a bit like pie-in-the-sky because considering the rhetoric on both sides, it's difficult to see that engagement, but it is even more difficult to see that engagement of tomorrow your talking to a nuclear iran. in that sense, frankly, the answer to your question, question, the implications of the deal will be what we make them. that is our responsibility and why i think your going to see a great flurry of diplomatic activity in the middle east. everyone knows that the deal
is not the answer to all the problems, but everyone knows this is now the time to work very aggressively to begin to build the diplomatic framework in the middle east that the moment doesn't really exist. >> one last. >> very good question. i just want to add a point about the money issue because i think i always like to look at data, and this is a case where we have data. if you look at 2011 to 2013, that is when the sanctions regime reached its apex. it was really hurting iran. 50 percent loss of value of the currency, 50 percent loss of oil exports. during that period of time iran we will have actually made the majority of its gains if you can call them gains. it succeeded and popping up beside, and the beginning of
the crisis, it succeeded in helping iraqi pushback isys. that is when there were reports of increased iranian presence in yemen. 2011 to 2013. now iran actually received about 15 billion as a result of the interim agreement, but during that same period of time aside started getting weaker and weaker and today is in his weakest position. a long-lost it's our in baghdad. it saw the islamic state taking over half of iraqis syria. it is not that money necessarily will empower iran or lack of money and sanctions and pressure will bring about a more moderate iran.
>> thank you. jim goodby from the hoover institution. i just wondered particularly what you thought of the possibility that the cooperation that is taking place now within the p5 plus one framework we will continue and perhaps expand and what does it mean for the relations among these countries that are in the group. this is a fairly important development where some potential nesting. >> i think it is true that this deal would not have happened without quite effective diplomatic cooperation between the united states and russia, which at the moment on ukraine and most issues are fundamentally on the opposite side and likewise
between the europeans and russia. and we have seen on this deal that the priority given to nonproliferation has meant that the countries have been able to coordinate their positions. and i would be cautious in suggesting that that is going to be expanded and can build on it for a broader cooperation. when there is a paramount goal like nonproliferation where the p5 fundamentally create, then they can come together, but when that goal isn't there is much less likely. there is a question of the fight against violent extremism against the islamic state, but that is fraught with difficulties
because when you read it from a russian perspective it is just a way to say, look, side is your best bet against violent extremism. so behind a superficial appearance of agreement as soon as you scratch the surface the divisions remain deep. and likewise, when there was the chemical weapons issue on syria and the security council for the 1st time in a long time was able to agree, there was hope that that agreement would lead to a more coordinated policy on syria. that did not really happened , and at the moment we see probably greater russian support to the
regime of president aside. so i think one should not overstate the possibility of convergence, but i stand to be contradicted and hope i will be wrong. but i think the fact at the moment does not support a very optimistic thesis on the convergence in the security council. the experienced diplomats at the table must have an opinion. >> okay. yes. >> hi. just a quick question. you mentioned the pressures and articulated very well the pressure put on iran to put them in the negotiations on. and i understand who is the state, the spoilers of the negotiations.
my question is, why do you think israel and the gulf area, i feel the other spoiler in my opinion and also why do you think that this is the optimal plan for negotiation knowing what we know, what iran is doing in syria and iraq? why you are releasing the pressure now and you think this is the optimal plan. although i understand the preface, but if i take a holistic approach and i see you are releasing the pressure, giving them a chance, why do you think this is the optimum point of negotiation? thank you. >> i make two points. first is the question of, was this pressure of sanctions putting us in a
better situation in terms of iran's regional policy? he will continue a policy only if it is successful. if it is not working there is no point and continuing it. we could have another 50 years of sanctions on cuba. and that is also the question of what happens with iran in the region. there is a fundamental misunderstanding of what iran seeks which is why people think the pressure of sanctions else. i would argue that as long as these fundamentals don't change, iran foreign policy will remain the same. number one, it is encircled by the us. number two, it is inferior inand conventional military capability to almost everyone else around. the uae which is the size of
a suburb of jurong has a more powerful air force that iran. number three, it is completely excluded of the regional security architecture. that is why it needs the former defense policy of supporting proxies command as long as those factors don't change coming iranian policy remain the same because those are the three elements that inform policy. number two, i think we should be careful about moving the goalposts. there arethere are not a lot of tools in the foreign-policy toolkit. one of them is sanctions. and if we come to the conclusion the sanctions were useful in bringing iran to the table. they were at the table the majority of the time, but making them to negotiate seriously, if we move the goalposts now and say you
also have to change your regional policy or foreign-policy or domestic policy, the sanctions as a tool of statecraft will lose their credibility and it will be hard to go and marshall international support to you sanctions for narrow, specific objective that people start thinking at the last minute we change the goal post. >> let me come back. it is hard for me to accept the analysis which says iran is a victim of the rest of the world. it is encircled and weekend and therefore must support aside who has killed 250,000 people. it supports hezbollah, which is a terrorist organization. you flip the logic on its head. i don't think it is black and white. iran has its own internal dynamic. it does feel insecure, but you take it for these
purposes, postulating on the other side that iran is a reactive country in the region. i think iran would be able to integrate itself more if it dealt with some of these broader issues, and i think that this agreement is a kind of steppingstone to that kind of integration. >> what makes the situation dangerous is that all countries have a deep sense of insecurity, and when the narrative in each country is fundamentally different from the narrative in another country the situation gets even more dangerous when you add to the sense of insecurity nuclear weapons, but that does not mean that without nuclear weapons you have aa stable situation. you do not. that is why you need diplomatic engagement.
certainly the narrative into round will be our push forward to enhance security that narrative will see in saudi arabia and other gulf countries the sense that they are under attack. that perception is perfectly legitimate. that is a strong reason why the region will not achieve stability without some kind of a diplomatic engagement from outside powers because left to its own devices that dynamic of insecurity will only feed escalation in confrontation. i think there was a question over there. >> the administration and the supporters of the deal insist that this deal is based and focused on iran's nuclear and is all based on trust. but many critics say that if
it is not based on trust is based on hope to achieve a certain goal in tackling the questions in the middle east but it is difficult to see that. even if behavior changes and harmonies and if it is not, if it was based on the nuclear, why did the negotiation team and the administration agreed to giving more and more incentive to iran doing a negotiation, like on purchases and missile systems and reduced periods. some of the experts like nicholas burns and michael hayden have expressed worry about this concern. >> let me start with an answer to that. ithat. i do not think the us made a series of concessions. this is a bargaining process , negotiation.
we went and with strong positions. would have preferred iran give up its nuclear program entirely. the safest outcome is that there is no enrichment facility, no nuclear activity of any kind. that was the position of the us back in 202,003 and 2005. that failed. iran built up a nuclear complex that in 2003 had about 164 centrifuges to something that had 20,000. now you trying to get them to go all the way down. it is not a freebie if iran is going to cut two thirds of the centrifuges what are we going to do? that is what the us and its partners started putting it sanctions relief on the table. these are the kind of things we do. but i don't see outside of
the sanctions relief package any other concessions that the us made. it did not lack nonproliferation standards or have a lucid verification regime. it does not legitimize the behavior. we are not dropping sanctions on terrorist activity, human rights activities. although stay in place. at the last minute you may remember, at the last minute they tried to get us to drop the sanctions on conventional arms transfers and on the missile program, and they had a pretty good case because the sanctions were adopted by the un security council because of the nuclear program. it was part of the package, the pressure that was put on to try to get iran to come to the table and negotiate a
deal. lift the sanctions. we did not want to do that. in this final agreement the ban on conventional arms states for another five years in the ban on missile trade stays for another eight years. this is a complete ban. we have other restrictions. they don't get a free pass to start importing the equipment to build intercontinental ballistic missile. so i'm sorry. i basically disagree with the premise of your question , that there were concessions made. this looks like a pretty good deal, and you have to understand, this is negotiation. for negotiation to succeed, whether it is labor and management, players and owners poor countries everyone has to be able to leave the table and declare victory which is what is happening now.
we may not like the sound of victory, and they certainly don't like it coming from us , but that is what makes it a strong agreement, a lasting agreement. all sides feel like they one. >> one quick comment. because diplomats never get credit for anything. this is a remarkable achievement. they sat in the hotel room 17 days and took a tough line. john is better than i for most of the critics a year ago he suddenly you take this deal they would say it's unachievable. so the negotiating team really didn't extraordinary job. both of us happen to no the negotiators involved. for example, wendy sherman.
she cleaned my clock. these were tough people. you see the smiles on tv, but behind that there teeth of steel. the only thing that prevents us in the us from seeing what our european allies see , with the conservative government in the uk and france and germany see, this is a remarkable diplomatic achievement. we have a better, partisan divide in the city where the republican party has decided they will not let the democratic president get anything. if he came up with a cure for cancer it would be rejected. if a republican president negotiated this agreement would have already named an airport after him. [laughter] >> and i would add, speaking
as a frenchman, as francis a difficult relationship over the years, and an ethnic occasion, france was on the top side. when it failed that verification provision or this or that was not tough enough, it made its voice heard very strongly, sometimes almost creating some worry that it could torpedo the negotiation. he did not have one country taking a tough position but a group of countries. that i would single out because it took a strong position wanting to have an agreement that would be really based on very strong verification because there was no trust, they had the experience of terrorism originating against french interests, on french territory. a sense thata sense that you
had to have a very solid, rocksolid deal was part of the dynamic of the negotiation. >> yes. >> american security project. the success of the deal will rely primarily on the ability of the iaea to verify the provisions. so what does the iaea need for the us and international community in order to assure its operating units for potential given that we know american inspectors won't participate in the inspections. what can the us and the rest of the international community contribute? >> money. the iaea is chronically short of money. one of the pieces of legislation that some of us have seen that i think should be supported by all of congress is to increase the donation to the international atomic energy agency. they will be applying state-of-the-art
technologies. if your idea of inspections is what happened in iraq in 1991 where you shut inspectors out in the parking lot for days, our friend sat they're looking for water. you don't understand what modern inspections like. this is, we will have cameras and sensors and seals everywhere, not game of thrown seals on parchment, fiber-optic seals with radio links to headquarters. if they are broken we will know instantly and have inspectors with 247 access. the entire sprawling complex , that whole thing is covered by the iaea. this agreement doubles the amount of inspectors now. we are setting up a special procurement channel so that everything iran buys they
have to buy through the special procurement channel. if you see a company in northern iran buying which is a, people will find that out. we will track the iranian the time it leaves the mine to the processing facility until it is stored. unprecedented. we don't do that anywhere else. you have to back up the iaea with money, with support, and one of the sticks you have to carry into this is making the threat of snapback sanctions real. there is a role that congress can play in helping to implement this agreement, fund the necessary inspection tools and keep your powder dry on sanctions and show the us is going to snap these in place koran keep the unity because it is not unilateral sanctions that matter, not what we say but what japan and south
korea and india and china and russia say. >> let me pick up on something you said about the next phase and how this is where we have to engage diplomatically. in new york last week and said several times that, yes, it is possible we can deal after the agreement with the united states, but it will depend on whether you continue to bully us and whether you treat us with respect. and i guess i would say, it looks to me like after the deal the combination of loading on of legislation which will restrict the president of the united states effort to provide all
that israel and the gulf states want, the political dynamics in this country and our own narrative combined with the narratives that we will here from iran could possibly make it a very long and difficult time before the discussions, the diplomatic discussions are really possible. so i guess i wonder how you think we can manage this next period or help the administration manage it in ways that will minimize the anger that will arise in both countries, certainly in both parliaments after this deal is done. >> first of all, turn off his radio and television for
the next three weeks. this debate is going to be ugly. we are sophisticated enough to understand. i think you make a really excellent point. as i was listening to you, 1st of all, thank you for all you have done in terms of putting together support. the triggers in my mind, start thinking about how we deal with this. so focused on the agreement, getting the agreement done, supporting the agreement, i think we need to think about the period you were talking about. hopefully the administration is because you can undo. there are some people in the opposition who believe the
affordable health care act strategy, which is introducing various things which will try to undermine the agreement will fail a series of amendments that put supporting senators in a difficult position. if you are democrat and decide to vote for this, which goes against a lot of your most serious constituents, and a month from now you get a piece of legislation, tough legislation which mandates sanctions against iran, supporters on, which would be logical. so they're could be a strategy here of kind of legislative harassment as one piece of this. but i think you are right. there needs to be a broader
process in terms of how we slide back. >> i was glad that sandy was answering your question. it is a tough one. i do think that over the long term it is really about building a narrative in the middle east that would not be the same in riyadh in tehran. but nevertheless that will allow for a discussion, and engagement between those countries. as i said earlier, i think that because of the regional dynamic region will not come to that conversation without strong outside engagement, and i think speaking as a european, it will be important for the united states not to think that we
have the deal now, monitor the technical implementation and of course that will be important, but that is not -- let's be as little involved in the rest as possible. i think it is essential on the country to be diplomatically engaged with the region so that the measure of reassurance comes from the united states because ultimately when you look iran is a big country. a much weaker military than saudi arabia or maybe the united arab emirates, but nevertheless when you look at the population it is the big country in the region. it will be hard to build that sense of self-confidence in the countries of the region if they don't have some kind of
external reassurance. the diplomatic challenges, you don't want that reassurance to build the kind of escalation. you wanted to be a path to diplomacy in conversation rather than a path to -- and that is a very fine balance defined. >> thank you. they and a perlman. read the statement endorsing the deal as an opening for improved relations. following up, there's a question about whether this deal can have a moderating effect on whether it can be transformational command i
>> to reassure each other we will not attack each other because if we reduce tension and then in 50 years we don't have to worry about that? >> that is an ambitious way to start. [laughter] first of all, i think it is a test of both parties not just united states but the iranians are great at casting themselves as the victim without regard