tv Key Capitol Hill Hearings CSPAN September 15, 2015 12:00am-2:01am EDT
cannot achieve their objectives because basically i'll discussed three scenarios. as you know, reported since at least 2007, the argument is different. basically in 2,003 to 11 as a nuclear program. guarantee, and other words, it will have mostly at a couple of years and after that is going to basically wholeheartedly go for the ball. in pakistan, for limited resources. human and material equipment they start to make a bomb. if they have not made a decision is because it does not serve our interest. not onlynot only is it not
going to increase or enhance security, but our vulnerability, provided working reasons. anyway, the us thought all was not going to help them achieve their objective. the number two issue of sanctions. those were negotiated. important. that impact of the economy. but they have not made us desperate. i was having a dinner with a colleague, and she asked me, can you take me to a place where i can see the impact of sanctions? i told her, if you ask picked meexpect me to take you to store the shelves are empty, such a place does not exist.
but you are talking now with the much more nuclear capable iran. second-generation, 10,000 and 1,000 kilograms of 20 percent enriched uranium. so that was not attracted to anyone. but two factors facilitated. number one, the momentum. no one can plan to create the momentum. it just happens. it is not a planned phenomenon. both the administration here, they use the momentum which happened because of these actions. in his campaign he said, you know, the life of the people. so you have the mandate. and also, one factor, the
facilitator process, this momentum, and the present seen really at the same time one of the diplomacy to work there have been times america one of the diplomacy , but this time to teams, they both wanted. so these two factors facilitated. the last factor was a regional issue. you know, from syria, lebanon always syria, iran and iraq and also afghanistan. so we talked, we need to pay attention to the issues, they are far more important. so we talked about that this
regional issue is important. americans thought, if they want to use that issue pay more attention to east asia. they did not want to run that is poorly. they encourage them to explore. >> i want to add to the question, the recommendations for the administration. we heard a lot of talk about compensating israel, compensating the gcc for the iran deal as though it is somehow detracting from their security rather than adding to it. my question is whether the provision is more sophisticated weaponry, bunker busting bombs and whatnot to israel in particular.
>> the implementation has been miserable. the iranians of plato weekend when the americans played a strong and miserably. the best way to make sure this deal does not fail, but i'll give you three recommendations that could be useful verification, there is no question about it. clear language on consequences of failure to comply with the provisions of the deal. that is not an option. if your serious about the campaign deliverables. ineffectiveness on the delivery of those in the
united states will end up with far fewer friends. compensation, i don't like that term. what contributes to regional stability should be the ultimate purpose. not sure how that really contributes. it's hard to measure. i'm not sure that's what contributes. we are going to get into that. if, withif, with your permission, it is only fair that i respond briefly to some of the assertions made earlier which i quite respect, but it is useful to provide a counterargument because it's important for the debate. i think the central theme is that iran is misunderstood, and if only we better understand it, is primarily defensive posture in the region seems to be so much
better. fair enough. we have a lot of misperceptions about the country. some are failing because it's quite a notoriously opaque system over they're. it is becoming increasingly easier to read due to these long negotiations that have happened with the united states and iran. we know much better today, but there is a lot we don't no. what was described as a stabilizing effort, as you mentioned, mentioned, are seen by adversaries is nothing but destabilizing. it is notit is not a theoretical conversation. there's quite a substantial amount of evidence that goes against the iranian claim. for example, what are they doing for the saudi's? this is never been a direct conversation between the two it has always been and direct conversation. when iran went full support
to a man in damascus that is single-handedly broken the country and caused a tremendous amount of human catastrophe and tragedy and also has contributed to spillover of the civil war, that in no way contribute to stability. when iran commits terrorist acts inside bahrain and iran plans itself inside kuwait, that in no way contribute to stability. when authorized military assistance command i 100 percent agree with you that it is not a priority, but i'm not sure why they still devil, regardless, just to focus, that does not contribute to stability. the ruling is still out. there is plenty because they are like no other actor fighting isis. let me just finish my point. >> and serial against the
saudi's. >> sunnis. >> as i mentioned earlier, they're has never been direct confrontation between the two countries. >> it is direct, not interact. >> let me make my final peemack,point, you can describe me how the doing of directly. there is plenty to praise, but it is worth asking if the end justifies the means. that exacerbates which in itself prolongs the survival of isys -- isis. you look at these actions that are incontrovertible, nothing much to debate. i'm not sure why there misunderstood or there is so much to debate, at least how i knew it.
i believe it to that. >> i want to give our audience time for more questions. something i wrote for a paper on iranian regional influence. some years ago. i think this is still true. they seem to be largely offensive to achieve strategic depth and safeguarded system, to have a major say in regional divisions and prevent. willing to sacrifice many. >> aa country bent on offense of action, always perceived in defensive. >> let me open to the gentleman right there. say your name and ask a question. >> i have a question.
i wonder if you could talk some on next year's assembly of experts solutions. do you see the guardian council blocking a substantial number? do you think the success of the nuclear deal and lifting in lifting sanctions will have a positive or negative impact on success? >> are going to have a selection next february. very briefly answer your question forces from the government we expect to see a massive disqualification. and still we expect to win the election. the people are hopeful.
they are not going to see any tangible impact. the optimism would lead to basically increasing of the participation rate and as that increases the chances of these verses winning the selections are hard. and they have been able to do the following. what i said is entirely different. for those who don't no, made of 86 people, all supposed to be basically on muslims scholars, but it is not to be a cleric and have three main functions, to supervise
or rather to check the power of the supreme leader in case of his death to be replaced. so they are not all that important. it depends upon the day-to-day affairs of the country. you know, again, pro- modernization forces are hopeful that we can have major input in the election. basically between the traditional conservative forces and the arrival. so we expect and hope that they can win that election.
regarding basically we have not exploded any bombs in kuwait. i just don't know where to begin. >> on discovery of explosives. >> there is no incentive to do anything. have not been doing it and have a good relation. in fact, bahrain, there are many, secular and nonsecular feel like the iranian government has been so adamant in its reaction, for many it was humiliating to see saudi arabia sending
forces and invading bahrain and scapegoating iran for with the doing. to see that why they should do that. in fact, as i'm telling you, we are involved. we are involved in lebanon, but not the rain. >> we had mentioned this earlier. the impression that you get from the opponents of the nuclear deal here is that it was a huge win for iran and loss per the united states, the there was a substantial component of individuals who think they gave away too much. >> thank you for giving me the chance.
because i have been critical of it myself. i developed for criteria. these four criteria are timing, strategically, strategic composition, and the 4th one is reversibility. on timing what i mean is cash for cash promise. 159 pages document and you will see that in terms of the timing, the conversation , 1st of all, you have to remove 2,000 substitutions, remove about 12 or 13,000 centrifuges, dilute or get rid of about
11,000 kilograms of enriched uranium, transform the core of the reactor, answer the questions, and activate all caps things. then they should say, i'm satisfied and the sanctions could be suspended. frankly, i would have not signed this deal. what would happen if they pass a law and prevent the president you have to leave the sanctions.
of course optimists, trust the administration. new line and trust. based on a different kind of verification. it became quantifying. if i can quantify what was given or taken still, strategically is not all that important. what is more important is the strategic composition of what was given and taken.
basically prefer to have only three cascades of second-generation centrifuges closing down iraq. the 1st generation which are very old, very important , and that's what i'm critical of basically. the composition of what was given office taken. number one was basically for path toward the bomb. then there was an issue with detection. that's why you basically supported a very robust
the post deal, capitalizing on the political success. having some sort of free range diplomacy within the region. my question as to what extent they have five whether there actually testing the waters coming up with some kind of diplomatic solution within the region and achieving the objectives in the region however they are sort of putting some lipstick on the involvement, basically very powerful
they can help us to concentrate more. one more thing that the stabilization, the 1st group, pro- stabilization, then it all the way. cooperate the saudi's with americans so that their open >> to the front and in the back. >> could you be a little more specific, one of the specific threats to national security is how they come from her on. my other question, the saudi
government is a very closed, tight political structure that they have had for centuries. >> is clearly not the case. so the threat coming from iran to saudi arabia, as i mentioned earlier, the threat is not direct. the projects that support throughout the region. both countries would seem to be the main adversaries in the region. whether it's in lebanon,
iraq, syria, or others. what's going on in yemen the backing is contributing to the degradation of the national security of saudi arabia which seems to be the most eminent due to physical proximity threat. what goes on in lebanon, iran supports the most powerful actor has its own vested interest for quite some time, perhaps the biggest damage happened. no secret about it.
also, i convenient enemy for them. whether khan quickly unless some major thing happens in the region. they may decide to come into work and to cooperate with the others to handle or to contain and security in the region. >> i don't thinki don't think it's useful or fair to try to understand one perception and disregard the other. the significance of the debate. it has been a useful conversation. between these two heavyweights, it's long overdue. it's ridiculous. and he blames the saudi's for being ready. i think that the conditions are ripe. they would be interested in
having that conversation. >> there waiting to see. but the.is how to do the negotiation. right now it's negotiate. >> says ron have a practical solution? as we speak more pressurized forces that we have seen. >> the analysis, the collapse or removal of the side would lead to the collapse of the regime. in thein the collapse of the regime is going to create more chaos that no one interest is going to be set. right now the.is to negotiate for the transition , for us sought to be removed or to leave the office not right away the two or three years down the road.
the condition for the negotiation. that's the result. but that is not the way that they perceive. it's entirely another issue. in fact, i would like to submit myself. not going to have any problem. the.is, that are fighting not a soft but us. >> the gentleman. >> yes. jones from executive intelligence review. if you could say something about the changing threat perception given the very dramatic changes in the international situation for
decades of course this was the us versus iran, the us policy was to isolate if they could not get a color revolution, but that isolation has been broken partially by this agreement and the change in the international situation. china's role in the middle east, the promise of the economic belt which will encompass iran as well as the arab countries command china will be playing an important role. putin is sending troops to syria not because it's power move but that there is a concern that the whole thing is spilling out of the chaos, and he wants a different trajectory and has the support from the europeans on that. the us is critical and saying the usual things, but maybe this is the way we have to go to get a diplomatic solution. the change on the europeans given the refugee situation
where not only did they decided taken the refugees the critical voices were being raised about the us and there policy in the region. that is a different ballgame , different world. how does that reflect in the perception and the threat perceptions? >> they can be vindicated. and they feel that in other words, you know, you have to continue. but that is very sensitive. as i mentioned, it is not just one group. there are debates. in other words, the agreement gives us a good chance to play a different role.
if we give us a chance to do securitize. the principal securitizing actor was able to secularize iran, particularly successfully securitize. they were able to pass a number of resolutions. hopefully now they can basically move toward the securitization and hopefully normalization and then we can deal with the regional issues and as we mentioned particularly with china, china being conceded as a rising power, we're debating more and more, no longer is a factory. china has been perceived as a strategic player in the world because no longer the energy security is going to
be taken as granted, in other words the security for the energy. the rising power, china is going to be the biggest economy in the world. china wants to be sure about the energy security. that is why they are going to be in iran, not as -- not just only seeking the market will look at them as a factory, but rather to seek a more strategic partnership so we're in the midst of the debate about china. >> did you have a question? >> sorry. yeah. john lindberg from the us
naval academy. >> my question is really about this debate. other voices in these debates that are advocating now for better relations? in other words, saying look, whatever our problems, these people, these others are our neighbors are not going away, and we share a culture and share history and religion, and therefore we need to change the existing situation which is not in our interest. >> thank you. as i mentioned, and think tanks, we did not consider
saudi arabia the enemy. we did not consider them a threat. the strategies okay. how to deal with them. we did not consider them. find a voice. you know, the situation is different. how do you find a voice, no, we should not have a good relation. all in all support better relation. wanted to go to king abdullah. the personal relations are important. but even today, there are number of other important forces ready to take the
initiative to improve their relationship. it is very much one-sided. why we should consider kuwait or qatar the enemy? perceive them as a threat. we are at the top of the threat space. you know, once personally, the national security advisor come easier. why don't you travel to the country? you know, in fact, to improve the relationship because of the same language you may be able to give them more confidence. okay. perceiving you as a threat,
but what can be done to also take initiative to put to rest the concern about us as a threat but also an easy thing to do. particularly after two or three years, have become their convenient enemy. there has to be a reason why >> you asked about the arab. >> sure. >> let me let her add to it. say your name. >> what john asked, don't you think the animosity goes back to when ayatollah main started talking about the
royal family and the legitimate president look after the holy places. number two, during the iran-iraq war with all of the year countries, except for syria, supported saddam. in my question is also, why did saudi arabia wait so long to send an ambassador? number two, when the iranians got involved with hezbollah, why didn't the saudi's get involved? >> okay. that's a good point, but for the 1st decade, always,
after that we had a better relationship. but you know, historically you are right. the negative you against one another, but maybe put aside that stuff. notstuff. not reasons why we should not have a better relationship. there is more -- we have to look at the actions, not just the rhetoric. the gcc was for, not against they supported all around, but after all of this animosity and, in fact, you are right, we did not even call it saudi arabia. we did not want to recognize but that is very much at the
beginning of the revolution. after things changed. we cannot explain the current behavior on the basis of what happened. he has been much different relationships after those years. >> speaking with confidence and candor, it's something to admire. if you would go to court with the legal case such as yours, i think the judge would have a hard time. you have to understand, regardless of how valid and true iran's claims are today , the country has tons of explaining to do the rest of the world. it is not enough to be right
if it is in fact that you are right you have to explain to the community of nations around you simply do not believe what you're saying. the problem is also that there's tons of evidence that goes against we sang. everyone wants to believe what you're saying, but it's hard to. on the arab side, really interested in enhancing relations creating a dialogue between both sides, it's always a mistake to think of it as one entity. at the top of that committee of people are actively advocating for knew money and have been for a long time. never equate the saudi's with the immoralities or the kuwaitis. the kuwaitis rather indifferent when it comes to
relations with iran. it is not adversarial. bahrain has a very difficult perspective when it comes to run and are in an entirely differently for reasons of there own. the relations are drastically improving to the chagrin of the neighbors. there's no point. you're exactly right. perhaps the most intense and adversarial relationship is between abu dhabi and iran, and they both have there own reasons. dubai has fewer concerns.
>> good afternoon. thank you for joining us. my name is david kenner, middle east editor of foreign policy. grow happy to have you here this panel at the woodrow wilson center on the road to election. we have here assistant professor of international relations and author of turkey's kurdish question, discourse in politics since 1990, the turkey journalist
for the economist. and doctor henry barkey who is the director of the middle east program at the woodrow wilson center. they are great discussion today and thank you for coming. we will take it off. >> thank you so much. happy to be here. i would like to start this talk with an interesting anecdote. at the beginning of world war ii turkish ambassador to uk was summoned to the foreign secretary's office on halifax, basically trying to inquire whether turkey was going to join the allied side will remain unattached.
so practically this is the we have to take and stability they did not use the term kurdish problem or question. we are really worried that the problem will destabilize us in case we enter into more on other side. and so halifax says, i've known about this for a long while. why can't turkey just resolve this issue? why can't you resolve this issue? he takes a good positive says, well, kurds on scottish. kurds --dash.
at that point everyone freezes. you know, in any case i think turkey's kurdish policy or the overall approach has since been increasing the number of scottish kurds and irish kurds. practically they been successful, unsuccessful is up for grabs, but not going to talk about in my recently published book basically spent a lot of time analyzing the 1990s. and i want to talk about how right now compares to the 1990s, specifically the
difference between 2015 in 1991. a lot of them.to the start of the goal for as the source of why things have such a chaotic and violent characterizations of them. they go for, turkey opens up to your face question jets. saddam hussein decides to punish turkey and launches a chemical attack. he attacks the northern iraqi kurds driving them to the border as aa result of which you have a large population shift dealing with the refugee crisis. pkk but overall it intensifying the security question. 2015, we also have an extraterritorial crisis, the
syrian civil war. again, a larger population shift emerging from syria and turkey. and the refugee crisis that is worsening the crisis conditions in turkey. as a result pretty much look in terms of structural, 2015 in 1991, politics, and the 1990s there was a general election that produced a coalition government for the 1st time. 2015. again, an election on june 7 which produces a coalition government which is the justice and development party.
one exception between 91 and 2015 is for the 1st time ever the political party passes the 10 percent threshold which is the people's democracy party. in a lot of ways 1991 and 2015 i quite alike. what about the conflict? in 1990 the conflict is mostly about world conflict, clashes around rugged terrain, not in areas, mounting holes that have substantial strategic influence. but in 2015 this clashes turning gradually more. different splinter organizations, groups that have popped up in urban areas that have differed in
the turkish military used to have defacto control in the 1990's with the primary decision maker a large component of policy options. but in an 2015 it will enter a difficult process of leadership with institutional distrust with an excuse with the political leadership to resolve the crisis. also not monolithic leadership but what about social perception? and the '90s turkish society was nationalistic with the
military candling of the conflict even though people have access to conventional media. but what happens in these areas would rarely be to be vacated through mainstream media. and 2015 there is a very nationalistic society but it doesn't translate into complete support for a military solution so this emerges from the fact that part of that now thinks the peace process even though imperfect succeeded in extended period of cease-fire. so once people saw it happen
if it changed social perception away from unilateral resolution. to a the contrary it is defined on a partisan lines where people who are closer to the government to argue that this is 100 percent of the. >> host: table where the suit tonight identified with the government's belief this is a political calculation of measurements in place that the state and the government had decided to go to war.
and that is partisanship how society thinks of the kurdish question period people then argue that peace process was doomed from the beginning and to head the shelf to completely the other part of this society if it is imperfect and if it could step away from a political solution. so this paints a picture how is similar but also not. so i would give the floor to other speakers in a the q&a session. >> hello everybody it is
wonderful to be here today. for those were celebrating russia shanna starting with what was a turning point when the kurds in northern syria those who are closely linked that support the pkk that took control over several areas of the border that had been expanding our control ever since because of lusby understand that dynamic we cannot properly assess what is happening between turkey and the kurds. for happened then was a great opportunity for turkey to advance the peace process but what they needed to do with that point was extent
the hand of help to do what they did which used to develop political relations but church he chose to view this as a threat but because in that area they happen to be closely affiliated with the pkk as a national security threat so what they needed to you was to keep the kurds in check in this underpins the 2012 yes it was part of that equation but above and beyond that was the fact that turkey perceive this as a huge national security threat and what they did juror do is
somehow get to keep the kurds of syria in check. that is what they were talking about and as the sauce subsequently that did not pan out. and to keep them in check somehow encourage them and that was conveyed with the steady progression with northern syria. so when the plan failed what turkey chosen giraudoux was stearic get the support of other groups to fight the ypg the when resawed the control where it was obvious
that certain facts shins were supported by turkey and of course, we saw that did not work out because they ended up taking control of that as well. so that policy obviously was not working but turkey persisted and that was another turning point and that is what propelled turkey to open the corridor once that was suggested they decided what they needed to do then was to open to
somehow get americans on their side because they get very nervous about the cooperation between the united states and the ypg. so there is is an understanding that the ypg will not go into their. so the turkey policy to open net with kurdish expansion could be somewhat successful but for how long? but many believe that church the will of attack the kurds. so of course, you could have a good and bad kurds that of
cited syria and turkey when i was in northern syria and went to the homes of people when i saw the ball was pictures of children that died fighting for the pkk rand ypg and against isis. the fact of american engagement bister again to ruth an opportunity to somehow revived the priest -- the peace process get these to get back to the negotiating table it will be very destabilizing but also for the region and.
to have turkey fighting there kurds not just the pkk if you were following inside turkey it is unjust. >> host: tea or the youth wing better targeted the ordinary civilians as well to have repercussions and what needs to be done for the americans to use his leverage because if you don't it will not be sustainable in their. to reprove turkey's actions to continue the alliance because at the end of the day the pkk itself will say
you need to the ypg support they will continue to back turkey. we're not sure we can do that. there is a great opportunity a for the united states because it led not have opened up the of corridor. also have to ruth c. it is say hard assumption to make what happens after the elections is our key. or if we have that at all but if we do the and the question is what kind of
government will we -- will we have? so we have to hope that we do have these elections and that they can then participate the people in the southeast can go to the ballot box and it comes out will be a coalition. and to some harriet will make debt deal to cut their losses but that is hard to imagine. >> to talk about the elections encourage prices
good things are out of control in recent times it isn't just the violence but you have seen quite a significant casualties of the security forces but also the fact said government is now responding is the election and government that is supposed to be independent to have to members but so what is going on there lifted the curfew then reinstated.
and a great number of television stations it is eggcrate aspect after the peace process after they have television and radio stations and broadcasting in the kurdish but not by the order of the supreme broadcasting authority. newspapers have deadlocked because they have been blocked with an order by a judge so we do have been escalating situation becoming more and more
between the turks and kurds and a significant segment of the population tuesday at the root of the failed election results on june 7 for the first time loss of majority for two reasons. it was weird there was weird to switch from constitutional to parliamentary system to the french system and there is a great deal of resistance. if it was not a kurdish or turkish issue butted the cable l way for people to express their opposition to make sure the kurdish party was that that threshold.
so then what happened is a significant number of those who wanted to make sure he doesn't get the majority for the kurdish party but most of the conservative kurds kurds, at this time they defected for a good. historically the declining percentage votes for the assessors. but there was a break and the 2015 elections was the
case with these conservative kurds change size. there also closely alliant -- alliant and despite the efforts they didn't. why not? the one word answer. when the turkish government made very clear he rather see it fall bin be saved that is a psychological break between the kurds and turkey and that is the breaking point because there is every reason to be successful they are pressuring the idea there can be a peace process even
if he did not mean to your heart was not in niche the fact is the threshold was crossed talking to the enemy , as the pkk that point you cannot go back. so there is every reason why those would have voted for the party but it was the major psychological break because the cable on television to make it clear he wanted it to fall and it also gave them confidence. but once it became obvious
he is not supposed to take part in any elections he would run roughshod and participate which is all the more recent this election was devastating because despite his personal involvement he still lost for the defeat is merck that there were overshadowed. so almost immediately he started to be essentially maneuver through another election. so maybe he hoped he could win a second time to maneuver the process in a
way that is exactly what happened. so there would be a new election on november 1st but now in the tweeting increase of violence between the states and pkk and that is puzzling looking at it from their perspective there cecily's no reason for the pkk to escalate. but they have 80 seats as many as a nationalist party and in fact, technically with them losing one member it has more seats than the nationalist side of the young dynamic coalition. technically you think any peace process will have real lakes to it needs to be
handled through parliament and democratically elected members. the only thing you can assume is that they have one target that they both is essentially cannot. this is my hypothesis. i have not asked to the leadership for called them up of the phone where you going to do, but the point i make is given that situation both essentially benefits from the violence because if it undermines the http between a rock and a hard place in that the room to maneuver is a fairly the
magic by defense, by the way it does not mean we have loss of four. all polls indicate, and they think they are this time because the previous election results are similar but there are marginal differences in the election results so therefore it is possible that on november november 1st the same results will leverage from the elections. now if the violence increases from what we saw yesterday that calls for martial law curfews, is essentially a the breakdown
in the southeast to read with the overwhelming majority. but that is ruled by the minister of interior she won by 83% to. and i suspect given the way the state has been behaving the number of votes will increase. solyndra that 10 percent threshold, then it is legitimate. so from my perspective she cannot win. it is to major ones for him and to create a coalition.
antoine is the possibility that is the best way to maintain control to go after the. >> host: team but if http is kept below the threshold then may have an argument in urban areas, organize but not centralized that will take matters on their own then there is the dangerous proposition but turkey will be unstable with the dire consequences you can think of for the turkish stability , economy and investment. so in in a way that is the
gamble. and i don't really understand. but the pkk is the un nuclear actor clearly the pressure of the united states is increasing white this week if there is a major conference that the turkish chief of staff came out this and we're fighting three terrorist organization is at the same time. and the ypg the same organization the united states is giving arms to arab with doug ground forces. we're working this the all
the way we can push back crisis. so it actually will get more severe with more dilemmas for the united states. i will stop here. >> will open this up for questions. but i want to ask the united states has dealt with less than democratic kurdish governments before. why doesn't matter for u.s. interest to resolve this right now?
>> you are absolutely right. so when it comes to the pkk as it is supported in the fight and essentially it is a racist. here we have different perceptions but isis is the most important threat it has to be pushed back and defeated and eliminated so that is the number one priority. sova priority is much different would say priority number one are the kurds am not sure which one comes first but i suspect now the
kurds are far more important there is another aspect that we have not talked about but the relationship between the united states and turkey and the government there you find there much more in line with each other even despite america's displeasure but to the destabilization of the region is not good for the united states or fighting isis requires by the assyrian kurds and the pkk. that requires complete attention and complete focus
>> i think pkk to be labeled a terrorist organization headed is the most influential kurdish movement you have to deal with that. there inferential n iran and syria but they do have some influence in kurdistan and is is a very difficult balancing act to maintain a strategic balancing act with his agenda for him to sell his oriole but on the there hand as the kurds are
feeling very angry what turkey is doing and on the one hand and what isis does on the other and for it to be the most effective fighting force, it is time to deal with the pkk and as i said, this is a great opportunity and now for them to have this experience is having a profound effect to deal with issues of ordinary people he may argue they already have that experience but it is a different set of people who were doing it.
so this is an opportunity providing incentives but for that to happen you need to have accommodation and it could be though win-win because they need to find a way to cohabitate and that seems to be getting rather difficult now americans have the leverage because they are the primary protectors at this point, as somehow bring hussites together. is a lot to ask but they should try. >> why should the united states intervene? >> with the political ambitions generally look at eastern europe the cold war
iron curtain that divided eastern europe may think in terms of that but take that geographic consciousness moving itself you have a hidden dash - - another one tusis as the underbelly in terms of the western expansion. recently the perception over its own territory is a national security issue for russia. but their desires are quite similar russia wants iran and turkey not chaotic that
they fall apart battle so not strong to become impediments and to russia's reassertion of its zero strategic plans. so russia and iran have initially supported amounts of instability and when you interview especially those in the field in the 1990's that explains a lot in the same is true for russia so if it is the result and a destabilized turkey. is not as good as a u.s.
ally, i think rather than resolving the kurdish question it is a rivalry for stability verses instability that is why the united states has stabilized turkey in that regard. >> now i will open to questions. please identify yourself and any organization and you are affiliated with. please no speeches. >> can you explain why from those of had disappeared from turkey in favor.
>> i am not sure i completely agree with your premise somehow they have been removed but just recently he said she was willing to go on a hunter strike if need me and i am not sure if i complete the understand your question but clearly it is of a young bird generation as a talented person but if anybody is familiar that is affiliated broadly speaking knows that in fact, individuals still matter in the end it is a collective movement on the one hand you have the people from europe
and organizing with public-relations. and the most interesting to date is you were silenced when he is silenced. >> the washington correspondent. the first question as if debt to produce more democratic i want to know what went wrong. for not only to become more democratic but the second question is the possibility
of the elections were a wrong to believe the turkish voters only have two bad choices? either vote in the making an absolute leader with the same outcome that we have? >> day you want to start? [laughter] >> in response to your first question why do we have this unstable situation i think it is clear that june 7th was a wonderful day for all of us in turkey. it is great for the first time we have kurdish political party over coming terribly undemocratic with the principle of the votes of kurds but people like my mom who is a hard core secularist who voted for each cheapie i expected her
to say we must do everything possible but no. but no, we cannot keep the kurds out. at is bad for the country. p phone understand so it wouldn't be assigned places. fe wanted that to move forward and if it was sincere about solving the problem they would embrace this because obviously it is a public consensus for moving forward.
but they open the said the fact of democracy working was a bad thing for democracy. i am not sure i a understand that beyond what we have come to realize that he wants absolute power and has been denied that. >> yes sanders did not encourage people spirit there is no influence. it was a very interesting election campaign. even though the majority of the press was nostalgic because of the control and
in turkey, the answer is with him becoming president of the a judicial system and everything else comes second to. to a large extent it is almost a way where he is a great politician never underestimate him however people are capable of telling him what is going on in the country in a sense deal it wants to listen to people and agree with them. you can see it the way he has maneuvered by doing
exactly what he wants them to do. have the system created that he essentially is a vacuum chamber. in terms of prices, this is a gamble that is problematic in the sense they thank you will get the same results. it could lead to chaos which is bad but who decides? if not outsiders it is the government and the president >> so if parliament you have a coalition government with
because complex by a definition are unpredictable. but it never ends when they start though war. so in that sense, i'd think there hibernating because is he walks on a tight rope. >> it is influential but was he sees these are things that are said in captivity but he knows this. i think he is keeping
/ eight show that as evidence? clearly with that. >> host: team leaderships and how it was connected to this date and to send us strong message will is happening inside syria and what did they are achieving as an alliance with united states. so there after persuaded them that is with this was about. what the pkk has said on the other hand, if you tried to
marginalize but very few of us actually predicted this because we believed when said pkk was spawned down in its fight it could hardly open at the second front but a certain sense america enabled it to do so. which of course, took a lot of pressure off the pkk on the ground. >> when we talk about the
attacks recently where one local branch said we did the attack but then the others said we have no connection we don't know. then several days later they said we did it. so you have pluses and minuses and when you try to control these assets but when you try to gain the upper hand with the psychological aspect and there is a car crash you call the police. the same thing is true for help services in firefighters.