tv Key Capitol Hill Hearings CSPAN October 27, 2015 10:00pm-12:01am EDT
if you can carry thousands of pounds of something you can carry thousands of pounds of something else. this can assist in disrupting future efforts. security measures were enacted to better protect our homeland by expanding efforts to detect and deter threats overseas. obviously much better to find things when they are not on us shorelines including screening cargo manifests before containers are loaded, scanning shipping containers that have been determined to be high risk, screening personnel data, knowing where a ship and its cargo have been, and intercepting a vessel at sea and preventing its entry. we will hear from our witnesses on how the federal government deploys the whole of government layered approach including law
enforcement, technology, and intelligence to detect, deter, and interdict potential threats. treaties and agreements with foreign governments to conduct corporate enforcement efforts at force overseas. the last five years to successfully enter for attempts by criminal gangs with suspected russian ties. we can talk about that either in this panel on the next. the successful disruption of the sale was a positive result, however the desire to obtain materials for a dirty bomb or the extreme materials for nuclear weapons are growing. due to the the iranian deal, no matter what you think about it one way or the other and the reaction that the other middle eastern countries will have to iran having at their facilities, there will be more nuclear material out of the market which is just the way that it will be going forward. you will have more countries with more nuclear capability then we have probably ever
seen in the world. that's one of the reasons we will start this series of hearings up because the interdiction efforts by the coast guard and homeland security will be paramount. paramount. that is the only line of defense, not just the 1st. it is concerning that the whole of government approach does not appear to include foreign-policy. we're heading out a path. well this hearing is about preventing, deterring, and interdicting threats that is important to be aware of how foreign policies conflict and potentially disrupt enforcement measures to keep our country safe. >> mr. chairman, thank you for the hearing. when you 1st notice the hearing i am going to wait a minute. when? about 2,005 we did a series
on national disaster insurance. included among the three things that we looked at was , let's see, hurricane of the east coast, that would be sandy, earthquakes at the new madrid fault which has not happened, and terrorism, a dirty bomb at the port of long beach. so there is a study out they're that i wanted to get in time for.for. in any case this is a subject that we need to pay attention to command i thank you for holding a hearing. the threat of nuclear or radiological dirty bomb arriving is sobering. national review of disaster insurance. virtually unimaginable 15 years ago, not quite ten years ago. coordination strategy.
numerous federal programs, activities, capabilities and fermented to fulfill the strategy. other threats outside of the us homeland is something we ought to be grateful for command i certainly appreciate that. becausebecause of the effort made by thousands of federal employees every day to protect us. and yet we cannot let our guard down for you andeven the likelihood of a terrorist cell smuggling weapons of mass destruction into the country may be low, but the consequences would be catastrophic. we mustmust continue to do everything possible to make sure doesn't happen.
are we adequately testing and validating our technologies? and procedures and training to make sure they remain relevant given the current and emerging threats and circumstances and in the event of a detonation of a dirty bomb making sure today that we will have in place the technologies capabilities to quickly and effectively respond to the cleanup and recovery of such an attack. today i am sure the answer is also no. thirdly, considering a future terrorist may be homegrown come are we doing everything that we can to track and monitor within the us the coast wide triedtrade to make sure the vessel is operating in us domestic waters of potential conduit.
i think the witnesses that are here and i'm looking forward to the testimony. >> thank you. >> i'm going to introduce everyone really quick. we are admiral peter j brown , thank you for being here. did i get it right? the department of homeland security director of domestic detection office. the office of field operations for customs and border protection. thank you for being here. and the gal director of justice and law enforcement issues. we will start with you. you are recognized. >> thank you and good morning. i am honored to be here today to discuss the coast guard's role in the prevention and response to the arrival of a radiological dispersion of a
dirty bomb. i thank you for your strong support of our coast guard and men and women in uniform. it is a pleasure to be here today the two of our most important partners, customs and border protection and domestic nuclear protection. the nation's safer in no small part to the partnerships that we have with these two organizations: i would like to personally thank the commissioners for their ongoing support and leadership. the complete statement has been submitted to the subcommittee. through a layered security approach coast guard pushes border security out well beyond the nation's shoreline of fostering strategic relationships with partner nations to detect, deter command counter threats as early and is far from us shores possible in order to prevent an attack on the homeland. coast guard efforts begin overseas with robust
international partnerships to provide access to maritime ports of origin. through our international port security program the coast guard performs overseas port assessments to confirm the foreign trading partners meet international standards for security and antiterrorism. since the inception of this program is personal have visited more than 150 countries and approximately 102,000 port facilities. two more effectively counter these threats the coast guard maintains more than 40 maritime bilateral law enforcement agreements and 11 bilateral proliferation security initiative ship forwarding agreements which allows coast guard teams to join vessel suspected of carrying illicit shipments of weapons of mass destruction, their delivery systems, or materials far from shore. the coast guard membership within the intelligence community provides global situational awareness, analysis, and interagency.
they provide security plan compliance and inspections and this reduces the vulnerability to terrorist attacks and are involving our ports. building on preventive efforts the coast guard brings agility and mobility to our detection regime with the jewel to have the ability to deliver detection capabilities anywhere. they connectthey connect over 400 routine vessel inspections, examinations, law-enforcement boardings every day, and coast guard personnel who visit carry detection devices to alert users to the presence of radiation. in 2004 we developed a maritime radiation detection program and have since maintained a close relationship with dnd out to standardize equipment and
enhance national capacity for protection with multiple levels and capabilities, including the ability to reach back to scientific experts for more information. we do this in conjunction with cvp and tsa visible intermodal provision response. many units, including our coast wide sectors, deployable specialized forces and major cutters are equipped with devices that can identify specific isotope distinguished between man-made and natural sources and reach back interagency experts to assistance. provides the nation with the unique maritime capability for radiological detection, identification, self to contamination, and routine hostile situations. specifically designed and exercised to integrate with other interagency or dod response forces. at the national level
together with the national targeting center, the coast guard screens ships, cruise, and passenger information for all vessels required to submit what we call a.m. no way,way, advanced notice of arrival 96 hours or more prior to entering port. that process screened over 124,000124,000 notices of arrival and over 32 million crew and passenger records. the response to the chief of the coast guard response would be part of a coordinated interagencya coordinated interagency effort to bring the most capable and appropriate resources to bear. a dirty bomb is suspected in route to or identify with any us port, the interagency maritime operational threat response protocol will be employed to coordinate the whole of government interagency action to achieve the best solution, and with that thank you. >> thank you, admiral brown, dr.. >> good morning, chairman, ranking member, members, distinguished members of the subcommittee, thank you for the invitation to testify
with my colleagues from the department of homeland security and the government accountability office on our 1st to prevent and respond to the introduction of a dirty bomb into a maritime port. an attack withan attack with a dirty bomb in the us port would have profound and prolonged impact. as the domestic nuclear detection office we have a singular focus, preventing nuclear terrorism they cannot be accomplished by anyone agency and takes a whole of enterprise approach and so they were deliberately established as an interagency office and benefits from the support of detainees from across the federal government. we work closely with our federal, state, local, and international partners and those in the national laboratories. my testimony today focuses on the work to strengthen the operational readiness.
responsible for the domestic implementation of the global nuclear detection architecture. a framework for detecting, analyzing, and reporting on nuclear and other radioactive materials that are out of regulatory control. dependency can be to place great focus on technology alone but it is more effective to carefully integrate intelligence, law enforcement, and technical capability to improve the g nda. the colleague captured and well stating detection technology is an important part of the overall effort to keep a nuclear device out of the us, but it is not the only one. if the us ever had to rely on our radiation port monitor to stop a nuclear device a lot of other things have gone wrong. law-enforcement missed it, intelligence authorities missed misted, risk-based treaties misted and nonproliferation programs fail.
providing effective technologies as they connect intelligence driven operations. by implementing a multilayered, multifaceted defense approach it is our objective to make it there terrorism may prohibitively difficult undertaking for the adversary. and so our efforts begin overseas relying largely on sovereign foreign partners to develop and enhance their own national detection program. in this endeavor they work closely with the interagency and multilateral partners to develop and share guidance, best practices command training. they can be interdicted before the arrival of our shoulders. the layered approach continues at our borders. the operational components of ports of entry, long land and maritime borders and within the us.
today all teams are equipped with detection devices and they have applied detection systems to the coast guard and custom and border protection to scan small vessels. cvp scans nearly 100 percent of all incoming maritime containerized cargo for radiological and nuclear threats. building capacity is also critical. and so they are presently working with 33 of the coast guard area maritime security committees sharing information and intelligence, assisting with alarm adjudication and providing technical support operational partners as they build their detection program. in case of an attack of nuclear terrorism or the interdiction of a nuclear radiological threat leadership will need rapid attribution based upon sound scientific evidence. nuclear evidence. nuclear forensics when coupled with intelligence and law enforcement information support those
determinations. the indio therefore advances technologies to perform forensic technology. make no mistake, the united states remain committed to holding fully accountable any state, terrorist group, or other nonstate actor that supports or enables terrorist efforts to obtain or use weapons of mass distraction. we will continue to work with our partners to counter nuclear terrorism and improve our overall collaboration across the technical, intelligence, law enforcement committee. we sincerely appreciate the committee support of our efforts to secure our homeland. thank you forthank you for the opportunity to be here, and i look forward to your questions. >> thank you, dr.. >> good morning.
thank you for the opportunity to testify today on the role of u.s. customs and border protection in preventing and responding to the threat of a radiological weapon that our portsare ports of entry, an important responsibility we share with our partners today. as the lead agency cvp works closely with domestic and international partners to protect the nation from a variety of dynamic threats including those posed by containerized cargo arriving at air, land, and seaports. before my appointment earlier this year i served as the director of field operations. i know firsthand how complex cargo security operations are and how valuable a programs and partnerships are two national security. since the september 11 attack attack they have established security partnerships, intense targeting and risk
assessment programs. all essential elements of the multilayered approach to protecting the nation from the arrival of dangerous materials such as a dirty bomb in ports of entry. increase the security of the supply chain. i would like to highlight a few of these efforts. today. they have been receiving advanced information on every cargo shipment, vessel, crewman before they arrive at our ports of entry from maritime containerized cargo this information is received 24 hours prior. this advanced information is then run through the automated targeting system which will compare the data against multiple law enforcement and trade databases which are identified as high risk and selected for examination.
high-risk shipments may be examined overseas before being laden onto the vessel heading for the us as part of the container security initiative. the program places us officers in the 64 and seaports at 35 countries around the world. these overseas officers have the ability to reach 80 percent of the maritime cargo heading to the united states all overseas examinations are performed with the assistance of those country counterparts. we include the scanning of the container for radiation as well as subjecting the shipment to a nonintrusive inspection. look into the container for anomalies. performing over 124,000 overseas examination of high risk cargo before the cargo is placed on a bet -- vessel destined to the us. if the exam is not performed overseas shipment will be
inspected upon arrival at a us port of entry. at the us port of entry cvp deploys the same large-scale nonintrusive inspection systems to quickly examine containerized cargo for the presence of anomalies which may indicate a threat. thosethose containers found with anomalies are physically searched at warehouses located in the seaports. lastly, every containerized shipment, every single one is scanned for radiation and has been since 2010. there are over 1280 radiation detection portal monitors deployed at us border crossings allowing for nearly 100 percent radiation screening. >> you just said that 100% of cargo leaving us ports. >> leaving us ports. >> leaving. >> yes, sir. so the 1280 portal monitors
allow us to scan nearly 100% of the arriving see containers, trucks, and passenger vehicles arriving from canada and mexico as well as shipments in the mail and air cargo environments. most americans are unaware of this critically important security measure. detection technology targeting capabilities and partnerships are strategically aligned to prevent the arrival of a dangerous weapon. standard processes to ensure coordinated and effective response. in the event they detect radiological material all personnel are trained insecure, i slay, and notify protocols. the suspect cargo is secured, immediate area is isolated, and scientific experts are notified. scientists will confer with the department of energy and when necessary refer the findings to the fbi to coordinate appropriate response. thank you for the opportunity to testify.
>> thank you very much. our last witness is misted -- mr. david morrow. you are recognized. >> good morning. i am pleased to be here to discuss the efforts to prevent a dirty bomb attack on a us port. preventing the smuggling of aa nuclear radiological device into the us is understandably and deservedly a top national priority. as we are from the other witnesses there are a wide away a programs and activities at several federal agencies to help address and mitigate this threat. mymy statement focuses on one key aspect of this much larger effort, the covert operations to assess capabilities to detect and interdict the smuggling of nuclear materials and the us.
over the years dhs has invested billions to develop, purchase, and apply radiation detection equipment on the nation's borders as well as equip and train personnel on how to use the technology. they have invested substantially less on testing to see whether it is being properly used. for example, over five years cvp spent 1 million for covert testing, and that covered all types of covert testing, not just nuclear radiological. it is important to give them credit, through much of that time and up to the present day they are only required to do a single covert test per year. they took it upon themselves to do more than that. while they did more than required, this resource investment meant that they could not test every port of entry. and it's covert tests undercover officers try to smuggle radiological materials three us ports of entry. basically this isbasically this is a real-world test of the equipment and personnel using it.
we found the testing provided limited assessment, specifically the number of covert tests was not sufficient to make a generalizable assessment of all us ports of entry. cbp conducted covert tests command 86 of the 655 locations were testing could have been done. in addition,. in addition, the decisions on which locations to test were not based upon risk assessment which meant it's covert testing did not prioritize the most dangerous materials, most vulnerable locations are critical equipment. for example, 31%example, 31 percent of the tests were done at fixed checkpoints within the us, not ports of entry. we recommended that they use a wrist former approach to help determine where to conduct covert tests. they agreed and are in the process of doing just that. we also reviewed what they
did with the results of the covert test. these tests found problems with officer noncompliance from equipment failures as well as opposite error due to lack of training. they followed up on systemic problems like these to ensure corrective actives to a corrective actions were taken but did not consistently track the status of actions to fix problems of individual locations. we recommended they do so and have actions underway to do so. in some respects findings on this program mirror some of the themes we have seen over the past several years. they have made significant progress. in particular,particular, we have made great strides since 98 when the us began deploying radiation detection equipment. in some cases agencies rushed to failure to deploy
technologies before ready. over the yearsover the years dhs and other agencies have implemented gal recommendations to address these problems, and as a result strengthen programs. looking ahead, congress, dhs command other agencies face tough decisions. complex, vital to security command certainly not an expensive. as agencies adapt to changing threats upgrade or replace aging equipment and enhanced capabilities gal will be there to provide congress independent oversight of this critically important mission. thank you for the opportunity to testify this morning and i look forward to your questions. >> thank you. i am going to now recognize members for questions. you are satisfied that cvp took into account what you guys found in that they are making corrective action? >> yes, they took the
findings my report from last year very seriously can't put together a team of folks to address those recommendations and have actions underway to fully address them. they are out all the way there yet, they have taken action. >> thank you. let's start with the questions from my letter with the numbers. what is the percentage of shipping containers inspected prior to arrival in the us port? >> every container is assessed for risk. 124,000 containers were expected. >> what is that percentage? >> aa little over 1 percent of the 12 million containers >> but everything is analyzed. >> everything is analyzed. >> screened, i guess you could say. >> depending on how you define screening in scanning , we do look at the advanced data we receive from the shipper in terms of the manifest as well as the importer.
we compare all of that to what we have in our databases in terms of automated targeting systems, intelligence information is provided, and from those reviews certain containers will rise to the top causing greater concern. highest risk containers are the ones we look at overseas. >> what happens when you look at a country like uae that scans everything. as passive systems that are made in san diego that scan everything. >> that is correct. many countries of the.radiation scanning equipment similar to what we have here. the radiation scanning is very doable from a technology standpoint. the challenge becomes the -- x-ray imaging of the containers, whether it is high, medium, or low energy, it still takes human intervention to analyze the results of that scam. so you have a radiation portal monitor that is a
very ineffective and passive system and will tell you if there is a source emanating from the container of concern. you then need to take it the 2nd step to have the x-ray technology see what is inside. most countries in the world use a risk approach like we do and only inspect those highest of concern through x-ray systems. >> okay. what percentage are inspected after they get here? >> a little bit over 1%. >> and when it hits the us port. >> it's about 2.7 percent on top of the 1 percent. >> the next 2.6 or 7 percent is the next level down? >> yes, sir. ..
examined that whatever seaport they come into. a lot of that depends on shipping patterns and where they are arriving from and where they are coming into. they should be focused on the ports that have more of a greater likelihood of finding that type of device rather than a universal approach. we thought their findings were very fair and we built a new risk maintenance that have a
more likelihood of finding those types of containers. we will inspect high risk containers wherever they enter the united states. >> let me just get this, in 2007, was it 2007 when you all past, i wasn't in congress then. it said 100% of cargo would be inspected, is that correct? so what happened was everybody set that was impossible and there's no way to do that. >> what happened is we ran a series of six pilots around the world in pakistan, the u.k., honduras, korea and hong kong. throughout those pilots, we were able to identify and document all sorts of challenges from the technology to the logistic impact and the effect on efficiencies of the cargo, things down to whether and things that would impact the dependability of the machine. through the pilot we were able to identify and catalog all of the challenges we found.
from that time we didn't move forward in pursuing that any further. since then the department has reengaged on the issue to look at what can be done. we're understanding the technology that is now present in other locations. throughout all of these pilots, what we learned as it's not the radiation screening piece that is troublesome, it's the x-raying of the machines. that law requires both hundred% scanning and screening of all of the containers and that becomes the troublesome piece. >> for everybody's benefit, the next panel is a bunch of smart people from labs who can tell us what could be seen and what can't be seen as far as they can go in a non- secret hearing. thank you. one last question for admiral
brown, if something did happen, and this is just a general homeland security type of question, if something did happen, can the coast guard talk to everybody? can you communicate with the cbp and the sheriff and the ports all at the same time right now? >> yes sir. there are systems in place that bring together ports stakeholders, governmental and nongovernmental to plan and prepare for and in case of an actual event, respond to an event. whether it's a dirty bomb or some other type, there is ongoing communication among all the ports stakeholders from unit to unit, vessel to vessel, patrol car to patrol car, there is no single communication system that integrates all federal state and local government. >> you say there is not a
munication that integrates everybody crush mark. >> there is not a tactful radio system that communicates through all those entities, state federal and local and industry, but there are coordination protocol and command systems that allows each agency to communicate with others and then to communicate to their own. >> is that called a a cell phone? >> we use interoperation, some are brick-and-mortar entities to coordinate that. we brought those together so the operational priorities or action could be taken and divvied up among the agencies. the agencies would go outperform those given the task to be individual tactical unit. >> thank you all. with that i yields.
>> thank you very much mr. chairman. i want to go into the budget and availability of money. it looks like you spent something like $2.4 billion on this overall project since 2013. is that correct? >> i do not have the exact numbers but across the enterprise as that sounds about right. >> i'll take that back since 1995, $2.4 billion i'm putting in place the technology and the question for the three of you is, is this a money issue that there is not enough resources or money to get the job done
question let's start with admiral brown. >> i say that one of our challenges remains coordination. we have a great thing going with dnd zero and within our department as we've implemented the unity of effort goals of the secretary. one of the areas in which we are applying greater effort is to coordinate the acquisition of technology so the physical devices that we are using and the doctrine and the tactics by which we use them are similar and coordinated across multiple agencies and dnd zero has the lead in that. so in your annual budget report to congress, do you need more money or less money for the specific purpose question on. >> for the specific purpose we have run our requirements through the department and through dnd zero. >> we are the strategic partner
for this particular mission. we have the responsibility bring in all of the requirements from the operational requirements and allocate the right resources to meet the nee. very recently we did something for the first time in the department. we pulled together requirements from across the agency and made a single purchase, not just for the equipment itself, one particular unit, but by standardizing the unit across the operational units but also the maintenance contract. in the long run this will benefit. that has helped significantly. i would put in a slight plug for your efforts to pass our budget, continuing resolution would put a significant clamp on our ability to support cdp in
particular to replace some of the aging monitors and support operations at high-volume ports. >> back to sequestration and continuing resolutions. mr. owen. >> similar to the coast guard, we define our operational needs with the dnd oh who will then survey the equipment with what's available. most of this has been dealing with dirty bombs. there is a whole other aspect of this radiological material control that is over and the defense budget and the department of energy budget having to do with the international transshipment and the effort to address that. i'll note that in the house version of the nda a, we cut that budget which would seem to be unwise. i understand the recently vetoed bill increased it at the senate level. perhaps still insufficient.
i do note that we are spending some $30 million this year on an east coast missile defense system to protect us from a nuclear bomb. that's a three and a half billion dollar investment. should it ever come to pass and another $3.2 billion in missile defense systems. the question for the three of you is are we more likely to see a missile incoming or a bomb in a tugboat or fishing vote or in a container? >> a dirty bomb or otherwise question. >> i think the likelihood of a dirty bomb is mitigated by several factors beginning on the international arena. the presence of radiological
detection at border crossings throughout the world is much higher. there is also the logistics aspect of international shipping. if you actually have your hands on a dirty bomb, you turn it over to a truck driver who is going to take it to the port. the carrier will put it on the vessel and that vessel may move to other ships. other ports word is offloaded. you lose control of your asset. i think the nature of that works against supporting the dirty bomb in that container. there is much more detection than we have had in the past. you would also lose control of your asset for some time as a go through the shipping channels. i think there are other scenarios where you retain control where it may be a greater threat. >> example. >> aviation, small boats.
>> i would tend to agree with that assessment. i think the answer to your question would probably better come from the intelligence community but i would say in addition to the dirty bomb scenario and a container and the challenges associated with delivering one, some of the other threats we face would be from smaller boats on whether they were radiological devices or small arm attacks. that's another area of port security that we take very seriously. >> i think most of the hearing will be focused on other than that, but it would be useful for us to focus on that. i know we've had some previous testimony and other hearings about that piece of it. my time has expired but i thank you very much mr. chairman. i yield back. thank you for the witnesses and all the work you do to protect this country. the year so go the radiation detectors in shanghai, i think they were put in place in the early 2003. after 911, what is the status
for monitoring the effectiveness , their wear and tear and the lifespan and then is it to replace them? is their plan is there better technology #is their plan for replacement? just in general. i saw that in shanghai. it was right around that time in 2002 that you would see that equipment around the world. we anticipated about a ten to 15 year life cycle at that time. this technology was new and we didn't know what to expect. it has held up very well and has been a workforce of radiation detection in our seaport. they are now coming to the end of that lifecycle and we need to replace them. there is better technology or the algorithms has advanced from where we were in 2002. the original equipment, just speaking for los angeles long beach it would receive several
alarms per day and they were all non- threat materials. with the new algorithm that we now have within our radiation port monitors, we reduce that number from about 35 to 50 alarms per day. that's about an 86% reduction by having advancement in the last decade. so there's a plan in place to replace those just like a prime sector does. >> like a refresh of all the logarithms out assume globally that same type of activity is underway. >> i believe my memory serves me right there are shippers, like coming out of china, if you got
shippers that you work with all the time that are credible and go through certain procedures you can certify those containers. >> as part of that adoption we go out and validate we have implemented what they said they would. we will treat them as lower risk than an unknown company. >> so you can be more effective. >> yes the higher risk. >> i guess, once a specific pathway for smuggling, how often is that used, when you find something, do they shut it down and open back up later on.
>> transnational criminal organizations are very resilient. they react when we are successful and so they will move the geography of their smuggling. they will sometimes change the timing in ways and we combat that primarily with intelligence so we can try to have a very limited offshore assets in the right place at the right time. i would say i started my career in the caribbean in the mid- 1980s and just this week we have fishing vessels that are trying to get from order he go to the virgin islands. they never completely give up on something that works for them. we continue to monitor those same threat pathways even 30 years later. >> a real challenge is small aviation and small boats.
i think the real challenge, i don't know how you handle that but it's got to be a real challenge. >> did you want to stay something? >> when it comes to small and general aviation, i would mention that all general aviation aircraft using radiation detectors so we have seen an increase in last ten years. our capability in the general aviation environment are thinks in a large part due to aircraft. >> thank you gentlemen. i guess i'm just duck telling here. the bad guys are sending up small bass boats from central america. isn't that how they would get anything here? some isomers the bowls, do you think we are putting too much emphasis on the shipping container when they are sending
all the drugs up in small boats. 30% total of the 100% that we know of are coming from south and central america, right #. >> that's fairly accurate. we do think somewhere in the 15 to 20 or 30% depending on how you measure and what we think the flow rate is for those drugs that are bound for the united states. those small vessels and some isomers of almost never attempt to make landfall in the united states. the era of a go fast vessel going from the bahamas toward south florida or a fishing vessel going from columbia all the way to the florida keys are long over. most of the drugs that leave south america first make landfall in central america and then take land pathways toward the border in much smaller difficult packages.
the success that we have using offshore aircraft offshore covers, that really takes those multi- ton loads out of circulation and causes success that we've had over the past decades. we see very few drug smuggling vessels arriving in the united states. small amounts of marijuana landing in california. some landing in puerto rico. that particular pathway from south america toward the united states is not really a a full marathon pathway. so we don't see significant threat of nuclear material along that pathway. certainly it could be exploited. we would have to make landfall somewhere in central america and then move on land pathways toward the u.s. >> thank you. we are honored to have the
ranking member whose recognize. >> i served eight years on homeland security and a lot of these programs were very much a work in progress. >> have you audited the program lately? when i served in the arrears years ago we found significant problems with that program. >> we looked at that program roughly in 2008. we have an ongoing review that just started a month or two ago. it still underway and we are very far from having our final findings. we'll be happy to chat with you about what were finding along the way. >> that was a major vulnerability previously. >> in terms of, you say under the noa you will have to register to own the vessel. real registered owner or a front?
when i was discussing these issues, they were like no way are we going to give you the names of people who only ships because we will lose all of our business here. that's what we provide. we provide cover. has that changed or are we getting the names of the real owners question on. >> we typically get corporate names which are. >> right which are double-blind triple blind lawyer officers etc. >> what we scan against are the names of all of the ownership entities associated with the vessel and with the containers and with the crewmembers in their hiring. those are some of the areas that we look at to try to see beyond the individual names of the people on board or the company that is shipping a given container. we try to look at all of the corporate entities and their history behind the vessel itself, its cargo in the course that it's been in and the crewmembers in hiring practices as well. we see some characteristics of companies that are engaged in the hiring that may be more problematic than the individual
him or herself. >> you mentioned the monitoring of all ga aircraft coming in. what are we doing in a maritime environment for ships or large boats that cross into the u.s. #. >> as i mentioned, all coast guard teams carry radiation sensors. they certainly include the detection element. we have also worked with our coast guard partners to give them some capability to detect the standoff ranges for small vessel scanning's. whether they they are scanning a marina for fourth of july or they have some reason to go up and out of c to look at a particular small vessel. they now have capability to do that. not just that they can carry on their backs but in their boats as well. >> the coast guard also asked us to look at detecting from above
so we have a very interesting research project where we are looking at the ability to equipped coast guards with detection system so they can scan from above as well. >> on the ais, what about in exchange, a theoretical exchange at sea. maybe the containers have been scanned and we know the risk but the ship exchange is a container. theoretically, i guess if somebody was watching every vehicle at every moment, you would know that perhaps these two ships came in very close per proximity and there seems to be no movement, but were not doing that. >> that type of rendezvous at sea, it would be extraordinarily uncommon in a container environment, it is common in the drug trafficking so we use a variety of systems, ais being one of them to try to detect if the vessel lingers somewhere for
a longer period of time than economically viable route. using ais systems and other national sensors that are available, i think we would be able to detect if a laden container ship deviated from its track or significantly delayed in route on a non- economical way and we would be able to then decide how to target that vessel either off shore or once it arrived in port for additional scrutiny. >> thank you i notice that you said we monitor every container on the way out. who cares? why? >> we scan every container before it enters the commerce of the united states.
>> no no, you said it was reversed, on the way out. >> no on the way out of the seaport, on the way in. they're positioned at the exit gate before it gets on the road and leaves the seaport environment, to enter the united states. >> so were not entering on the way out? >> you mean our exports? no we are not. i guess in the post- 911 environment, i wouldn't call it a reaction, it was a warranted reaction based on the tragedy that occurred on 911, but what we all know from this civil liberties standpoint and a variety of different standpoint, there is probably over reach because of operational things that were just flat out impossible to get to. in other cases from a cost standpoint they didn't prove that effective in deterring whatever it was we were trying
to deter in that particular sphere. i guess as i listen to this, the question would be along the same lines. if you look at the briefing material there's really not enough radiation to kill people. if you look at the logistical components in terms of the improbability of use in that somebody trying to do it that way, you put it as lose control, you look at alternatives to sort of masking where one would come from in terms of rendezvous at sea. it becomes a relatively low probability vehicle but were spending a couple billion dollars a year as i understand it in the gestalt on these different programs. is it overplay relative to the degree of risk that we are really confronting as a nation in this particular sphere? >> congressman, the way we
calculate risk is we couple the likelihood with the consequences. the consequences are a nuclear attack that would be so catastrophic that we cannot afford to take ri off this fall. we do need to remain vigilant and make sure we have capabilities to detect and mitigate. this is the ultimately preventable catastrophe. we can't stop doing it. >> again, let's back up a minute. were looking at, in essence, a 1% rate on the way in. you can maybe bump that up to 4%, but the reality is, the papers in pakistan or in other places around the globe can be relatively mixed. that's ultimately what we are checking about 95% of the cases. were% of the cases. were looking at that as to trigger a degree of further and inspection or look in that further inspection look is less than 5% rate.
so you say the consequences are catastrophic but we've already determined that we can't ask backed every container. were not doing so. so we are inspecting less than 5%. worse still spending $5 billion per dollars per year. >> i apologize. i was thinking about this at large. i could not agree with you more. we need to level our investments across all the pathways and across all the layers so that we are not over strengthening one element of our system for the ways things can come into the nation. >> i only have one minute, let me come at you from a different angle. i guess what what i want to say is this, if you look at break bulk activity and container activity, the overwhelming inspection seems to be at the container level not at the break bulk level. so if you wanted to bring something in seems like you could do that.
if you go back to the issue with the small vote, the reality is, if you leave in the bahamas and had for fort peers, you're not inspected until you've docked the vote. you could've hopped off at the vote go and the inspection is coming after the point of entry. if you really want to do harm is seems to me there are a whole variety of rather porous vehicles by which to do so if you're looking at marine time activity. i think it gives us false security. >> i could not agree with you more. we have to be careful to make sure we apply our resources across the board. that's why we work with our international partners to build our own detection architectures
and make sure they are aware and can stop them before they have any form of conveyance to the united states. >> thank you. >> the distinguished gentleman from maryland is recognize. >> thank you very much. your testimony describes gao's review of the operational covert tests. you found several areas in which the cvp could do a better job do you believe they have taken the steps necessary to identify systemic trends and systemic weaknesses to resolve these in a
timely manner when they're found? let me say what i'm asking this question, it's a series of question, i found so often, when we have a situation where were talking to each other and telling everything's going to be fine and then when the rubber fits the road we discover there is no road. where are we? talk to me? >> they had three recommendations in our report last year. they've taken actions to address all three of those recommendations. they've taken action to try to make a more risk-based approach to target their limited resources for testing to areas that are of higher risk or the technologies that are a little more costly to deploy and use.
they've also done a better job of following up on the recommendations of their prior testing, for example when they found problems on the path they want to make sure those problems have been recognized and fixed. they made improvements in that realm as well. what they haven't done enough yet for us to consider those recommendations closed, they are very close and were pleased with the progress they have made. it's only been about one year since the report came out. >> the appointment of the screening capabilities across the nation's seaports was done in a manner that caused violence and threat levels at each port or is it based on a single standard that all ports are meeting and if so, are all ports meeting the standards? >> the radiation detection equipment is in place to ensure they are all scan for radiation before it leaves the port and
enters the united states. so in that regard there making sure everything is done before it is on the road to united states. >> can you cover the steps that are taken to avoid smuggling people onboard these containers and onboard vessels? >> think you that question. i will really address this in two different ways. we did have, for quite a while, problem was still a ways on vessels. stowaways. the number of stowaways on commercial vessels has dropped dramatically over the past decade. we are down in single digits per month of stowaways arriving on
commercial vehicles in the u.s. >> as compared to what? >> as compared to hundreds that are happening in the early 2000's. the shippers and the ship captains are highly incentivized to prevent stowaways from coming on board. that problem has been mitigated substantially with financial incentives and policies. with immigrants coming on various pathways, we do have a nationality screening process, in the case of puerto rico and the virgin islands we do scan many of the people who are attempting to get in.
we have many agreements to make sure that they are in very high percentages returned to their country of departure or origin. >> mr. owen, in your testimony, you identified an initiative. i understand it was previously being implemented at several form ports other than the one in pakistan. is that correct? >> yes sir, that is correct. secure crate was our pilot program in 2007 - 2010. that was one of the six locations we piloted. >> my time is expiring so i will have some questions in writing. >> my colleague from california is recognize. >> thank you for holding this hearing. this has been of huge concern for me really since 911. when i came to congress i started the ports caucus because
i think ports are so important to this country. they are the main economic engine and i always had a sense that after 9/11, we spent a a little more time, effort and money securing our airports and we did our ports. when people ask me what keeps me up at night, it's a dirty bomb at the port of los angeles or long beach. ships make 50000 calls per year on our u.s. ports. they carry 100 million passengers, they are incredibly important and one dirty bond at bomb would be disastrous. we were able to finally quantify what those ports meant to our economy in 2002 when there is a labor dispute and the workers were locked out for ten days. everyone finally figured out
that the closure cost about $1 billion a day to to our national economy. i am concerned and i applauded congress when they passed the 2006 safe port safe port act. i wanted 100% scanning of all cargo containers. as we are hearing today, we are around 3% of scanning, greening is very different than scanning, and we keep moving that deadline. no one really seems to believe we can ever do 100% scanning so that deadline keeps being left down the road. it makes me very nervous, and all the scenarios that you are saying could never happen.
two all remember in 2002 and 2003 when abc news smuggled depleted uranium through the port of new york and the port of long beach #no one detected. it was in the size of a soda can with shielded by material that was bought off the shelf no one detected that in either port. so i get that with resources we are doing this layered approach and risk-based approach, but i am still very concerned that we are not scanning, and by the way there is a big gap between when they come into port and then skinning scanning them before they leave on a truck.
i'm worried, and i thought this hearing was about what could happen about one of these large ports, a dirty bomb exploding. not to mention the lives, we have 5000 men and women who work in long beach and los angeles every single day. i am still extremely concerned in the next panel, i'm going to see if we can talk about technology that actually could scan 100% without slowing down commerce. i'm worried and i think part of why our ports are vulnerable to this kind of terrorist attack is because of the disruption it would cause to our national and global economy and also because i'm not convinced all of the ports have a good recovery plan. if in fact something like this happened. i was going to ask admiral brown, what are you doing to work with ports in the recovery
plan? if if you imagine the ports of los angeles if a a couple ships overturned in the main channel, not to mention maybe thousands of lives that would be lost, folks not even be able to get there to work or to rebuild the ship or clear a main channel, what are you doing that would convince us, and maybe the terrorists that that wouldn't be such an attractive target because we can get back up and running quickly? there is a question in there somewhere. >> thank you for that question. i will have to go over time to answer it because it is the fairly complex. one thing i would say is through the area of brand time security, part of that is an exercise program and each city can prioritize which scenarios they think are the most important scenarios.
think since about 2003, different ports around the country have done over two dozen exercises that specifically address dirty bomb scenarios. one element of each is recovery. we have learned through a a variety of real-world events, that the resilience of the system is vitally important to the population and our economy. we've developed a process called the transportation recovery system and we've used it in response to super storm sandy and in response to the haiti earthquake that you don't feed the country through an airport but through the seaport. helping to recovery that from sunken vessels, damage peers that has all informed our processes so we engage with industry in the army corps of engineers, the navy and other
federal partners to put recovery of that system on the fast track of recovery. >> i know los angeles has a port recovery plan. are you convinced that every port in this country has read covering plan in the case of a major disaster? >> i couldn't tell you that every port has a plan is robust and well exercised as the port of l.a. long beach, but it is a significant part of the responsibility. >> i would like to see that. thank you mr. chairman. >> mr. grays from louisiana is recognized. thank you for being here today. i just have a few quick question. do you have any information on the percentages that are actually coming into u.s. ports
and any breakdown of foreign vessels opposed to domestic vessels? >> i'm afraid i don't have a specific percentage breakdowns because the inspection regime for u.s. and foreign vessels are quite different. what we do are called port port state control examinations. they are risk-based based on the history and as i was discussing earlier, the ownership, the cargo ship and so on. some of those holes are examined every time i come to the port. >> would you be able to come back to the committee and provide information for the record, but would you know off the top, if we inspect more foreign or domestic?
you have to ask my staff to do some research and get back to in writing. >> would you mind? >> i would be happy to do that. >> in regard to u.s. vessels, because they are a flag state we are sponsored will not only for the safety and security of the vessel, they are subject to different inspection regime that may suspect them two more visits or less visits. >> i've seen statistics and data that show the percentage of data that are actually inspected i remember that being low. i remember that being surprisingly disturbing. does that make sense question what. >> it certainly does.
how that relates to criminal organizations. with regard to both security and a dirty bomb, the main subject of this hearing, but also with regard to protecting our borders from other transnational threats, our operation is based on layered security where we attempt, some of the partnerships that we have with regard to port security, to inspect facilities and with regard specifically for narcotics, we also have partnerships with countries in south and central america that allow us to board their flag vessels on the high seas. those partnerships allow us to
detect -- one that i made, over 1000 miles west of the galapagos island, there would drugs destined to land in mexico and ultimately the united states. what we do using our long-range aircraft and cutters, and other partners, partners, we attempt to identify those targets as far away as possible but then whenever we can, prosecute in the united states. we not only take the drugs off the streets. >> and less any of you customs are dhs folks care to -- >> no. >> there is a federal law enforcement present on each one,
not to the level of inspection for the issues the coast guard looks for but to determine the crew. >> i have one other question. whenever i look across, you have local and federal law enforcement, in the state of the louisiana, they form this organization and they were grouped together and doing a lot of security. what role do you see those folks doing? what role do see them playing important security, part of the overall system? >> yes, we are. >> we were in new orleans for
four years so we certainly understand the role the local county sheriffs will play. they will often come in contact with individuals that may be of concern with what they're doing and those seaports. they will notify us and we will respond out. there are very strong working relationships, particularly in small communities clearly a strong role for that role. >> i would just like to add that we certainly believe the progress we have made in we have been working with our state and local department to build capabilities across the state of public safety and law enforcement agencies. in fact all 50 50 states, we have engage with all 50 states to begin to build capabilities across ernie chen.
>> thank you very much. i just want to make note that homeland security is no longer allowing the eight sheriffs to apply for homeland security grant jointly. they have to separate out. i just want to put that on your radar. >> think my first question is to mr. mauer. i represent a small deepwater port on the coast of california. a lot of automobiles come through that port. big ships come in and there are 6000 automobiles coming off of those ships. i was wondering if they have reviewed the screening procedures for non- containerized cargo and if you
had any specific recommendations for improving screening for non-containerized cargo? >> most of our work has been focused on containerized cargo because i think that's where the bulk of the federal investment has been. from a larger perspective, we have done work at a much broader interagency effort to make sure terrorists and nationstates aren't getting their hand on nuclear material that would allow them to construct a device and bring it into the united states. one of the themes of our body of work has been the technology and screening procedures are very important but there are all these other programs to make
sure we have a robust program to identify flaws before someone is able to construct a device and bring it into a port. >> mr. owen, can you talk a a little bit about the screening process? >> for all of the brake box that you see, depending on how the cargo was discharged, it might still pass. they would just that through hand held radio devices. the bananas and pineapples that have come into the port are also computerized and come through the radiation monitors. it is our primary detection methodology but we also have some personal radiation pager. >> thank you for that. do you think small ports are
more vulnerable than large ports? >> i think small ports are less honorable because everybody knows everybody. you have the same vessels that call every three or four bit days. i think in that environment from the outside, unknown, somebody who somebody who is up to no good will stand out. when the terminal operators, when they notice something that is amiss, they reach out to the federal police. >> if there was a port that went down, are there contingency plans to keep trade moving? >> that's a great question, thank you. partly because trade is not entirely of federal responsibility, the private
sector and their distribution shipping networks would adapt to any disruption, whether it was a national man main destruction or a. some of that could be directed or shaped by federal response including the coast guard captain. they would work with neighboring captains of the port to see if we could expedite the adaptation of shippers to the new conditions. >> each part does not necessarily aware of a specific contingency plan. it's just if something happens, you will adapt. >> each port has this committee which has a planning process, but because it would be so dependent on one scenario, it
would be hard-pressed drive a specific recovery plan for that port. >> thank you, i yield back. >> we have a second panel now that we were just looking at their testimony and it's in math, whatever language math is in. i just want to stress, coming in from known areas we can do the assessment. i guess my question is why wouldn't a bad guy who wants to get a bad device take the same route as drugs into the u.s. why when you bring it up through central america and sneak it across. is that totally crazy talk? do you think they would ship it in and have the manifest beyond us and all that stuff?? >> that is certainly one of the scenarios we consider.
we do look at alternate means of bringing the vessel in. we analyzed almost 400 elements of the architecture. we then base our resources on that. >> thank you mr. chairman, i guess i want one more clarification from the three of you, we are basically banking on this layered approach. this point of origin, when it leaves the port. although the three of you sitting here today saying that you are 100% positive that a dirty bomb could not slip through and get to have our ports through our security
model? >> i don't think anybody can give you 100% guarantee for that but i can tell you based on the incredible resources of our law enforcement officers, our intelligence committee and technical community, community, we are bringing every lost resource to bear. if we didn't have this multifaceted approach we would be far more vulnerable. >> would we be better off with a hundred% skinning? >> in the classified section i'd love to walk through with you would describe why we probably wouldn't be. >> the only thing i would add to that is we have had over the past 12 years or so several scenarios in which there was a radiological or threat concern on a vessel coming in from overseas. with the motor process begun, we were able to board the vessel at sea and resolve the issue are bringing the issue to a safe
place with minimal population to conduct the examination and resolve the issue. in one very specific case, not regarding a bomb threat, but a possible terrorist threat where it was ambiguous to whether the vessel was going to a united states coronary u.s. court, are you still able to do that same level of communication? it's a very good effect? the processes we have in place are effective for recognizing and responding to these threats in a way that will mitigate the probable impacts but i can't guarantee with 100% certainty that we can completely prevent a dirty bomb. >> every container coming out of
fellow from lowe's alamos and that is my daytime job but this is something i have spent working on emerson's 9/11. on that day the department of energy in the department of defense were kind enough to send an airplane out to mexico to get the doctor out to pursue some projects that we were looking into one of which was a concern there were nuclear materials here in the capital perhaps in the form of an operational form. so we spent some time looking into that. looking at dirty bombs and the big brothers.
put those protection approaches are similar that as was pointed out to earlier, groups have smuggled fairly frequently with actual enriched uranium is a little harder to find excuse me it is harder but not that much easier. so we tried to find nuclear materials. as an air force colonel for whenever it has been, i worked on designing nuclear weapons, a testing of nuclear weapons, but 9/11 was the first time i ever had to worry about the problem to detect nuclear materials. i find it to be very
difficult and challenging business. there are a lot harder to find they and the dirty bombs and we also found although we have good techniques for diffusing nuclear weapons once you find the business in the first place is very difficult. after 9/11 a continued to work with the department of defense for a couple of years to remedy this problem it was very frustrating and was quite difficult because we went in the wrong direction to recognize neutrons' the tiny particles of matter, they don't carry an electrical charge but can go through the thing it is a great way to a canceled nuclear to materials in
particular when they produce maurer neutrons and hence the signature so that makes them a good thing to work with but we got off on the wrong foot we adopted the idea of the track was to standoff for miles with the particle accelerator to try to do the elimination from there but that does not improve survivability and it just made everything more complicated and we got discouraged with that approach. after a while at looked too hard and we gave up. so the problem has nodded financed very much from 9/11 two today to detect nuclear
weapons. what has changed? there are five things. number one. a decade of development of nuclear sources and detectors that made much more practical schemes possible. and even affordable possibly. so you could now have detector systems on transborder vehicles or ships and do an inspection of all the things from nuclear weapons. second to, what that leads to an end in the testimony inland's to a modular deployment most moving to
the 20-foot equivalent unit now is a 45 unit that i get wrapped up between the bulkhead of the big ship. happily if you use neutrons arafat last, they are very well suited to candle or inspect such creatures in port or in transit. second, what hit me there is a mistake that we made early on to ignore the countermeasures to the approach that we were dancing for detection. we were asked to go against a friend of the adversary that makes life easier for us and that turned out to not be a favor because we
ignored the fact that there are observers better used to control ordinary power nuclear reactors. they gobble those up efficiently so 1,000 of an inch could not the signals down to almost nothing but then it turns out to that the neutrons could easily get a rare these absorption to produce the big signal that is insensitive to the known countermeasures. there is the penalty does somebody mentioned already when you x-ray, most go places that you're not interested lake with the big
teu if you look for a ball that is 10 centimeters across and said teu is 3 meters only a fraction of the neutrons hit the core activate to produce a signal the rest is not always so there is a problem you have to overcome. but the third thing that i realized is that in the process to get the nuclear core that the neutrons would identify themselves instead of that the initial energy% to have a spectrum between 10% and 90% better readily identified air and can beat filtered out if you throw away the new ways
efficiently. particularly since the distribution of norway's from the source is fairly specific and doesn't degrade much in the process to slow down so you don't wind up with too many new ways neutron's showing up where you expect your signal. those three things or four things, made life a lot easier to the point you can do very effective filtering on energy that makes up for what you lose initially in the numbers of neutrons that miss the target. overall you can get signals at the appropriate energies that are observed halfway through the slowing down
process ratios between 100,000 or more that means you can have a confident detection of nuclear materials with the very low false alarm ratio of other materials. as someone alluded to, the tough thing about x-rays is you never know what it will be in a shipping container it could be axles or electronics and even if you can radiograph those then you have to go through long screening process are the unpacking process to figure out what it was. with those high signals of norway's you have a fighting chance to pass everything through without having to go back to sort what the
problem was in the first place. it just seemed to have the characteristics that we were looking for. i was on the advisory committee for air force base in the north command when it was first created we were trying to figure out how to parcel out, all the smoke. it just jumped forward for by big your pardon is seemed to do everything that the coast guard would do that would detect failings or eradicate losses and false alarms with the first line
of defense of the country purports sorry i went over. >> we will contact you. >>. >> chairman hunter and ranking member and distinguished members, they give for the opportunity to testify today to respond to an attack. ims systems analyst from albuquerque mexico specializing in architecture over the past five years in its states government and foreign partners have been working for more than a decade to reduce the risk of her idiological disbursement attack from the engineering standpoint rest is a combination of the
likelihood of the degree that the adversary has the intent and capability and materials acquired. it is a complex and multi dimensional problem the u.s. government has designed and implemented a number of programs based on scientific studies to reduce the likelihood of attack to reduce the availability of exploitation as well as identifying the pathways but the scientific understanding of the cost in the psychological effects are less well understood. and has been established for cleanup and publications written by the organization indicates there understanding of the possible economic consequences of an attack.
in 2006 or 2007 and august of this share were convicted of attempting to develop a dirty blonde in the eric city and chicago and elsewhere. they could be developed by a lone wolf individual to a high capable and technical competence adversary like who perpetrated the attacks on the subway system in 1995 in tokyo. the more likely they would be to find ways to spread over a larger area at higher activity levels. says the study at the port of boston angeles many programs have looked at that threat likelihood for security or the office of domestic and foreign programs in said dhs
architecture to identify radioactive material. if a device is located prior to detonation we have a rapid response. they're unlikely to result peeling to those caused by the blast there may be long term effects to other individuals however depending on involved the consequence could be considerable if it is difficult to remove from the services the contaminated area could be off limits for months or years that could affect those businesses to be shattered or their residences to be relocated holocaust and decontamination is undertaken. also into your dependencies -- interdependency since there is no standard, it is
difficult to estimate the cost of decontamination. the risk is real and multifaceted and there's a number of programs to increase the difficulty of movement of materials read to -- resulting in reduced likelihood of an attack. for the development of policies and capabilities for cleanup to allow for resumption of formal operations constitute an important element of the integrated solution to address the threat. thank you. >> if you actually gave 30 seconds back to the doctor. [laughter] >> from the american association of port authorities you are recognized. >> chairman hunter and
ranking member and distinguished members of the subcommittee and a director of the maritime security in boston and here today on behalf of the port authorities. a unified collective voice we empower the poor authorities maritime industry and service providers to create economic and social value for the communities so those resources in partnerships inform the leaders in maritime professionals in all segments of the industry security is our top priority for all members in the testimony i am giving today is to secure airports from the dirty bombs could not happen without strong
partnerships. our ongoing relationship support authority of federal government specifically customs import protection, united states coast guard, fbi, the state and local law-enforcement who play a vital role to identify threats, combine security resources into a dirty bomb were to arrive. the threat of a dirty bonds ending up in the hands of people was underscored recently from illicit smuggling operation that was reported over the last five years there has been the least four attempts by criminals in eastern europe to send the materials to the middle eastern extremists of the plots were successful these materials could have been used to construct a dirty bomb used against us. the concern is terrorists
could exploit the maritime system to bring a dirty bomb into the country. stopping them before they reach the shores is a priority but we must have the effective system to detect if there never to make it to the shores. a fully funded border protection agency is the for step to fight the threat of dirty bombs. to meet the ships and all ports of entry to check the manifest to utilize rhodesian portal monitors. the ports rely upon these to detect 30 bombs with cargo shipped into the country. the protection device has the noninterest their process to detect movement of freight to their presence of nuclear idiological materials. they are mandated from the
active 2006 the volume must have our opinions and all containers must be screened for radiation. most 10 years since they were mandated but questions have been raised of who is responsible to pay for new portals? what is the long-term obligation? a d chess inspector general states the initial estimates showed the average useful life expectancy of 10 years. what we hear repeatedly is the lack of clarity of funding to read minister the r.p.m. program. it has become a hindrance how we protect our ports. we're fast coming to the end
of first generation of life expectancy in the ports such as tampa, jacksonville, long beach, new york, a mobile report complicated discussions with regional offers on a the ongoing responsibility correlated to the r.p.m.. the recent example where we requested jacksonville assume financial responsibility for the technology park where suffering connectivity. this is significant given the complex and critical nature of these systems. other ports are reporting similar disruptions. there is too much at stake
congress and the administration. >> is a federally mandated program there should request adequate federal funding and it became all equipment at the ports through the united states but this is not feasible. the department of common security should consider a standalone priority titled radiation detection monitors. it will expand on the full capability to support the purchase and installation of radiation detection portals. regarding the port security grant program many port authorities have utilize that to obtain idiological nuclear detection equipment
those devices the first responders where the isotopes are used to determine the radiation and a sophisticated backpack detection device are some of the items acquired they not only supplement the efforts efforts, also enhance law enforcement role in the small vessel of the protection program jeff congress restore the funding to the original level to maintain them as a stand-alone program. additionally they go directly to the ports with that security facility to have the necessary resources to implement the security programs. in conclusion, we must provide law-enforcement agencies such as the port
security directors with all the tools and resources necessary to succeed. i appreciate the opportunity to testify and look forward to answering any questions. >> final witness on the second panel the center of resilience studies you are recognized. >> you'll hear back to back boston accents. i have been knocked this about 30 years now currently at northeastern university in support of the macarthur a foundation to manage the spread of the global supply chain so i am honored to be here today. it is my assessment the threat of good dirty bomb is the clear and present danger that current u.s. efforts are not up to the task to prevent an adversary for
exploiting the system to setup the dirty bomb if it was set up it would be so much of a weapon of mass destruction but mass destruction there ribby three immediate consequences first local death and injuries with the blast, a second the environmental damage the extremely high clean-up cost, we don't have standards to cope with bad and third is the morning after paul since there is no way to determine a way to compromise that led to the way it happened the entire supply chain would be presumed to be a risk of potential follow-up attacks and call into question all the initiatives that the first panel talked about today.
nearly a decade ago, this is my 29th time talking to congress since 9/11 i outlined a scenario that has been informed by bioresearch who is chairman of the security operations. but looking at the investigations but the athletic flaubert is from indonesia. these are destined for retail stores all across america. there are but then he turns into the alleyway when one prize lose those hinges and so are removed and then
that'll all this heat the portal monitoring. now he takes the container to the buyer were it to it's concurred in and they go to another ship carried between 12 and 1500 containers and then the ship goes to hong kong ltd. on a super containership with a trans-pacific wage it is then loaded directly to a railyard in chicago. and is carefully deployed along the border and when the container reaches the distribution center the trigger device sends the ball off. is revered as realistic today as it does 2006 because it still remains
unaddressed to target a shipment while being transported to where it originates from the local truck to a the factory to the poor river is loaded aboard the vessel. once the leaves the factory edwin's placing a dirty ball into the container in to they can reap a polished or those containers who have metal skin and it could be breached some erectile fluid look at the known shippers.
first you can kill the faggot is extremely unlikely that they will subject the container to any physical security as it originated from a well established company and it has no past record of smuggling is no chance and hit anybody is radar screen. as a trusted source is deemed to be identified already inspection in vancouver if it is offloaded. to explain from unknown shipper they can be confident they can generate the maximum amount of fear down because of high risk. with its sensational media coverage american people would set the entire regime records instead a level known to emphasize this is why potentially david platt
there is a compelling rationale for doing this. requiring donations take action to detect and intercept shipments of illicit nuclear radiological materials. we have the rationale. secondly, the us government must focus on the active participation of private industry that owns and operates the terminals. this is a significant busine c