tv Discussion on French Reaction to the Paris Terrorist Attacks CSPAN November 24, 2015 11:37pm-1:13am EST
the refugee flow to homegrown terrorism. this is an important moment, an important moment not just for american and france. it's an important moment for all of us in the west, in the middle east, around the world. people who are committed to addressing the profound challenges that we face. we at the institute are delighted to host a special panel of french experts. french experts on the middle east, french experts on french foreign-policy, french experts who can provide a unique insight into not just what is going on and what has happened in paris.
french experts are not only of the unique insight into what is going on but the implications for what is going on for french society, french politics, french foreign-policy and how that fits into broader european and international efforts to address the challenges on this agenda. we have never quite done a program that featured only french experts. it is not the mark of prescient but a year of france at the washington institute in that while we match an outstanding expert in paris i will introduce in just a moment we have the great benefit of having to french experts here on our staff this year. one diplomat in residence through partnership with the french foreign ministry and the
second, and outstanding french scholar of syria that we have been endeavoring to bring to washington for some time, a scholar on the alawites and we are delighted that we have such a scholar with us right now. let me introduce our panel is very briefly. from paris, speaking with us is one of europe's most eminent experts on islam, the middle east and the relationship between europe and the west and the middle east and that is professor gilles kepel. he is extremely well-known around the world. he is spoken here at the washington institute and is repressor at the institute of political studies in paris. his numerous works have been translated into multiple languages. he's about to come out with this
newest book. this is the latest in a series that looks at political islam, jihad in relationship to muslims in the west and muslims in the middle east. i'm delighted that he can join us from paris. speaking after him will be professor sob live. he is an associate professor and research director at the university. he is a visiting fellow at the washington institute. fabrice balanche is one of the rare experts in the world with expertise on the alawites community in syria. he will offer very important remarks about russian syrian strategy in the context of a challenge of isis. and then i am very pleased to introduce olivier decottignies.
he is the diplomatic residence as i mentioned earlier at the washington institute. he comes to a strictly from tehran where he was the second secretary at the french embassy in tehran and he brings a truly unique insight here in washington given that we have such little first-hand diplomatic experience in iran over the last several decades and so the contribution he makes to our understanding of the iranian angle and how all of this is occurring and the impact on french foreign-policy is truly priceless. i should underscore of course olivier is speaking in his own capacity is a very smart frenchmen, not as representative of the french government french foreign ministry. i am sure president hollande and speak well for himself and he's in washington tomorrow. but that i will turn the floor over to my colleague and then turn to our friends here in washington to gilles, welcome.
>> hello. can you hear me? >> yes, we hear you just fine. yes gilles we hear you just fine. >> all right. hello. >> gilles the floor is yours. >> i'm sorry i thought you wanted to ask me something. good morning to you and good afternoon to us. there are now more than a week after the events of friday the 13th of november and in a way things are being put into shape. that is to say what happened on friday is being put into perspective. we know that the years 2015 and france started with the tax on
the policeman and and or at least we hope nothing else is going to happen in december with the attacks of friday the 13th both attacks belong exactly to the same pattern. they are part of a strategy for what i call in his forthcoming book which you mentioned and which is going to be out in three weeks now. [speaking french] they belong to the strategy that was designed in 2005 approximately five this french and spanish national engineer in
his lengthy book posted on the internet that called for global islamic resistance. he considers europe is the soft underbelly of the west and hubris in attacking new york and washington on the 11th of september was misplaced and it fuels the reaction by george w. bush which ultimately would destroy al qaeda. europe is not weaker and in europe there are millions of young people coming from the post-colonial immigration and to our not be franchised and ready to go to radical islam as an ideology to fight against their own. and what he thinks they will
thinks they will depart from in order to become a real jihadist and boutique at the time called the islamic state that something of that ilk as their real place of operative. so what has to take place in some sort of civil war in europe or enclave or between what he thinks are muslims radicalized under the aegis of the would be people on the one hand and this will lead to the wilderness if you want translated literally in europe and that will lead to the ultimate device if you're then free over the caliphate. if i may say so jokingly it looks like the neocon in reverse
but this is what they are doing. in order to do so they need to divide european societies and also to mobilize all muslims except the ones that are opposites and to be assassinated under their banner and what ayman zawahiri called in his days and nights under the prophet's banner. and this is a twofold strategy. and the one hand terrorize the enemy and on the other hand gather support. now if we look at that and we compare what happened in january and what happened in november, even though the strategy is the same the context is quite
different. in january the groups that were targeted were quote unquote enemies of allah and the islamaphobes, the upstate -- opposed it from policeman. the one who looked like a muslim who could have been a muslim and also the -- this led as your member on the one hand to the huge demonstration at january 11 which was the biggest demonstration ever to have taken place on french soil since -- and breaking in the ranks because you have the dash which
means well done and north african colloquia which was posted on the social networks and that led to a sort of heated debate in france in spite of the unanimous dimension at the 11th of january demonstration showed and in spite of the fact that heads of states from all over the world came to paris. nevertheless a rapid society. this one in november is quite different. the killings were indiscriminate and they aims at any one who was at the dinner table or attending a concert. it's a sort of mixed area if i may try this transatlantic comparison.
the sample of people killed or wounded is a sample which was very representative of the paris crowd today with people coming from all walks of life. number of them being sons and daughters of the post-colonial immigration from muslim dissent. therefore even if they achieved what they believed was their first aim i.e. terrorize society, terrorize the enemy, they prove senate has proven a disaster for more difficult to galvanize. we have seen very very few expressions of solidarity except to within the core group of the jihadist beer or the jihadist from syria, but there has not
been much support among the range of sympathizers who found excuses to the killings in january. so this is one difference. how can we explain it and provide it as proven to be the case because we are reacting as sure as we sit here in our colloquial. the one thing that we may think about is one difference between what i call the second phase of jihadiism, al qaeda is that 9/11 was something which was planned. al qaeda was a top-down jihadist some operation. and the idea of the third-generation sunni opposes al qaeda with arabic language formula. what they are doing is a system
organization. he sent people who would implement what they had to do who would follow the roadmap. in the third-generation you have a broad view i.e. civil war in infidel france or europe. but you're not going going to see it at the top level. you are going to need a wide margin for the guys who implement annual record whoever you have at hand. or maybe some of them have decided they were volunteers. brigades of da'ish there is
competition set to pray that they have guts and the foreign fighters were not considered very well by the locals and the iraqis and the syrians for me it groove that they were good at doing something else offering prisoners. having this major onslaught begins european country and france of course leads to a bigger say in the da'ish system. the terrorist attacks are not really highbrow. the criminals who served time in jail for assault, for drug dealing, for rape for some of them and to within this sort of
prison incubator where you had a lot of third-generation jihadist him come into action in 2005 until now. they met and they had predicate or so and preachers who would tell them if you are in jail it's not your fault traded because the society is put you there and you have to use your violence and your crime if i may say so not for criminal issues but for radical jihad. out of jail they would meet again. the problems that those guys are not released tedious. some of them are serving time now.
that belong to the second generation jihad. they would kill as many people as possible in france and they used the ways and methods of criminals. they had the kalashnikovs. the two people hostage in the cinema and the music hall, the bataclan. they killed it like you would play a video game. but it was not very well organized. there were many victims of course and this is a sad phenomenon but what they had in mind was very different. they sent a number of people with vests which should have just dashed detonated themselves when they were 80,000 people attending beyond the german prime minister in france and
germany and for some reason they could not get into the stadium. they left their vests outside and they killed themselves plus one passerby. that's one thing. also for those guys who more than anything else have their attacks on a friday night, so i suppose to what is touching -- happening in january they didn't target as many jewish as they would have wanted. this is something that shows it was not prepared to teach a glee. also the fact that they targeted everybody has led to the feeling
among muslims in general and france that they were a bunch of criminals. i wonder to what extent does the 13th of november was not for the third-generation of jihadists, something that could be compared with what happened in the late 1990s. after afghanistan there was this copycat in algeria and egypt and also a spillover from algeria to france. in egypt and algeria in the fall of 1997 there was a sheer violence in egypt of this islamic group in algeria which alienated society at large.
they were like fish outside of bonds. people provided safe houses to help them and turned a blind eye on what they were doing it just turned their back on them. this was the failure of phase one which led to phase two. then to what extent was 9/11 successful or was it a failure? but at the same token it engineered a process of reaction that would lead to the demise. to what extent is the 13th of november, to what extent is it a watershed thing, a turning point? is it too late to tremendous
difficulties in the future? this is really a question mark. it's impossible to go further -- you know i was attacked a lot. he and 2000 there was a decline in islamism. at the time putin had no background. it was in 2000 so i didn't know what would happen later on but i think i was right in saying what i did know was the first phase and didn't see the second phase because it had not yet taken place. to what extent is it now the beginning of and for the third phase? is the da'ish system now under duress? let me at least ask the question
and we will discuss issues that have to do with the coalition which you mentioned earlier on. i hope this was clear enough. >> gilles that came through loud and clear. that was very interesting. very useful, very insightful. i will send to -- turn to fabrice balanche rated fabrico the floor is yours. we will come back to gilles after the presentations. >> the former strike on isis, i don't think putin should agree. according to these strategy in the middle east, because vladimir putin is not after
the strategy especially moving forward. they cannot officially support him civilly that russia do it. the anti- isis coalition and. [inaudible] if russia could prevent the threat european countries should reconsider the sanction. i think russia thanks that is the major process in the middle east. they would.
[inaudible] this against turkey we can send this map in the southeast. the western countries cannot support an effect russia doesn't have this problem. it can help to achieve the conquest of the north. particularly to get syria to go towards russia. it's against isis but it is also against turkey. assad doesn't agree that he can
benefit because the turkish border closing it would be more easy to destroy the other rebels. in january 2011 there 30 years of peace. the hud side doesn't want to but crush any opposition killing hundreds of people that is assad's strategy. because a strong opposition could be a threat to him but isis cannot be. we have to recognize.
[inaudible] western countries and underestimate the strength of the assad regime. he was not not so weak as they said of the opposition. as with some countries that do not want to be involved in syria, turkey and qatar -- that's why exactly what assad wanted. so we are in front of a dilemma because the time is quick. the other ultimate solution is not working very well. on the ground they tried to
target isis the first week but sense a few times and moreover after against russia's striking isis the main objective is to prison aside. the military threat and in the green you have other groups and it is also in the mask us. it is more threat than isis is in the east of syria. it is in this area that we have the concentration of the troops and the main offensive of the
another area of hezbollah is very strategic. because for instance if you have been to paris last week the turkish border is not closed. they would like to have a no-fly zone on this area but they refuse. after paris a tear and is an emergency because terrorist are using mesquite to turkey and europe. russia agreed to expedite this area but only if they can get back the army.
unless of course it would be under control. france is going to strike isis. russia would rebel but would not do the difference between french and russian bombs. we are going to be considerate. the threat is in france and to destroy the isis organization quickly to preserve the peace in europe to prevent future attacks. another massive attack in france will be a disastrous.
we have seen that france's raising and in 2017 will have the presidential election. so we have to destroy isis opposition. thank you. >> okay, thank you. very provocative, very interesting. olivia. >> think of her much. what i'm going to try to do for you is to try to outline the french foreign policy response to the attacks in paris. first of all i should say that a large part of the response is a
domestic response. most of president addressed to both the house a week ago were devoted to domestic issues, homeland security mainly and a necessity to maintain national unity. so setting this apart, apart, i will focus more specifically on the form policy elements of the response which are key given the attacks, although they were mainly conducted by french citizens born and raised in france, where plans in syria and within a network spending over a number of european countries, especially belgium. the president's visit visit tomorrow to washington as part of the multifaceted response to the attack. the first i mention is to step
up french military operation against isis. you will have to french airstrikes have intensified and today the french aircraft carrier has arrived in the mix east military and it is starting its operation against the organization. this will triple available power in the area. this power will primarily be directed at key isis infrastructure, common centers, or infant structure et cetera both in the raqqa area. there is strikes alone will not defeat isis. there is need for action on the ground that might not necessarily be french operation. to give you an idea of the thinking in paris right now,
yesterday the french prime minister gave an overview on the french radio and he pointed out an example to the deliberation which was the results of the combined coalition airstrike and ground offenses by local forces on the ground. in that case the turkish area. in his address to parliament a few weeks ago the president stressed the need to provide help and more supports to those who are fighting dacia on the ground. prior to more military action their diplomatic -- the goal that was spent by the french president was to create a large united coalition against danish and that is the meeting that was passed last friday last week
after the attacks to have the capacity to do so against danish and other international recognize groups. the president will meet president obama tomorrow and then glad amir putin in moscow. although the view of the french authority right now is that no definite defeat of danish is possible in fact isis has already been defeated once in iraq been taken out of the
condition in syria. the calendar has been agreed upon, there is still ambiguity on exactly how the transition should proceed, but the french view is that they cannot beat the outcome of the process. syria is of course the main focus but there need also to be political process and reconciliation in iraq and also on the way out. this is why the distinction between engaging russia is important. france talks to all powers involved in the crisis including iran, that is is what he seven he addressed parliament. but russia's political time in syria right now makes a key to the solution.
we'll know more about that when the president meets with his presidential counterpart on thursday in syria it will be core of the conversation them. in other french priority is to get the europeans of all. france decide not to turn to nato after the attack but instead to invoke an article of the union that is introduce into thousand nine. the rationale for that choice is that dacia is not only a threat to france but europe as a whole. as as you know today brussels is completely paralyzed by terror and police operation spit the french would go to the council it to share -- and also the
partners to show the cost for french budget of the additional figures. in military terms, the support is expected of european partners for ongoing french missions in iraq and syria. meaning additional striking capabilities, feeling, intelligence, et cetera. and burden sharing in africa, where france has for years been the defense line. isis may consider -- the minister can a brand principle on that, they're encouraging for me prime minister cameron said he would open one of the british sovereign basis to french
operations and provide refueling. last week the germanys newspaper talked about the possibility of 500 german troops joining the operation in mali. but but there is a lot to do. the prime minister is struggling to get approval for strikes and syria. there's a debate on whether this is actually a war we are facing despite all evidence. the terror attack on molly on friday might have some european countries hesitate about the need to commit troops. the french would say it's even more needed now. there is no issue of the french and the europeans by the way. it is a major importance because what is that take is the political will of your pains take place of their insecurity. at the conclusion, i would say that the french reaction fits in
the france's dramatic options. an active diplomacy both with the un security council and the key partners believe that the military capability and the will to fight are needed. what is very encouraging is that people are enlisting in higher numbers in the french military. this is a healthy reaction. some feared there would be retaliation against the community and that we would be playing by the isis playbook. this is, on the whole not what is happening. it is once again healthy. if you look at who is showing up it is the reflection of the diversity of the french youth. which is also very good sign. another of the french defense
and of the continent, last but not least strategic with france's major alliance, the u.s. and the president's visit visit tomorrow, presidents obama strong words to defeat isis are encouraging. we'll see what what the conversation will be like tomorrow. jihad is him, generally speaking is fighting and is a long-term threat and is likely to shape french policy. although we also keep the rest of the show going and it was a sign of those resolve in cold blood that -- one of the paris
attacks is the french domestic politics. probably never before has policy been discussed to that extent. additionally will speak in france about the form policy and the public will be more talks about it because some aspects of the fight against isis has form policy replication. defending of terrorism, et cetera. i like to end up on a very positive no. the reaction to the taxol of the world are very well and even discovery from people themselves. the fact that all over the world people are showing french symbols, by the way the show on
hbo of being a strategic weapon in the fight, so this is also very enforcing and very important in situation where our country has its own way of life. and will win the war of isis is a war of ideologies. >> very good, thank you gentlemen. lots to discuss here, i'm going to come back to you now there is a sub text that may be analytical disagreement among the panel. i want to play it out a little more. the conventional wisdom, such as conventional wisdom can emerge in just a matter of days is that this was a very well planned, coordinated attack that took
extreme precision, etc., cetera, et cetera. you offered a somewhat different view. that the attack was not that the attackers were brilliant but i do not want to say they were bundlers but there was as much problem and poor planning as there was brilliance in what the attackers were able to plan and implement. you also added that this is, i don't want to put too many words your mouth but i heard the import of your remarks say that this is this may herald the downward slope, we have seen the second phase of jihadist him reach its aipac's and this is probably where we are heading downhill here. that would suggest that, that may have implications, the
implications for the urgency of a global coalition to go attack isis. so i would be interested in your views on whether you share the sense that the intense urgency to go in now, partner with who you can, do deals with the devil if necessary, to go in and destroy isis. or alternatively is ice it's on its way out? and we'll have to deal with whatever is left with the decrepit remains. is isis on its way out? >> well thank you. at at first i don't know. i can't judge after a week or so. it's impossible. but whether or not isis is on
its way out, will were on the 13th of november it was not up to the expectation of the strategic's if there is such a thing as a strategic in isis as we say here. because they will sort of have countries and bringing about a recruitment of the movement in the middle to wide circle will this was one of the reasons why the first phase of jihadist and failed in my ultimately the second phase failed. now this does not mean that you have to sit all in and see it disappear. this is not going to happen like that.
i would think a departure between the two fronts, the domestic france on the outside france. on the outside front which was just mentioned eloquently by the panel members, i believe that we have reached a new step. for many of these reasons within the so-called wide coalition against isis, as the president merit would have said way back, everybody was against isis but everybody was against the either one more than he was against isis. the turks, for instance it did not like isis but they left the border open and even though they
said they are now checking the border it looks like all the belgians and the french who came back from syria came back from turkey without difficulty. they needed also isis to counterbalance the kurds. particularly the pkk in their syrian branch. so now that he has won the election he needs to as we say in french, -- he may be well interested in having a more active and offensive policy against isis. look at the gcc, though the governments always said they were against isis, nevertheless there was a lot of money flowing from the coffers of the gcc countries to boost isis because they were a real, you know they were fighting against.
look at what happened in beirut and of course in iraq. so of course it was something that they would not put all of their strength in this issue. look at russia and their are in russia, they they are bad gays, the propaganda, but as far as their concern they were interested in going above the so-called moderate jihadist. that is to say they would have the jihad on one side and isis in the other. >> ..
and also spent some time with now markoff, the only arabists in the world to become prime minister. and when you come prime minister we -- he said the following. we might become something in france. okay. it is not like that -- it is not like we like a sod that much. we don't want to be ousted from the region. it may not be forever. it is not a catholic marriage. the problem with this irritants in syria is that we have thousands of chechens being hyper trained
and he will come back just like abood and the others have come back to france. and to some extent in a way it's a reminder of the takeover. so this is the big threat, and it is my understanding, but surely better experts than i have this matter. over the ones the other day, italian, turkey. so destroying the territorial base is very important even in order to do with what is happening in europe with the domestic crisis in europe because isi s is territorial base
provides the sort of romantic figures, the robin hoods of jihad, not somatic, but they stand up to the empires of evil, zionism, imperialism. i looked into the ideology on behalf of the social networks and there is a tremendous blend of pseudo- language that blends into the language. so there is -- in a way that time has arrived for striking from the west
powers.of view. and i believe we have a common interest in doing so. if the territorial base is severely damage will be a reason to go. the number of people going as lower. france is the 1st exporter of jihadists, but we have less people going because it is becoming very dangerous to go. i mean,, there is not much of a mystique like you would see in the earlier literature of the web appraising paradise on earth in syria. now, on thenow, on the
domestic front to ms. different. and i am not sure. by and through our official language services france's award the islamic state or the so-called islamic state, the jihadist army. wewe are at war and the labonte, syria command your rack. it is an issue of security. versioning and southern morocco and shows that france is now soft underbelly and its own. and make it a strong element which is one of the reasons why it is particularly
targeted. but the issue comeau we are not at war with france. they want to have civil war in france, civil war era, but we will not buy into that desire. it is an issue of police and an issue also of eggs aligning what makes it a social deprivation needs -- leads to the region and some networks. it works so well in our prison system. we have to look deep into ourselves. , the european model. something you mentioned, we will have an action intuition france.
for that we have to be careful and understand how to create european societies which are more inclusive. don't have to negotiate with isys or a comment their claims. there is no doubt there is nothing the confrontation. but, you know, the riposte is different. what is being done in the labonte's military. what must be done in europe
has to do with police and security and social engineering. okay. thank you. >> i just want to ask our other panelists about a debate which we have in america and is implied in the last remark, the boots on the ground debate. on the one hand i am hearing a sense of great urgency. people want us to act and on the political level if we don't take care of this the far right may inherit the political spoils. there is both popular urgency and political urgency which is compelling a more forceful action, but on the other hand we are hearing no calls for
autograph activity by french forces asking for partnership forces. we are hearing more of an american-style expand the existing approach, more airstrikes, help our local partners do more but not a different approach. is there a collision, a point at which the french debate,debate, the european debate may change, or is it so deeply ingrained this is a reflection of the reticence itself and is just not going to happen in the french context. >> in france again to send
an alternative form boots on the ground and also the necessity to take into account our allies and partners. i think this is how things evolve. i mentioned the prime minister of defense yesterday on french radio, an example of how things could get down on the ground. the type of scenario. >> very good. let's open the floor to questions.
>> boots on the ground, whenever there is an escalation of terrorism the responses mobic. the problem is, isis has been able to protect themselves against the bombing was civilians have not and so the civilians are paying a heavy casualty and that the same time being deprived. when they try get out for refuge they are being denied. in this sense the idea of not putting boots on the ground, is there a chance of
having a lesion from the french army, volunteers to go to syria and fight so that it is not the french fighting but rather muslim who are for piece and democracy and all of the values people stand for against this nihilistic destructive force which is to be muslim. the jewish legion in the 2nd world war, to give a chance for those muslims in the west who are against isis but take a stand. >> organize a muslim foreign legion.
>> i mean,i mean, within the framework of the french ministry we do not differentiate between soldiers. so that would not be legally possible. it is the french army from a legal.of view. -- from a legal point of you. foreign nationals, but the muslim religion, as you suggested from a legal.of view, not what is contemplated, it's a more immediate prospect that such
i think basically all the topics we test upon today need to be a part of the discussion. >> this is a unique rare moment in time. one might expect this is an opportunity. the major request. if not now when. as this has as much to do with over the last number of years french leaders may have internalized the reticence. it may has as much to do with the lingering impact of the syrian redline issue a couple of years ago when i was a bad taste left in the
mouth of our french allies. but you will get a serious discussion. accelerating assistance to our partners on the ground but it sounds just reading the tea leaves that major, profound request. maybe you will have a huge announcement. i would be surprised if there is that. >> security-related. >> a political solution in syria. >> j solomon.
>> following up on this question i have heard a lot from the french-american british in recent weeks, detecting splits but at the same time i'm just reading headlines and they sound very unified. is there a sense why it is so much talk of splits when it does not seem like there are any? >> i do not think that they completely overlap. russian and more generally speaking foreign fighters in syria are major threat and
it is not something that iran shared. the west end in the region syria, basically they only need them in the talks. the russians keep talking, and much more regular and consistent manner. russia is probably not looking for the same type of strategic projection and are suddenly less concerned with hezbollah. the question is when and how those differences will materialize in more cooperation with russia and
and if we're making concessions began the head of the sod, but the iranians would not agree. in the future we could have disagreements, but for the moment this day because the goal is to win the war, when the war they have different issues to win the piece. >> in the center. >> thank you. may i direct they say you? i am wondering if france might show a tendency to
keep away from controversial middle east issues. [silence] against the islamic state whether it is about north africa, israeli-palestinian issues, visit the trends, we better keep our distance. it is too dangerous. >> i do not think that that is of issue. the issue is on the offensive. françois along is now looking at aa situation where he is under threat from the extreme right and right. what i believe is changed is the conversation was surreal. you have spring took place
was a strong feeling that is one of the talks of ideologues syria in spanish which meant everything must be done to oust and boost. the problem is we did nothing. that opened the way to a numbera number of people who wanted to take it into their hands went to syria for military reasons which has now been defeated. and there are different policies, one which has to
take into consideration the fact that there are others who are actors which is the meaning of the meetings with president åland and have to find a common ground which is reasonable. originally we were in ideology. and now there is another does not mean we must step back. find a common policy because
it turned out to be a fake passport. >> why should we be rewarding this diabolical plan to create a worse enemy and seeing the phenomenon letting them off of the hook for now and deal with him sometime down the future? wouldn't it be wiser to deal with fed isi s, maybe assad? >> it was part of the strategy, since the beginning to destroy the moderate opposition and succeed because we did not
maybe we did solve a problem >> it is to fight isi s with more military means. but if you want to see the equilibrium the enemy has isi s, but the solution should not have him as an icon. >> if you can put this in the context of what seems to be the most significant flow of muslim see your modern history?
the situation impossible and to lead to knew wars of religion and so forth. i am not trying to interrupt. now in dire straits in germany. the policy is challenged on the inside. someone told me you don't want the city to become like marseilles. and so this is clearly something which we will have some sort of political weight in all countries. the other issue is whether or not there are people who
work be jihadists or turn to jihadists within the refugees. the yen lady who spoke maintaining that the syrian passport was not part of the person whose name was there. this is true. syrian soldier who died but the passport was forced under the control of the three opposition. someone came to euros. and this has raised enormous
anxiety and put a name on the fears so clearly this is a challenge that we shall have to face. the influx is important. probably the most frightening is the influx coming to the failed state of libya by both in the southern part of tunisia to italy. which led to france during this in turn of calais in france you have the camp of migrants trying to get into the tunnel to go to britain.