fundamental human right that includes both belief and behavior in public and in private, individually and collectively. congress enacted the religious freedom restoration act almost unanimously in 1994. irknow, i know. i was the principal advocate for it. it sets tough standard and offers this protection for all exercise of religion by all people. democrats and republicans, liberals and conservatives adherence of different phase, everyone joined hands on these basic principles and i might add hatch and kennedy joined hands as well. in his 2013 religious freedom day proclamation, president obama said that religious freedom is an essential part of human dignity. this is the path on which america began, the path america's founders embraced, the path that all three branches of government have healt recognizeh that we have reaffirmed countless times. the burden is on those who
believe that we should now leave this path. those who no longer believe that religious freedom is an inalienable right and an essential human freedom should say so. those who no longer believe that as our statutes and treaties assert religious freedom is a right and pail already a of our nation should be honest and up front about t those who believe that the shifting political priorities of the day trump religious freedom should candidly make their case. in the last weeks since the terrorist attack in san bernardino, we have glimpsed some of the ugliness that is down the path where politics trumps religious freedom. many of our leaders expressed support and offered thoughts and prayers for the victims an and their families. those were met by some with disdain, ridicule and scoffing. reporters backloggists and activities and even members of congress sent the message that thoughts and prayers are not much of anything are are legislate only if they come had
from those who want more gun control. finally, i want to highlight for my colleagues another source of guidance in choosing the future path for religious freedom. in june 1988, the most diverse group of leaders in american history presented the williamsburg charter to the nation. it's purpose was to reaffirm religious freedom for all citizens to set out the place of religious freedom in american public life and to offer guiding principles for the fiewmp. former presidents jimmy carter and gerald ford and the chairmen of the two political parties signed t the chairman of the afl-cio and the chamber of commerce signed it. the bar associations signed it. leaders of faith communities including the national council of churches and national association of evangelicals, seventh day adventist, and the church of jesus christ of latter day saints signed it. what could unite such a disparate group? it would have to be something too general to be so useful.
the first principles of religious freedom affirmed by the williamsburg charter are these: first, religious freedom is an inalienable right that is -- quote -- "premised upon the inviolable dignity of the human person. it is the foundation of and is integrally related to all other rights and freedoms secured by the constitution." second, "the chief menace to religious liberty today is the expanding power of government control over personal behavior and the institutions of society when the government acts not so much in deliberate hostility to but in wreckless disregard of the communal belief and personal conscience." third, limiting religious liberty "is allowable only where the state has borne a heavy burden of proof that the limitation is justified, not by any ordinary public interest but by a supreme public necessity and that no less restrictive
alternative to limitation exists." these are our principles. religious freep dome is in inalienable. government burdens on religious freedom you must be the least restrictive means of a compelling government purpose. these principles inform proper resolution of the challenges that religious freedom will certainly face ahead. some are calling for government to revoke or deny such things as tax exempt status certifications or licenses for religious organizations with certain beliefs. i already mentioned how some courts are using antidiscrimination statutes to trump religious freedom. applying the principles i've discussed would require the government to make the case that such impositions are the least restrictive way to further the supreme necessity. another challenge would be in the development rather than
implementation of antidiscrimination laws. applying the appropriate principles requires that such legislation properly accommodate religious freedom. title 7 of the civil rights act of 1964, for example, includes a religious exemption. i supported the employment nondiscrimination act in the 113th congress because in addition to incorporating that exemption, it also prohibited retaliation against those that qualify for the exemption. my state of utah this year enacted an antidiscrimination statute which similarly included a robust exemption for religious organizations. earlier this year, however, senators introduced the equality act which would prohibit discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation and gender identity across areas such as employment and education. it not only fails to incorporate the existing title 7 exemption, it contains no accommodation for
religious freedom. this is an example of the path that rejects religious fremont of even -- religious freedom worthy of consideration. it should not become law unless it properly accommodates religious freedom. mr. president, this is a time for choosing. the story of religious freedom is an inspiring narrative and cautionary tale. it brings to mind the inscription on the statute fronting the national archives that eternal vigilance is the price of liberty. the heritage of religious freedom that took centuries to build could be dismantled in a fraction of that time. the right path needs balance and accommodation. the wrong path means exclusion and suppression. the way forward requires us to choose the right path to make sure that our actions speak louder than our words. mr. president, i apologize for going over about five minutes, but i suggest the absence of a quorum.
health care is only going to get more and more complex. and we are just going to need better and better nurses to meet all those complex needs some thinking about how to keep us strong and healthy and encouraging that is huge. i don't think -- we don't really emphasize it. politics, which i admit i've been part of all my life is not so different from the world of petty criminals, robbers and racketeers but it's less obvious
to see. in fact the 25 years in my career i've looked to america as an idea. i defended american principles, the american dream, the american founding. and i've looked at american politics as a debate. the republicans belief in liberty. the democrats need any quality. republicans want equality of rights, democrats want equality of outcomes. now it's the point of view of the underclass that this way of looking at american politics is complete and total nonsense.
>> we were supposed to have a democracy where we as citizens were equal participants that we have a system where members of congress spent 30 to 70% of their time raising money from the 1% they can't help but be more focused and concerned with the interest of the tiny fraction of the 1%. so that is a system where the basic equality is the night. >> all weekend every weekend on c-span2. the senate homeland security committee held a hearing on the visa waiver program that allows visitors from 38 countries mostly in europe to stay in the u.s. for 90 days without a visa. in the aftermath of the terrorist attacks in paris in san bernardino, congress is considering putting more restrictions on the visitors. wisconsin senator ron johnson is the chairman of the homeland security committee.
i want to thank the witnesses. there may have been miscommunication. i was told it was until 11:25 and a lot of senators want to come and see what you have to say. also appreciate we were able to set this up as a round table. i want to have the administration officials from the outside sitting together so we can have a good discussion. this will be a free flow discussion which is also nice rather than have a very structured in seven minutes. when we are on a topic i'm going to encourage all of my colleagues to jump in if they have a question so that it's not just joined. we have four witnesses here. i'm really bad at getting pronunciations.
>> the deputy assistant secretary of the supreme court office of policy at the department of homeland security. she can speak to the enhancements currently considered to strengthen the waiver program for the u.s. customs and border protection at the department of homeland security in the visa waiver program and and the officers make determinations in the ports of entry. you can also discuss the benefits of the preclearance operations. the next witness will be mr. justin. really bad not even 50%. the deputy coordinator at the department of state and can speak to the existing information sharing agreements the government has in the program countries and benefits to the program. finally, mr. mark fried the director and former director of the program at the u.s.
department of homeland security from the 2007 to 2010 is the former director of the program mr. frey he can speak to the need to enhance the program in a sensible way to allow us to maintain the benefits of the program at the same time enable them to prevent a travel now. we did ask people to submit testimony. i don't want to make anybody feel bad that he did submit a testimony and i will tell you he was the most succinct description in the advantages in terms of enhancing the security so not to put you on the spot but it would be nice if you could go through enable it by fashion what you provided and talk about really why the program doesn't provide security and why we should be looking to strengthen its addressing some of the vulnerabilities but we don't want to weaken it.
we did have a hearing on the refugee situation and one of the reasons we are having this roundtable is because one of the outcomes of that is we did lay out that there is a strong process and from my standpoint i am a little concerned that with this administration announcing at once to increase it would to increase the number of refugees coming in by 21% first-tier that there might be sure to start cutting corners on that and i support the process but in not hearing we heard there are certainly concerns about the blog abilities and weaknesses in the program and i want to explore those. if there's holes that needed to be plugged in to plug those holes. the purpose of this roundtable i come from a manufacturing background. to start setting some goals based on the reality of this is about laying out that reality and i think by going on here i have given enough time to maybe
the pair that i would like to start and ask the question can you kind of summarize your testimony and lay out the case for the program? >> thank you chairman for having me here. i have to say that i cheated because you may have recognized what i provided was an updated version of what i said to the committee in march when i also testified on the program and so they didn't get a chance to submit testimony because i recycled -- >> i like efficiency. but having to talk about what can be done in the round tables like this that you held last
spring are important because it needs education and awareness and misunderstanding of what the program is and what the program isn't and there seems to be a perception that because the word in the title somehow security requirements are waived when in fact that is cicely the opposite so i have to talk about what i see as the security components but before i do that i would like to note that it's fitting and appropriate that round tables like this hearing into the legislation that you are committee introduced just the other day are being talked about because i call good security programs it needs to evolve in light of the environment it's not a static program or should it be and in the history of the program certainly since 9/11 it predates that certainly since 9/11 when it became a security
program more so than a solicitation program has been a history of reforms in the something in the administrative that we've done so this all makes sense and it worked. >> we have a couple of the colleagues that have joined us now. if you have a question on a particular subject bring it up while we talk about the subject so it's not destroyed. >> again let's keep this very free flowing. >> to get into briefly i think that the main security components and why it is a security enhancing program the first is individualized screening of the waiver program. if you show up it's simply not true there is an individualized
program that goes on by the electronic system which is overseen by the cdt. and that was a part of the last major website of reforming the program which is done as a part of the implementing regulations so they set up a system that requires the data from the individual travelers and others in the government or able to run the data against the watchlist and law enforcement databases. >> is that the same with all of these us to become -- visa? >> yes, sorry go ahead. >> the same checks that occur for the visa occur. if the database state department lookout supports some other ways. in triple lost or stolen travel
documents, so it is law enforcement databases and of course -- >> people are getting the cart ahead of the force. does the screening of of all present trouble and how far back does it include? >> i'm trying to flush out the individual screening and do they need to take a look at things we need to do? >> i think sean is probably the best person to handle it but there is some screening that goes on after the specifics of the program and its identical to those that go on for the visa. but complement another protocol for all travelers to the united states and that does take into account travel history so that
fits into the larger security work. >> how far back does that go? >> if there isn't access to the united states we wouldn't have that but that is regardless of the visa. some information sharing agreements we do have that gives access to travel to the united states through the intelligence committee or the law enforcement networks but it's not -- we don't have visibility around the entire world.
>> is educating about what it is and i know that he is getting to it. if we could talk about the program is and when it requires us to get through some of those i personally think that we might help inform the questions. >> that's what i was trying to do. >> i'm very comfortable. >> i want is to this to be a pretty relaxed atmosphere so why don't you go through as quickly as possible, don't go to such great detail because there will be a lot of trickling down. >> we talked about this individualized and returned screenings just because you have enough for today doesn't mean you would have one for tomorrow if derogatory information comes up. the second piece of the program
itself is information. the countries that participate in the program are required to share information in the united states on the citizens or passengers who may be a security risk or who are serious criminals and related to that as well is the passport data which they use in the screening process and its larger screenings committed to the united united states, so there is an information sharing peace. i noticed they work together because the information sharing we get from our partners feeds into it to make the entire database better and more effective. >> the senator was talking about including that information sharing would have travel from france into iraq or celiac con is a robust enough that despite? robust to figure that out?
>> system hits against her and turned databases and is informed by derogatory information on individuals provided so if there's travel history provided there's a concern from the partner and that raises to the little person is known as a suspected terrorist that name would be given to us and as a general rule it doesn't have travel without an access. spinnaker relies on the reliability of that. it's not all uniform reliable. it's bad to not have any information sharing. >> it's going to be contingent on that information and they are
not even allowed to share it with us and if it isn't a say and identified national security reasons and can they give us the information. >> there are standards that require certain threshold of information available that can't be shared. >> for an example for the folks in the attack, would they have been stopped at the border of the united states based on what we have right now i'm each of those individuals if we looked to see whether the system would have paid him to do that. >> some of them would have been prevented to begin with. it cuts more more detailed in a classified settings. it's been in the database. >> there's information that we
would have received from the travel details that were confident we would have identified had identified had it up to travel for the united states. >> dot what they have information on these individuals better or worse. >> at the same databases that we check in the biographical information whether it is on any type of an application for the travel the traveler just your basic biographical information and your basic point of contact. the same types of derogatory databases and government holdings and how it is best back and forth we can do the same result. >> but with the program and information sharing intelligence sharing information in the
program, would their -- again i'm trying to compare if you didn't have the program, but it needed we don't have access to information that some of us -- some of the information in those countries. >> it gives us the formality to exchange that information and provides a platform to share. >> if that information exists. >> that's always the case. maybe i'm not talking loud enough. as a result of the arrangements required, they've shared over 9,000 known or suspected terrorists with us we are using and developing as a result. we wouldn't have that if it wasn't for the program so there is a excellent security value of the program that wouldn't exist in the countries. >> under the framework of the data known as the suspected identity data we use that as a
requirement of the program and therefore being a member of the program requires that you pass that information to us, so in that regard if you didn't have the program you might not have the incentive for the disincentive to not provide that information so that's what helps us in a structured framework to push the governments to government to share that information because nonperformance could be problematic to the country. >> there are several bills that have been dropped into the program. one of them is to require that a person for your for example has been traveling that that information would be automatically transferred. if we required that of them they will require that of us which i don't have a problem with.
>> we are enhancing it even further as part of an announcement from the white house november 30 and we are already on the process of making those additional changes. >> that was my question if we have a person that's an american that has been too serious to be have that information and can be can be shared with the country they are going to send into france. >> i will have to go back and check the legal piece but it is a reciprocal program to get to the first point. they will -- similarly we are sharing the terrorist watch list for the foreign fighter and we want the countries against the data.
this is a security program considering beyond. >> isn't it also true of any database you start with the basic database and it is in perfect and then the beauty is you can continue to add to it and improve it. as a part we are seeing some holes in the data that we want to fill so over time the beauty of technology is that it just builds upon itself and gets better and better. it's never perfect but it gets better and better and that is certainly some of the things we are talking about in the testimony. >> i think to reinforce a couple of these points of the information that's required in the program either incident devices or the threat can make sure the countries are sharing what they should be sharing a bit like to point out to by definition they are strong allies to begin with so i don't
want to point out that there wasn't information before the department. of course there was. security forces to share all the time but the structures it as my colleague said as mandatory, and we could take remedial action of the if the country is not meeting their obligations. so then just very quickly to the other two components, their secure travel documents. again this is something that exists as a requirement but is much more fraud resistant and incorporates the biomarkers at the moment as i think that you know and the bill addresses that there is a small percentage of travelers who don't have to carry those passports and the bill closes that loophole to make all of the travelers do it so that's a good thing but it's a that it's a much better assurance of not being able to use a passport to use the
program and then finally this is a point that i think sometimes gets overlooked. it mandates the inspections and audits of the program at least every other year but in practice, working with the state department and others to set up the monitoring systems of the developments in the countries that i would like to focus just in a minute on the inspections having participated in a number of them. they are unbelievably comprehensive soup to nuts review of the border security, passport development and issuance processes, counterterrorism capabilities and it is a way for the u.s. government more broadly to have visibility into how a country that security and if we find that there are gaps whether in information sharing or with a country does with its counter radicalization programs, we have the ability to know that country s. s. isn't up to our standards
and we can work to fix them may be sharing information with them, providing technical assistance would have you but without that visibility, we wouldn't have as much information and so these inspections i think incredibly are powerful tools to mick sure that the program countries are actually meeting the standards that we set and if they are not as it is a collaborative program to help them get here. >> to open up to other members you talked about requiring travelers to submit biometrics. what about the fingerprints prior wouldn't mean security to intervene security to the contrary resulting in enormous resources and diplomatic challenges. >> my colleagues hopefully can be in on the security benefit were minimal benefit at the moment. what we talk for a minute about logistical challenges and the resource challenges of doing so. and then as i see it there are
primarily two days you could set up such a system to capture the biometrics to ensure the person submitting them is a person traveling. you either have to direct the people to embassies and consulates overseas and those in particular are not staffed to handle the extra flow or you can set up enrollment centers. again how many you would need would be quite a logistical challenge so some trusted agent can oversee this and then of course there's connecting back so that's one method of viewing it and can honestly extensive to have the personnel doing it overseas. some folks suggested maybe you do a kiosk at the airport. again, very difficult for me to imagine how this works logistically in part because it is not just kiosks and visa waiver programs, it is kiosks in every airport all over the world because if you are ... a british citizen living in hong kong, if
you want to travel to the united states for business use can leave so we would have to put them in hong kong and in beijing and moscow and all sorts of places that somehow set up sorting the systems so that they are submitting the biometrics. analysts logistical challenge to do that overseas. so that's the diplomatic side. the security site is all of the program travelers are actually they submit the biometrics of the port of entry already when they arrived. fingerprints are taken and digital photograph and all of the -- i'm not aware of a lot of people being turned away every day at the ports of entry because biometrics are otherwise identifying threats we didn't know about in part because the watch list we have today is
biographical ebay stand so the betting that they are doing is catching folks in submitting a biometric is not as far as i know turning out hundreds or thousands of people who we otherwise didn't have derogatory information on. >> i will turn over to senator carper. i want is to this to be pretty free-flowing so feel free to talk about something i want to see an open discussion. senator carper. >> i apologize for being late. i -- senator as you know has a delightful if it's been introduced that it's required but it's required for the gathering of biometrics on the program can you explain why that is counterproductive? the idea of the implementation. so -- the idea in lieu of her
approach is to try to see what we can learn from that pilot or what doesn't work and maybe what does work. could one of the other witnesses give your response to that reaction >> well we are open to any requirements adding a value to the program whether it be something that's referring to biometrics or others so we are absolutely trying to work very hard to address any security gap that may arise as a result of the changing environment. we are looking to expand
preclearance. >> i'm trying to get reactions to the pilot. i think that we are contemplating in some of the discussions we are having and perhaps some other ways that could involve a biometric from what we have done traditionally at some of the context. >> your reaction briefly. >> the program is this on the process of the reciprocity so that pilot could be reciprocal to the citizens seeking to travel to the country. >> i don't know what the pilot would show us in that i don't into question technology the
questions that you can see that it works you are not getting a lot of hits from the pride of the copilot of the points of entry but even if you establish a system works, you're still faced with a scalable problem going forward. i'm not so much for how much you address the overall implementation even if you have a successful pilot. >> if someone in the audience director would you raise your hand? at some point i'm going to ask you to take that seat right there. i think that is a hugely important issue. welcome here and i apologize for being late. >> thanks for having this roundtable. it's important. a lot of things have come up
today. it's tough to verify what we are going to do but i think the congress will act and the house has already acted overwhelmingly. i guess my question goes to the fundamental issue of the fact that our security in the country is only as good as the data that is being provided to us by the partners so these countries have different databases. so drawing down a little bit further on that let's assume the numbers are right there is about 4,000 fighters coupled with them coming from the france, uk, belgium that means that there's more than 5,000 total. i still don't have a good number on it so if you would like to have it either 8,000 from we don't know, i've heard that it's more than 5,000 but if you don't mind for the further question to give me what you think the answer is on how many people we are talking about. the question that i would have is a pretty simple one. if you have a border with turkey
as we have in our borders, with mexico and canada, and you have the ability to go back and the package without being identified through that border if you have thousands who are leaving europe to go into the battle none of them have come back and we are told we have that number how do we know the information is accurate? in other words they wouldn't show up in the preclearance where is the data necessarily because they are walking across the border and we've seen the refugees coming to going the other way so could you comment on that? i don't know if you are the right person to start also like to hear the commissioner. but anybody jump and how do you account for that and how good is the data? >> when looking at programs and
the investing we do we are not looking at a specific trip this is before they book their travel is its authorization is authorization basically to book travel to come to the u.s.. so, looking at a person's travel history can be a little complicated at that point if it isn't including previous routes to the u.s.. where we see the most value is looking at the data that we do collect, the biographical information, the contact information, some other points of contact and a few other pieces and trying to draw associations to other known pieces of information that we no gives us national security concerns. during any type of associations we can do other people and then bouncing it through a lot of the intelligence community to see a holding is holdings that they have if any of the data show up in any of the information that they have and we pull it back into our holdings to see who is connected to this e-mail
address? i'm getting at is the gap's testimony before the committee seven weeks ago approximately the director of the fbi and the director of the counterterrorism center of said of the same gaps and they are trained specifically to those in serious because we have nothing on the ground to collect information. even if compared to iraq we don't have to data but wouldn't -- i am not suggesting this is necessarily a large number of people but as we learned with terrorism it doesn't matter. if it's a large number were small number and the number is significant. we have to be right every time and they have to be right once. so are there people that will go across this border where there is no means to identify them and come back to the program country and not be able to have that data in the system. are you saying that because we have other data sources including our own that that is
unlikely to occur or are you saying that we've only got what we've got which again will be based on the best information we get from these countries and there's going to be some gaps. >> we use what he had access to and what provided to us so it is a mixture of what the intelligence community and the law enforcement community can provide to us through the information sharing agreements into the data that we do collect what can we draw upon the two other pieces of information that we have? stack the problem that you are identifying is the first comment concerns gaining the network techniques they can bring back to their home countries so there's been a tremendous concentration by intelligence services, law enforcement to try
to get a handle on this in exchange for information. it's no wonder these are countries that share a high level of capability so that our best partners and there is a diversity in the countries in the program some of them have an acute foreign fighter program particularly the western european countries and the numbers you cited in the kinds that we heard. >> it's the best source of the data for the estimates but.
>> it extends the on western europe that but that is the larger numbers that come from those countries not so many from the participants that this is a critical problem held we know those watch lists and we probably have the best of all with about 90,000 names and then we have a smaller number which is the foreign fighter extract that really wanted to have that watchlist. >> i've taken more time than i should but we are glad that they have a result and it's getting better information and i don't think you can tell us here today that the program requires the more strenuous screenings in the programs in other words it's there for a reason and the facilitating of traveling visa for facilitating travel and so
on. what we are asking is given the fact that requirements are not as stringent even though more data was collected because of it specifically those that can go back and forth to a certain extent without identification. >> it's going to be the same issue if they are applying for a visa if we don't have information if you doesn't exist >> isn't the main difference -- the travel information doesn't exist in the u.s. government holdings neither one of us are going to get to it. >> the biometric will check that we are doing are the same. they are government officials or both albeit they would occur at
a different time and that is a big distinction. so, in terms of the biometrics, we have biometrics on three quarters of the traveling population so that as we pen against the databases to see if we have biometric holdings so some of it is when it would be the first time travelers and so the first time visa applicant which is the equivalent you get a biometric on the first application that even the state department upon the renewal you don't get an interview or the biometrics taken again so that you do it once and then you don't get that again so there's
lots of reasons for that and most of our drug trade information is associated with biographical information and the biographical information as you heard i think all at this point have said are the same between visa. >> where would we be if there were not a program. >> what would there be are we better off today because or are we worse off and then really what is the difference right now in the current state of play that's the reality i'm trying to lay out in the number of denials. >> people are screaming out to be caught screamed out.
>> but it's also to comply with the terms and that could be establishing ties to their home country if they are not registered for school but the national security vetting based on the data collected is going to be comparable between the two. we are involved in the bidding to make sure that they are in the adjudication that similar and we also take the database and run the entire content perpetually and we can feed back to the department of state any type of national security concerns that we uncover and that we can request a revocation of that just like we do in the database but it's the same data
that's run consistently between the two at that point from a national security perspective. >> every two years but is typically the period not only is that we currently dated for the period of time than but that the individual would have to resubmit every two years and we would rerun and know if it is heading hitting the terrorist database we would know in real time. >> and that way it is better. your correct, thank you. better than a visa. every year the applicant is providing us the information and i don't want to lose your point for the other security benefits that mark outlined. not only do they have to meet certain security standards to be in the program, they have to maintain them. the intrusive, robust reviews that mark was talking about earlier last about six to nine
months we do them at least every two years and they are sitting in the border agency was looking at how they do this and we are into passport issuance facilities. no other program allows the u.s. government to go in and do such an intrusive review. i don't believe that we provide that. >> it is adding those additional layers of security that don't exist. >> in the waiver process, i heard the total number per year is roughly 20 million is that accurate? what are the numbers that secured to come in?
like one of the points i want to follow-up on just so that we are on the same page it is only leaving the visas that are short-term 90 day business -- >> that's kind of where i was getting. >> get student visas, employment that are different. the vetting that we are talking about how true the comparison is, the state department issues including the people in the visa waiver program who don't qualify in the travel. >> at this point when you get a visa part of its outdoor intense moving forward and not working in the background prior so i want to come and study or i want to go to a funeral of an extended family member and i
will only be there for x. number of days and i will leave again but we don't capture any of the intent in the program would be an accurate statement? >> there are ways what are you doing and those types of questions. then the aggregate number. how many denials in the program? >> we denied about 60,000 applications last year. >> 60,000. >> we get about 13.8 million applications. they are good for two years.
so we had nearly 22 million last year. we had 112 million commercial air passengers total. so it makes things may be 18% of the total population and air travel. most travelers are going to come to the commercial aviation to 18%, through the program. 50% of u.s. citizens and permanent residents and then the difference of the waiver. >> you talked about a couple of different ways if one wanted to collect prior to the arrival of the united states you talk about sort of adding that function to the consulate to talk about setting up new centers and then you talk about the kiosks at every airport, every international airport. i guess i'm curious to know following up on senator carper's
questions about piloting would it be useful for the country to games of expertise and gain some expertise and gain some insight into how those would work? >> i think it could've the question of benefit versus cost because obviously the biometrics are taken every day at of the embassies and consulates all over the world so they are capable of doing it in some of the countries of course they haven't been issuing the regular visa is now for close to 30 years. the state department resource just doesn't exist for example to do that would come from france so you either have to ramp up the service pretty significantly to buy more office space or you would have to set up some sort of a satellite location again staffed other by the government employees or
other contractor to oversee the biometric enrollment. so it's not that it wouldn't work it's just a pretty massive undertaking and again, from what i see at the moment to be very minimal and the biometrics that goes on when they arrive so that's not worth while it's worthwhile it's just not worthwhile compared to the cost at least that's my view. >> what do you do when the pilot says -- >> how do you scale it realistically? >> what would we hope to gain by doing this is that the fact an imposter id applying for this benefit using different biographical information and we
might have to put a fingerprint record of a person. that number is made to be very low if the fingerprint are associated with national security concerns compared to what we have access with the biographical information. if it is a concern that a person is going to board the plane using somebody else's document, i think that concern is going to go against all travelers that they could board a plane as a different person and then you're looking at the biometrics that would have to be boarding the flight of the united states which is a whole different set of issues and that's why we have the discretion to collect biometrics but where do we collect them under the problem we are trying to solve right now we are collecting the biometrics from the traveler when they arrive. this is after they have gone through the via graphical information that has been invented through all the different holdings including the intelligence community and then perpetually it is after the book travel to the united states and
then we have received it with the reservation information to look at the airline manifest in the station and run that through a very intensive series to look at the know of the pieces of information and then travel patterns that would give us concerned that looking at intelligence reports or real life events with about this person's itinerary would raise red flags for us, e-mail of a certain age with a certain passport traveling from certain parts of the world are going to give us more concerned than others and we set up conditions in our database to flag this type of information. we have an extensive set of information that we apply against this so they go through that level of revealing than when they arrive in the united states, you know, they go through the interview with the officer and we collect a full set of biographic so at the point in time where do you do
that when they go through this whole level of review is it worthwhile to do it before their departure for the department of state like a visa and what type of information are you really trying to get to collect it and that's what we've been discussing. the biometrics are helpful. we want them. where is the right place and process so we don't shut down air travel versus the more good we are trying to do so that's what we are trying to balance because what information can we really get from it? a >> the question i have cut several things we talked about. one is the biometric information validating this is the person standing in front of me that i will send the document forward. we have anyway to be able to track a number or just how many people would try to come through and have a document that is false? >> for the visa waiver travelers, it's cheered it was about two hundredths of 1%.
>> is the idea of what that is. >> 476. >> that's pretty good off the top of your head. >> where we have the biometric hits. upon the arrival they arrived and they are showing a document. >> they are all for immigration admissibility issues in relation to entering under the visa waiver program. >> so the question then is we caught it at entry for all of those or where are we picking it up? spinnaker was upon entry in the united states. stomach that is the recognition that we have looking at the passport and what we see and taking it further as well. >> it's based upon us interviewing the passport, reading the passport database performing the system and queries, taking the fingerprint and comparing them against the