tv Peter Neffenger and John Roth Testify on TSA Misconduct CSPAN May 13, 2016 5:35am-8:24am EDT
we go back to the intelligence community and to the fbi and we do a scrib on those individuals. >> we have the methods, there is higher level of sensibility here, allowing these folks to actually work inside of secure areas? >> yes, sir. that was exactly the question i had about that. i've been working closely with director comey and the national counterterrorism center to -- >> mr. roth, you did a great job on the screening tests the a the big airports and you know, we had, we have very high failure rate the last time of that test. and i know, i'm not sure of enough time has gone by to allow admiral neffenger to sort of adopt a new protocol among the screeners. has that happened yet? have you done any new tests to take a measurement how we're doing? >> sure, what we've done is two things. one is a natural follow-up we would do any audit.
for example, with regard to the penetration testing we have reviewed tsa's 22-point plan to increase security at the check point. additionally we're planning more covert testing this summer of a similar scale we did last summer, so we'll be able to tell exactly how we're doing. >> great. thank you, mr. chairman, for your indulgence. i yield back. >> i recognize the gentleman from north carolina, mr. walker, for five minutes. >> thank you, mr. chairman. i am amazed to know how much money was spent in previous relocations. reassignments nearly $200,000 per relocation. have you directed any of these reassignments during your tenure? >> i have not, no, sir. >> mr. brainard reported that the relocation expenses for his reassignment, exceeded $100,000 s that true, as far as you know?
>> that's my understanding. >> would you agree that is illegitimate use of taxpayer dollars? >> in excess of what should have been spent. i cap any relocation or any reassignment cost. >> how are voluntary relocation decisions are approved now? >> now the process, first and foremost, it has to be looked at by the office of human capital. is there a need for the relocation. second, has the individual that thinking about relocating is that something the individual desires, wants? what is the skill set you need, why would you do that? i have the cfo, chief financial officer signs off on ability to pay for it. has to be reasonable costs. we set limits on the reasonable costs. finally after it gets reviewed by my executive council we make the final decision. >> mr. neffenger sounds like you're developing a plan for the future cleaning up things in the past. probably the biggest thing that concerns me is the issue with
mr. hogan. do you believe mr. hogan's performance balances are justified for the taxpayer? >> i don't that bonus was justified. >> i'm glad to hear that. as a leader, did mr. hogue fan have key role in direct reassignments. >> he had a role. these came out of a different office. >> when you say a role, can you expound on that for a moment? >> office of security operations ultimately has to get the people moved from one location to the other and perhaps has to carry out the order to make it happen. >> is it fair to say he had a key factor? >> he had a role, yes, sir. >> in looking at that, at his situation and his involvement, i'm sure you considered replacing mr. hogan as director of oso given his responsibility for screening failures and role reassignments and questionable bonus paints, is that fair to say? >> i would like to back up
little bit, mr. walker -- >> i appreciate it. i want you to answer the question. you're welcome to expound. i asked a direct question there? >> my first task to see what my leadership team was able to do. everything i asked of mr. hogan since i've been here he has done that i look at all my leaders to determine -- >> i appreciate it. there have been past violations. have you had discussions, part of groups, listen this is decision we may need to make for removing hogan for these past transgressions? >> inspector general look at situation with respect to that i think there were people responsible for that -- >> i'm not asking, with all due respect, you did a great job for inspector general roth. i'm asking you about what. what is your role in mr. hogan's previous indiscretions when it comes to some of the spending expenditures? have you had discussions or is there any plan to remove him or put him on probation? what is the situation. >> i do not currently have a plan to mr. hogan. he has performed to my expectations since i have been there.
i have not seen any indiscretions on his part since the time i've been in tsa. >> even though we acknowledge there has been some, do we -- >> i don't acknowledge that he had indiscretions. i think he carried out orders. those orders resulted in people being reassigned, sometimes for good reason, sometimes maybe for ill-considered reasons. >> even carrying out orders, reminds me of a movie, "a few good men." these marines in the fictitious movie carrying out a code red. if he is following orders oar doing something wrong or going after people there is still accountability, is that not fair? >> some issues were investigated and recommended. we filled out the recommendation as necessary from the inspector general. i have not seen any direct misconduct on the part of mr. hogan in the time that i've been there. >> i appreciate that in the time you've been there. our concern with the facts that we have before you arrived, it was not, not so far distant past
there were some of these indiscretions as we've used going on. my time is expiring. i hope there will be some kind of looking into the mr. hogan as far as some of these things went on, involuntary relocations mr. coupling talked about, tearing families apart. there was responsibility even if he was carrying out orders. i have 10 seconds. i comment inspector general roth. every hearing i go to you're properly prepared and i yield back, mr. chairman. >> i recognize the gentleman from virginia, mr. connolly, for five minutes. >> thank you very much. welcome, both of you. admiral neffenger, let me start by saying, really appreciate the management reforms you have undertaken and -- he which you've taken them. this is a big enterprise, a difficult enterprise. a critical mission with a lot of unsatisfying aspects to the job. very few human beings are going
to make a 30-year career telling people to take off their belts and shoes and yet it is critical to the mission, security of the american people. and so, not easy, to keep motivated to have a salary structure that makes sense and, i for one, very much appreciate what you've done and i hope you don't leave with the new administration, and as a matter of fact if you do, i hope you give paul widenfeld at metro to join his team because we've need kind of management reforms you've undertaken at tsa. one little plug i always make, and i have seen in my own experience a big change which i appreciate in how we're treating the public. we still have got work to do. but, i have really been impressed at different airports i've gone to, where, i just think when you create a more
hospitable, friendly climate that invites people's cooperation, you get it. and there is always risk if you get a hostile public or resentful public that something can go wrong. why not go the former if you can? and i just thank you for that and i hope you keep that sense of the culture present. we're not dealing with cattle. we're dealing with people. and we need their cooperation and we want them to feel good about the experience as best they can and i think we do have a long-suffering public that gets it about the security mission and willing to put up with a lot more i would have guessed but we should make it as easy as possible without compromising security. i commend it to you and i thank you for the progress that has been achieved. let me first ask, having said all of that, i think there is a growing concern as a management challenge what's happening in
terms of wait times. so for example, 600 passengers missed their flights in charlotte, north carolina, on good friday because of wait times that exceeded three hours. now, miss maloney doesn't know anyone who complains. my guess there were 600 on people on on good friday that day in charlotte who did. one thing i to understand i will be discomoded to get through security line to protect me and everybody else. the price of that it is moving so sluggishly i will miss my flight. american airlines said 7,000 customers missed flights alone due to long waits in security lines. seattle and atlanta indicated they may seek authority to privatize passenger screening to expedite this process. could you address that? because i think we have to agree
that is not acceptable. it may happen but if that becomes routine, that just doesn't -- now we'll get real public resistance. >> yes, sir. thanks for the question. the, we've seen huge increases in passenger volume, there is no doubt about that at peak times, we're seeing more people moving through the system than we've ever seen before. just to put it in perspective, four years ago a big day in this country was about 1.6 million passengers going through screening check point. we're well above 2 million passengers daily right now. it is just a volume increase. and i do think we need to grow the staff slightly to get up to that. we're working hard on that. in fact we've been, once we got our appropriations bill passed in december, we began accelerated hiring. if you reduce by another 1600 or so people, we cut into that number well in advance of the fiscal year. we're hiring and meeting hiring quotas. good news we have people that
want to work for tsa. >> i know you know this is a good management principles we need to set some metrics. three hours is unacceptable. so we ought to be setting for ourselves a time frame that is acceptable, we don't go beyond that whatever staffing required, i mean, mr., mr. mica correctly talked about staffing to traffic. this is part of that. >> that's right. we've been working closely with the airlines, the airports to understand when those peak loads are coming through to make sure the staffing meets that. i think we improved significantly in the past few weeks. i'm not aware of any wait times of the length that you're talking about right now. i track them daily. i look at passenger volume daily and i look across all airports. >> may want to check good friday in charlotte. >> i will do that. >> according to this report. one final question if the chair will indulge me real quick. inspector general roth, do we have anonymous hotline within tsa that people can call they feel something is untoward, sort
of the under broader whistle-blower category? in my county there is a hotline you can call if you think someone is doing something untowards and you're protected with anonymity and followed up by the inspector general? >> absolutely. we have a hotline that is manned as well as website, so you can use either of those ways to complain or give us information that we will -- >> guaranteed follow-up? >> we will take a look at it. we get 18,000 complaint a year. we can't guarranty every single one of those complaints will be thoroughly investigated but we certainly look at them and evaluate them. >> very fine. thank you, mr. chairman. >> thank you, mr. connolly. the chair recognizes the gentleman from georgia, mr. hice. >> thank you, mr. chairman. i think we've got a very great facility for the federal law enforcement training center but i think the tsa frankly is not utilizing it to the full potential. certainly not to the potential
that would be helpful. but how long on an average does a new hire have to wait before they begin training at the tsa academy? >> well, i've got good news to report on that. we're, as you know that academy stood up first time ever on january 1st of this year. so this is new for us and we are pushing eight concurrent classes, 200 officers a week. we think it takes four months to on board somebody new. and we typically bring them on board and they have to get their security background checks and the like. and then we get them right into training class shortly after that. so we're actually seeing the ability to move people right in. >> four months is the average wait? >> on average four to five months but during that time you're going through background checks and the like to determine -- no so how many, what -- >> so how what percentage go through flatc? 10%?
>> we're putting 100% through. used to be the case we trained at various places on the job throughout the country. we're going to make a couple of exceptions because of a need to get more officers out in front of the summer travel season. we're taking the flctc curriculum in couple local case. >> is that local training as good as flctc? >> in my opinion it is not ideal. i would like to do everything. we're building out capacity and flctc is working with us. >> how many airports requested authorization to utilize local training? >> i think i've got two airports that asked authorization. >> okay. have any been denied? >> what we said we will do it on as needed basis. we aren't currently doing local training class as. we're working with flctc to --
>> is there a clear policy to determine as need basis? >> there is a clear policy, yes, sir. >> could you submit that to us and let us have a copy of that? >> yes, sir. >> in regard to the bonuses i would like to go back to ask a couple questions regarding mr. hogan. you're aware that 90,000 in bonuses were broken up into increments of 10,000 each. could you explain why the agency did it this way, why it was broken out that way? >> as i understand it, as you know that was done under previous leadership but as i understand it was because the maximum amount allowable at any given bonus was $10,000. >> okay. so is this some sort of scheme to give him -- could you explain smurfing? >> say again? >> smurfing? >> i'm not familiar with the term. >> so, if there is $90,000 broken up in $10,000 increments, is that the type of thing that
would need approval from dhs? >> it does now. i will tell you that there is nothing in my experience that finds that justifiable. why i stopped practice. doesn't matter if it didn't violate policy. >> why do you say that? why is that not justifiable? >> it just doesn't pass front page test for me. >> it looks like something is being hidden? >> i don't think it is right and i stopped that practice. i make sure now all of our, all of our bonuses have to be approved at the department level and i severely restricted them within tsa. >> mr. roth, i would really like to hear your comments on all of this. >> as we look at report, it was clearly an attempt to circumvent department regulations on approval. >> okay. >> smurfing is breaking up specific financial transactions to below reporting requirement which is what happened here. >> right. >> the individual responsible for that by the time we did our
investigation is no longer employed at tsa the regulations existed at time were so loose it was technically permissible even though clearly intent was i think wrong. >> so the intent is to hide? >> absolutely. >> absolutely. that is what smurfing is. i appreciate you bringing that. is there anything currently preventing the agency, back to you, admiral, from disguising these bonuses in forms of payments be it relocation or any other method where it is really just a disguise for bonuses? >> yes, i have expressly prohibited it. i made that very clear in policy happy to provide the policy for the committee's record and i require oversight from the department before any bonus can be awarded to a senior executive. >> i would like to have that policy submitted. so you are saying, your testimony here is that there is no disguise taking place? >> not under my, not under my
leadership and i have made clear we put that directly into policy. i made sure even, that no single individual can approve a bonus award for senior executive without oversight and it has to be approved by the department. even, i not even given myself to authority to make final approval. it goes to the department for oversight. >> thank you, mr. chairman. >> thank the gentleman. now recognize the gentleman, from missouri, mr. clay. >> thank you, mr. chairman. thank both of you for being here. we all agree that security must be the top priority and there's no disagreement about that. mr. roth, when you testified here in november, you were critical of certain programs that granted passengers access to expedited screening lanes when they had not undergone risk assessments. you also commended administrator
neffenger, you said, and i quote, deactivated certain risk assessment rules that granted expedited screening through precheck lanes, is that correct? >> yes, sir. >> okay. on march 24, the bureau of transportation statistics issued a report that said, u.s. airline and foreign airlines serving the u.s. carried an all-time high of 895.5 million systemwide. so administrator neffenger, passenger volumes have been increasing but the number of screeners in the tsa workforce has dropped by nearly 6,000 over the past four years, is that right? >> yes, sir. >> and why did this occur? >> i'm sure there were good reasons for people before me to reduce that. i think it was predicated on a prediction of higher numbers of people getting into expedited screening than we've seen. it is a fact we're smaller
agency on the front line workforce than we were before and that we have significantly more people moving through the system. >> you know i heard my friend, mr. gowdy from south carolina, he doesn't encounter much trouble. i travel through st. louis lambert field weekly. it seems to have a shortage of employees, especially for the precheck line. probably 90% of the time that line is closed and each time staff gives me the excuse they don't have enough personnel, enough security officers, to check people. so it is very frustrating to my constituents who have paid the extra fee for precheck. is there a shortage of staff for airports like lambert? >> we, i think we have a shortage of staff across the system right now. we're moving people into the areas of greatest volume and
greatest need. we are hiring back the people that had been slated to be atrited out this year. we're push be out 200 new officers a week. i hope to meet the peak staffing that we need. we currently can not staff effectively across the system to the peak volume periods. >> so in your opinion was tsa screener workforce sized appropriately to handle increasing passenger volumes? >> i think the -- budgets were predicated on what was predicted to be 2% volume growth. we used the bureau of transportation statistics predictions. you remember these budgets were built a couple years ago. the actual volume growth has been significantly higher than that. so in my opinion we're not at the right size. that said, i appreciate all of the great comments about our workforce because we have really dedicated workforce and they're
doing a very challenging job out there and doing quite well. i would like to get them some more help. >> okay. then perhaps you can help me. i'm annually give a career fair in st. louis. it is largest one held. would love to involve your local staff coming out and looking at potential candidates. i will follow up with you on that. >> yes, sir, thank you. >> in, on may 4th, homeland security secretary jeh johnson issued a statement responding to increased waiting times and he said this. tsa is increasing staffing of tsos to help expedite the check point process without sacrificing security. mr. neffenger, what is the size of the screener workforce tsa needs to handle projected passenger volumes while insuring that only passengers who are subjected to risk assessments
are sent through expedited screening procedures? >> well, congress just approved reprograming which will allow me to hire 768 screeners, screening officers this summer. we'll get them out in the workforce we hope by the middle of june. that will significantly help us. we've also been working with airlines and airports. they are taking on some of the non-security-related duties which helps free up more of my officers to go on directly on to the screening checkpoints. we think combination of those two, use of our passenger screening k-9s should significantly alleviate some of the challenges that we're going to be facing over the summer. >> thank you both for your response. mr. chairman, i yield back. >> thank the gentleman. now recognize the gentleman from georgia, mr. carter, for five minutes. >> thank you, mr. chairman, and thank you admiral and mr. roth for being here, thank you very much. let me ask you, would you agree
that having expert and standardized training for tsa screeners we have at fltc, the federal law enforcement training center in glen cove, georgia, that is torn to make sure we have personnel to keep our airports safe. >> absolutely. >> i bring that up the federal law enforcement training center in i know you've been there, it in my district. i'm very proud of that. i think one of the areas we're getting light in the federal government. to go down there, i want to invite the other, my colleagues on this committee particularly to visit. we'll try to schedule a trip down there for everyone to see what an outstanding job they are doing down there in the way of training. i mention that because i want to make sure we're not confusing these well-trained employees with what, problem that we're having i consider to be more in
performance and more in management in particular. when you talk about having a shortage of employees, that is not because they're not well-trained. that is a management problem. when you talk about employees not showing up on a holiday and having a shortage during the busiest travel time, that's a management problem. so, i just want to make sure we understand that this, there is a difference here fletc is the a great facility. training is not the problem. it is a management problem and performance problem. >> thank you for recognizing. i believe our front line workforce the best the in the world. i see their dedication. i've been down to fletc multiple times. i meet with as clamses as i can.
that is world class institution. that is really an opportunity to stand up to a full-time academy down there. connie patrick who runs the outfit is one of the best in the world. >> absolutely. >> we're looking to develop that. my goal is train every single employee of tsa through that academy. that is the plan in the future. we have pretty aggressive plan and ambitious plan but i am getting a lot of support from congress on that. >> i want to make sure we differentiate portion of it and management. >> yes, sir, that is exactly right. >> we obviously as you can tell, a lot of upset people there. obviously we have a management problem at tsa we're depending on you to get it straightened out. >> that is what i've been tackling sir. >> let me talk about something else a different subject. couple weeks ago, employees of tsa testified before us and talked about the an involuntary directed reassignments. some of these we had to testify
before us were, had gotten excellent marks. in fact had gotten awards and being recognized for their outstanding performance, job performance and yet they were, they were reassigned against their will. the thing that concerns me is not just that they, upheaval having to move somewhere else for these people. obviously that is a very trying time for families and for employees. but the cost in it. what we were told is that, relocation costs were well over $100,000. is that really happening? >> i believe it did happen. i share the sail concerns you do. i stopped that policy completely. we don't do directed reassignments. now that said, i think it is important for a operating agency to have the ability to move people periodically. you have to do that. >> i understand it their concern
was they were beings disciplined as a result. >> and that is what my concern was too. i put very strong controls over that process. i will share with you the nature of those controls so we don't take up too many time but i will tell you i'm as concerned as you are about that those reports greatly distressed me. i stopped the process. it is not going to happen again. >> so we can take your word it's over with? >> yes, sir, you can absolutely take my word on that. >> we appreciate that i thank you for your dedication to fletc. again, mr. chairman, i will try to get that together but i want everyone to understand what a great facility this is. this is example of federal government working. >> yes, sir. >> i yield back. >> thank you the gentleman. chair recognizes the gentlewoman from michigan, miss lawrence for five minutes. >> thank you, mr. chair. i would like to examine the hiring and role of human
resources at tsa in more detail. in 2008 during the bush administration, tsa awarded a $1.2 billion human capital service contract to lockheed martin. under this contract known as hr access, lockheed administered the agency's process for recruiting an hiring and it is also responsible for personnel and payroll processing services such as position classification. administrator, is that correct? >> that was the case, yes, ma'am. >> so many of the improper personnel practices that the whistle-blowerrers alleged at last hearing including improper hiring and directed reassignments would have occurred while lockheed was providing services at tsa, is that correct? >> it was during the same time period, yes, ma'am. >> on january 29th the inspector general issued a report about the tsa contract with lockheed martin.
the report states that among other performance deficiencies, there were incidents in which lockheed martin failed to handle personally identifiable information properly. is that correct, mr. roth? >> yes, ma'am. >> the report also found that lockheed martin quote, failed to consistently refer the eligible veterans on job announcement. ultimately the report state that the lockheed martin hiring team, and i quote, report ad total of more than 150 veterans who were not referred on six different job announcements. mr. roth, is that correct? >> yes, ma'am. >> so if lockheed martin failed to follow our federal regulations in regards to the competitive service hires, particularly veterans preference, this is simply intolerable. so, administrator, are you familiar with the inspector
general's report? >> i am, yes, ma'am. >> okay. so what does tsa -- when does the tsa's contract with lockheed martin end? >> it is coming to an end this year and we are completely restructuring our approach to that. i would like it. sa to own more of its hiring recruitment and personnel policies and so we're restructuring that completely. it is part of a plan to completely overhaul the human resource management program of the agency. >> in lieu of the contract ending, with lockheed martin, will this be put out to bid again? or, when you say assume, do you have a capacity, and the resources as far as budget to be able to take on more of these responsibilities in hiring? >> we don't have all the capacity we need. what i would like to do, if i can get back to you with fuller answer for the record we can show you what the plan is, what the strategy is for moving forward beyond the hr access
contract. >> i want to be on the record that the issues that were brought forward in the hiring process, and we being a federal agency, is totally unacceptable. the fact that we are seeing a relationship with a industry or company that did not meet our benchmarks is refreshing but but i don't want to hear that we're taking on the responsibilities ourself and then come back later with concerns because you weren't able to handle the capacity. >> yes, ma'am. i share those same concerns and we have to do this in very deliberate way, in a way that protects our workforce as it currently exists and then our potential workforce for the future. >> mr. roth, did you make any recommendations based on your findings on what tsa could do to improve their hiring practices? >> yes, ma'am, we did. we made five different
recommendations. tsa agreed with each of those recommendations and we're in the process of doing audit follow-up to insure in fact tsa would do what they said they would do. >> thank you. i look forward to moving forward under your leadership and in protecting a group of employees in our federal government. so many others are, but the tsa, being a member of congress in the airport constantly, the respect that i have for the agency, the need for good, firm leadership and accountability that we saw through this situation, we need to move forward and i support you in the future. thank you. >> thank the gentlewoman. now recognize the gentleman from for the caroline, mr. meadows, for five minutes. >> thank the gentleman. inspector general roth, i want to thank you and your entire team for your service.
i have a great respect for your role and your colleagues across the federal workforce. i have the top five list, you and your team are in top five list not only inciteful work, actionable work and follow-up work that provides real tool for members of congress. so i want to make sure that the record reflects that. >> thank you. >> administrator neffenger, are you familiar with federal air marshal robert mcclain? >> yes, sir, i am. >> are you familiar with the fact that the courts have overturned tsa's assertions that his whistle-blower disclosures were not prohibited by law? >> yes, sir, i am. >> okay. are you aware of the fact that it has been over a year since an administrative judge hasn't indicated that those disclosures should indeed be protected? >> yes, sir.
>> okay. so if you're aware of all those, and in light of the fact that mr. cummings asked, do you tolerate retaliation, in what scheme could you not see the fact that he has been reinstated but yet no raises, he still continues to be paid at a position -- not put in a position that he would have been in had he not been fired? at what point can you justify that that is not retaliation? >> well, i don't believe -- i believe he was reinstated as required by -- >> at a pay he was at in 2005. do you know any other tsa employee at pay he was at in 2005? >> well, i'll double-check that. >> you don't have to double check. i know. >> off the top of my head i can't give you exact pay of tsa employees. >> do most tsa employees get a raise? >> well you get the annual cost
of living increases authorized by -- >> would you say if he didn't, would that be retaliation? >> i will check to see. >> yes or no. if he is getting paid the same he got paid in 2005, is it retaliation? >> i don't, i would have to see the facts of the case. >> i'm giving you the facts of the case. is it retaliation or not because let me tell you, what really bothers me, i protect my whistle-blowers. for you to get up here and talk about how wonderful the rank an file is, and how you're looking out for their best interests, and to see evidence that retaliation continues to go, has a chilling effect, wouldn't you think. >> if in fact there is retaliation i will look into it. >> why is the office of special counsel having to open a full investigation? >> on mr. mcclain? >> yeah. why are they, doing a full investigation. >> talking about one that was already done? >> talking about the one they're about to embark on? >> if they're opening one again because he made an allegation
there has been retaliation. i support his due process to investigate that. i am not familiar with the specifics of this current situation. >> don't you think you ought to be? >> i'm familiar with the fact that we have reinstated him and he now is in position to compete for whatever position he desires to come for in the organization. >> administrator, let me just tell you, that testimony is very troubling to me. because what i'm not going to tolerate is retaliation on whistle-blowers. that is what it looks like to me. >> i don't tolerate it either. i promise you will follow -- >> so can you get back to this committee within 30 days, with a way that you're going to rectify it so the office of special counsel doesn't have to do a full investigation? >> i fill follow up on this coliquy, to determine two what the actual situation is. >> do you have a commitment? >> i have a commitment. >> with action plan. >> with action plan. >> within 30 days to the chairman?
>> i will get back to you exactly what i will fine -- >> that is not an answer. what is reasonable amount of time there? >> i can do it within 30 days. as i said i want to do, this is new information that you're providing to me i'm not aware of. >> you've done your research. this would not have been a shock that this might have come up today. is that a shock to you? >> i'm aware of the previous issue concerning this federal air marshal. >> let me dispense with the rhetoric. get it fixed where we don't have to waste taxpayer dollars on a special investigation into this. you're the guy in charge. we're going to hold you accountable. i will yield back. i will expect a response to the committee in 30 days. >> thank the gentleman. we'll now recognize the gentleman from oklahoma, mr. russell, for five minutes. >> thank you, mr. chairman. i share my colleague's concerns obviously about whistle-blowers.
think, while everyone who has the mantle wants to do right with the organization. i want to take questions on security end and take it in different direction however. inspector general roth, i too share my colleague's opinion of the confidence of your office and personal diligence. the record has just been a outstanding. but my question today deals with dog teams in terms of security and you will see why in a moment. did the ig in their reports make any recommendations on vapor
wake dog teams and how they should be deployed or how they should be used at different airports? >> we have not looked at that issue. my understanding gao may have done some work on that but we have not. >> okay. i appreciate that. admiral neffenger, as a preface, first off, i take, i take some comfort knowing that you're at the helm of this organization. i don't think anyone who has advanced to your level as an admiral in our coast guard, who has protected our shorelines and protected our borders has anything other than the interests ever the defense of our country. and i appreciate that. i also think that it probably gives you incredible insight dealing with a myriad of problems in a very complex and at times lethargic organization. in oklahoma city, in my
district, the vapor wake dog team issue came to mind because acting federal security director steve cartwright cited it, it was the ig's reports as the reasons for the elimination of vapor wake dog teams from airports such as will rogers world airport and, it was due to the need for performance and screening and getting people through and therefore these airports would have to lose their dog teams. and in the case, although, we had will rogers that was one of the charter five original airports in the training of these teams, they trained for such teams, very effectively. allowed great through-put. the entire program was eliminated from that airport and i suspect it is probably not the only one. so my question to you is, why would a federal security director make the claim that it was the ig and their findings
that would call for the elimination of that program and why would we not want these teams at airports that might have less capacity other than a huge airport, but they also might have greater vulnerability for infiltration? it seems to me that security wise, it makes good sense and i realize, that this is not part of the normal stuff, but it is very important for security? >> well, i'm not sure what the federal security director's discussion was. let me tell you from my perspective what we've done. >> sure. >> we are, i like the, we call them passenger screening k-9 vapor wake dogs. they work passenger line and look for trace odors and follow back to the source. it's a tremendous resource. it is a great explosive detection technology we have and it can move people very efficiently through a security line. i don't have as many of those dogs as i would like to have and
so to meet, this is my decision, so i'm the guy you need to look at for this. it was my decision to take dogs from some airports that aren't seeing as much volume as some of larger airports for the coming summer in order to meet what we know to be real passenger volumes we see in passenger airports. it was never my intent to eliminate their use. right now we have 322 total dogs tsa operate. they were trained to do cargo sniffing, not passenger screening. we're in process of converting many of those to convert to passenger screening k-9ss. take a month or so to do that and we will continue to do that. >> i appreciate that. i would just ask, security is lot of my life and a lot of my interest here in congress. i would ask that we would consider, i mean if i were an enemy, i would infiltrate in small or regional airports simply because there is a better chance of infiltration than in a large one.
deploying all assets, once you get in the loop, you're inside the loop no matter where you originated or flew from. i would ask that you look at some of this specifically in vulnerability stance, not necessarily regional or political stanes. that is irrelevant in my view when it comes to security of the nation. but we ought to relook, rather than putting everything where we expect to have a problem and maybe leave areas vulnerable where we don't. with that, mr. chairman, i will yield book my time. >> thank you. recognize the gentleman from alabama, mr. palmer. >> well, i'm the guy you have been waiting on, the last one. mr. neffenger, how many different assistant administrators have left the office the intelligence and analysis since tsa was created? >> i don't have that exact number. i will get that for you. >> it's 11. and i ask that because it
concerns me that the office would suffer from that rate of turnover, would you agree with that? >> turnover in offices is always challenging. >> particularly the office responsible for your intelligence and analysis. have you looked into that? >> yes, sir. in fact i brought in a new chief of intelligence this year, and. he is intelligent professional. one of the things i asked him to do is insure we build a world class, high quality intelligence operation. he is in the process of doing that. >> that is mr. bush? >> that is mr. bush, tom bush, yes, sir. >> are you aware of any significant security violations committed by oia officials? >> i'm not certain if you're referencing anything in particular? >> i'm asking you if you are aware of any security violations committed by oia officials? >> prior to my arrival a
individual in charge of oia disciplined by the agency. >> so that answer would be yes? >> yes. >> do you believe. oi should proabide by the professional standards of intelligence community in handling information? isn't that what the issue was, classified information? >> my understanding that was not what the issue was about, no, sir. >> what were the circumstances related to departure of former administrator steven sadler? >> with steven sadler i need to familiarize myself with that case, i'm sorry sir. >> multiple security violations took place under his leadership. what percentage of tsa es intelligence and appropriations used for vetting and what percentage for traditional intelligence? >> i will get you the exact number are to the record but we, a significant amount of our activity is spent on vetting. understanding the vetted population.
but we also have a, a strong analysis branch that works very closely with the intelligence community members to provide specific intelligence assessments of transportation security challenges and risks. >> one of the -- i will transition a little bit here. one of the things that i'm concerned about is in our last hearing, there were repeated reports that only three u.s. airports that require employee security checks. are you aware of that? >> i, that is actually not correct, depends on what you mean by security checks. we vet -- anyone who hold as credential that gives them access -- >> requiring them to go through the same kind of security that a staff member? >> this would be screening of individuals as they come on property? >> reporting for work. >> i should have been more clear, i apologize.
>> okay. there are currently i think three or four airports that, the airport themselves do security screening. there are other places where employers provide security screening. we are varying levels across the system right now for direct screening. everyone has access requirements. that's a fundamental requirement and those access requirements are with their badge and those badges give you access to certain locations. then there are some airports that have gone beyond that to do actual screening. we in tsa do random screening throughout the sterile area of the airports as well. >> well, but that gets to my concern. every member of my staff, every member of any member of congress's staff has to go through a screening process. their bags are screened. they have to take metal objects out of their pockets. they all have badges, okay? that is part of my concern is, out of the thousands of people who work for tsa, is it not
create any concern? i mean it was reported there were a number of tsa employees who had some tie to terrorist groups. it just seems to me that they ought to go through the same screening process that other federal employees. >> we have no tsa employees tied to terrorist groups. we vet our employees daily and if we found that, they would be gone. >> i'm telling you in the last hearing that came up. apparently it was reported that there were some who had some connections with terrorists or, have potentially had terrorist ties. i'm bringing this up in the context of out of the thousands of people who work for tsa, all of whom have security badges, it just makes sense before they enter these critical areas they go through a screening process like everybody else. their bag goes through a machine
and they to through machine like everybody else. >> congressman, let me understand what i'm saying. there are people who are not tsa employees that have access badges and we vet those people continuously. there are population of 900,000 or so in aviation system have access badges of some type. varying types of access. they're not all-accessing seam type of locations. they're continuously vetted against terrorist screening database. they're vetted against extended screening elements the tie database and vetted against the criminal database where we have piloting a continuous vetting pilot. >> we're not talking about the same thing. >> tsa employees are also vetted against -- >> we're not talking about the same thing. also been reported that there is thousands of badges that have been lost or stolen that, let me say. that haven't been accounted for.
my question is, when they report for work, do they have to put their bag on a conveyor to go through a machine to see what is in the bag and do they go through -- >> some locations they do and some location they don't. >> my contention is, it ought to be all locations. i yield back. >> i haven't asked questions yet. so i would like to recognize myself for probably more than five minutes. so, let's talk about the involuntary reassignments or directed reas assignments you spoke about that. you said there is or is not evidence that was done as retaliatory action? >> i do not have any direct evidence. what i'm waiting for is to see what the results of office of special counts sell investigations tells me with respect of couple people that made such allegations. >> well the office of special counsel has already stated that andrew roads directed reassignment and as well as
becky roarings suspension due to evidence there was cases of improper whistle-blower retallization. are you telling me they haven't given you the final report? is that what you're waiting for? >> i am waiting for, mr. rhodes has outstanding investigation which is still spending. meantime i was, pleased to see that prior to my arrival that had been stayed and he is still located in the -- >> what about becky roarings? >> same with hers. i understand hers is going through review as well. >> you have no evidence of any other retallization? do you have any other evidence of any other types of retaliation above and beyond directed reassignment tool they used? >> i don't personally have any knowledge of any other retaliation. if i see it, i will take action to address it. >> mr. roth, do you have anything to shed on this? >> i do not. i don't have any evidence that i could share at least today. >> okay.
administrator, we have, particularly over the last six months, i've got kind of one pain, two-sided page here of outstanding requests that we have from this committee of the we will give you a copy of this. i don't expect you on the spot to respond to it but there are some that have had no -- handing awe copy of it. i don't expect you to answer on the spot but we need help getting responses in timely manner. some have been good but others have been not so good. some we have had nothing on. we get very frustrated with having to do in camera reviews. we handle classified intelligence on regular basis. i need your support in responding to these outstanding requests. >> yes, sir, i will. >> i want to go back to what mr. palmer was talking about. you said you vet daily.
when somebody -- i want to get a crystal clear picture, when somebody applies and goes through the process of working for it sa they get what sort of background check? >> it a standard national agency check. same type of check you do for people coming into the military first time. you do a criminal history background check. you check their name against the terrorist screen database. you look for any disqualifying activities, offenses or the like in their background prior to coming -- >> there are some infractions that would still be acceptable to be hired as tsa? >> there are. i can't enumerate those off top of my head. >> if you could provide whatever the current standard is. >> yes, sir, i will. >> you say you vet those daily, how do you, if somebody were to get arrested, somebody had a assault charge or a murder charge, or, pick something heinous, how would you know that once they have been hired? >> well, once, after they have been hired?
>> after they have been hired. >> we do recurrent criminal history background checks. >> how often? >> i believe on, annual basis. i will verify that. and then we do daily recurrent, i mean, continuous check, against terrorist screening database for our employees. >> 450 or so airports, i'm not sure how many ports you're dealing with. how many of these, you mentioned 900,000 security badges of all sorts. >> in the aviation system. >> in the aviation system. so, how many of those are, do you have a sense of how many of those have biometric information, whether even be as simple as photograph? >> he have this all photographs. those risch issued, these are bangs that airports and airlines issue individuals. it is set individually at each airport. so a badge that you have for atlanta hartsfield will not work in any other airport. these are issued by employees and the airport, usually
standard is set according to, there is a federal security standard they have to meet in order for the badge. they have to have photographic i.d.s and biometric identifier associated with them. not all of those biometric identifiers are necessarily in use for access purposes at every airport. >> when you say biometric, one of the issues in the past they didn't have readers, they didn't have electronic readers for each of these. >> i don't want to confuse this with the twit card. transportation workers identification credential is not credential used in the aviation system. that is primarily in the maritime transportation system and people interacting with that. that one does not currently have a readers for it. so that biometric in the maritime world is not currently in use. so it is still a -- it's a badge that is, card that is issued with a background check. it has a biometric on it but not
all of the readers are out there. but in the aviation system -- that is government-issued card. a joint program between the coast guard and tsa. it does not apply to aviation workers. that's much larger population of people who hold that twic card. >> you shouldn't be able to use it at an airport? >> you can not use it in airport. >> shipping cruise lines, things like that terminals? >> yes, sir. truckers that interact with the ports and the like. >> okay. that is one of my bigger concerns is the access that so many people have. dulles airport alone my understanding there are some 16,000 security badges out there. to mr. palmer's point, what he was talking about is, you know, why not check people who go, why not check tsa employees as they go in and out? you check a pilot. i stand there, they go to the front of the line as they should. pilots are checked. if we're trusting somebody, it
is trusting the pilot. why not check each person? >> well, we do check each person. they do, they do recurrent drug testing. we vet them against databases. we watch them every day. remember these are people standing in the security check point, day in, day out and -- >> if it, pick whatever you want, in a backpack and they just walked past you would never know, correct? >> well that is not necessarily true. we do a lot of integrity testing. in fact we have a pretty good integrity testing program. i think if we find people -- >> you're checking and screening every person that goes through, except for the tsa people. >> i mean they're checked by definition when they show up in the morning. they are vetted every single day. like i said, we look at them every single day. probably some of the most watched people in the transportation system because they're under the watchful eyes of supervisors. under the watchful eyes of the other screening workforce.
so i believe that we're doing a very good job of keeping track of those folks. these are really food people and taken an oath. >> by and large i'm sure they're really good people. again, when you have zero tolerance for, you have to keep security at it's highest level, i don't understand that we check pilot and flight attendants but we don't check tsa folks going in. you have had arrests. there have been problems. >> there have been arrest. >> not as if it's never happened before. your ability to move drugs or weapons, or anything else across at that line. mr. roth, do you have any insight into this? >> i don't, no, congressman. >> i want to move to dogs if i could. i'm a huge fan of dogs. the person i want to sit next to on the airplane the person who had luggage screened, handheld information screened. walked through a metal director and walked by a bomb-sniffing dog.
i have never seen some of the technology used at airport, i never seen it at white house. i don't see it in afghanistan where they're dealing with improvised explosive devices on a daily basis. i don't see it in a lot of other places. europe banned some of this technology yet we still use it here in the united states. and i appreciate your comments about the dogs, but, the single best way to secure an airport from an improvised explosive device is a dog. would you disagree with that or agree with that? . .
.. a live smoke grenade. the rise of people bringing or attempting to bring guns on an airplane is as to there mom call. i mean, the statistics on this are are quite high. my question, maybe you could shed light on what that's happening, but i don't see there's much any consequence. i don't hear anybody's getting prosecuted. we have a $10,000 fine, you can go to jail, but find me a person in this country that's violated this. and if you don't know, if you don't understand at this point in time that you can't bring a gun on an airplane, where in the world have you been living? a lot of people i know will come to the tsa and say, oh, i forgot
i had my gun in my backpack, gosh darn it. well, go put it in your car. i mean, i believe in the second amendment. i'm as pro-gun as you get. but if you're an idiot and you don't know you've got a gun on you and it's loaded and you're trying to bring it on an airplane, why aren't some of these people going to jail once in a while? >> mr. chairman, i'm as shocked as you are. you're right, we saw many, many more last year than we saw the year before. tsa's not a law enforcement agency, so i don't have the authority to take action. the protocol is when we see a gun, it gets held inside the x-ray machine, we call local law enforcement, and it's up to local law enforcement and the laws of whatever jurisdiction that they cover to take action against that. we can take action against an individual, we can strip them of their precheck eligibility if they come to a precheck line, but we have to turn them over to local law enforcement -- >> what would you, what would the call be, what would you like local law enforcement to do?
>> well, again, we know that we have laws in this land where people are allowed to conceal carry, where they're allowed to open carry, and in many states the local law enforcement says take that back out to your car and come back in. sometimes they get arrested. if you're new york state, you'll get arrested. someplace else you might not get arrested. i just don't want that stuff coming through the checkpoint. it's astonishing what people try to bring through -- >> okay, is so live smoke grenade, trying to bring it on an airplane. what should happen? are you encourage -- i guess i'm trying to -- >> well, we're working very hard. we encourage local law enforcement to take as strong of action as they can. i think somebody shouldn't be allowed to fly anymore, but i don't have the authority to make that decision. >> all right. i far exceeded my time. let's recognize the gentleman from wisconsin for five minutes. >> thank you.
in the past the committee herald numerous accounts of line staff being punished for minor infractions while high-level managers went unpunished for significant abuses. is there a double standard if senior officials who retaliate against their subordinates or lie to the police about a dui are allowed to keep their job? >> i think that there needs to be -- we're doing this. i think there needs to be work done on the way in which we do discipline and performance management across the board. the law, as you know, the aviation transportation security act set up somewhat of a bifurcated system, and it needs to be, it needs to be consolidated, it needs to be coordinated. >> okay. next, this is more of a comment, and i want you to respond because i think congresswoman
maloney said something i don't agree with. i obviously, in this job are, fly a couple of times a week. i have never seen a situation in which the precheck line is longer than the real line. i think i can speak on behalf of most people, i wish you'd put more people in the precheck line. i to hear people complain that they wish they could go through the lines faster, so i don't know who she talks to, but there's another side of the story. i've got another question for you. tsa spent $47,000 on an app to randomly assign people to go right or left that anybody with basic knowledge of codes could do. do you feel that app was worth what tsa paid for? >> i think that was an excessive amount. that was done, as you know, back in 201 3, and we're not using that. >> okay. mark livingston testified that a
watch floor transformation that was supposed to cost $3-3.5 million cost approximately $12 million because it was performed improperly. do you want to comment on that? >> i'm not sure which watch floor transformation he's referring to, but what i've done -- we've done a complete review of our entire acquisition process, and from my perspective, there are lots of opportunities to save the taxpayer money in our current processes. >> we'll give you one more thing mr. livingston said. he said there's still a half million dollars' worth of equipment sitting in a box in the office. are you familiar with that? >> i'm not familiar with that, but i'm going to go back and look for that. >> okay. i'll yield the remainder of my time. >> go to mr. cummings for five minutes. >> i'm going to be very brief. first of all, i want to thank both of you for your testimony.
after the last hearing we had on tsa, admiral, we had a -- i just, my staff has just given it to me this morning, but it was a letter, a handwritten letter from one of the whistleblowers. i've never realize a letter into the record -- read a letter into the record that was addressed to me like this, but i'm reading it for a reason, and i'm explain it in a minute. again, this was one of the whistleblowers. dear sir: thank you for your leadership and direct fairness in the hearings on the issues of tsa's potential misconduct. you spoke truth to power when you asked and demanded a fair and balanced hearing. you breathe air into our agency and gave hope to all the men and women when you asked for the facts. we all, all of us at tsa now believe that congress and will
fix tsa. thank you, sir. you have inspired all of us to renew our faith in the process of accountable leadership, and i wish you continued success and great health. and i'm going to leave the name out. the reason why i read that leder is because -- that letter is because there are people depending on us. and i they just want to get it right, you know? a lot of times i hear negative things about employees; that is, federal employees and state, government. but i tell people that a lot of these people, most of them, they come out, they have a mission, and they want to serve the public. and they want to treat 'em right. there are stressors that come with the job. i mean, any elected official will tell you that they can be at the supermarket and maybe
somebody will come up and say, hello, and then they'll say somebody will say, congressman, they're just trying to get out of the supermarket. about the seventh or eighth person, you know, the person doesn't realize that they're the seventh or eighth person that's called him and doesn't realize he's got to get home. but, so there is -- that's part of the job. and i realize that a lot of the things that the employees do, i'm sure, can get monotonous. and the chairman was just showing me the we toes of all of -- the photos of all of the knives and guns and grenades and things that people, i'm sure in many instances, accidentally are trying to get through. so we do not have room for record. but -- error. but i read the letter because i want to remind you, and i know i don't have to do this, but there's so many people who want us to help.
they want you to help, and they want us to help. and when i listen to those whistleblowers and i heard all of their testimony, you know the thing that, the theme that ran through the whole thing was that they simply wanted the best for the public and for the agency. they weren't show boating. they probably didn't even really want to be here. but they, like many of our federal employees, they had a desire that their agency would be the elite of the elite. and that's the kind of reputation i want to get to. i want people to be very proud to be a tsa employee. and i want them when they say, you know, i work for the tsa to stick their chest out and say, you know what? it's a great organization. but again, keep in mind what i
said. if you go back and you listen to all the things that they said, they talked about a few bad apples in the leadership. and excluded you, by the way, said that you were doing a good job. so i just beg you to keep all of that in mind, and i really appreciate your efforts. i know it's difficult. mr. roth, i want to thank you. and i hope that you all will continue to work together. because that's what it's all about. this is how it's supposed to work. we need the critical eye of just a great lawyer and a great i'm . like you, mr. roth, but then we need the response to be appropriate. so with that, mr. chairman, i yield back, and i thank you, mr. chairman, for this hearing. >> thank the gentleman. now recognize mr. mica from florida for five minutes. >> thank you, mr. chairman. i spoke earlier about the attrition rate which overall is about 10%, about 4500 a year.
and then the new hires were losing about 30% of those and 38% of the nontso which is information we got from you. the problem is that's an average. you have 30 airports in the country that handle 75% of the traffic, and those numbers are much higher. i know los angeles, a whole host of the big ones have had problems recruiting, retaining, training and hiring. you actually have deferred, you told mr.-- [inaudible] you have lots of people going through with few exceptions to -- [inaudible] but you actually have given authority to 21 airports, almost all of those the largers in the country, isn't that correct -- largest in the country, isn't that correct? for local training and hiring?
>> it won't be at 21 locations. we've given -- >> waivers to 21 locations -- >> right. >> boston, o'hare, jfk -- >> yes, sir. that's right. >> -- laguardia, miami, lax. i mean, these are the big ones too. >> yes, sir. >> and i don't generally have a problem with that. i think that you can get people to do the training, and and there are firms that will do that maybe internally. it can be done. but i just wanted to make sure that was in the record. i disagree with the gentleman who last spoke, and i talk to him about every, at every airport screening the employees through a metal detector and all that. in orlando and miami it's a -- i don't know if you're still doing it in atlanta. you need to be vetting the employees first before they're hired, and you need to be vetting even the tsa people which are not all getting
cleared. the people who work in the secure areas. we had a hearing, and thousands of them we didn't have social security numbers. many -- hundreds and hundreds of them are foreign nationals with working papers we don't know anything about. that's what concerns me, is the people who have access to secure areas. so vetting and monitoring those people, knowing who they are. the dogs, there's an opinion about dogs. dogs right now don't deal with the threat that we face. the threat is a nonnitrate-based explosive. dogs can't detect that. neither can the equipment you've got at the airport. you know that, don't you, sir? just say -- it's yes. i can tell you it's yes, because i've tested the system, and i've ordered more tests of the system for the first time in years. and we can confirm that. and this thing about getting guns and knives and all, they aren't going to take down a
plane. those people don't pose a risk. maybe they did it accidentally. do you know any of them that intended to take down a plane of those guns and knives that you took? none of them. but i do know that known terrorists have gotten through the system. that concerns me. i do know that your intel and analysis divisioning is in chaos -- division is in chaos from what i've been told. your intel division lacks a classification guide we were told which is a breach of classification guidelines. did you know that? >> i don't believe we lack any guide, sir. >> well, again, that's what we're told. it says lacks a classification guide. this is information given to us. also reportedly does not have the capability to internally vet and disseminate intelligence in realtime. any intelligence information
that disseminates to the field must be first vetted and then approved by dhs and fbi. sort of a bureaucracy. these are other reasons why we fail to connect the dots in the past and failing to connect the dots in the future is a concern. then, again, i'd ask you to respond also to that intelligence analysis. the spp program, to solve your problem you've got to get out of the screening business. you need to set the rules for the screening, oversee it and audit it and let the private sector do it. they do it for nuclear facilities, dod facilities, some of our most secure facilities. you'll never get it right with 45,000 personnel awe cross the whole country -- across the whole country. it's just not going to work, i can assure you, no matter what you do. i want to speed up this spp
process. it takes a year. can you prequalify people that provide screening services? >> it depends. i'll have to check the exact rules -- >> but i would like to see that, because thises the first thing -- this is the first thing. it requires 120 days. we'll have dozens of airports that will opt out, but you can still set the rules. you get out of this mess and get into the security business which will save us from another terrorist attack. i'd like a response on how we can clean this up so it doesn't take that long as part of the record. and then finally, mr. chairman, i have asked for some information about salaryies both within the district and then overall i want to see for the record the amount for screening and the non-screening positions in your highest paid positions a complete list of them and the totals and salaries. thank you. i yield back. >> thank you. >> as we wrap up here, mr. neffenger, last point i just
wanted to make. we have a request, and i want to reiterate the bonus policy. one of the criticisms, believe, from the inspector general -- there really wasn't a bonus policy in place. so what is it? in 2015, for instance, the senior members that were ts, es members who made less than $160,000 were ineligible for a bonus even if they achieved the highest level of excellence, but you made more than $160,000 even if your performance evaluation came in lower, you could get a bonus. that seems so upside down and wrong. >> yeah. i'll get you the policy for the record, mr. chairman, so that you can see what we've done. >> mr. roth, do you have any comment on that? >> no, just what was many our investigation which was that the policy was very sort of loose, but we had a commitment from tsa that they would fix the policy. my understand is they have.
>> okay. it's something we'd like to look at. mr. roth, last question. what's your, what are your biggest concerns? >> just the size of the enterprise, two million passengers a day, 450 airports. tsa as the checkpoint operator but also tsa as the regulator of the airports. it's a monumental task that's going to take time to fix. >> okay. we appreciate you both. we have with the greatest confidence in the administrator but also in the inspector general who plays a vital role, and you each represent a lot of employees and a lot of people who are good, hard working, patriotic people that are trying to do the right thing. and for that, we thank you. we have a mutual, is symbiotic relationship in trying to weed out the bad apples. and they're there. and to the extent that we can make that better, smarter, more fair, i think it'll improve
morale, it'll make the airports and the population more safe and secure, and we share that mutual goal, and so we look forward to continuing to work for you and thanks for your presence and to the men and women who do the good, hard work every day. with that, the committee stands adjourned. [inaudible conversations] [inaudible conversations]
[inaudible conversations] >> alleged misconduct in the tsa held by the house government oversight reform committee. find full-length video from both hearings online at c-span.org. >> social media profiles are not currently used when conducting federal background investigations. this morning the house oversight and government reform committee looks at why that is and results from pilot tests that consider information from social media sites. that'll be livat 9 a.m. eastern on our companion network, c-span3. >> executives from national youth football, hockey and lacrosse programs will be on capitol hill this morning to talk about concussions. they'll be joined by public health officials and the parents of victims suffering from chronic brain injuries.