tv Key Capitol Hill Hearings CSPAN June 3, 2016 7:05pm-8:01pm EDT
that is why we are granted this authority. we are authority. we are not interested in spending money for the sake of spending money. it is about generating capabilities that directly impact our mission the material way. >> i would be interested in how your acquiring in more detail, how you are finding the right acquisition personnel no competitive we are in finding the right acquisition personnel because in many ways that is the key to the kingdom. if we're going to have the capabilities, a lot of it is people being trained. >> the capabilities. >> so i am worried about getting the right people. i would like us to stay updated and that progress. what kind of coordination does your command have at this point with nato allies,
allies, israel, arab allies, particularly interested in any coordination and cooperation you have. >> i'm not going to publicly. >> obviously. >> i would only tell you, we have a handful of nations right now, very direct and real relationships with with respect to capabilities, real-world operations. one of the challenges i find isi find is cyber like any other mission, we have got to prioritize. i asked where's the greatest return for us as a department, the ability to execute our mission. spent almost as much time with the discussion with the team about what we are not going to do as was discussed , still in the midst of building out.
you can't do everything. we have identified identified an initial set of foreign partners, if you will, the partnerships that they are generating, the capability of your using the day. >> and maybe in a classified setting i could get more information. what is the ratio of civilian versus military within the command? >> we are trying to build about 80 percent military, 20 percent civilian. if you look at it today, probably 7030, 70% military, 30% civilian. >> , 30 percent civilian. >> what about contracts? what is the ratio on contractors? this could be an area, underlying that is a concern about the actual screening of contractors. what is your ratio now and what do you want it to be going forward? >> we probably right now, trying to do the math in my
head. it is probably about 25 percent. we have an additional 25% on a contractor basis. >> is that where you would like to be going forward? >> i am a little bit leery. i try to remind people, cyber is a domain ona domain on which we conduct a wide range of military operations. in accordance with the law of armed conflict they need to be conducted by military personnel. not trying to minimize the role but remind the team, it is not one-size-fits-all. they haveone-size-fits-all. they have to step back and ask ourselves what is the right allocation. i am pretty comfortable right now. increasing the ratio of contractors. manpower wise, i am
>> but it is still an area of advanced advantage for us right now. >> the iranians trying to close it. >> they are. >> from a nato point of you your familiar with article five plan attack against one is an attack against all. is there any such contact in the cyber arena? >> they believe article five applies to all domain? >> probably in the same arena. >> when do you think we will arrive at a conclusion? >> is it the congress, -- >> it is as much in some
ways as -- again, itagain, it is much in some ways from our perspective is this is just an intellectual exercise,. >> the department of homeland security is responsible basically for protecting us into financial service power arena or civilian targets. you'reyou are responsible for checking the military infrastructure. >> and to provide support. >> you are also responsible for going on offense. they are not going to attack a foreign nation. so how could we, as a nation , given the threats that we face in the cyber arena not really have a good answer is to the impediment to creating rules of engagement. >> i apologize. you really need to speak to the policy side. >> for your operator. >> yes, sir.
>> are you talk to. hey, let's see if we can get there. >> the secretary of defense for the office. >> how do they respond? >> intellectually we all realize that is what we need to do. >> congress is not doing that you would like us to do to help resolve this issue? >> ii can't argue it is something that congress has failed to do. >> thank you. >> thank you, mr. chairman. admiral, i know that you talked a little about cyber teams in response to our earlier questions,questions, and i think the idea to leverage our outstanding national guard capability and capacity and establishing many of the cyber teams is a good idea. as you and your colleagues like to establish additional cyber units in the future and while i am sure you are
looking at the pacific region, i ask you look closely at the needs of asia-pacific region in hawaii as you all know we have kids come!.e from the various component commands and other agency regional officers that are likely targets for cyber criminals. we focus on the rebalance of asia-pacific. last september of thethe us and china did agree that neither government would support or conduct cyber enabled theft of intellectual property. now that we are six months down the road would you say that china is living up to its agreement? and ii don't know how specific the agreement was, but it seemed like a good one for the two countries to enter into a dialogue and discussion. what is happening with regard to that agreement? >> if i could, neither
nation would engage in that activity for the purpose of gaining economic advantage for the private sector. we continue to see chinese activity in this regard. thethe million dollar question, is that activity for governmental purposes or being been passed from the government to the private sector? from my mind the jury is still out. the activity level is somewhat lower than prior to september of 2015. >> is there any way that we can determine whether china is engaging in such activity? other any parameters? is there anything that we measure? determine whether these -- this agreement is being adhered to? >> yes, ma'am. in an unclassified form.
>> so one of the areas -- thank you, and maybeyou, and maybe in another context we can get to those questions. with regard to our ability to support our cyber capabilities, training and retention are important. important. in that regard, stem education is critical. can you talk more about what you are doing,, collaborations, partnerships you are doing with universities are community colleges to train a workforce for us? >> let's take hawaii has an example. today the adjunct general's meeting in the complex. include the academic sector. how do we generate more capable work face. how can we partner more effectively and aligning that capability to deal with issues of common interest.
you see that same -- hawaii is an area where we probably have gone further than others, but you can see that same type of activity for us cyber command right now with what we are doing with a handful of universities across the united states on the west coast, carnegie mellon some west coast universities, tulsa, you heard one. i want to say something on the order of 60 to 100 right now comeau one area where they tend to partner together a lot. >> obviously that needs to continue.
>> the capabilities. and alternative ways to look at problems, if you will. those are at a macro levela macro level the three things. you really could add value for us in that regard. but we have done today is created the point of partnership where we placed a small element on the ground. the part that is interesting to me is, i did not want us cyber command people. what i wanted was one individual that was a us cyber command individual and i wanted to harness the power of reserve individuals
currently in the ecosystem in the valley working on their day-to-day jobs. we just started that since last summer. it gives us a chancea chance to get a sense from the technical innovation going on. we approach them with different problem sets and say here is an issue we are trying to work our way through. would you give us suggestions. i am trying to see if we can replicate that model that we currently have in place in silicon valley in other areas. probably somewhere in the greater boston metro area. >> area. >> it sounds like more of an informal kind of arrangement right now. maybe going forward you would want to institutionalize the collaboration with the private sector. >> thank you, mr. chairman, apple rogers. i do not i do not envy you with a job and complexity. the chairman has said about sequestration, things on the horizon.
you know,. you know, and listening to the discussion i think one thing that is important is we are never going to have the perfect weapon. absent the united states coming up with a game changing offense or defense of capability to the scale of the manhattan project, you cannot possibly get inside the decision cycles of the state actors, organized crime, terrorists and other people. you think about decision cycles in this realm, every single day you get new malware, viruses, other technology added to your pc to deal with new threats that did not exist a day or two or a week before. i'm trying to give my head around how you segregate your scope of responsibility which is largely the vulnerabilities of the dod or however you would like to define your scope, how you differentiate that from the
broader private sector threat. you got 28 million small businesses. you have close to 19,000 businesses the 500 employers or more,ñr distributed public sector infrastructure, whether itinfrastructure, whether it is electric, water, gas. and the concern that i have is that we have right now, the equivalent of guerrilla sniper fire or mortar attacks, we have not seen and i think we will see someday a nationstate organized crime or terrorist organization literally be in the position to execute a multi- pillar attack that if they are smart, and they are comeau what they will do is something to disrupt you and then disrupt your ability to react by attacking the private sector which is integral to your supply chain. how are we looking at this on a global basis and understanding that as they continue to increase their abilities they will figure out a way to go after
communications infrastructure, supply chain infrastructure, whenever public infrastructure may be vulnerable, how do we get these things to coalesce versus finding out we doing good job at dod, create the line and then they just go around it and disrupt you. >> you have sustained clear articulated the challenges. these arbitrary boundaries, cyber just blurs the lines. so it is one reason why i have argued we have to think so much more broadly about this problem set. this is one of the reasons why, if you look at our exercise and training regime we try to do that not just within the dod but across the breadth of the private sector.
our annual exercise will be in june of this year. we pick a different segment every year. >> that is what i'm getting too. it is almost as if your military exercises have to involve all of these players so that they have a better understandinga better understanding of their vulnerabilities in the nature of the attack that would occur. any. on the other question i had is to what extent are we looking at state and local government as a way to at least -- in north carolina i i served in the legislature, and we were talking about what we could do to work on cyber threats, and as an economic advantage, estate became get a grid hardening at securing the physical presences and
cyber threats within their state borders they create an economic advantage. toto what extent are we trying to lead and help make this problem a little less difficult at the federal level by making sure states and local governments are stepping up their game. >> it is one of the reasons why there is a component to this effort to ensure we can try to address the state and local aspect. >> i have a million different questions. what i will do is see if i can schedule some time to go over a number of one's. we may have to do it in a secure setting. thank you very much. >> thank you, mr. chairman. one of the issues is, in fact, the services being able within their resources to fully develop the units
that they will detach provide operational control. can you givecan you give an assessment of whu)3 we are, where they are in terms of doing that across the services? >> that goes to the heart of readiness, if you will. so in september when i was with you one of the things i said then was that i thought one of the reasons why 16 would be such a big game changer was i thought we would get more involved in the breadth of capability, and the other reason was because we needed to shift the focus on the generation of capability to actual readiness. so we have spent the last six months working our way through how you to find readiness down to the individual team level so
that i as a commander have an awareness what the true capability of the forces and using the same mechanisms we used to assess readiness i can provide policymakers and decision-makers a true picture. we have just started doing that. i have gone through too strong and so far. we will do do a 3rd and final one this summer. by the end of september. providing a quarterly basis by team, here is where we are in terms of true readiness. >> it is a nightmare scenario that one of these nations acquires the capability to shut down satellites. >> there are two scenarios that concern me. one is the physical shutdown and interdiction capability. >> explain. >> if you were to shut down -- look at it from the department of defense
perspective. much of all we rely on this commercial infrastructure, power, the ability to move force, for example, if you were able to take that away a materially impact the ability to manage in a traffic control system, manage the overhead structure and the flow of communication of data, that would materially impact the ability to execute the mission, let alone the broader economic impact. the other concern i have is to date most penetrations of systems we have seen by actors have other than to steal data what to do reconnaissance. what happens if the purpose of the intrusion becomes to manipulate data and say you can no longer believe what you are seeing? think about the implications of that, if she could not trust the military picture that you are looking at,, using base decisions along the broader economic impact is a nation.
>> thank you, mr. chairman and alamo for being here and for the job you are doing every day. .. some mutual deterrence that goes on when we are talking about some state actors. >> it again is a lot more complicated than just a yes or a no. >> okay well i hope we will be able to ask that question in a classified setting. i had the opportunity over the last two weeks to visit estonia
which is as you know one of the most wired countries in the world and also probably the first victim of a cyber attack a nation-state, by russia and i had the opportunity to visit the cyber center that's been accredited by nato and to hear them talk about how they think about cyber issues. can you talk a little bit about how sieber, works with our nato allies? >> i've been to the center. i was just in brussels for example in december and as u.s. cyber command i adjusts the north atlantic council is one of the member nations and was asked to talk the leadership of the alliance about the implications of cyber and how might the alliance work its way forward as we are trying to deal with the cyber arena. cybercomandos tried to partner with the alliance as a whole as
well as specific member nations on specific issues within the alliance and what i suggested to nato is the real key is you got to get to the defense of house together number one and secondly secondly. >> explained a little more what you mean when you say that. >> much like we have seen on the u.s. side i said look i have seen nato spending a lot of time on some good things focused on nato's fixed infrastructure but i also remind them that i think there is value in spending time thinking about for example dado creating additional capabilities with additional force constructs to be able to apply traditional capability in a much faster way. i have also been part of discussions where i remind him them even as you are generating that additional force and additional capability need to think whether the cyber defense applications of that because we can spend a lot of money on
generating new capability but it quickly negates its ability to be used and that's not a good situation for the alliance or for us. i have had those discussions with the alliance writ large. >> how do we increase their participation and training exercises? >> for cyber flag we have some nato nations that participate in cyber flag which is the largest exercise. i won't say we involve all 28 member nations in cyber flag. we over time we'll see more and war nations participating. one of the things i talked to nato although we have and get flushed out the how is how might we go about taking a look at the cyber exercise or training regime. it's just a preliminary discussion but when i was there in december i said i think this is something we need to be
thinking about. >> one of the things that i was really interested in in estonia was turning about their estonian defense leaks and you talked earlier in your testimony about the effort to take advantage of the expertise in the private sector to help us as we are looking at cyber issues. i was very interested, one of the things i heard was that the reality is we can't completely prevent a cyber attack so what we have really got to do is be prepared to respond to that attack in a way that is most effective and the fastest. they were talking about their defense league as one-way that they are able to do that. is that something that recognize and we are probably not talking about, but is that we were looking at when you talk about the teams that are being set up to help respond? >> is a little different in the sense that the idea between the
cyber league for estonia is you have private citizens on a voluntary basis who will apply themselves in specific problem sets as they emerge after hours, after work on their own time. it's kind of the model for estonia and they use that to augment their government capabilities. on the west side for us in the dod that cyber league is a cross for us and our structures between the digital service arena that dod is creating as well as the dash the only difference is when the estonians do it you are doing it. on your own time and it's not as if a uniform member of the -- it's not exactly the same but the idea of trying to tap that is similar. >> thank you mr. chairman.
>> thank you chairman and i want to thank you admiral rogers for your service to our country. i wanted to ask the question, you have financial responsibility in your position. what keeps you up at night? what is it that you are the most worried about? >> let me be a bit smart and say they saw on the workload i have note problems sleeping. secondly they are three things. number one is actions taken against critical infrastructure in the united states amateur manipulation and number two what happens when actors start to no longer steal but to manipulate or change data so we no longer can believe what we are seeing in the third and final thing in the cyber arena is what happens when nonstate actors start to use cyber is a weapon system and they want to use it as the
vehicle to insulate the pain against the united states and others. >> to the third right you said about nonstate actors using cyber as a weapon system how great of a threat is that too is currently? >> i would argue it's one of these you say tomorrow something will change but today i will tell you i have not seen groups yet make huge investments in this but i worry that it's a matter of time. it wouldn't take long. one of the challenges of cyber we talked about how doesn't recognize boundaries. it doesn't take billions of dollars of investment. it doesn't take decades of time and it doesn't take a dedicated workforce in the people like you see most nation-states deal with cyber is the great equalizer in some ways. >> what are the greatest threats you can describe in our critical
infrastructure, the first issue here? >> in that regard what i worry about is based on the accesses in the activity at scene of some nation-state actors out there what happens if they decide they want to for some period of time disrupts the things we take for granted, the ability to always have power. >> power system, financial system. tonight to move money. if you take a look at face scenario of the ukraine in december a matching having a scenario like that in old in the united states. i'm not going to argue that someone is capable of making the united states totally go dark but i would argue there is capability to cause significant impact and damage. >> you discuss in your opening testimony the need for the coordination between government private sector and across the whole of government. i wanted to ask you, the law
that was changed by congress in terms of the nsa holding of information, the usa freedom act. can you give us an update on what is happening with that and whether that is working and any concerns you have? i think it's an important question. >> yes maam and if i could i'm not going to go into great detail but what i would say is what i've said to the intelligence oversight committee we have been able to comply with the act and to do it on time. there has been some level of slowness effect in terms of difference of the old system and the new system. >> in terms of how quickly you get it. >> the time duration is minutes or hours. it's not days or weeks so it hasn't yet gotten to the point where i felt i needed to come back to the congress or the administrations say i'm seeing
an impact on our ability to -- i made a commitment that if i saw that and i have not seen that yet. >> there's no doubt that is it's taking longer in some ways. >> in some ways it takes longer. >> i think it's important for you to come with us -- come to us with apt given that minutes and hours can make a difference when it comes to terrorist attacks and preventing them in taking action i think this is really important for all of us to understand given the world that we are living in. i wanted to ask you a final question about the jcpoa or the i ran deal and in their there's a provision that says the u.s. must cooperate with tehran's workshop to strengthen iran's abilities to protect against sabotage of its nuclear program. admiral rogers from a cyber-- to protect against sabotage? >> maam i cannot speak as a
whole that i can tell you cybercommand has not participated in any such effort. >> thank you. >> thank you mr. chairman thank you admiral rogers. i miss some of the discussion i do want to be needlessly repetitive but i want to go back to the change ahead with a chair in the opening questions. and met recently with the senior military leader who tried to basically summarized his sense of things and he said we have plans but no strategy. i have been thinking about that. i think in your back and forthwith a chair you talk about and others may have asked about this notion that we are kind of reacting case-by-case to cyber attacks in deciding in each instance what we want to do but the development of a broader doctrine what will a deterrence policy be and we might communicate how do we view a cyber attack under article v in terms of triggering collective
self-defense in the collective defense operation. we are assessing those things that we are not at the end point of answering a lot of those questions. could you talk to us about the doctrinal development process and working on these questions they are so important. what might an we expect from the pentagon from cyber command in our interaction and our oversight in terms of the development of doctrines that have greater clarity that aren't just reacting? >> you will see in the dod cyber study abroad over arching framework from the department about how we are going to have the capability and then to deploy it. cyber command as part of the broader dialogue within the department about how do we align the capabilities of the force with the world we are seeing today when the arguments that we have made over the course of the last six months is we need to take an element of the cyber
capability and focus it very much on the deterrence piece and how do we shape potentially drive upon the choices and behavior before we get to the crisis scenario? we are in the early stages of that but i'm heartened by the fact that we now have wrought agreement that that's an important part of her strategy and we need to be doing that so we are starting in the early stages of that journey. the department participates in a broader dialogue within the u.s. government as to how from a national policy perspective how we move forward in addressing some of the issues that you have all raised today. meanwhile for me as u.s. cyber command we know the capability will be part of that deterrence strategy. that's what we get paid to do. we have got to focus on generating that capability. we can't wait for the broader discussion. it's just a losing strategy for us so that has been if you will look as good at the operational
level. >> let me ask another question and i think senator shaheen may have asked this before he came into the room with respect to nato but another thing that is common of committees we talk with the postures as joint training exercises in joint training with united states than any other nation. we have marines deployed throughout africa doing training of african military. what is our posture and partners in the cyber area in the training that we do together in the development of joint resiliency strategies? >> we do some level of training with key allies. one of the challenges is how do you maximize prioritization. you can't do it over thing you would like to do with every nation would like to do as a part of her strategy is how do you focus the greatest return and what nations you want to start with? we have done that. the other challenge i find is
and this is part of an on going internal discussion for us based on where we are in the journey right now i can do so much with the external world that negatively impact our internal department because unlike some missions we literally have decades of infrastructure capability capacity and experience or they don't have that in the cyber rings of the same force that i'm using to train a partner with foreign counterparts and still building every day. that's part of the challenge for us right now. i don't think it will be as much of an issue in the future if the capacity fully comes on line but we are not there yet. >> we trained aviators that of other service branches and then we created an air force academy in 1954 decided we are going to train aviators, not that we don't train aviators in the u.s. and i believe senator mccain has had training somewhere and the past that i have wondered
about whether the cyber domain would eventually become so significant that there may be the need to consider creating a dedicated cyber just like the air force was created in the 50s and the question is you trained cyber folks everywhere and drop the service branches where you can focus on a particular cyber expertise and those folks could go into the different service branches. has there have been any discussion or thought about that? >> i am put to that discussion has been based on my experience and what i see. my concern is to maximize effectiveness and cyber you need to understand the system of the broader contest. at times when i deal with elements of her own workforce who are incredibly technically savvy incredibly smart about the mission and when i try to remind them it's part of a broader
strategy and a broader context when you don't understand that broader context you are not in my experience not as effective and that's my concern about that approach. you start to make this very neuroand silent concern about the financial implications. >> thank you and thank you mr. chair. >> admiral rogers thank you. if i heard you correctly you testified and senator ayotte there were three main fears were threats to our critical infrastructure the ability to manipulate system such that we might not have faith in their operations and third nonstate actors using cyber is as a weapon against the united states. that an accurate account? >> yes sir. >> are the islamic state or al qaeda able to do -- at this point? >> i haven't seen them yet though my concern is now. >> the islamic state has a reputation for being effective on line and what we inferred
then as on line recruiting and propaganda from the use of cyber as a weapon in electrical power grids and so forth. how hard would it be for a nonstate actor like islamic state or al-qaeda to develop the skill set? is it nothing more than recruiting the right person? >> you would not be difficult with the right people in the right folks but it's certainly not beyond their ability. it's not beyond their ability if they made that decision. c any we think about potential nonstate at ers do those groups that have that capability tend to be associated with state actors? >> in some cases yes but not in all. not in all. >> i want to turn now to the ongoing debate about encryption. i think data security is obviously critical in the modern world and most people this room room probably have a smartphone in their in their pocket.
even my 7-year-old daughter turned in a flip phone and got a smartphone. we keep e-mails text messages and phonecalls and financial information and any other sensitive data. >> you are ahead of senator graham. >> on our phones cyber security is essential and physical security is essential. i would hate to see americans be blown to pieces because we empower us the priority of cyber security over physical security. how do we strike that balance is a society? >> i don't think it's either/or. >> i don't either. >> we don't serve either viewpoint particularly well when they cast this as all or nothing or either/or. my view is over time we have been able to integrate around changing technology in the course of our nation to do it in a way that enables the nation under the right circumstances
with the right level of control to be able to access that. for me, my starting position is what is it that is different about this that would preclude that from applying here? i don't personally see that even e-sight knowledge there's no one simple answer and is probably no silver bullet. it's not going to be a one-size-fits-all but i look at the innovation and a can-do approach that we have as a nation and i'm thinking we can solve this. >> like for instance the communications assistance for law enforcement act which telecom companies of any size that they want to can construct to tell a phone system country and have it be susceptible pursuant to court order. say a terror suspect or human trafficker or a drug dealer treats similarly we expect privacy in our bank accounts but things obviously must maintain
systems in which they turnover bank account information subject to a court order and a potential money-laundering. is there any reason our society should treat data tech companies differently than how we treat telephone companies and banks? >> is clearly a broader issue than cyber command. like you i would say look we have frameworks in other areas of my can we apply that here? >> these questions have been about the larger debate about encryption and the way smartphones are designed. there was a case recently involving apple and the fbi in the san bernardino shooter in which the fbi asked for assistance to override a feature of the iphone and apple refused and apple found a third party capable of doing so. should americans be alarmed at this kind of vulnerability and a widely used device? >> the way i would phrase it is
vulnerability is an inherent nature of the technical world we live in today and if your desire is to live in a world without all the ability i would say that is probably highly unlikely. >> do you know for shared that vulnerability with apple? >> as u.s. cybercommand i apologize, i don't know. >> one of the point, we know for a fact that baghdadi is sending young men into the refugee flow to commit acts of terror wherever they can locate. is it true or very likely that they also know the web site to come up on secure so that they can communicate back with baghdadi? >> yes. >> so right now there was a media report that 400 young men had been sent into the refugee
flow. i would assume at least some of them have or are armed with the web site to come on line once they get to a preferred destination so they can coordinate acts of terrorism. >> a web site that is encrypted, yes that's probably like lee. >> that's a bit concerning, isn't it? >> yes sir. >> what should we be doing to counter that? besides take-out isis? >> i think we need a broader national dialogue about what are we comfortable with. we have got that security and we have got to have safety and privacy. at the moment we are in a dialogue that seems to paint it as one or the other and the dialogue we have with senator cotton i don't see it that way.
>> yet we know of a direct threat of an attack in europe or the united states and the technical capability to enhance their ability to commit this act of terrorism. isn't that a pretty tough -- so we needed national conversation. do we need more hearings? do we need to urge the administration to come up with a policy? what are our options here? >> the worst-case scenario to me is we don't have the dialogue and then we have a major event and the aftermath of the a major event we decide to do something and perhaps in that are at the time step back and ask ourselves how did we get here. >> i don't think there's any doubt that that's a likely scenario.
>> that is what i hope it doesn't come to but to date we have been unable to achieve that kind of consensus. we have got to figure out how we are going to do this and you don't want law enforcement i believe, you don't want a lot for some individual or intelligent individual justice i don't believe you want the private sector of a company dictating this. this is too important to my perspective. >> is awareness of this threat important for the american people to know how serious this threat is? >> yes. >> senator king. >> mr. chairman hearing this dialogue in the discussion we have just been having it strikes me as underlying the foolishness of continuing to be governed by budget decisions made six years ago when this threat was nothing like the magnitude that it is
today and here we are dealing with a major new thread and try to fit it, to shoehorn it within a budget structure that clearly did not take account of the fact that we have got a major threat and a serious one that we are facing that's going to take resources to confront. i just can't help but make that point that it underlined the fact that we are trying to govern by decisions made at a time when circumstances were very different than they are today. >> i think senator king but admiral rogers hazard made it clear i think in this testimony that sequestration will prevent him from carrying out completely the missions that he has been tossed with. is that correct admiral? >> yes sir. sequester edition will be an impact on our workforce particular civilians.
i can replace equipment. it takes us years to replace people and there is a real likelihood if we continue the sequestration that you will have to come you'll not be able to continue to employ these outstanding and highly select good individuals. >> yes. >> you know sometimes admiral i do not want the american people to see what goes on at these hearings. the old line about laws and sausages but i certainly wish the american people could hear and see your statements that you are making today rather than as you just indicated an attack and then we always overreact. that's just what democracies are all about. and so i thank you for your good work and i also want to thank