tv Key Capitol Hill Hearings CSPAN July 21, 2016 12:54pm-2:55pm EDT
strength, which improves our understanding of russian military, but also sun hopes to underpin a better relationship between the two militaries. at home, we are looking again at your report, particularly focused on the number of russian speakers, the number of people we have specializing in intelligent on russia. i can't commit to restoring the sentiment, but you are certainly already seen and greece and process on russian this generally. may i remove my jacket? >> by all means, yes. >> i think as we said before in a previous session, we have increased the number of his staff that we have working on russia as the foreign office as well increase the number of
intelligence and through organizations like the development concepts and doctrines enter and defense academy and so on. we seek to increase the access we have to academic experts and there are a number of organizations as it's actively engaged. [inaudible] >> given advanced research assessment group, which used to exist as a long story, the soviet studies of the research center, which became sometime ago and the work they used to be
done in the group is now done by various organizations across defense. there is more diversity if you like and giving us more access to a greater range from academia. we are not planning to reestablish it. >> and i just checked on this point. russia has famously been described as a mystery wrapped in a riddle and that does suggest that you really do need a unit or a team of dedicated experts and that is what you used to have and it is perfectly understandable that as russia went down in our list of priorities and concerns that you broke about. they talk about the functions distributed around the public parts of the defense
establishment, is it not time to do a serious study as to whether a dedicated russian experts shouldn't be reconstituted? >> as i said, within the administrative defense on russia and immediately surrounding in the defense intelligence area. the unit referred to. russia happened to be an interest of one or two members who are active and publications. it wasn't purely focused on russia. my view would be the arrangements that we have now give us the breadth and depth across policy intelligence and order outreach to academia. >> how many stops to this unit have? >> the policy unit or when all
the time is about 15. >> 15, yeah. >> how many of those of the russian specialists? >> i would say at the moment what we are seeking to do is to make sure we make the best use of our speculates on. for example, and moscow has come back to dealing with russia inside. we are making best use of the knowledge and ask areas. >> i think it is only fair to his day, mr. chairman, you brought me into where we wanted to go next. we've been taught not being a noble capability about russia has been left for far too long.
are we doing enough with the unit we have with the nato russia specialist. i'm just a little bit of worried that the agencies in the committee's fearless not receptive. can we have some assurance that there is a recognition that there is an urgent need to have a greater understanding of what it is thinking and the way it is doing. >> let me give you that assurance. we are building up our capability in understanding and i certainly accept there is more to be done to continue to focus
on what russia's aspirations are and to better understand how blakely -- russia is likely to react and the next moves at home and indeed in the middle east. we are doing more, but there is more we can do. >> we have russia's response -- [inaudible] do we know? do we have any understanding? >> yes, we do. russia's reaction has been relatively restrained, but it may not be completely. there has been a meeting of the nato russia council's since the summit, which i hope help to explain to russia they renewed
posture of nato. i think it is also important to remember that russia's reaction to warsaw actually began in response to previous prior announcement of enhanced forward presence and in response to the completiocompletio n of the ballistic missile side in romania back in may. so far, the reaction has been relatively restrained, but there may be more to come. >> thank you very much. >> presumably the experts we've gotten with links across the security services for their expertise. are the good links right across
all methods of gaining information, intelligence, whatever on russia with the security and cbi. my other question is this policy intelligence? this is much more joined up than it used to be. there is much closer work between eyes and the agencies. i will tell you where these officials are locating. >> the new unit that i mentioned is pass the policy staff. the defense secretary said there are extremely good links between my staff and a russia expert in the office and between tdi staff and ask words across.
>> that is the reassurance. >> thank you very much. [inaudible] -- dedicated staff. does that take into consideration the issues. the therapies with the interviews to fit forward -- [inaudible] mr. chairman, when it comes to our role within nato, what is the number one issue that mod is preparing for her. isn't russia, iraq, syria?
>> clearly the units are military and personnel and civil servant, said they are sub deck to the normal rules dealing with the media and so on. many of the academic experts that we talked to embed given evidence to before talk to the media all the time and we share much of our analysis with them. in terms of where they are focusing, clearly within russia it south which we discussed the previous section such as the national guard and things like that. it is russia's act committees in the immediate neighborhood bother belarus for ukraine or whatever, but also very active at the moment in syria. the other thing is we are also
looking out a russia is doing in the asia-pacific and far east area. we are looking at all aspects of russian behavior. >> i think it's very well the mod is using its officials in this way, but i think the committee still feel that there is a role of a more independent group of actual experts rather than clever officials who are gaining experts who could actually challenge the orthodoxy that might be prevailing. this is a topic that i think we will be coming back to. i think we've got to move on now to talk about the vocational format being put forward for the baltic state. >> thank you very much. martha attached on some of the reaction you might be from russia following warsaw with the
format for the four extra battalions. obviously, russia does not accept that. how does it appear for the russian was not to the new battalions? t. want me to repeat the question? >> please. >> my question of the vocational format, the fourth battalions and nato claims that does not violate the nato russia at. russia is not accepting a position. how are you going to prepare for the russian was gone -- response. >> it is very clear that the deployment of this new forward presence does not contribute the founding act.
there is no definition in the activesync tanjug versus, but i don't think there's any way you could claim the rotation of a battalion in the book extends the amount to substantial policies. the forces there will be rotational in each of the four host nations that are not going to exceed more than 1000 personnel. you have to set that against russia's decision back in january to form three new divisions in the last end of five new strategic nuclear missile regiments that involve tens of thousands of troops, whereas each of our deployment that they said it's going to be less than a thousand nature. it is also important to refer back to one of the key principles of the founding act, which is the parties to the act must respect the sovereignty of territorial integrity of all
states. we are deploying the invitation with the blessing of the government, historian and likewise the deployment that obviously can't be a site of russian activity in the crimea or in eastern ukraine. so far as the deployment itself is concerned, we are deploying to british companies that will be enablers that we will suffice as well, plus headquarters element. we are lucky and then adding to that some armored vehicles, several guided missiles, various other enabling capabilities and reconnaissance and logistics. and then, we would expect the other countries that are going to act in our battalion to add on top of that companies have
their own and the whole battalion to protect its presence in estonia for the spring of next year. >> i think you explain the case very well. your actions will be perceived on the other side of the border or a russian source. we explain some of the discussion with russia going forward. can you tell us a little bit about the discussions you have had with warsaw, with for example, monday in and the direct communications via add with the members to explain truly what the intentions of the warsaw summit and how you can avoid any name in the forces
that nato placed there and of course the protect your -- protective force. >> i do not have regular meetings with my opposite number in russia. there is dialogue at the senior level of the government obviously between the prime minister and the russian president and between our foreign secretary and the russian foreign minister. the defense dialogue is it principally through the nato initiative and after warsaw, the meeting of the nato russian council on the 13th of july ,-com,-com ma which covered the situation in ukraine, a review of the current issue a shame in afghanistan, but was principally devoted to the alliance explaining the motives that have
been adopted at warsaw. this is the absence of the alliance policy, to make sure that the steps we take to reassure our members or to deter russia are fully explained his total transparency in order to reduce the risk of misunderstanding or miscalculation. so on the 13th of july, the alliance explaining the various measures that were adopted. obviously, there was a response from russia and a concern about this particular positioning. but of course we did not have a proper explanation. as to the three new military divisions that it was stationing on nato's slack. we have an openness to further dialogue of production. russia has proposed keeping the military exchanges between the alliance and russia, including
the proposal over the baltic should have their transponders switched off and the likelihood of accident of miscalculation. we look at in a russian interest in risk reduction is extremely well informed. i would conclude by emphasizing that for those to explain these missions to russia and the keep the important than russia so far as we are not as nato returning to business as usual with russia. what is happening in the crimea and ukraine cannot simply be forgotten. >> if i could just interject the vice-chief discussiodiscussio n and can you explain to us, please, how this rotational system will actually work in terms of the numbers why it is a
rotational system to try and send a signal of assertive great permanence of troops and what it eat true to describe what you are trying to do as to make it clear to russia that there is no way in which they will be able to carry out operations in any of the baltic states and now just what they did in ukraine. >> on your on your last fight, the answer to that is explicitly yes, a show of solidarity and commitment to nato allies to those nations that feel vulnerable to exactly that sort of threat. we are describing it as an assistant presence rotating forces around. we think that is the best way to demonstrate that solidarity and we think it is the best way we can extract payback for not deployment. we are not doing that simply has
to show of military force. we are doing this as a way to extract benefits by working with allies, improving interoperability and developing the host nation capabilities as well as their own. there are all sorts of reasons we decided on that rotational role. >> thank you very much. >> in terms of nato, obviously an open organization. what will be the effects to the nato membership or will they actually bring to the table, from her point of view, what could be the potential concerns of montenegro succession? >> i wouldn't describe nato as opening expansionist. we have always made it they are a membership of nato remains open to those countries in the membership criteria and can
command all existing members. for example, that requires unanimity. this is not a docent late opening its door. there are a number of hurdles to go through. equally it is true that we don't accept that russia or anybody else should have any kind of veto on the future membership as a matter for the members of nato to decide. so far as montenegro is concerned, montenegro has no completed the various criteria that are required and attended warsaw as an observer and its membership i hope will be completed by early october through this house as well as the other players and has to be ratified by the other member states, in sudan congress in the united states. it will only be complete when
all 28 allies have completed their national ratification processes. you asked me what was meant. i think it does demonstrate that members is open to those applications that can satisfy the criteria and also i think fairly obviously sends a strong signal to the western balkans of the alliance is, the benefits, the membership in britain in terms of stability to the much troubled region. any concerns? >> we have wholeheartedly welcomed montenegro as has the rest of the alliance and i hope the ratification procedures will be completed as quickly as possible. >> enrages touch briefly on
brexit for nato and native e.u. operation. the end of the summit says something about the cooperation. to what degree was britain discussed and in what way do you tank it will affect the way the e.u. works? discuss. >> there is discussion not the result of the referendum and the margins of warsaw as one of the major topics. but i don't think it's any secret there wasn't a single member of my college defense ministerial colleagues who wouldn't have wished for a different result. they are all concerned about the security of our continent and they all seem membership of those who are also members of the european union. they've always seemed membership as complementing.
the strength of the alliance itself. so far as i open a position now, cooperation with the european union is going to remain important to our shared security interest. those interests have been changed and we also have a continuing interest on a closer relationship in a closer relationship between nato and the european union, which is reflect dead in the communiqués. the long-standing british preoccupation that these two organizations will work better together, should avoid duplicating each other wherever possible should complement each other's strength. finally of course, there are a number of interlocking missions so far as migration in the mediterranean is can turn as our nato mission in europe, as the
european union mission in the central mediterranean, in essence doing the same thing when they tried to break the models in to rescue those whose lives are at risk i see and we are contributing our ships to both operations. >> presumably will not take heart and e.u. operations throughout the others. >> well, let's be clear first of all that we remain members of the european union until the moment we leave and then we were made all members of the european union. we will continue to participate in what is called cs cp, missions and drawing from those missions and the missions we have contributed to. >> my question is once britain leads the e.u., presumably we will no longer -- [inaudible]
>> i'm afraid what is happening now, the opposition in the future we participate in these missions because there is a british national interest in these missions. we want to be good europeans. we have a trading interest in suppressing piracy off the horn of africa. for example, we have a very strong interest in trying to curb illegal migration from the african growth into europe. we have an interest in this particular missions. we have invested at at least one member of this committee knows in bringing peace to the balkans. we have an interest in making sure that e.u. mission is successful. so i don't myself see the british interest in some of these missions diminish. now of course we won't be members of the european union. we will certainly have a national interest in the success of those missions because you
know, our trade and our security and immigration will be effective. >> that is definitely the case that we would want to ignore and of course that is right. we will be doing so in the u.k. rather as a number of the e.u. >> we won't be members of the european union, but we will have to look carefully at where the british interest is in there already some examples of non-e.u. members participating in cs cp missions, worse than their national interest to do so. we can get you have some examples. >> that would ease the basis -- >> before he answers, i want to be clear about one thing. that is not entirely a matter for me. that is to be finalized across government.
i am not going to speculate now on whether we are going or not going to join particular cs cp missions. i just make the point that there is a british national interest, whether we are there or not. >> just to give you one example precisely what the commission is involved does participator has participated in cstp. >> what you are saying is the threat does not inhibit our future cooperation militarily but e.u. military missions whether in the context of nato or not. >> we have not taken a decision. it is only a few days old. but there's no reason why it should inhibit either our cooperation bilaterally with our key allies in europe, with the northern group, with the e.u. members who are members of the
key alliances with france and germany and there's no reason why you shouldn't inhibit future cooperation with missions that are in our direct interest. we have not taken a position on any individual missions. i point out that we join these things not just to be good europeans, that there is a british interest. >> is there a reason all -- reasonable presumption is the case to not increase the importance of nato. the e.u. will be lessened because we are no longer members of the e.u. presumably. presumably that means that our presence in nato will become more important. >> i think as we leave one, it will be of britain's interest to strengthen our commitment to our other alliances, whether it's
nato or the key relationships we have with the united states bilaterally with france and others and other multinational relationships. we have around the world are participation in the five powers agreement in asia pacific. i think you can take it as we withdraw the european union. yes, we will have to demonstrate our international leadership a leading more heavily into these other alliances. the broader industry, yes. >> secretary of state, my question is how is this not met being impacted by nato intelligence? my background within nato as everyone knows. that means we can share
intelligence pretty accurately with remembers for 26, perhaps not. having sat in nato for a number of years, one of the problems of gathering intelligence and the use of intelligence in nato is that each episode within the intelligence organization within nato as a direct line back to the capital. and yet, has to produce a nato product as they were, which is actually much less than perhaps national intelligence. it is a big problem for nato to actually produce seriously good intelligence assessment without compromising national security sometimes. so i go back to my original question. have there been improvements as a result to the summit in trying
to solve the dichotomy on the one hand between the requirement to keep our road sources good and secure and the fact that we want also to contribute to the nato alliance to give nato some kind of decent intelligence assessment. >> well, you are right. there is tension there between the intelligence capability is particularly and those who are members of the community burying. you know, some of the restrictions on sharing that intelligence because of the way it is source, sharing it more widely. i'm happy to report to you that the warsaw summit, they did have the joint intelligence surveillance and reconnaissance initiative, which will i hope to maximize the resources that the individual members of nato have and enhance the interconnectivity between the
different intelligence says that will help improve the trading and expertise that the intelligence functions in each of the different member states. and i hope, lead to better procedures for information handling and information sharing. there is quite a way to go on that as you drawn attention to. we did make some progress. >> the reason for my question is a member of the nato parliamentary assembly, i have to resist quite strongly and other british members some other parliamentarians in the native state to actually taste at all intelligence should be shared equally among nato members. i was quite and others were quite robust and saying you must be joking. there is a dilemma here. when i served in nato, we
recommend anything with nato secret classified on it took half an hour. there is a huge leakage. i just raised the matter because i knew that you would understand that and i'm just raising that for the committee to understand when someone says nato secret, that's the last bloody thing it is. sorry for the use of language, but i've seen it breached so many times. there is a tension there and of course the alliance expands more and more numbers to consider. what i want to assure you of this everybody recognizes the problems, not least because the terror raise a members are facing in western europe they need to share intelligence. the question is recognized to try and improve the position.
>> i think we are going to spin on with just the one question. the historic communicate states are responding to the challenging of the the hybrid warfare made out has adopted a strategy of actual implementation. would you be prepared to share what they are and potentially what our role is not maybe? >> well, so far as hybrid is concerned, i think nato and the individual allies will understand the threat of activity that is designed to introduce uncertainty and ambiguity below the article v -- hold becoming a real issue for the alliance. i think the lesson think the
lesson that i is a i have will be exactly the same as the type x we saw in ukraine. but it is important to develop the alliance's agility and responsiveness to be able to respond next time we see these kind of tactics. now with the alliance agreed to express at the end of last year the implementation per plan. there is more detail on that, if you'd like, but it is now been agreed. there was a joint declaration at the warsaw summit at the nato secretary general, the president of the european council, president to the commission in the scene and getting nato out of the e.u. ..
the central conflict in europe, and -- >> i missed the first part. >> what is the next region of potential conflict? >> well, there are -- i think one of the successes of the nato summit is we did not exclusively focus on the eastern border, where significant reassurance walling required and met by at
the deployment of enhanced forward presence, as we discussed. we also looked and an entire session was devoted to this, at some of the pressure us on nato. there are rising tensions in at least two parts. one in the black sea region, where the militarization of the crimea, is causing particular concern in romania and bulgaria, countries not that far away and are seeing increased naval activity in the black sea area, and then of course in the mediterranean itself, where we have seen russian naval activity off the coast of syria, but we also see -- from syria, along the libyan, and supplying the daesh along the coast, very much closer to the nato border.
so, there are these areas of tension itch don't think it would -- i don't think it would be wise of me to start speculating where the next conflict is likely to break out but there are these pressures, and the alliance recognizes that >> -- wants to come in. >> the approach to the -- [inaudible] -- just questioned what they're effectiveness is. there's no mate. it's lying there, not breathing. they tried surveillance and recognizance. the crimea is a supreme example of what -- and many of -- how effective is it?
who sets criteria and priorities. >> it needs to become more effective clearly of the alliance and members of nato failed to predict what was going to happen in the crimea, and indeed failed to predict the insurgency that russia fosted in eastern ukraine. they weren't predicted accurately. surveillance wasn't there and the response was a little fragmented. i think that was all a wakeup call for the alliance, not simply in intelligence but also in getting the alliance to look hard again at itself and to reverse the decline in defense spending that led to the commitments at the wales summit which led on to warsaw. mr. watkins might be able to
answer more specifically. >> as to what said earlier one, 0 thing we have been arguing for, crimea, since ukraine in 2014, from the wales summit onwards is that nato needs to become more adaptable, flexible, better able to anticipate and respond to these events and that's not just the intelligence arrangements but also -- but there has been extensive work over the last year or so on improving nato's intelligence arrangements as reflected in the initial -- the the defence secretary mentioned. we're determined to make it better. >> can i just ask the vice chief, what specific assessment arrangements do you have within
the military, the british uk military, and do you feel in light of the fact that leaders were so surprised by what happened in ukraine, crimea, have such changes been made? >> takes us back to the first question about how, as you yourself said, we had drawn down on russian expertise and russian intelligence specialists in the intervening years. that is something we have been addressing for some time, and the commented of secretary of state made earlier about developing are absolutely valid and they're an area with quite considerable investment. would also highlight the fact that nato collectively is absolutely addressing the challenge -- and this gets back
to stewart's question on how we can best leverage that. on me more recent question of the effectiveness of our isr and how we can leverage the 28, nearly 29 nations, more effectively. there's a precedent in in that we have for many years now committed or aircraft to nato. they have been tasked by nato with those of other nations to the objectives set by nato, and even today we're flying sentries both the in the south europe and also north europe in support of nato. one of the challenges that as nato nations, many of us are quite tight on isr capability, but there are many proms in place across the alliance to develop that, and i think the opportunities for collaboration
will grow. >> thank you. >> north korea? >> emphasized strongly in the communique from warsaw. how are you preparing for any military confrontation we might -- might emanate from north korea and the south china sea? >> well, with no direct nato role in korea, obviously we condemn any ongoing nuclear activity by the peoples republic of korea, and we continue to emphasize that activity is in violation of the security council resolutions. we want north korea to put a stop to these provocations and start re-engaging constructively with the international community, and we work as the united kingdom within united nations to maintain that pressure. we were instrumental in drafting
the latest resolution, 2270, and that, you will see, contains some of the toughest measures yet, restricting the transfer of technology and more to impede north korea's attempts to develop a deployable nuclear weapon. there is also the statement by the european union on the 27th 27th of june which the uk supported that, to con the missile tested. those are the forums we bring our particular influence to bear on what is happening in north korea. >> do you think it would be any point in the future where north korea could be a direct challenge to nato security? >> well, certainly it development of nuclear weapons is a very direct challenge and yet another reason why parliament was right yesterday to endorse the replacement of
our four boats. there are too many nuclear weapons out there, and north korea is a very good example of a rogue state developing these weapons in a most dangerous way. why we have had to continue to protect ourselves. >> john. >> yes, welcome the fact that the comments yesterday were highly action given the opportunity to vote on what was clearly always going to be a very substantial margin. can i then look at the nato communiques referring to the security in the region? calls on nato to deepen --
>> about yesterday's vote, we promised in the review before christmas. i've been pressing for it for some time. slightly delayed because of the referendum period, but the majority achieved last night was really of enormous significance. a much bigger majority than the previous votes, and sends a very strong signal to our allies around the world. and i'm sure mr. chapman wouldn't want to delay my departure this afternoon to washington to be able to convey the full significance of the vote that parliament took yesterday, because i want the american administration and all our allies who are meeting in washington this week to understand yet again, yet again, that britain is not stepping back but stepping up to it commitment. turning to the black sea, we're seeing increasing militarization of the crimea itself.
we're seeing insurgency activity in the southern part of the insurgent -- of the provinces that are affected, and there is obviously a real threat to romania in particular. we're seeing increased naval activity through the -- back and forward through the bosphorus and that's a concern for romania and a concern for bulgaria and a concern for other countries like greece and something we need to keep our eye on. i think i was the first defence secretary for some time to visit romania. last year the romanian minister came here for a bilateral meeting earlier this year, and we have looked to see what
further reassures we can offer countries like row main ya. -- romania. we have sent officers to the nato forward -- if you -- >> integration unit based in romania, and we're looking to how we can deepen military cooperation with these particular countries. >> before we move on to your next question, i know james gray has to leave us in a moment to attend. would you like to make a brief -- >> kindly to bring me in early, chairman, and you have been talk about what chilcot can do, considering the decisionmaking process. i think your question was -- given there were three parliamentary votes prior to the 2003 invasion which chilcot has
rolled into one, would you agree with me, any merit at all in the argument that having parliamentary consideration of balance of troops, the way it happened in 2003, what the right thing to do, that the two options available would be, one, return straightforward to the use of the -- the geneey is well out of the bottle. the prime minister would operate with the -- the act without -- these are some -- my question really is, is there some area of discussion to be had there in the aftermath of chilcot? >> well, this clearly academic discussion, and i notice some have published in this particular area, and it's always -- this is always something to reflect on again after chilcot.
i think you have answered your own question. the genie is out of the aboutle and i can't see a situation where parliament wouldn't want to debate a combat deployment involving substantial numbers of british troops or planes or ships, and i see real difficulty is with the war pour act that might lead to definitional problems as to what was being deployed and how significant that deployment had to be before the act wag triggered and so on. we are in the position where a convention has now built up that a substantial combat deployment should be debated and should be voted on where appropriate by -- subject to the qualifications of the previous prime minister has always set out, whether a fight for british national interests at stake and isn't possible to consult parliament in time or whether some humanitarian
catastrophe, which has to be debt with very quickly. >> we accept the risks 'one is that parliament will vote for things, the wrong thing, in iraq, and other occasions parliament will vote against something some would be the right thing to do some perhaps argue the case that syria in 2014. so, i quite accept your definitional questions, and we wouldn't want this to become a matter for the courts. your question of drafting the act in such a way that would allow the executive to act in the way he wished to act with the authority of parliament in the act rather than by a particular vote. >> i'm always ready to keep thinking about these things but in general terms i'd prefer conventions that evolved rather than the legalistic approach of trying to define in some
paragraph exactly what constitutes a particular mission or deployment, which i think does lead you into this, and i'm afraid does involve the courts. parliament took the wrong decision in the first syria vote. i think there were a number of people who spoke in the chilcot debate who still believe parliament did the right decision back then or were misled about the extent of the information about the intelligence about wmd. but i think it's probably wrong to start off by saying, poor -- parliament shouldn't debate. >> before we revert to chilcot can i raise an announcement, the 17th of july, that -- been appointed by the prime minister to conduct a review into the use
of reserves in the army. really raises the question that with the independent reserve commission in 2011 and the -- 2013 why is a new review necessary? >> we have made considerable progress in recruiting reserves. a lot of focus on that through advertising and encouraging the regular units to team up with the reserve units in their area and so on. but i think it is right to look more broadly now as the reserve numbers are -- have increased, particularly in the army to look again at the possibility that open up how reserves can be used in the future, and also whether the boundary between being -- between regulars and reserves is the right one, whether it is too artificial, for example. might be worries at different
stages of people's career, involving more flexibility and movements. i notice we have significant numbers of regulars leaving the armed forces who want to be reservistsists and may have peoe who want to move from the reserve to the regulars. is the boundary between the two too farmallized? that's onthing that we haven't finally finalized yet. but that one area alongside where we should use reserves. but i think it would be useful to have another look at it. jurassic -- >> okay, anything else from your report. >> no this was only announced a couple of days ago, in terms of reference for mr. francois, and i can't think of anybody better to do this then a former armed forces minimum city. he served him as a reservist and
is suited to carry this out. >> will we still then have a minister of the reserve inside the new structure of the war department? >> a minister who deal with personnel issues, including the reserves. me minister will be dealing -- the new minister -- same minister -- mr. lang -- lancaster, will be dealing with personnel issues, people issues generally, including regular service but also includes veterans and reserves. so you can look at all the issues together. >> just looking at those sort of issues you just described going forward, in any way reviewing whether in fact the number of reserves coming forward has finally been inadequate to replace the number of those going out of the regular forces? iwouldn't agree it has been
inadequate. we have some time yet to meet the target that was fixed. the numbers coming in, in the last two years, have again up and up, and i'd like to pay tribute to the former minister for the reserves who did a huge amount to drive up recruitment and to focus activity in this particular yeah. i want mr. francois to look forward to how we can find more opportunities to deploy reserves, and as i say, to look at making the boundary between being a regular and a reservist more flexible, but i'm not yet actually finalized the terms of reference to your input is very welcome. >> would like to comment. >> on that very specific point, one is the issue -- one of the issues under the inquiries be about women coming in and out? one of the issues, women leave
and almost impossible to return and that is affecting the number of female senior officials. is that also part of the inquiry? >> that exactly it. want to see exactly that explored. we need to do better in terms of recruiting women interest the reserves and we need to understand women's priorities will change at different points in their career, and why we're losing too many people that we would like to retain. can we make it easier, for example, for them to come back again after a short break, without losing some of the advantage they might have had by staying in all along? and can we look again at the liabilities that a reservist has to accept. could those be more flexible, different stages of somebody's life. that's exactly the kind of area i hope will be look at. >> thank you very much.
in the remaining time, which is just over half an hour, we'd like to focus now on the chilcot report and the lessons from it. john, if you'd like to start. >> -- [inaudible] -- the lessons and analysis of the chilcot report. first of all. >> we welcome the report. it tells a very important story about our recent history of a period, a military campaign where we could clearly have done better. it concludes that we did not achieve our strategic objective, the troops fought well in the initial part of the campaign. clearly we could have done better, and we need to learn from that, and establish why we didn't do better at the time.
so, we're looking at everything chilcot has said about the ministry itself, about some of our own decisionmaking processes, the way in which advice is tenders. to minimum stares, looking begin -- ministers, looking again at the armed forces how to improve the structures there and the ability of proper -- the ability to ensure proper challenge within the armed forces to avoid the dangers of group think. and of course we'll have another look at our equipment process, some of which were improved for the afghanistan campaign, but then again may be further lessened in terms of getting the equipment needed for particular campaigns to the front more quickly. so there's an awful lot there that we need to pick up on. and i am quite sure, as i said,
and when i spoke in the debate last week, -- thursday -- the debates on thursday, we're not at all complacent about this. we believe the ministry has improved, but i suspect there's a lot more to do. >> will there be in sort of defend indicated unit -- dedicated group that will distract the main lessons and make recommendations? >> that is yet to do exactly that, to drill through the property and make sure that the proper lessons are learned and they're hard at work doing that at the moment. >> any chance of the findings being made public, even in a slight he redacted form? >> we can report on how we get on in the findings and more importantly how we're
implementing the changes, but you would like us or expect to see -- i'm happy to look at that. >> can you tell us who is in charge of the unit? >> can i just perhaps -- one thing to add to your earlier question. has to be a government response to the chilcot report in due course, and it may be that will summarize our initial work in our findings are going to be implemented. >> just -- that's very helpful elucidation. can you tell us who is in charge of the unit that's going to be trolling through -- >> i'm in overall charge of everything, but -- >> i appreciate that. even your super human capacity to work, might not extend to -- whether you're able to tell white house the officials are. >> sure. will discuss the team for you. >> that would be helpful.
>> we have set up a team. a directoryat in the military defense, the engagement policy dealing with inquiries and investigations and so on for many years. we have set up a team within that directorat, some of whose members are sitting behind us and they are doing just what the defense secretary said. they are trailing through all 2.6 million words. one point i should make about the report is that, as you will have noticed, it doesn't contain a sort of simple table of recommendations and conclusions. the findings, the conclusions, the lessons, are actually spread -- not just across the whole report or the executive summary but deep into some of the other rather thick volumes. that they're going through it. every single volume. line-by-line, to pull out all that information. >> maybe they thought they didn't have enough time to
prepare a summary. can you tell me who is in charge of this unit? >> well, currently being led by dr. hutton, dr. huton, who is actually sitting behind us, workenning on my behalf. >> sir john kill connecticut judged the decision to demy a large scale force with potential combat operations was taken without collective ministerial consideration of the decision and its implications. so, it's not too early to ask the question how will the m.o.d. and the government's crisis management organizations now petitioner prepared to provide advice assessment, strategic options and appraisal, of the consequences of potential conflict. in other words, assuming it's not going to be so for government next time, how is it going work? >> it's already not social government.
because in 2010, the then-prime minister established the national security council, which meets every week, indeed is due to meet this afternoon. meets every week, and comprises in a not simply the most senior ministers in the government but the heads of the various agencies, the chief of the defense staff, the permanent secretary at the foreign office, and all those wow would expect, and prepares briefing materials prepared by the national security secretariat, and all those who attend that council a there's no danger of a decision like that ever been taken on a -- by a handful of people in the prime minister's study. >> so, would you say that this new machinery would be adequate
in relation to post conflict planning and delivery, seeing as one of the main findings with chilcot is the inadequaciy for preparing what would take place after the initial military face -- phase has been successful. >> a member of the national security council, and one of the lessons of chilcot is that stabilization planning has to be in the overall plan right from the outset. we have a government stablization unit. we see officials from that unit participating now in our exercises, and in our training, and i think that is one lesson that has been learned from the experience of iraq. this has to be absolutely central, and that is something we are thinking hard about in respect of libya and syria and
indeed, back in iraq itself. >> well, you anticipate the next question. if this machinery is so fit for purpose to be machinery, why did things good wrong in libya? why was there apparently not enough information that removing that dictator, would compare to removing the dictator in iraq. >> the initial action which was fully authorized by the international community and was done at the request of the arab league the initial action was successful and prevented the massacre that would have taken place in benghazi. the view at the time, and i think you'll appreciate, mr. chairman, i wasn't there at the time but the view at the time was that thereafter we needed to respect the position
of the new political authorities in libya, who had little appetite for foreign assistance but didn't require it, they didn't request it, and i think that led the west to overestimate their capacity for establishing the order that was required. of course, as you now know, they essentially disintegrated into different factions by the middle of 2014. >> is it not the case that the military advice that was given to the national security council -- doing inquiries in libya alone -- that the military advice begun by the chief of the defense staff was not in our strategic interest to remove the dictator and that was rather brushed aside any the prime
minister at the time, and the -- it leads to -- you have heard this from the committee before -- is the question of whether or not the military representation needs strengthening when decisions of this sort are being made so that the purely strategic considerations of whether it is sensible remove an unpleasant dictator without regard to the chaos that may follow can be more strongly put forward, and that's why, although it does seem a get step forward to have the national security council, this committee has consistently suggested the chiefs of staff should have a more inputs' the consideration than just the chief of the defense. >> the chiefs of staff have an -- through the chief of staff that attends the national security council and attends the
meeting of officials that precedes it in the days leading up to the national security council. he will always be kept to ensure he does have the advice of the chiefs of staff. i can't comment on what happened on the particular -- leading up to the libya operation. what i can tell you is sitting alongside the chief of defense, in the years i've been on the national security council, i don't think i've ever attended a meeting where his advice -- what was your --board aside. >> brushed aside. >> absolutely not. >> the widery reported phrase was something along the lines of, you do the fighting and we'll do the planning or something of that sort. >> well -- >> we'll leave it at that for the moment. thank you. appreciate you weren't involved at that time. >> wish you well in washington.
and might be surprised at the -- actually questioned -- the nuclear deterrent if we didn't have them. yesterday something you keep to yourself when you're in washington. i'm sure you have -- just see what people actually said. can i just ask the question on chilcot, and the chilcot report, judged that the government was not -- on post planning and did not take responsibility. also held that the systemic evaluation of the national options. can i ask -- perhaps adoption of crisis management and conflict planning that can be implemented?
>> i'm not quite clear about your first point, as i understood the speeches in the debate from scottish representatives they would have been happy to morally contract it out our nuclear defense to the united states or to france. i simply -- that is something that i simply couldn't understand why we would want to cower under somebody else's nuclear umbrella when we have the capacity to defend ourselves and the deterrent already to hand. but perhaps i'll read the debate. >> i wish you would. >> not be able to -- >> good luck. >> let me turn to the question you have asked. yes, we have a stabilization unit, and that cross-government machinery now. in a way that simply wasn't true in the early 2000s.
i visited exercises, large-scale exercises, griffin strike, i think it was, with the french, to validate the combineed joint expeditionary force. was down in the planning room and saw the stabilizize unit representatives sitting there, working with the french on the implications for post conflict, what would need to be done in this exercise to he to stablize security in areas once the fighting had started. mr. cat consistence may be able to -- watkins may be able to add to that. >> i would say that planning for post conflict situations and stabilization is now in a much more simmic basis than it -- systemic basis than it was then and the stabilization unit is part of it. but we have produced and refreshed our doctrine on this.
we have adoption 340 on stabilization, very good read itch prepared it to you. the point of the document is that it was produced by the ministry of defense and is actually across government doctrine and reflects the lessons and the experiences not only of the ministry of defense but the foreign office and so on. the only thing i would add is we must be quite careful about imagining there are some sort of separate lessons or precise playbook which you can learn and apply in every circumstance, because each circumstance is different. afghanistan was different from iraq. libya would different from those two. and so what we have sought to draw out was generic lessons, and the first generic lesson, which might seem at glib, is about the importance of planning. planning itself has a real benefit.
and then there are other lessons about the importance of cross-government coordination, about coordination with the local authorities, involvement of local people and so on. all of which are in the document is mentioned. >> can i just jump in, support the comment wes have collectively learned a great deal, and to peter's last point, we have absolutely accept thread is no generic solution but we do recognize this is a balance between security, governance and development, and getting that right, and ensuring you are advancing in all three axes. the second point is that this is not just about getting our own national ducks in order. the stabilization community is now in a much more mature place and mutually understood place
now internationally than it was then, and the third component of this is our engagement with ngos, which i think is a deeper one, with those ngos that wish to work for the government. was in the fco yesterday with a large group of ngos, taking sounding from them on security issues. so a number of areas. >> there's no one solution that fits every single situation. does your comment include things like planning and simulation, that kind of thing -- [inaudible] -- there's actually -- killing people to make sure that the difference enough is i look down and play that -- >> i think is this at the -- the
idea of being careful about group think when we have the plan planning process, it is bat challenging and introducing alternative viewpoints to ensure that the mainstreamsome the only one being heard. >> thank you. very good. >> why won't we keep on chilcot. the defense intelligence -- the joint intelligence about the alleged wmd. are you confident this couldn't happen again? if so, why? and what lessons will now ensure that defense intelligence is analytical capabilities are probably integrated into the work of the jrc? >> the jrc existed before chilcot.
it's important to remind ourselves of that. but it has now been significantly enhanced since that -- since the iraq campaign, and there is more independence built into it assessment. we are regularly, senior ministers, briefed on analysis of the various countries and issues that are in front of this -- on the nsc, and i think it also is more widely based, more access to other forms of reporting, and i can't see a situation where we -- the advice we got would -- the intelligence we would be asked to act on was ever limited to such a small number of sources as appears to be the case in the intelligence, for example, on wmd.
>> okay, thank you. >> just expand on what james gray was saying there. there seems to be this sort of crazy dichotomy at the moment of a general public opinion of a lack of willingness to engage in -- that seems to be mask matched with an ever-increasing dangerous world we live in. can you confirm to the committee that there is absolutely no no -- to protect this nation and they have everything they require and that includes defending ourselves. >> yes, we will deploy where we need to deploy to keep our
citizens safe, and no question on government about that. you have seen the retiring chief of defense start interviewing in "the telegraph" on saturday where he picks up on the point we need to learn the right lessons from chilcot, that there may be situations where we intervened in the wrong way, but equally we need to avoid a position where we don't intervene again, and that means we would have to work harder to explain the need for intervention, and get over to the public what many of the issues we face, although they may -- these area maize seem far away from our shows, can become unless they're tackled, very direct threat. that extends whether it's peacekeeping operations in somalia or south sudan, to our
continuing presence in afghanistany you have traps national groups that if not held in check can bring terror to our streets. politicians, all of us, have to continue to show to our constituents there is a very direct national interest in dealing with these issues in and helping to stabilize fragile states, aiding states infected by insurgencies, improving the training of their soldierses and professionalizing and reforming their defense ministries and helping to eradicate corruption all these things are part and parcel fur the downstream -- or upsteam -- further upstream in helping to keep our country safe. >> but at the moment would the political sort of situation
we're in, you can't confirm that between yourself, the prime minister, the chiefs think decisionmakers at the top of government, have no -- to do the things we to answer things we have seen in nice and across the globe. >> to give you an example i authorized the deployment of another 250 troops to iraq. in addition to the troops we have serving there, to do further training and deployment of engineers and medics and more force protection for the base in which they're going to be headquartered. that is an additional contribution to the fight against the daesh. we have increased our commitment, our deployment in afghanistan, by 10 temperatures -- 10% over the summer so there's no question about making additional
deployments and declare to our friends in europe that where we can assist in the fight against terrorism, on the continent of europe we're ready to do so offering to share intelligence, to deploy forensic assistance and any other help owl allies require and we repeated that ifer to the french government in light of the tragedy at nice and the prime minister will be reemphasizing that when she meets the french president shortly. >> thank you. >> the capability gaps in respect to mobility and the significant impact on operations chill cost concluded that no gaps in capable should be
clearly communicated to the ministers and the ministers gives less than accurate answers to the parliament and the public. have you ensured that practice does not persist today? in my experience there is clearly no conscious decision of anybody to come and say the wrong thing to a select committee ortho house of parliament or westminster or whatever that may be gut there has been a -- where we have seen over the last 12 months liberty be the inquiry into -- how we look after people, where ministers have been patiently not correct. there is no accusation of misleading or anything there but how do we ensure that the ministers who comp and represent these facts to the public to us and by extension the public, are absolutely saying the right thing? >> well, ministers should be correct as they can be when they
appear in front of committees, and i'm sorry to hear the specific allegations you're making. i'll have a look at that. i'm not aware of ministers giving this committee incorrect facts, but something you want to direct me about that, i'm happy to do so. i think your question really relates to, is there -- would there be examples where people down the main of command had questioned capabilities capabild equipment and it wasn't being supplied, and then perhaps they went about challenging that. that is a question i've asked. came in right at the tail end of the afghanistan operation, for example, when a lot of the equipment was being brought back. but when i've asked it, people who served there, i'm pretty clear that certainly towards the end of that campaign the military got what they thought they needed, and there weren't any restrictions on the
capabilities that -- on the equipment that was provided. it's probably worth emphasizing that -- you know this better than anybody -- that no force actually sets out with perfect equipment in each case, each campaign can be slightly different and may require equipment to be slightly reset. nate why we have what is called the operational requirement that enables us to reset equipment capabilities at relatively short notice to get the money out of the treasury and move quickly to upgraded or reset what was originally planned. >> i don't think anybody is suggesting there's been any intentional misleading of this committee. what we want to explore is whether or not ministers would know if there were gaps in capabilities at the outset
before, for example, a force was deployed? do you have in the internal machinery, excepting the fact, obviously, these are specific capability gaps wouldot not under those circumstances wish to make public but do you have the internal machinery that would ensure that you and the secretary of defense would be told at the outset, before an operation begins, we have got deficiencies in a particular area? >> yes, i'm reasonably confident. >> how does that work. >> we have a new -- deputy chief of the defense staff military capability. is tasked with ensuring there is a coherent equipment and support program right across the defense. and he is responsible not just for equipment and support but for capability as a whole, and
i'm pretty confident that they would come and tell me if there was some urgent capability that was not being provided in one of the theaters where our people are at risk at the moment, in either afghanistan or iraq. >> let take perhaps an example going back to where we were in the first part of our discussions today, namely, nato's very high readiness, joint task force. so this is a body that would be intended to be put into the field, as the name implies, very short later in the event of some hostile or aggressive move to one of our nato allies. now, are you satisfied and possibly maybe i could bring the vice chief in at this point. are you satisfied that if that
particular balloon went up, and the joint task force was prepared for rapid deployment because of some emergency that has developed in, say, the baltic state, are you happy that within the machine there would be people who would speak truth to power and inform their superiors what gaps there might be in the readiness of the force to do what it's tasked to do in an imagine. >> the short answer is, yes. i am satisfied and i would be informed of any concerns.that. the overall requirement for the bjtf is important to emphasize is deployment by nato, so the decision to activate it is taken by a north atlantic council
command and control responsibles lie with -- within nato, and the kind of certification that the force is ready to deploy, is really a matter for nato. we would very -- we have supplied the right force but i'm pretty confident i would hear if there were gaps. >> i think firstly it's important to say the purpose is to actually deploy quickly to deter, and not necessarily to respond. the aim would be to get it there during a period of escalating tension in order to de-escalate that tension and deter. and its capabilities are absolutely designed to bring with it a combat capability that is meaningful, that can pack a punch and that can defend itself. if we were in the game -- let's
not be theater specific but if we were in the game of responding to a threat, then we have the ability to tailor the elements we would put into that to the nature of the environment they might find themselves and we would do so as the secretary of state said, with nato ensure our collective capable was enhanced. >> we absolutely satisfied that if there are any gaps in the structures and in these formations, capabilities, which you know about? >> so, we have selected the capabilities we're committing to it on the basis of defensive and deterrence and we're absolutely comfort able with the force element that can pack that punch and can defend itself. if the threat manifested itself in a specific way, if this was about response, then we would be looking to bolster that capability both nationally and with allies. >> if there was any deficiency
or shortfall, would it be something that you're satisfied you already have measures in place to remedy? >> so that you know there's a pretty comprehensive and rebust program of capable enhancement underway. that is absolutely being delivered with a view to the likely threats that force might face. that does include competitors so i'm -- i can give you that assurance. >> excellent. thank you very much. >> comment to chilcot's -- less effective at promoting support to service personnel and their families, and especially in relation to support those who are mobilized independently or individually as reservists rather than at a formed unit. i'm sure that the -- something on the government's agenda.
what has changed in order to ensure the m.o.d. is ready to support regular and reservists from the outset of any future conflict. >> the support to personnel has improved since iraq. we now have in law the covenant to make sure -- commits to us ensure that members the armed forces are not disadvantaged compared to other citizens when they go out on military service, and that in some cases they get special consideration, especially those who have been either injured or indeed bereaved in the court of their duty. improved immeasurably since the initial campaign in iraq, and i think there is better support where there are injuries or deaths in service, there is
better support for the families than existed before, and i always appointed to support the families from anybody who is killed in action and to act as focus for their concerns, those visiting, those who are trained, supported by the defense academy at the armed forces chaplain center, and there are number of other improvements especially in the availability of mental health services. there is better clinical knowledge and policies surrounding mild traumatic brain injury, example. there's a reserve mental health prom that didn't exist before and there is more welfare support in addition and property points of contact between the service welfare staffs, and some of the wounded personnel who have returned home. so i think we have learned a lot from these campaigns, and
continue to improve the service available to -- services available to personnel and that was born out in the latter statements of the campaign in afghanistan. >> we have got just one more topic, secretary of state, and that is something on which the committee can take special into with the subcommittee, chaired by johnny mercer, who will now ask our last question. >> thank you. it's essentially about this process that is going on at the moment. in recommendation to what you just said about military covenant, the military covenant is this fantastic team. if it works, 17% of people think it works at the moment and that over half have not even heard of it. i just think that these things are fantastic but we need to kind of change how we look at this stuff.
not what we're putting into the system, which is lots and lots of brilliant things, but actually how the brokes see it. what it means to them. how they can access this care. and i think once we change the we look at these things we'll get a real difference in how we look after people who are going through -- who -- have left. ... >> >> you have worked
extraordinarily hard but the fact remains that it was set up by the commission as we are told on one thing from anyone other than in the individual but yet we have hundreds of people threatening to arrest people from 2009 and 2010. it is completely at of control. with feet government investigation how we are told things with the minister's of a personal campaign but this evidence points the other direction so what is being done?
openly with the servicemen and women? >> i thank you are right that it is working practice in those obligations and it is very important to me with a local council, in the big companies that is through signing that are implemented on the ground to go stage by stage we need to make sure more are aware. to step back a little bit.
to have those investigated properly but so far we provide trading to the humanitarian as in the first place and then to add further assistance belladonna of trading can protect us with that allegation is still has to be looked at from what i think is important in to do with allegations if they don't have any prospect but to deal with those as quickly as possible to deal
with those more serious allegations. >> why is france or the united states not part of this particular program? and second may be in this is the point of the allegations. of those standards in we need to do that but i find now hard to except in terms of how long it takes to investigate and up practices adopted and the truth is there are many soldiers including commanding officers that feel betrayed by the process and we must
investigate allegations that suggests something somewhere has gone badly wrong. >> as far as other countries are concerned and those are in a different position with the application of human rights we have chosen not to do that we have chosen to abide as well as a whole series of these but it is important whether our credible allegations are properly investigated. they have to be investigated. it is important that we clear a way and cannot be
stood up in a moment. and though one summary hearing as a result. so it may be dead very few can be substantiated. >> they're all really trying to advance this course but this is entirely ever own making through the united states or any other allies to bear the brunt. >> we have subscribed to the international criminal
then maybe something about the legal system and taking those opportunities. >> if even a small proportion and to have the inquiry as an example of that. of the industry to develop proposals to try to protect our service personnel from what is clearly an organized effort but it has this terribly fact.
>> yes. they were put forward in the manifesto at the election last year so for example, restitute better recover cost from this industry of false allegations to limit the time period with other litigation to ensure that there is more immunity there is a package of proposals. >> just finally one small or
practical suggestion ministry is quite good at supporting the service personnel once the charges have been brought in they are uncertain what to do but they are subject to investigation. is there any one stop shop in the form of paid dedicated number to serve the people who find themselves after the event to face charges for past campaign contact before giving any statements of any sort and if there is such a
number, fitted be highlighted on the web site and publicized so that service personnel in particular that are threatened with legal action immediately note to get in contact with sources by a ringing a particular number before making any statements >> that is an important point in an excellent suggestion to come back to the of ministry to recall something that took place many years before. i will take that suggestion. >> forgive me but there is
an understanding in this suggestion is extremely basic if that hasn't been done this are can you assure the committee the industry and in that would happen in america and elsewhere to play a fundamental part of the operations. >> i am determined to make sure that is demonstrated. >> we have a very comprehensive session. >> we will have live coverage as ashton carter
and john kerry have a joint press briefing is the isis summer wraps up the of ministers of more than 40 countries have been reading to discuss terrorism you can watch it live. for 45:00 p.m. eastern on c-span2. also at 6:00 the discusses form policy and security challenges you can watch that live also on c-span2 6:00 p.m. eastern. today is the final day of the republican convention donald trump is expected to officially accept the nomination he end of the few hours ago he did a walk-through looking at this set up for tonight.
>> is this exactly as it is? there is a higher one over here also. >> it is right in front of you. >> donald trump earlier today met with marcia blackburn we will get remarks from reince priebus and donald trump's daughter and she will introduce her father before he formally accepts the nomination. with the speech make america won again.
listened and also get a video on demand. nigel farage sat down to discuss the upcoming u.s. elections and the decision to leave the european union he was in favor of brexit and he talked out the differences between the u.s. and the u. k campaign styles in his view on donald trump. [inaudible conversations] >> welcome to the live stream breakfast briefing we are on 29 websites across the country to deliver news
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as a representative i will tell you how the morning will go. and then we will take some questions. and then have another q&a. with the leading provider for education so now let me introduce your host and our politics editor in washington former white house correspondent, also a very popular video series we will be interviewing nigel
farage who was a key leader for britain to lead the european union. he argued of the flight of immigrants are outplacing the native born british workers. this is part of the decision and now he wants his life back. he accepted an invitation for what donald trump had to say please welcome nigel farage. [applause] >> welcome.
and dad is quite useful. >> as you may or may not know we have a standard question that we ask would you like to have a beer with that kennedy? that is a connection to the voters but you miss that a lot of people want to hear the of bricks and story that is the bigger shot to the establishment from one ec here in america what does it mean foreign relations for foreign policy also the republicans that i have spoken to if fabrics the campaign beachbag beer drinking it reaches those
saying who people should vote for but that sense of entitlement. >> what obama has done and what trump gets right to it seems is talk about those issues steadied talks about those things and i have been told that some of trump's comments are pretty out there. in difficult to enforce as user bin u.s. army i can see what he is trying to do with