tv Key Capitol Hill Hearings CSPAN September 17, 2016 2:00am-4:01am EDT
limited but still activity those that are either clergy were on the board registered for the community or perhaps written permission from a general meeting of the registered religious community. but even they can only engage in missionary act 70 in very limited places, mainly inside buildings or on land owned by these registered religious communities. lly evangelical protestants are often denied permission to build churches in russia and many of them choose not to register or refuse registration because it goes against their religious beliefs. to register with the state. so they are then not going to be
allowed to hold in formal religious services in their homes. because if there is a one single nonofficial member of their religious community present in that apartment or house, or whatever, then they will be engaging in missionary activity. and the russian courts have already gone to town against several individuals in various parts of russia for engaging in russian missionary activity. one and a american baptist, mormon missionaries have been denied permission to come because they allegedly do not have the proper kind of documentation. the first was tried and acquitted is the only one that was acquitted. but anyway, with that restless,
hopefully not too confusing overview of the situation, i close. >> thank you. in the interest of time i want to go back to some things i want to have plenty of time for audience questions. one of the things that we talked about, all all of you have pointed to the internet, and i want to get your thoughts on that. in 2014 they also passed a bloggers law which allowed the government to shut down the blog the size of very well-known leaders in the space in russia today is where what were discussing and perhaps one of the last spaces for public open discussion. now what what were seen as the bad result of closing, some of the things that you described as part of the new law to provide in a store information on users and provide open access to the government that information. to provide encryption.
>> russians have gotten used to having the ability to go on websites from around the world, talk to friends on facebook and russian twitter is reasonably active. they are quite used to these things and the thought of it ba being taken away is alarming to them. creating and implementing and enforcing these laws would have all of the data that is being sent out by russian citizens come back to the russian government for analysis. forcing these telecommunication companies to keep metadata from three years and text messages and pictures people send over their cellphones. that is the thing you can see
that might be useful if they are attempting to say prosecute people involved in major protest actions. we saw this after the protest in 2012 when the kremlin went to the then-owner of essentially the russian version of facebook and said we want this information. we want to be able to access what these users have written. to their credit, the creator and owner said absolutely not and he had the entire company taken away from him and it was put in the hands of the pro-kremlin business men and he finds himself in the same situation. he has a new company. telegraph which is an encrypted app you can use for messaging your friends. with the orders about giving up
encryption keys he said absolutely not. what happens to companies that refuse? what happens and there have been attempts into the past to make companies like google and g-mail keep the information of russian users physically on russian soil rather than say in california or new york. will the russian government have to ban these apps? will they bhauk block them? that is an opening question. will they take away these programs like g-mail and facebook and what will that mean for the way that russians chose to interact with the world. >> i think that is an ex tremely interesting -- extremely interesting question.
given where we are if one company is forced to shutdown many others come to replace it. and it is a constant chase. we should consider this is an inkrcredible amount of metadata they seek access to me and it isn't clear the government has the capability and capacity to use it and analyze it in perhaps the way it seeks. we have to ask ourselves is this about giving the population the sense they are being surveyed. >> i think another piece of this is to take a look at the behavior of large western-american companies. we find china companies buckle.
you can see people taking a stand and the jury is out on how western companies will behave. facebook moderation practices where accounts of different critics, regime critics, dissidence have been shutdown and arbitrarily controlled or government agents complain in a very targeted way against famous commentators and they get taken down. arbitrarily there has been a whole petition with a couple hundred prominent russian asking them to revise the way they handle moderation and the questions about accounts because it is clear the russian government is manipulating it.
when you have these major figures signing a petition to facebook saying please take a look at how you are handling russian akoupts that is something. for us, the way companies behave in one space can transfer to other spaces as well. >> he belongs to an alternative russian orthodox church and he has faced all kinds of difficulties basically no longer lives in russia and those -- and the alternative russian orthodox church which he is affiliated has had all kinds of -- including earlier this month
call-in by the security services. one relic of theirs was removed and video of the court bailiff has been reported as well. these go across the board. >> the question i want to ask you are the further ramifications of this not just for russia but also for the u.s. we are in washington, d.c. why should americans care about this? >> lots of evangelical
protestants do care. there was one good lengthy letter signed by, i believe, a hundred represents of religious organizations from all over the united states. i should mention the search of scientology has provided space and logistical efforts for this. as have many other churches. holding a summit in support of persecuted christians and has decided not to hold the summit in may in moscow but we will hold it in washington. a hundred religious leaders from all over the -- i should say religious leaders from a hundred countries are scheduled to take part in this meeting.
and franklin graham has said he is doing this specifically or rather not doing this in moscow because of the bylaws. so it affects a lot of american people and especially the evangelical movement and religious freedom doesn't get attention as a foreign policy question as many other issues do. and environmental issues. i am glad you pointed out this coincidence. >> hannah, same question to you. >> i want to add to what kathy was saying and eco what was said earlier about the laws and the closing space for different religious groups has a tendency to trickle down to other soviet
countries. i think you particularly see that in places where the clear paths where russia implements one law and several months later you will see another country do something similar. there is certainly a trend in which countries who are interested in clamping down on their populations they tend to take their page from what the russians do. you see many, many instances in which if russia can get away with it, if no one cares about what russia does, all of these other countries feel they can get away it. they don't want to be the first but they are happy to be the second one. >> add kyrgyzstan to the list.
they are reordering their struck that deals with religion. >> i think the mimicking of the laws is true but it hits closer to home than that. there is an editorial in the "washington post" today about the need to take seriously russian hacking and m of the u.s. elections, russian hack of the dnc and that material leaking to wikileaks, trying to influence u.s.' elections. so the whole question of russian abuses in cyberspace are a major
u.s.-domestic issue at this point. you don't need to go very far to see the relevance in these issues. >> absolutely. i would like to open it up to audience questions. we should have the mike going around. introduce yourself, give us your name and state your comment in the form of a question. gentlemen in the back in the blue. yes. yes. yes. >> my name is al murphy. thank you for mentioning the "washington post" article. it leads into what i am talking about. we are aware with the hacks on the dnc and collin powell. what interference do you thing this has to do with tit for tat over the domestic opposition groups and over overt support
for ukraine. >> no, i don't think that this is an anyway a tit-for-tat. i think russia has clearly chosen sides in the u.s. election and they are trying to manipulate. we have seen similar operations in other places. we saw this in germany for instance with the scandals or allegations of a rape last year that were false and manufactured by the russians to stop the entrance from syria. there are instances where russia m manipulates internal politics of other countries and that is what they are doing here.
it is not a tit-for-tat for any u.s. politics. [inaudible question] >> the united states does not support -- does not hack and then release documents of united russia for instance. there is no -- there is no parallel between the behavior of these two fwments. -- governments. the u.s. doesn't hack russia's servers. >> the argument we are engaging
in goes to the heart of the campai campaigns and what they have become over the last ten years. undermining trust in democratic institutions and making the argument that the u.s. and western european countries did the same thing and that is not true. that is the kremlin line put out there and i think what we are experiencing here in the united states right now countries across russia, ukraine, georgia, have been experiencing many elections but right now it is incredibly brazen of the russian federation and hackers to reach out and use their cyber capabilities.
this isn't new but it a broader trend in how russia tendency to m manipulate politics around the globe. i will do the next question now. yes? >> hi, i have a masters in security study from the university of college london. you expressed tern about the legislation that makes it illegal to not report on certain types of crimes. we have had several instances of terror attacks in the united states that intelligence would never have picked up but people close to the perpetrates knew about. is mandatory a reporting of terror tactic or something morally unacceptable for
governments to force their citizens to do. in the extremism law, there is not even a necessity to use or advocate violence. this is opening the window very wide to allowing citizens to report on neighbors they don't li like. given the vagary of the judicial system unfortunately i think it is written and conceived of in a too wide and vague of way. >> i agree with cathy. context is everything year.
i understand where you are coming from but the way these laws are applied is a completely different context is what this is saying. >> curt rose. the events of the past week and what i learned here have stimula stimulated some of what is going on in russia and two words come to mind. one is metadata as mentioned here and the other is irony. during the last week for those who read a hard copy of the newspaper, the "washington post," for example, there was an ad that was sponsored in part at least by the aclu requesting
that snowden be pardoned for this activities. it seems ironic now that what is going on in russia has been the revelation that metadata has been used to find out what is going on on the internet. what i am wondering is is -- and i don't think this is too harsh but has any portion of the russian public been horrified by what they learned about the use of the metadata? >> i am jump in on this. i think there is a couple of interesting things here.
one is snowden himself came out strongly against this law. he himself said he is horrified at the way these provisions could be implemented against the russian people. there was in the initial stages of the drafting of the law and a stipulation that i believe people convicted under this law could have their russian citizenship stripped of them and that provision raised the feathers of the russian republic. it was quickly removed from the law but there is still the kind of feeling in the air that that could be potentially be added back in later on once people are acclimated to what is in the current law. there have been protests and groups of people who are extremely upset about this reality. the difference here is that essentially the russian press is
largely controlled by the government. so you are not going to see the same kinds of aclu ads in large papers in moscow and the newspapers are not reporting it in such a way that some of the u.s. media has reported what happened a couple years ago here. i think it is a different picture and unfortunately while there have been protests they are not going to be on the same scale of people being horrified. because the way the laws have been slowly implemented they have gotten used to the government being in their business. if you lived through the soviet era it is not that strange. >> they want to shutdown the internet because that is the interesting space where people can speak out and actually among young people there was a poll
recently 22-42-year-old urban used their attention more often than they do the television. there is about 5,000 signatures against the law. in the context where you can go to jail for a protest? 5,000 people showing up to protest. it was a big deal. individual tickets, smaller protests in other parts of the country. i wouldn't say that -- is it massive? no. but there are certainly russians who are opposed and companies themselves, the russian internet providers would be bankrupt by this. their unions and kind of
advocacy organizations are a flaw. so i took it as a kind of -- and it slowed it down. so the success at this point is there has been an acknowledgment that you cannot implement this any time soon. so if it is possible to slow it down it is possible to make more changes. >> jus quickly. there have been many, many protests from religious leaders, mainly evangelical and some muslims. there are oddities on the way the law was put together. it was the defense committee that had total control over the wording.
more that could be done but it not happening now. one thing that concerns me a little bit is because these laws are put out there under the name anti-terrorism and we do this current administration sees russia as an ally in fighting terrorism. russia has a history of terrorism that we are not paying as much attention to as we should. >> i think that is a good point, hannah. these laws are really focused on the national security at large and part of the national security package. russia has been passing repressive laws. the label of anti-terrorism is security, which of course the
u.s., has no -- i will not intervene on various versions of russia's own national security laws. the language of human rights and anti-terrorism are being used to pass what is the opposite of those values. do you have a comment? >> there are all sorts of international standards and laws and storms that we can refer to more frequently. we should call a spade a spade. russia's behavior internationally and behavior at home contributing all kinds of international standards and we could be saying this more cleary on some occasions.
>> what else can we do? we can be clear in our approaches. >> these particular laws are not tied to the actions and i think this should make policymakers feel more, i guess, confidant that the regime is something that should be maintained because russia domestically isn't moving in the right direction. of course, there is foreign policy. >> patrick tucker. i really appreciate this panel. so the fsb, the russian intelligence service, has been getting a lot of press recently in the united states from one of the groups suspected of breaking
into the dnc, stealing data and using that to influence the u.s. election by releasing to it wikileaks leaks and other proxy services. i wanted if you can talk about the fsb and if that method something you that you see in play in terms of dealing with presence in russia? and how do russians perceive the fsb in their activities? thanks. >> who wants to take that one? >> sure. there have been instances -- you have different tactics in different situations. but the obvious outrageous case
was putting sex tapes on the screen and discrediting the party by clearly hidden video of two people who are -- why was that done? because at that point, the clear leader of the united opposition of several parties. his private life was taped and put on tv. it is reported to be these people i should say. it is not completely clear. and their conversations are private and insulting to other members of that coalition. so this tape was used to make sure russian n parties wouldn't enter into the election period
together. the sort of thing that is so dirty yet becomes a basic element of controlling the political context in russia. >> i can give a much more simpler example. about ten years ago i was told a russian opposition politician who was studying music in london was told his son would have his fingers broken unless the politicians mended his way. the forces were manipulated and
meant to instill fear and discreted whole categories of people. occasionally they are done periodically and different scapegoats are identified and a light is shined on them. >> i think an important point is that the random selective nature of how these laws are used i think is an incredibly effective for creating anxiety. they are at the deposal of the government agencies to use when they feel like targeting an individual or organization. you never know when you are the target and that is part of the process. and to go back to to questions
of how do the russians think about the fsb and i don't think we will know that. we have lost access to the only main independent polling in russia. i think the information we are going to get from russia going forward is going to increasingly painted by the government perspective. >> can i just add something? the kbg which then turned into the fsb has a long history of collecting what they call co compromising material. it is the setting up of these situations whether it is a honey trap, video cameras, hacks. it is all about gathering information that can be used maybe not today, or next year even, but can be used in the future it make political gains and earn political points. the hacking is really important
to mention. hacking of political parties and systems isn't new. there was a famous hacking in histonia that took most of the country offline. just a few days before the election ezthe entire system was taken offline. it is certainly not something that is outside of the norm of what the fsb would do. to me, it fits very much into the same patterns. you have seen them go further taking part of the ukrainian electrical grid offline.
liber liberal -- [inaudible question] >> thank you. >> you want to take that? >> i think it is without question that the rush n -- russians are masters are restrictive laws. i only recently sort of some to understand the russian court system is organized or disorganized in such a way there is no precedent. a court in one place can rule one way and then a court in another region ruled the other way. because the other court ruled one way doesn't influence how that other court rules. some of you who may be lawyers can get a better explanation.
there are many restrictive laws and unfortunately here this is another one to add to the arsenal. >> may name is karen. i have history in this area and questions. but to the point about lack of precede precedent, all systems don't have a common-law system. having said that it is not supposed to be completely random and what is called a post co codery. -- code lottery. my question is about how technology is a game-changer or not. everyone made reference to the fact that everything old is new again. all of this gives a restrictive
legislation, selective prosecution, using the tool of social control is not an invention of the putin regime. it has been going on for hundreds of years and it swung depending on where you picked in russian history from total repressive control to sort of incompetent attempts to control. i remember the tape in the 1980's that nobody had to time to listen to. the question is how this new technology, the internet, is a collection of metadata and everything else that is tech that i don't understand is on either side. the russian government attempt to control social organizations and society. and how it actually works on behalf of the other side which is the side seeking to maintain op openness contact and activism.
>> i am happy to start with the question. i think it is a very important one. when the internet first became a thing there was a lot of expectations that the internet is going to change the way that people are able to connect and that the internet is going to be a great tool that civil party activists can use and this might change things to the better. i think unfortunately it has been proven to be correct because we have seen with every step and progress that is made in the technological theory you create telegraph, for instance. while they may not be able to gain control of the proprietary information of the software that
runs telegraph and that is one of the fears by gaining some of the encryption codes thal be able to gain access to the information as well as backdoors into other systems. it is just about the same speed as is the creation of new technology. where you see civil society folks and the action on their side is when the law was passed last year that log bloggers were put under the control of the same kinds of centers that helped run the russian media. a lot of blockers who were affected by that decided to do something different. they would have a sign-up list
on their website and you would get an e-mail only to one person the blog contained inside. they have been able to circumnavigate the information but it is getting a lot harder. what miriam was saying earlier is when we don't take notice of this happening. let's try to make sure governments and large organizations are not just cooperating with governments. you may end up in a situation where our worst fears of internet control can come true.
>> i thought it was a great question. it gets at the theme of what is it that we expect of the internet? there was this phrase liberation control. social media remains and i would say in russia it is the main vector and that is where content can be shared, that is where people can neatly discuss still. it has for a long time been open. i would say it just reflects our moods about the internet reflect larger forces in the world. so as things were liberalizing globally, the internet was flourishing. as there is a greater clamp down, more authoritarians are using internet for surveillance
and so forth. it is part of a broader global trend. that is an important question and i am not sure how exactly to get at that. it is both things. it is simultaneously the best avenue for free speech in many places that are repressive and at the same time place that is closing and contains the potential for greater and greater reforms of surveillance. >> i think we should not underestimate the creativity of the russian people to get around these restrictive measures. in the soviet years i don't think we are there yet but it seems like we are moving closer
and closer in that direction. we had a self-publication of literature, music, and it was passed on to person to person informally. and we can use encrypted networks and services to pass around the information. new forms, i think of technology is an enabler as miriam and hannah were saying. and i think they have been savvy at using to undermine the regime. >> the russian state has gone
further back than the soviet country. the orthodox church is not only an attempt to specifically -- this plays an important role not only inside russian society increasingly but also in the foreign policy. but that is another discussion. >> absolutely. >> i am from the muslim public affairs council. it seems that the things you spoke about exist in many countries where there is regimes trying to maintain control and mask human' rights violations under terrorism or security or
those kinds of things. when you talk about the russian orthodox church in muslim countries it is the mosque, is the religious community -- and islam and if you violate that you are speaking to the prophet or whatever. they use these laws to cross any forms of descent against governments that have sectarian and not democratic. how much do you think about making a significant spot when we created the terrorism. thing like arresting tens of thousands of people or brought people into guantanamo bay and some of them didn't belong there. then how much do you think we have sort of lost the moral high ground in saying you can't use terrorism in these broad brushed
strobes? i feel like some of them may be using our playbook. if not now but in the near future of using terrorists to do a lot of things that were publically not appropriate. >> i will quickly respond first first international law does not allow restricting religion in the name of anti-terrorism or policy. that is a high standard which many countries violate. we should remember what russia has done in various wars. i don't think russia has looked to us to learn a lot of these techniques. i would say the same thing.
when if comes to using the idea of security as an excuse russia learned that in the early 1990s when it was fighting these wars and dealing with the ideas of separate states and in the early 1990's there was a movement for more of these religiously or ethnic differences in the country and break away as a whole. that was one of the tooutilized the time. >> we have time for one more question. the lady in the magenta. >> hi, i know you expect an anti-russian question here. but this is the last question so i want to see if you will venture and answer. how many more questions of
westernizing and repression do we have to live through in russia to get them to be a western democracy? as a transatlantic of russian background i think of russians as europeans and feel terrible for russian democrats. it is a lonely place to be. >> anybody want to take a stab? >> russia is eurasia so it will also be in a -- >> thank you. it is split between the two. i don't think any of us have a crystal ball to say what is
>> it was year after the killing in moscow and it was decided that no one should speak because we shouldn't be politicized. there was a small group of people and an exhibit of photographs and it was starting to rain and we said we are not going to politicize. there is the rain starting and people are standing around
awkwardly. it was mostly people that worked with her and her friends. at one point there is an older gentlemen with an umbrella and a younger man is helping him. he takes off his raincoat and he is wearing a vest and he starts to pray. and he turned around to us and said what is this faith that you are supposed to have? what is it? and it is [speaking in native tongue]sk f.
we recognize both of them. admiral mike mullein who is of course the former chairman of the joint chiefs of staff. and on my right, former senator sam nun who is the chief executive officer of the nuclear threat initiative. joining us is adam mount who is the project director for this endeavor. we will ask them to start out talking about the report, we will spend 30 minutes discussing it and open it up to questions from the members. i want to extend thanks to the task force members here. i will ask you to raise your hand or stand up. we would like to see who you are. if you played any role in this
task force. don't be shy. hands up. right here in the middle. welcome. >> mike and i want to clap for you. >> i want to welcome all of the council members who are joining us from new york and anywhere else. let's get started by talking about this. i want to start by asking admiral mullein the two of you have a lot going on in your lives. why did you care enough about what is going on in north korea? why was his urgent for you? >> thank you, judy. i, too, would like to thank the task force members and in
particular if you haven't had a chance to look at the report it is dedicated to steven bos worth who was going to originally co-chair this with me but unfortunately passed away. the dedication really is to him who dedicated so much of his life trying to solve this challenge diplomatically and we are mindful of that and his contributions have been enormous over the decades. i haven't done many of these reports. this is really the first one. when i retired in 2011 i felt then and i will now that the korean peninsula is as plosive of a place that exists in the world and it can explode rapidly and dangerously and needs to be addressed. when richard haas asked me to do this not having done much in termsz of these kinds of reports or task force since retiring i
>> let's lunch into the report. senator, let's talk about, lay out for us in brief, how is this a departure, if it is and we know it is in some regard from current policy? what to you are the principal points here that you want the membership and the rest of the policy world to pays attention to this part of the world to take away from this report? >> i recall winston churchill once said that no matter how beautiful the strategy, occasionally you have to look at the result. looking at the result we face a grave and i think, increasing danger. when i say we come i mean japan, south korea, american personnel in korea as well as that region of the world. yes, i mean china also. china also. china is a very important part of that region. so how does it differ? the first thing i would say is that a couple of other members
of the task force are very helpful, gary in particular a bob in helping clarify exactly what the u.s. policy is right now. i think we should say up front that we have deterred major war and that is an accomplishment. that is something that has been done. but we haven't done is change the north korean calculus to continue to defy, not the united states, but the united nations. they are defined the united nations security council resolution. both on the nuclear program and on the missile programs. that intensifies. so what has changed? i think the main thing that i would emphasize here, we have four major steps and a lot of other steps in the comprehensive and adam did a terrific job of bringing them together. but what we emphasize in the op-ed this morning that mike and i had in the washington post is that the steps have to be taken in parallel. this is not sequential. we cannot wait until the
sanctions completely work and then basically go to talks. we have got to try to get talks going now. we have to increase the benefits to north korea if they basically sit down and talk in a sincere way, move towards getting rid of their nuclear weapons. stopping the missile and so far. we have to also talk to china in a very frank way. it is in china's interest in our interest. we need to take into account china's interest because china has got to be a part of this. without china it without china it is going to be very difficult to solve this peacefully. the third point i would make is that we have to enforce the un resolution 2270. that is a powerful new resolution that the obama administration should get credit for pushing this and getting it through the un security council.
it should be noted that china and russia both voted for it. it gives that the mandate, not just the right of all nations to inspect cargo coming in and out. in and out of ports, airports, ships, sore ships, sore fourth. that is an enormously important to if it is implemented. china has to be part of that. we recommended and we have a multi national effort led by the united states to equip our allies and friends throughout the region to enforce the un resolution. that can make a big difference. the poor thing i would point out is the need to increase the deterrence and defense while we are doing all of this other. mike can speak to that but there are in a of steps we are recommending that our defense department under kate undertake with south korea and japan. these have to move together. it is not just one or the other. it is all. >> adam, as a project director let me go to write to one of the specifics and that is, that what you recommended along with the
sanctions that the senators outline is in effect a lower set of conditions. north korea korea would no longer have to completely free this nuclear program before the united states would be willing to sit down and talk about the future. why was the task force recommended that? >> the task force does have a recommendation on negotiations. it's recommendation number two. the reason is that a long-term solution to the north korean problem will require a negotiated solution. unfortunately there is no way around that. the only way to denuclearization of the queen peninsula is through talk. so negotiations play a critical role. all of the other recommendation cape two quarters north korea about the talk. the structure of the talk is important. on the one hand the task force believed very strongly that the united states should clarify the negotiating position and offered
real -- to north korea to reengage in talks and come back to the table and to seek a lasting solution to the nuclear problem. we believe that a freeze on the north korean nuclear program and we outline several steps in the report that would require for it to be in place will, should be on the first item of the agenda for the talks. but on the the other hand we do believe that there are other issues that we can include in talks that are beneficial to all parties, including china china and all of the parties that were engaged in talks. this involved regional arms control and eventually discussions on how to and the korean war. a peace agreement that will finally end the war. so all of these pieces should be part of negotiation. but what is important to recognize is the united states and the allies will never accept a nuclear
north korea and it shouldn't. each step of the weight north korea does have to demonstrate that they are taking steps on denuclearization. >> you have all stress the fact that this all has to happen in tandem, and theoretically it has to be moving forward at the same time. what has to happen first? >> in addition to the simultaneous of all the steps we also try to lay out what we thought was a sequence of events. in particular it has been mentioned that it is really important for the u.s. and china to take the lead to solve this crisis. in my own personal experience, historically involved in previous crisis on the peninsula
, china has basically said that they have limits on what they can do, what they can actually get done in north korea and how much they can control the leadership there. we. we just think it is imperative that they lead in this to open the door for a peaceful solution. to me that is a relatively early test of at least the strategy that we talk about. it has got to go through china and it has to go through china as quickly as possible. while all of these other things are occurring and specifically sam talked a little about the deterrence piece, strengthening the trilateral relationship between the u.s., south koreans and the japanese, getting to a .. and one of the things report calls for is to look at the possibility and the attack on one as an attack on all. that is much easier said than done. these are relationships that have also had their ups and downs. they're both incredibly important allies to the united states. strengthening that, looking at conventional capabilities,
whether it be antisubmarine welfare, cyber commerce special operations, strengthening strengthening that relationship between the three countries as well. in addition a very strong recommendation to deploy this missile defense system which the united states and south korea have agreed to as rapidly as possible. to get to a point that should, should the north get to a point where they are actually about to cross the threshold of a being able target and nuclear ice, miniaturizing nuclear as a warhead that they could hit the united states with, we cannot let them get to that point. so that any missile capability which support that we could actually shoot that down with the systems like this with fad being one to prevent that capability from becoming real.
really, in the sense that that is a self-defense capability as opposed to something that would be an attack capability. >> is sticking with it china, what is the incentive for the chinese to be cooperative, to want to make this work when we have not seen that from them up until now? they have made it clear that they are not interested in seeing a unified korea which is part of the long range wish of the united states. it is really what you talk about here. and frankly with the missile defense system which is something the chinese cannot find attractive. what makes you think the chinese
are ready to jump on board and do something that is helpful now? >> personal, we make it very clear we are not advocating that the united states or our allies try to induce the collapse of north korea. in my own personal view if north korea does collapse at some point in the future it will be because of their internal problems. their abuse of their own citizens, the human rights problem, the economic mismanagement. that is north korea's problem in the path out of that for north korea and its citizens is the path of cooperation. in terms of china, first of all china's interest in the region is huge. stability of the korean peninsula for china is very important. china, i think it does realize but we make it clear that they have to realize what mike just said, the united states and our allies cannot afford to see this threat continue to grow. particularly against the united states. china has to know that, as well know that, as well as our allies in japan and south korea. the third thing is, we are making it very clear that we
ought to have a new dialogue with china. of course china has to be willing to do it. were not sure they will. we have to talk about what is in china's interest? what are they worried about on their borders? how can we talk about them informally about the refugee problem that might occur if there is a collapse of north korea. whether it is by any military action they take, and north koreans take, or internal. the chinese have to be worried about that. border control per they have to be worried about border control. and i think we need to sit down with china and have that dialogue about all of these issues. they have to take into account our interest and we have to take into account their interests. the bottom line is we have to have cooperation. china china has to recognize that has their leader said, he does not intend to have chaos and war on the korean peninsula. it is going to take all of us toward that goal, that's the right goal.
it's going to take operation. all of that is in my view fundamental in china's interest. it will take a new conversation. >> adam, what would you add to that? what is it that makes the members of the task force believe that china will find it in its interest to work with the united states on this? >> in some ways this is the very hard and i commend senator for bringing a start the star tension. each of the recommendation not only sharpens the choice for north korea also provides incentive for china to transition how things about north korea, to me from seeing it as a buffer against against u.s. power in the region to see in it as a major problem for security and stability in the region. each of these steps demonstrates and the united states and menstruation should be clear about this, that until the north korea problem is resolved.
the us, china relationship which is one of the most important in the world cannot progress. it will restrain the relationship. it will. it will cause tension and strain. also each of these steps demonstrate the steps that we have to take necessarily, the united states and its allies to secure themselves against north korea will strain china's interest in the region. all of them are meant to convey and help encourage china to transition how abusive north korea and to get on the right side of this issue. without a resolution of the north korea problem, as we say very prominently, stable, prosperous northeast, prosperous northeast asia is unlikely to emerge. >> in that connection and another connections the report includes the mention of revising the number of u.s. troops on the
korean peninsula. clearly a a very sensitive subject. under what circumstances could that number come down? >> we try to address that issue in all of us and how sensitive that is in terms of a tremendous amount of progress in stabilizing the region, denuclearize in the peninsula and virtually eliminated the threat so that at some point in time an aspirational point in time down the road, the possibility of looking at whether those forces would remain at that level would be part of the discussion. that gets back to what senator was talking about, which is that we try to look at how do you incentivize all of the parties here? another way i try to look at somebody like china is how do you see this problem set from
their perspective, not just our perspective. often times we try to generate solutions just from our perspective. that is just not want to work. so recognizing work. so recognizing the sensitivity with troop levels, we try to characterize in the report and characterize it that way, it is certainly a long way off but down the road that is something we should address. >> i will echo and say exactly what mike said. i will add one other feature. we make it clear in the report that the troop discussion in the position of american forces would be something the united states and south korea, and japan would discuss and agree on together as we put it forward on the table. this is not simply the united states, this is also the south koreans in japanese. >> in the category and if you look at this among other things as terrorist and sticks. one of the sticks is recommending a role for the united nations and moving to suspend north korea's credentials at the un if it doesn't demonstrate real progress on human rights.
why do you think this a be effective? >> this is unusual and i'll call in our military man here to talk about human rights because he feels very strong about this and mary beth played a huge role in this. and mike played a huge role in this. let me kick that question to mike. >> roberta is here who also had a huge impact on this aspect of it. i effort, for too long have been involved in executing policy where the discussion about human rights was put on the back row if you will. yes, we need to represent that it is a value for a country and one of the things i felt very strongly about in this report was that we are not going to do this. and we weren't going to do it in any way, shape, or form. so the contributions of those who spent their life doing this in understanding in particular roberto who has particular expertise in north korea was hugely important.
i just don't think is a country the united states can try to resolve the military aspect of this without directly approaching it on time progress to human rights in north korea because he is so appalling. and because the stuff that he and his regime and predecessors and his dad and granddad have done it's just unconscionable. we cannot look in our good conscious at this issue without making it a major part of the report and recommendation to include the recommendation to take away the credentials from this country if they don't make progress. that is a pretty simple statement, but it is a very controversial recommendation and execution. to the degree to the degree that
north korea is incentivized again and at least we have seen them sometimes react to the international perspective, not always but to the degree that that might create some kind of leverage and impact and human rights. that is why we recommended what we did. >> would and that serve to further isolate the north koreans which has been part of the problem here? >> the hope is that they'll begin to talk about human rights. the hope the hope is that they will sit down and have a discussion. the hope is they will begin to work with the united nations on human rights. that is the hope. this this business of going to the un and credentials is if nothing else works. if they don't come in good faith and if we don't make progress. so so the report makes it very clear. we hope to make progress. if they don't, i think at some point with the family of nations the un should take action. suspension is not the same thing as termination of membership.
suspension of certain rights but it is a very strong and powerful step. strangely enough the north koreans have indicated they have some sensitivity to some of these possible outcomes by the family of nations. >> if i could just add, and you ask this question before we came out here is how is our intelligence with respect to north korea. all of this is done against a backdrop of how little we understand about north korea in general and the personalities and certainly this new young leader specifically. it has been, we are smarter than we used to be, we know more than we use to but there is still a lot we do not know. so we can speak to this what sam said is right, it is in hope because we just do not know how
either he or the leadership in north korea is going to react to these kind of recommendations or possibilities. that said, without the reaction that we sort of would hope for, the recommendations really focus on increasing the pressure in the human rights area and clearly in the nuclear area to try to generate a much better outcome for the region. >> one other point that adam made was that we believe that talks are essential here. you you do not know what the north koreans are going to do until you sit down and talk to them. sometimes even then you do not know what they're going to do. but you have to have communication. we make it clear and this is also the administration's position, i was not was not aware of that when we started this effort. but we make it clear that informal discussions between the united states and north korea can take place right now.
we make it clear that there are no preconditions or to that kind of informal. when you get to the more formal talks we do think all parties need to sign up to the 2005 agreement. there are a couple of conditions, not preconditions. but getting tax going. but getting talks going is important. when jimmy carter went to north korea many years ago, i happen to read a remarkable diary diary he wrote about his conversation with the grandfather. some of the things that were discuss their were amazing in terms of the vision that carter set forth which, in many respects it was agreed to. now it did not happen, you have to be skeptical, you have to have verification all the way through this. but nevertheless, you do not know what is on other people's mind if you never communicate with them. you have to have talks. >> in formal, and i think there is a little bit of a lack of clarity on what is the policy now. is it that informal talks could proceed without any conditions?
or it has been my understanding that north korea had to to freeze its nuclear program before there could be talks. this is a change from that. >> as respect it does represent an adjustment from that but we agree that u.s. policy has not been good on this front so i went to the next administration takes office they should do a top to bottom review of the u.s. policy toward north korea. that should include preconditions for negotiation. it should be very clear with the north koreans, the chinese and other parties. precisely what we expect of them, what we are prepared to offer and what we expect to get out of these talks. >> i just want to say one word about, we cannot take a long time to get this going. the clock is [inaudible] our side now. and that's because of the developments of the north korean program. they are are moving out
very strongly with that missile. i would urge my colleagues in the united states senate, whoever is elected president to put on the front burner the confirmation of the people that have to deal with this problem. and to get discussions going in the administration and with china and hopefully with north korea. certainly with our allies of japan and south korea. at the very beginning of the next ministration per. that needs to be on the front burner. >> before i turn to the members for question, is it clear right now what the response would be if the north were to take further -- we have seen test after test. if there there were to be a provocative action on the part of the north korea that us, japan, south korea deemed a threatening, and i realize it has to deal with what direction the missile goes, but is it clear what the u.s. response would be? would there be a military response? what would it take to get a military response?
>> well i am right in the speculation world which i don't really like to do. we spend a lot of time on this and we certainly have capability to respond. it covers a vast array of potential options and so it would really depend on what he did. merely attacking and south korea or attacking japan, hitting them with system, with some get a missile system we would rapidly destabilize the area. it's hard for me to believe in i'm no longer in fall but it's hard for me to believe there would not be some kind of severe response. we have worked with our allies in the region with respect to that for a long time now. what we don't know about the guy
, you just don't know what he's going to do. you don't know know what drives him. so the likelihood that something like that could happen is certainly out there. >> we are in the realm of speculation. what i understand you to say's there would there would not be a preemptive move. >> no, i actually would not say that at all. i would think that again in the array of options that certainly is one that is there. >> okay, we are going to turn to membership for questions. i'm told told to remind you that it is on the record, we would ask that you wait for a microphone. there are couple of out there that they will bring to. speak directly into the mic, stand up and tell us your name, your affiliation, limit yourself to one question. let's start right over here with this gentleman.
>> if you could stand up. >> okay you don't have to stand up is fine. we know who you are. >> my memory on this maybe hazy, but i was with bill perry at the time of the earliest crises and the old man, the grandfather i guess you could say somehow or another at the time as the cold war was ending made it possible for some of their records to be made available to us. one of the things that was a surprise to those of us who saw those records was that it took about one year him to persuade the russian and chinese leaders to get into this. they are very much a frayed they want to go to war with america again. so the record show.
so that was certainly an opening pressure back up and say was opinion then that we simply had to send a person of great stature over there. you have to keep in mind maintaining face, stature, we were important in the world. so if you're so if you're going to send somebody don't send assistant secretary, however able he may be. send somebody who has the ability but also the recognition stature in the world. so it happened that i knew at the time to people who had been asked by him to come over. one was secretary general of the un, the egyptian, now passed away. and the other was president
carter. my suggestion was nine presidents as i did, i thought none of them would like to have that done. you don't want to be undercut by somebody who seems to have more knowledge in the subject than you do. if anybody's going to do it you will do it. well, that is not the way is going to work in it doesn't usually work that we very often. so i say, why not -- why not just say we are not inviting anybody to go but nobody will stand in the way. if somebody of us stature they can step aside and let them come. >> so your point is someone of a high standing needs to be needs
to go. >> and carter do going get an agreement. >> let's let's ask if what about that. how high does the representative of the united states need to be involved in the negotiation? does it need to be the president himself? can it be. >> i think it has to be the by the president. any suggestion that he makes based on his contribution to humanity i would take seriously and i would hope the president, whoever that will be will take that's her sleep and i think that's a presidential call. >> i just sat and we alluded to this, this regime has a pretty robust history and the report lays out the cycle that we have all been in for many years, decades now. there simply are meant to presented the report a sense of urgency and a very specific statement that the next president, whatever he or she may be is going to get tested
very early with this capability. part of the idea of this was to propose at least a framework that might be used as a new and ministration will take over. were not the only ones in town doing it by the way. >> no hands on this side of the room. >> i'm on affiliated but a humble assistant secretary of state -- but i agree with a higher level of representative. i asked my question with a disadvantage of not having read the report. does the report address his concept of the deterrent and whether he gets it? thinking specifically of the narrow that's worrisome and south korea when he going talk to them about him using his nuclear umbrella now his deterrent to take conventional action with impunity and this has led to debate about whether there should be a south korean nuclear weapon or reintroduction
of u.s. nuclear weapons. you you address that in the report? >> i would say that this is the core of recommendation which is the the suggestion. as the missile capabilities develop he may believe, mistakenly that he is able to aggress set some conventional and conventional levels and cover that with his nuclear arms. our recommendation are explicitly designed to dissuade him of that pulse impression. we propose, as mentioned, new abilities in a submarine warfare, counterforce operations activities and the mantra of the 20500 women of u.s. forces command in korea and they need to be ready to fight. that is absolutely true. that might require what we send
the report not only defense reaction but proactive action. ma also required strikes and to create itself if we are aggress to get with sufficient magnitude. that may be required to dissuade them of this notion. at some parts recognize that we do not enjoy condition of mutual destruction with kim jong-un own and we will not consent to that arrangement. >> we have a question from new york. would you stand up and tell us your name and affiliation. >> i'm herbert with a chinese society. with when the united states has been confronted with this in the past, we negotiated our way out of it, first of all we were free to negotiate very early on when faced with it which has not been the case here because of opposition within administrations and with the congress.
we won after, but serious serious threats in argentina, brazil, we talked them out of it we managed to get south africans to stop. we then had israel in, india, india, pakistan, iran and at every case negotiations achieved a lessening of the threat. now when it comes to north korea, we have tried as the senator knows to do some serious negotiations, negotiations have failed most of the time because north koreans are failed to fulfill at least twice have failed because we did not fulfill. so this. so this is a negotiating situation. a negotiated situation, what are our minimum criteria? well, it is not, with your hands
up and agree to get rid of your nuclear weapons manufacturing capability. that is not initial negotiated situation. you have to start with no advance criteria and then you have to look at what it is the north koreans are after. they are paranoid, remember we invaded north korea when we were defending south korea. there are paranoid. we can get rid of this absurd military exercises with the obviously threatened them. >> did you have a question you wanted to tack on to that. >> yes, we can start by recognizing them as a country offering to send an ambassador in there, maybe mr. trump after the election and get started dealing with them as a serious country. not simply as a threat. thank you. >> do you want to comment on that? >> while we make it clear that negotiation with north korea's one of our top goals. i have said said this morning
communication is enormously important. we also made it clear in the report that we recommend that we have informal discussions with them. we do believe that you cannot sit down and negotiate with the men while they are continuing to test nuclear weapons and missiles. that would have to have a freeze at some point. that on be the aim of the negotiation but we can sit down and start talking to them if they basically make it clear they will sign a principle like all the other players will have to of the 2005 framework which they agree to wants. and then. and then we can discuss all of these things. we make it clear in the report that we are willing to talk about forced dispositions. i said that this morning. we are willing to talk about exercises. that's in the report. we're willing to talk about conventional arms control. that's recommendation in the report. i think we all have to remember that the north koreans have a huge threat against our ally, south korea and the city of seoul before they ever had a nuclear program. it was a severe threat on the
conventional side. all of those things can be put on the table it should be put on the table but you have to get to the table first. you have to get to the table with some hope of achieving a freeze on some of these very dangerous developments. >> we have a question over here. the gentleman. >> it good money. thank you for the invitation. >> jj green, wto p radio. there are those who think north korea already has achieved miniaturization of a weapon. we see they continue to test delivery systems. while the concern about the possibility of a deployment of a nuclear weapon on top of a miss lesson point is a great concern, i wonder what your thoughts are about the test phase which is if they do have a miniaturized
weapon, when they get to the point where they start testing because that is a huge risk. anything could go wrong as with something that they have already tested and deployed later. that is a lot closer to us now than them perfecting something and launching it later. i wonder what the panel thinks about where we are now in that process and what your thoughts would be on preparing for the possibility and perhaps an idea on what to do? >> thank you. >> actually i have looked looked at north korea's almost not having a test phase in terms of the way they have developed their systems typically is a basically operational. they're very content with putting the system out there, firing it and having it fail but learning each time. they can see just as we have observed the progress that they have made. i would agree,
although i do not know that certainly they are making progress with respect to miniaturization. the submarine launch recently are indicative of progress there as well. all of that is what greatly motivated the task force to focus on the urgency with which this is required to be addressed and the likelihood in the very near future that he is going to have this capability. he will not go through test phase. from my perspective i would treat it all is operational right now. i'm be able to address it from a threat perspective as he continues to go through these tests. they can be, they are and they can be very threatening. >> okay the front row. >> i am in the naval postgraduate school. i'm an
anthropologist by training. i look at this from a human standpoint. one of the changes i have observed, i have observed, i came to the pentagon 40 years ago. when the admiral when i think was a lieutenant. [laughter] , i met him at the naval academy. >> okay kaman asked the question. >> what i am struck by is a slow change of language in the defense department where both the vice president of the secretary of defense, last spring is the word relationship. and i think this question of trying to build relationships rather than going in insane we have got all of the strength, how are you going to deal with it, it is a real shift if we are going to move in recognizing how important relationships are. the question i would have is, how, how do you start putting that in military education so you do not have this sense that if you are in the military you fight and if
you're in the state department you try to work it out. >> that's a good question. >> she knew you. >> i actually with a survey from my perspective what i have observed and again i'm a few years removed but in my time particularly as a senior officer there is a number of people in the military, the pentagon, working on the relationship aspect of this. the strong preference for the military is we would rather not fight, we certainly can but our preference would be to have a peaceful outcome to be led by astute policy and doctrine and even politics so that we do not get to the point where we have to use the weapons. i think the military certainly in the last several decades have
this move to -- that that it's moved away from the ability to fight but the importance of having it. we are in a much different place and we were a few years ago and this is a great example. i believe the most important relationship in the 21st century is the one between u.s. and china. driven principally by the fact that there the two biggest economies in the world. we are going to have to figure out how to make this work. if this region destabilizes, our economies go bad very quickly. it has four of the five largest economies in the world in this region. that is compelling, motivation to try to get this right. and so part of this is our relationship with china which is enormously complex. you cannot just pull on peace out and say do this. that is why think what senator
said earlier so important. we have to understand this from the chinese perspective. what other priorities and incentives. what are they worried about, in addition to what we historically thought they were worried about. that said, we cannot get to a point with this young leader puts a nuclear weapon on top of a missile and puts the united states and our people under a stranglehold. that is a line in in the sand that cannot be crossed. >> the next question. and we invite task force members to join in the questions and comments if you want. let's go to the back of the room. >> and i had one thing? to that other point that was just me. mike mullen has said over and over again that the most important security challenge america faces is our economy. and our fiscal problem. the main that is a military leader say that. bob gates said at least on two
occasions that he would take money out of the defense budget to beef up the state department if he had the ability to do it. i don't think the type of military wanted to fight and the state department wanting to make a deal, come i don't think that's correct on either count. that is, perception, i think think that is wrong. >> okay question .. of the room. >> can we stand up so we can see you. >> i'm rachel with congressional quarterly. mr. malik, when when he talk about a potential preemptive military strike, would that be envisioned as a strike sun north korea's launch sites recognizing that it is now developing mobile missiles, or with these be test that or strikes you alluded to earlier to destroy missiles
launched in the sky? if that is the case or you talk about developing new types of missile-defense capabilities beyond bad? -- tha de. >> really from a self-defense perspective meaning if we believe that they're very close to develop in this capability which can threaten us, it is important for us to develop the capability to defend herself. which could theoretically take out launch capabilities on the launchpad or take them out once they are launched. certainly the capabilities we have deployed in the region on our u.s. navy ships are part of that as well as the japanese self-defense force. the maritime self-defense force. so we also we also urge the continuing evolution of those regional self-defense capabilities to
neutralize that. but but it is to prevent that threat from actually being effective either before it is lost or after. we are clear in the report that certainly and adam said this earlier, it could include attacks in north korea. >> okay there is a hand here at the second table. >> gilbert. my question is there has not been a single word mentioned about russia and there has been no mention of china with its weak implementation of the marc. what, if russia and china are not at minimal to these actions, what besides defense and deterrence is intended to make it clear to them that the u.s.
takes this situation very seriously? rather further thinks expected? >> the un resolution that we have alluded to and that is one of the pillars of our report in terms of enforcing it strictly was voted on and four by russia and china. we mention russia throughout the report. it there part of the five party talks that they recommend. russia would be part of the six party talks of north korea joints. we have made it clear that russia has to be part of this. it is clear that is the feeling that the panel. i don't think think anybody has questions about that. >> we also say a word about u.s. sanctions policy. it is often said that the policy ought to be integrated into the broader levers of the american power. sanctions alone are not
sufficient to solve the problem. but when we look at the contribution to the test were some sections it was very clear that enforcement of 2270 strictly which china has signed on to should be a priority. we hope china will join with us in that. if they do not, the standing regional mechanism that can enforce these what we are obliged to do under un obligation is important. there are also other pillars to u.s. sanctions policy. for example this is an area where u.s. and chinese interests overlap. in shutting down north korea's illicit network of illegal and destabilizing activity that happens in china and happens in southeast asia and to confront their allies in the region. these are areas where we should devote considerable attention to try to get china on the right side of it. lastly, if after these few steps
we need to be prepared to reporters put in place new u.s. unilateral sanctions. hopefully in concert concert with our allies. if necessary either steps the united states should take. so they do not face a strict sanctions as i rented. that's not acceptable. we really do need to be able to ratchet up pressure from north korea in order to course them back to negotiation. >> i would act quickly that if you have been in involved in sanctions you know how hard it is and if you haven't you think it's simple. i mean it's a good example of the whole financial sanction or which we thought we knew something about in 2006 and seven, and we are at a level now that we cannot even have imagined back then. the same is true with the 2270 sanctions. 270 sanctions. these are enormously complex. their countries in the world addressing the report you are ignoring the sanctions.
but the physical aspect of said should be keeping this material out are from flowing out of a country like north korea particularly on the chinese border were china has not been as active as we would like them to be in enforcement of the sanctions, even though they signed up for them when the un voted on them. >> back against the wall, the gentleman that had his hand up for a while. >> the question is not about the council but by my count this as either the fourth or fifth study group the council has undertaken related to north korea over a number of years. obviously this is a problem that alludes easy solution. my query is this and i want you to connect the dots if you can. it's been alluded that the goal is not a change of regime.
what i think about what an essence the study group is urging north korea to do, the only way i can conceive of this is either the end of the regime as we know it, or alternatively a transformation in the internal structure of the regime and leadership of the regime that is almost on a match double in the context of a dynasty now 70 year standing. is that appropriate therefore that the ultimate outcome here would presume the end of north korea as we know it? >> thank you for that question. i just mentioned that when i was asked to start this project the first book i picked up was -- to no exit. you also mention there have been previous task force reports. many. many of which have done some serious work. but, i want to reemphasize the
flexibility in the consideration a dedication of our task force group. they were remarkably engaged, remarkably unified and the need for a progressive and series report. we think this is an important case study for how you as policy north korea should be made. with respect to regime change, the position of the report is that we do not take steps that intentionally cause the collapse of the regime which is most likely to occur for internal reasons. that having been said, if this new ultimatum and new proposal is not sufficient to say if they don't make progress on the steps, the next presidential administration is going to have to take a serious look at that. we will have to take a new look at policy review and that
includes questions that you undermine the viability of the regime. it is not permissible to allow a north korean regime to exist that can threaten the continental united states with a ballistic nuclear missile. >> that necessarily would entail military force, wouldn't it? >> so that is part of the toolkit but there is also for example persistent concern that new sanctions could undermine the economic viability of the regime and lead to collapse. one thing we mentioned in the report is the north korean economy is diversified. there is marketization cropping up in various areas both in illicit and illicit markets that are increasing the resiliency of the regime to sanctions pressure and forcing them to have or allowing them ways to circumvent as a sanctions regime. so i think it's important to recognize that as the regime has adapted the sanctions regime has to adapt as well.
that will have to result in new pressure and new relationships. >> i have one point. we get into the point of implication of the question of having to use military force and regime change in that sort of thing. it is very clear the report that that is the last resort, as mike said we're not going to sit here and see a threat develop against the united states that puts our own people in danger and put our allies in danger. that's a last resort and if we get to that point this strategy has failed. the china strategy has failed to and it goes against what the leader of china said he was not going to permit to happen. it goes against the south korea adds that policy would fail. it goes against the interest of japan so that would fail. and for goodness sakes a war is going to be devastating to north korea so that would fail. so don't think this on to become a front burn off option.
this is a last resort, it's devastating with the huge number of flies lost. we have to understand that. we have to understand the risk but north korea has to understand the biggest risk is to north korea. >> the other thing i would add us maybe it is a modern phenomenon because throughout history certainly regimes have changed. the regime change has not been working that well lately. so i'm a little sensitive, i think were a little sensitive to quote, unquote advocating for that even though there are certainly, and it is in the report some discussion about what could be from a common sense standpoint would logically get you a point where you would have a transformation in the regime. he has executed more people, he has conducted more missile and weapons test in five years than
his father did and 18. you don't know what is going on in his head but the action certainly start to paint a strategy that is pretty distractive to the region and potentially by his own regime by our perspective, maybe maybe not by his. >> and lastly i would commence you the additional views in the back of the report which we do feel strength in the report. for example others do discuss that consideration and death. and i would encourage you to take a look at those. >> last question in the front row. >> hello, thank you. i work on china and nuclear issues in the security bellows. even though much china expert i have a question talks. it seems from the discussion that there is a consensus consensus in the discussion that an increased
pressure would lead back to the negotiating table. i just spent an embarrassing large proportion of my adult life working on dissertation on this precise question of how to get enemies to talk to each other during complex. the bottom line is the united states seems to think that escalating will get the other side to the table but it undermines efforts. the other side is worried about giving in under the got a course and them look weak and they're worried about creating for the coercion in the future. my question is given that there's a consensus i'm curious to know on the discussion, were there any voices that talked about perhaps how the increased pressure could reduce the probability that north korea would be willing to talk to the united states? or was there a general consensus that the strategy would work? >> an easy last question. >> we thought that this would