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tv   Prime Ministers Questions From the British House of Commons  CSPAN  September 21, 2016 7:00am-8:01am EDT

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entrées launched cruise it can threaten our allies with nuclear attacks while exercising theirii nuclear forces near allied territory and are developing an underwater nuclear dronees designed to cause maximum damage to the united states coastalto e target. what does this suggest about the role of nuclear weapons in russia's national security strategy and what should the u.s. abstract, in particular do in response?ul >> senator, there's two elements in response to the question. if you look at what russia has been doing the last number or appears in direct response to what we've been they modernize capabilities they see. they watch the conventionalmaze
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forms that can dominate any battlefield of the world today and i believe they're concerned about their ability to respond in a conventional arena. therefore, it is logical from their cave to continue to modernize sources including nuclear forces in all areas. the second piece is that also watch the power of our partnerships. they are challenging the status. quo across europe in crimea in a number of areas, pushing into creative tension within our partnerships and alliances, which is another significant damage the united states has built over the last 20 years, sarah. >> i thank you under general. >> thank you, mr. chairman.
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>> and think to ask a few questions, maybe one before it leaves. general hyten, synchronizing our warfare efforts in years ago things were jamming radar and now cyberis a big part of this domain. can you give us your thoughts on the interaction between electronic warfare the traditionalists i suggested and also the role of cyber command? just your thoughts. >> as commissary. i look at the problem in the following construct. i see cyberas a domain, as a place where we conduct missionsw one of those is electronic missn warfare. electronic warfare is trying to control the spectrum to your image. we have some significant capabilities in the spec term
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that those capabilities have also had less focused than they should have over the last numbeu years. i look at it in my own service with unit tronic warfare missions in the united states air force has not had aorce significant priority over the last 15 years of conflict in the middle east. i've confirmed this commander of u.s. strap, i look in to need to look the entire depart and ato the same to make sure we understand electromagnetic warfare, role in cyberspace and how we control the spectrum. speed make thank you for image. i look forward to working with f you.agai >> north korea develop the capability to strike united states of america. speed make from my perspective i believe they develop the
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capability. kim jong cohen has made it clear that development in the news this morning there was news so they tested a a very large rocket engine that he said would be capable of going to space and has the ability to reach the united states. i'm concerned about that. i haven't seen "the intelligence report." i'm just commenting on what i saw in the news this morning i'i saw in the news this morning. >> general, i think there's going to be a lot of redundancy in the questions you are going to be asked up here. we've had people come in and testify to us as to the fact we are not keeping up where we should. we are not advancing far enough ahead. james clapper from several years ago talked about what we are looking at.
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admiral hayny testified before this committee. we are not meeting the critical investment time lines to ensure our agent platforms and weapons to maintain superiority. we heard from admiral winfield last year for the house committee when he talked about remaining margin we have for investing in nuclear deterrent. we hear this all the time, then have the non-public meetings, we hear it worse. chairman referred to that. so, i just look at this and i know that we are concerned when we talk about china and russia. but, i personally get more concerned on what you touched on, north korea an iran. these people, they want to kill everyone in this room. in the case of north korea, it's
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run by a guy that is mentally deranged. this is scary. you are getting into the toughest job in the united states of america right now. i'm very much concerned about it. we know that russia and china are actively modernizing their nuclear weapons and delivery systems. north korea continues to develop land and launch ballistic missiles and conducted the fifth and largest nuke test two nights ago. i think it would be a good thing for you to give us as much of a detailed assessment in this setting as you can on north korea and iran. >> the way i look at the threats across the world, senator, i think that russia is the most dangerous threat. china is a close second.
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the most likely threats and the most concerning are north korea and then iran because north korea is very unpredictable. it's hard to tell exactly what they are going to do. i want to caveat the unpredictability a little bit. if you look at what they are doing with their missile programs as well as the nuclear programs and where we are today, it looks very beginning. but, if you look at it when you think back to where we were when we started flying missiles and getting those capabilities, we had failure after failure and we ended up getting there. what concerns me the most is they will get there. they will get there. once they have those capabilities, what are they going to do with them. that's my biggest concern. if i'm confirmed that will be at the top of my list to figure out how to best respond. >> i'm glad that's your biggest
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concern. it's mine, too. back when this administration first went in, i was critical. they cut the '09 budget and cut the missile defense by $1.4 billion and delayed the or terminated the third missile defense site in the czech republic. i can remember being over there and talking to the president of the czech republic, which i have a lot of respect for. he made the statement to me, if we do what we are talking about doing here in poland and the czech republic where it's going to enrage the russians to the point, we are taking a risk. are you sure that you are not going to pull the rug out from under us? we pulled the rug out. i have talked to a lot of people in private that talked that wasn't a good idea and i'm not
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going to bring that up now. i'm saying, i didn't like the way we were headed back there at the beginning of this administration. then we went from 44 of sites from alaska down to california down to 30 and i think now we are going back up now where we started? was that a necessary drop in increase? i think it was. so, i just would -- would just say that it's a tough job you've got. i'm very much concerned about it. i'm hoping we'll have an opportunity, members of this committee and members who care in the united states senate to hear from you on the versions. so we'll know exactly where we are. the chairman mentioned it and i wanted to re-emphasize the
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importance of that. >> senator, i'll say that if the chairman asks if any of those senators ask, you'll have my top attention and you'll have a rapid response. >> that's great. thank you. >> yes, sir. >> general hyten, first off, congratulations on your nomination. it's an incredibly important post and i want to thank you for your service and thoughtfulness to our questions. i want to start with the nuclear deterre deterrent. d.o.d. spent on nuclear weapons mods earnization. at the same time, they spent $8.5 billion to service the stockpile and support our nuclear labs. in total, that's roughly $24 billion or about 4% of the base defense budget. so, another way of looking at that is we invest about four cents out of every defense dollar in our nuclear deterrent,
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which is served as an insurance policy that prevented a war over seven years. i want to get your perspective on how to pursue the modernization of the nuclear arsenal and infrastructure and ask, in your opinion, what will be your biggest challenges to maintain that stockpile as safe, secure and reliable as well as ready as senator reed mentioned. >> senator, i think it's essential that we always maintain a fully ready nuclear capability. there should be no doubt that the nation needs that capability, it's a backstop for everything we do as a military. one of the duties i will have as a member of the nuclear weapons council chaired fwi secretary of defense of logistics. nsa is also on that committee as
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well as vice chairman. through that committee, we will look at the nuclear weapons stockpile and make sure it is always safe, secure and reliable. the last year, i got to visit the three big national labs. los alamos and i go there for space reasons in my current position. but, when i'm there, because i'm curious, i ask about the nuclear stop pile and they explain how they are certifying the stockpile every year. if i'm confirmed, it will become more important to me and i'll look deeper. >> sort of a related question, obviously other members brought up how much the nuclear landscape changed in recent years, the proliferation we have seen over the last couple decades. has that nuclear landscape changes, how should that generally inform or change our nuclear posture in the world?
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>> i think it's important that as we look at the international situation concerning n inin ini weapons we don't get focused. we need to look at the tactical nuclear weapons. the chairman mentioned them. we need to look at the nonstrategic nuclear weapons and look at it as a total. a nuclear weapon is significant. it doesn't matter how it's employed, tactical, nonstrategic, strategics. its's an event in the world and we need to look together. >> thank you. in your written response to the committee, you state that the operation response to the space program has been a successful path finder to response in quoting you, we must infuse this thinking across the entire enterprise and the space industry, end quote. i agree with that estimation.
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i would love to ask you to expand a little bit on how you would pursue that goal and as commercial capabilities for the launch market become operational, how would you intend to leverage those services to enhance the d.o.d.'s access to space as well? >> in my ways, it goes back to the chairman's comment, his opening statement and my response about the need to go fast. the need to go fast is so important in today's world. many of our traditional processes are slow. in my ways, i don't like the term operation nally responsive. i think we are operationally responsive in everything we do. the thing about ors is it goes fast. it goes much faster than other processes. those are the processes we need to transition into the broader
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space community. then, if you look at the commercial sector, the commercial sector has been on the verge of something special for a long time. i think they are about there. both on the launch side as well as the satellite side. i think in the not too distant future, we'll have u bik wittous communications and imagery. if that is the case and on the commercial side, we need to take advantage of that. the most important thing is persistence. we may be able to achieve a lot of that persistence even though we don't get as high of a resolution from those capabilities. >> thank you. i couldn't agree more. i look forward to working with you on that. that encapsulated much of what we have to do in terms of reacting quickly. the last issue i will bring up quickly is trusted supply of strategic trusted microelectronics.
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nsa requires a trusted supply of strategic hardened microsystems if tr our military weapon systems platforms however do not have a trusted supplier of microelectronics for the future and i know this is an issue the secretary is aware of. what are your thoughts on maintaining a trusted microsystems capability in government to meet the requirements of the military ans the nation's nuclear stop file in d.c. opportunities to partne with to sector to achieve that goal? >> you have to be partnered with the private sector. they are going to generate the supplies one way or the other. i'm concerned about the depth of our industry in terms of how many suppliers we have, how are they certified, how are the parts controlled. we have significant concerns in space. i say commander strategicrts command, the services thatll support the strategic command.
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if i'm confirmed to make sure we continue to look at the problemm across the board i agree that is a concern we need to monitor. >> thank you, general. >> welcome, general. t nice to see you in your family here today. i appreciate the visit we had in my office earlier last week and your candor and the information you provided. in 2011 the president committed to modernize the triad of strategic nuclear delivery systems including the airlines cruise missile. to its credit the department has proposed budgets supporting nuclear modernization and senior leaders such as the secretary have referred to guide featuring as the bedrock of our national security. ofbelieve that is correctly stressed the importance that we follow through with these plans. do you agree we must modernizeze
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all three legs of the triad in between the airline cruise missile or do you think these plans should need to be reconsidered? >> i agree we have to modernize >>l three elements of the nuclear triad. i can state my support any stronger. i'll continue if i'm confirmed to state that in all forums. >> thank you. some observers have argued a penetrating bomber with new layer rhapsody bombs obviates the need for a standoff weapons such as a cruise missile. s do you think those weapons systems are duplicative? >> if i'm confirmed i'll look into it in more depth four may 35 years in the military. i believe you need the the flexibility of a long-range strike option can provide you. there's always a challenge to a bomber that doesn't matter how
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stealthy it is. doesn't matter how capable it hw is. i believe the long-range strikew option advanced cruise missiles gives the president of the united states flexibility that is essential and i would recommend strongly we pursue that option. >> when we were at my office, i told you when i was visitingy with general kaler, a previous commander abstract concept he gave such a great definition and explanation of why we need a triad in the importance of each leg of that triad. you just touched on that. would you like to expand on that? >> after a week, general kaler used to be my boss. after we talked senator fischer said he was simply brilliant. the >> did he remember?
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>> insurer was brilliant but i don't remember what it was. he did send me a couple speeches and basically the fundamental piece of his words i think that a very powerful with eachh element provides such a significant different attribute that is so important to the security of our nation and the s triad. the bombers are the most flexible. the submarines are the most survivable in icbms are the most ready in response to it. each of those is essential to the security of our nation. >> thank you. >> admiral haney testified before the committee this yeart. that the 2017 budget supported the mission requirements but also says there is no margin to absorb risk. do you agree with thatmargin assessment? >> i agree with that assessment on the air force sites are w
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really, senator. let me say i'm not as fully versed on the navy program is the four-star general in the air force.e. i see it as a corporate process so i'm very concerned about thea just-in-time be shared. i will certainly it's a card that i've talked with the navyn. leadership and many people in the business the last week and they're all concerned of the navy said as well. >> thank you your predecessor and other senior commanders have also stated that furtherssor and reductions of bilateral negotiated and verifiable agreements. you agree with that decision? >> yes, ma'am, i do. >> you to discuss modernization and nuclear reductions? it seems to me the more modern in response to are nuclear
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enterprises the less need there would be to retain the assistance they get on the othee hand, failure to modernize could give us no other option that weu retain significant stock piles. what is your view on that? >> there's been five turns their various senators, including the chairmen have talked about today that it's a safe, secure, affect it, reliable. if you look at those five turns, that describe so we have to do to modernize capabilities to make sure those five turns surrogate pair. you can't have one element drop off. you can't have the weapons readiness drop off. they have to be safe and secure all the way. the united states in any nation that has nuclear weapons is responsible for making sure they are all safe and secure and always under political control.
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that's one of the reasons we need to modernize we can make sure that's always the case. >> thank you for your service and your willingness to give to me to serve in a very position as commander of strike on. >> thank you, mr. chairman. thank you for being here and thank you for his long and distinguished service. a i am here as a father of two sons who also went to harvard and also became military har officers. neither in the air force and one is out now so it's a rather unusual career choice forou harvard graduates i know when i congratulate you on making your choice in serving our country with such dedication so thank you.u. i want to ask about one of the nuclear triad high replacement programs and you have mentioned correctly the survivability of
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our submarine forces because it made delivering in defending our nation a profoundly important term. let me ask you, are you committed in what you commit to supporting the program?y >> yes, sir. i will. >> were you commit to being in a thicket of it because it will take advocates in the time of t increasingly threatened fiscal resources and very expensive commitment necessary to be an advocate of the period >> all advocate for all the young.ts of th -- elements. >> maybe you can describe where the program is so fundamentally important. >> again, for my background i'm not as deeply versed in the review kid the. t
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lucidly will share my fact good. this is a little tedious youage should have access to do so love this is is safely conduct their operations because ch at the reactor and the shed. we can never reach that point. that's why the program is so essential because by that time we reached the point it's essential we have a submarine to replace it. >> i want to shift to the cybersecurity area, which is related to a capability in the states, is it not? >> yes. there is a column recently great by david ignatius the cold war is over, the cyberwar has begun. it reflects the growing sense
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that one of the great challenges is not the biggest ahead in the immediate future is our increasing confrontation with other powers most recently and dramatically the russians and recent hacking over theirically capabilities in cyberin their apparent willingness to use thes against that. do you have any idea how we cans work to improve our response with a coordinated reaction and how to domesticate the best work with the depart of defense to shore up our security system both in space and here. the chairman and i recently
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confronted a number of our security leaders. abdel rogers among them with this kind of question. i left word about this country to respond.respon >> wanted that question is best discussed in the classified a foreign. we have space and cyber in the same command in the united states air force. a lot of the effects are the same. it's to provide information pathways for information, deny adversaries information in times of conflict. that's what we do in space and in cyber. but the difference is the cost of entry into cyberspace is very low. that's the attractiveness for
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potential adversaries because the cost of access is so low. so to respond to it, you hit the most important thing. it has to be a whole government response, all the way through. from a military perspective, i'd like to get inny to point in cyberspace where we treat it like a domain where we conduct operations. we tend to contaminate that discussion with a lot of legal implications which are extremely important. that usually work through the fbi, the department of homeland security, a number of elements. that's why it has to be a whole government response. but from a military perspective, it's essential that we look at cyberspace as a place where bad actors are. we need to be able to identify them. and if they are threatening the united states, we need to be able to eliminate that actor from cyberspace. it's the same as any other domain. it's going to be a very complicated process, though, because it is important, as an american citizen, my privacy is just as important to my as it is
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to every other citizen. noms, we have to figure out how to treat cyberspace as an operation domain. you're right to be worried because in many cases we're not fully embracing the military aspects of it. >> thank you very much. thank you for your service. i welcome that answer. i'd like to pursue it in another setting. my time is expired, but this is an important topic. thank you, mr. chairman. >> thank you, mr. chair. general, welcome. in your opening comments you quoted your son who i think graduated with a degree in physics. my son graduated with a degree in physics and said almost exactly the same thing about me. i just have people now. but i welcome you and congratulate your family on being here today. i've got maybe some ground level questions to ask. one is on the current status of the gps ocx project. it's about five years, looks like it's right now 61 months, 5
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years or so, past due. can you talk a little bit about your position on the significance and importance of that project? >> so i was quoted in the press, senator, calling that program a disaster. i think any program that's five years late and a billion dollars overbudget meets the definition of disaster. it's horrible. and it's embarrassing to me that we find ourselves in that kind of position in today's day and age. we should not have that kind of program, but we do. the concern i have is the legacy program we have right now has significant information assurance vulnerabilities. basically, we're plugging those holes as fast as we can, and the best way to do that is with people. and that's what you were talking about. people are our most valuable resource. we have to divert a lot of people to secure that critical capability for the united states and the world.
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the ocx program would fix those problems. i've told the under secretary, if he thinks that program will succeed, i'll support it. if he thinks it will fail, i'll support the termination of that program. it's up to him. right now he buildielieves that program will succeed and they're doing three-month deep dives in that project but we're going to watch it closely. >> the people involved in it to the extent the people involved in what is now a billion-dollar overrun and five-year delay that we need to make sure we have other sets of eyes looking at that to make sure the decision to move forward or to cancel the project is one that has independent objective input. i have a question about the current arsenal. this question came up last year. we have some weapons that i understand are reaching a point where they wouldn't be used.
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and they need to be decommissioned. can you talk a little bit about that issue and where you are on it? >> i am not as deeply versed in that area as i would be if i'm confirmed and become commander of strategic command. i can guarantee i'll get into that in a significant depth. looking at the capabilities we have, we have issues on the weapons deliveries platforms, whether that's's submarine we were just talking about, the icbm or the bomber, whether it's the long-range strike capability with the new cruise missile. we have issues with our nuclear weapons that we have to continue to look at and figure out how to modernize. if i'm confirmed, i'll work closely with the national labs and national nuclear security administration to make sure we watch those capabilities closely. and then we have some -- i have some concerns on our nuclear command and control capabilities aging out as well. and i think we need to watch
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closely those capabilities and make sure we modernize those along with the rest of the enterprise. >> thank you. i have a question about unity of command. i think you lean more towards unity of effort. ides like to have you talk about why you do that in the context of something along the lines of one of our satellites get damaged by an adversary. who is in charge in reacting to that threat? that would be one part of the context i'd like you to answer the question. the other one, i think you were part of a war games shriver 15 and it would be curious to see if there were any challenges exposed concerning that coordination in command and the context of unity of effort versus unity of command. >> so senator, i'm probably one of the biggest believers in unity of command in the world. when we started down this project to figure out how we
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command and control space capabilities, i was a vocal opponent to the construct. i honestly didn't think it would work. but, you know, we all have a process. we all have bosses, and we decided we'd pursue the unity of effort construct with the intelligence community, the national reconnaissance office and see if it would work. and to my surprise, it actually did work. the record of the nro and director of national intelligence made sure that if we had to make a decision quickly, that decision process would work very effectively through an operational center and the commander and strategic command would be the one to explain it to the united states if we had to go down that path. we ended up in a very good place. i have to admit, i was a little surprised as we went through that. >> thank you. thank you, mr. chair. >> thank you, mr. chairman. i'd like to put a finer point on
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your son chris' observation. i worked here 40 years ago as a staff member and was once called upon to set up a hearing and called the office of management and budget for a witness from the administration. the fellow said we'll send you the deputy under secretary of such and such and i said i don't really understand these titles. can you tell me who this guy is? and his answer will be the title if i ever write a book. he's at the highest level where they still know anything. the bad news is you and i are now above that level. deterrence has been a theory and a doctrine that's served this nation well for 70 years. it's been a huge, hugely successful theoretical construct. but the problem is, it seems to me in the modern day, is it rests upon a premise of rationality on both sides. does deterrence -- the theory of deterrence work against a mad
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man, or a suicidal fanatic? do we need to be thinking about deterrence 2.0 because of that potential lack of rationality on the other side that wouldn't be concerned about the destruction of their country or perhaps they're possessing nuclear weapons and don't have a country to destroy. >> i think we need to look at deterrence 2.0, 3.0, 4.0 and deterrence in the 21st century, i think is fundamentally different than it was in the 20th century. deterrence in the 21st century involves all elements of national power. not just nuclear deterrent. involves space and cyber and conventional forces, it involves offense and defense on the strategic side of the house. you have to look at the integrated defensive capabilities if you're talking about responding to north korea or iran, and that defensive capability because an essential element of our deterrent
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posture. >> we also have to think about who we're deterring. and what works. what would -- what would be the -- again, deterrence is an idea, mutually shared destruction but you have to tailor it to the other side. >> and you do. and i finishing ythink if you lh korea, the unpredictability is the hardest to deter. how do you deter somebody or something that is unpredictable. it's very difficult. that's why you have to have a defensive mechanism that will ensure if they wanted to attack the united states, it will fail and leave the president all the response options with the rest of the capabilities. >> they have to know that. >> they have to know that so we have to make sure that is readily transparent to all the world and all our adversaries. >> we have both the means and the will. >> to defend ourselves and to respond, if need be. >> a few months ago, a froup of us went on the national airborne operations center and the thing that struck me as we went
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through a nuclear attack scenario simulation was that in that situation, a, there's a very limited amount of time for decision-making, and, two, only one person makes the decision. the president. there's no check and balance. no congress, no required consultation. is that correct? >> that is correct, sir. that's the constitution. >> and it is -- that's the sole responsibility of that person who will be making that decision in a matter of minutes, i think the exercise we were in there was 28 minutes. if it was a missile coming from offshore would be 5 or 10 minutes, is that correct? >> yes, sir. like i said, i love the constitution. i swore an oath to defend the constitution. in article 2, section 2 is one of the reasons i'm here is because the advice and consent clause in the constitution requires me to prepare for the senate to be confirmed before i move on.
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it also establishes the president of the united states as the sole commander in chief. >> and it could hold in the hands of the president the future of our civilization. >> two big elements in that clause in the constitution. one establishes the president and commander in chief and the other is advice and consent of the senate. >> but it doesn't apply in this. >> the commander in chief is the commander in chief. >> [ inaudible ]. >> -- co-equal branches of government, okay? executive, legislative and judicial. and the president proposes and the congress disposes. so i understand your point about the commander in chief. this administration has done
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more to ignore the congress of the united states than any administration that i have been associated with. >> going back to the naoc, command, control and communication, are you satisfied when talking about modernization, the focus is almost always on the triad. it seems this san area that also needs modernization and strong consideration. >> yes, it does. the big challenge as we look at command and control in the united states will be the cyberthreat which will be much different than when we created the current. >> should cybercommand be elevated to a separate command? >> yes, i believe it's time to elevate it to a separate command. >> thank you, chairman and thank you, general, for your service to our country. i want to follow up to the
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answers on your advanced policy questions. what are the most serious strategic threats facing the united states today. and among your answers you mentioned the increasingly provocative and destabilizing behavior by potential adversaries like iran. what i wanted to ask you is why do you believe there's significant concern about the adversary of iran which they have done quite aggressively, even post jcp q away. >> senators, he provided part of the answer when you started talking about ballistic missile program. i think there's three elements that concern me about iran in the last number one is they continue to be the foremost state sponsor of terrorism in the world.e that should be enough to cause the nation concerned. second is their continuingse pursuit of ballistic missile
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program and testing ballistic missiles over the last couple years. third, a statement after one of the test early march this year by a member of the iranian military that said we are billing this capability to threaten israel. he put those three statements together and look at the technology they are pursuing, that is why i'm concerned about iran. >> or ballistic missile program from what i hear from your testimony, this is a real threat to israel. is that true? >> they stated as a threat to >>hael. >> what about our deployedou troops in the european area and also european allies that represents threat to us as well. >> it does. >> would you agree with what dni clapper has said when he is sai repeatedly testified that tehran would choose ballistic missiles as its method of delivering nuclear weapons? m
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>> i agree with that. >> we also need to focus on ourt own homeland when it comes to their testing and development of ballistic missiles. would you agree with that? >> that has to be the missile defense architecture in the pacific and it needs to be in the atlantic as well. >> and when we look at the baby then pose a grave that testing ballistic missiles on multiple n occasions in the u.n. security resolution which calls upon iran not to undertake any activity related to ballistic missiles designed to be capable including launches of such ballistic missile technology. >> from a military give i find that behavior extremely of destabilizing. >> how are we going to address
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their testing issue? what do you see your role as commander of the ways we should be more aggressively on deepss concern to us and our allies. >> a lot of that is for the political ground. my job is to find confirmed would be to provide military advice to the president by thisy congress. i think you're asking for myg military advice. my military bases where is have to make sure our capabilities to respond to an immediate threat are visible, powerful and the deterring discussion a while ago that know what her stare that would want to take us on a lease will think twice and reconsider actions before they do that. i'll take that very seriously. >> in the political realm, havel introduced legislation to impose further sanctions on iran for their ballistic missile programe
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and i've been disappointed it did ministrations from my perspective pretty much ignoring their testing of ballistic missiles. i wanted to follow-up with you. i would love to have you come, if confirmed, to visit new hampshire because we have the 23rd space squadron and new boston operates the largest aire force remote tracking station and they provide strack con provide stratcom with very important satellite command and control capabilities. so i wanted to extend that invitation and hope you'll take me occupy it. >> i've been to new boston many times. one of the most beautiful bases in our country. it's a hidden treasure, but they do an incredibly important mission. there's amazing airmen that do awesome work up there. >> we're glad you're very
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familiar with new boston. they'llb an important asset to you in this new position. thank you. >> thank you, mr. chairman, and i want to thank your family. thank you to all of you. stratcom recently provided a requiremented letter related to hypersonic weapons systems. and specifically conventional prompt strike. are your familiar with that? >> i'm familiar with the broad topic. >> and i know some of this information is sensitive, but to what degree it is possible, what are your thoughts on the importance of making progress on conventional prompt strike? >> i think that from my position today as air force base command, i think that has a role to play in the future. if i'm confirmed as strategic command, i think that i'll need to work with all the combatant commanders to make sure we get the requirements right. i see a significant role in
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terms of our ability to double any target on the planet without having to move into the nuclear realm. i think there's a powerful requirement there, but it's just not a stratcom requirement. it's a requirement that i think awl combatant commanders will have to be involved in developing to make sure we get it right before we start going down that path. >> the sooner cps transitions from a dod risk reduction project to a navy program of record, i think the sooner that's system will reach its initial operational capability. what is your view on the ideal timing for cps from stratcom's standpoint? >> i think from a commander of stratcom perspective, i think yesterday would be a good answer. i don't think there's -- if we had a capability to provide prompt strike, just think how it would fundamentally change the equation to go back to senator king's question about what deterrence is. because now you have a
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conventional capability that can deter and nuclear capability that can deter. i would like to see that answer be yesterday. >> the air force general i think has an historic opportunity to leverage research and development, common parts and lessons learned from the navy's recent program to reduce risk, enhance savings and field an extremely capable follow-on to minuteman 3. there's been some difficult back and forth on how best to leverage commonality across the two services, but when i go back to my home state of indian anaval surface war center crane, our navy and air force personnel are working very closely on this. and we're doing incredible work for the air foerks particularly in the area of radiation, hardoned electronic parts. i know collaboration between navy and air sfoers happening on a daily basis at the staff
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level. if confirmed will you work to establish commonality and collaboration across the air force and navy strategic programs to reduce cost and risk? >> so if confirmed i'll advocate for that. the commander of stratcom is not in the direct acquisition realm. that would be the service chiefs for the most part. i'm a huge believer as we build things for the future in particular, to make sure we can leverage commonality across those capabilities. i'm not a big believer in trying to go back and insert commonality in retrofitting because almost always that costs us an enormous amount of money. every time we modernize, whether it's a component, subcomponent or entire weapons system, we should look at commonality as much as possible. >> do you have any idea at this point where you see the greatest potential for commonality and collaboration? >> i think the greatest potential will be in the missile technology of the future, especially the microelectronics side of the missile technology
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that will go into the future ground base strategic deterrent element they are implementing to leverage ground force from navy programs. >> let me ask you this, i think we're coming on a battle wave of cost and modernization around 25 to 35 which is a ways off but we also have an obligation to try to help at this point. last year admiral haney said it currently represents 3% of dod's budget and the figure could grow to 6% in outyears under current plans. how do you see the defense budget flexing to accommodate the things we need to do and how to prepare the next administration for success in this effort? >> senator, i think the nuclear triad is affordable as we go forward in the future. but it should not be looked at as a blank check. i actually -- i don't like when
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i see the numbers that show up in the paper of a trillion dollars or $85 billion or $500 billion. i don't like to see those numbers. they tend to be self-fulfilling prophecies. if we say it's going to cost that much, it ends up costing that much. we need to define our requirements, figure out what we need to build and then within the defense budget, because it is the backbone of what we do it is everything that our defense department is based on, we have to modernize the triad. and i think the money will be there to do that. but we still need to do it smartly. >> thank you, mr. chairman. >> general, thank you for the effort you made in very thoroughly answering some advance questions which i've had a chance to review on page 24 of your answers with regard to electronic warfare and spectrum operations. you say among other things, russia and china have each committed significant resources to electronic warfare
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capabilities and dedicated military operators. and then you talk about their layered advantage that each of these countries has attained. would you explain what their layered advantage is and enlighten the committee with regard to china and russia in this regard. >> senator, if you look at what china and russia have been looking at themselves for the last 20 years, they've been looking at the united states developing incredibly powerful conventional military that without a doubt can dominate any battlefield in the world. and so they have taken those lessons and started building capabilities to respond to that. one of those lessons is in the electromagnetic spectrum. they see us dominating that. ution gps, satellite communications. they see us basically conducting
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information age warfare where in the not too distance pass, industrial age warfare. developing layers of capabilities in the elect romagnet, cyber and space to gain a strategic advantage in those areas. our job is to make sure they never get an advantage in those areas but it's clear that's what they're trying to do from my perspective, senator. >> will you further say with our increasing spectrum dependence, assuring access to and freedom of maneuver within the electromagnetic spectrum can no longer be guaranteed, this san area we must improve. what suggestions will you have for us in that regard? >> i will continue to advocate if confirmed, for improved capabilities in each of the domains i just described. space, cyber, as well as the elect romagnetic rect rum. we have to build resilient capabilities to fight through and respond to threats. it's no different than a threat to an airplane, a threat to a
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ground system, a threat to a ship. the navy has a layered approach in how they respond to a threat to the fleet. we need a layered approach in how we respond to threats in space, threats in cyber or threats in the electromag nettic space. >> it can be achieved through redundancy, through prolifration of capabilities, it can be achieved through defensive systems that can defend you against such as anti-jam capabilities to allow you to fight through a jamming scenario, which is an electromagnetic spectrum operation. >> i read a novel awhile back, i think published in 2009 entitled one second after by william forshten. i wonder how fanciful that is. i don't know if you've read that novel, but the concept is there's an electromagnetic pulse
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which shuts down our entire gps grid and electric grid. and renders this country pretty much defenseless. how big of a layered approach would russia or china have to have to accomplish that, and is this just fanciful science fiction that could never happen, or is it something we need to be prepared for? >> i haven't read that book, senator, but -- >> i've i've described it. >> yes, you did, very well. the concern is an electromagnetic pulse that goes off in space. that's the concern. it is the most dangerous threat that a space officer, which i am right now, is concerned about because it is the most threatening and the most damaging. but if a nation in the world does that, they now reached a very significant threshold, and the response of the united states could be broad and very -- and more likely not a response in kind but a response in another domain.
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>> it would be more damaging than a nuclear bomb, would it not? >> it is a nuclear bomb, basically. it is a nuclear bomb in space. that's what creates the electromagnetic pulse. >> who has the capability of doing such a thing now, if they were mad enough to do it? >> anybody with a nuclear weapons capability and a launch capability into space. >> and how prepared are we to respond -- in the mutually assured to start good manner, to defend againsty such a thing. >> or command-and-control nucle architecture and satellite communications is very well positioned to operate through the scenario. the rest of our infrastructure is not as well prepared to respond. the good news is it is a global architecture and we can go in another forum that dared the site depredation supposed to
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knock that would potentially take out certain elements but it feels that tells as it comesit s over. i do want to get into too much technical detail. it's resilient because of numbers.r together they will allow the united states to continue to fly inside but they can concern ishe what does it do to our infrastructure? >> thank you, mr. chairman. congratulations, general. i would just say your upcoming position if you are as successful as you've been in selecting your life in racing to find children come you're going to do the whole procurement system, the 52 we put in operation in yugoslavia and hundred 44 still
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in operation.okay. over that period of time, maybe a little bit it may come along and when here did have 35. we are on track to spend 1.5 trillion.n makes that decision? the other ones do what they do, but also would spend. 1.5 trillion it makes you think president eisenhower and say he to you, be aware. be very concerned about the comments as far as what we do and procurement defense. how do we explain not and why does the 15, 16, eight t. not upgraded continued service? >> senator, that's really not a question for me. it's a question for combat commander.stion f i do have some opinions so i'll be glad to share those opinions
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with you. those the f-15, 16 and eight teener fourth-generation aircraft. going up against a modern 21st 21st century threat, they cannot penetrate any threat scenarios that we are going to have to be able to penetrate. >> what generation is b-52? >> d50 was at least a third generation weapon. >> and most cost effective. >> and because of the cruisefe missile eight carries as well. we need a fifth generation either. we need the f-22 and f-35 in this thread environments. we have to have the four airmen to fight and win in any conflict in the future. .. penetrate. we'll need a penetrating capability out of the bomber and fighter. we'll need to handle any threat
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scenario. as for the cost, it should not have cost that much. i think any american who looks at the cost and is proud of that cost has not seen the big picture. it cost too much. but that capability is critical. and it will be awesome on the battlefield. it will create an advantage for the united states for decades to come. >> i have does the president of the united states have the absolute abilitd and the power to call for a nuclear strike without any input from congress, legislators, any input from generals whatsoever to negate that? he or she alone can call forat? that strike. >> my job as a military officer is to follow orders of the commander in chief. >> so there's no checks or balances. you don't check to make sure if you get the order from the't president, then it is a go order speak with the president will as before the military advice. i will


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