tv Public Affairs Events CSPAN November 4, 2016 8:00am-9:01am EDT
its original purpose. they don't have to be a deterrent force, given where we are in europe today. our nation's the protection and article v is real. hopefully it will not be challenged anytime soon. and i think we also, just an overall thing, the u.s. really has to reestablish his leadership on the world stage. i think a little bit too much rightly or wrongly we are perceived as weak on the world stage and we've done a little bit too much bleeding from behind and i think we need, i think the dynamic needs to change if we are to successfully engage with putin. i would specifics to the next round. >> john? >> i will also start at a high level. in the early sessions today and in this one already, we've talked about what our interests? any conversation has to do with our interests are it's really pretty simple, i apologize if i think is quite basic.
the post-cold war era, despite all of the headlines about it, unpleasant news, has been the most prosperous and the most stable in world history. and the basis of that has been peace in europe. the two greatest world's that the wars in world history began in europe. and establishing nato shortly after world war ii provided the basis for building a global stability system, and that was a path to global prosperity. i'm telling you this because our interests are in maintaining that. that is the vital interest of every american. and right now we have the world's second greatest military power with one of the world's largest economies changing borders in europe by force. explicitly saying he wants to upend that security order.
that is a vital threat to our interests. and part of the confusion in washington and globally on this is because we have a president who claimed that the crisis in europe was a regional crisis. he just didn't get it. now, one of the reasons he didn't get it is because his predecessor had us engaging in the middle east in ways were beyond our capacity. in that way i'm sympathetic, that we can do everything we might want to do. but we have a vital interest in stopping putin in europe. so i think the next president should have a different policy than the current president. also, this objective of ours to deter putin to stop them in ukraine in which is the current battleground, is very much within our capacity. we and the eu together something like gdp 17 times that of russia. we remain by far the world's leading military power.
we have the ability to stop putin in ukraine without involving american troops by using a combination of our economic power, our diplomatic power, and not our military men but our military equipment. so what i would like to see the next president do is say explicitly my job is to reaffirm the transatlantic relationship with europe, strengthen nato, help the eu to strengthen itself which is also in america's interest and to stop a power in the plan from upending this world. we do that, a simple statement like that will remove most of the power of moscow's massive disinformation campaign. american leaders and european leaders are saying what point evidence tells us everyday that is going on in ukraine's donald boesch is not separatist, it's not a civil war, it's a horrible war led, finance, staffed and
equipped for moscow. certainly newspapers will begin to get this straight. and with that once we acknowledge that we can develop the policy is relatively modest with her means with the means to stop it and secured the basis of global stability and prosperity. and, one more point, watching originally week west respond to clear aggression only encourages the longer-term danger to the united states which is an economically powerful and militarily china. who has been pursuing some of its own aims and the south china seas. i think i've said enough. >> all good policy depends on good analysis, the fundamentals.
we've heard or allusion to great military power, less economic power but still important intentions, not only in this panel at in the previous two panels. but i do want to dwell, before ask you to go into more specifics about exactly how the policy should be where there's more robust containment whether it's the titles were given for this panel, i do want to go into the analysis by asking basically three questions simultaneously but all deeply interrelated. so the first question is whether the current dilemma, the current confrontation we have between you in and russia is driven primarily by vladimir putin and his global strategy for, as general breedlove said, or become, recognized as a major world powe power or what is powr what is the dimension and and i was shocked at the size myself,
i did into question earlier, his need for political survival. existential threat that democracy, the west -- so the question is, is a driven primary by vladimir putin and the circle around him and his agenda, their agenda, or is it a driven primary by mistake in u.s. and european policies doing -- during either or both the obama administration as several speakers have said, or the bush 43 administration as other speakers have mentioned? this of course includes nato expansion some of the other things, support for the color revolutions. these two questions of course raise the question of what the lessons of history and what the consideration of grand strategy as you put it will an archive of folk recession, how these play into. these are the three questions of
an analytical sort for which i ask you to come back and spell out in greater detail the policies that you outlined already, all for someone to figure out what it did and i will come back to ask you for the first 100 days, if anything special is to be done than. so we went in what order to do good the first time? we just ended -- i'm going to mix it up. evelyn first. >> all right. >> then will, and then john because john just had the last word the second time. >> so i think it's important to understand what or a lease for me i have to first start with what i determined objectives. it's the group around you never wanted to keep them in power, to keep themselves in power. number two is a sort of been
touched upon, to ensure that russia is regard and is indeed playing a role as a great power equal to all the other great powers of the world. number three which is related to one into is that this gremlin that building is against regime change. he's against it because it touches on number one, his desire to stay in power, and his perception rightly or wrongly that america and the west is actually interested in seeing his regime change which, of course, can become a self fulfilling prophecy if they continue along the road that he's on. but is also related to wanted to demonstrate that russia is a great power which we see point out in the context of syria. so those are the objectives of the kremlin and i think that it's always important to bear in mind. the foreign policy the kremlin is now advancing is also a reaction to the fact that kremlin no longer deliver on the economic deal that he made with the people when he came to power
first in 2000. he's now switch forces to the nationalist force. is going to make the russian people feel good about being part of the federation based on making russia great again. and that means that what it is essential if this isn't 19 such a perspective on russia's role in europe in particular, europe and central asia so with regard to his periphery, that clashes drug with what our perspective is with regard to russia's role in the international system. because the kremlin sees that the countries in particular around its periphery did not have a full sovereignty, that have limited sovereignty, that the government has right to exercise control over those territories indirectly or directly but primarily indirectly politically, economically but also with force. from our perspective we believe that sovereign states not only have the right to defend their territories but that the people within the sovereign states have the right to determine their government and if you'd like to be democratic and determine
their own futures, their institutional affiliations, we support that. that is a value that we hold dear and runs into direct conflict with the criminal. i think that's at the root of what's going on, and i'll stop there. >> thank you. >> i don't have a brief for putin or his aggressive actions, but i think -- >> the question is is that what is driving are not driving? >> i think, you know, it takes two to tango. i think we have to acknowledge that there've been actions on both sides that are not made the relationship what it needs to be or could be. and so i think we have to acknowledge that our behavior in the post-cold war era in support of that and no one less than general breedlove wrestler lives as long as his arm of things that we did that provoked the security dilemma inside of russia and caused them to do for themselves. this is a country that has been invaded multiple times in which
most recently happened in the lives of people still alive and russia, that is a reality i don't think we should ignore come and americans again, the cold war for most americans is ancient history but the experience of world war ii is not for russia. something we have to be careful. i want to kind of talk about the beginning of the end of the cold war. george h. w. bush. he was pressured by staffers at one point to go to berlin as the wall was falling, and he said so that the gross portrait he said what would i do if i went to berlin? dance on the wall? we not only danced on the wall but we danced over the wall and we danced right up to the reporter. i think we need to kind of go back to the kind of wisdom of h. w., which is to kind of understand how these engagements, how these even choices by other states are going to affect us and to really try to calibrate or effect them
to try to calibrate properly so that we are focused on achieving things that are positive. i think there are positive ways to heal relationship and that would be good for both of us. again, so for example, evelyn talked about letting other countries choose to institutional affiliations. that sounds great and i think that's a good ideal, but that doesn't, we could also choose our affiliations. so, for example, with ukraine or georgia or other countries that i want to join nato we have to ask is that good for our safety? it's not a club that has open membership. it's a club that the club should decide who gets to be in and we should think again about what might be the consequences of -- >> this is policy. don't extend and it appeared we are still in analytical face. john, the question is a primarily putin driven, primarily mistakes of the u.s.
and perspective history, the causality of present the limit and the underlying factors before you can make policy? >> i recommend to everyone in this room to read the end of the bar -- empire, a book about the last year or two of the soviet union. the reason why is that in talks between russians and ukrainians in late 1990, early 1991, you have the most liberal russians we've seen in the past generation or two generations, or for that matter centuries to yeltsin and gorbachev both telling them the leader of ukraine that if you decide of a referendum and be independent of us, we will have to worry about protecting our russians, not just our russians in ukraine but our russian speakers. that's point number one. telling do a certain phenomenon we see today which are the precondition for criminal aggression whether among liberal
russians in 1990-1991. second data point, nato expansion as the conversation not a reality was not taking place in 1991 and 1992. if you look back and see what soviet union imploded, that within weeks or days actually of the demise of the soviet union, you had frozen conflicts. now, the frozen conflict model is a model of criminal aggression today. it predates nato enlargement. will okay, data .3, cry me. wended russia take crimea? at the end of the 18th century. question, wended russia take eastern poland? central pole? at the end of the 18th
century. i don't think it's unreasonable to ask the question if we did not enlarge nato would the front today between russia and the west be in warsaw or in kiev? i agree with will that the russians do not like nato enlargement is that i don't disagree that this place upon traditional russians historical sensitivities but the same nation that combines of being invaded multiple times is that same nation that has invaded other countries more than multiple times. and even someone who's contemplation we disposed of putin right now, henry kissinger, has said that russian security is contingent upon insecurity of its neighbors. is that an acceptable solution for us? is not acceptable for us? i don't have any doubt that poland being and nato, a strong member, is very much in our national interests. so i think that even if you have
questions about nato enlargement in the '90s you have to say it probably makes sense. the reason why it probably makes sense is because those internal russian tendencies which were supercharged in soviet times never died. and we see the imperial russian tendencies today and those are very much not in america's interests. >> judy. >> well, i agree with what john has said. and i don't buy the argument that what we are seeing for putin today is because of quote mistake in u.s. or european policies. i don't think you are mistaken policies. i think they are policies as john said that are in the u.s. national interests and their policies we should continue to support. they are in line with our values, and bind with the helsinki final act, in line with most generally accepted principles respect for borders. i mean, russia doesn't agree with it but maybe the only
nation in europe that doesn't. so i don't think that we should lower our values or lower the policies that we support because of what russia believes that affect only way we have been mistaken in recent years is not responding strongly enough and russia has acted. i think in those cases ukraine, some of the georgia, those have been mistakes and we haven't been strong enough. the problem is if we were to adopt is, i'm not saying that you're arguing that are in what appeared is but i think it just emboldens putin, emboldens any russian leader to just keep going. how far is it going to go if we changed and we say that's okay, i know russia doesn't like it so maybe we change our policies. in fact, i go in the other direction which is i think in
terms of georgia and ukraine, we opted after with a u.s. policy of never shipped for both of them as soon as we can get it. because i think that's the way, for though i think it's an interest of both of them in the alliance. they both really wanted. we've always maintained an open door policy but i think it sends a very strong signal as well that this is the path we're going to take. just one of the things i than it expected a local i think john -- although i think john has answered the. we spent a lot of time during the '90s and into the 2000 working with russia, nato-russia council. we have gone over and above what we should've had to do to try to make it clear. i remember a discussion and the '90s about russia becoming a member of nato. i mean, we have in so many ways shown that they should not -- we
can't change the perception but we didn't ignored. we took it seriously and would try to bring them along. it clearly didn't work but i don't think that means we should change our policy. >> just a footnote of history as we agree to factor in history, the longer-term, remember that when nato, after the iron curtain fell and after russia became the russian federation rather than the soviet union and offered a special relationship to russia with nato and they accepted it and there were some significant actual changes in the 1990s. but my roll is not primarily that of historic or commentator. this panel, simply sort of 15 minutes late is now scheduled to go until 2:30 p.m. will have to leave it to 20 time that. i'm saying that because i'm
reserving 30 minutes for the audience comments and discussion. probably start with general breedlove. all right. now the third round is, you already all over did to your policies, but in the framework of engagement versus restraint versus containment, i'd like you to spell out a little bit more, and i also, especially those who have congressional background also to ask the question okay, what kind of policies would congress sustained and agree to? of the key questions are, please, those of you who, well, everybody advocates renewed engagement in this is general breedlove put out. if we can find areas of common interest when we can get a good deal, of course, but that's an
obvious apple pie and motherhood, but if you advocate, i think i'm addressing this to you because if you are advocating renewed engagement based on the analysis you said, largest advocating restraint but in either case what they want to see, what would you expect to see from the russian side as the response, a positive response or to show the policy is working? in one area should the u.s. pullback from the wrong things it's done in the past? if so, what to be seen as a sign of weakness? and finally, welcome let me stop right there. >> i'm glad you talked about engagement and restraint nothing mutually exclusive because they are not. i think we should be restraint in some areas to make sure that we are not actually creating self-fulfilling prophecies for, and a different direction. but i also think that we should be engaged.
we should find areas of mutual interest to start to build some of that relationship back, including counterterrorism, counter proliferation efforts on trying to maintain stability that ultimate i think is in both of our interests in the long run. i think we should do that. we have to find ways and the general talked about different kind of lower level discussiodiscussio ns. i think those are helpful and fruitful. i also think that we need to come i think we need to kind of stop talking about russia as, the way would you as a potential superpower. we don't need to rub it in the knows that they're not anymore but i think we should pop is probably something the american public this is the cold war again. this is a country that has a fraction of the military power of the united states. they spend about 66 billion. the united states spends about 600 billion. i mean, the population of russia
is a lot smaller than united states and europe combined. our wealthy allies in europe are far superior in terms of the economic capability than russia. so doesn't mean that there are not danger do i do what is that unrealistic given my plea for realism o of have to put in a proper context and that means there are opportunities because they also to acknowledge our interests in that region. and john talked about old europe and the first wave of expansion and the next wave, i think we can be pretty clear about where our vital interest do stand with regards to the current allies versus the issue of expanding further -- >> now, these are generalities. i like it to be specific as we discussed on the phone. all these questions we agreed on and sent around. the time to think about it. so what specifically, what pullback, but of the specific actions which have for the next president take what would you
expect from the president side? what would you expect specifically? >> i would've quietly and diplomatically but surely take off the table the notion of expanding it to include -- >> would be seen as a unilateral concession could would not? >> how what happens is -- >> it's a two-barrel question. the shotgun is how would you be seen in moscow? would be seen as weakness? >> look, i think america is a great country. it stronger they should be confident about it so. it didn't have to worry. agency look, we are powerful, the most powerful country in the world. we have nuclear weapons, the world's strongest military, economy. we just don't have, i just think we are getting too upset about they may perceive this as weakness and then what, right? is of the thin what going to be the 1930s again speak was a good question.
>> but not everything is music and i think in the foreign policy community think any act like this -- >> right. i think the outlines, if i'm correct you are confirming that a combination of restraint and engagement would be a better policy for us. i think the other three panelists all advocate and of all restyled out in some detail the policy of containment. which that what you would like to add further either to your description of the policy or justification of it, or to eradicate the opposite approach, not only now but in some of the earlier panels we heard considerable and i'd be happy to come back to your sanctions removal, et cetera your so who would like to speak next?
>> i just, i really want to respond because yes, of course we should not overblow russia's economic power, its political power. unit, russia has no real allies, et cetera. there's a whole list of things we can list as the weaknesses but the reality is there are nuclear power. they can do a lot of damage. they're doing a lot of damage to us internally in reducing the confidence in our electoral system and, of course, everything we've already talked about that they're doing it the international context it to say nothing of i don't think we talked about the abomination of what's happening in syria. there's a human rights violation and up so i didn't list that on the candidate list because that is just despicable. so i think that you are right that we shouldn't over emphasize what rush is about. the problem is in part those of us who follow russia recently have been pushed into this because, because there was a real interesting kind of dismissing rush and sang they are a small regional power.
we don't need to worry about them. and general breedlove and myself other than the government who want an appellate our colleagues but the rest of our country to be aware of what the risks were of what the objectives were of this country which is not behaving as a status quo power, we felt we needed to spell it out very clearly. and as many people of our dimension is not just about russia. i worry very much, i lived in japan this summer. i worry very much but with the chinese are derided as lessons were fitted to deter russia. it's about the international order. i think the first thing the patient has to do is come in and say okay, i support the international order. the united states is a status quo power. we may have differences with countries about how we implement the rules. there are problems with interventions, humanitarian interventions are being lumped together with other interventions. let's have a discussion with the rest. we need to be clear what the rules of the road are and
spelled out clearly from day one. and then there's a whole host of policies that i would advocate with regard to syria in particular and ukraine and other scenarios. >> okay, please go ahead. >> if i could pick up on this because i agree with what evelyn has said. in some ways in terms of specifics, i think i'll engagement -- not our engagement. wrong words. our interaction, thank you, john, with russia, almost talked with series you. i mean, a lot of issues with it was on the european front advocate to those, but i mean, this is where they are really stepping way outside. we about a vacuum to be created. in my mind they step into i think we need to figure out our syrian policy, i agree with you on that. i think we need to figure out first of all stop the discussion educated because it just makes us look weak, they got what is it we want to do we get back to
assad moscow? there's a humanitarian crisis we have to deal with. we probably need to take steps to change the dynamic on the battlefield. we need to figure those things out. i think that some of them as we should be taking the, some of tm that you for discussed safe haven, humanitarian corridors, no-fly zones to protect those, more arms to the rebels to a new administration should figure out is there more should we should the military can either u.s. militarily, the allies, working with allies. we needed to get where we're going on series you. but i keep hearing the administration said there is no military solution in city. una corti doesn't agree with it. we are the only ones saying that i think we need to get that right. that would be first 100 days, i think focus on certain what needs to happen in series is one thing because we're letting russian set the agenda and it's too important to let them set the agenda. and don ukraine i think ukraine,
georgia, moldova all the same but on ukraine specifically, if the russians and the separatists do not implement men's can come we should not only increased sanctions, we should be providing arms -- minsk -- to the opinion government and ask the question what about congress? congress is way ahead of the administration on this. ..
not a doesn't in any leader's mind, map for georgia and ukraine was a presidential priority. which is only reason we got the language that we got in that communique, that they will be member nations sometime. the president has to own these issues in order to bring others along. >> we have a conflict between john having last word but also being the one where they laid down the groundwork of 30 minutes. do you have comments about we open to questions? your cities. you're the host. >> i will speak. first 100 days the president has to state publicly our interest in the global order and transatlantic relationship and
strengthening nato and eu. two, or or she should reendorse the warsaw summit decision on increasing our military capabilities in the baltic states in ukraine and poland and perhaps increase them. make clear there is war in eastern ukraine, not civil war. the united states will provide support for ukraine in all ways possible. we will announce our new sanctions and intention to work with europeans on new sanctions. we will provide defensive military lethal weapons to the ukrainians. we will not announce it. let russians discover it on the battlefield. we begin -- oh, syria. syria is a place where i may not agree with judy. we don't have any options that are acceptable. the opposition people we support can not win you but fundamentally we're enabling putin to look good in syria for two reasons.
one is what everyone talks about. we let him act and we don't act. what i do as president of the united states, we hit their guys every time they hit our guys. but, we have been very effective going after isis and our effectiveness going after isis has enable assad with russian support to make gains on the road to aleppo. so there is kind of interesting paradox here. if you want to know more about that, i did a piece for real clear world on monday. you condition take a look. finally agree we should also engage. dialogue with russia on strategic weapons. also, very, very important, deconfliction of encounters of our warplanes and ships and our planes which could lead to actual deaths and a real confrontation. >> thank you. now i'm going to vary the rules just slightly because i want any panelist from this morning
starting with general breedlove and our keynote speaker of course, if you have a one-minute comment, please raise your hands and i will recognize you. microphones. general breedlove here in the front. >> so just to the last remark, we have a good sea that works in a u.s.-russia relationship. >> the acronym. >> incidents at sea. we turned it into sea, land air. we do all of them. we could develop the same paradigm with nato and russia. there has been pushback from russia for a while. they only want to deal with the u.s. now they're more open to doing this with nato. that would be a great first step. inc, whatever, there. if i misheard you or, forgive me, i am not a fan of we're america, we don't have to sort
of, you know, get excited. i think that our inaction in a couple of places, especially, as it relates to crimea have bought us some problems. i think the people of donetz and luganst have been how things went with them. >> i'm sure those people have opinions about whether the united states should done more for them. i get it. if i were them i would have wanted it too. in all history they would love someone else come ride to the rescue. the question for me is, do i want to potentially increase conflict between the united states and the soviet union for something that is peripheral to u.s. interests, sorry, russia. all this talk about, all this cold war mentality to my right has bottom me -- [laughter]
but, i want to, so, what i say is like, are, do we want to have conflict between, you know, united states and russia that leads to problems that potentially will drag us in or draw us into it? if i'm from des moines or from houston, if i'm from new orleans, i'm from seattle, i don't see how any of these places being in, out, under, over the russians actually makes them any safer. we have to draw lines in the world because we can't police everything and provide results everywhere. that doesn't mean we can be a leader in the world. we have to draw a line between vital and peripheral interests. >> quick 30 seconds. >> i got it. i don't think we're in disagreement. i think we have to be a part of leading. when we don't be a partof leading, we get a lot of chaos so. >> okay. any other panelists first?
no. mitchell, in the middle aisle there. >> so excuse me if i'm slightly confused but it sounds like a lot of this advice is advice to hillary clinton and not advice to donald trump who announced that he wishes to have a summit meeting with putin to arrange a better agreement, you know, kind of on cooperation, et cetera. am i hearing this wrong? does this more advice to hillary clinton, or is this also, are you saying that this is the same advice you would give also to donald trump? i mean, i would have thought, when we're there in moscow palling around with this meeting he is planning to have, is this the kind of stuff that is realistically going to be listened to? >> with the national interest of the united states be different whoever is president? you might have to couch it differently to persuade one candidate versus other.
i thought that is what we're talking about. what is the next president, who he or she is should be? what is in our long-term strategic national interest? that is my view. any panelist -- >> with president trump, talking about building a trump tower in st. petersburg. >> any other comments? >> i think, you know, general breedlove is somebody that goes meets with both sides of the aisle. i don't think he changes what he says? >> [inaudible] i think message needs to be delivered to both sides. >> okay. other questions? yes, please? up here. up front. and others raise your hands so we'll know -- one, two. okay. we'll take two more. go another round. >> i want to thank the panel for taking 12-hour discussion compressing it so admirably. i got really bad news for you. the first 100 days, the
president is going to have to be forming an administration. going to be more concerned with economic policies. probably appointing a new supreme court judge and new director of fbi and dealing with all sorts of legal issues. so the likelihood they will form a study group which will take months to come out about russia. i hate to say that -- >> could listen to us. >> i understand. >> or she. >> my question is this however, donald trump has demeaned nato is obsolete and now he says they're just freeloaders. hillary clinton was author of the strategic pivot to asia. what incentives do you think or disincentives can we provide to mr. putin to change his as general breedlove says his behavior? i heard a lot of ideas but nothing about what actions and incentives we have to change or get russia to do things we would like them to do and stop doing things that we don't. >> thank you. >> we'll collect three questions. please stand up and identify
yourself. >> atlantic council. my question is, we know that russia is trying to build the russian world. trying to co-op the russian compatriots abroad. we also see it is very difficult right now to engage with the russian government. what ideas could the new administration have in trying to engage that russian world themselves, to try to engage russians and russian speakers both inside and outside of russia who, more liberal values, who value democracy and so on? >> and third question is back on the aisle. then we'll have a next round. back on, the side there. >> hi. my name is a dimitri. thankthank you for interesting d informative discussion. my question piggybacks off the
last question. i had a random conversation with a girl from moscow who is visiting. i asked her what is going on in moscow, nothing good. the next line was putin is the greatest president russia could potentially v he is keeping russia from being put on its knees by the united states of america. this is having huge price on people domestically and economically. they felt the united states was also against putin and against all russia, all russians. my question, what is the next president in the first 100 days, thinking outside the box, gather 20 successful entrepreneurs ask them to go to moscow to help with small business development in moscow? would you approve of something like this or would you think it is appeasement to president putin? to show the russian people quick with them. speaking of post-1945 order, what can be strengthen the
united nations and international law because i haven't heard the united nations today? >> who who wants to take a stabt each of the questions? >> could i ask a clarifying question? did you say incentives to russia or incentive to trump to change. >> incentive to putin. >> the questions are incentive to putin. democracy in the equation. >> right. >> then specific ideas to change the balance putin and moscow. >> i will give a answer it officers one. there are negative incentives. there are cost. if you go any type of incentive, i can't even think what it might be, one of my fellow panelists can come up with, i think it will be seen as weakness. no change in behavior. general breedlove says it starts with behavior. if there is no change in
behavior, he will pocket that and go on with the incomes one. i'm not sure dynamic works with somebody like putin. a negative, ratchet up sanctions, give ours to the ukrainians, do whatever in syria, safe havens, no-fly zones, whatever it might be. those are incentives in a way -- >> incentives could be using leverage or pressure. >> in that sense, i would take it that way but -- >> evelyn? >> i would agree with jude youdy, the incentives we will relax sanctions, eliminate sanctions if you do x, y, z. putin has nice conditionality for coming back into nuclear disposition agreement us so we can take the same approach. if you come back into that agreement, for example we will do these things. we won't dot the things he has on his list though because they run up against our values. i think on the issue of engaging the russian people, that is a
real predictment because the propaganda machine in russia is so strong that the message that woman gave is pretty much what the government wants her to take away. that it's a mess in russia, i guess, economically, because of the west which is not actually the case. the sanctions that we developed when i was in the government were targeted. target the at putin cronies, quote, unquote. they were not targeted at the russian people. but the problem or good fortune was that they coincided with the fall in oil prices. so it looked like sanctions affected the russian people. the other problem though, this is the big problem why this delegation wouldn't work, this business delegation idea wouldn't work, the biggest problem russia has is structure of their economy which isn't going to change, because that what insures that putin and his cronies stay in power. until you can change and make it a truly, you know, normal, non-core result economy, i don't
know how we can get business people to go there and do serious business, besides the ones that are already working there in the indug stress and other industry like that, russian state will guarranty, more or less, not always, their investments. so the lack of rule of law, the lack of protection for international business in russia is the biggest problem with your proposal. i do, however, think that dangling those ideas out in front of the russians while we're taking the harder actions is not a bad idea because at some point, some russian leader in the kremlin is going to have to turn around and cooperate with us and europe. because reality is, the future for russia, lies in europe. the pivot to asia is real, except that what was left out, is that we pivot with our friends and partners economically and politically, not militarily necessarily because hopefully we can avoid that. towards asia. and so there is a lot of lack of
information but that, i have spoken enough. >> good. any of you want to -- >> one thing to add. he brought up the u.n. i don't think we've brought up enough about our european allies what they can do to handle russia and i want to bring that in which is, i think the united states has to find way to incentivize, either carrot or stick, our european allies to step up to their responsibility. they are not meeting their responsibilities as part of this alliance. we need greater burden-sharing. if russia is the threat that people here are talking about, and we need to do this, we need to expect those folks to step up. and so leadership would be to press them more than we have been. >> if i could elaborate. back up to asking the question about the diaspora because i know the baltic states are now doing more than they have before with regard to their ethnic russian and russian-speaking minorities but that is the kind
of thing we can do and we can persuade them to do more to address real grievances that russian speakers and ethnic russians have. >> any other in this round? >> add to russian -- building more information programing and radio in russian language which would attract them to our side of the information sphere. >> propaganda war is completely lopsided now. first question here. second question there. is there a third? one, two, three. we'll go another round. my name is jack. i'm unaffiliated. my question can members of the panel offer suggestions for the next administration to deconflict our legitimate democracy promotion initiatives with what russia perceives as its quote, legitimate security interests?
or is that even possible and we should just acknowledge that it is going to be conflict and only question is, how will the conflict unfold? >> second question on the aisle, middle of the aisle. >> david colton. actually piggybacking on that comment. henry kissinger once remarked that national power is means times will and american will it is fractured what we've seen here today on the panel, which we still are caught in relitigating 2002, 2003 with professional wrestling notion that it is realism versus the neocons of 2002. i like to base my question on ambassador herbst and ellen said, isn't the larger macro question now an international challenge to liberal democracy and anti-liberal democratic,
authoritarian push we see in france with lapenn we see with orbonn in hungary. we see in uk with the "brexit" vote and see here in the united states and elsewhere? my question for the first 100 days of a president how can we articulate, how can a president articulate support for liberal international democracy is 2002, 2003 and will's extension in the emotional things, but what bob osgood said, founding member of sais, a seen of sais, he said in 1954 america must recognize and reconcile national interests with idealism? that is national power. that is means times will. and i'm interest in what ambassador and alan and the rest of the panel have to say, thank you. >> and the third question? back there. on the left. >> thank you.
[inaudible]? >> identify yourself. >> dominic, from the hamburg, foundation. i have a quick question on arming ukraine and implications for transatlantic relations. yeah, i am in ukraine or official way or inofficial way but, what do you think that do to transatlantic relations? we know that the europeans are not really completely united on that question, how to deal with that. but right now, there is more or less consensus in europe, we don't want to sort of arm ukraine. and you said also, transatlantic relations are a priority. so how do you bring this together with other contradictions? >> thanks. so i promised anya a word for all her work. right here. alina, i'm sorry. i said anya. >> we know you're nervous.
[laughter]. >> yes, not all the people are named anya. thank you for the discussion. right. to be a bit of a i guess contrarian here, go back to the sanctions question, something all of you have discussed as a policy tool, right? we talked about it in the previous panel. one argument, that our sanctions policy had unintended consequence pushing russia further towards china, right? russia has also gone through a self-identified pivot east, right? that pivot has not been that successful because chinese banks don't bankroll like goldman sachs. so they haven't received kind of credit they were looking for in light of lack of access to western credit loans. but my question to you, what are unintended consequences of increasing and rationing up sanctions then? will we see more of an alliance between russia and china? as a consequence of that, how
will that affect our policies and our national interests, right? last question which is actually for mr. gipiski to my left, what realistically kind of deal can you get from russia, given all the tools we talked about, sanctions, strengthening eastern flank of nato, what kind of deal would y'all want to he see? >> okay. who wants to speak first in. >> unfortunately i have to take off because i have a train to make. those are questions i need to ask. if you say, hey, we need to arm you ukrainians, we need to push russians in syria and exert leadership an expand nato, stick it to them, don't that provoke the -- thank you very much. >> thank you for the koch institute support of this conference.
why don't we go in direct order? >> i think on the question about democracy and kissinger quote as you imagine i agree. i don't really feel to elaborate on that. i believe that the next president should speak clearly and that will get us pretty far towards the will. that leads me to take of arming ukraine. i believe that in europe, there is no consensus. if anything, going along with the current status quo situation with regard to our support to ukraine. if a new american president came in, not just support for ukraine and other countries than before, our allies in europe would follow suit coming along with us. frankly speaking some. europeans are more ahead. obviously the ones in nato who are front line states are more
possibly more ahead than we are. on sanctions i agree, on realistic deal. i think we'll see kind of a stand still. we have to be strong so russia doesn't take more territory, take more liberties and feel emboldened to you know, try to prevail over its neighbors and in international arena. i don't know whether this current regime in the kremlin we can change their minds. but the best we can do is try. things like iran deal. agreed framework with north korea, they are good, because they buy you time. whatever we can do to buy time, until there is some other change is at least, is the least we can do. >> may i comment, just a little bit on the ukrainian thing. and really, i agree with evelyn
on this. yes, there is a split in europe arming the ukrainians. i think i go back to the leadership issue. i think the u.s. really hasn't articulated our policy very well, to the extent we have is clearly ambivalence or opposition on part of the administration to providing weapons to ukraine. in that type of situation i don't see the europeans stepping forward and doing it. i think if we were to do it, if new president came in and it is now policy of the united states to arm ukraine, obviously it wouldn't be done without consultation with the allies. i think it might be more of a willingness even if it is not at 28, maybe more of a willingness with some who are willing, coalition of the willing, they might be more willing to do that. and i don't think that is in conflict with good transatlantic relations. in some ways it supports it.
anything we do can with improved transatlantic relations. new president, new policies, a lot of things might be possible in europe but it will take presidential engagement to get some of this done. >> john? >> in sport of the ladies relating to arming ukraine, the pattern of the past 60 years has been taking of strong military measures in europe in support of western security has required american leadership in the face of european opposition. anyone familiar with the imf, deployment of intermediate range nuclear missiles in early and mid '80s, knows this exactly t came out just fine. we deployed the missiles despite hundreds of thousands on streets in britain, italy an germany. they accepted it afterwards and after that we had a deal with the russians. on the question of how we come
to a deal with putin, i don't know if we come to a deal with putin or with russia. we may. the point is he pursuing aggressive policies that challenge our interests. various measures we talked about, sanctions, arms for ukraine, weakened him. hopefully would lead to his defeat in ukraine. if they don't, we increase the cost of his activities which would make him less likely to inter screen elsewhere. or if he chooses to intervene elsewhere he is weaker as a result of these stronger policies. finally the point about international challenge to the liberal order. you know whether it is putin or erdogan or lee or duerte, it is absolutely true what is happening although i wouldn't put "brexit" in that category. i wouldn't put trump in the category. we can argue about the details. going back to our conversation. the poster boy for this challenge is putin. we defeat him, give him a blow, that knocks the wind out of this movement globally. one more reason for us to do the
smart thing which is very much in our interests. i would recognize there is case where ideals and our interests are more or less in sync. thank you. >> before we all thank the panel. somebody who worked on these particular thoughts and written, about questions of democracy and compatible, could putin ever be persuaded? the answer is no, seems to me. very clear his vision and you his system, his regime depends on the non-spread of kind of liberal ideals that we, bob osgood talked about and others have mentioned. it can not be done. that doesn't mean we can't act in a way that is non-threatening if we draw some borders -- we have to pull back how much democracy promotion we do inside of russia. the idea we could ever persuade him it is compatible is definitely not real. i would like to start by
thanking, before i thank the panel, all of the wonderful staff of the atlantic council and my deputy, my, if you will stand up for a second. worked everybody bit as hard today. maybe others, other sponsoring organizations. [applause] and to our outstanding panel, outstandingly articulate panel, i think we got it very, very good not only review of issues, so deepening of the issues. i hope we will all work on deepening understanding of the american public and next administration. this conference we will produce a conference report or summary, that will be sent around hopefully sent around to all of you, but, this is to be continued and we thank you all for your extraordinarily active engagement and endures lasting all this time. thank you very much. thank you to the panel. [applause]
>> heading into the final weekend before election day here is what the road to white house coverage looks like on c-span networks. hillary clinton in detroit this evening for a rally there. she is up six points in michigan according to "real clear politics." that rally at 5:15 eastern. donald trump campaigning in pennsylvania today where polls are showing hillary clinton up not as much, 3 1/2 points according to "real cleapo