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>> we are going to move the speakers up to the front of everybody coulifeverybody coulde ten seconds we would appreciate it. ..
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you're watching live "in depth" on booktv. >> december 7, 194,a day of infamiliary. even as japanese diplomats were con ferring on peace measures, japanese plains were swooping down on pearl harbor. they dropped their death on the air base, civil homes and schools. a hundred japanese planes and midget sub marines took part. the arizona was completely destroyed and four others severely damaged. three other battleships and three cruisers suffered damage.
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nearly 200 planes were destroyed and that sunday morning the pacific fleet appeared to be completely immobilized by this sneak attack. nearly 3,000 casualties added to the catastrophe. >> it's been 75 years since over 2400 american sailors and soldiers were killed in the japanese attack on pearl harbor, december 7, 1941. starting now on booktv, on c-span2, a three-hour discussion of that day, what led up to it and its aftermath. we have three authors joining >> >> he did you ask the question why did japan attacked the you want negative to united states quick. >> my conclusion was they did not know what they we're doing to be exact reckon
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nobody was responsible they felt nobody was brave enough to say this war is crazy so let's stop and somebody else should be blamed but with uh dictatorship to feel that they had to keep up appearances so it was very a complicated to pass on the responsibility to each other >> mine is the same almost of deep into the abyss and was more of an attack of hope more than of a strategic calculation. remember coming attack on o pearl harbor was only a
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small part of what japan was doing bad day all across the pacific.we we knew what was likely to be happening elsewhere as its were moving forces toward singapore malaysia the dutch east and that was their primary objective and that was an added element primarily i think because physically it was the only thing in the pacific that could interfere with their plans elsewhere but basically day idea that it was on a fairly shaky foundation. >> the great example is yamamoto the will see the the japanese cannot possibly attack americans it is
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suicide you cannot win the war but the rest of the ndp is fearful and actually he was assigned to stand the battleship to keep that from happening and then he plansing e attack on pearl harbor he had to quit the service twice to make that happen he is famous call the reluctant admiral the attack on america was reluctant. >> host: december 7, 1984 -- 84. >> guest:, what happened? >> learning about the americans that were attacked those japanese air crews came in and as they did they said farewell it was a last day after being stationed
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they were going to return to california cahan but they decided to use their pilots bisons better low tiny airplane seats to the first american's taken down by the fighters on their way to pearl harbor disallows low 20 planes it is astonishing to me but those with the first casualties. >> host: 8:00 in the morning as they flew a in to oahu bike. >> 96 ships the average agesare9 19 they are tiny kid they have no idea about what is to happen i need not even know they were sore at does
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that is so far removed they were. with stated the art torpedoes as they fall into the water than they strike the target to create a state of the art naval explosions that would hit the arizona and then you see them with that famous north shore of oahu and they said cannot believe we're looking at this. >> host: steve twomey your subtitle is the tool days to the attack, what happened quick. >> the reason for collecting noat timeframe the japanese
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left the november 26 from their secret assembly point that would take them 12 days to get to hawaii over 3,000 miles and during those 12 days, the united states was collecting clues of one kind or another. i mentioned that we knew the japanese forces were moving toward the southwest pacific from the agents on the coastt and the commercial ships to mask the movement with the military offensive.about
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and something was about to happen. into that is how much we anticipate but judgments and decisions were made in many cases and the results representative the end of the period. >> host: was pearl harborar a surprise? as th >> with the japanese attack in then to discuss pearl harbor.
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end in january was concerned prior to the declaration and that kept coming up in noticeably and a report in march in which the army general and a navy admiral pretty much the rise exactly what would happen as if they had gotten into the future to see what had happened they foresaw the air attack on hawaii, of course, we never would have detected. a surprise attack on pearl harbor was not with the reality was. >> what was going?: well, >> remember japan was
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already at war in 1941 and had engaged in this conquest from this exit plan already and fighting china up. and they conquered the east but don't get the country under control. and leaping from victory to victory but they're not winning the war. so people are starting to wonder if this war that was quickly supposed to be over in one month after four years it had not ended and the most acute sign of this mindanao which way it was going but the system went into effect april 1941 and
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the main target was race with a huge stable of the japanese diet's.y have r as long as they have price their healthy but they don't have the of rice. it is imported and even then they have to denuded -- dilute it. but before 1941 all major to dard politician cities have a rationing system which was quite scandalous they cannot really questioned the authority because of the war economy
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and there is no independent press to speak of in 1941 with the manchurian it - - newspaper they were trying to boost their circulation t with the campaign but once you start that self-censorship it is difficult to turn back around but from now on we are criticizing you.you. so that was escalated and bye wr 1941 there was more regulations of the everyday aspects of people's life that they felt uncertain they also knew of going into china in the summer of 41 and that was retaliated by the american embargo so low
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they fell to that japan was cornered into this situationua of the economic side only because they wanted tond survive. they also wanted to believe there were doing this for their asian neighbors as well that was part of the claim in the official rhetoric. so they have these emotions and uncertainty also wanting to get on with life in and just move on. >> host: why did japan attack china? >> for a number of reasons
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but there was a genuine fear coming from the soviet union. also there was a sense of imperialism because all of western powers said they were happy to keep it divided until they realized that perhaps they were westernized and chiang kai-shek maybe it next leader of china sunday decided to keep a unified which japan did not like. said they felt they should be protecting chinese and byan
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extension, asian interest on bill whole. it was their backyard basically and they felt they had a special regional interest.at >> host:, a craig nelson how significant was it when fdr move to the naval base to pearl harbor? to death threat in japan? >> not really. he thought that would calm down their ambitions against the chinese we were very close at the time actually they were thinking they were our natural allies in the fight against russia. but he was convinced he had to fight twice on the issue in fact, he lost his jobha fighting with fdr on the topic.
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specifically it was to make japan nervous but that did not work. but i want to explain one of the great conflicts we see a it this moment is the united states is looking at thehe japanese leaders like we would look at the nazis' unified force of fascism united behind a commonon dictator and way of life but none of it was true the japanese leadership would change 15 times over the course of the war. the navy was fighting with the self the army was fighting. they were fighting with everybody they just went from crisis to crisis the most chaotic government and one of my points that it is difficult to go up against an enemy. >> politics played a role?
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to make a guess you cannot separate what was about to happen from what was happening in the atlantic. the fact of the war in the atlantic was paramount in roosevelts mind in terms of using american resources to keep the british in the war against the germans. in fact, there was a shooting war in the atlantic ocean american naval ships word escorting convoys to britain and were given orders to shoot on sight for every submarining countered and that was happening in fact, a couple of destroyers were sunk with loss of life prior to pearl harbor. so as a result he was scripting ships in hawaii much to the objection of the
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pacific fleet. last thing roosevelt wanted was a war precisely because of the ability to help of british they were sustained in part from those resources coming from a the far east and any war would disrupt that chain of resources but the american eight navy would shift the ships back and very famously at one point roosevelt wrote to a member of his cabinet as saying is simply don't have enough ships to go around to fight a war in both places and his preference was the atlantic's but yes geopolitics was a major reason for what wasng happening. >> host: about them to booktv on c-span to with our monthly program where we
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have one author or one topic discussed three hours with your phone calls and social media comments.. this month the 75th anniversary of the attack on pearl harbor. world war ii veterans really above to hear from me who or those who remember pearl harbor. 620,000 veterans are still surviving according to the veterans administration.
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us,@book tv is our twitter handle. we'll get to your calls just as quickly as we can. let me tell you just a little bit about our three authors. let's begin with eri hotta. her book is called "japan, 1941" and came out just a couple years ago and he is also taught at oxford university in the past. born in tokyo. craig nilsson -- i'm sorry, steve twomey next. his book is called "countdown to pearl harbor, the 12 days to the attack." he won a pulitzer prize for feature writing at the philadelphia inquirer and then worked to "washington post" for many years and has taught at new york university and city university of new york. and finally, craig nelson, his most recent back is called "pearl harbor from infamy to greatness." a former vice president and executive editor of harper and rowe, high peeran and random house. some of his other books include rocket men ex-epic story of the first men on the moon and author
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of the first heroes. the extraordinary story of the doolittle raid. >> guest: -- >> guest: -- would who superior of the major players heading up to pearl harbor. >> guest: it's eye ron yankee you ask the question because i thought that all the japanese counterpart countries, like germany, italy uk, they have figs, key statesman, the problem with japan is they didn't have effective leaders. they had a handful of fairly ineffective leaders who, by the sheer force of their weak personalities, remained in power, and i think the utmost example is hirohito, who is -- >> host: emperor.
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>> guest: empour empour ore. he wait to supposed to inter fear will politics over the felt like he had a veto power was what reluctant to use it, according to his potion war confession. >> host: could he have stopped pearl harbor. >> guest: i personally do. many people disagree but i think the fact that he felt he needed to explain why he didn't intervene and exercise a veto power after -- immediately after -- a few years after the war. that's very telling because he probably himself felt that he needed to explain and probably could have done so. his reasoning was that he thought if he didn't go along with the joint decision of the military civilian government, that was put up to him, to
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pursue diplomacy or military or -- he would be undermining the military. probably felt there could be a diplomatic breakthrough within the time frame, which is really too optimistic in hindsight but might have felt it because somebody else in the government, prime minister, from conway, who was for three years prime minister of japan out of four years leading up to the war on and off. he is another weak, ineffective leader who managed to perpetuate his bauer because of his weakness and indecisiveness. he was from the second novelist from the japan -- almost like the second emperor, and because he was a prince and he felt that prime ministership was really beneath him, and even if hi makes a mess of something,
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somebody else will cover for him. that was his attitude all the way through. he escalated the china war in 1937. he allowed a very bombastic and rather maniacal minister to reach an alliance with germany and itfully the fall of 1940. he didn't really pursue the opportunity to back out of that infamous alliance when they had a chance after the operation when hitler attacked soviet union and the alliance should have no longer held, and that would have impressed on the american mind that japan was really serious about the peace negotiation with washington. he didn't pursue any of that. then he went ahead and okayed the southern occupation of -- couples of southern indo-china
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which roosevelt was really -- said he felt like he had a cold bath or something like that. don't know the exact quote. he was waiting to hear from the japanese, a reply to this proposal that he -- roosevelt came up with which is really conciliatoriy. if japan decided to with draw from southern indo-china, its troops, roosevelt would make slur that the whole of indo chinese peninsula would be neutralized which should have minute a whole different history for at the region as well. roosevelt wanted to make indo-china the switzerland of southeast asia which could have tipped the balance. one thing roosevelt tried to do for conway was not to link the chronic china war problem with the most recent indo chinese
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appears so that he would -- conway would have a chance to save his face. conway didn't really pursue that. he again made this deal with the military, okay,'ll let you mobilize for the war and continue with this really bombastic war rhetoric, if you let me go talk to roosevelt in person. and have a conference, possibly in hawai'i. hawai'i kept come can back as a mid-point of the peace conference location. and i think he believed that it was possible because roosevelt seemed quite keen to do it. we never know how truly engage head was but roosevelt was that adverse to this kind of theatrical statesmanship where great things were decided by great men in one sitting two sittings like in churchill. >> host: craig nelsonnor,er
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noding your headey about roosevelt attending a conference. >> guest: the great moment in pearl harbor history because the last civilian prime minister that we have, was very sincere about setting this up and really all of these manipulations in the japanese government. you left oust he liked to eat and he was followed by geisha with a bowl out water and he would swish around fish in the dish and put it in his mouth. he spent the first term being very pro-war and pro-military, and all of this, and then he became prime minister again and then became antimilitary. the roosevelt administration saw the hawks and the previous
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stands said, we can't take their seriously, and conway went so far as to have a chip standing by to take him to oklahoma where he would meet with the prosecute aboard a battleship and then the roosevelt administration passes on it and if hey that idaho gone through pearl harbor would not have happened. >> host: why did was it passed on. >> guest: didn't trust the secretary of state and his vote was the dissf vote. his ambassador in tokyo was pushing for the meet can very hard. the thought it was a sincere offer and thought there was nothing to lose by agreeing to some sort of conference but hall wanted to know almost upfront a soviet american era summits where everything is decided long before they get there. hull wanted to know exactly what the outlines of the deal were going to be, and when they couldn't get that he was determined not to have that
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meeting. >> host: well, to mark the 75th areas of pearl harbor, c-span's american history tv is joining booktv for the first hour of this "in depth." now, american history tv is on c-span3 every weekend with archival films, tours of historic places, lectures in college classrooms and much more. now, for viewers interested in american history, and want to know more about pearl harbor you can watch next saturday, december 10th, start agent 8:00 a.m. eastern -- at 8:00 a.m. eastern time. american history tv on c-span3 will have the december 7th december 7th ceremony from both pearl harbor and the world war ii memorial in washington, dc, first personality accounts from pearl harbor veterans and civilians, fdr's speech to congress requesting a declaration of war, and live viewer call-ins with historians. that's all live on american history tv on c-span3 next
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saturday. well, we're live here and glad our american history tv audience is with us as well. we'll put the phone numbers up on the screen and let's take some calls from viewers. roger in east lake, ohio, you're on the air. >> caller: i'm glad you guys are talking about this. there's been a story -- a story i heard back in the '60s i've been wondering about. supposedly it was told by a guy who was a p.o.w. in a philippine p.o.w. camp, and was supposedly high up in -- anyway, the japanese had invaded manchuria, and the russians had troops on the manchurian border to protect the country and what was supposed to have happened, according to there is guy, is that the japanese and the nazis were attacked at the same time,
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forcing russia to run a two-front war and then -- >> host: roger, all three of our authors write about that. craig in the son. >> guest: what was going on was . >> actually was going on with the soviets were invading russia and the japanese were completely taken aback. they had a treaty with stolid and -- stalin and they thought they were on top of the world they actually thought the baby a u part of the united nations and they were completely taken aback and then, just like hitler turned on stalin to read the next call pleaset: go ahead. >> caller: as the japanese
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diplomatic codes were already open by the time the war was started so the fdron administration knew what was going on and i also understand that the american aircraft carriers were said to waive pearl harbor just before the attack occurred so of the japanese were attacking military targets. it appears the admiral and his men were betrayed by the fdr of frustration. then the american responsen was to attack civilian targets to drop napalm on cities like tokyo so what is the response to that? xx raises several points i
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could go through them quickly we did break the diplomatic code meeting theet messages between tokyo and washington for about one year but at no time were there any indications in those messages that pearl harbor itself was a target for attack. and there be no reason for the fourth ministry to include those ambassadors to say war was coming particularly giving thewa confusion of the japanese government who was doing what with the second point regarding the aircraft carriers i think this is evidence of new somebody knew something was coming the two aircraft carriers that were in pearl harbor were in deed away but they reach dispatched on specific missions they were behavingerry
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like fed ex taking airplanes to the outpost in the pacific. there not told to get out because anybody believed an attack was coming it was pure coincidence and extremely was fortunate but the third aircraft carrier was of the west coast and it had been there for some time . saw the adn that they were ordered out because somebody knew it was coming at all think is incredible argument >> part of the question i think of course, is unfortunate civilians were bob over and over but put that in the context of the history of how japan figured into the picture as well.rld wa
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the westin - - the western world was attacked but then the japanese followed suit and then during the trial now war. i am not excusing the civilian targets but it was part of the total war ito's they thought that they were preparing for even if the declaration of war was decided people were asking what tokyo gets bombed? that was in that back for the front of their mind. >> what i would like to address is the admiral received 56 pages of warnings of the japanese from washington in 1941 than he received additional warnings from his own staff had he received warnings from british intelligencee of wi some of which still has notec
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yet been declassified he did not send to washington so the conspiracy theory is washington with howled and if all the key receive those three year for he would have done something? the site could lineup is incompetency behavior or the sting is in detention -- hisit'm intention that was not possible. >> admiral did not have good job much longer? t >> actually thought he was treated quite well by theos roosevelt administration he himself removed his star birds from his shoulders and devoted himself and was then placed on the retired last day kept their salary and pension and their title at the time of the demotion but
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they could not be in charge if anyone going forward. i thought they were treated very well but in the courtin of public opinion accuse them of being responsible w and they were. that is why we have this theth descendants trying to restore their reputation. >> host: coming from georgia that afternoon. >> caller: so how far is nagasaki from japan? >> host: what was your role of world war ii? >> i was in the navy. guest:
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i was of machine-gunas a g operator. >> host: what years did you serve? >> 43 until the war was over >> host: you mentioned you went through pearl harbor it was still a mess in 1943? >> base still had twisted steel out of the water and topside it wanted to show was what happened he was quite young and said those people our comrades are downthez here talking about arizona up. >> host: have you been back to visit in the 75 years? >> no i have not.
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i have obscene the tv series . but that my time it was uh hong of twisted steel what anybody want to respond? >> even today it is a pretty moving place to go. you cannot not be moved by standing on the platform of the arizona memorial to be gazing down at the arizona.so, a i cannot imagine what would have been like 1943, even more graphic and compelling. >> host: if you are aou world war ii veteran or lived through the area to share your experience, we want to hear from you as well.eve twom
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how long did the attack last's t ? >> it is interesting to note in military terms it really wasn't catastrophic in retrospect. the japanese did not find the american aircraft carriers in the harbor twitch proved pivotal in the coming months of the war. and they did not attack the infrastructure the drydocksh weq or the farms that were quite visible because they do nottu have natural resources doesn't have oil or coal it all had to be brought from england and it was all sitting there. and many of the ships that were damaged actually were repaired and found their way back into the war most
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notably bottles shipped west virginia one of the eight that was in the harbor wound up in tokyo bay on the day of the surrender 1945 and was repaired and fought through all of the war and the battleship was there one of the most wreck on december 7 was actually off the coast of pharmacy 1944 with the invasion of franceing o providing bombardment cover t for troops. strictly in military terms settled think it was the greatest psychologically prepare it was overwhelmingin. and obviously still is. >> what was the reaction in japan? >> overall was euphoria
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because they were fighting a war in china with no end and now they attacked a western power successfully so they could justify the war they were fighting in china from the western power. so i think that ingrained sense of colonialism, we tend to overlook that but the japanese in general and they could not change that. what a shame but it was thetr way to demonstrate that they could be brilliant at something.ma >> of course, it could be an indication of what they felt inside.
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some people knew about the of western powers so there were reasons to fear and the diaries are quite telling to have a very cool mind and i to say this will last. >> as your book been translated into japanese? >> i translated myself. [laughter] i recommended to anybody but i am glad that i did it because quite of lot is lost in translation or
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misinterpreted. so to make sure if you speak the language you write the language. >> host: it is for sale in japan greg. >> yes. one other thing? >> the major newspaper prize which was humbling to me because i thought it would be very touchy like why are you right thing but i could not have the wrong. maybe the government didn't others were receptive to my riding. >> but you use a phrase in your book to talk about that japanese character one is the face and what is the real meaning? >> that it could be
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translated as the public face. >> did that affect your research? >> yes. all the time with the setter not said for example, you have to look between theet lines. to be more significant also you get a sense in the conference proceedings perceived them there is a lot of disparity and people speak from both ends ofut mouth but quadruple talking sometimes into don't really know who the inner voice maybe but you just have to imagine yourself looking at photographs and trying to overcome the differences. >> craig nelson, with the
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japanese archives were they organized? >> every time i got into the very easily to of them but trying to get into the naval school archives they would not let me in every time i tried to find out why they came up with a new reason i called caroline kennedy ambassador's office i just wanted an answer why. >> we don't have any interest or we cannot open that right now.d and i had my translator there to say he is a japanese writer coming to america has never been treated this way. but i do want to follow-upbout e with the public can private face a couple of months after pearl harbor called
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day conference to say it is such a shame that roosevelt noted the emperor came to light if he would've come earlier it would unchanged everything and then said it by tried to stop there wouldld have the coup d'etat and i would have been assassinated so there were two differentt interpretations.ja >> here is one pitcher from the book of craig nelson assistant secretary of the navy franklin roosevelt, 1914 at the brooklyn navy yard watching the keel of the ship of uss arizona. >> finding this is like losing. two months before assassinated seven years
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before he gets polio and is paralyzed so here he is that the height of his happiness. he loves the navy so much he raises their budget every year and tell marshall makes him cut it out. and dino some of you feel its was in brooklyn. >> host: california book t v on c-span to the 75th anniversary of pearl harbor. >> caller: yes. i have a question. can anybody confirm or deny the actions of the assistant secretary of state dean acheson in respect to
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circumvent the desires or the policy of fdr concerning the fuel embargo that congress passed for japan? >> keyword nodding your headnod bin right to work in concert with the treasury secretary behind the back of fdr. with that embargo that he could jerk those reins now and then if he wanted to pull the strings. and while he was at a conference of the coast of newfoundland treasury used their abilities to shut down the japanese to exert the fall embargo's a your correct. >> host: steve twomey well was u.s.-japanese relations u leading up to 1941 greg.
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>> the relationship was pretty good compared with a word emerging world powers and in fact, on december 6 he wrote his famous letter to the emperor seeking to find a way around the problem my belief heth referred to the longstanding relationship of the two countries but it was clear these were the only to countries of strength in the pacific and certainly i think if the american navy had been preparing for years as the japanese had with the possibility of conflict over control in the pacific most navy board games in the pacific comment and in
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particular as the years drew closer, the prospect of japan to be the adversary was obvious to all and that to longstanding good relationship gradually faded away. >> host: there seems to be a lot of intrigue in tokyo, eri hotta and the '30's and 40's. >> based similar problemsit wase just because economically it was hard around the world but in japan that temptation to look back which could be i think that held sway over of the of military location
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that they should be one and they're doing that in china. but to blame lawyer problems a o on foreign policy socially. >> what is the phrase torah toward torah? >> be origen's. >> i don't know bitterly. >> i do know literally but i do not know why that was used as the success of the operation. >> is at the first time it was used by. >> as first guy knows. >> it was code for the torpedoes attack if they went in first if not the dive bombers would go first.
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>> so for. >> listening to the program earlier talking about the regime that there were 178 teeing turnovers whether china or japan 22 clarified at and also my cousin was in hawaii at the time of the attack. >> we will start with the japanese government, how many were there and what wase going on in a general sense greg. >> 1941. they were not sure if the change of government was happening china or japan? >> it was japan.
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but it was attended to be the main character that was the decision that was said chance to reverse it so up until then that the prime minister was in power in the fall of 1942. >> because of the lack of leadership? >> if that caller wanted to find a of relative quiet. >> i assume they mean the navy one is through a naval
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heritage and history commandords the service record should be one of those sad if not him google how do i find him?ho said >> who said we have awakened the sleeping giant and instilled in him a terrible resolve. >> originally yamamoto said y that the commander-in-chief fle. i do not know if it is established fact that he actually said that, but itle reflected his sentiment that the united states would be e an extremely formidable opponent. and both times what bayta military attache at different levels had traveled around the country country, he spoke in english
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even went to an eye of was a northwestern football game and he had an appreciation also a big fan of abraham lincoln, but an appreciation for the industrial power of the united states that and seemingly in limitless natural resources and understood any long war the united states could replace its losses much quicker than japan which of course, turned out to be thehe case but his boat was noted sta. the deciding vote. sort of but he was responding i think what was regarded as the inevitable decision i cannot stop what will happen swy will make the best of it by launching the surprisehi attack on pearl harbor to eliminate the threat to his
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ships in the pacific and the heather japanese offensive that was planned for that time. she was making the best of b the bad situation wherete there was said or not accurately reflects. >> host:. >> annie to go back so this is a great example of internet history we have awakened the sleeping giant there are thousands of citations. h when i did my citations to find out exactly when and where he said this site could not find it. it was made up for the movie tora, tora, tora based on a letter that he wrote. but what i love what we have not discussed it is the momentous battle he lost two
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fingers so his nickname was 80 because at that time and manicure cost 100. >> so why of the first of our interpretations of that code was knowing where he was flying and those that were battling in court to this day. >> marking the 70th anniversary of american history tv has joined us for h the first hour they've will be going away at this point but american history tv on c-span three a. every weekend. for the viewers who are interested and want to learn more join american historyhistor team beat next saturday
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morning beginning at 8:00 a.m. eastern you will see the ceremonies from pearl harbor and the world war ii memorial in washington with first-person accounts and the fdr speech to congress. . .
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i was able to attend college with two pearl harbor japanese survivors. it set me back at first in japan in 195 1958 i've established an academic relationship with some of the japanese which turned into a very positive social relationship primarily with the family that survived world war ii.
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>> is to think 75 years ago we were on the brink of war is also moving for me to be here discussing pearl harbor in this room in washington. and washington has always been the symbol for the relationship and friendship. do not assert complaints misjudge. >> host: how many americans were in japan and how many got stuck there throughout the war? >> guest: th >> guest: the number isne around 100.
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they included people with passports and who were stuck in japanese propaganda. there are many books to be written about as far. the japanese ambassador to japan in the counterpoint he was married to someone who was a grand niece enforced japan open to western trade by the diplomacy it was very much a sentimental appointment for him as well for him to see the progress of the society that his relatives helped to unleash but then suddenly crumble within a minute of seven or eight years.
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he was a great promoter ofas japanese interest. nobody could make sense of this but he tried his best in his letters to fdr. i think that he explains better than anybody in the japanese government could have. he was almost an english of what was happening to the company that he liked very much. they were filled with this is not the country i love what i see around me and he tried very hard i think to what he suspected was coming and i believe when the war broke out everyone in the embassy ofeverye course was returned and eventually they were exchanged
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and the members of the japanese embassy were actually exchanged on the east coast of africa. >> host: 1943, wasn't it? >> guest: i think it was 1942. the ships have left respectively from new york and i'm not sureve where in japan. it was half wha at what i thinkt mozambique and they knew each other and respected each other. he was afraid during this meeting, during this swap that they would meet and would be an uncomfortable minuncomfortable y did beat literally walking down the street of the city in which the exchange d d was occurring,d he resolutely kept by his
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foreword. it hurt him to ignore his friend, that if our diplomatic niceties protocol that required him not to acknowledge the other country. so it was a very painful experience. >> host: i think i read that they were kept in the heartstrings of virginia. >> guest: they said the united states and japan were like two children into this wouldn't havo happened. but we also found out that it was the double cross named after the other japanese ambassador.
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>> host: the next call is from a dwight. >> caller: macarthur didn't prepare very well before they hit the philippines. second, no one ever seems to talk about the diplomatictalk ao attaché to hawaii at the time who was actually spying for the japanese and was commenting to japan on the number of ships would they leave or be there and also he did work and we never heard anyone talk about him very much but thank you for your comments. >> host:
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>> guest: i spent quite a bit of time with the japanese spy. he would act like a good time charlie and he was a drinker and the reason he did that is he was working for the japanese navy. outside of the embassy, he was the greatest tourist that hawaii had ever seen. he went swimming in the channel, he did everything in fact he went to a famous teahouse to get a view of pearl harbor so i went to get the exact same thing and he spoke many times at how wonderful it was to be tended to. you can't see any of pearl harbor from their. >> guest: he was much more of
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a self promoter than a spy. you could hardly call him a spy. what he was doing anyone could do. it was an easy thing to see if you just climb up a little bit into the hills we could all stand there and count the shipsu just like he did. he had some experts identifying individual types of ships that he inflated much of his own legend as the years went on. he did send back reports and they were essential but i think that he became more blondish as the years went on in his own mind. i don't want to understate his significance. he was providing vitalital intelligence including the day before the attack telling tokyo what i thought was a subordinate
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advising superiors a little bit too much. he said this looks like a goodli opportunity for a surprise attack. i'm not sure that it was a good thing to put that in a message that code and in fact was intercepted.rcepted. so i agree he is in trouble to the story. >> on the first question yes it was an eight hour domain between the philippines and be hawaii was attacked. it may be that in fact heame couldn't imagine that in that experience. >> i think that it bothered him to the end of his life that he was so vilified, and macarthur somehow escaped penalty for being surprised any of us excusable way and macarthur of course went on to great fame and
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he was only heard of any negative sense for the rest ofor his life. >> host: 8 a.m. in honolulu, what time was it in washington and how quickly did washington find out about the attack? >> guest: washington found out about it was 8 a.m. in hawaii for 1:30 in the afternoon on sunday in washington. the first word of the secretary of the navy received was from a messenger who showed up at his office where he was at that point talking with the chief of naval operationsand i believe the assistant chief of naval operations was there so the three of them are there and he hands him a message as the ranking person. he was a civilian newspaper guy that had been the republican vice presidential candidate in
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1930s as.idn't he didn't really know the naval message terminology. he looked at the message and said out loud this must be the philippines, it has to be in a error. he took the message and he knew the lingo and said this is perl telling them there is a raid underway at the moment. at that same moment or perhaps little before, he came out and stood on his lawn. he lived in brand-new quarters, residents built for the commander-in-chief of the pacific fleet on a little volcanic rise. the house is still the quarters of the commander-in-chief of the pacific fleet and it overlooks the harbor. you can get a very clear view.
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he'd received a telephone call about a report regarding a submarine attack off the channel and then someone on the phone told him there is an air raid underway and i'm surprised he needed to know that by radio but he stepped out into the yard and he could see what was happening beneath him. that is one of the most poignant moments in american history. he had a spotless record up until that point. everything he does he'd succeeded at. the decisions he'd been making in the previous 12 days were now literally blown up before his eyes and he knew his career was over at that point, this was going to be a catastrophe unfolding beneath him. his neighbor, the wife of one of his officers and described his
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face as being as white as uniform and you really feel for him that he could be so wrong, and of course it got no better from that point forward. >> host: so washington knewt: w within minutes.ashi >> guest: i would say yes. communications between the two were far less sophisticated. we had no satellites that could be minced and television pictures back over the distance. there were no tv stations on the hawaii and broadcasting live. it actually in his remarks that evening to the cabinet, roosevelt was only able to provide sketchy details of what happened. they knew that it was bad and that of many people have been killehad beenkilled but the tote strike was still difficult to find out and i think remains so.
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they were not anxious to make the public. >> he had his press secretary told the press we are saying that 300 died and when cbs among others said our affiliate in hawaii are saying it's worse than that now when you go to thg december 8 headlines of the newspapers you will see 300 perished. >> host: 1178 were wounded and craig nelson reports in his book pearl harbor from infamy to greatness that burns constituted 60% of the injured. let's hear from raymond of indiana on the world war iika veterans line.e. you are on book tv. good afternoon. >> caller: thank you. good afternoon to you guys. i was a veteran of world war iir and served in the philippines
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and d-day in ogallala.my -- okinawa. we went to pick up the bypass soldiers and sailors and made several trips but our -- when we held guard duty at the medics we looked at that and said where did you learn how to write back and he said ucla. yes i graduated last year. they had to stay another two weeks and my relatives would stay another two weeks.
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we took 20 some thousand men back on the tank. others were friendly and stuff like that. we were doing different things out there and said that was part of the propaganda and you are out there because of what the americans were doing. that's part of the story that i like to tell people.
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there were a lot of people that were very friendly and always smiling and stuff like that. >> host: have you visited some of the sites that you participated in world war ii? >> guest: i've never been there but in my teenage years when i was 18 i got drafted out of high school and my heart is out there quite a bit. i was a high school monitor up until a couple of years ago and i always stopped to find out where they are from. one girl a year or so ago said she was from okinawa and so we got talking a little bit and things really changed. she's taller than i am and most of the people there were shorter.of
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i was about 5 feet 8 inches and now i'm down to about 5 feet 7 inches. >> host: how old are you? >> guest: i will be 91 pretty soon. >> host: thank you for calling in. what would you like to say to him? >> guest: iem moved by these real words people going through that some of those experiences. i wish you would write these things down so that later generations can benefit. >> host: what about japanese veterans in world war ii? >> guest: i think some people keep their memories to themselves. some are more active about writing things down. there is an archive in various places and film interviews as well but not enough i don't think. not enough people are looking that up but as long as they are
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there the memory soon slips away. do any of you know i know there are five men still living from the uss arizona attacked but who were on that day do you know what any of the survivors from j pearl harbor? >> guest: if there are they are probably this week but i don't know that. that was his nickname and he was quite a fascinating character was the lead pilot and pearl harbor and he trained the aircrews in a somewhat state-of-the-art techniques. my favorite is how they figured out how to torpedo because they had to launch them in the
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shallow water and they found out that the american naval aviator followed it and it worked. that's why you have so many reports of people being able to see the faces. when we drop the torpedoes into the water splashed up and hit our wings renew. >> if you did know that. >> one of the interesting aspects of the attack with any warning at all with just an hour even they were the most
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vulnerable because they were sot low and might not have been able to do the damage they did because if any aircraft fire hae been there they would have been hard to miss. but the fact that it was still unaware and unable to go forward first which was essential because by far the greatest damage was done by torpedoes to the battleships and so that's why at any number of places that morning of reports had been taken more seriously, at least it could have been all hands on deck and waiting for the boats coming. >> host: you told the story ofof the life. >> there is reconciliation at the end and i got to hear it from both sides.
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one was jacob was taken prisoner by the japanese and he was sort of treated as a war criminal and he was abused in prison and a sorsortof came to awakening andd his life over to religion and christianity when he realized he couldn't forgive these people, it would change his life and it did and many years later he was preaching in japan and he came across david pilot in the attack who was also lost and outlawed during the period when the japanese had repudiated the history and he sort of fell under this talk and they end up preaching together and so all the descendents now still live in california.
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the next call is from sean. [inaudible] >> caller: they came to the plantations during the day of the attack a generation that had become american japanese one of them was part of the air national guard and during the attack he had to secure them in places.
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he was brought in running towards her and she was in fear of her life. it's no surprise into the second thing is i leave off with a question for the military installations and i want you to comment on it. >> guest: is on the eastern side of the island. they have a memorial there anda there will be a memorial service
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coming up. one thought on the beach thatase day. i want you to talk about the other installation as well.stala >> host: thank you. >> guest: the greatest defense was the army air corps which were based into there was also a naval air station where the caller is from. they would have incredible heroism because all the planes under the order of the army commanders had been lined up to protect against sabotage so they made fantastic targets comingsao straight for him but they were taken out and completely
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devastated. they were all on their way to pearl harbor and so it happens when a 32-year-old says he's not going to take it anymore and pulls a machine gun out and sets it up on the apron and starts taking down japanese planes. then he has to make a little base for him so he can keep doing this. the hospital said he was shocked 30 times. he was bleeding from 30 wounds including his scalp was torn open and at the end of all thisn he said it wasn't my day to die and he wanted the medal of honor. >> guest: it's interesting there was an enormous amount of instant heroism on the part of people, the ships and bases but in fact it was a very one-sided engagement. we didn't shoot down all that
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many japanese planes i think it was 29 or 39 or something like that., someth not to diminish there was heroism of the ships that give a medal to all those that acted heroically that they the whole crew would have gotten a medal but roosevelt was asked that night when he was addressing the cabinet how many of them did we get and he quickly tapped out the notion that this was a fair fight. >> host: ten years ago johnson was at the anniversary and this is a picture of him with some of the covert. >> guest: that's the greatest thing. what did you think of that and affleck movie pearl harbor andd he said the actresses were very pretty. v [laughter] >> host: anything you want to add to the conversation at this
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point?his >> guest: line just overwhelmed by the tales of heroism and also feel sad that you have the bad luck of being born to the wrong side and have to show commitment to the statee that's supposed to protect you, which the japanese state event you just have to keep giving and giving and giving. it is such an unfair world. leading up to pearl harbor. >> guest: i'm not so sure how accurate. i think the one problem is the newspapers repeated many of the reports of the home country that anybody could be suspect and involved in the translation of that kind of information.
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that is quite a blurry line although i might be stating the obvious but after 40% of the population were american japanese ancestry and the irony of attacking that is so enormous and the fact the location was proposed many times a has the peace talks venue is double ironic. >> host: well, we know the internment camps happened for americans on the mainland. did they happen in japan as well? ask hi, if you did and they were mostly caused in the mountainous resort type of places so it happens. >> host: appear from michael
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in georgia. thank you all for taking my calls. i am an african-american and a veteran of the vietnam war. in the spring of 1944, my father was sent to georgia. [inaudible] he was discharged so i call is about the propensity on white supremacy that has been a part not by having americans prepared. do you think maybe if they would have taken germans could have
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picked troops to the philippines without all the talk between?ar it seems they would have applied the philippines midway and it was ready. >> host: all three of you talk about the issue of racism in different ways. let's go around the table.yo let's start with you. >> guest: it could have been prevented. >> host: you can take that however you want. we talk about the issue that there was colonial of wisdom. >> guest: you can blame a loss on these things, but the decision to enter the war that t you are certain you are not going to bring doesn't really compare to the history. it's the reading of the point.
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you can explain resentful feelings that many japanese need or is included. succumbing you can explain them that there is no excuse for m misjudgment and calamitous decisions that you make for other people, the decisions you are supposed to be meeting and forget things so that's my feeling about it. i think the feeling of being cheated out of was very real and has always been since the opening of japan in 1860, all the restoration. >> host: how do you look at itit and count down to pearl harbor? >> guest: i think superiority is a major explanation for why the attack happened. i think the best evidence of that i would start with is that shortly after the attack, there
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were rumors in washington and congress that the germans have helped plan the attack and some of them have actually flown thee attack planes. this reflected an east coast and the military that the japanese were a second-tier military power. their planes didn't work very well, their aircraft carriers were not very good and bad in somthat insome cases they were physiologically and they would try to counteract this tendency that they'if they'd been born ir new japan and try to educate the superiors that they can actually fly their planes and they make the pilots but it was a very hard mentality to overcome as
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one of the officers in the navy department said the press was just filled with how we beat them in a minute and it would take nothing at all to overcome japan because they are not that good. when you have that kind of mentality, i think that it walls you into a belief that this thing that you theoretically imagined could have happened really couldn't have been. first is t has to do with mility intelligence agent that appears before the lead admirals in the department of the war and he does this incredible presentation on how the japanese aircrews have had ten years experience.y for the first two years of world war ii they couldn't hit in thing. the fighter plane in general posted within hours and then he's doing this heartfelt
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presentation of how we start treating them and people are on the table and start laughing. another story is after the attack happened, they said it's outrageous to me that they did this when everyone knows that america is superior to japan bue the favorite story involves an attendant aboard the uss virginia. mr. miller wanted to escape the sharecropper family but he wasn't able to join and instead he becambecame the heavyweight n of the ship and said why don't you hand me that ammunition.
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for his great bravery, he won the navy star but he died in the philippines and many people were upset that he didn't win the medal of honor. >> host: there he is gettingng>> an award. we are talking with craig dawson, steve twomey of the anniversary of pearl harbor and we will again we've got an hour and 25 minutes to go in our programs if you are on the line, don't enjumping up and if you ct through, try our social media avenues on booktv is our twitter handle. we want to show you one more
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book cover. we talke talk to them earlier ts week. >> host: where were you on december 7, 1941? >> guest:1941?guest >> aboard the uss arizona in pearl harbor. what were you doing there? sundy >> guest: it was just sunday morning and [inaudible] >> host: how did you get on the arizona, how long have you been in the navy? i h >> guest: a little over a year.
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>> host: did you enlist in the navy? >> guest: yes i did. >> host: by? >> guest: i was in nebraska and there wasn't much moneyfortn floating around. >> host: what was your job onon the arizona? [inaudible]] >> host: what did that entail? >> guest: maintenance around the guns that if things came out of the water we would clean the, up, whatever. >> host: what do you remember about december 7, walk us through that day. >> guest: i remember a lot of
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things. we were all up and around to the sleepy sunday morning. [inaudible] went to my locker to get w something and they were hollering about planes bombing pearl harbor.e
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i had to go up about five letters. >> host: once you reached your battle station wha but were youe to do? [inaudible] >> guest: [inaudible] we shouldn't shoot because the vessel was alongside so we showed a [inaudible]
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fusco you write in your new book all the gallant men about when the bombs hit arizona. what happened at that point? >> guest: at 2500-pound bomb and down and then a round ofn ps ammunition and the gasoline blew up part of the ship. >> host: did you see the fireball at the time? >> guest: how could you miss
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it. >> host: what did you recall about the noise or the smells? >> guest: it went about 600 feet in the air and just engulfed us. >> host: how did you get off>> the ship? >> guest: [inaudible] then we got a hold of the sailors over there [inaudible]
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so the line would carr carry acs and it took about four or five times to get over there. so we pulled it across and proceed to go hand over hand across that line which was about 70 or 80 feet. >> host: how long did the attack last? >> guest: i couldn't tell you that. >> 335 sailors got off the uss arizona. 1102 perished. >> host: ther there are four ofw surviving today. will you be going to the reunion this year the 75th anniversary? >> guest: i have every intention of being there. >> host: when do you leave for hawaii?
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>> guest: tomorrow. >> host: were you injured in the attack?or >> guest: part in? >> host: were you injured in the attack? what was the recovery process like? >> guest: it took a year. they sent me back to california and then from there medical discharge. had to go through boot camp and 120 through their.he they wanted me to stay there and then they had a request for the race.
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we were there in the latter pa part. then we went to pick up some troops. now we can tell people they were coming from japan.
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[inaudible] i had to finish school >> hudible] >> host: what did people thinkwh when you reenlisted in 1944? >> guest: how can i tell what they are thinking? >> host: you write about the fact that the draft board was a little perplexed. >> guest: i had to go through the draft board so i could go back into the service and they were not reluctant at all, they helped me very much.
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>> host: the other five survivors of the pearl harbor attack do you feel a special connection to them? >> guest: he was in with me and went across the line. him and i are the only ones that are still alive. >> host: why did you wait so long to put down your memoir? >> guest: living day-to-day and week to week nobody ever said anything about telling the story ended came out a little bit one-time led heard it and told her father and from that,
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that's how it happened. >> host: and that is the co-youa writer. you've also list in your book the failures of the u.s. military in planning for this attack and say the u.s. was not prepared, didn't communicate in this overconfident. >> guest: they actually didn't pay much attention to it and then the radar picked up all those things coming in from the north on the north side of theof islands and they said it'sng coming from the atlanta states that there were 200 planes and they didn't pay much attention
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to it. >> host: when you visit pearl harbor, does it all bring it back to life after that they? >> guest: it's something i think about every day. it's kind of hard but it's nice to go back and pay homage to the soldiers and sailors and all the other air force bases. bases. >> the survivor at the uss arizona on december 1941 the attack of pearl harbor is one of five still surviving. 335 men got off the ship that day, 1177 perished. thank you for spending a fewen minutes with us on booktv.
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>> thank you very much. >> guest: appreciate your time. it is a pleasure and an honor to talk with you. did you spend a lot of time, do you get a lot of information o from the survivor's? >> guest: my book wasn't about the survivors, so i didn't speak with any who are still with us. one of the things was to writein about something which i cannot interview people on the phone or in person. it was a new experience for meew to do that. fortunately the archival record is so voluminous that you can successfully i think get a sense of people's personality andd characters as you read what they are testifying to.
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plus there are many oralus histories and i think the great gap in our knowledge he testified a lot but wasn't given to writing. i don't believe he participated in any world histories and the letters he left behind at the university of wyoming don't really shed much on his thinking and actions. i would give anything to find the letters i'm certain he was writing to his life even months before the attack. >> host: have these oral histories and invaluable and if
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you find when we look at the 50s, 60s, 70s, 80s my theory is they were so traumatized by what happened toa them that it took until they were in their 60s, 70s and having grandchildren to breach that detail they suffered. it starts dying down again. >> host: is world war ii pearlci harbor discussed in the japanese schools like we discuss it here? >> guest: not at all. the motivator is i want to figure it out for myself.
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i first encountered this question why did you attack usus at pearl harbor. they had no idea and i tried to explain the dictatorship. they don't make sense together. so i questioned why did they launch a war they were sure to lose and it still doesn't make sense to me logically but i think i put my finger on the malfunctioning of the system and also the division of responsibility it's still a problem in japanese culture today. my book in japan the subtitle is called origins of japan. [laughter] not the very flattering. but it's the idea that if
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everybody is responsible therefore nobody is responsiblel the mentality is still there and the fact that the origins of world war ii and pearl harbor, the fact that it doesn't get discussed the problem is perpetuated in the cold war because america wanted awanted a powerful ally which by the way they don't want to upset the power that could rein in on this so it is a more rebellious leftist type that can challenge the order that was perpetuatedts despite the fall of the government many people stayed in power into the wartime symbol of the japanese greatness was perpetuated.
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it's nothing personal but the fact his institution was not responsible or that only a group of people that were tried at the trial were responsible it still degrades the whole question of f why did japan have to start the war to begin with but they woul? very much rather concentrate on their victimhood and survived the atomic bombs as if they survived in earthquake and tsunami. it's something to be expected but it doesn't solve the problem of why.
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i felt something was about to happen and seen the inevitable. so the move wasn't emotional or let's give them a taste. the first wave was an hour ahead of us i figured the first must-have already arrived by n now.and then, just then i finally saw something glittering white and i knew that it had to be the coastline.
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i headed out to the sending from an altitude finance the unit commander i made the assault.tho my mission was to suppress the attack that they were not there or at least we didn't know the actual location. at first i was disappointed because it would seem my targets were not there at all. the battleships were all lined up in tennessee, arizona, maryland and all that. nothing happened as a result of my attack. what i mean by that is they were
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already below the water line and i realized [inaudible] i saw a large object and we werr re- attacking the battleships h: that were already hit. .. >> guest: i couldn't hear the japanese clearly, but it made sense that he was doing the vast -- he was doing the best that he could do in the job that he was giving. there was no sort of like being a good student and demonstrating your skills and diligence. i think that's probably how they
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survive this war. so many things didn't make sense and so many things seemed meaningless, so i think you just needed to concentrate on the job in front of you. >> host: craig nelson, was there about a vengeance and later battles in this war? >> guest: you take this incredible moment that happened in the navy just responded with fury. the first in baghdad was the unexamined here is the pearl harbor, which was to salvage crews. they were able to resuscitate the 96 ships in the harbor. they brought back all three of them. in fact, the cover of my book has the horizontal bombers that is striking and is penetrating to its ammunition. so it is turning the ship is
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golf into a bomb hit the ship is back in business and taking part in the pacific campaign a year later. it's extraordinary to me they were able to do that. he had this outpouring so that they play four of the six japanese aircraft and the other two were essentially hunted down. it was used as a nuclear test target. you should call your book american rage. >> host: let's go now to our collars made by the way, we've got our phone lines set up by the social media. you can tweet us at nine booktv. join the conversation and of course e-mail book tv@c-span.org. larry, thanks for holding. you are on with our three authors. >> caller: yes, i'm greatly enjoying this. i'm 80 years old, but we were
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very well aware of what was going on having the blackout at night and the pulldown curtains. .. >> caller: and the medical experimentation on people with they termed as logs, so they dehumanize them, and no one was prosecuted after the war with
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for war crimes on that. and i just wondered who makes those decisions not to prosecute. in fact, you hardly each hear it mentioned -- even hear it mentioned anymore. on the history books, china doesn't even list tiananmen square, students that were killed there. they're not mentioned in their history books at all. >> host: all right. that's larry who was 5 years old when pearl harbor happened. any response for him, mr. twomey? >> guest: i would only say this, there's a terrific book -- and it's not mine finish. [laughter] called "war without mercy" about how savage the war in the pacific was on both sides. there were, certainly, racial beliefs on both sides that contributed to just enormous atrocities, far more than in europe, i think. and it's a fascinating book.
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i'm blanking on the name of the author, i think it's john dower -- [laughter] who just got a good plug. but i highly recommend that book to you for further discussion of just how awful that war was. >> host: albert is on the line, a veteran of world war ii from houston, texas. hi, albert. please go ahead. >> caller: hi. there was always this talk that roosevelt said it was a day of infamy and so on and so forth, but i could never understand why we were having blackouts on the island of oahu about six or eight months before, before the attack actually came. >> host: now, albert, where were you stationed during world war ii?
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>> guest: hickum until '41. >> host: how old are you, sir, may i ask? >> caller: i'm 96, i'll be 97 in january. >> guest: bless you. >> host: thank you so much for call anything and contributing. what about the blackouts. anybody? >> guest: they were routinely practicing prior to december 7th exactly that. hawaii had gone through preparations in terms of possible invasion for months. one of thes aspects of this -- the aspects of this that i think is most interesting to people is how militarized hawaii was prior to the attack. people were used to constant training by army and navy planes. you could hear the fleet practicing its gunnery over the horizon. military convoys clogged the roads all the time. honolulu was a booming city as the influx of army and navy troops kept building.
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and, yes, there were blackouts regularly planned and scheduled in preparation for, i think, what everyone knew was coming which was war. the local magazine, monthly magazine called "pair a rah dice of the pacific" -- paradise of the pacific, was constantly talking about what's just beyond the horizon. so air raid practice was a given. >> host: i think in one of your books you talk about the fact that husband kimmel, when he came on as chief, really boosted training very, very stringently. >> guest: that must have been you. [laughter] >> guest: he did. one of the reasons, the reason that so many people responded so quickly in the opening minutes of the attack was due to him. he had relentlessly trained the fleet in the ten months that he had been in charge. and and training was his thing.
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this was a task master, a drill sergeant for the entire fleet. nothing escaped his attention. no detail was too small for him to pay attention to, and people would point out to him that he probably shouldn't be paying that much attention. he couldn't help himself. but he practiced, he insisted on practicing maneuvers that everyone needed to be at their position, everyone knew, needed to know their job. and by the late fall, people were saying to him and in subsequent testimony they had never seen the fleet in better condition than it was at that moment. and so what happened after december 7th, he wasn't there to see it. but the performance of the navy was due to him. >> host: what's on the cover of your book? >> guest: it's a, an image of someone looking through the, through binoculars for an enemy. i think it's more
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representational than a depiction of someone on that day. >> host: eri hotta, how militarized was japanese society by the time of pearl harbor? >> guest: i think it was militarized by default because so many people had to be sent off to battle fronts in china, and the home front had to show their support. otherwise you'll be called unpatriotic. so, for instance, a neighborhood was organized into small block of four or five households, and they would cooperate with each other. in other words, they would sort of -- [inaudible] on each other that they were performing patriotic duties and attending drills against possible fire or air raids actually already. also they had the job of distributing food, rationed food amongst themselves equitably.
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and that was also a source of resentment for many, many families, because people felt cheated. the it's just a system of mutual distrust. so, but then every sort of neighborhood association had an incomer for the military -- informer for the military police. it's speculated. there's nothing to prove, but i think it was based on fear of being singled out. so people really kept really low profile. jazz music was banned, and dance halls were closed, shut down. so there was no sort of overtly western entertainment, something that went unchecked because people were still holding american football matches in 1941, but i think you didn't want to be singled out for all the wrong reasons. >> host: i think i read in your book that, basically, private
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cars were banned because of the use of oil. they invented cars running on charcoal, and one bottle of beer every six months or two bottles of beer? >> guest: unimaginable. [laughter] not a society for alcohol. [laughter] >> host: john is in new york city, another world war ii veteran. john, please go ahead. >> caller: yeah. my story is i was in japan. i was sent by the army to japan in september of 1945, and i got out of the service there, and i continued to stay in japan for a total of five years. and i taught at a japanese university and another school. and anyway, i was wondering
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about the japanese, how they got into this. my experience is the man in the street really didn't seem to understand what they were doing, what had happened. [laughter] >> host: john, how were you treated in japan when you were there? >> caller: well, as soon as i got out of the service, i continued to work in a japanese university, and i was treated as a curiosity, of course. and i gave, and i talked to the japanese a lot, and i speak japanese. >> host: now, do you remember feeling angry after pearl harbor? >> caller: no. i was, i was younger then and,
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no. well, we were all kind of crazy about the war. [laughter] but when i was sent to japan, i wasn't angry at the japanese at all. in fact, i was curious. and what i discovered is the man in the street really didn't have any feelings about the war at all. >> host: and before we, before we have our panel answer that question, just one final question to you. do you think it's fair to compare 9/11 to pearl harbor? >> caller: no. >> host: why? >> caller: i, well, because i think the japanese, there was two groups of people there in japanese. there were common citizens who really were not told very much, and then there was the military
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class. and i made kind of a study of that, because i was very curious. and when i returned to the united states after five years in japan, i gave 105 talks about my experiences to the locals, any convention or any kiwanis club or anybody who invited me to speak. and my message was always purchase the man -- pretty much the man in the street didn't know what was going on. >> host: thank you, sir. eri hotta. >> guest: it's true that japan is not an open democracy for many reasons that we discussed already. but to say that military was responsible be oversimplifying the picture a bit, in my mind, because military was not a monolithic organ. and it was divided into different cliques, different sort of interests and, of
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course, navy and army never got along. [laughter] so i think it was far more complicated structure of bargaining and deal-making. plus, civilians were involved in the decision making as well. and the emperor in some indirect, very, very strange but very powerful way in the end were very much the glue holding together those different fragments of interests. so i think it's okay to say that, of course, commoners, regular people in the street didn't really know why that happened, but that's different from not asking why it happened. so i think they should, they shouldn't be automatically excused or should be disengaged from the whole why did this happen picture, myself included as the inher to have of that sort of -- inheritor of that
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sort of collected guilt. i have the responsibility. and writing this book was one way of sort of dealing with that issue myself. but people have different ways of dealing with it. but to say that people didn't know what was going on, people in the government didn't know what was going on. so let's try to figure out. >> host: did your family have a connection to world war ii? >> guest: i have a -- well, both my grandparents, grandfathers didn't go to war for health reasons or the age, but i have great uncle who died in iwo jima, another one who was an english literature student at tokyo university, was considered quite dispensable because he was not an engineering student. so at the end of the war, he gets called on to become a kamikaze pilot. he actually doesn't go. i mean, he, the war ends right before his mission. so i didn't know him, sadly, enough.
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he died in his 60s, and i was quite ignorant about these things and not really conscious about these problems. i think he lived with survivor's guilt all along. i think he ran a pilot flight school somewhere in the west coast of america. so he sort of half immigrated to america in a strange sort of twist of fate. but i think, i don't think he quite knew why he was left to live. >> host: craig nelson, this is an e-mail from robert hyde in syracuse, new york. why did the japanese not invade and occupy the hawaiian islands as part of the pearl harbor attack? >> guest: well, they were so busy invading and occupying all of southeast asia from the northeast boundaries to the southwest boundaries of india that they really didn't have
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enough left over to take on the 43,000 servicemen that were in hawaii. so i really think that as mr. twomey had said, hawaii was very much a sideline item towards this great big operation to turn, to expand their chinese territory into all of southeast asia territory. but i do want to explain one thing about the attack we haven't discussed yet, and that's how really nutty this idea was. it's something that mystifies me about yam ma moto, that he spent so much time in america and thought, well, if we kill 2,403 americans on hawaii, the american citizenry is going to go, oh, we certainly can't fight them. we've just got to turn asia over to the japanese. i just don't understand why he got that idea and why he was so keen on that. it's just so nutty. and you take that as sort of a foundation of why pearl harbor was attacked, and it makes no sense. >> host: how long did the japanese occupy that great expanse of sea in asia?
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>> guest: well, it took them six months to get it, so by the middle of '42, they have the great empire of japan. and they hold onto it until, you know, '44. so for two and a half -- two years about. >> host: when was the next major battle or when was the first battle after pearl harbor? >> guest: well, the great story is about midway which is another three-hour conversation because it's such ab amazing story. -- an amazing story. three months after pearl harbor, so that is the only time for, twice in their entire life the navy and the army have cooperated, we're talking about japanese. in america the navy and the army have cooperated twice, and this was one of them. that's april. and then six months after pearl harbor comes midway which completely turns the pacific war, and nimitz called it the greatest squeaker of all time. that's a story for another
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three-hour panel. >> host: next question is bo in georgia. please go ahead with you are your question or comment for the authors. >> caller: thank you for letting me join your conversation this afternoon. i've got two quick things. i live down the street from a pearl harbor survivor, and his name will probably bring a bell, william -- [inaudible] that spotted the japanese midget submarine. they could not confirm they sunk it because of the way it went down, but i think they found in 2002. and ironically, it was like four years later, december 7, 1944, that same ship that sunk that japanese midget submarine was destroyed in a kamikaze attack near the philippine islands. the admiral told me a couple of things, and when i knew him, he had retired from the military as a rear military, and he's buried in tipton not too far from another famous person that was a veteran in world war for, henry
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meyers, i think he flew the plane for roosevelt. anyhow, the guy was a walking history book, and i want to ask ms. hotta one other thing, and i'll let you go. i knew a japanese naval officer from the self-defense academy i met in the 1980s, and he told me they called it the great pacific war, and that's how they viewed history, what he was taught. and he also mentioned there's an article in the japanese constitution that prohibits them from having any kind of military operations overseas. i'd like y'all to comment on those two points. thank you, and i'll hang up. >> host: one of you write about then-captain outerbridge, was it? tell the story. >> guest: well, his story's pretty well known in its broad outlines. i don't think people really understand or know what an extraordinary set of circumstances led to william outerbridge being in the position he was in. he had been the captain of, the
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executive officer of another destroyer and truly hated his captain. just couldn't stand the man. and had been seeking to get a transfer off his destroyer in any way he could. and he was hoping for a land assignment so he could be reunited with his family. in late november he was relieved and given command of his own ship, the u is, s ward -- uss ward. he took command of it on friday, december 5th. he had never commanded a ship until friday, december 5th. the morning of december 6th he and the ward went out of the harbor on his first patrol ever, and they were tasked with patrolling back and forth in front of the harbor channel, and it was the next morning when he's asleep that he is awakened with a call to come to the bridge. and they spot an object in the water, and here's a man who's in
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his first job on his first day, and he didn't hesitate. he ordered his ship to hunt it down and open fire, and they did open fire. and they knew they hit it too. it wouldn't be confirmed until the submarine was found, as the gentleman referred to, decades later. but they warned, they sent a message saying they had attacked this submarine, that's the object. i think i should have said that. he didn't know it, they didn't know it, but it was one of the midget submarines the japanese were using as part of their attack. unfortunately, his message alerting his commanders to what was happening kind of wound with its way slowly up through peacetime, and the vice grip of peace was still in people's mentality, and they didn't react swiftly enough to what he had just told them.
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and he sent a letter to his wife a few days later saying took command on friday, went to see see -- went to sea on saturday, started the war on sunday. [laughter] >> host: eri hotta, what about that gentleman's call? >> guest: the terminology, there's a lot in a maim and how one choose to -- a name is and how one choose to call a certain war, i think, reveals a lot about your political affiliation. pacific war or asia-pacific war is generally used in japan by both right and left. i think it's a value-neutral, very sort of uncontestable term because, of course, war happened in that theater. i think extreme righters still prefer to call it greater east asian war because they claim that japan liberated all the colonial parts of southeast asia and china as well. i don't know how they extend the argument that way. [laughter] nor why. leftists, on the extreme left i
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think some people prefer to call it 15 years' war because they see the beginning of the war as 1931 when japan, japanese field army invaded parts of northeast asia. northeast china, excuse me. so i think there's a lot in the name, but i think many more just prefer to call it the value-free, neutral way of asia-pacific war. the second question, i think, had to do with article ix of the constitution which the president abe administration is trying to revise or do away altogether because he, as a sort of hawk, thinks that it's a humiliation that japan didn't have the right to write its own constitution at the end of world war ii. i think the truth is slightly more nuanced because the suggestion of including this
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clause that renounces war as a sovereign right of japan came about because of japanese suggestion. i think there are some evidence to that, and there's been some research done on that. so to say that it was an american imposition to disarm japan and completely emasculate japan is wrong. but then that's how he views it, and he's been trying to correct that post-war regime, as he calls it. because japan should have the right to defend itself and wage war if need be. so he tried to pass security bills, and he did so successfully in the past year. but that actually put his administration in a very sensitive position. americans might welcome that japan is finally sort of taking
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more charge in the military matters in the east asian security in terms of actual military capabilities. but that also means that japan has to balance power in asia itself not by solely relying on the united states' help. so that might mean that -- it depends on how the cold war in east asia ends. it might also depend on how japan faces up to its past and how other concerned governments of east asia deal with that and also all parties stop politicizing all memory to their advantage. so -- >> host: you look like you wanted to add finish. finish -- >> guest: no, i didn't. >> host: okay. craig nelson, in your week you cite some surveys of japanese citizens, american citizens, how
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they feel about pearl harbor, hiroshima and nagasaki. what did you find? >> guest: a wonderful man went through all the visitor comment cards at the arizona memorial of japanese descent, and he pulled them all out, and he found out that the number one thing japanese people wanted was for the american movie about pearl harbor to mention hiroshima and nagasaki. and you would think that's fair except when you go to the hiroshima memorial, there's no mention of pearl harbor there either. [laughter] so there's still this tug-of-war going on between, well, if we apologize for hiroshima, they'll apologize for pearl harbor, and i can't believe this is still going on 75 years later. >> guest: and i think no japanese prime minister has visited -- >> host: well, president obama was the first to -- >> guest: to visit hiroshima. prime minister's wife advertised on her facebook page i went there and prayed for the future peace. it doesn't really mention how
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the war started or how he -- well, her husband's government is dealing with the war memories. i thought that was really strange. >> guest: i do want to point out something. i think one of the great moments in this story happens when you see that, you know, macarthur starts off as something of a stinker, and then in korea -- which is another three-hour panel -- he's something of a stinker. but when he goes to japan as supreme allied commander, he does an amazing thing. he gives a speech at the surrender that will make you bust into tears -- burst into tears,s it is so heartfelt. he then really begins the process whereby america supports the japanese. he -- and this is like two weeks after the surrenderer. japanese citizens are going through the american army garbage looking for food, and macarthur gets in touch with the congress of the united states and says you've got to send me some money. these people are starving. and they go, what are you talking about? we just defeated those monsters, we're not sending them money.
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he says, well, give me butter or give me guns. and he begins the support for a prior enemy which lasts over into the marshall plan when marshall is secretary of state under truman. and so america, after winning world war ii, does these reverse reparations where we rebuild japan and germany. and i think it's an incredible pearl harbor legacy -- >> host: maybe on "in depth" we'll do a douglas macarthur panel. george, thanks for holding, you're on booktv on c-span2. >> caller: yes, thank you for taking my call. i have a couple of comments, and i'll hang up and listen to the answers. this is directed to the three authors. have any of them ever read the, excuse me, the road to rainbow by henry cole or john to to lin's rising -- tolin's rising sun, and if they have, has it helped with their research in their current or future books? and my final comment, hopefully
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they can answer this question. i remember a few years ago reading about the japanese imperial staff and their long-range war plans making the comment that their war was not to start until 1947, and then it would be against russia. have any of them run up against that comment? i'll hang up now, thank you. >> host: and who's that -- george, who was that first author, road to rainbow? what was his name? oh, john is gone. john tolin and rising sun and road to rainbow? anybody? [inaudible] >> guest: i've realize john tolis tolin's book on pearl harbor which i think has some problems. he buys into the notion of prior warning to a degree, and i think the primary source he had in there was subsequently debunked. >> guest: yeah. >> guest: but i don't know the
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other gentleman. >> host: is this a conspiracy theory, in a sense, about prior warning? >> guest: oh, yeah. >> host: we've gotten several facebook comments here. stanley says, i was there as a navy kid. my dad sat up in bed and said, quote, the japs are bombing pearl harbor, no surprise. it was neighborhood gossip for weeks ahead of time. it was bait set in place by roosevelt to save england, france and hold land. >> guest: well, the very first guy to start this idea was one of the founders of the america first committee, a big anti-roosevelt graduate school group. you'll remember that was the group that charles lindbergh got in trouble with anti-semitic comments, and that was that group. and then it was expanded on by husband kimmel's lawyer during one of the congressional investigations. it was then followed up by a guy who wanted to take all the blame away from the navy and pin it on the civilian government. ..
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so there was no reason that germany should go to war against the night states for japan. so i think from a logistical point of view. >> i would offer two very practical reasons why i think that on the 75th anniversary, this is a very weird finally out to bury forever. the first practical piece of evidence as we already knew the japanese fermented essential military forces towards the southwest pacific including one of our possession, the philippines. all roosevelt had to do was sit back and wait and he would know whether japan is going to attack
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the philippines at which point we probably would have declared war. we didn't need to sacrifice the pacific fleet. the second reason i would offer is no independent means of intelligence. they had the chain of command to ease dropper is listening to messages and decoding them, up the chain of command. hundreds of people would've had to know in order for franklin roosevelt to know and it simply defies belief that all of those people would then go to their graves with their lips sealed with the greatest act of treason in american has really. >> when i did a book about a third of what i was researching and i talked to somebody under the age of 40, you're going to show -- >> some people are reminded --
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>> host: on page 49 of "countdown to pearl harbor," you write that war was coming to the pacific and they all know it and they all knew no one to that more seriously. the keywords in there, war was come into the pacific. was that general knowledge? >> guest: yes come as there is money by the first week of december it was so well known. >> host: what about earlier? s. go all through 1941 were negotiating with japan the idea that the chap named were an arm was quite calm that they were engaged in similar activities in which hamilton commanded the fleet on february 1st, 1941, he noted that they would be working hard in light of what we all know. i believe that was his quote.
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he was referring to what was late late in the pacific. war was not the surprise in 1941. it was the target of where it began. i think that's really important for people to understand. i will share one small story about how likely it was or how common it was. it won them by the of helen.travel by ship from san francisco to honolulu with her two kids around november 1st. she got there. she wrote a letter home saying she was thrilled to be alive because she had assumed a passenger liner would be some japanese. that is how prevalent the idea that war was just around the corner was. now she may have had an additional belief because her uncle was campbell, but she said that she fully expect that they would die and was relieved they did not.
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>> guest: in the second week of november come the general arthur held a press conference at the leading journalist to get them ready that war was coming and told them to danger. it's the first week of december. but after that, we won't have many problems because we will have b-17 taking off in the philippines, bombing japan and coming back. someone pointed out according to your specs, the b-17 can't go from the philippines to japan and come back here "the new york times" published there off the record this is aware we could lose. >> host: george marshall, secretary of the army at the point. pam, agoura hills, california. please go ahead. >> guest: >> caller: i want to say how much i enjoy both tv and i have all of your books, all of the others. my grandfather was commanding a task coming in the morning of don and because he had submarine
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watch on, that's how they spotted the submarine. when it was spotted it was 1500 years to the starboard. my grandfather james to it is out this week of pearls are the remember in on wednesday. i spoke to a lot of radio guys before they passed away. i'm just curious going back about the significance of the submarine's oddness. it is an naval doctrine of the time and very well known if he spotted one japanese submarine come again and to ask back a secure your force not too far behind. i will verify admiral kimmel have been continually planning maneuvers. the squadron five was involved within that july in was if a submarine without diet pearl
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harbor. people were very conscious and had even given orders. this is also a cause to warning coming out november 26. the codebreakers in hawaii have noticed two thirds of the japanese submarine fleet that use returns the marshals and they knew very well what that meant. i went back to washington. it was ingersoll and in the final world war in a november 27th. dr ordered everybody to make the first offensive move. kittles likely countermanded that menace of my grandfather used that morning. i spoke to enough eyewitnesses from that morning. )-right-paren father is an admiral quarters and they cited the submarine and why he had some are not shown us because they had been followed across the pacific a japanese fleet submarine. >> host: let's hear from our authors. craig nelson, do you want to
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start? >> guest: it's really amazing factors to pearl harbor mystery today that we found one in pearl harbor than 186 he is enfolded up and they had no signs of human life as all. the two officers aboard the submarine escaped into the wind japanese-american population. one of the many things they have a different opinion, one of the things that upset me greatly is after he receives his warning that they are still sitting there but the youngest members aboard and only one boilerplate, which means most of them don't even have electricity to defend themselves. out of all the things mr. kimmel could have done, you could've done that. >> host: bodies in lincoln, nebraska. >> caller: high, and ms. hotta
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already answered my primary question by half an hour ago about the education system over what was being taught about the war. i will have to go to my backup question regarding the doolittle raid. after doolittle took off and quite frankly insignificant damage, though outlays that political thinking after the doolittle raid and what was the repercussions of the chain of command as cyrus halladay that the bombers attacked tokyo? >> well, in america it was considered a great big three because we had not had a world war ii vet jury yet on our team, i'm pretty much any. we haven't had much happiness. it was taken very well.
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in japan it was taken very hard because they allowed the emperor emperor to be impaired and they immediately launched plans to take out the final defense forces. you can say in the scheme of things that led directly to midway and it also made americans suddenly change their opinion even though the damage was minor. they thought, was g, sad little britain and soviet union couldn't possibly win a war against the great japanese than the great german and the great italian army and now they thought maybe we might win. that was a great moment in history. >> host: from your book, here is a couple of pictures. fdr on december 8 and a hand written speech. what to show our audience part of this speech.
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>> yesterday, december 7th, 1941, it did which will live in infamy. the united states of america was suddenly and deliberately attacked by naval air forces of the empire of japan. the united states will appease that that nation and that the solicitation of japan was still in conversation with its government and its emperor, looking towards the maintenance of peace in the pacific with confidence in our armed base, with unbounded determination of our people, we won't gain the
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inevitable triumph so help us god. [applause] >> host: one draft with america. [laughter] he basically gave that dictation ended one reach out and that is one of the greatest speeches in american history. >> host: did this speech get played in japan? >> guest: now, instead they did the declaration speech -- it really doesn't compare ascending than that keen on it now. he is now fortunate for them not enunciation and it does sound like a stage actor. he was then propaganda aspects of the not these.
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he really wanted to stylize his declaration speech in a very effect manner. i think it backfired. >> host: in your book, japan 1941, there seem to be a lot of german influence in tokyo. is that fair? >> guest: it's fair to the extent that americans have lots of influence. in 19th century, they were both industrialized and great power or so i think there is marketed well on the senate buckled than europeans ironically. i think they have been fluid to the extent that so many people are influenced. also lots of bright students into germany in the 1920s and come to america with written
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because it was cheaper. the hyperinflation made it so easy for students of western sciences and philosophy to go there and enjoy themselves in his dispatch to germany for a time. so i think people were influenced by that kind of very organized germanic thinking. it doesn't really translate immediately. not seeing some of the suspect ideology for many people because it looks down on colored people and second-class race in third class. many people who read translation in japanese was omitted from the text. the only people who could read german knew about this. so i think this fascination is more theatrical in nature as far as my understanding.
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>> host: was sparked you to write about pearl harbor in about this era? i'm just going to go around the table. >> guest: the most pedestrian of event they took a family vacation and my son and wife but not to the arizona memorial. i had been there before. the exhibit at the national monument are quite good. but i got interest did oddly enough, perhaps you can tell this already in husband kimmel and no one had ever written his biography, which i thought was very strange. subsequently as i alluded to earlier i decided there was a reason. he was in a very introspective man. you were going to get great revelations from him. once you get into it, you kind of get hooked. i find a way to tell it was this way, starting with the departure of the japanese fleet.
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as we have now, the knowledge today but exactly how we got to that point is fairly in and i hope as i'm sure we'll did that people would come to understand the complex to be at moment and also the founding drama. it was sort of a nonfiction thriller in those days. >> i actually wanted to do a pearl harbor book almost 10 years ago because i was living a mile away from ground zero and a friend called and said there's been an accident. he should go look at it from the roof. like the look look in the sky completely cloud free and i think how could this be an accident? that's when the second plane hit and they blacked out a couple of hours and it's been three years having this unbelievable phobia about planes. who put.-- just nutty stuff.
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trying to saw what was happening in this problem, i tracked down other people with fear of planes and there are thousands of them and their survivors of pearl harbor. i had this sort of feeling towards it. i did want to take it out because the dutch a titanic thing to do. when you go to legislative archives and look at the fundamental document, they are 48 feet long. so there it is me. so it's like nightmarish. then i realized if you look at craig's definitive, it was research 50 years ago. civilians think of his greed is set in stone. historians know the history is like water and it comes and goes. 50 years later it's time to try a new one. >> guest: i do agree as to his
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task is to keep breathing and interpreting history. aside from things i said about the personal faith i felt that the topic, beyond not i really thought this is a kind of crime fiction. we know the outcome very well. but there are so many moments that it turned around. i really was fascinated by the defense building. it almost shakespearean as well because it's human weakness and start a tragedy. it's farcical that people are discussing are not discussing at the highest levels in japan. i wanted to introduce back to as many audience members as possible. so writing in english made sense. >> host: creek mouth then you mentioned horton crane from back
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in laconia, new hampshire. i would like to cast to give their assessment that the historical research such as that done with flat and miracle of midway. >> guest: i think mr. craig with the greatest book about japanese military of world war ii and he was working with the card. he was part of his reception and you're supposed to interview every single person i came across any date. his archives were fantastic for my own work. however in 50 years time we have on new information coming out from japan. we have inside on new information from the survivors because they couldn't talk about what happened to them. if you compare what were able to write about now versus what i wrote about in the attack at south, and you think it is sanitizing it or something that is worried about weaker sensibilities that he just didn't have the material.
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at one point they spoke with a million pages of documents. that is how much new stuff we actually found. >> host: might come in san diego, things are holding. you are on with their three authors. >> caller: thank you. i have a comment and a question. the comment is there is a terrific value of reporting world war ii. one of the articles in their is by an american journalist in tokyo at the time of the attack and about how he got rudely hustled out of their than they get back to this days. if i'm not mistaken, the title of it was basis for keeps. the other you mention the colorful character and truman got the real blame for not being
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ready was with hoover because they were supposed to prevent espionage and of course hoover was so entrenched in secret the empowerment. i wonder what he thought about that. >> host: the fbi certainly less attuned to the japanese-american community there and had a tap on the phone on maquoketa consulate and that's how they learned on december 3rd to consulate was starting to word his secret document. but the special agent in charge in honolulu never thought there was any evidence of sabotage by the local community. certainly nothing new about this guy who is operating fairly openly and freely, although they have lists of people they intended to round up as soon as war broke out, which they did.
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there is a less than at the list of suspect good folks in the japanese community. but i'm not quite sure i understood the caller's point. did the fbi now? i don't think the fbi had any knowledge that an attack was imminent. >> guest: they did have one report which happens in august 1941 minus one in the event pearl harbor's worries that the man named dusan popoff who was a triple agent working simultaneously for the yugoslav comment reddish and intelligence agencies on the one of the models and he appears in august 1941 at the offices of jack or hoover in washington. if this had been sent here to assess american defense capabilities after three pages of questionnaire to fill out, a third of them was about pearl harbor and hoover refuses to take this seriously because he thinks he can't trust the agent
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and a mass popoff is having an affair with french movie star simone's amount and they are both married and you can trust him and having an affair with a married woman. one of the two serious warnings about pearl harbor. >> host: next of my kiowa, new jersey. go ahead. >> caller: yes come you're talking about the midget subs, but had the japanese typos at the most advanced submarines. how come that wasn't used as a primary weapon to search down the american carriers? is there a second attack on pearl harbor by seaplanes? >> guest: i think we need to appreciate what a spectacularly daring raids this was on the part of japan. many people in his own navy did think this just militarily could
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be pulled off. the secrecy was a prime direct it, but it's also important to remember they had no way of knowing whether the fleet was going to be there and whether the carriers were going to be there when they laugh. so one of the questions they have to have on route with our plan going to succeed because the enemy was indeed where we hoped they would be. they went hunting for the pacific fleet at sea with submarines. they were hunting for it in the harbor because that is when they were the most vulnerable, made the easiest target. it was only in the 24 hours prior to the attack but they realized that their wish, their hope was going to be fulfilled. the fleet was there except for the aircraft carriers.
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why weren't they using the submarines to hunt for the fleet? they had no knowledge of where the fleet is at any time. they were hoping it would be where in fact they founded. >> host: how do they keep a secret? >> guest: i think they really miss treating people at the top level. if i may be allowed to talk about envoys here in washington the day, they really didn't know what was going on when they ran into the room. his hands started shaking reading japan's declared intent to and diplomacy. even then, it really didn't declare war on the united states, said the south that event was not included and naomi realized at the embassy was happening. ensure the pearl harbor success
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than they were given enough time to type up the ladders, so that by the started the state department. it's a chain of maltreatment of people within your camp. >> host: craig nelson, back to restart it. whether the japanese attacked pearl harbor? >> guest: they wanted to keep us from interfering with a plan for operation number one. they wanted to strike out in a western power and western power and showed favor they are equal. they wanted to ensure a source of petroleum and be out reminder of the united states. and they thought into a mess that america would let them keep their colonies and would give up on trying to proceed in a war against them. >> host: steve twomey, was it successful? was it militarily successful? >> guest: short answer is no, i don't think it was.
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they certainly achieve surprise, the yamamoto miscalculated completely the response to the surprise. he thought this would weaken the row. it had exactly the reverse effect. militarily they achieved in a limited sense the goal of conflict deemed severe damage on the fleet. but as we've talked about, they missed the target they were going to be the most important in the coming war. the battleship era although many people didn't thought was already peaking and perhaps had peaked. these are all old ships. there is oil. they couldn't keep up with aircraft carriers. those were the weapons of the future and this was the first war in which that became apparent. militarily by missing the aircraft carriers, they probably did not achieve their goal. ..

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