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tv   In Depth  CSPAN  December 7, 2016 10:58pm-1:59am EST

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this three-hour program is recorded, so we won't be taking phone calls. ♪ ♪ december 71941, a day of infamy even as japanese diplomats were differing with the secretary on these measures, japanese planesr
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were down on pearl harbor.ping this includes [inaudible] and a member took part in the attack.ly battleship was completely destroyed and others damaged. nearly 200 planes were destroyed and that sunday morning compared to the code appeared to be completely immobilized. >> host: it's been 75 years since over 2400 american sailors and soldiers were killed in the japanese attack on pearl harborr december 7, 1941. starting now on the tv onsi c-span2 a three-hour discussion,
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what led up to it and its aftermath. we have three authors joining us, eri hotta misdeed twomey and craig nelson. ladies and gentlemen, each of you in your books about pearl harbor and the era ask the question why did japan attacked the u.s.? >> guest: my conclusion is that they didn't know what they were giving
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going to assassinate him and it is actually assigned to stay on a battleship to keep that from happening and then at the same time his planning the attack on pearl harbor and has to then to quit the service to make that happy because the navy is so against going forward. so he is famously called the reluctant admiral by historians. you can see the attack on america was the reluctant
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japanese as a whole. >> guest: i found one of the most thrilling parts of hearing about the story was to hear the very first american weather were attacked, which is the japanese air crews came in over the north, and as they did so, they came across three of the california servicemen, saying farewell. their last day after a year of being stationed in hawai'i. they were going to return to california on the 8th and as one final day they decides to use their pilot's license to rent tandems and piper cubs, little tiny ball so- li little airplanes into these were the first americans taken down by the state-of-the-art japanes it's these little tiny planes and meets the japanese aironisht force. it's astonishing to me that firt
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those are the first c aasualties of world war ii. >> host: but 8 a.m. as they flew over into pearl harbor. >> guest: you are seeing them in the harbor beneath them. the average age at that time is 19. they have no idea what is about to happen. one of the favorite quotes i got if i didn't even know they were swore at us and that is how far it is. they settle into strike the target instead of as they are supposed to. you see them arriving over the
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sportsmanship now. you see them arriving there and they say we can't believe that we are looking at this and about to turn it down. >> host: steve yvette christianse the -- steve yvette >> guest: 1941 from its secret assembly point at the far northern extremity of japan. it was going to take them 12 days to get to hawaii a little over 3,000 miles and during those 3,000 days the united states was collecting clues of one kind or another that something was about to happen. i mentioned that we knew that the japanese forces were moving
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towards the southwest pacific. we knew that from the consul berries and a chinese coast, commercial ships. it was very hard for japan to mask the movement of those particular forces. we never knew about the advancing fleet that was also part of this military offense. but getting there these days there is the accumulating something was about to happen. 75 years ago today, december 4 is one washington warned its outpost to start burning its secret documents and destroying its machines. that's how much we anticipated something was going to happen. along the way of course judgments were made and decisions were made in many cases incorrect ones and the result was the end of the
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period. >> host: was the fact that it happened to pearl harbor a surprise? >> guest: it had been discussed as a possible target for any japanese attack. a target even before the declaration of the war. the navy was discussing the possibility of surprise at pearl harbor. it started with the secretary of the navy writing to the counterpart at the war department that he was concerned about the japanese attacking pearl harbor prior to the declaration and the screen kept coming up most notably in the report in march, 1941 in which an army general and navy admiral pretty much theorized exactly what would happen as if they'd gotten into michael j. fox's delorean and went into the
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future. they solve the attack from a force that we never would have detected. so, a surprise attack in theory wasn't a surprise. >> host: eri hotta what was japan like, what was going on? >> guest: japan was already at war. they've been engaged in this war of conquest that started already japan starts fighting china and they conquered the cities that they don't quite get a huge country under control and they keep saying they are leaping from victory to victory but it's true that they are not winning the war.
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it hadn't really ended what's going on. it's the most acute sign of this the rationing system had been put into effect. as long as they have rights, but they don't have this rice. they have to do with this suck grade imported kind and even then they have today lifted with potatoes or something and that started 1941 but all of the
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major metropolitan cities had to do with his rationing system which must've been scandalous to them. they can't really question your authority because they are already in the semi-war economy. since the major newspaper incidences have been very friendly with the military and they've been trying to boost their circulation by really launching this campaign supporting the effort and once you start that kind of self-censorship it is quite difficult to turn back into turnaround and say from now on we are criticizing you. the 1937 that got escalated and
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by 1941 there were regulations about the everyday aspect of people's lives that people must have felt quite suffocated and also knew that japan went into indochina in 1941 and that was retaliated by the american embargo on oil. they were told that japan was cornered into this situation of economic plight only because they wanted to survive while they also wanted to believe that they were doing this for the neighbors as well. that was part of the claim that had been put into place so they
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had this emotion and sense of uncertainty but also wanting to get on with life each day and just move on. >> host: why did japan attack in 1937? >> guest: a number of reasons but there is a genuine fear from the north coming from the soviet union and also there was the sense of being cheated out of rewards because japan arrived too late. they were happy to keep it
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divided for a long time until they realized this westernized might be the next leader of china so they decided to keep it unified japan didn't really like so they felt like they were the ones who should be protecting the chinese and asian interests as a whole and it's not america. they involved the sense of moral doctrine and the rehab this regional interest. >> host: craig nelson how significant was it when fdr moved the naval base to pearl harbor, did that for ten japan?
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>> guest: fdr was convinced he could get them to calm down with our friends the chinese america was close to china at this time and impact we have a poll that the chinese were natural allies which more than the british, so that's how close. but he was convinced him he had to fight. richardson lost his job for fighting. fdr was convinced it would make japan nervous and it didn't work but i wanted to explain one of the great conflicts we see at this moment the united states is looking at the japanese leaders like the nazis, a unified voice of fascism and a dictator and a common way of life and philosophy and none of this was true. the japanese leadership will
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change hands 15 times, the army was fighting with the navy. the civilian government was fighting with everybody and they lurched from crisis to crisis. it was the most chaotic government and one of the points i felt was that it's difficult to put a defense strategy against an enemy. >> host: steve twomey, chico politics had a role in all of this depended? >> guest: you can't separate what was about to happen from what was happening in the atlantic. the fact indialantic was paramount in roosevelt's mind in terms of using american resources to keep the british in the war against the germans and in fact there was a shooting war in the atlantic ocean.
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american naval ships were escorting convoys to britain. roosevelt had given orders to shoot on sight any german surface ship or submarine they encountered and that was happening. in fact a couple american destroyers had been sunk so his focus was the atlantic and as a result he was stripping ships from the pacific fleet in hawaii much to the objection of the commander-in-chief of the pacific fleet. the last thing roosevelt wanted was a war in the pacific precisely because it would affect his ability to help the british. the british were getting sustained in part by the resources that were coming from the far east into any war was end anymore was going to disrupt the chain of resources plus the american navy would shift from the atlantic back to the pacific if there was a war.
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very famously at one point, roosevelt wrote to a member of his cabinet is saying i simply don't have enough ships to go around to fight a war in both places. his preference was to keep that indialantic but yes, geopolitics was a major reason for what was happening in the pacific. >> host: welcome to the book tv on c-span2 and our monthly in-depth program. this is where we have one author or one topic discussed. for three hours with your phone calls and your social media comments as well. this month it's the 75th anniversary of the attack on pearl harbor. here are the phone numbers if you want to participate. for those that live in east and central time zones, (202)748-8201 if you live in a the mountain and pacific time zones come into world war ii veterans, we would love to hear from you as well. world war ii folks who remember
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pearl harbor. 620,000 or so veterans are still surviving from world war ii according to the va. (202)748-8202 is the member for you to call. if you can't get through on the phone minds and want to participate you can join facebook discussion facebook.com/booktv. we are going to get to your calls as quickly as we can. but me tell you a little bit about the authors. the book is called japan's 1941 and it came out just a couple years ago and she's also taught at oxford university in the past. she was born in tokyo. it's good to see the twomey this book is countdown to pearl harbor the 12 days to the
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attack. he won a prize for future writing and the philadelphia inquirer and then worked at the "washington post" and has taught at new york university. and pearl harbor infamy to greatness he's a former vice president and executive editor and random house. some of his other books include the epic story of the first man on the moon and the author of the first heroes the extraordinary story. eri hotta who were some of the major players in japan leading up to pearl harbor? >> guest: it is quite ironic that you asked this question because i thought all the japanese counterpart countries like america or england, the uk, they have a nice figures, key
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statesman. the problem with japan was that they didn't have effective leaders. they had a handful of ineffective leaders who buy their weak personalities remained in power and i think the utmost example was the emperor. he's basically outside of the real decision-making process because he's not supposed to interfere with politics. he did feel he had a the veto power that he was reluctant to use it according to his postwar confession. >> host: could he have stopped pearl harbor do you think? >> guest: i personally do. many people disagree but i think the fact that he thought he needed to explain why he didn't
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intervene when he took power after, that's very telling because he felt he needed to explain. his reasoning was he thought if he didn't come along with the joint decision of the military and civilian government to pursue diplomacy in parallel here with the undermining the military. he probably thought there could be a diplomatic breakthrough in the timeframe which is optimistic in hindsight but he might have felt because somebody else in the government, maybe a prime minister who was for three years but i minister of japan in the four years leading up to it on and off.
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he is he's another ineffective leader who perpetuated this power because of his weakness and indecisiveness. he was from the second novelist almost like the second emperor and he felt that it was really beneath him and even if he makes a mess of something somebody else will cover for him. he escalated in 1937 and allowed a rather maniacal foreign minister to reach an alliance in the fall of 1940. he didn't really pursue the opportunity to back out of the infamous alliance when they had a chance after operation
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barbarossa and of the that the alliance should no longer held and that would have impressed that japan was really serious about the peace negotiation. he didn't pursue any of that and then he went ahead which roosevelt said he felt like he had a callback or something like that. he was waiting to hear from the japanese a reply to this proposal that roosevelt came up with which was really conciliatory. if japan decided to withdraw from southern indochina, roosevelt would make sure the
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whole peninsula would be neutralized which would have meant the whole different history for that region as well. so roosevelt wanted to make for southeast asia. one thing he tried to do was not link the problem with the most recent occupations would you do of you that have a chance to save his faith. he didn't really pursue that. he again made a deal with the military okay i will let you mobilize and continue with this rhetoric or if you let me talk to roosevelt in person and have a conference, hawaii kept coming back as a midpoint for the peace
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conference location and he believed it was possible because roosevelt seemed quite pleased to do it. we would never have don't have true. he was averse to this theatrical statesmanship where great things got decided by a great man and one or two sittings like churchill. >> host: you were nodding your head yes about roosevelt. >> guest: this is a sort of great moment in pearl harbor history because the last civilian pay minister that we had was very sincere about setting this up and he did all of these manipulations but one thing you left out is that he liked to eat. he was followed by a gigantic hole in the boiling water and
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they would pick it up and with a chopsticks for a while that's what it prints he was. all of a all of a sudden he spent the first term became very pro- war and pro- military and all of this and then he became premaster again and became anti-military but the roosevelt administration saw that previous position he held and said we can't take this seriously. he even went so far as to have one standing by to take into alaska where he would meet with the president aboard the battleship. it was close to happening than the roosevelt administration passed on it and pearl harbor would have never happened. >> host: why did they pass? >> guest: i don't think they trusted the japanese at all, the secretary and the state and his boat i think was the decisive vote. his ambassador in tokyo was
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pushing for the meeting very hard. he thought it was a sincere offer and he thought there was nothing to lose by agreeing to some sort of conference. but he wanted to know almost upfront, it's one of those summits where everything is decided long before they get there. he wanted to know what the outlines of the deal were going to be. when they couldn't get that, he was determined not to have that meeting. >> host: to mark the 75th anniversary of pearl harbor, c-span american history tv is joining booktv for the first hour. american history tv is on c-span three every weekend with archival films, the tours of historic places, college classrooms and much more. now, for the viewers interested in american history that want to know more about pearl harbor, you can watch next saturday december 10 starting at 8 a.m.
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eastern. american history tv on c-span three will have the december 7 memorial in washington, d.c.. first person accounts from veterans and civilians. fdr speech to congress december 8 requesting a declaration of the war and life calls with historians. that is all live on american history tv next saturday. we are glad our audiences with us as well. we hope that the numbers up on the screen and let's take calls from the viewers. roger in eastlake ohio. >> guest: >> caller: i'm glad you are talking about this. the story that i heard back in the 60s i'd been worrying about ever since supposedly, it was told by the pow in
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philippine pow camp and he was supposedly high up and anyway, the japanese had invaded manchuria and the russians had troops on the border to protect the country and what was supposed to have been according to this guy the japanese and the nazis would have protected at the same time forcing russia -- >> host: all three of our authors write about that. >> host: what was going on with that when they invaded russia, i'm sorry, when the nazis invaded the soviet union the japanese were completely taken aback. they had a treaty with stalin and germany and they thought
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they were on top of the world with this sort of closure. they thought they were going to be like a united nations eventually untold they were completely taken aback and over and over again you see how we told the japanese just like hitler turned down stalin said he's going to turn down you are a >> host: mike in wichita kansas, please go ahead. the book tv on c-span2. >> caller: okay, here we go. my understanding is the japanese diplomatic codes were already broken by the time that this war got started so that the fdr administration knew what was going on and they've been sent over just before the attack occurred. it appears that the admiral and
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his men were being portrayed by the administration. then the american response was to attack civilian targets on cities like tokyo. what is your group's response to that? >> host: we will see if any of the other authors want to add on to what he has to say. i can go through them quickly. at no time were there any indications of those messages that pearl harbor itself was a target for an attack and there would be no reason for the ministry to be telling its ambassadors in washington that a war was coming and where it would start, particularly given
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the confusion within the japanese government about who was doing what. the second point was regarding aircraft carriers, and this is often cited as evidence somebody knew something was coming. the two aircraft carriers that were based there at the time were indeed a way that they been dispatched on specific missions. they were kind of behaving like fedex. they were carrying airplanes to american outposts and the pacific. they were not told to get out of the harbor because anyone believed an attack was coming. it was pure coincidence, and actually extremely fortunate. the third carrier was on the west coast and they have been there for some time. so the idea that they were ordered out because someone knew it was coming i don't think it's a credible argument.
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>> host: eri hotta come anything like that? >> guest: that is part of the question i think of course it's unfortunate civilians got bombed over and over in japan. you have to sort of understand in the context of the history of the civilian bombings and how japan figured into the picture as well. the rest of the world with short fired and then the japanese followed suit in china if bombed major cities in china. i'm not excusing the civilian targets but it's part of the total ethos that japan and south of prepared for even before the declaration of the war was decided. people are asking what if tokyo
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gets bombed, and that was very much in the back of their mind or the front of their mind. >> guest: i would like to address this very simply by explaining the admiral received 56 pages of warnings over the course of 1941. he received additional warnings about the japanese from his own staff and he'd received warnings from british intelligence some of which has not been declassified which he didn't pass up, so the conspiracy theory is that roosevelt was held in some other messages and if only he had received those three or four other messages he would have done something. i can prepare this story and why not this behavior or at least his inattention in this behavior and make it look like he was in league with the japanese, too. it's completely implausible that every way we've looked at it.
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>> host: he didn't have a job long after, did he? >> guest: i thought he was treated quite well by the administration. he removed the star reports from his starr report from his shoulders and cemented himself. they were then placed on the list meaning they kept their salary into their pensions at the time of the demotion but they were not in charge, how could they have been in charge of anyone in world war ii. so i thought they were treated very well but then what happened is that the court of public opinion accused them and that's why we have this 70 years now trying to restore the reputation. >> host: well he is willie is calling him in georgia. good afternoon to you, sir. we are listening, go ahead.
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>> caller: [inaudible] how far is nagasaki [inaudible] >> host: what was your role in world war ii? >> caller: i was in the u.s. navy. >> host: what was your job? >> caller: i was a machine gunner. >> host: what years did you serve? >> caller: 43 until the war was over. >> host: you mentioned you went through pearl harbor. it was still a mess in 1943? >> caller: they still had a twisted steel out of the water, you know what i mean.
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they wanted to show us what had happened. we were quite young and he was very emotional telling us about the comments down here [inaudible] it shook me up and like i said it stayed with me until the end of the war. >> host: have you been back to visit at all in the 75 years? >> guest: though i haven't. i headed to have it for the transportation if you know what i mean. i saw on tv the survivors. so in my time, a hunk of steel was twisted poking out of the water. >> host: thank you for calling in. appreciate that. anybody want to respond to what he had to say? >> guest: it is even today a pretty moving place to go. you can't not be moved by
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standing on the platform that is the arizona memorial looking down at the arizona. i can't imagine what it would have been like in 1943. it would have been more graphic and telling i think. >> host: if you lived through this and want to share your experiences we want to hear from you as well. (202)748-8202. how long did the attack last? >> guest: the attack really wasn't catastrophic in retrospect. the japanese as we talked about earlier did not find the american aircraft carriers in the harbor, which proved pivotal in the coming months of the war. they also didn't attack the infrastructure of pearl harbor.
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it was quite visible and without which they couldn't sail very long because hawaii doesn't have any natural resource is that a navy needs. it doesn't have oil or coal. it has to be brought from the mainland, and all the wailing needed was sitting there. many of the ships that were damaged actually were repaired and found their way back. perhaps most notably the battleship west virginia. and actually wound up in tokyo bay on the day of the surrender in 1945. it had been repaired and fought through all the war and the battleship nevada whose story is among the most heroic on december 7 actually was off the coast of normandy on june 61944 for the invasion of france providing bombardment cover from
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the invading troops. strictly in military terms, i don't think the attack was as great as perhaps our minds tell us. psychologically, it was an overwhelming event in history and still is. >> host: what was the reaction in japan? >> guest: one that surfaced was one of euphoria because they were fighting this war in china and now they attacked the western power successfully so they could justify the war they've been fighting as well as to show the sense of inferiority i think we tend to overlook that nowadays but it was great and it
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was a condition to think a lot about the color of their skin in those days. they could change it, what a shame. so it was their way of demonstrating to the world they thought that they didn't matter and that they could be brilliant at something. of course surface relation may be what people really felt inside because mothers had to send their kids, their voice to the battlefield and they might never come back. some people knew about the western policy and industrial outputs. so there were reasons to fear. the diaries are quite telling what he was thinking about. to say this is not going to last
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>> host: has your book then translated into japanese? >> guest: i translated it myself. i'm glad i did it. it's writing the language and you do have to do it.
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maybe the government interpretation. >> host: you use a phrase in your book talking about the japanese character in the sense where one is the face and one is the real meaning. did that affect your research and ability? >> guest: all the time because what is server is said or is not sent for example you really have to look between the lines and it's often more significant what they are not saying and also you get the sense that in private records between them you see quite a lot of disparities. people are speaking from both
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ends. you do just have to imagine looking at the photographs that help a lot so it's trying to overcome. >> host: in your research for the japanese archives organized? >> guest: we had three big ones and i got into two of them. guess what they wouldn't let me in and everything we tried to find out why they came up with a new reason. we called her office to try to get this resolved and i just wanted an answer. we don't have any english
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speakers here. we are not open right now. i have my translator state a japanese writer coming to america would never be treated this way and you are not acting like a friend. it was quite a to-do. a couple months after pearl harbor, the kind mr. called a conference and said it's such a shame if it had come had come early it would have changed everything franklin roosevelt in
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1914 at the brooklyn navy yard watching as the keel for the ship, the uss arizona. >> host: all of us will say finding this is like losing my mind. 19142 months before. it's seven years before roosevelt. i know some of your viewers are upset. at the arizona was not only a new yorker it was brooklyn so there we are.
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>> host: thanks for holding your own book tv on c-span to talking talking about the 75th anniversary of pearl harbor. >> caller: i have a question for your historians. can anybody confirm or deny the actions of an assistant secretary of state in circumventing the desires or the policies of franklin d. roosevelt concerning the embargo congress passed towards japan. >> guest: fdr wanted to do and embargo.
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they didn't want the wrong ocean at the wrong time and. they exerted a full embargo. what has it been like leading up to 1941. when franklin roosevelt wrote his famous letter to the emperor seeking to find a way around this problem i believe that he referred to the long-standing relationship between the two countries but it was clear that
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the strength in the naval sense of the pacific i certainly think the american navy had been preparing for years the possibility of conflict over control of the pacific. the wargames the enemy was japan in theory and particularly as the years grew closer to 1941 prospect was going the prospect was going to be the adversary the long-standing good relationship gradually frayed away. >> host: there seems to be a lot going on in the 30s and 40s.
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>> guest: many societies face similar problems just because it was very hard times. in japan the temptation to look back to this past that might be completely imagined that they were somehow spiritually dead or in howard i think that helps way after the military came up with this idea that they should be the ones making and doing that as an extension of the domestic reform as well and to blame all the social ills in your society on foreign policy is not an uncommon thing. >> host: what does the phrase toward tora tora mean? >> guest: i don't know literally what it means -- and
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that's when it was first used? >> guest: as far as i know. >> guest: it is the code for torpedoes attack. if they hadn't -- >> host: i want to come back and talk about the captain in just a minute but let's hear from sarah calling in on california. >> caller: i was listening to put to put in earlier and the putin earlier and they were talking about the regime with 17 or 18 changeovers and i didn't hear whether that was china or japan and i want to clarify that and also i want to know how i could find out about my cousin
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who was in hawaii at the time of the attack. >> host: let's start with eri hotta. the japanese government leading up how many japanese governments were there, what was going on in the general sense? ready for 1941. >> guest: it kept changing hands but as the main character in all of it in october of 1941 to reverse the momentum who hit the hard-liners a chance to reverse it because they can do a better job containing so up until then it kept changing but
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he stayed in power from the fall of 1942 october. >> host: you see because of his lack of leadership. craig nelson come if that caller wanted to find her uncle or relative -- >> guest: there's two ways to look them up, one is naval heritage history command, and the other is archives .gov. >> host: who said this week at the weekend the sleeping giant and its instilled in him a terrible result. >> guest: i don't know that
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it's an established fact that he actually said that, but it's certainly reflected this sentiment that the united states would be a formidable opponent. he lived in this country twice and both times as some sort of a military attaché. he traveled around the country a lot and spoke english and have gone to an iowa northwestern football game. he had an appreciation could also a big fan of abraham lincoln. he had an appreciation for the industrial power of the united states. its seemingly limitless natural resources and he understood in any long war, the united states would be able to replace its losses much quicker than japan board, which of course turned out to be the case.
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but his vote wasn't the deciding vote on whether to go to war with the united states. he was a sort of responding, i think, to what was regarded as an inevitable decision. i cannot stop what's about to happen. i'm going to make both the best of it by launching this surprise attack on pearl harbor to eliminate the threat of that which existed in the pacific to his chips and the other japanese offensives that were planned for that time. it was sort of he was making the best of a bad situation, and i think that quote, whether it was said or not can accurately reflects what he thought. >> host: would you consider him an anglophile? >> guest: we need to go back because i spent three days on that vote. [laughter] this is a great example of internet history. if you look up we have awakened
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the sleeping giant, you will find thousands of citations claiming that he said this. when i did my citations, we had to look up and find exactly what when he said this command we couldn't find it. we realized it was made up for the movie and that it was based on a letter he wrote so now it appears as a footnote in the book. but the thing i thought about that we haven't discussed yet is the momentous battle he lost two fingers, so his nickname was 80 because at that time a mannequin was 100. >> host: the u.s. to come out in 1942. >> guest: one of the first of our interpretations of the military code, code, instead of diplomatic code was knowing where he was flying. they've been battling to stay.
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>> host: c-span american history tv has joined us for this first hour of in depth. they are going to be going away from us at this point, but american history tv is on cspan3, tours of historic places, college classrooms and much more. for the viewers interested in american history and want to learn more about pearl harbor, joined american history tv on cspan3 next saturday morning beginning 8 p.m. eastern time. they are coming you will see the december 7 ceremonies from both pearl harbor and the world war ii memorial in washington. you will hear first person accounts from the veterans and you will see the speech to congress requesting a declaration of the war and why viewer calls as well on american history tv on c-span next saturday.
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.. i'm not a veteran of pearl harbor or world war ii, i'm actually from vietnam era, but my experience in japan caused me to have a greater appreciation of the japanese people as well >> with tw >> but was really set me back 1958 is i had established in academicc relationship with some of the japanese which turned
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into a very positive social relationship in primarily with the family who had survived growth or to -- world war two as officers of the japanese army. >> is so moving to scheerer stories like that. in is also moving for me to be here in pearl harbor. washington was always the negroes and if they do not
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have enough courage addis and appoint. >> host: how only married his were in japan 1941 and the many were stuck throughout the war? >> in those two berger visiting family is. and with this experience as well. >> and the japanese ambassador.
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minden of the diplomacy so very much a sentimentall appointment as well. that they hope to unleash a and he did everything. nutty tried his best and i think he explains better than anybody with the japanese government. >> he was almost in paying wish -- in english but this
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is not the country that i love. and to try very hard when he suspected was coming. in every betty's in turn in the members of the japanese. on the east coast of africa. and then mozambique's. and various embassies were
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exchanged. and with this swap on ended is an uncomfortable moment. the in this city in which it was occurring. in their hurt him to ignore his friends of the diplomatic niceties the protocol not to abolish the other country. the was a very painful >>perience. and then also the hotwa springs resort in virginia? >> the and what we found outin
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from interviewing is that the united states in japanike t and there is nothing they could do to stop it. but it was uh double cross. >> the with the attack off pearl harbor with the short period of time and second in with that diplomatic attache to hawaii at the time who
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was spying on the japaneseand he in to do some intelligence work but thank you for your comments. >> in those that did a fantastic job to masklike is a good time in all of the embassy staff but the reasond. that he did that outside the embassy with aerial tours
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and went swimming of the outskirts to honolulu. move to speak many times our wonderful was in that there are times. >> to be much more of a promoter it was extremely easy to see if you climb into the hills. he had some expertise. but he felt his own legend as the years went:but i
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think he became more as the years went on. i don't want to understated as significance in the day before the attack actually telling tokyo a subordinate role little too much that this looks the debt opportunity for a surprise attack that was intercepted. in the interval to thehe story. and one of the greatd. mysteries to this day and
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that may be they could notng have imagined and the same way. >> but i think give bunt him for no land for the rest of his life to be surprised in a less excusable way. >> and to go one-two great fame to only be heard of. >> what time was it in washington? have quickly did they find out? >> it was 1:30 p.m. sunday in the afternoon in washington. the first word that the secretary of the navy recede
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for a messenger that showed up at his office. he was talking with the assistant chief of naval operations arrived and knocked he was a civilian a newspaper guy. he really didn't know the message terminology to say this has to be in thee philippines and must be in arabic. so no they said this in is. paroled that is telling them there is a raid under way at that moment and then himself
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to stand on his lawn in brand new quarters for the commander-in-chief of the pacific fleet and that is on the pacific fleet to that overlooks barber to get a very special clue and receive data telephone call regarding a submarine attack . then somebody said there is an air raid underway. i am surprised he did not hear that by telephone in one of the most poignant moments was a spotless
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record up until that point. >> all of the decisions he had been making were nowth literally blown up before his side is in that this would be a catastrophehe unfolding be need him.rs came and then to describe his faces and then you feel for him. >> so washington knew within minutes then uh communications between the two. reactors known satellites back over the distance and
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there were no zero tv stations broadcasting live. d and that sketchy details to know that many were killedw manp the totality of uh strike -- of the strike and brought anxious to make that public. they said 300 died in the affiliate's say it is much worse.pay if you go to the headlinese, you and you will see those who perished. >> from infamy to greatness.
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, susan 60 percent of the injured. good afternoon.or i was a veteran of world war two. one after the war was over we were dispatched to go southeast of the philippines and there was of medic and i
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looked at at and i said where did you learn to ride it that way? he said ucla. i graduated last year in my folks said say another two weeks so i did. and then the brothers said stayed another two weeks and then nobody got out. but i had a good job bin ucla. we took 20,000 men back so why do they like to tear me yet? the what went to manchuria
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then to korea and then doing different things with the different islands. that is the propaganda because of what the americans were doing there is of a lot of people that i meant that were very friendly. >> host: have you visited some of those sites they participated in world war iien'. >> no. but i was 18 but i was a
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high-school monitor up until a couple years ago to findn out where they are from cheese said she was from okinawa. in things have really changed. >> host: how old? to make that will be 91 pretty soon. >> we appreciate you callingou r >> i am moved by the real world -- the real words of people who have gone through that. so that the major generations i think they p
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keep their memory is to themselves. harrison will history -- oral history archives that is part of the on film interviews as well.e lookin and not teaneck's are looking them up. in that memory soon slip away. >> do you know, many survivors served there are. >> do you know, of any japanese survivors and corrects to it if there aren't there probably in pearl harbor this week.
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>> but he trained all of the air crews. the favorite was have phase tarrant to a torpedo thio and the cue for the technique then they came in spiraling but then flew in drop at 1500 yards for the target then immediately would have to climber they would crash. and then to see the faces
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when the water splashed up to hit the wing so we knew we were in trouble. [laughter] one of the most interesting aspects is no sort of warning at all. not even one hour. the torpedoes whom were the lead planes in the most fulle durable because they were so low maybe could not do the damage they did anti-aircraft fire would have been there that would have been hard to miss but the fleet was not aware and was extremely vulnerable and by far the greatest damage was done by torpedoes.
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but least audience on deck and waiting for what was coming. two >> to incredible stories of reconciliation one was a man named jacob that was the prisoner and he was part of the raid and treated as a war criminal. but to come to an awakening when he realized he could forgive these people and
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those that were lost as theyeses repeated their entire history.nded u and then into the preteen together. >> host: the next call comes from of why. >> caller: good morning. i am from hawaii. the first japanese immigrants but this was the
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japanese the one of them had a vacation as he was sick to death morning towards her but she was in fear of her life. did business surprise that they would enter american japanese and it is no surprise it was one of the biggest. and without question with
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those military installations >> host: what do you do and why and where is connie? >> caller: and live on the eastern side of the island. there will be a memorial service. >> a just wanted you to talk about the other installations. >> with american defense it was the army air corps.
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and even a marine base 30 naval air station but the incredible tale of heroism because all of the planes under the army commander were lined up to protect against sabotage.aking out and the air force was completely devastated on their weight to pearl harbor so that only happens when he says he will not take it anymore so he pulls the machine-gun note to sets out on the apron to start taking down japanese planes. the hospital said he was shot 30 times and was
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bleeding from 30 wounds including his scalp that was torn open at the end he say it was not my day to die. >> is interesting there was an enormous amount of hair was of on the part of the people on the ships and on the base. it was a very one-sided indeed true we did not shoot down any planes may be 29 1/3 craig nelson not to diminish the heroism that occurred the captain of one ship said if he had to give a metal to those who acted heroically that day the whole crew would have to have a metal. but roosevelt was asked that night when he was addressing the cabinet how many did we get? he quickly tim dowd the
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notion that this was a fair fight because it wasn't. >> host: 10 years ago talking about the anniversary and here are some pictures. >> i sd what did you think of that movie corrects he said the actresses were very pretty. [laughter] >> i am just overwhelmed by the tales of heroism but if you have the bad luck to be born in you have to make that commitment of which the japanese state and did not bid is had to keep giving. it is such an unfair world.
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>> it what about those japanese-americans?arbor? >> but the american endeavoro ti man depicted by a not so sure how accurate but the local japanese language new pay -- his papers repeated but anybody could be involved with the translation of that kind of information gathering. of southern but after 40% of the people's japanese and the irony is so we enormous with the fact that the
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location. >> we know that the internment camps happened. >> in germany with the western allied, yes, they were mostly housed in that mountainous resort. >> host: georgia is on the line. >> caller: hello. p thanks for taking my call and it to the panel. but they did say of the service work and with his
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discharge papers. . . maybe if they took the japanese people to send troops to the philippines with all that talking between them before pearl harbor feel like it would apply to philippines, but more men on the midway. >> host: michael, thank you. all three of you talk about the issue of racism in different ways in your books. let's go around the table. >> guest: white supremacy
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having not americana could've been prevented. >> host: you can take anywhere you want. you talk about the issue that there was colonialism, imperialism attitude. >> guest: the reckless decision to enter a war that you are certain you are not going to win doesn't mean that compares to a history of colonialism. that's really not the point. you can explain resentful many japanese leaders felt. you can explain them there is no excuse for misjudgment or calamitous decisions that you make for other people. the citizens that you're supposed to be leading and protecting so that's my feeling about it.
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yeah i think -- >> host: how do you look at the countdown to pearl harbor? >> guest: the superiority is an reason for why the attack happened. the best evidence i would start with is shortly after the attack there were rumors in washington or congress that the germans have helped plan the attack and some of them have actually flown the attack planes. this reflected an ongoing ethos within the military that the japanese were a second-tier military power. their planes did not work very well, aircraft carriers were not very good and in some cases they
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were physiologically hampered and the ability to be good pilot and there were people in the navy department tried to counteract this tendency that they had been born in japan or new japan and they would try to educate the superiors that they actually can fly airplanes. they make the pilots. but it was a hard mentality to overcome as one of the officers in the navy department said the press was filled with how we beat them in a minute and would take nothing at all to overcome japan because they are not that good when you have that kind of mentality i think it walls you woolsey went to a belief that this thing you theoretically imagined could happen really couldn't have been. >> guest: i like to tell you three things. first has to do with the military intelligence agent
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before the department of war he does an incredible presentation on how the japanese aircrews have had ten years experience fighting over china. the japanese technologies american navy couldn't hit a the thing with its torpedoes. it was better than ours and as they were doing this presentation they during this presentation they needed to start achieving japan seriously. he said what are you laughing about and he looked over and said you were talking about those funny little people. and another story is after the attack happened, the commander of one of the airbases said it is outrageous to me that they did this to us when everybody knows america is superior to japan. that's my favorite racism story with a happy ending involves an
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attendant aboard the uss virginia. mr. miller wanted to join the navy to escape his sharecropper family in texas but he wasn't able to join the navy because he was black and instead he came across as a messman, took them took some gunner listens and during the attack and officer said why don't you hand me that ammunition and i will fire the gun. for his great bravery he won a needy start that he died in the philippines three years later and many people were very upset that he hadn't won the medal of honor. it stuck so much that he became a hero of the civil rights movement. >> host: and there he is getting that award from chester who replaced commander of the pacific fleet. we are talking about the books
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that we showed you the covers off and we will again. we have one hour and 25 minutes to go in the program. if you are on the line, don't hang up. if you can't get through, try that social media avenue into booktv is our twitter handle and facebook.com/booktv if you want to participate in the conversation there as well. want to show you one more book cover. this is donald stratton. where were you on december 1941? >> the uss 41 in pearl harbor. >> host: what were you doing
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there? >> caller: getting ready for a shower, clean sweep down and all that on a sunday. >> host: how long have you been in the navy? >> guest: i had been on a little over a year. >> host: were you in -- did you enlist in the navy? >> guest: yes i did. there wasn't much to do in nebraska. the money sounded pretty good. >> host: what was your job on the arizona? >> guest: first class. >> host: what did that entail? >> guest: maintenance of the
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guns when they come out of the water to clean them up, whatever and scraping up painting. >> host: what do you remember about december 7, walk us through that day. >> guest: i remember a lot of things. we were all up and around, clean sweep down sunday morning. we went to town and picked up some orange is we were going to take them to my buddy. i went to my locker to get
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something and find out to the bow of the ship and the sailors were hollering about planes bombing and took a look and saw one of the planes thinking around and i thought they are headed for were headed for the battle station which is going above the bridge and i had to go up about five letters to get to it. >> host: once you reach the battle station what were you able to do? >> guest: [inaudible] >> host: what does that mean? >> guest: the dive bombers and
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what have you. we were at 90 degrees and we couldn't ship to the ports because the vessel was tied up alongside and we couldn't ship towards the other side because part was in the way. >> host: donald stratton you write in your book all the gallant man about when the bombs hit arizona. what happened at that point? >> guest: a 2500-pound bomb [inaudible] and then found ammunition,
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18,000 gallons of ammunition to blow up 110 feet of the bow off and a fire ball went up in the air. >> host: did you see the fireball at the time? >> guest: how could you miss it? >> host: what do you recall about the noise or the smell? >> guest: it's a hell of a noise and the fireball went about six or 800 feet in the air and engulfed one deck above the bridge. >> host: how did you get off the ship? >> guest: we ran burning alive you might say.
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that's when the fireball kind of died down but we went out on deck that was red-hot and got a hold of a sailor alongside the side by the name of george. he was with a unit so the line would carry across four or five times to get it over there. he tied the heavy line on there and we pulled it across the arizona and proceeded to go hand over hand across that line 70 or 80 feet. >> host: how long did the attack last? >> guest: i couldn't tell you that. 335 sailors got off the arizona.
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1102 perished. 1177. >> host: there are five the few surviving today. will you be going to the reunion and when do you leave for hawaii? >> guest: we leave tomorrow. >> host: were you injured in the attack? >> host: were you injured in the attack? >> guest: i burned over 70% of my body. >> host: what was the recovery process like? >> guest: it took a year. >> host: what hospital did they put you at? >> guest: california and then from there the medical discharge, back home for a year, reenlisted, went back and had to
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go through boot camp in idaho and went through the honor company ended in a way wanted to go to the sea so they sent me to the island and there was a request for a gunner. i went aboard there and proceeded to the south pacific and we were there in new guinea and then in the battle of lady and the guadalcanal to pick up some truths and then the
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invasion a number of days and nights so we could tell people the kamikazes were coming from japan. there were about 100 that were damaged. left for 30 days for san diego when the war was over. i had to finish school. they sent me to st. louis and discharged me a second time the fourth of december, 1945. >> host: what did people think
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do people think when you reenlisted in 1944? >> guest: how can i tell what they were thinking? >> host: you write about the fact that the draft board was a little perplexed. >> guest: i had to go through the draft board to get a hold of the navy so i could go back in the service. they were not reluctant at all. they helped me very much. >> host: do you feel a special connection to the other survivors? >> guest: lauren was with me and went across the line. he and i are the only ones that are still alive. >> host: why did you wait so long to put out your memoir?
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>> guest: living day-to-day and week to week and year to year nobody said anything about telling a story and it came out a little but one time. a lady told her father and he approached me and from there that's what happened. >> host: and that is your cowriter. you also list in your book the failures of the military and planning for this attack and you say that the u.s. was not prepared, did not communicate and was overconfident. >> guest: they didn't pay much
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attention to it and then the radar picked all those things that's coming from the north iowans and they said it's coming from the united states but that there were 200 planes and they didn't pay much attention to it. >> host: when you visit pearl harbor, does that bring it back to life for you that day? >> guest: it's something i think about everyday. it's hard but it's nice to go back and pay homage to all the others that tarnished that they.
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>> host: donald stratton is a survivor of the attack at pearl harbor. he is one of five still surviving. 335 and got off the ship that day. 1177 perished. thank you for spending a few minutes with us on booktv. >> guest: okay is that it? thank you very much. >> host: appreciate your time. a pleasure and honor to talk with you. >> guest: thank you. >> host: that was donald stratton one of five survivors of the uss arizona. did you spend a lot of time, do you get a lot of information from these survivors? >> guest: actually i have to confess my book wasn't about the survivors so i didn't speak with any were still with us. one of the difficult things about having been a journalist
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all my life is attempting to write about something which i could not interview people on the phone or in person. it was a new experience for me to do that. the archival record of pearl harbor is so voluminous that you can successfully i think get a sense of people's personalities and characters as you read what they testify to. plus there are many oral histories. i think the great gap in our knowledge involves kemble. he wrote no autobiography, well, he did. a very bad when i have to say. but i don't believe he participated in any world history is and the letters he left behind at the university of
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wyoming don't really shed much on his thinking and his actions in this period. i would give anything to find letters that i'm certain he was writing to his wife in the months before the attack. he was was part of it remains to be a mystery about the attack. >> host: have these oral histories of survivors invaluable to you? >> guest: what we found was so fascinating is if you look at the 50, 60 for 70s, 80s you can find nothing because my theory is that they were so traumatized by what happened but it took until they were in the 60s their 60s and 70s and facing their own mortality and maybe having grandchildren to sort of breach the typical ptsd that they suffered and so you have this fantastic record and
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it starts dying down again because it is just too long ago. is world war ii pearl harbor discussed in japanese schools like we discussed it here? >> guest: no, not at all. one of the great motivators writing this book if i wanted to figure out for myself, having been a high school student in the united states i first encountered this question why did you attack us at pearl harbor and i had no idea. i tried to explain military dictatorship. they don't really make sense together. so i started this? why did japan launch a war that they were sure to lose and it still doesn't make sense to me logically but i think i put my finger on the malfunctioning of the system and also the
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responsibility that is still a problem in japanese culture today. the translation of my book in japan, the subtitle is origins of modern japan. the idea that nobody owns up to responsibility because they think that everybody is responsible, therefore nobody is responsible. it's still there and the fact that the origins in world war ii and pearl harbor for the fact that it doesn't get discussed, the problem is perpetuated in the environment of the cold war because america wanted a powerful ally in japan against east asia which by the way is
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still on and they don't want to upset the power that could rein in on this sort of more rebellious leftist type that can challenge the conservative order that was perpetuated despite the fall of the government many people stayed in power and the symbol of the japanese greatness was perpetuated in the position. it's nothing personal. i don't have anything personal against it. but the fact that they take it for granted that his institution was not responsible or that only a group of people who were tried were responsible to sort of evades the whole question of why did japan have to start the war to begin with but they would rather concentrate on their own
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victimhood and if they survive an earthquake and tsunami. it's something to be respected but doesn't solve the question. >> host: here is a little bit of oral history from the u.s. national world war ii museum. i felt in my bones something major was about to happen. it seemed inevitable. so the move to pearl harbor wasn't at all surprising or emotional. there was no but give them a taste of what they've got coming, none of that. just i guess this is finally starting. the first wave was was an hour and a bus and the scheduled time
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for the attack was sunday at 8 a.m.. i figured the first wave must have already arrived by now. just then from under the cloud bank i saw something glittering white and i knew it had to be the island. i headed out towards diamondhead defending them as the unit commander i gave the order to make the assault. my mission was to attack aircraft carriers and suppress the emergency response and counter attack that the carriers i was supposed to bomb were not fair, or at least we didn't know their actual location. at first i was disappointed
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because my targets were not there at all. the battleships were all lined up in battleship alley, tennessee, arizona, maryland, all that. i wound up attacking the arizona but nothing happened as a result of my attack. what i mean by that is after releasing the order i realized that arizona was already a meter below the water line and the sinking. first wave had successfully hit the battleship and my bomb was wasted ammunition. i saw a large object from 2,500 meters. since there were no carriers, we were re- attacking the battleships the first wave had already hit. >> you were nodding your head listening to him. was it interpreted correctly?
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stanek i couldn't hear the japanese speech very clearly that it made sense he was doing the best that he could do any job that he was given and there was no -- it's almost like being a good student and demonstrating your skills and diligence and i think intelligence and i think that was probably how they survived this because so many things didn't make sense and so many things seemed meaningless so you just needed to concentrate on the job in front of you. >> host: was there a lot of vengeance in the later battles? >> guest: you would take this moment that happened and that the navy responded into the first thing they did i think was
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the unexamined heroes of pearl harbor they were able to resuscitate the entire operation. they brought back all but three of them. the cover of my book has them blowing up in a horizontal bombers striking its ammunition so it's turning the ship itself into a bomb and its backend business. it's extraordinary to me that they were able to do that. then you have this outpouring at midway four of the six areas were some. the other two were essentially hunted down and it was used as a test target. someone said you should call your book american rage. [laughter] >> host: back to the calls and
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by the way we have a phone line set up. we also have social media if you can't get through on the phone you can message at booktv and join the conversations and of course our e-mail, booktv@c-span.org. larry from washington. thanks for holding. you are on with our three authors. ..out at night and the pulldown curtains. ..
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>> caller: and the medical experimentation on people with they termed as logs, so they dehumanize them, and no one was prosecuted after the war with for war crimes on that. and i just wondered who makes those decisions not to prosecute. in fact, you hardly each hear it mentioned -- even hear it mentioned anymore. on the history books, china doesn't even list tiananmen square, students that were killed there. they're not mentioned in their history books at all. >> host: all right. that's larry who was 5 years old when pearl harbor happened. any response for him, mr. twomey?
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>> guest: i would only say this, there's a terrific book -- and it's not mine finish. [laughter] called "war without mercy" about how savage the war in the pacific was on both sides. there were, certainly, racial beliefs on both sides that contributed to just enormous atrocities, far more than in eui >> at the. >> i highly recommend thend book to you for a further discussion just how awful that was. >> gave veteran from worldld war two from austin texas go-ahead. >> caller: there was always stockbridge it was the day of infamy but i
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could never understand why we were having blackouts on the island of about six or eight months before the attack actually came one? >> host: where reuse stationed in world war ii and what year? >> 19 -- through 1941. >> i would be 97 in january. t >> host: thanks about contributing to the. >> the of routinely practiced prior to december december 7th as exactly that.preparations hall ye had gone through a separation in terms of possible inflation over months.
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one of the aspects that was the most interesting is howw militarized hawaii was prior to the attack. people were reduced tomy and constant training by army and navy you could hear them practicing done every over the horizon. military convoys all the time. honolulu was a booming city as the influx of army and navy troops kept building. and yes there were blackouts regularly planned and scheduled in preparation forwhi the lifting would everybody knew was coming.oc which was more the magazine called paradise in the pacific was constantlyad talking about what is justzo beyond the horizon. the practice was the given. >> in one of your books
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talked-about boosted training very stringently. >> the reason that so many people responded so quickly in the opening minutes of the attack was due to him. he had relentlessly trained in the 10 months that he was in charge and trading was his thing he was a drill sergeant nothing escapes his attention no detail to small and people would point out he probably shouldn't pay that much attention but he could not help. insisted on practicingeeded to t everybody needed to be at their positions they neededw to know their job. by late fall people said to
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him that they had never seen the fleet in better condition than it was at that moment. so what happened after december 7th, he was not there to see about the performance of the navy was due to him. >> what is on the cover? >> and image flicking through the binoculars of an enemy in think it is morea representational. >> host: how militarize was japanese society by the time of pearl harbor greg. >> i think so many people and the homet off to battle and the whole front had to show support otherwise you were called the patriotic.
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so the neighborhood was organized and then theych would cooperate with each on each ot that they were performing patriotic duties against possible fire or air raids and they had troubleod distributing the food among some solves and that was difficult for many families because people felt cheated that there was a system of mutual distrust. but the end the neighborhood association had been in former to the military police. it was speculated bed nothing proven but based on the feeder to be singled out .ll
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so they kept a low profile b japanese music was banned. so there was no over the western entertainment and that went unchecked. but you did not want to be singled out for all the wrong reasons. >> host: i read basically the cars were banned because of the use of oil so they evre riding on charcoal? one in bottles of beer every six months? [laughter] not the society for of alcoholics. >> please go ahead if. >> i was in japan
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september 1945. and i got out of the service and i continued to stay in a total of five years and i taught added japaneseersity and university. i was wondering how the japanese got into this?dn't seem because nobody on the streetet really seemed to understanddwhae what they we're doing. >> host: john, how were you treated in japan when you were there? >> caller: well, as soon as i got out of the service, i continued to work in a japanese
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university, and i was treated as a curiosity, of course. and i gave, and i talked to the japanese a lot, and i speak japanese. >> host: now, do you remember feeling angry after pearl harbor? >> caller: no. i was, i was younger then and, no. well, we were all kind of crazy about the war. [laughter] but when i was sent to japan, i wasn't angry at the japanese at all. in fact, i was curious. and what i discovered is the man in the street really didn't have any feelings about the war at all. >> host: and before we, before we have our panel answer that question, just one final question to you. do you think it's fair to compare 9/11 to pearl harbor?
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>> caller: no. >> host: why? >> caller: i, well, because i think the japanese, there was two groups of people there in japanese. there were common citizens who really were not told very much, and then there was the military class. and i made kind of a study of that, because i was very curious. and when i returned to the united states after five years in japan, i gave 105 talks about my experiences to the locals, any convention or any kiwanis club or anybody who invited me to speak. and my message was always purchase the man -- pretty much the man in the street didn't
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know what was going on. >> host: thank you, sir. eri hotta. >> guest: it's true that japan is not an open democracy for many reasons that we discussed already. but to say that military was responsible be oversimplifying the picture a bit, in my mind, because military was not a monolithic organ. and it was divided into different cliques, different sort of interests and, of course, navy and army never got along. [laughter] so i think it was far more complicated structure of bargaining and deal-making. plus, civilians were involved in the decision making as well. and the emperor in some indirect, very, very strange but very powerful way in the end were very much the glue holding together those different fragments of interests. so i think it's okay to say
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that, of course, commoners, regular people in the street didn't really know why that happened, but that's different from not asking why it happened. so i think they should, they shouldn't be automatically excused or should be disengaged from the whole why did this happen picture, myself included as the inher to have of that sort of -- inheritor of that sort of collected guilt. i have the responsibility. and writing this book was one way of sort of dealing with that issue myself. but people have different ways of dealing with it. but to say that people didn't know what was going on, people in the government didn't know what was going on. so let's try to figure out. >> host: did your family have a connection to world war ii? >> guest: i have a -- well, both my grandparents, grandfathers didn't go to war for health reasons or the age, but i have
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great uncle who died in iwo jima, another one who was an english literature student at tokyo university, was considered quite dispensable because he was not an engineering student. so at the end of the war, he gets called on to become a kamikaze pilot. he actually doesn't go. i mean, he, the war ends right before his mission. so i didn't know him, sadly, enough. he died in his 60s, and i was quite ignorant about these things and not really conscious about these problems. i think he lived with survivor's guilt all along. i think he ran a pilot flight school somewhere in the west coast of america. so he sort of half immigrated to america in a strange sort of twist of fate. but i think, i don't think he
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quite knew why he was left to live. >> host: craig nelson, this is an e-mail from robert hyde in syracuse, new york. why did the japanese not invade and occupy the hawaiian islands as part of the pearl harbor attack? >> guest: well, they were so busy invading and occupying all of southeast asia from the northeast boundaries to the southwest boundaries of india that they really didn't have enough left over to take on the 43,000 servicemen that were in hawaii. so i really think that as mr. twomey had said, hawaii was very much a sideline item towards this great big operation to turn, to expand their chinese territory into all of southeast asia territory. but i do want to explain one thing about the attack we haven't discussed yet, and that's how really nutty this idea was. it's something that mystifies me
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about yam ma moto, that he spent so much time in america and thought, well, if we kill 2,403 americans on hawaii, the american citizenry is going to go, oh, we certainly can't fight them. we've just got to turn asia over to the japanese. i just don't understand why he got that idea and why he was so keen on that. it's just so nutty. and you take that as sort of a foundation of why pearl harbor was attacked, and it makes no sense. >> host: how long did the japanese occupy that great expanse of sea in asia? >> guest: well, it took them six months to get it, so by the middle of '42, they have the great empire of japan. and they hold onto it until, you know, '44. so for two and a half -- two years about. >> host: when was the next major battle or when was the first battle after pearl harbor? >> guest: well, the great story is about midway which is another three-hour conversation because it's such ab amazing story. -- an amazing story. three months after pearl harbor,
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so that is the only time for, twice in their entire life the navy and the army have cooperated, we're talking about japanese. in america the navy and the army have cooperated twice, and this was one of them. that's april. and then six months after pearl harbor comes midway which completely turns the pacific war, and nimitz called it the greatest squeaker of all time. that's a story for another three-hour panel. >> host: next question is bo in georgia. please go ahead with you are your question or comment for the authors. >> caller: thank you for letting me join your conversation this afternoon. i've got two quick things. i live down the street from a pearl harbor survivor, and his name will probably bring a bell, william -- [inaudible] that spotted the japanese midget submarine. they could not confirm they sunk it because of the way it went
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down, but i think they found in 2002. and ironically, it was like four years later, december 7, 1944, that same ship that sunk that japanese midget submarine was destroyed in a kamikaze attack near the philippine islands. the admiral told me a couple of things, and when i knew him, he had retired from the military as a rear military, and he's buried in tipton not too far from another famous person that was a veteran in world war for, henry meyers, i think he flew the plane for roosevelt. anyhow, the guy was a walking history book, and i want to ask ms. hotta one other thing, and i'll let you go. i knew a japanese naval officer from the self-defense academy i met in the 1980s, and he told me they called it the great pacific war, and that's how they viewed history, what he was taught. and he also mentioned there's an article in the japanese constitution that prohibits them from having any kind of military operations overseas.
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i'd like y'all to comment on those two points. thank you, and i'll hang up. >> host: one of you write about then-captain outerbridge, was it? tell the story. >> guest: well, his story's pretty well known in its broad outlines. i don't think people really understand or know what an extraordinary set of circumstances led to william outerbridge being in the position he was in. he had been the captain of, the executive officer of another destroyer and truly hated his captain. just couldn't stand the man. and had been seeking to get a transfer off his destroyer in any way he could. and he was hoping for a land assignment so he could be reunited with his family. in late november he was relieved and given command of his own ship, the u is, s ward -- uss ward. he took command of it on friday, december 5th.
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he had never commanded a ship until friday, december 5th. the morning of december 6th he and the ward went out of the harbor on his first patrol ever, and they were tasked with patrolling back and forth in front of the harbor channel, and it was the next morning when he's asleep that he is awakened with a call to come to the bridge. and they spot an object in the water, and here's a man who's in his first job on his first day, and he didn't hesitate. he ordered his ship to hunt it down and open fire, and they did open fire. and they knew they hit it too. it wouldn't be confirmed until the submarine was found, as the gentleman referred to, decades later. but they warned, they sent a message saying they had attacked this submarine, that's the object. i think i should have said that.
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he didn't know it, they didn't know it, but it was one of the midget submarines the japanese were using as part of their attack. unfortunately, his message alerting his commanders to what was happening kind of wound with its way slowly up through peacetime, and the vice grip of peace was still in people's mentality, and they didn't react swiftly enough to what he had just told them. and he sent a letter to his wife a few days later saying took command on friday, went to see see -- went to sea on saturday, started the war on sunday. [laughter] >> host: eri hotta, what about that gentleman's call? >> guest: the terminology, there's a lot in a maim and how one choose to -- a name is and how one choose to call a certain war, i think, reveals a lot about your political affiliation. pacific war or asia-pacific war is generally used in japan by both right and left.
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i think it's a value-neutral, very sort of uncontestable term because, of course, war happened in that theater. i think extreme righters still prefer to call it greater east asian war because they claim that japan liberated all the colonial parts of southeast asia and china as well. i don't know how they extend the argument that way. [laughter] nor why. leftists, on the extreme left i think some people prefer to call it 15 years' war because they see the beginning of the war as 1931 when japan, japanese field army invaded parts of northeast asia. northeast china, excuse me. so i think there's a lot in the name, but i think many more just prefer to call it the value-free, neutral way of asia-pacific war. the second question, i think, had to do with article ix of the
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constitution which the president abe administration is trying to revise or do away altogether because he, as a sort of hawk, thinks that it's a humiliation that japan didn't have the right to write its own constitution at the end of world war ii. i think the truth is slightly more nuanced because the suggestion of including this clause that renounces war as a sovereign right of japan came about because of japanese suggestion. i think there are some evidence to that, and there's been some research done on that. so to say that it was an american imposition to disarm japan and completely emasculate japan is wrong. but then that's how he views it, and he's been trying to correct that post-war regime, as he calls it.
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because japan should have the right to defend itself and wage war if need be. so he tried to pass security bills, and he did so successfully in the past year. but that actually put his administration in a very sensitive position. americans might welcome that japan is finally sort of taking more charge in the military matters in the east asian security in terms of actual military capabilities. but that also means that japan has to balance power in asia itself not by solely relying on the united states' help. so that might mean that -- it depends on how the cold war in east asia ends. it might also depend on how japan faces up to its past and
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how other concerned governments of east asia deal with that and also all parties stop politicizing all memory to their advantage. so -- >> host: you look like you wanted to add finish. finish -- >> guest: no, i didn't. >> host: okay. craig nelson, in your week you cite some surveys of japanese citizens, american citizens, how they feel about pearl harbor, hiroshima and nagasaki. what did you find? >> guest: a wonderful man went through all the visitor comment cards at the arizona memorial of japanese descent, and he pulled them all out, and he found out that the number one thing japanese people wanted was for the american movie about pearl harbor to mention hiroshima and nagasaki. and you would think that's fair except when you go to the hiroshima memorial, there's no mention of pearl harbor there either. [laughter] so there's still this tug-of-war
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going on between, well, if we apologize for hiroshima, they'll apologize for pearl harbor, and i can't believe this is still going on 75 years later. >> guest: and i think no japanese prime minister has visited -- >> host: well, president obama was the first to -- >> guest: to visit hiroshima. prime minister's wife advertised on her facebook page i went there and prayed for the future peace. it doesn't really mention how the war started or how he -- well, her husband's government is dealing with the war memories. i thought that was really strange. >> guest: i do want to point out something. i think one of the great moments in this story happens when you see that, you know, macarthur starts off as something of a stinker, and then in korea -- which is another three-hour panel -- he's something of a stinker. but when he goes to japan as supreme allied commander, he does an amazing thing. he gives a speech at the surrender that will make you bust into tears -- burst into
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tears,s it is so heartfelt. he then really begins the process whereby america supports the japanese. he -- and this is like two weeks after the surrenderer. japanese citizens are going through the american army garbage looking for food, and macarthur gets in touch with the congress of the united states and says you've got to send me some money. these people are starving. and they go, what are you talking about? we just defeated those monsters, we're not sending them money. he says, well, give me butter or give me guns. and he begins the support for a prior enemy which lasts over into the marshall plan when marshall is secretary of state under truman. and so america, after winning world war ii, does these reverse reparations where we rebuild japan and germany. and i think it's an incredible pearl harbor legacy -- >> host: maybe on "in depth" we'll do a douglas macarthur panel. george, thanks for holding,
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you're on booktv on c-span2. >> caller: yes, thank you for taking my call. i have a couple of comments, and i'll hang up and listen to the answers. this is directed to the three authors. have any of them ever read the, excuse me, the road to rainbow by henry cole or john to to lin's rising -- tolin's rising sun, and if they have, has it helped with their research in their current or future books? and my final comment, hopefully they can answer this question. i remember a few years ago reading about the japanese imperial staff and their long-range war plans making the comment that their war was not to start until 1947, and then it would be against russia. have any of them run up against that comment? i'll hang up now, thank you. >> host: and who's that -- george, who was that first author, road to rainbow? what was his name?
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oh, john is gone. john tolin and rising sun and road to rainbow? anybody? [inaudible] >> guest: i've realize john tolis tolin's book on pearl harbor which i think has some problems. he buys into the notion of prior warning to a degree, and i think the primary source he had in there was subsequently debunked. >> guest: yeah. >> guest: but i don't know the other gentleman. >> host: is this a conspiracy theory, in a sense, about prior warning? >> guest: oh, yeah. >> host: we've gotten several facebook comments here. stanley says, i was there as a navy kid. my dad sat up in bed and said, quote, the japs are bombing pearl harbor, no surprise. it was neighborhood gossip for weeks ahead of time. it was bait set in place by roosevelt to save england, france and hold land. >> guest: well, the very first
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guy to start this idea was one of the founders of the america first committee, a big anti-roosevelt graduate school group. you'll remember that was the group that charles lindbergh got in trouble with anti-semitic comments, and that was that group. and then it was expanded on by husband kimmel's lawyer during one of the congressional investigations. it was then followed up by a guy who wanted to take all the blame away from the navy and pin it on the civilian government. ..
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so there was no reason that germany should go to war against the night states for japan. so i think from a logistical point of view.
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>> i would offer two very practical reasons why i think that on the 75th anniversary, this is a very weird finally out to bury forever. the first practical piece of evidence as we already knew the japanese fermented essential military forces towards the southwest pacific including one of our possession, the philippines. all roosevelt had to do was sit back and wait and he would know whether japan is going to attack the philippines at which point we probably would have declared war. we didn't need to sacrifice the pacific fleet. the second reason i would offer is no independent means of intelligence. they had the chain of command to ease dropper is listening to messages and decoding them, up the chain of command. hundreds of people would've had
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to know in order for franklin roosevelt to know and it simply defies belief that all of those people would then go to their graves with their lips sealed with the greatest act of treason in american has really. >> when i did a book about a third of what i was researching and i talked to somebody under the age of 40, you're going to show -- >> some people are reminded -- >> host: on page 49 of "countdown to pearl harbor," you write that war was coming to the pacific and they all know it and they all knew no one to that more seriously. the keywords in there, war was come into the pacific. was that general knowledge? >> guest: yes come as there is money by the first week of december it was so well known. >> host: what about earlier?
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s. go all through 1941 were negotiating with japan the idea that the chap named were an arm was quite calm that they were engaged in similar activities in which hamilton commanded the fleet on february 1st, 1941, he noted that they would be working hard in light of what we all know. i believe that was his quote. he was referring to what was late late in the pacific. war was not the surprise in 1941. it was the target of where it began. i think that's really important for people to understand. i will and then will share one small story of how, and it was. a woman by the name does hell in travel by ship from by o seven cisco to honolulu by
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december 1st. she got there in road to a letter she was thrilled to be alive fictitious assumed the passenger later would be sold by the japanese. that is how prevalent is the dia then it was just around the corner berger she may have added an additional half leaf but she said the issue who lives with and they would die. >> and to be held with all the leading journalist to get them ready that war was coming and said the danger period is the first week of december but after that we want have any problems because and then your timeser
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processed grandfather james to s out this week of pearls are the remember in on wednesday. i spoke to a lot of radio guys before they passed away. i'm just curious going back about the significance of the submarine's oddness.
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it is an naval doctrine of the time and very well known if he spotted one japanese submarine come again and to ask back a secure your force not too far behind. i will verify admiral kimmel have been continually planning maneuvers. the squadron five was involved within that july in was if a submarine without diet pearl harbor. people were very conscious and had even given orders. this is also a cause to warning coming out november 26. the codebreakers in hawaii have noticed two thirds of the japanese submarine fleet that use returns the marshals and they knew very well what that meant. i went back to washington. it was ingersoll and in the final world war in a november 27th. dr ordered everybody to make the
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first offensive move. kittles likely countermanded that menace of my grandfather used that morning. i spoke to enough eyewitnesses from that morning. )-right-paren father is an admiral quarters and they cited the submarine and why he had some are not shown us because they had been followed across the pacific a japanese fleet submarine. >> host: let's hear from our authors. craig nelson, do you want to start? >> guest: it's really amazing factors to pearl harbor mystery today that we found one in pearl harbor than 186 he is enfolded up and they had no signs of human life as all. the two officers aboard the submarine escaped into the wind japanese-american population. one of the many things they have a different opinion, one of the
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things that upset me greatly is after he receives his warning that they are still sitting there but the youngest members aboard and only one boilerplate, which means most of them don't even have electricity to defend themselves. out of all the things mr. kimmel could have done, you could've done that. >> host: bodies in lincoln, nebraska. >> caller: high, and ms. hotta already answered my primary question by half an hour ago about the education system over what was being taught about the war. i will have to go to my backup question regarding the doolittle raid. after doolittle took off and quite frankly insignificant damage, though outlays that
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political thinking after the doolittle raid and what was the repercussions of the chain of command as cyrus halladay that the bombers attacked tokyo? >> well, in america it was considered a great big three because we had not had a world war ii vet jury yet on our team, i'm pretty much any. we haven't had much happiness. it was taken very well. in japan it was taken very hard because they allowed the emperor emperor to be impaired and they immediately launched plans to take out the final defense forces. you can say in the scheme of things that led directly to midway and it also made americans suddenly change their opinion even though the damage was minor. they thought, was g, sad little britain and soviet union
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couldn't possibly win a war against the great japanese than the great german and the great italian army and now they thought maybe we might win. that was a great moment in history. >> host: from your book, here is a couple of pictures. fdr on december 8 and a hand written speech. what to show our audience part of this speech. >> yesterday, december 7th, 1941, it did which will live in infamy. the united states of america was suddenly and deliberately attacked by naval air forces of the empire of japan. the united states will appease that that nation and that the
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solicitation of japan was still in conversation with its government and its emperor, looking towards the maintenance of peace in the pacific with confidence in our armed base, with unbounded determination of our people, we won't gain the inevitable triumph so help us god. [applause] >> host: one draft with america. [laughter] he basically gave that dictation ended one reach out and that is one of the greatest speeches in american history. >> host: did this speech get played in japan? >> guest: now, instead they
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did the declaration speech -- it really doesn't compare ascending than that keen on it now. he is now fortunate for them not enunciation and it does sound like a stage actor. he was then propaganda aspects of the not these. he really wanted to stylize his declaration speech in a very effect manner. i think it backfired. >> host: in your book, japan 1941, there seem to be a lot of german influence in tokyo. is that fair? >> guest: it's fair to the extent that americans have lots of influence. in 19th century, they were both industrialized and great
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power or so i think there is marketed well on the senate buckled than europeans ironically. i think they have been fluid to the extent that so many people are influenced. also lots of bright students into germany in the 1920s and come to america with written because it was cheaper. the hyperinflation made it so easy for students of western sciences and philosophy to go there and enjoy themselves in his dispatch to germany for a time. so i think people were influenced by that kind of very organized germanic thinking. it doesn't really translate immediately. not seeing some of the suspect
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ideology for many people because it looks down on colored people and second-class race in third class. many people who read translation in japanese was omitted from the text. the only people who could read german knew about this. so i think this fascination is more theatrical in nature as far as my understanding. >> host: was sparked you to write about pearl harbor in about this era? i'm just going to go around the table. >> guest: the most pedestrian of event they took a family vacation and my son and wife but not to the arizona memorial. i had been there before. the exhibit at the national monument are quite good. but i got interest did oddly oddly enough i was
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interested and realized nobody ever did the biography would chide thought was strange so i'll wanted to see a book written about him he was very introspective. he would not again revelations but once you get into your hawked and so by
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having this problem that there were thousands of them >> and toolkit that fundamental document it is like a filing cabinet.
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>> but then realized tragedy.
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it's farcical that people are discussing are not discussing at the highest levels in japan. i wanted to introduce back to as many audience members as possible. so writing in english made sense. >> host: creek mouth then you mentioned horton crane from back in laconia, new hampshire. i would like to cast to give their assessment that the historical research such as that done with flat and miracle of midway. >> guest: i think mr. craig with the greatest book about japanese military of world war ii and he was working with the card. he was part of his reception and you're supposed to interview every single person i came across any date. his archives were fantastic for
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my own work. however in 50 years time we have on new information coming out from japan. we have inside on new information from the survivors because they couldn't talk about what happened to them. if you compare what were able to write about now versus what i wrote about in the attack at south, and you think it is sanitizing it or something that is worried about weaker sensibilities that he just didn't have the material. at one point they spoke with a million pages of documents. that is how much new stuff we actually found. >> host: might come in san diego, things are holding. you are on with their three authors. >> caller: thank you. i have a comment and a question. the comment is there is a terrific value of reporting
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world war ii. one of the articles in their is by an american journalist in tokyo at the time of the attack and about how he got rudely hustled out of their than they get back to this days. if i'm not mistaken, the title of it was basis for keeps. the other you mention the colorful character and truman got the real blame for not being ready was with hoover because they were supposed to prevent espionage and of course hoover was so entrenched in secret the empowerment. i wonder what he thought about that. >> host: the fbi certainly less attuned to the japanese-american community there and had a tap on the phone on maquoketa consulate and that's how they learned on december 3rd to consulate was
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starting to word his secret document. but the special agent in charge in honolulu never thought there was any evidence of sabotage by the local community. certainly nothing new about this guy who is operating fairly openly and freely, although they have lists of people they intended to round up as soon as war broke out, which they did. there is a less than at the list of suspect good folks in the japanese community. but i'm not quite sure i understood the caller's point. did the fbi now? i don't think the fbi had any knowledge that an attack was imminent. >> guest: they did have one report which happens in august 1941 minus one in the event pearl harbor's worries that the man named dusan popoff who was a triple agent working simultaneously for the yugoslav
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comment reddish and intelligence agencies on the one of the models and he appears in august 1941 at the offices of jack or hoover in washington. if this had been sent here to assess american defense capabilities after three pages of questionnaire to fill out, a third of them was about pearl harbor and hoover refuses to take this seriously because he thinks he can't trust the agent and a mass popoff is having an affair with french movie star simone's amount and they are both married and you can trust him and having an affair with a married woman. one of the two serious warnings about pearl harbor. >> host: next of my kiowa, new jersey. go ahead. >> caller: yes come you're talking about the midget subs, but had the japanese typos at the most advanced submarines. how come that wasn't used as a
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primary weapon to search down the american carriers? is there a second attack on pearl harbor by seaplanes? >> guest: i think we need to appreciate what a spectacularly daring raids this was on the part of japan. many people in his own navy did think this just militarily could be pulled off. the secrecy was a prime direct it, but it's also important to remember they had no way of knowing whether the fleet was going to be there and whether the carriers were going to be there when they laugh. so one of the questions they have to have on route with our plan going to succeed because the enemy was indeed where we
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hoped they would be. they went hunting for the pacific fleet at sea with submarines. they were hunting for it in the harbor because that is when they were the most vulnerable, made the easiest target. it was only in the 24 hours prior to the attack but they realized that their wish, their hope was going to be fulfilled. the fleet was there except for the aircraft carriers. why weren't they using the submarines to hunt for the fleet? they had no knowledge of where the fleet is at any time. they were hoping it would be where in fact they founded. >> host: how do they keep a secret? >> guest: i think they really miss treating people at the top level. if i may be allowed to talk about envoys here in washington the day, they really didn't know
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what was going on when they ran into the room. his hands started shaking reading japan's declared intent to and diplomacy. even then, it really didn't declare war on the united states, said the south that event was not included and naomi realized at the embassy was happening. ensure the pearl harbor success than they were given enough time to type up the ladders, so that by the started the state department. it's a chain of maltreatment of people within your camp. >> host: craig nelson, back to restart it. whether the japanese attacked pearl harbor? >> guest: they wanted to keep us from interfering with a plan for operation number one. they wanted to strike out in a western power and western power and showed favor they are equal.
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they wanted to ensure a source of petroleum and be out reminder of the united states. and they thought into a mess that america would let them keep their colonies and would give up on trying to proceed in a war against them. >> host: steve twomey, was it successful? was it militarily successful? >> guest: short answer is no, i don't think it was. they certainly achieve surprise, the yamamoto miscalculated completely the response to the surprise. he thought this would weaken the row. it had exactly the reverse effect. militarily they achieved in a limited sense the goal of conflict deemed severe damage on the fleet. but as we've talked about, they missed the target they were going to be the most important in the coming war. the battleship era although many
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people didn't thought was already peaking and perhaps had peaked. these are all old ships. there is oil. they couldn't keep up with aircraft carriers. those were the weapons of the future and this was the first war in which that became apparent. militarily by missing the aircraft carriers, they probably did not achieve their goal. .. >> the authors we have been talking to, eri hotta, her book is "', 1941." steve tommy, countdown to pearl

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