tv Nuclear Weapons Non- Proliferation Treaty CSPAN June 9, 2017 12:34pm-2:05pm EDT
>> watch our coverage of the 33rd annual chicago tribune printer's row lit fest tarting saturday at 11 a.m. eastern on c-span2's booktv. >> the arms control association held its annual meeting in washington, d.c., and considered the best approaches to combat arms proliferation and previewed a nuclear weapons nonproliferation treaty conference scheduled for 2020. >> all right. good morning, ladies and gentlemen. good morning and welcome to the
2017 arms control association annual meeting. i'm daryl kimball, executive director of the arms control association, and as most of you know we are an independent nonpartisan membership organization established in 19 said one and we are dedicated to reducing and eliminating the threats posed by the world's most dangerous weapons which would of course be nuclear,, chemical, biological weapons as well as certain conventional weapons that pose particular harm in risk to civilians. you can find more about the arms control association, its history, its ongoing work and to get more information also about these issues through website, armscontrol.org and you can follow us on twitter at arms control now. the latest issue of our journal arms control today just went online so you can check that out there. you can also check out our resources on our arms control out which is simply arms control on all of the app stores.
we are very pleased to see so many of you here today, members, friends, colleagues from the diplomatic community, journalists and we welcome those of you who are with us watching it on c-span ticket for those the following on social media, that twitter handle for today's event to be part of the conversation is arms control 17. so the theme of this year's arms control association annual meeting is arms control and nonproliferation restraint at risk. and they are, we are facing serious and in some ways unprecedented challenges this year in the ongoing task to reduce the nuclear danger. the bedrock of all nonproliferation efforts, the nuclear nonproliferation treaty, faces serious implementation challenges. we have key commitment and nonproliferation obligations that are unfulfilled, and that's led many of the world's
nonnuclear weapon states to begin negotiations on a treaty to prohibit nuclear weapons. we will talk more about that later today. with the deterioration of u.s.-russian relations, key arms control treaties including a new strategic arms reduction treaty are at risk as well as the nuclear forces treaty, and worst steal all of the world's major nuclear arms states are either replacing, upgrading, or in some cases expanding their nuclear arsenals. and last but not least, unless we can work with our allies to engage north korea in talks to help or reverse its nuclear pursuit, its capabilities will become more dangerous in the years ahead. so how the united states will respond to these challenges and whether the united states continue to provide global leadership is not entirely clear and that's part of what we will be talking about today. president trump has made statements that concern key allies. he's made statements about
expanding the u.s. nuclear capabilities. he's been highly critical of some agreements like the new s.t.a.r.t. treaty and the iran nuclear deal. so we've got great lineup of speakers and experts and analysts to address these issues. we are especially happy to have later today senior white house adviser christopher ford, during the lunch hour, and the new u.n. high representative for disarmament izumi nakamitsu will be closing of the conference with respect as from the international community and the united nations. but before we moved to the first part of our program i just want to give a brief bit of thanks and a shout out to some of our individual members and contributors to make today's event possible. some other names are on the tables here at the carnegie endowment for national peace. and that's important because we are a small organization, we try to have a big impact but it
needs that your donations make a huge difference. in response to the challenges we are really gratified that our members have responded over the last few months. we seen an uptick in contributions at this in very important time. we are very happy to have several organizations and individuals help with contributions for this conference concluding our colleague organization nuclear education peace foundation which is committed to world free of nuclear weapons. our partners at women's action for new directions, which empowers women to be agents of change in support of disarmament and peace, and our individual sponsors for today's event, pierce gordon, deborah gordon, jan, andrew weber, and to members of the arms control association who wish to remain anonymous. so thanks to you all and thanks to everyone who is here. we cannot do without you. we could also not make progress on these issues without leaders in arms control, and that's why
ten years ago we launched the arms control person of the year award. we felt it was important to recognize the important work of key individuals who in various ways in different parts of the world have catalyzed awareness and action to deal with these weapons related challenges. so each year the staff of the board of directors, nominate several individuals about kendra doesn't, who we think have provided notable leadership in the previous year. and then we put it all to an online vote, and the top vote getter becomes the arms control person of the year. so it's an imperfect process perhaps, but so far our elections have been free of any cyber hacking and we think it's a free and fair process that is about as democratic as it can be. and the republic of the marshall islands and former foreign minister of the marshall islands tony to broome, garnered the highest number of votes for 2016
and they are our arms control persons of the year, over 1850 people from 62 countries anticipated in the voting this year back in december, and that's a record for this contest. our winners were nominated and are being recognized for pursuing a formal legal case in the united states -- for failing to meet their obligations to initiate nuclear disarmament negotiations. it's important to remember the republican marshall islands is, and the people there, were subjected to 67 u.s. at mr. nuclear test explosions in 194 1946-1958. unfortunately tony but accepted our invitation to come here to play all the way from his home in the south pacific is unable to be with us due to health difficulties, and the republic of marshall islands ambassador is out of washington today on official business.
we've asked john burroughs who s executive director of the lawyers committee on nuclear policy was a member of the legal team that brought the suit to the international court of justice to say a few words about tony and the significance of the case in the larger scheme of things. so john, thanks for being with us to explain the importance of this. [applause] >> thank you, daryl. in bringing the nuclear disarmament cases before the international court of justice, the marshall islands and it's a been foreign minister tony debrum, showed courage and determination rooted in tragic experience. they also showed good faith in seeking long guided solutions. tony and the marshall islands have shown similar courage and determination confronting
climate change. tony played a catalytic role at the negotiations that yielded the paris climate agreement in december of 2015. he helped to bring together a large coalition of nations, the high ambition coalition, that strengthen the agreement and perhaps even made it possible. so in light of the province yesterday, i think i should call it a couple thinks the marshall islands of the high mission coalition has said. president hilda hinds said just a president trump's intention to withdraw from the paris agreement, she said this, while today's decision will have great impacts, we must not give up hope. the high ambition coalition convened by marshall islands also released a statement for people around the world most vulnerable to climate change, the paris agreement represents
the best hope for survival. the arms control persons of the year award of course was about arms control, so let me return to that. we were of course very disappointed that last fall by the narrowest of margins, the international court of justice decided not to adjudicate the nuclear disarmament cases on the merits. however, simply bring the cases raised to world attention the failure of the nuclear powers to fulfill the obligation to negotiate and reach a global elimination of nuclear weapons. that was what the court said in its 1996 advisory opinion unanimously, that's what the court said the obligation is. for those of you who like to dig into things, the marshall islands pleadings are also a
rich resource for the development of political and legal arguments for disarmament. in the uk, memorial in the uk case, the national legal team argued the nurse because that's just the way the case unfolded. so as daryl mentioned, for making 46-1958 the u.s. conducted 67 at mr. nuclear test in the marshall islands at the eight tolls of bikini and we talk. they include the first hydrogen bomb test, mike, in 195252, and infamous bravo test in march 1954, 15 megatons. 1000 times the size of the hiroshima and nagasaki bombs. tony debrum was a nine-year-old boy fishing in a canoe with his grandfather when he witnessed the bravo test 200 miles away.
the sky turned blood red, he told the international court of justice in march 2016. however, the marshall islands cases before the international court of justice were not about compensation for the effects of testing. when the cases were filed in april 2014, tony said our people have suffered the catastrophic and irreparable damage of these weapons and we found to fight so that no one else on earth will ever again experienced these atrocities. tony also said in accepting the 2015 award, i've seen with my very own eyes nuclear devastation, and no with conviction that nuclear weapons must never again be visited upon humanity. this is not just an issue of treaty commitments or
international law, though it is that, and not just an issue of ethics or morality, though it is that, too, that this is an issue of common sense. how could anyone common person walking down the road, street, ever permit the possession or use of such weapons? so i think that the marshall islands and tony debrum richly deserve this award, and i think daryl and arms control association very much for arranging it. [applause] >> and it's an actual award. i want to ask you, john, to help us get this to the marshall islands to tony. thanks a lot. all right, and thank you, john, for helping to explain and to remind us about documenting impacts of the work that we are
discussing here today and the interconnectedness of these issues for all of its inhabitants. now, it's time to turn to the first panel of the day, which is nuclear nonproliferation treaty and a nuclear weapon ban talks, a status report. i like to ask our three panelists to come up to the podium. we will make a quick transition here. as they come up to the states let me note that our moderator is ambassador susan burk. susan, along with a panel of tom countrymen were selected to the arms control association part of directors, and susan among other career accomplishments was head of u.s. delegation to the successful 2010 nuclear nonproliferation treaty review conference. so with that, susan, the floor is yours and we're going to begin. thank you. >> thank you. good morning.
feedback? our first panel today is going to tackle the challenges facing the nuclear nonproliferation treaty as it approaches its 50th anniversary of the entry into force. that will be in 2020, the review conference. and in particular, the paddles going to to dress the efforts currently underway under u.n. auspices to draft a treaty prohibiting nuclear weapons leading towards the total elimination. challenges to the npt are not new in pursuit of measures to strengthen its imitation is ongoing. the negotiations on a band trade on the growing international frustration over the pace of progress on nuclear disarmament pursuant to article six of the npt -- ban treaty. as this frustration has fueled deepening concerns about the humanitarian consequences of nuclear weapons use among many nations and civil society.
supporters of the ban treaty believe that it will fill a legal gap in the npt and give a boost to disarmament in a way that complements the npt, not compete with the npt. another group of states include the npt nuclear weapons states are insisting that they are a step-by-step our aggressive approach to nuclear disarmament has been and remains a proven way to reduce arsenals. this one would have come to experienced diplomats and experts on the subject. there's a brief biography of each gentle man in your program so i will be even briefer and introducing them. tom countrymen was a crew member of the senior foreign service achieving the rank of minister counselor and he sits as acting under secretary for arms control and international security and simultaneously as the assistant secretary for international security and nonproliferation ride the honor of working for him for about a year.
ambassador jan kickert is austria permanent representative to the united nations in new york picky with director-general for political affairs in the austrian ministry of foreign affairs and is also served in a number of other government positions. his government as many of you know has been among the leaders in the humanitarian consequences movement. we will start with ambassador kickert he was prepared to address the goals, value, and the possible shape of a new prohibition or ban treaty. and then will have mr. countryman focuses comments on the convention, but the convention needs to contain, what it sponsors did you do to make progress towards this goal, and hopefully to address the intersection of the band and npt. so after about 15 minutes of remarks by each, will open the floor to your questions. without further ado i will start off with ambassador kickert. >> thank you much. i don't think i will need 15
minutes. >> okay. >> for introduction, but rather save time for q&a. at the outset i also have to say i am not a development specialist. i am a diplomat and i happen to deal also with the government, but i am not a specialist. i'm not the chief negotiator -- which is going to be negotiated on june 15 at the united nations with the view of hopefully concluding such a treaty by the end of the three weeks span, beginning in july. i just wanted to explain a little bit to you how we have committed you said the traditional role of austria in disarmament, it's that only nuclear disarmament.
we've always found austria at the core group, the vanguard of any initiative. because we believe that a world with less weapons, especially deadly weapons, is a safer one and not vice versa. so this is our general approach. being here i want to give you a little bit of perspective of those countries who are behind the prohibition. i have the feeling that the united states discussed among themselves, maybe also with other nuclear weapons states, but don't hear so much what you mentioned, the frustration of all those involved, the parties to the nonproliferation treaty. because it has been built up
frustration. if i want to very, very sharp thing, being cheated. the npt said -- set out a commitment, nonnuclear weapon states, the article 50, about acquiring a nuclear weapon -- [inaudible] so the whole result of this treaty, the result of this frustration and of a feeling that there needs to be some added element so that we will fulfill the npt in its entirety. so how did this come, how to become today, it all started out with the humanitarian initiative
based on a speech by then president of the international community, in february 2010. [inaudible] there was also mentioned that of the humanitarian consequences. and built on that we have three conferences in mexico and in vienna to go in depth and ask experts about these consequences of nuclear weapons. actually it was an extremely overwhelming experience. i was there in vienna, and to be honest i was shocked to learn that the dangers of nuclear weapons are so much graver than i was aware of, and i think we are all aware of, and that
somehow that this was shoved under the carpet, the danger we deal with imposing each and every one of us on this planet, be it a nuclear weapon state, be at those who just happen to be near those, like austria. we are situated not so far away from -- the airbase there where we expect that there are nuclear weapons. if anything happens we will feel the consequences of like -- [inaudible] and so it is shocking details, and one of them, i'd like to site because of the huge change, impact of nuclear weapons, some
-- [inaudible] >> petitions saying that the likelihood or that the danger for our children to die from nuclear incident is actually higher than from a car accident. because if something happens it will be so devastating that the numbers are so huge that those who die from car accidents is smaller. anything about this emulation of humankind, and that we were just damn lucky that nothing has happened until today. accident, human error, never, nothing has ever happened. we are playing russian roulette
here, and why you want to continue that? so this was the motivation that we pushed and it was not by coincidence before the 2015 npt -- [inaudible] press conference which yielded no results. there is no, from our point of view, no willingness of the -- [inaudible] from the nuclear weapons state to disarm, to fulfill the obligation under the article. yes, it is a nuclear weapons state. you have to disarm but when you determine all the elements around, working for nuclear disarmament, that it is also an obligation for nonnuclear weapon states to help fulfill --
therefore -- [inaudible] which is overwhelming support of the international community. it was supported by two-thirds of the member states. [inaudible] the umbrella states. and those countries informal or formal alliances with a nuclear weapon states, and we were actually astonished to see, working against, lobbying against our coalition treaty, which as you said in the beginning, i complement to this. for us and nonproliferation treaty is today the cornerstone of nuclear disarmament and nonproliferation.
but as the word cornerstone -- cornerstone always says, it's not the whole building. with other instruments consummate the npt, the comprehensive test ban treaty is an example of that. we also see how important it is to have more and more weapons of nuclear weapons, and maybe one day we'll have a fissile cutoff treaty. [inaudible] mainly getting rid of all nuclear weapons. i'd like to remind everybody also that the first general resolution after the foundation was exactly on the issue of getting rid of nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass distraction. we believe that the proponents for the prohibition treaty, that
it is good instruments to go ahead and you can create a legal norm prohibiting it, as we've done with the biological or chemical base. the argument you are here is it's not universal, it's failed. yeah, but biological and technical prohibition treaties were also not universal at the beginning. even npt was not universal. and so we believe that our endeavor could add a very important element to our common goal of reading the planet of nuclear weapons. >> thank you very much. -- >> microphone good? thanks, susan, ambassador kickert.
it's an honor to be with you and it's a special an honor to be with the arms control association for the annual meeting. among the many public issues that the american people have to be ready to discuss and raise the own consciousness, arms control threats of nuclear biological chemical weapons have to be near the top. so it's important for all of us in this room to go beyond and to do for the public outreach on the issue. as i started jotting down ideas a couple weeks ago, they were fairly inchoate, and then i read a couple days ago an article by george perkovich about the draft convention that prohibits nuclear weapons. if you have 15 minutes, it is probably better spent reading george's article on the subject than listening to me. but you already seated and i'm already seated so we will go right ahead. [laughing]
>> just a few words first about the nuclear nonproliferation treaty, which as ambassador kickert said is the cornerstone of the global nonproliferation regime. there is widespread, as he said, frustration and disappointment that the goals of the nuclear nonproliferation treaty have not been achieved. and that frustration merits analysis. it mert discourse. it merits even pressure upon the nuclear weapons state to move faster, to realize the commitments that they've made in article six. white is not sensible is to doubt the treaty itself. what makes no sense is to say that the nuclear nonproliferation treaty is the problem.
that's absolutely aiming at the wrong target. and i think that the current review process for the npt, the treaty, is always at risk of being confused with the treaty itself. there is no question that the five-year review cycle is a matter of great frustration to diplomats whose professional specialization is disarmament and nonproliferation. it is very difficult to get 180 some countries to come to consensus on a final document. and that frustrates those who see that there ought to be progress, that there ought to be better reports on commitments made by both nuclear and nonnuclear weapon states, on the progress that they have made.
but a couple of quick points about the nonproliferation treaty process. an unhealthy process, and overly complex, overly ambitious and overly contentious review process is one thing. it does not mean that the treaty itself is failing or even that it is sick. the treaty continues to be, in my view, the single treaty that in history of the world has done more to contribute to the security of every nation in the world by greatly restricting what could have been an unbounded nuclear arms race. and even those countries that are frustrated continue to benefit from the essential agreement at the core of the nuclear nonproliferation treaty. no other treaty has done as much for the security of nonnuclear
weapon states as well as nuclear weapon states. so this leads to just one point of connection between the npt and the convention that is currently under discussion in new york. and that is a single strongest recommendation i have for those who are drafting the treaty is to make explicit that membership and adherence to the nuclear nonproliferation treaty is a precondition for adherence to the convention on the prohibition of nuclear weapons. there is no inconsistency at all between the goals and what is likely to be the final language of the convention on the prohibition of nuclear weapons.
i have heard the concerns by some about what they would call forum shopping. that is, that there may be countries that for political reasons are tempted to embrace the convention, the new convention, but then to withdraw from the npt. it doesn't sound very logical, and yet i've done enough in the nonproliferation fuel to know that logic does not always win over politics. and it is possible to envision a situation in which for political, .co reasons a country like iran or egypt could make that choice. why create an issue? why create a circumstance in which the nuclear weapons states you're trying to convince, have an argument about inconsistency between the most important treaty we have now and this new convention?
just avoid the argument by including a specific recommendation, a specific requirement for npt membership in the cp endeavor you. and don't hide behind frustration that we are not happy with how that treaty has been appointed. -- implemented. one very small point, ambassador, believe me, the frustration expressed by austria and other leaders of this effort have been heard in washington. whether it is being heard today, i'm less qualified to judge. i'll let, let me talk a little bit about the process so far. first i want to express my great respect for what's been accomplished so far in the grasp of the convention, is at the upper end of what i thought achievable in the first session of the negotiation. and i think it is in the
direction of what ambassador kickert said is the task. what can nonproliferation states do to help to fulfill article six of the nuclear nonproliferation treaty? the requirement really accepted by the u.s. and all the other nuclear powers to work towards nuclear disarmament. it is a contribution in that regard. what is crucial and what i'll talk about more is what can be done in the next negotiating session. within the text and in the statements that states make outside of the negotiation, that actually moves us closer, makes a contribution to the very long-term undertaking of achieving its purpose. so here, as you draft, i've been
in yet of these things to know that i draft, special if it is going to take the form of a treaty, is going to have some incoherence because it represents compromises among different states or groups of states. i hope that the drafters week to avoid that incoherence by focusing on what is the ultimate goal. and the ultimate goal is to persuade nuclear weapon states that they can go to complete nuclear disarmament without damaging their own security. much of the argument on the margins of the convention negotiation is not about security. it is, rather, about political pressure, which matters, about
morality, about establishing norms. all of those are important. none of those are going to win the argument. the argument will be about security. so just a few, three points of advice. you don't have to pay for them, honest. first, during the negotiation and afterwards, stay on the high road. staying on the high road does not mean assuming an error of moral superiority. does that mean giving lectures to nuclear weapons states. it does not mean taking a disdainful attitude or accusing them of bad faith, even if that's what you believe. and i'm very conscience of the need to avoid giving lectures, even at a time when we have a
president who likes to lecture our closest allies. but don't reciprocate that urge to be hectoring and lecturing. rather, take seriously the real security dilemmas that both nuclear weapons states and the states that you referred to as umbrella states, i prefer the term those who enjoy extended deterrence, think seriously their security issues. second, pick carefully the targets that you want to persuade. and by that i mean above all don't delay, don't avoid choosing the hard targets. again, as george perkovich points out in his article, it's natural with the movement that depends largely upon civil society, upon ngos in democratic countries to start by
seeking to persuade democracies, and to leave aside those nuclear weapons states, russia, china, and above all, north korea, that are impervious to any kind of outside rational argument. but to focus on other democratic states that are part of the western alliance or the asian states that under extended deterrence, risk being perceived as a discriminatory movement, and it risks having that used against the movement. it will be easy for people not only in the city but elsewhere to say that this is a one side movement that seeks to damage western national security without addressing what is happening in, or the nuclear policies of nondemocratic
countries. and, in fact, again, i think perkovich makes his point well. it actually risks emboldening the nuclear posture and the doctrine of use of those nondemocratic countries. how do you persuade those countries? well, i know, at i think anyone who's worked in arms control as a bitmap knows that one of the built-in frustrations is that the issues that we hear passionate about and that we get immersed in and we become expert in, seldom rise to the level of our president or our prime ministers. president obama was an exception in terms of that time in serious thought and study that he gave to these issues.
but in most countries, no matter how deeply the director general for arms control feels about the issue, it is unlikely that the president or prime minister is going to raise that or make them subject of primary topic of conversation with other world leaders, particularly with the leaders of nuclear weapons states. so there's a need not only to make sure that your national leadership cares about this issue as deeply as you do, but also cares about it enough to apply equally the outreach to all the nuclear weapons states. now, it's not only the five recognized nuclear weapons states and the others who are outside of the npt, but it's clear from the discussions in new york that civil society attempts to focus on those allies in nato and in asia who
are covered by extended deterrence, and as you say, a nuclear umbrella. and that's understandable. but just a word about the practical effects that are likely to get in europe. you should not expect great results, whether, within nato, whether the goal is removal of the small number of tactical nuclear weapons that the u.s. has pre-position in a few european states, or whether it's convincing nato to change its self-definition as a nuclear alliance. it is for me very difficult to see any of these governments changing fundamentals or their security policy at a time when there is a genuine threat of aggression when, in fact, european countries occupied by their neighbor, and that there is a willingness to use both conventional and nonconventional means of warfare to destabilize
nato members. indeed, i think a lot of european countries, members of nato, would see a change in that policy, declared policy of nato as inviting additional aggression, whether overt or covert. but again i'd like to warn the advocates of the convention against giving lectures. i know i'm giving a lecture. i got the irony. [laughing] a nato ally for the republic of korea or japan facing a genuine security threat will not take well a lesson about their defensive policy from a state that is unwilling to give the same lecture or even condemnation or even
condemnation backed by painful action against those who perpetrate aggression, whether it's in pyongyang or in moscow. just for the point europe that nato, even if one ally or five allies decide that the you likee u.s. to remove these tactical, the 61 bombs, it is a limited step. and it doesn't fundamentally change, it's an important change but it doesn't fundamentally change nato security policy, nor does it fundamentally change the united states nuclear posture. while i'm sure it would be welcomed by advocates of the convention as an up or step forward, it's important to be aware of how limited that would be. it's a huge step from discussing our changing policy on tactical weapons to questioning what not
only the u.s. but other nuclear weapons states have defined as the central purpose of possessing nuclear weapons, which is to deter anyone else using them. so to try to come up, what can you do to make this current effort to negotiate the convention on prohibition live up to its potential? well, a couple things that are in the treaty that need attention, and one i think of us can talk about, which is to strengthen and make specific what kind of safeguards regime would be necessary for adherence to the convention. and as i mentioned, my very strong recommendation to link this to the nonproliferation treaty by making mandatory membership as a prerequisite.
second, i hope that the advocates of the convention, both in the next month and afterwards will do all they can to elaborate a verification mechanism that would give confidence to actual declaration of non-possession. here again, george perkovich has some good ideas. i would add that the nuclear weapons, the nonnuclear weapon states would be smart, work hard on initiatives such as the international partnership for nuclear disarmament verification. it is a concrete area in which nuclear and nonnuclear weapon states work together towards a specific goal. third and very difficult requiring long-term work is to elaborate what would be the
actual process of disarmament. it is not something that you can dictate to the nuclear weapons states, but it is something where you can give serious thought to how to get step-by-step, i know people don't like that phrase, you would like it better if you wrote someone the steps yourself and it would add credibility to the movement itself. and finally on suggestions, once this convention is drafted, i would hope that the excellent diplomat who worked on it put their attention not just on public opinion, on propagating the text, but on working with diplomats and military officials who are experts not just on negotiation but on real-world security challenges.
what can be done? what would you do if you were in the position of london or paris or beijing or washington? what are the security challenges that could be addressed that would give those states confidence in building down and building toward zero? and i would even suggest something that i think is of enormous practical value, which is very extensive simulations of such discussions. if the u.s. and russia are having a hard time talking to each other about their strategic stability challenges, i think we could learn something from diplomats, from mexico and austria and elsewhere playing the role of washington and moscow and in talking to each other. and last point, this is what i
would hope would be the is positioned and i hope we will hear from the doctor today. and i think it's very well summarized in an article on the same topic by michael, and just to summarize his summary, i hope the u.s. will express understanding of the sincere motives of those who are pushing for this convention. i hope that the u.s. will offer respectfully specific concerns about the text and that what comes after. that the u.s. and articulate in detail the circumstances under which it will be possible to build down and to move to zero, and most concretely, i hope to see the u.s. agree with russia on the extension of a new s.t.a.r.t. treaty, and reassert its commitment to further strategic arms reductions.
a lot of this is very ambitious people i think it's no more ambitious than the convention itself. i hope that the sponsors will keep their eye on the long-term calendar. not just to get through june, with a text that elicits champagne and hugs, but a strategy that actually addresses the real world concerns of those who feel that nuclear weapons offer them security, and accolade a basis for a very respectful partnership between the nonnuclear weapon states and the nuclear weapons states. thank you. [applause] >> i want to thank you both for keying at this issue in such a substantive and creative way.
and i think ambitions these days is something we all ought to strive for, and positive energy. i just want to ask one question before we open up the floor. you both focus on the ban negotiation and the ban treaty,, and if it went a lot of great food for thought here, can have a conversation. looking ahead to 2020 in the npt, if the negotiations are completed this year or next, the question i would have if i were active-duty, whidbey will the nuclear weapons states, nonnuclear weapon states be able to agree to disagree on this issue, when they convene for the npt review conference, and be prepared to move on to find common ground and also construct a discussion of how do they ease the growing tensions between the states? i mean, there's serious questions about security, instability. tom, you may some clear references to that.
can we move with this now beyond that to come together in a creative search for common ground under the auspices of the npt? i opened it up to both of you. ambassador kickert? >> again, from more political and less disarmament specialist point of view, yes, i think we can. thank you very much, tom. i think that was extremely constructive and yes, we used to be lectured. we can take that. but it was very constructive proposal that i think there we find a lot of common ground. for us and others who are in the core group like ireland which at the outset of the npt, we would do anything not to undermine our country strengthening. the suggestions you may and also
the verification well taken. this is also our intention. the big question is how do reintegrate the nuclear weapons states at some stage? we are not naïve. we also understand the security dilemmas and discussion, and we want to keep that treaty open, and we do not, that's what we disagree a bit, we don't want to prescribe anything in this treaty to the nuclear weapons state, but once they would come in together with them to find circumstances like a landing zone. and coming back to question, i think if we work in the spirit of complementarity and then look back into the goals of the npt,
we had a 2010 action plan. maybe we can make some progress there. because of the issue in 2015 was that we look at it. so i think this is not the competition. i think that's the most important, what we want to stress. nothing to undermine it a something to add to it. you would have austria and other countries really proponents that we have to work together for security for all. we can talk but discussion so with security, but i think we need to acknowledge our approach was always that we want security for all, also for those nonnuclear weapon states. >> thank you. tom? >> i think the best way to focus for success i in the 2020 review
conference of the nuclear nonproliferation treaty is to be less obsessive about it. i mean a couple of things. first, we had a pattern through several review conferences that which there is broad, painful consensus, sometimes on an important advances, sometimes on minor advances, that is been taken hostage to the issue of establishment of a wmd free zone in the middle east. and that is what caused the last review conference two years ago, not to feel because i don't believe it failed. but it did not reach a consensus document. the more that we obsess about how crucial it is that we avoid another such outcome in 2020, if
we label the failure to get a consensus document and a failure of the treaty, what we are doing is raising the leverage that the states that are obsessing about the middle east zone have, and raising the likelihood that we will fail to have an agreement. .. that convention rightly relates to the nonproliferation treaty as he
has suggested, and if building out the option of that convention, there has been a sincere effort by its advocates to engage with nuclear weapons states and the beneficiaries of the nuclear deterrence in the ways that i suggested. there's no reason to have to become an obstacle to a meaningful conclusion at the 2023 conference. if on the other hand the npt review process itself is used as a lever or as a shaming tool, the way similar to what egypt does with in this case with regard to the convention itself, it will be defeating to both purposes.
the nuclear weapons states will have two one day change their policies if this effort is to succeed. they are not going to be moved by a deadlock and handwringing over a deadlock at a conference in new york. they're going to be moved by concrete actions and systems solving security dilemmas so i would hope, don't overthink it. actually have a more beneficial outcome and one that squares well with the purpose of this event quite thank you, great answers and again, lots of food for thought. going to open it up to questions. is there someone with a microphone? when you ask your questions, please identify yourself and
to whom you are directing your question quite front row. >> thank you very much. my name is brandy riddell, neighbors for peace. susan, i would like to wait a minute, i'm the moderator. >>. [laughter] >> let me draw upon your vast special experience. and comment on the lack of any infrastructure in the government. there are no disarmament agencies in the vast nuclear weapons, when the arms control policy in the 90s, in disarmament terms even disappeared from the organization charts for the
same purpose. there's very little sign of institutional support for disarmament in the government. what extent is this a problem, is this a barrier, an obstacle to progress in the policy of the state and to tom, i'd like to ask him during the 1960s, the johnson administration was facing the problem of whether the nonproliferation should be a us policy. they created a real pacs solution and produced this report, yes it should and it should not be nondiscriminatory. how are we hear that the nuclear posture where government is now being assessed as to whether it should have a goal of this policy? what could be the outcome of this assessment and what would be the effects of this goal is abandoned, thank you? >> very quickly, because i'm not answering the question what the arms control agency was abolished on april fools' day 1999 .
from my experience, they always had a robust arms control nonproliferation bureaucracy and in contrast to many other countries that do not. i think that gave us the opportunity , we had a responsibility to do more work interacting with our partners through diplomacy, engaging with foreign partners, providing information, that sort of thing and because we had bureaucracy, we could do that if we wanted to do that. i can't comment on today, but i can address at least the part of the deluge. >> your first question for susan, what concerns me is not the absence of the word disarmament. what concerns me is the absence of officials who are charged with implementing policy.
i'm looking forward to chris speaking to us at lunchtime, he's well-qualified and he leads this effort at the white house. but to actually move something ahead, to have an undersecretary and assistant secretary in these fields and the department of state has shown unprecedented lassitude in nominating anybody for any position. very good, fantastic well-qualified career progression professionals acting in those slots but they are not in a position to act on policy objectives. the nuclear posture review that the administration is undertaking and to which it is assigned lead responsibility to the department of defense is supposed to be completed by the end of the year. i do have some concerns about it. i have no idea how it's
going. i would love to be reassured by mister ford today that in fact not only the department of defense but the department of state, department of energy are involved in the discussion. that would be reassuring. the parts that concerns you and i think concerns me a little bit as well, that the last time this posture review was undertaken at the beginning of the obama administration, nobody was putting on the table the idea that we need more nuclear weapons and more diversified nuclear weapons. some people, some ngos, some thinkers are putting that on the table and i'm completely unable to gauge their influence or the likely outcome. now, i know for example on
climate change you can give a speech that says i love the environment, the environment is huge, it's a great thing but i am breaking a commitment that we've made. the effect is actually even more serious. if the nuclear posture review were to conclude what you suggested. that disarmament is not a goal. that would be breaking not just a commitment to an agreement but a binding ratified commitment that the united states has available for nearly 50 years. and that would be an extremely serious step. so let me not alarm you by speculating. >> now that we're all depressed.
>> thank you, richard kiel house, an independent consultant out of the senate arms services staff. i'm sorry to say susan, i'm not going to cheer up the crowd with my question but . >> ask it to this gentleman here. >> i'm just warning you, lowering expectations. i want to explore the other side of what you were suggesting. about trying to do things in a way that is constructive and will undermine the process and the question is do you see a risk to the mtv or the possibility of undermining those constructive steps are not taken, could there actually be a result that could undermine the treaty, put it into it, etc. if the darker side of how this should work. >>. >> i'm not very concerned about that.
a few of my colleagues had us government last year and some of my colleagues in government of other nuclear weapon states said that this effort would undermine the npt. that part i need to see. as i noted, there are definitely colleagues from some foreign ministries for whom disarmament is a game, is a tactic rather than a goal. and you can expect them to at least be tempted by that idea that if i have to different treaties, to demonstrate what a great moral citizen i am that's not going to take what we respectively want, i think it's possible. i think it's unlikely. it depends very much upon a
couple things i already mentioned. it's very explicit that everybody who's signing this convention was the npt and wants to push forward the goals of the npt with the new convention and you take that as not just a preamble clause but a requirement in the new convention. i think would minimize that danger. secondly, the other thing that could create or increase what is a small risk is what i think it is a very unfortunate trend of among some who advocate, and portray themselves as great advocates of the department which is to say we can't do any more steps on nonproliferation, no matter how rational they are, no matter what they could improve security until the
nuclear weapons states do more on disarmament. you know, it's this division of hostagetaking and it really makes no sense. so if states that advocate this dissension begin to be obstacles in the path of improving the safeguard system, improving the nonproliferation system, then they will be doing the work of undermining the work so these are possibilities what i am really not that worried about it in any fundamental way on leaving the npd. >> we will get out tom's contact information so you can get in touch with him you get worried and he will give you a comforting thought. back there. alex. >> this is for ambassador kickert. i've heard some say when they
talk to the chinese about nuclear weapons they say that's an american talk because everybody does away with nuclear weapons, the us will be by far the superior military power because of its conventional superiority. what can you do to mend countries like china and others and obviously it's not something that will happen tomorrow but what can you do to convince countries like that that this is not what's going to happen, that their security is preserved even in a world without nuclear weapons? >> i personally would not consider china considering their conventional weaponry but on china i find it interesting that they have limited themselves in the amount of nuclear weapons. they don't, my perception is that they didn't expand to a degree where russia is and
the united states so i think they're quite happy to have this, is it necessary from their point of view limited amount of nuclear weapons and don't expand further. >> 90 percent of our nuclear weapons are in possession of russia still so i think it is still those two countries who have the key to press forward for nuclear disarmament agendas. >> china, i think is conventionally beefing up so i don't see china as an obstacle for the abolishment, they were even a little more engaged than other nuclear weapon states. >> you had to disengagement
by russia, china was at least out of the first state, also as a preserver. this during the conference on humanitarian conflict. i think even the state general assembly when we voted down this prohibition of the path. so i'm not so concerned that china is the biggest obstacle. >> it's actually, that's a concern or a comment i've heard more often from russian colleagues and chinese colleagues and it's understandable. first, neither of them take seriously the long-term prospect but secondly of course china is a global power for a number of reasons. >> for russia there are only two things that russia will overpower and that is your weapons and innovating from
programming. >> ambassador kennedy. >>. >> thank you, laura kennedy and like tom and susan i was proud to represent the obama administration in both geneva and vienna and also i joined the board today along with then. i want to pick up on a point that tom made about the importance of the nuclear man lobbying equally, not on democracy as well but typically i wanted to ask that because my understanding is that they are in part of the process and i'm, if that's the case, how do you deal with that? theoretically, you could pick up some point it makes sense to the membership as far as
the treaty and say gee, that would bring them in but don't you run the risk of having that part of the process and either allow them to take off the pressure to deal with the international security prep for conceivably bring some underline the arms-control accomplishment by having say, a north korea part of it whereas the uk, france, japan really are not part of it. >> thank you very much. >> if i recollect, they were all in favor of the gaa resolution but they are, i haven't seen them and i was not there the whole time to participate and one important aspect of we implemented in the rules of procedure is
that we be a pejorative boat and not consented so that those who participate cannot offer division by i would say the baby majority. and it was interesting as proposed by some countries who want to have it exactly their way, egypt, he ran so but this was thwarted so there again, i had to read north korea any rules there. the north korea dilemma is in into the next session. >>. >> thank you susan. darrell kimball, i wanted to note that you issued arms-control today, there are two in article 1 concerning the prohibition of treaty. >> and that is worth a look. i wanted to come back to one
question that has been raised about the prohibition treaty. >> and mission combat, one way to deal with this was to have obligations through the prohibition treaty. that might be problematic for israel. >> that's one of the problems but. >> one other approach i wanted to get your reaction on, is places that are already members of the entity to remain. other approach that still gets those countries like syria. >> and also, tommy brought this up a couple of times when a successful, i've
always argued the real trend of these states is other than the us and russia. ... i find that ... [audio lost] >> okay. well, on the first point, not to be flippant about it but the problem with india, pakistan and israel is not a closet treaty, it's about more fundamentals and if we were ever to get to a point where those countries were seriously considering joining this convention, it would not be a decision based upon
whether or not that npd membership clause didn't have an extension, it will be a decision based upon on the mental changes . in their national security perceptions. >> and that's very long-term. it's not going to happen soon. i take that the advocates of this convention would do a disservice by not making that linkage and thus opening themselves up to the criticism that they have created an alternative pathway to the nonproliferation treaty. >> so yes, you're right in a technical sense. i don't think it's a terribly important factor over a lifetime. on the new start treaty, as you all know, the new start negotiated between the us and russia went into effect in 2011. >> its last for 10 years, it
has a clause for automatic attention by an additional five years until 2026. if both parties agree, president clinton has already suggested this extension, president trump by contrast has said as he has said about anything that the previous administration has done, it's a 40 negotiated deal. >> it has so far refused to consider it. >> i would hope that we are all for reasons the united states comes around to agree with russia on this automatic five-year extension. it costs nothing, it prevents at least for the moment and escalation of the arms race and the number of questions weapons both countries possess. it preserves important
capabilities, it cannot be replaced for their expectation and monitoring of the of the field and it would be the single easiest and most visible step for the united states to address the legitimate concerns of countries all around the world about our actual commitment to disarmament. >> thank you. other questions, in the back, right in the middle. sorry, can't see that far. >> you, diane berman, george mason school for analysis and resolution. this is for tom. while the logical implication of what you're talking about i think the next stage for us to go to is what's known as second order change. first order change is sort of eliminating the weapons and the consequences and how bad they are. second order change deals with the analyzing the underlying conflict and what the needs of the parties and
challenging clauses and raising clauses for this theory, addressing the spiral theory and security but also looking at how to reduce tension and work on addressing the underlying conflict of nuclear weapons that are necessary or irrational. so anyway, i just would appreciate. also i registered, i got accredited for the ban treaty, mediators on board transcend network of transformation and for those responsibilities so i want to build some energy around the northern change. >> okay, i have great respect for the academic work being done. i'm not an academic. i don't think in those terms. i think that the academic work could help inform those who are trying to bring about
what you term both the first-order and second order change. to be honest i'm not sure how i would use that terminology or that typology. >> okay, other questions. >> red levine, center for arms control and nonproliferation.one of the recurrent problems under the institute has been the feeling of a part of some states that treaty allows them to build up as much of a peaceful nuclear infrastructure as they wish, even if that brings them to the brink of nuclear weapons capability. and i wonder what the riffs are that the convention would increase the pressure on the
nuclear suppliers group to stand down and stop putting roadblocks in the way of what it sees as the nuclear proliferation. >> good question. i hadn't thought about it. i think it would be tremendously counterproductive for the advocates of this prohibition to either promote or to tolerate an effort of some nonnuclear weapons states to claim to make the argument that this allows us to develop nuclear capability right up to the edge of weaponization. that would be damning to the credibility of the movement if that were tolerated. >> the nuclear suppliers
group includes a number of countries not only nuclear weapons states but those on extended deterrence but it includes those who are advocates of this process. >> and i simply can't picture that the nuclear suppliers would say on, this changed the reality. it allows us to have more confidence in iran's peaceful intentions because they signed a convention. i don't think it would happen that way so it's interesting but i think that's a small world. >> i think we have time for one more question. larry, you get the last word. the last question. >> e wire. i'm old enough that i often think i'm in error but i'm
neverwrong . and i lived through 65 years of this business. >> and i was asked by a group with where i now reside to do a little talk on arms control . i haven't finished preparing the talk. but it took time to go through the whole history and i have a couple things to add here and that is that if you look at where we are, from the day when we first announced the american plan to take care of nuclear weapons, and look at what's been accomplished and it's an interesting history because it's jerks and lives in jerks and glides area.
>> and we didn't know what to do about dealing with the problem for a long time and then we started and we got some firsttips . and thinking about why we moved forward and why we stopped, in large part, there's a bit of an accident involved. personalities are involved. which we could have started long ago but they decided the problem with germany was such that he had to fund his program of negotiation. and one little step here, therefore, you go down the line. but if you look at it, where we are today, with the test ban, that we haven't ratified the test ban, that's true but basically there's a test ban. and basically, it's a cut
off. and basically, we've learned how to deal with a lot of these problems. and we've dealt with the submittal problem. what we have, and i could go on. we've got pretty much the first stage of the original general and complete disarmament program that people talked about in theory. so don't give up. it's a long haul and we've really got stage one, we got the cut off. all these other things. so don't, don't begrudge that we haven't gotten all the way through here. >> i have a question however. >> okay larry. >> my question is what is it the difference between the no proposal and the effect of
having nuclear free zones all over the world? it's a simple question but what's the difference? in practical terms? >> i'm not a specialist but from the officer perspective, we don't have a nuclear weapons free zone in europe and we have studied also this proposal, we're jealous about the other areas of the world, austria happens to be a neutral country, it's an option in ending the military alliance and we're in the middle of this big competition. so yes, if you want to have nuclear weapons free zones all over the world, we will have a nuclear free world. and we can continue that, if we extend it to europe, we will be the first to be happy about it. >>. >> essentially those countries that have formed
nuclear weapons free zones argue and with great merit that they cannot fully enjoy the benefit that comes from living in such a zone if nuclear conflict can occur anywhere in the world. you cannot isolate the nuclear weapon free zones from places where nuclear conflict could occur. now with, there's reason to raise that as a point. >> okay, i think were going to have to wrap it up. i will say that i know a lot of you tend to focus on the challenges and problems and we're all at high anxiety, the mel brooks movie but i think we're taking away, what i take away from this panel is that we need to be positive. we need to be creative but we need to keep our eyes focused on the big picture and the prize and we can't afford to
forget all of the accomplishments that we have over here as larry talked about but there is far more good things than there are and we have to persist so let's give our speakers around of applause. >>. >> nice job. >> thank you very much. >> susan,, professor kickert and thanks to all of you for participating in this discussion, i want to thank people like larry weiler. for those of you who don't know, he's been working on this and is one of the fathers of the nuclear nonproliferation treaty and he's still here. decades later. were going to take a break. between our two panels and the next session is to be on one of the threats of the
nonproliferation systems, the north korean missile threat. we begin that in about 10 minutes. so you have a chance to take a quick break. there are a few seats up front when you can't come in. please find seats up front. we are briefly adjourned until 10:40. >> the arms control association conference featured a discussion on the threats posed by north korea's nuclear weapons and ballistic missile programs. >>. [inaudible conversation]