tv After Words with Anne- Marie Slaughter CSPAN June 18, 2017 12:00pm-1:03pm EDT
in 1500's but had a resurgence and then in -- right before treaty of high park, a few years before that, there was to put a price on the head of every native american and so what happened a lot of the natives start today leave and go out west. many had already gone west and, in fact, the people are here. they're going west and some of them merge. some separate but they are going through what is all 48 lower states. it's absolutely important to understand native history. i feel that you can't understand american history without understanding the native history . >> c-span where history unfolds daily. in 1979 c-span was created as a public service by america's cable television companies and is brought to you today by your
dean of the woodrow wilson school of public and international affairs at princeton. what's important, those are just some of her past assignments, and a very illustrious career. what's important i think in terms of today's discussion is that you will see in her background and in the book that she is both a practitioner as well as at the arrest, or as a teacher, professor of international affairs. so it's an exciting opportunity to discuss her new book. why do we just jump right in, right up front, just tell us little bit about the thesis of the book and about why he decided to write the book now. >> guest: denis, it's great to talk to you and to be able to reflect on both of our experiences, actually as foreign-policy practitioners. i've been writing about networks since 1994. so as a scholar i've been
looking at how the world was moving increasingly from big hierarchical organizations like the united nations or the imf or the world bank, and increasingly toward networks, government officials like central bankers or finance ministers, but also big networks of ngos, when they are seeking humanitarian disaster you see all these nongovernmental organizations playing an increasingly important role. when i was in government and, indeed, you chaired many of the situation rooms meetings, what would strike the was that we knew there was a world of states and state threats. today if you think about north korea or iran or sometimes china and russia, that world of state to state relations is still very, very important and i think of it as the chessboard world because it's the world of how do
we essentially beat our adversaries. we think about a move and we try to anticipate what moved they will make. that world is there and it's very important, but equally important is what i call the world of the web. that world of criminal networks including terrorists but also arms traffickers and drug traffickers. the world of business which is increasingly big network supply chains, global corporations and the world of nongovernmental organizations. i think of all those actors as well actors as increasingly important actors, but we don't have strategies for how to bring them together. so this book is a book that says if are going to have all world of chessboard and strategies of how you deal with conflict between states and cooperation between states, we also need a set of strategies for how to design networks for specific
people. who do reconnect, how to reconnect them, how do do we run this networks to meet challenges or to advance our goals. and this book is a set of the strategies. >> host: it is surely a timely book, very much, and just building on what you said in your opening remarks, anne-marie, let me just go to what i thought was a pretty effective quote that keyed up the argument in the book where you say on pages nine and ten that whatever the future brings we need the ability and the tools to operate effectively in a very different world where states still exist an excellent power but side-by-side with corporate, civic and criminal actors enmeshed in a web of networks, this chessboard running up against this web of networks that you talked about. there is a question of either or, is it that your realist and, therefore, you just click on the chessboard or you're an idealist
and just playing in the web. or is it question of both, and now do you see that, and how should the reader into into the book on this debate which goes back decades and decades among practitioners and students of the field that you and i have both come out of? >> guest: it's definitely both and. and, indeed, the endless debate between realists and liberal internationalists about to pursue our interests interests or do we pursue our values. those are i think you and i would both agree often overplayed. i strongly believe, for instance, that we have to pursue our values. that's part of our interests, but i would also say that, i would also say that we have to be able to put together chessboard strategies and web strategies.
and often it's a question of shorter term and long term. so we have an immediate crisis with another state, if you're thinking about the middle east and you are thinking about what do we do with iran or what we do about syria, there's going to be an immediate set of choices that are going to involve other states. we push back. we try to cooperate. we said to our willingness to cooperate. sometimes that works, sometimes we don't. but longe longer-term, if you tk about president obama's speech in 2009, a new beginning with the muslim world, to really address the causes of terrorism and the deed of lots of other problems coming out of the middle east, you need to build networks, networks of entrepreneurs, civic groups, scientists, networks of actually muslim groups that are pushing
back against a radical islamist narrative. and that's where the web strategies come in and that's where you bring in business and civic groups and governments, and you design a network a particular way and you run it. it really is both. >> host: makes a lot of sense. the question that that leads me to raise, something you call on page 37 of the book, the disaggregation of the state which and you just had been arguing since 199 1994 as humank at these networks, you say that the proliferation of these networks is a result of what i call the disaggregation of the state, meaning that different parts of governments repeating away from the chessboard model of foreign-policy. directed by the head of state and the foreign ministry, and instead creating networks of both private and civic actors. the question i have is, as we
are watching the debates play out now, debates are in this country that really fueled i would argue the election of president trump, among the things he still argues as president but then argued as candidate was that the need to return american sovereignty, to america. and the ongoing debate that we see even most recently in the french election for president. where one candidate was arguing very much to pull back from the european union, in an argument she made at the time to reassert french sovereignty, and one candidate, the winner ultimately, arguing that the french interests are best served by more aggressively engaging that network of the european union. what's your sense of kind of where this ebb and flow goes as a relates to the arc of this debate and the development of these networks since 94 when you
started as you said making the argument and really digging into this? >> guest: that's a great question. in a way again he back to both the hand. in the book i reprint that famous picture look at and do you see an old lady or a young woman? some of the say it's an old lady. you see the big nose in the wort and that could what it is -- >> host: i was going to ask you about that because i saw the young lady cited know if that says something about me or what. but anyway, i -- >> guest: i believe that to you and your wife. some of the cdm lady, some of see the old woman. my point is you actually have to see both. and then to do foreign-policy effective you must be able to toggle between them. because in some cases the state needs to be unitary. if we are under attack that's no time for different government
agencies and different citizens and different corporations to be networking around the world. in those situations, the president is the commander-in-chief and the secretary of state and the secretary of treasury can everybody has got to be on the same page. so when where really under threat, and again i would say dealing with north korea right now or again when you were working with iran, there were many different contacts to the government, the department of energy like a very important role, the state department, defense department but it was what i would call a unitary state figure somebody in charge and everybody was on the same playbook. at the same time in a globalized world and interdependent world, our networks are a great source of power and advantage for the united states. the fact that our corporations are doing business around the world, the fact that her movies
and entertainment are seen around the world. the fact that our universities are attracting students from all over the world and running campuses abroad. and again are civic organizations thinking of the networks abroad. we've got to be able to do both, and the second disaggregation dates a very aggravated term but it means our cities and our states are able to engage others. others. the right now on climate change, california and the cities of new york and chicago and los angeles, they all are actively networking with their counterparts abroad to fight climate change. but they can do things on the ground or similarly if you're fighting terrorism, again, you want the ability to help build educational institutions and businesses in states that don't have opportunity for you to
fight the long-term causes of terrorism. you've got to toggle back and forth. some of the time you need to be really unitary, all hands on deck crisis or conflict state. and in other cases it's critically important that we stay open to the world and able to participate and network. >> host: is remarkable, it's great you brought up the case of california and climate change. i think that time time supportes week, maybe yesterday, on the things that the state of california, governor brown are doing as it relates to work on climate in fact, even convening a meeting, ministers of the government of mexico, government of mexico city or the state of mexico, and ministers of the government of canada in california strikes me as a really remarkable case. the question is do you see risk?
is that ultimately, what's the risk in that for u.s. policymakers or use interests? or is it just a function of the fact that this just is the world, if california an independent state, and independent country, what, the seventh-largest economy in the world or something like that. do you see risk in this case of california? >> guest: absolutely. and this is actually an old question and the supreme court has revisited it several times, and i'm sure there will be another suit right now about what individual states can do. so early on the supreme court informed, issued a ruling that said states can't engage in treaties with other states pics of california cannot actually create a kind of nafta formally
with the governments of canada and mexico. on the other hand, and again this is happening in the 1990s where governor started leading trade delegations to china and other parts of asia for their states. and california actively intervened in issues going on in the eu and is a lawsuit brought about that about california's taxability to tax. and california's power was upheld. so this is again, it's back to sort of seeing the united states is both a unitary country but also a country of 50 states at the same time, we benefit as a nation having our states be able to forge relationships with other countries or states around the world. think about the sister cities network just as one example.
i think chicago's more sister cities than any other city in the country, but all of our big cities have those relationships. that's a form of soft power. people learning about the united states, it also helps for trade and culture and the flow of ideas. but what you have to make sure is that a state or ocd can't get you into trouble. the reason the founders insisted that the four affairs power be located with the federal government was that they didn't want, back in the revolutionary era, they didn't want states refusing to pay british creditors pixel states were very sympathetic to american debtors after the revolution. but that could get us into war with britain. it's a balance. i can do favor more autonomy for states and cities because again in the web world you simply have to allow more independence.
but unmindful that you wouldn't want california going and making a deal with china that might imperil our defense, defense capacity or frankly undercutting of the states economically. >> host: it's remarkable, remarkably diverse international system as we dig into this. i want to come back in a couple of questions and some of these case studies. i think china necessity. north korea which you reference a couple times also faceting. i want to dig in for maybe a couple more questions on networks themselves. you befitting a sum has been look at this long time, you know, i headed anybody else. i noticed mark zuckerberg talked about this in his commencement address yesterday about network networks. i guess you know something about them, build a pretty powerful
networking self. but you break down different kinds of networks and i think the reader will be quite engaged by that. but the route, i just want to pull up one example if you talk about networks but each of your network to bring up you highlight the importance of diversity which i think is pretty interesting. i think as you hinted at in your remarks so far that a networked state ultimately is going to be a diverse state and their strength in diversity. you write on page 134 if i can find it, in the context of a taft networked you write their best carried out by small diverse but cohesive groups. diversity of team members provides multiple talent and perspectives while small size build sufficient trust in team spirit for the group to act as
one and to adapt seamlessly to changing circumstances. if my memory serves me, you draw the set of conclusions out of an effective set of networks that a former colleague of ours by the name of stan mcchrystal, a highly decorated officer use army, used to carry out different catechism operations in place like iraq and afghanistan. i'm interested if you want to spend a little time of the differentiation of networks that may be interesting but also it was in this concept of diversity. one could argue that this debate that which is referenced a minute ago in this country and in europe, for example, between those who want to stay in the european union, those who want to as was evidently the brags about who want to get out of the european union, there's a debate about diversity threatening something particular about them on the chessboard.
something that they identify as uniquely their own. so the question i have a little bit like a question about sovereignty. you argue it's both and that is to say, both the chessboard and the network. that is to say, and the web. but is there a pushback on this trend? because people are feeling their sovereignty slidably, because they're feeling certain things that they don't identify as their own, this inherently powerful diversity, they are maybe retrenching against that. is that if you're a conclusion or do you see it differently? >> guest: no, i think that that's right. let me start at the end and then work backwards. to sort of oversimplify, united states that are more closed and
more homogeneous, at least over ten years, 50 years. you sort of think about this great wave of globalization we've been through that really starts in the '70s and '80s and takes off in the '90s with digital technology were suddenly the world really is a web. you look at a map of the internet, we are all connected and you can't even see national boundaries because the internet doesn't really recognize them. that process brings all sorts of benefits but it also has brought lots of immigrants, lots of changing cultures, lots of suddenly kind of new ways of working and being that many people find quite frightening. and one of the ways of understanding our politics and
european politics is exactly this desire, and my vocabulary, to close backup and be a chessboard state. we are france, we are the united states, we are britain, this is what defines us, this is our people, these are our customs, this is our culture and here we are on the world stage. and again, you do have to pay attention to that. part of that is just real anxiety at a way of life that was familiar and comforting and that you could be proud of that many people feel is slipping away. so you have to pay attention to that just like you to pay attention to our ability to defend ourselves as a state. but the other way to understand it, and this was back to your point about diversity, is it's the countries that have the most diversity internally and are most connected to opportunities and ideas abroad that will
flourish the most. again, this is not all good or all bad because some people will hear that and say you mean like being connected to countries where there are criminals, like drug runners or again arms traffickers all of that or terrorists. we don't want to be open to this country. those contacts, those that works bring danger. enough and jeff to protect against that. but those connections also bring us exports. and talent and the diversity that brings you new ideas. all the people who study innovations say look, innovation and creativity comes from the collision of unexpected things. so if we're all the same people every group in same place and we think about the same stuff, we are much less likely to come up with something new and when you reach out to the people you
don't know so well and your exposure south to new experiences and new ideas and to put those together with your own ideas, that's the magic of the spark of creativity. when you look at that from the perspective of the country, the united states, country of immigrants, country that has connections all around the world again through culture, our business, through our people, to our educational system in the world of the web, that openness is our greatest asset. but in the world of the chessboard we have to be close enough to make sure we can protect ourselves. and that's the balance we have to strike. >> host: i think it's, i persuaded by the argument but i think what a more powerful things in a very well argued book the argument you make based on stan mcchrystal experience with this particular network,
which are not talking in terms of a broad international geographic, geopolitical question, although he is leading really remarkable unit in foreign countries as they do it. but it seems to be as reading this book that general mcchrystal would argue on the individual tactical level what you just argued on the strategic level. is that a fair reading of his experience? >> guest: yes, and it's a great example. and i have to say i wanted to write this book in 2011 right after i came out of government and i taught a course called making networks work and the collected all this material and even writing about networks for decades. and then i wrote an article in the atlantic about working family and kind of -- >> host: missed about one. >> guest: while i was working
on issues of women and men and work, there came stan mcchrystal book team of teams. i was so spoiled because he describes exactly the in charge of special forces in iraq, and he's got to fight al qaeda in iraq. he opens with this description of an attack and then very quickly the people involved figure out what happened and reconfigure and repair the damage to their network, and then go on. and you are reading it you think he's describing our special forces. he's not. he described al qaeda in iraq and he is saying that kind of flexibility and adaptability and nimbleness was characteristic of the al qaeda in iraq network we couldn't match it because even
though our special forces is the most nimble part of our military, we were to hierarchical. and savini describes taking special forces, and he says first we had a commando teams. he was on top and they'r do alle different groups, the intelligence group and the logistics group and the communications group, and he figures out how to make that command into a team of teams, where he's got different groups, each one is connected to all the other groups, but in ways that are flexible enough so that as he describes it, he says and network can become one big entity where everybody is connected to everybody else, and he describes the strategy of shared consciousness forever but has to know what everybody else knows here but then it can come back together in this team of
different teams, each of whom can act independently. what he calls an powered execution. that's a strategy he's used on the battlefield. he uses now as a business consultant, and it's a great example of thinking very, very strategically about the types of networks you need for specific task. and i describe it as a task network you also talk about resilience networks and scale networks, but he's is a very compelling, concrete example of this idea of a strategy of connection. >> host: what struck me just as an aside in terms of our time together in the government is in the military, it seems to me the experience that you just talked through of general mcchrystal
was not the exception but rather the rule, the military had a really remarkable way of, after action in each of their undertakings. so as to ensure that their drawing the best lessons and making themselves that much more nimble. and it seemed to me that comes through in your book for the big strategist that you say that too often now we have strategists that are stuck on one side or the other of this divide between the chessboard and the web. but sometimes maybe the public perception is that our armed forces are strictly chessboard actors when, in fact, they are
precisely and maintain the attributes you just talked to about being so beneficial, agile, open to rethinking, diverse task oriented but also learning from each of those iterations of the task. i thought it was really, that's looking to me as i read that portion of the book is just that we saw that time and again from our colleagues on the military side of the operation. >> guest: we really did, and in many ways that's because the military has had to make the transition from the chessboard world of fixed state to state battles to the war, the conflicts against terrorist groups on the ground, where if you think about afghanistan or
iraq, yes, they were never fully fighting estate. they were fighting the taliban government of afghanistan, but once that government fell, then they were fighting remnants of the taliban on the ground and parts of al qaeda. and that is right there, the chessboard world which of course during the cold war to assess against the soviet union and the classic chessboard conflict is between nato and the warsaw pact and you're still imagining national armies clashing with each other versus now, and, of course, it starts in vietnam with irregular forces, guerrilla forces. in modern war for any military now even called hybrid warfare is much more you're not quite sure who your fighting. they are networked. you must be networked to respond to them, but at the same time have to be prepared to fight. some military will he has been on the front lines of this transition.
i found myself often in the state department frustrated that it was such a hierarchy, and what you want to buil be able to even within government was to pull together a kind of network of experts and people who knew what you need to know. the way he did this at the nationals get accounts of, but we were still very much a lease at the state department, geared much more towards state to state world then there were the world of the web. i'll just say secretary clinton and president obama tried to change that in terms of appointing special representatives to women or to civil society or to use or to business, but they were pushing against a ferocious, ferociously difficult very set government. >> host: i think that's fair burkett seems to be their embassies, you would even close
to do this, but they were embassies where i certain ambassador did a really good job through the country team tr tryg to make that team of teams that dan did so effectively and that you write about. you see some of those embassies working extraordinarily well where they are not only have their political counselors and reporting back about what's happening in a particular country foreign minister but you also have the commercial service. you have all of your other services working together as a team so that you end up giving a more comprehensive picture of this. but maybe in places if you go back to 2010 and 2011 where we were not as effective in farming they can of information and intelligence out of the whole
network in a particular country. maybe one of the places where we were not as effective on that front is in, for example, the arab world where kind of across-the-board starting in tunisia but also going pretty aggressively into egypt and venture into syria. we were i think analytically as a government surprised by the depth and pervasiveness of unhappiness that led to the arab spring, as we called it at that time. but may be a more effective tem of teams were drawing on the networks on the ground, you know, in those countries would have had us a little more ahead of the curve on what inns of being one of the more
fundamentally change situations or systems or networks that we witnessed at least when we were on the ground. do you think that's fair? >> guest: i do. i think that's right. actually, there were ambassadors like ambassador who is first in sweden and they became our ambassador to britain, he really got this. in fact, a number of the ambassadors whom president obama appointed came from the digital world got it. he actually has an office of network engagement. he thought about how to build networks are ambassador to new zealand did the same thing, but what you didn't have any think your example in the middle east is very well chosen. you had that at the ambassadorial level, but often our foreign service officers, and many of them are superb. but they are career.
they come up through the foreign service for up to 30 years. that means even when they reached out to business or the civil society groups or to religious groups, they themselves are diplomats. i can imagine a foreign service where you would have business people going in and out at any level or people of oregon nonprofits going in and out. we argue that at the top level. those people would bring their networks with them. and to be very precise, why didn't we have deeper contacts, say, with entities that were using religion and politics,, islamists in many of these countries, or with other people who are more sympathetic? we didn't because we had relations with the government, take egypt.
we had relations with the egyptian government. that's the chessboard world. and the egyptian government didn't want us connecting to lots of these other people, and we were not really set up to do that. so it goes back to point about sovereignty. the traditional world of chessboard interactions is where sovereign. we have an embassy in another sovereign country. we're very formal relations and we try to reach out to society, but we often don't have nearly the same range of contacts that are business people do, our journalists do, our civil society does what i think is we need to tap networks of those kind -- contacts an and not dont have better information but also better ability to engage with crises and shape events as they happen, or at least protect american interests. >> host: let's look at it from that and from a second and take another example that you and i were both involved in, which is
iranian elections in the summer of 2009. where i think what was referred to at the time as the green movement rose up, criticizing the context of the government, the outcome of the election, which at the time reelected president ahmadinejad. there was a debate publicly and in the government about how deeply the united states should involve itself in that ongoing political dispute in iran. so how much from the standard chessboard state to state relations between the united states and iran, which were kind of basically covered by the experience since the revolution
there in 1979 and the hostage crisis, you know, the ongoing tension that we have had with the iranians. and then the question really is how much does this spillover across into this network or this web of civil society in iran, where independent iranians, irrespective or quite independent of u.s. states or anybody else, wher were expressg their frustration with the government. it seems that, if i remember right, the debate at the time really revolved around at least in my mind how much, what the risk to the united states is or else the risk to the independence of that green movement of appearing to be influenced by or run by or funded by the united states if
we appeared to be spilling into the we web or the network of tht activity. there's an argument to go the other way of course as well. what's the right answer if you have the right balance of seeing our interests across a a chessboard and across the web? with the right answer of the policy outcome to protect our interests and ultimately may be have a different outcome in iran, or is it even the right outcome for our interests to be shooting for? >> that is a great example, and i remember it well because of course president obama was reaching out to the government of iran as really the start of trying to engage iran, the policy of engagement of saying
we can't get anywhere if we don't talk to people. he was building relationship with the government, really relationships that ndn would become the foundation for the iranian nuclear agreement which i consider to be one of the great achievements of the obama administration. and so he's reaching out to government that is suddenly shooting its own citizens in the streets, and from u.s. point of view and with the world point of view, we look like we are on the wrong side and we gradually then froze relations for a while and announce with the government was doing. the key here i think you're absolutely right, that then networks engagement that i would like to see in that kind of context really cannot come directly from the u.s. government. in other words, to be supported by the us government as you said for the people who mounted the green revolution, that's the kiss of death. because of then the government,
having government says you are just western stooges. you are cia spies and you are delegitimized. but here's what we could do if we reorganize a government as sort of the way i would imagine it, if you really build network strategies as well as chessboard strategies, you would have in the u.s. government reached out well before that to universities and businesses and religious groups, and, frankly, some of the iranian gas. >> although the asper groups are complicated because they often carry very passionately felt politics with them. but you would have figured out how do we help support a network? that does not mean we constructed, that we find because that goes back to your dealer meditation. but he is government has the nose convening power -- delegitimization. the ability to reach to many
parts of our society, and you could have supported the growth of youth groups in the united states talking to youth groups in iran, businesses against the society. a lot of our foundations can fund that. it's not directed by the united states government but it is encouraged by the united states government. that would've meant, for instance, we might've had the ability to these networks to say to the iranian people hey, the united states people are with you. we support you, without it coming from the government but from the governance point of view, the u.s. governments point of view, we would be better positioned and, frankly, better able to communicate the sort of full range of who we are as a people if you encourage those networks even the region of
formal diplomatic relations at the same time you had this chessboard strategy. >> host: at the end of the day you would argue if you are effectively practicing the statecraft in this increasingly interconnected world, more interaction and the web doesn't either weaken or undercut our lesson your options on the chessboard, it increases. >> guest: yes. i would say you need to practice statecraft and web craft. and statecraft does have to come from the government. web craft can come from the government. they can be encoded by the government but also, it can come from again a mayor. it can come from a foundation for its a great to come back to climate change is mayor michael bloomberg after stopping mayor, has done a lot of work to bloomberg philanthropies to bring together mayors from
around the world who are committed to reducing carbon emissions in their cities. and so he now has a global covenant of mayors on climate and energy. that connects over 7000 cities, almost 1 billion people, who, in the covenant, note the language of the covenant, that sounds like a treaty, right? that sounds like something only governments can do. all of those mayors can take action regardless of whether donald trump pulls up of the paris agreement on climate change or not. so that's webcraft. the obama administration would been very supportive of that. trump administration less so. i think ultimately that is enlisting the power of the american people. again, it can be business, civic organizations. they can be mayors or even governors, in ways that advance
our interests globally in ways that really are most often compatible with the chessboard. there will be some places where it is going to be a conflict and ultimately the government is in control, but overall we've got enough challenges that people practicing webcraft with or without the government is a complement to what the government does in the chessboard world. >> host: i did notice that mike bloomberg even said i guess earlier this month in relation to this ongoing work in the cities that it actually even really matter to him, or rather didn't matter to the outcome of reduction of carbon emissions in the united states. now, whether president trump continues in person not saying because of effectiveness of this arrangement among cities, that
he argued that we are going to see the kinds of carbon reduction envisioned in the making of the paris agreement. i had seen an independent analysis that but it strikes me as pretty remarkable -- i haven't seen. >> guest: i have a former student who was working on exactly that, and he backs that up. he says that fundamentally if you look at the cities around the world, of course they are the concentration of 60-80% of the world concentration and growing in cities, that's the place where you have the densest carbon emissions. great idea of people are in charge of the cities, it's the citizens of the cities support a mayor who says we are going to reduce carbon emissions just like a citizen we will impose traffic controls or a mission controls because we have to live in the city, then they should be able to take that action. again, the supreme court will
probably look at this but it's hard for me to imagine that the supreme court says no, you cannot improve the life in the city just as you were taken with police or traffic or anything else under local control, because the federal government does not want to commit the nation to reducing emissions. because you're not oppose impost on people outside of your city. you know, go ahead. >> guest: no, please. >> guest: to take another example that may be politically less controversial, take things like global health where the gates foundation has worked with big pharmaceutical companies, the world health organization and thousands of smaller nongovernmental organizations to immunize and vaccinate children all over the world. we all benefit from that because if they are immunized, then it's much less likely that certain local epidemics can take off.
that means from the gates foundation it involves business. it involves government that it doesn't depend on government. those are examples, again, what i would call webcraft. >> host: in your last, not to last book, but in a book a couple books ago you wrote which you called america's edge, this quote, your this court, the emerging networked world of the 21st century exist above the state, below the state and through the state. in this world the state with the most connections will be the central player, able to set the global agenda and unlock innovation and sustainable growth. so again my question to you is, when you say a state with the most connections will be the central player, is that to say
the most networked state would be the strongest state? what is the strongest network state today? what do we do with the state like north korea which is arguably the least networked, but therefore also apparently, esters we can tell, least prone to suasion and pressure, even from its most important friend, namely, china? is there an odd outlier that by keeping itself out of the network, north korea is making itself particularly resilient? or if not just stubborn and isolated, is it also then more difficult to move?
>> guest: now, it's exactly the way i think we need to think about power in the networked world, or the web world, that traditionally power is your size, the size of your economy, the size of your military, the size of your territory under population. and in a networked world it is the number of connections. and i would say the quality of connections as well. at a don't think there can be any, there's not necessarily one center. because there are multiple states that are connected. and he can think about a map of the internet. you have a number of portals that have a huge number of connections, and did lots of smaller ones. but certainly i think the united states today, if we don't harm ourselves by closing ourselves off from the world, if we remain open to the world while still protecting ourselves, we are the
most connected state by virtue of our people, our business, our tradition of civil society. not all states have the density of civil society we do. that's what de tocqueville pointed out in the 19th century, still true. and so, and again educationally, those connections are hugely valuable, if we know how to support them and cultivate them and use them. but i would note that china has an explicitly networked grand strategy. the strategy of one felt one road says openly we are going to our power -- belt -- and spread are influenced by building trade networks in people networks and cultural networks. and they're building the physical infrastructure to do it like a river with the goes all the way to europe, sea lanes, highways. that's their strategy.
and the eu has a similarly networked strategy where they say we can exercise our power to webs of influence, and we need to build those webs. canada has the same thing. again, talking of building networks around the world. i worry that the united states at this moment, america first and closing off our borders and building walls is the opposite of what i think we need to be doing. so that's on the connected side, but you absolutely right then that when you look at north korea, what you see as a state that is so disconnected that there are very few levers of influence. china is the one state that north korea really trades with and depends on, but the flipside of that is that if the north korean regime collapses, a lot of north koreans in depth in eastern china come something
that china worries about. but it means that we have very little ability to exercise leverage, except the very traditional chessboard means,, right, where we threaten the use of force. we had sanctions. we have impose those sanctions, but china is not, north korea is not defending on our trade. so what i would say about that is that our ways to find connections and use them that are more specific. a number of administrations have tried this, looking at where north koreans bank, for instance, and closing off those networks, thinking about obviously where it gets its military supplies and nuclear supplies, although that's hard to choke off. but fundamentally it means we have to work through the state that has the most connections, and that's a china, and china
has its own agenda. so it's why the problem is so very, very hard. >> host: the one that we're watching in real time, and it is interesting to see how the trump administration and the new team is working this and doing precisely as you say, working aggressively with the chinese. so it seems to me if i were to boil down this argument, it's that the more networked actor is only going to be more dynamic, werand more influential and, therefore, better able to protect its interest. but you just also mentioned the fact that there is, we're in a current political mood and. in this country where some of those actions towards greater network, greater network posture
of the united states trade agreements and so forth lead to some as referred to earlier in our conversation dislocation. and that dislocation is leaving to political pushback against some of these networks. so i guess the question i have, and maybe this goes to the work you're doing at new america and elsewhere is what's the secret to maintaining the u.s. dynamism that comes from the united states being as network as it is, even as we're pushing up against a very difficult, a very powerful and arguably very understandable increased skepticism about whether this networked world is leading to good