tv CSIS Discussion on U.S. and China Relations CSPAN July 7, 2017 1:41pm-4:14pm EDT
what would become the iphone. >> watch "after words" sunday night at night eastern on c-span2's booktv. >> the u.s. economy added 220,000 jobs in june, the most in four months. the labor department released those numbers this morning. they showed unemployment rate increased to 4.4% from 4.3% in may which was a 16 year low. unappointed rose because more americans began looking for work and not all of them found jobs. >> the center for strategic and international studies hosted a panel discussion on u.s.-china relations. panelists cover trade come military and security issues and north korea's nuclear weapons programs. this is about two 1/2 hours. >> we had five issue papers with authors for each paper or papers on each subject from the u.s.
and china. we split the panels up so that this panel will address the papers on u.s. and chinese strategy and interest in the asia-pacific region, and also u.s.-china military to military issues. in the next panel will cover economics, global issues and politics. scott kennedy will share that session. we had a number of participants who helped to write the papers or joined us in study groups to review the papers so this is a representative group, claiming that anyone who is involved but some of the key authors for each of the papers were going to address in the panels. bonnie glaser, my colleague at csis and director by china project will talk about the asia-pacific papers. we're going to ask that panelists not to summarize the papers but identify between the
american and chinese papers the issues of convergence, divergence and some recommendations. my friend zhu feng were present on the asia-pacific strategy issue after bonnie. then will ship to the military relationship. david finkelstein and zhang tuosheng from the chinese foundation for international security studies will address the areas of convergence divergence and implications of what we identified and analyzed in military spheres. as doctor hanley said, we endeavor to make these papers that would be based on the u.s. national interest and u.s. strategy, on our side, and on the chinese national interest and change strategy on the chinese side. we did these in consultation with each other, meaning that for example, on the asia-pacific paper bonnie and i and with zhu
feng and his colleagues talked about how to structure the papers of what themes we would try to address that we were clear about several things. we had no veto over the other side paper. it had to be honest and forthright explanation of interest and strategy from that countries perspective. we informed and talked to our government by the u.s. government and chinese government did not review or approve these papers. they are independent. we are all independent scholars, and so what we presented is not u.s. are chinese government policy. but we think it represents a pretty goodbout how these issues argued in each country. of course are multiple views about military affairs, global issues, north korea in both china and the united states but
we had for each of these papers three authors of the american psycho three authors on the chinese side, and a group of summer between six and 15 other experts who weighed in. on the asia-pacific paper, for example, and he thinks is a to a sudden for the mr. crapo, there was an awful lot of consensus from experts hailing from think tanks across the ideological and functional spectrum pics of quite interesting. between u.s. and chinese papers, there was some common themes. one was that we should strive to avoid becoming adversaries. that was consistent for both sides. there was a theme in all the papers that we should seek out and try to build patterns of cooperation the twin the u.s. and china where we can on every area, military, asia-pacific issues and so forth. and many of the papers concluded
that the united states and china need a substantive, honest and far-reaching strategic dialogue where each side doesn't cover up its fundamental interest or concerns and presents those and goes from there to see what can be done. there are obvious structural and strategic differences that come out of these papers. it is not differences that can be solved with a different six character label or 140 character tweet or whatever you choose. they are fundamental, structural. they are historically we spent a lot of time on the history of these issues for our country's. for example, there are between the two papers on the asia-pacific some different assumptions about the future orientation of the korean peninsula. it's not discriminate on tactics. there are some fundamental structural issues about the u.s. and china each of you the korean peninsula and where it's going in the longer term.
there are some fundamental differences in terms of the south china sea on the first island chain that encompasses japan and taiwan and the philippines and easton south china seas, about what it means to influence control, denial, lisa this is not small issue. it were differences about how strong american alliances should be, very basic differences. not so much about the validity by hostile should be alliances be in asia. they were differences about what china should be doing to assert its sovereignty. not challenges over sovereignty but what china should be able to do to assert its sovereignty and what is destabilizing and what is not. there were big differences on both sides, i think they will say more about what constitutes a reasonable and acceptable level of defense capabilities. i don't think either side drew that yardstick exactly the same, vis-à-vis the other side.
there were differences about how we should think about the future structure or order of east asia. there was more enthusiasm on the chinese side of some kind of bipolar u.s.-china arrangement or condominium to manage the future of asia. there was much less enthusiasm on the u.s. side but even within the two side there was some debate and disagreement. i'm going to let my colleagues go into more detail on these areas, and just conclude for now by saying i think when you read the papers, you'll find that these, papers that sort of stand the test omenot based on today's or tomorrow's news about the g20 or the north korea problem, although we can talk about that. and in some ways they made a very strategic model for useful dialogue would look like and to address each side of no interest in find ways to minimize
consultation cooperation but be realistic about some pretty fundamental differences that we've unearthed. so with that i will turn over to bonnie and then zhu feng to address the asia-pacific paper. let me quickly add we printed out as many papers ever thought we'd have audience, this being fourth of july week. we were short about a 2% short. this is online as well and so you can get it online and check it out in chinese and english i think. so with that, bonnie, thank you. >> thanks, mike. and this is a very interesting project. i would urge you all to read newspapers very carefully, and it's a privilege to be part of this. we have a very short period of time, each speaker comes on discoid hit on some highlights and that if there's time for q&a we can go into greater detail. first on some of the convergences and divergences. both of the papers on asia-pacific security say that
there is a need for a rules-based order to so that's a good start that we should have rules, but, of course, there are differences over not only what those rules should be but whether or not the international community is likely to allow, even welcome china's participation in the process of shaping the rules. so he was paper is quite clear on that score. it says that america is not calling on china, simply sign of the rosetta been written in the past but understands the international community will draw these rules together. the chinese paper is very skeptical of the u.s. willingness to do that here it says whose rules are these, how can these rules be defined in light of the changing situation, et cetera. so a lot of suspicion and i think you find throughout the chinese paper and asia-pacific security that there is a lot of skepticism about u.s. willingness to include china. even though i would underscore
that i think the current administration, prior administration had welcomed china to be responsible stakeholder in this rules-based order, and that goes back at least as far of course as the george w. bush administration who coined that phrase. secondly as regional security architecture and alliances, and the chinese paper very much contends that the u.s. alliance system is increasingly targeting china and calls for the united states to give up that attempt to build the sort of anti-china coalition. and it states china favors an open and inclusive security system rather than alliance-based system but china can tolerate the alliances as long as they are not targeted at china. so a little bit of ambiguity there, so whether all to make alliances can be part of the system, but it does come at the bottom line is you estimate of my system can coexist with
increasingly influential china in the region is the u.s. gives up that effort. now, for the u.s., this paper doesn't portray in any way the alliances as aimed at china and it talks about the allies as the basis of our regional position. it lists several threats that alliances are trying to do with such as of course north korea's emerging missile and nuclear capabilities, talks about terrorism maritime complex. a very different discussion of alliances. when i was at the rollout in may in china, the chinese version of this, madame talked about china's concern about alliances in the regional security architecture. so i think this really is a difference that the u.s. and the chinese have about whether or not the alliances should be part of this rules-based order going forward. third, both identify areas of
concern for the much the same as you would expect. you have north korea, taiwan maritime issues. on north korea the u.s. paper claims china doesn't recognize the new level of threat posed by the kim jong-un regime. i think as we center today, events that transpired in the last couple of days and months really provide evidence of that. the united states is i think incredibly concerned about the launch of an icbm by north korea. very upset about how u.s. citizens are being treated and, of course, the most recent being the very tragic death of otto warmbier. so i think that the chinese paper in some ways recognizes the danger but insists the problem just can't be addressed through sanctions alone, that diplomacy is necessary. but i do since a real gap between the two countries in terms of their assessment of the urgency.
the u.s. paper has some interesting policy recommendations in this regard calling for not only more dialogue but very specifically on things like noncombatant evacuation operations, interdiction of north korea's weapons proliferation, closing loopholes in sanctions. the chinese paper honestly doesn't any of these very specific areas of potential cooperation, and i would underscore the need for discussions on crisis response in the event of instability in north korea and that something the u.s. has tried to do with china for several administrations as well. there are solutions that are put forward by both sides come and want to highlight again some of the convergences and divergences and comment on them. both insist on peaceful resolution come dispute supporting military conflict. ws paper focuses much more than the chinese paper on the need to
manage differences. of course we would note that xi jinping does talk quite a bit about managing our differences so i think that's a common position. both papers, canada strategic dialogue on major issues and asia pacific region. the chinese paper proposes an institutionalized and regular communication mechanism between china and the u.s. led alliance system. this is something interesting and we should recall that there has been consideration in the past for examples of a trilateral u.s. japan-china dialogue which was supposed to take place in june 2009, for various reasons did not. so should be considered once again ways that make an offer china reassurances about alliances engage in baby trilateral dialogue? on a couple of final comments on the divergences in terms of their recommendations. as mike mentioned the chinese
authors did not rule out a g2. they say either a g2 or through other forms of security cooperation china and u.s. need to establish a joint vision for the region that is inclusive and based on mutual consensus. i think that would be a very, very difficult thing to do. i don't know if we can establish a joint vision that certainly the u.s. paper and i think reflecting mainstream views in the u.s., rule out such a g2 arrangement. the u.s. paper says that washington is not interested in any sort of condominium that implies an exclusive great power relationship. and finally the chinese paper continues to call for adhering to the components of the new type of great power relationsh relationship. it says we should adhere to the principles of no conflict, no
confrontation, mutual respect, and win-win cooperation. accurately reflecting the late obama administration as well as where the trump administration has come to after its for several months in power, that americans in general don't like a bumper sticker phrase, and there continues to be enormous discomfort with some of the implications of this new model of great power relations, including the components. the use shares the goal of avoiding conflict, but it worries that emphasis on core interests may be an attempt to create spheres of influence, and that could be potentially destabilizing to the region. so on that area i think there is some disagreement, and i look forward to -- >> okay, thanks, mike, for your leadership.
[inaudible] looking for long, more importantly, and pressed me and encourage me as in the past two and half years so we are working together, thinking together to of course and then come up with reports, no matter how -- but its reflection, some sort we share the spirituality, share the vision, have the regional security can evolve in a way let's say compatible with the both sides. a couple things i like to pick up responding to bonnie's actual presentation. first of all, of course divergence and convergence, some sort of reality so we need getting to some sort of very accurate reality checking. we consider some sort of
accuracy of reality checking to get back to the history, so that way use history as some starting point and then we will find u.s. has been a very positive security inquiry in the region. no matter how china matters in terms of power, i think of long-run china benefit a lot from america's very steady and a very constructive regional ponderings. that kind of reality is a big one bearing on the chinese side. second, i think of course if we look at the current some sort of a potential, let's say, risk where causing some sort of collision between the two powers, then what's the leading element to create or drive back the divergences then we have to say it's not a status driven, it's an issue driven.
so yes, there is a lot of speculation across asia, for example, the moment, the leading challenge is that china is coming after the hegemonic transition. i had to say it's a fallacy. yes, some chinese nationalists paranoia way they see it that way, so then you read some sort of recently published book. it's called everything under -- then china may think some sort of china leadership very, very simply from a historical perspective. i think that for most of the chinese come well educated scholars, that kind of system is totally gone. i don't think it will be spaced out, once again, in coming days. so then we will say yes, there some sort of power shift
compared to 20 years ago, 30 years ago. china-u.s. power, such a disparity is truly very significant, significantly diminished by u.s. remain, have a very solid hold of power, disparity. we don't think in the coming days such a power disparity will truly is getting undercut very, very tremendously. so then from the chinese perspective, yes, asia-pacific area is biggest tasting grant for use china relations. a lot of interest now is in some sort of a collision, and where competing on some sort of a path taking solutions and methodologies. if we get back to some sort of central piece to behind, to be
behind the strategy, then we prefer to see tom and it's also very adequate and a very reasonable, it is issue driven. it's not status driven. secondly, then where we will see some sort of assertiveness in asia-pacific, of course this place is a very important testing grant as i mentioned to have a serious examination of china's foreign policy reaction or we say shuffling in coming days. but from what perspective consider chinese methodology in the region remain largely, it's some sort of china domestic transition race is not the power competing base, for example, north korea issues. consider china's policy of dprk
has been very consistently been smart. some sort of negative spillover of china in the indecisive policy with dprk. it's hard for china, a change of policy. most important reason should be deeper into china's factor. so before china can become some sort of very successfully transform the power, consider chided remain vulnerable at large. so then in the region, it would be some sort of way of competing place for china, to afford china some sort of inherited assertiveness. another point is, as we consider no matter how we do emerge our strategy and power should be --
it's not just history. we say we are oriented. there's a lot of speculation. overshadow power relations between washington and pyongyang, and the chinese and americans will be just a rivalry and also getting to some sort of inevitable conflict so the harvard professor also just published he's very sensationalist book called destine for war. but we don't see it that way. we consider use china we can jointly creating some sort of new modeling of power relations. conclusively, i have to say chinese reports in the asia-pacific area is also of course a very, very interesting challenge for us. on the one hand we also have to
balance -- for some sort of china's traditional policy narrative. but on the other hand, we also like to bring about some sort of new inspiring point. it's not easy job. i have to say mostly important to follow path on chinese site estimate how we can just envision some sort of power stories between the u.s.-china in the region, but how china can overcome some sort of our shortcomings, before china could be a real popular power in the region. let me stop here. thanks. >> thank you. you contracted our papers well in eight minutes and you fit in three book reviews well done. appreciate it. over to the military side of this panel to david. >> thanks. thanks again to john hamre for providing the leadership of the american steering group. i think without him as the glue
of the american side would then high state of entropy. thanks for that and scott kennedy. three of us comprise the military and defense lighting team, myself, randy schreiber and phil saunders from national defense, national defense university. all three engaged in this interpersonal and private capacity i what would be if i didn't state nothing in the paper or anything i stay today reflects the views of cna or any of its sponsors. if randy and phil were here, other on the dais with me i'm sure they would provide the same caveats. so as you heard we are not supposed to summarize our papers picked ours is 25, 26 pages long. you can take a look at it, but i feel a need to at least provide you a sense of her overall assessment. and the reason i feel need to do that, our assessment of the state trained in use china
military and defense relations is because this is the major area where the u.s. and chinese sides did have some convergence, recognizing some of the positive and recognizing some of the negatives. let me give you a jesting of the u.s. assessment of the state of being. and it goes like this. at the moment the relations between the u.s. and chinese military are more stable than they have been in decades. the two militaries are engaged in a wide range in unprecedented number of interactions from the strategic level down to the tactical level that they've never done since relations were established in 1980. both militaries are working together at risk reduction to ensure that highly contentious issues are not result in miscalculation. the u.s. team assesses that neither military seeks a conflict nor sees in the nation's interest to resolve differences between us by military means. however, all is not necessarily
well in the military and defense dimensions of the u.s.-china relationship. the u.s. writing team adjudged that the competitive aspects of military and defense relationship are growing and intensifying. both sides have deepening concerns about the other's defense and military policies as well as uncertainty over each other's future intentions. the competitive dimensions are most intense and asia-pacific region where traditional u.s. predominance in the maritime at aerospace military domains, and china's expanding offshore reach and increasing military capabilities are intersecting. strategically, the u.s. is determined to sustain its long-standing military predominance in the region through four military presence and its system of alliances and partnerships, whereas for its part we assess that china from a u.sau.s. perspective is purposey developing military capabilities to challenge u.s. military advantages as well as military,
political and economic means to weaken the u.s. the lights structure in some instances. operationally, discovered to his being characterized by the development of weapons and technology aimed at accruing operational advantage by doctrinal adjustments to maximize their effectiveness, and the shifting force postures and deployments. beyond asia and other parts of the world, there are and will be more opportunities for use china military cooperation, and we look forward to that. but, and we also recognize as china's military footprint around the world steadily increases, the potential for new misunderstandings the on the asia-pacific region cannot be discounted. so because of this intensifying competition, carefully managing the military dimensions of the u.s.-china relationship has to be a top priority for american and chinese civilian and military officials to reduce the chances of confrontation and ensure that military tensions
did not overtake other areas in the relationship that are cooperative in nature. so those are the u.s. sides bottom lines and i think if you read the two papers you will not see a lot of daylight between them. on convergence and divergence, both sides agree that this relationship between the militaries is more stable but both also assess that this is taking place against disturbing context that it laid out in which the use and chinese militaries are increasingly wary and suspicious of each other's intentions of both militaries are, in fact, hedging against each other operationally. on this account the chinese paper i think was a bit starker maybe then the u.s. paper with the u.s. paper, my paper talks by intensifying competition. the chinese paper talked about concerns that quote the potential for clashes over secret interests between the two countries has grown rapidly. so both writing teams deadlocked the efforts of the pentagon and the pla to introduce confidence
building measures into the relationship and both sides agreed that a military conflict would derail both countries larger domestic and strategic objectives, and they both acknowledge that each side is presenting significant secret challenges to the other and that both are exacerbating each other security situation in the asia-pacific region. on divergence, the two papers of course converge in identifying a common set of problems but they do diverge in many ways and explaining motivations, causality and impact. i think a significant example, either body or mike raised it, was differences in respected use on the motivations behind the u.s. alliance system or on the chinese part motivations behind china's military modernization. very different between the two sides on what those are all about. over although i think the two papers if you read them will provide readers a very sound appreciation for the strategic
perception gap that exists between the two countries on a wide range of military defense and security issues. readers should come away with an appreciation that the military tensions are a reflection of competing national interests and fundamental policy decisions of civilian leaders in beijing and washington, and not just the decisions of military officials. it's much broader than just military issues. on future cooperation if you take a look at the paper, we found many ways we can be cooperating in nontraditional security, some folks have mentioned that already but i think the most important thing to zero in on is what both teams did zero in on, that is cooperation on a very difficult issue of north korea. if you read the papers, both u.s. and chinese teams cited the need to engage in crisis management activities as regards the peninsula. that's an important potential
opening that we need to pursue either at a track want or track to level. final points, going forward development since january 2017 i think the events of the past week have underscored that the u.s.-china relationship remains a tangled and messy web of issues which impelled the two countries on one hand to cooperate but another set of issues that produce contention and competition and great tension between the two. the military dimensions of the relationship are no different, though some of us are concerned that the competitive dimensions are in the ascendancy. but it is clear i think leaders in both capitals today recognize this competitive problem and are attempting to manage the two sides of this relationship to include on the defense and military side. one of the recommendations was to conduct an assessment of the efficacy of the military security dialogue that have proliferated over the past two years to determine whether or not they were serving a good
purpose. clearly leaders in washington and beijing have already voted on that account having dismantled and creating the new comprehensive dialogue and its diplomatic and security dialogue which had its first meeting of course just two weeks ago. after the defense and security dialogue, defense secretary matt is commented that the idea of anything is to quote elevate and focus the discussions on i think on defense and military relations elevating the discussion and focusing the discussion is a pretty good idea. so there's a new s.t.a.r.t. to these discussions, whether there will be new solutions remains an open question and i will stop at that point. take you. >> i'm glad to have chance at today's great event. i will be focusing on two points. first, about my viewpoints about the two reports.
i think there are a lot of consensus and similar observations in the two reports. for example, both sides believe the relations is very complicated relations with both cooperation and -- [inaudible] but this is a very, very different from that of the soviet union and the united states. another example is both sides believe, although in recent years, the frictions and suspicions have been increasing, especially in the west and pacific region. however, neither military seeks conflicts and tries to resolve differences by force. for this both sides have achieved a lot in crisis management.
another example is both reports believe in recent years the military relationship is the highlight of the whole bilateral relationship. the most it has been in decades. this is not only reflected in enhancement of the differences and a crisis management, but also in the keeping and upgrading talks, exchanges and developing more cooperation on nontraditional security and global governance. both sides proposal, policy proposal, has a lot of convergence. i shall not mention made one by one. however, both sides report also have a lot of differences. here are just two more striking ones. first, americans report believe
there is a specific strategy and operationalization of the rebalance by dod is inevitable and very positive. it's an interest of the united states, its allies and its partners. however, china's report believes the rebalance, special the military element is our rebalance policy, mainly aimed at china. and regard china as one of the major challenge, security challenges in regard. it has intensified military and security friction between china and the u.s., and increased tension in the region. secondly, chinese believe the maritime friction are increasing. increasing. one of the reasons for this is
americans -- the u.s. takes sides. however, american reports believe that is chided military capabilities expansion and especially the maritime capabilities expansion, and china's policy and activities, which are the root of the maritime attention. both sides, both reports pointed out a lot of differences which refer to taiwan, korean peninsula, regional architectu architecture, security architecture, cyber, nuclear. now, we can ask the question, why do we had this kind of milton no relationship? most answer is economic
independence, the common global challenges we are facing, the common desire of no conflict and no confrontation. all this come both sides must cooperate with each other. including the present security cooperation. on the other side, because we have different political systems, we have different values and we had some different national interests. it has decided that we must have some differences. and especially in the new background of the changing of the balance, china rising power, u.s. is existing power. so because of this, all this has led to the aggravation of
military frictions and competition. then how can both militaries close their differences or manage them while also exploring the potential areas for cooperation? both reports have raised a lot of proposals here in summary, namely three points, the first is we must always keep and expand dialogues and exchange military dialogue and exchanges. especially we should have new talks in the new strategic domains, just like the nuclear talks, cyber talk and all the space talk. in this way we can increase the understanding of both countries strategic intentions.
secondly, we must put reduction of risk, operational safety, crisis management at the center of our efforts to stabilize military relationship and avoid military conflict. the third is that we must, nontraditional security cooperation. in this area we sit in the same boat. i will talk, my second point is about bilateral military relations in the first half of this year. and it's -- okay. i think in the first half of this year, generally speaking, the relationship is stable. we keep talks and expand new
talks, and especially earlier this year when the two presidents meet each other, they reached consensus to extend cooperation, denuclearization on korean peninsula. and also because of -- china sea. so all these is beneficial for stability of the bilateral military relations. however, in recent one month -- [inaudible] uss took -- u.s. has took twice freedom of navigation operation in south china sea, and declared military arms sale to taiwan again. so this house bring about impact on the relationship.
now, the two leaders are participating in the g20 conference. both leaders will meet each other, and very soon we will have first the talks between the two joint staffs, and trump, president trump will visit china in the second half of year, this year. i hope this effort will include relationship and stabilize the overall relationship of our two countries. it will be beneficial for the regional peace and stability. i will stop here. thank you. >> thank you, zhang tuosheng. let me ask one or two questions of the panel and then will open it up for audience questions. we covered a lot of issues in these papers from india-pakistan to hawaii and, of course, all the military and defense issues and different domains. let me focus first on one area
which is the news pretty much right now and that's north korea. seems to me of all the issues we look at in the paper, including cyber, including ai iv, of all these issues would look at, the korean peninsula is the one where the united states and china could because of our interactions on the north korea problem. in a few years become much more trusting of a child across every issue, or chili sensing the adversaries as we were when the korean peninsula was at work. it seems to me that's the one issue that you could have the biggest impact on the overall adversaries were we can work on hard problems that affect our security. and we are not any good place right on north korea. you mentioned by the reason was within patient it's very hard politically. the president announced his
disappointment the chinese side couldn't do anything, and yet probably xi jinping is doing more than was done before but it is clear not enough to convince the u.s. side. let me start with bonnie and ask you all, either concrete things we can do? right now russia and china blocking the u.s. british on the north korean launch. the u.s. has imposed or has announced it will impose secondary sanctions against the banks because the chinese side has a policed and cracked down on those sanctioned the mileage of themselves. are we stuck on these very, a very specific set of issues right now but it is very broad geopolitical implications on what our relationship looks like. can we expect more out of north korea cooperation and we're getting? i will start with you, bonnie. >> i think when xi jinping and president trump met at mar-a-lago and agreed in principle to cooperate, after
that meeting the chinese really try to identify what it was that the u.s. really wanted. and first the chinese interpretation was compliance with existing u.n. sanctions. china has always oppose any kind of unilateral or secondary sanctions, and china has banned, of course ports from north korea after reaching the cap under the u.n. security council resolution that was passed at the end of last year. and the chinese also told the u.s. it was typing up its border inspections. but i think there's been maybe a failure on the chinese side to identify what it was that would really satisfy the united states, not meet all of our expectations because that wasn't in the cards anyway, and it goes to this issue of banks operating in northeast china that are facilitating north korea's access to the international
financial system and enabling north korea to engage in these illicit activities. and so there has been efforts by the trump administration to provide evidence on banks and companies that are enabling north korea, and the reaction as i understand it from china was not sufficient. that's why we saw this 311 action last week. there can be a way forward. china can take action against these banks. if not i suspect what we are seeing is a tip of the iceberg. we've only seen one banks side. there are more but it would be better if china does this rather than the united states does it. in particular because some of the small banks and foreign companies do business in currency other than u.s. dollars and they really are beyond the reach of sanctions like those that we imposed under 311. i think there's potential way forward, made on president trump
called xi jinping on sunday made arctic are some of things that were looking for, if xi jinping can deliver some of those things in this meeting in hamburg. maybe there's a positive pathway. i think neither government really wants the relationship to sour over this issue. the best outcome for the united states is more cooperation from china. on north korea or can i think best outcome for xi jinping as he heads towards the annual meetings, the 19 party congress, and eventually of course donald trump's a visit to china fitted the circle he wants abuse china relationship to be heading in a positive trajectory also. so i think there is a way forward. we will see whether we get there. >> raised a very important question and i think of course china and use could do a lot more to cooperate over the dprk stability.
they variable is how to measure that, how to define the china cooperation. i know how frustrated maybe community -- i mean, towards china policy of dprk, president trump also complain though some sort of come some sort of help to rein in the dprk. as far as beijing we were not overwhelm the cut off tribulation because trade relations with th dprk is some t of normal term is china's leverage, is china's some sort of political preemption against the dprk. expect dprk -- will be victimized china too much. we'll see such a normal trade relations is chinese way to keep some -- [inaudible] some geological let's say some
no. that just is totally gone. it's a big strategic change. now we are also getting close to some judgment of what the dprk is. it's a threat not to the u.s. it's a threat to china either. so we need to figure out some sort of joint contingency plan to real good at the dprk. that's the promise, where is the starting point? how we can just move very femurly -- firmly but notably going beyond inheritance remain for better cooperation for chinese plus the dprk. dprk history, dprk ideology, the china security state, dprk is
also some sort of tangled personal, emotional, connections. it's not easy, but very positive but i hope two things could be decisive. one is one more nuclear test, really, real hurt the chinese government and give them a bigger punch. even they decide suspend all brings. second, if kim jong-un want to de-escalate tensions and stop the endless missile test. need to give them pinch, give them hurt, economically and commercially.
put as lot of hope on -- summer meeting. some sort of new summit momentum to build that, there was both sides could just behaving more specified and a measurable cooperation. >> thank you. i personally think that china's approach to north korea is not what is was a year ago and certainly 20 years ago but the changes are incremental compared to the growth of the threat itself. certainly that's the view in washington. and for our chinese friends, i can tell you, if the chinese security service turned over contains over centrifuge or precursors for reprocessing or shut down in specific ways bank
accounts in a dozen banks, having worked on the issue in the white house for five years, by, would that have a huge impact. huge impact on how the administration thought about how trustworthy the chinese are on this problem. i want to give the audience a chance for one or two questions. we have microphones, very briefly who you and are your questions. so i have the gentleman in the blue shirt right here. >> thank you. i'm from the university of washington, chinese student. i have a question about north korea situation. we have all talking for a long time what we should do which is putting plans to solve this crisis, but i want to just put
forth one scenario. >> can it be very brief? >> yeah, very brief. how about having china to have the kind of dominant control over north korea and nuclear scenario and having the united states internationally recognize north korea so we can stop the problem. thank you. >> we'll take a couple. one more. yes, ma'am. up in the front. >> hi. my name is jean. a couple -- >> a little louder. >> aim janey and a couple of days ago north korea just launched a missile and landed in japan sea, and i was wondering how far will let it go for security-wise in building the momentum for figuring something out with what actually should be done in letting north korea keep testing the missile and landing in the sea. >> you're asking about what is china's line of tolerance or the
u.s.? >> both. internationally. >> one more. >> make sure the interns run -- >> hello. i'm cameron, an international relations student at miami university. my question is regarding the idea that mutually assured restraint and whether that's a viable option given the two papers' viewpoints, especially from diplomatic and military channels. thank you. >> thanks. let start here and then different and work this way. >> our talk something about how to deal with north korea nuclear issue. so, i think china's position is very clear that it's in the interest's china, not just try
to satisfy the u.s. and japan because we think if north korea became a de facto nuclear state, it would also be a disaster for china. for example, north korea is the number one country which withdraw from the nbt and so huge. finally became a nuclear said. so it set a very bad example to the other countries. then the mpt will crash. many people will follow suit. and so many nuclear saids surrounding china. it's not in the interests of china, and the other thing is the military countries -- the risk of this is very high. now those any country really try to solve the issues by military meanings, but if this
substantial conflict, if there's a misjudgment, there could be a -- even a war, a nuclear war. just at the border of china. so it's terrible, and even without war, but because of the very attention to asia u.s. will -- send in the military alliances. so it's not in the interests of china. so i think china are determined the democratize democratization. with cooperation we can achieve anything. on the other side, u.s. and north korea will make some compromise between yourselves. otherwise we can also achieve anything. so in the future i think china's
policies are very clear. first, the denuclearization and the freeze the nuclear program should be the first step, and in the long run, denuclearization is the goal. secondly, we should prepare for the worst-case scenario. if north korea refuse to go back to the negotiate table and make a sixth nuclear test, so we should put more pressure on them. but now they are still chance, a little chance, for resumed talks, and we should have a try. anyway, we should also not just pressure on them, but pressure on them. we should also give them a carrot -- parrot to them.
we can just depend on the pressure. that if they refuse to go back to the negotiating table, we must prepare for the worst-case scenario. so at that time, especially after six nuclear tests, maybe turn on the u.s. and south korea should have a talk of how to deal with that contingency. it's in interests of all the countries. it's also a signal to the north korea. you can't go further. so, anyway, we should strive for the best. we should prepare for the worst. this is the only way to deal with this crisis. >> can i follow up and pick up the question that was asked over here about how much the international community should tolerate?
for my sense, i've been working on this north korea problem for 0 years and every time i hear someone say, we have to give north korea one more chance to see if it will work, reminds me of bars in japan and inside the do there was a sign saying, starting tomorrow no drinking. so everybody feel about themselves while they drank. and when -- at what point too we just decide or realize, north korea is just not serious about negotiating away the nuclear program. think that's what you're asking. so, is it your view this is the last chance? how much more do we have to try, a thing that has not worked for 20-some years. >> you see now the north korea tote haven't totally realized nuclear weaponization.
still maybe in two or the years they will go across -- totally go across the nuclear threshold, becoming a de facto nuclear state like india, pakistan, israel. at that time, there is no way to force them to go become. but before that, they are still a bit of chance we can do something. if the international community can united and we can have more coordination and cooperation, just like in our daily life, some people make decision. we have to do something. but it -- must be successful. the objective condition is very important. so if we can united, we can persuade them to change their wrong idea, we can force them to change their idea. so they are still a slip of
chance that if we can't resume talks in two or the years, i think the situation will be very pessimistic and finally we must be -- maybe just can only prepare nor worst-case scenario, that is in future the military conflict and even the war. that's very bad situation. but anyway, we still should have a try. that's my point. >> i'll good to you next and then david and bonniement on the north korea question or the other one. >> okay. i'm a little bit more pessimistic. very senior to me but i'm a little bit pessimistic. i don't think kim jong-un like to negotiate in exchange for any better off by dismissing the
nuclear weapon because they consider, in the minds, nuclear weapon is the only last result to secure the regime security or secure a regime safety, rise in national security. secondly, nuclear bomb the only way for kim jong-un to manage any -- magnify hour admirable he is to be a top leader of the dprk. so by all means, negotiations, yes, leave the option there, but unless two conditions happen, there's no way dprk will aban -- abandon their nuclear. to be hospital, one is u.s.a.'s seriously signaling the major strike is coming over, and
secondly the condition is, china is unbelievably clear in signaling to pyongyang, we're going abandon you. so then, yes, i consider negotiation is always operable. on the one conditions. history also is very telling in the past three decades. way needed to be more serious. second the question is about, for example, about this mutually assured restraint. i consider most important thing we should have some sort of a bottom line mentality. if both sides have such a bottom line mentality and somehow very smartly and very constructive accommodating each other, a mutually assured restraint will be totally achievable.
>> thanks. i don't know what i can possibly add to all of this except to say that the visual of vladimir pret and it the president xi jinping does not geoff me a lot of confidence that the gentleman's prospect or idea of china taking the lead in dealing with north korea has any legs. i think that's a nonstarter and does not give me confidence. the second thing if any country deserved an award for strategic patience it should be china and north korea. you look at the last 70 years, were it not for north korea and they would have owned taiwan in 1950 and if you don't believe me, ask professor warren cohen, an old friend. if it was not for north korea and their missiles, japan
probably wouldn't have sign the revised guidelineses for defense cooperation back in 1998. i was in the pentagon at that time, involved in that, and had it not been for the missiles, north korean missiles you would not have had 'providing millions of dollars dollars dollars for e china sees as threat and know reason for u.s. american forces in china's neighborhood which is viewed by china as not a good thing. so, how much is enough? we well leave that to the friends in china to deal with. the third thing is out is dealing with north korea is the trip to the land of bad policy openings and not just the united states but also for china, too. i know that chinese decisionmakers and policymakers and leaders must be struggling with the monumental implications of what they're being faced with the moment because of north korea. to wit, up until now, china has
not had to choose between north korea and south korea. china has been able to have it both ways to a certain degree. sooner or later china is going to have to lean to one side on this issue and how it leaps to one side on this issue will say a lot about the aspirations for world leadership. so, this is not just tough decision for the u.s. these are tough policy decisions for leaders and friends in china as well. and i'm honest to god glad i don't their make a decision on this because there are no good options at the moment. if you had at the time could i give you 15 minutes on why as secretary mattis say a conflict in korea would be the most disastrous departure in this century. >> very short since we're just about out of time. the question that the gentleman in the middle asks suggests that somehow what we, china, the united states, are willing to do would satisfy north korea.
maybe a useful conversation between the u.s. and china is what does north korea really want? you say u.s. recognized north korea. is that really that want? i that want to be recognized as nuclear weapon stayed. not simply diplomatic dies with the out. i don't think china wants to take over the north korea problem but i can be confident north korea doesn't want china to take over the problem. if china offered north korea today a nuclear umbrella, the north koreans would say, thank you but no thank you, we have our own. think that maybe that would have worked before 2006 when the north koreans tested their first nuclear. i think its clear to me that what the north koreans want is a nuclear weapons capability. they have and it want to be able too deliver it to the continental united states. think john was for a too opposite mystic in terms of the
time frame. the u.s. and china and russia have to two, out what we classified the recent test as but from the u.s. pound of view, if it were a standard trajectory it would have traveled approximately i think it was, 6,000-miles. that is icbm range. so, i think the north koreans have already miniaturized the nuclear warhead. i think most people believe that. may have mastered re-entry capability without the warhead burning up. we're probably far closer to this goal, not a nuclear deterrent, which is something else, but having a deliverable nuclear weapons capability, and i'll end on one very specific point that goes back to the issue of north korea using chinese banks and why this is so important to address. between 2009 and 2016,
approximately $300 million was laundered threw the banks the u.s. financial system. this money is going support the wmd program in north korea. and so this is a place to start. we can only cut down the north korean laborers because a portion of their sally guess to north korea's elite, and i think we should take a look at issues like crude oil. why do we have to wait until north korea does its sixth nuclear test to cut back on crude oil. an area where china has enormous leverage. there's more we can do. overall trade is going to be on the trump administration's agenda. 88% of north korea's trade with the international community is with china and i know that's a very, very sensitive issue with beijing. but it will be discussed, too. so i hope that our two countries can have a more serious discussion about what is really
do-able and not just talk about suspension for suspension or thing is frankly are not workable at this point, because we have really reached a very critical turning point, think, with this icbm test. >> i want to thank the panel and fellow authors and working group members not on the stage. david thanks his cowriters. i did the asia paper but with a lot of participation from bonnie and doug paul and other experts, and this was a good discussion and now for the really hard part. i'm going to invite the next panelists to come up. stape roy is going to moderate. thank you very much. [inaudible discussion]
the time limits, and in staying within the guidelines of not just summarizing their papers but looking for areas of con convergence and diversion and those will policy significance. our panel will be dealing with a different set of issues. the ones that are actually also fundmentally important to the bilateral u.s.-china relationship. economics. this is the area which during our election campaign seemed to be the most confrontational issue between china and the united states. and unlike the exciting north korean issue, which get as lot of the attention, the problem with the north korean problem is nobody knows what to do. they don't seem to be any good options about the administration thinks it has options for dealing with the trade imbalance
with china, and how the united states handles attitudes on economic issues has a potentially major impact on the bilateral relationship. global governance is another big issue. is china really out to undo the liberal world order that the united states set up after world war ii? does it want to push us out of asia? how are the governance issues playing -- what role is is playing in the relationship between the united states and china. and politics is fundamentally important. attitudes in both countries, public attitudes, often do not support the declared policies of the government. polling shows that attitudes toward the united states and china are more hostile than attitudes in the united states toward china, but when you think
about it, you realize, of course, because from china's standpoint, the united states is supporting countries who are making territorial claims against china, or we're supporting taiwan in way that china sees as interfering on a very important territorial tissue them and we dent have any territorial issues with china in the same way that the chinese see the issue. so, it's not surprising that if one side has a territorial issue, that's going to affect public attitudes. so, public attitudes very important and our panelists will get into the subject. i will encourage them to be equally diligent in sticking win the time limit. we have one additional member of the panel so the pressures on us will be even greater. there was a chinese participant who was supposed to be commenting on the economic side, one of the drafters of the chinese paper. unfortunately could not be
present so the economics issue is the one where the united states will be dominating the presentation, although i'm sure if we say anything that the chinese feel that be rebutted they will not be hesitant in doing. so scott, lead off. >> thank you very much. it's an honor to be a part of this project with everyone on both the first panel and this one as well as the other contributors. i wanted to talk about the economic relationship. the paper that you have in the report that we published today was written jointly by myself and liz from the council on foreign real estates and several other people acteds a adviser who helped did us but we are responsible for what you like and all of the mistakes and challenges. want to commend from peking
university school of business who can't be here bruce of a family illness about the other three authors on his dispeople the rest of the group should be commended for a very thoughtful analysis of serious discussion, presentation of evidence in their paper as well, which is on the csi web site which you can read. let me say a little bit about the differences -- similarities and differences in our analysis, economic issues, and then similarities and differences where we come down in terms of policy prescriptions as well. and particularly since hoff is not here i aren't to be as balanced as possible even though i probably can't fully meet that idea but i'll try. think in terms of our analysis, both sides agree that the u.s.-china commercial relationship has been largely mutually beneficial. it has benefited beth side --
both sides sides and despite tht there is a large trade deficit bilaterally, the number shouldn't be the measure by which we judge whether the relationship is beneficial or not. i think also we agree on both sides the united states economy faces a variety of challenges, and not all those challenges emanate from beijing or anywhere in china but emanate domestically in things the united states needs to do to address those that don't involve china. we also agree that china's economy is changing, evolving. the world, the government and governance in managing the economy is changing. that china still is trying to integrate into global economy. we all agree on that, we differ in a variety of other ways that are very important. i think the u.s. paper you'll find, if you look at it, we focus heavily on what we see is
the growing centrality of chinese industrial policy and protectionism in managing its economy and making life more difficult for those that want to export to china, and those that do business in china. and this is not a question of just whether -- how much it contributes to u.s. trade deficit or not or how much jobs it affects but first the question of the basic unfairness and the difference between just behavior and chinese commitment, as well as the effect on companies competing with china in the u.s. and elsewhere, but even beyond that, because of china's size, its unique size, chinese industrial policy is having a huge global effect on business models, not just in china but globally. it's really important that we address this issue, not because we're trying to support one company winning over another, but because of china's size and
has a special responsibility. that is something we focused on. i think hoofon and his group on the chinese side focused primarily on the benefited both sides gain from the relationship, the need to continue that, and to avoid any path which would lead to growing protectionism on either side. our sense was, again, from our report, is that these chinese declarations of a continued reform and opening, although repeated consistently in -- by chinese leaders, officials in the press, are inconsistent with the reality on the ground in chinese. in addition, we don't see a consistent -- equivalency between the challenges that foreign companies face in the chinese market and some of the things the united states hard already done with regard to market access in the united states or things we're thinking
of. for example, including revising sifis. there's not much the u.s. has on the table that would come close to our ongoing going on tack tells to access -- obstacle to access in the chinese market. you see the different approach in the rhetorical fight when the united states and china where china says it's opposed to protectionism and the united states at the g7 in lit didish expect we'll see this week at the g20 in germany -- its opposition to trade distorting measures. think that's a good summary of the difference overall visions of what is going on. now, when -- as the ambassador alluded to, when we got underway, we expected that after the president trump came into service at that time the u.s.-china economic relationship would be very contentious right away and also there was concern
in the obama administration and i think growing consensus about a need for a sort of more -- tougher approach on china, but that's not what we saw. that's what we have seen essentially in the first several months of the obama administration, we described the american -- a path, a policy so far as pursuing general cooperation and openness and we expected the u.s. to move for what we call college cooperation -- cal additional cooperation and the idea of reciprocity that we hear.every day. so, now, there's a chance over the last few weeks that thest may be shifting, it may be moving away from this effort to seek cooperation and deliverable toward putting more pressure on
china to try to get outcomes that address these questions of the chinese industrial policy, and considering penalties and pressure. so, we can't be sure because we're not exactly clear what american policy towards china is overall or what our clear policy is on trade, but we will see over this coming weekend a discussion of the global forum and whether what is going on with chinese steel and aluminum and we're seeing if we are just seeing media coverage on trying to push things in the new way or whether this is really a substantial term. in terms of policy recommendations -- this where is i'll conclude -- we had actually a lot of common agreement about the commercial relationship in terms of policy. i think we agreed that the u.s. should not engage in wholesale protectionism, and u just using
any convenient tool sitting around, above board or below board to punch the united states, for example. we, again, agree that the u.s. needs to do a lot to improve the domestic economy that isn't related and dependent on china with also agreed in both reports that china needs to continue to reform and open up, and the u.s. report we say chinese needs to resume that. chinese state continue. nevertheless the direction, i think, is the same on both sides. where we differed, as i think again the u.s. believes in our report that china isn't living up to its commitments and that is much more needs to be done to bring china back into compliance, and restart liberalization, and there are variety of things the u.s.ing
can do bilaterally and be pro-active in pushing for the outcome. to begin with, simply just rigorously enforcing u.s. trade laws, bilaterally and the wto. we're not advocating discouraging chinese investment in united states because it strengthens the economy but we think it's reasonable to strongen the -- strengthen the process for considering whether individual investments, particularly high-tech, may have concerns for national security. within our group there was no consensus about the principle or the term reciprocity but we think u.s. investment policy should be faked how china treats american investment. finally, the u.s. side thinks that the u.s.-china bilateral dialogue is extremely important but dressing solving all the problems in this economic relationship is not just about
the bilateral track. the u.s. and china need to engage in multilateral and the -- and the u.s. needs to further engage the allies. you can't pick a fight with everyone at the same time on every issue if addressing these type of core strategic challenges is a real important goal. the united states needs to pick its priorities, pick those it's going to cooperate with, so it can engage china more eek effectively on these issues and achieve what we hoped was a more genuine win-win outcome. thank you. >> we will now move on to global governance, and professor gowers will lead off. >> thank you, ambassador roy. it's been a privilege as others have said to participate in this project. i think it's important to say that because this project demonstrates how much good well
there is in each country to work hard to try to get this complex u.s.-china relationship on the best possible path. and it's been good to participate in that and to continue to participate in that. the topic of global governance is one that has been particularly disoriented, i think is the word, by donald trump's election as u.s. president, and i will get to that in a few minutes but i want to begin with the report because the report i think reflects and demonstrates a rather surprising amount of agreement on this large topic of global governance and want to give six quick examples, also noting along the way some of the disagreements, but in the current climate i think it's important to
emphasize the agreements. we agree that global challenges, of which there are many, require global solutions, and that no single country is going to be able to address them effectively in isolation. that cooperation is the path that produces the most shared benefits, and that rules based approaches are usually better than ad hoc responses. second area of agreement. the main institutions of global governance established of world war ii remain essentially institutions in the system of global governance. the chinese paper probably puts more emphasis on the united nations, and criticizes the u.s. for sometimes departing from the u.n. processes and norms, put the truth is the u.s. remains
strongly committed to the united nations and truthfully no country has a perfect record regarding the united nations. third, we agree that the established institutions of global governance need some reform. taking account of new power relations, taking account of new realities. yes, there are differences on what those reforms might be, but the is a shared agreement that we should be talking about what those reforms are. fourth, we want each other, both the u.s. and china want each other to be active players in global governance. the is some difference in the nuance that the united states has wanted china to be a full stakeholder, and china, by calling itself a developing country, has sometimes seem to
the u.s. to want it both ways. but recently -- by both way is mean a partial stakeholer but i don't think that much of a concern anymore. it's clear that china has been stepping up and changing -- has changed both itself self-understanding and its ambitions in playing a full-throated global role. indeed, that may be create something problems for the united states that are more substantial than china being a partial stakeholer. fifth, we agree that the established institutions of global government can be and already are in good ways, being supplemented by various multinational mechanisms of governorrance. now, not surprisingly, this is
an area where i think a number of more substantial differences have surfaced in the two reports and in the discussions around those reports. the chinese have already been noted criticized the alliance system, and the u.s. considers that the alliance system, especially in asia or at least certainly in asia, has contributed to the stability of the whole region, which has allowed china itself to prosper and we, i think, recognize in the u.s. the alliances come in a rather broad spectrum of difference kind partnerships and commitment. another difference. the u.s. applauds china's ambitions to make greater contributions to the global development, but has also
expressed some concerns about whether these chinese-led institutions will develop norms of adequate transplantation parent si and governance, and those concerns, among others, let the u.s. to decline to par tis -- to join aaib, but i think as we indicate in the u.s. report, there's been a change that are views on the u.s. side and the report remmed that the u.s. consider -- recommends that the u.s. consider ways of cooperating in aaib and as you probably mostly know, a high level u.s. government representative was recently sent to the forum in beijing. the most complicated and difficult difference that has emerged in this area concerns the phrase, liberal international order and what
that implies. the -- that phrase, which is certainly widely used in the west to characterize the institutions after world war ii and after the fall of the soviet union, have elements of emphasizing markets, individual freedoms, rule of law and democracy. and china in its paper so indicate, indicates that is a western ideological mindset and it has been invoking a disconcept in the paper called inclusiveness and elsewhere i've seen the phrase diversity in which global governance institutions are not guided by a liberal mindset but welcome as
equals illiberal commit:systems and not about the business of changing those liberal institutions -- those illiberal institutions. savagely a very complicated topic we don't have time to discuss but it's clearly an emerging one of great significance. the papers lastly agree on the areas where global governance is really needed and you know those and that's why there is a agreement, economic architecture that addresses current realities and problem inside globalization, addressing issues of cyber space, terrorismism, and serious problems of climate change and that last example is the pivot to my sort of closing observations, which climate
change as an example crystallizes the thought i began with which the field of global governance is that our american president has already taken a sharp turn away from the decades-long path of american leadership in the global order. his slogan is america first. he has begun a process of withdrawing from the paris climate accord. he crabbed tpp. he has criticized nato and given no sign yet of nurturing and focusing on the strengthening and building of institutions of global government. so it's fair to already start wondering what is the fate of this project in the upcoming period, and i want to close by
simply mentioning reasons why i think this current moment is not one that should prevent the effort of people like us be developing and working hard on thinking through these ideas. let me just mention quickly three factors. one, it's early in the trump administration. we don't know where this administration is going to good on these issues. secondly, the united states of america is not just superior after donald trump's election until the next election. we will have a long future and the issue of global governance is not a made-up issue. it's a response to realities that require international cooperation and the united states will have a future after donald trump, which i believe will focus more, again, on
issues of global governance. lastly, in the present, right now, the united states of america is not just the national government. and there are enormous numbers of actors who are working, in spite of what the national government may be doing, to sustain and develop and be active in issues of global governance, and i'll mention three states. under the american system, states can't sign international treaties, but they have sovereign powers, and they are standard standing up, particularly after the announced withdrawal from the climate -- the paris climate agreement. tear jerry brown, governor o california. 40 million people. he has organized other governores to take collective ashes action to meet the paris
climate agreement. in china there was headline that said: president xi eyes bigger role for california in u.s.-china relations. interesting. and he invited california to join the issue. so states, states. don't forget about them. two. companies. businesses are active in the enterprise of global guidelines, global judgment. and last ngos which play a distinctly strong role in the united states in galvanizing public opinion, helping on implementation of rules, and sometimes even sitting at the table at global governance institutions. there's two, be done in the present, regardless of what the national government is doing, and i consider this project,
even in the small working group on global governance to be part of that. thanks. >> thank you, paul. dr. lee. >> thank you, they're and mr. paul for your presentation. i also working on the global governance part of the chinese report. i'd like to see that both sides of the report is very positive and constructive. >> please be sure you're close enough to microphone so everybody can hear you. >> okay. and china and the u.s. all believes that during the part of the years, both countries have met great contributions to the global governance issue, such as the protection of the environment and the cooperation of global economy and the liberation of the weapons of
mass destruction, et cetera, and that's why u.s. report -- it wall cuss thousand to play more actively in the future and china also attach great importance to the bilateral cooperation on this area. the u.s. and the china also reached comment on what is the future challenges facing buy both sides and that is we're all call it a -- uncertainty about the continuation of the such good cooperation, and both sides provide the observations and conclusions. some conclusions are similar, such as with all concern about the trump's policy for transfer from the global to the domestic.
domestic will bring some effect on the future cooperation, and some conclusions are very different. for example, what impressed me most is that in the u.s. report, when they talking about the future time, maybe bring some uncertainty to the global governance cooperation. they think china want to change the current term because they think the current fifth term is developed by the -- is created by the developed countries and particularly lead by the u.s. and actually it's not true. that's why in the china report, provides the basic attitudes of china's side to how to understand the whole system reform.
i think we have two people in this area. first see if -- china always think reform is necessary. indeed, in the practical level we're almost at -- there are some specific mechanisms have some problems that cannot cope with the new emerging challenges. so that's why we sometimes need to take some reforms to improve the -- and the other key opinion is that reforms just based on the consensus, that means no one country ore for stakeholder can do one thing on its own. it needs cooperation and needs the worldwide cooperation. so i think maybe there are some differences between the china and the u.s., and after the
analyze of the future challenges, beth sides also keep focus on how to get the differences, and how to enhance our cooperation on the global governance issues. both side provide some basic suggestions or devices. i'd like to conclude with four key words. two from the u.s. side and two from the china side. i think the most valuable key words from the u.s. side, one is the mutual trust. that means both sides should judge one another global governance initiative based on the targets objective but not on simply its ideological mind and
the second one from the u.s. side is that consensus means whatever happens in the governance reform, we should cooperate and consult worldwide and make some consensus, and make reform -- and i think that true word from china said that is the practical. that means we should need more practical actions to do something, just not to just stay on the stage of planning which we all know the process of governance actually is a program or practice which have been proved is the most efficient way to enhance communications and
improve the cooperation, and the final key word from china side issue think it should be the focus. that means that as we not only for china but also for the u.s., the governance resources are always limited, and there are so maybe different global governance areas we should a.l. locate resources -- allocate the resources and the domestic governance at the same time so do something really efficient on this area. i'd like to end up with another -- how to say -- maybe a little bit pity from the u.s. side. you know, when we talking about this area, really look forward
to figure out how the u.s. colleagues think what kind of specific or practical actions or the projects under different global governance issues. that's why we spent a lot of time to excuse the questions but comparing with the china side i think the u.s. colleagues make a very general conclusion on this specific area. so i really look forward to heard about not more specific details about detailed information about the difference governance issues this area. identity -- i'd like to stop here, thank you. ...
>> and as a result they gave me the hardest topic of them all, politics. it was the hardest because it's so sensitive. it sensitive in america but it is even more sensitive in china. but yet the two teams work together, persevered at a think were able to generate a very credible products. what i'd like to do is make three points about how i think politics impacts the u.s.-china relationship and we think that those comments come some thoughts about the differences where views converge and diverge.
and hopefully make it policy relevant. my first point is that when one looks of the u.s.-china relationship, and i look at from a very practical perspective. i was fortunate enough to serve in the obama administration at the white house for six years, and i'd secured by got to sit at the control panel of u.s.-china relationship and see all the lights flash and the buttons world and to figure out how this big relationship operates. it was fascinating. one of the lessons that i took away, many lessons and is still digesting them years later, is that this is a deeply mature relationship. what i mean is as of 2017 this is a 38-year-old relationship, right? this is not a young kid. this is not an adolescent. it's not even a 20-year-old. a 38-year-old relationship,
which meets american as china and knows america. that doesn't mean we still have a lot to learn from one another. we are constantly changing and evolving as a society, as countries come as qualities but nonetheless there is a big and rich data set that both sides can draw from an understanding sort of the pace, the scope, the tenor of the u.s.-china relationship. and i think that the scope, the depth and the quality of the papers in this particular project reflect that underlying maturity in the u.s.-china relationship. look no further than the current period of the u.s.-china relationship. the use took arguably for major actions against china last week, taiwan, north korea, south china
sea, and all the sensitive areas. did the bottom fall out of the relationship? no. is the relationship in a rapid spiral downward? no, not really. both presidents talked a few days afterwards. they are going to meet on saturday. so in other words, there are boundaries around this relationship that are shaped by politics but nonetheless i think it's important to keep in mind the maturity of the relationship. that was point number one. point number two, as we try and understand what these boundaries are and how to get things done, and in the case of the work that myself and others did on politics, as were trying to understand how politics in both countries affects the u.s.-china relationship, i think there is one distinction that's critical to understanding how to assess this relationship.
and it's a distinction that i've used before, some of you have heard me refer to, which is distinguishing between the structural features of the relationship, in other words, those features of the relationship that are enduring and probably are not going to change and will have a deep and profound affect on the ability to stabilize relationship and to shape it so i distinction between the structural features of the relationship and the cyclical features. in other words, sort of the issues that come up on a day-to-day basis. we've talked a lot about a lot of them today, north korea, taiwan, south china sea. certainly a think tank community in washington it's fun and exciting and engaging to talk about those cyclical issues, but sometimes they don't really have a long-term effect on the trajectory of the relationship, and in particular what is the
shape of that curve look like. and so i think this is an important distinction, because when one thinks about these issues of politics in the u.s.-china relationship, that is deep structure. that's something that probably isn't going to change anytime soon. and it's important that we not always get caught up in the day-to-day debates about china north korea, south china sea, tibet, taiwan, et cetera, and yet focus on the structural features. there's too structural features that came out of our analysis of how politics impacts the relationship. and the first is that it's clear that competition anticompetitive aspects of u.s.-china relationship are coming to the fore. that's not meant to be a darker negative statement, but rather a statement about sort of the balance of issues facing u.s.-china relationship, and david finkelstein sort of began
to go down this pathway in his description of use china military to military relationship. but these are not issues, this is not a statement about issues that we should shy away from. we need to embrace the competitive aspects of the relationship because that's the only way we're going to manage them. and, in fact, one of xi jinping attributes is the fact he's been relatively frank and open about the fact that there are disagreements. we have to talk about them. they're going to generate competition. the question is not can we avoid competition. the question is what kind of competition is it? is it competition that leads us both to improve our game and razor capabilities? or is it district the competition, militarized competition that runs the risk of instability and militarized conflict? so competition if one structural aspect. the second is sort of what i
refer to as resilience and stability in the relationship. because from my perspective there's a big difference. and while i find that u.s.-china relationship is not always the most stable relationship, there's lots of disagreements, we disagree regularly, but it's a relationship that is actually quite resilient. in other words, even though there are disagreements come even though this competition, there's a sort of core stability at the center of it that has bounded the disagreements in this competition from leaving to a freefall. that's something that could change but it's something that i notice evolve over the obama administration, and it's one of these cyclical features that could become structural, depending on how the politics play out. what does that mean for my assessment of the papers? i would say that these papers are excellent complement your they do two very different things. they highlight different aspects of the relationship.
the chinese paper was very focused on history, ideology and the way in which those issues affect chinese perception to use china relationship. i think the paper is a very good description of how china believes that ideology and in particular this feeling that china has been the victim, china has been wronged by the united states, and how that affects chinese perceptions of the u.s. and the u.s.-china relationship. it's clear from the paper that china really hold onto these and that even in 2017, that these issues affect chinese perceptions of u.s. strategic intentions, and the quality of cooperation that can be gained in u.s.-china relationship. i have to admit i was surprised by the fact that there ar was so
much discussion in the paper about the u.s. trying to change china's political system. and that is continues to be a coworker at the heart of the u.s.-china relationship. and i say that because as somebody who spent six years in the white house, i was not in a single conversation with the president, the vice president, the national security advisor where anybody said china's political system is a threat to american national security and we have to do everything possible to change it. never once, never even remotely close. that said, of course with questions and concerns about human rights in china, the clampdown on political freedoms. because that's who we are and that is a structural feature of use china relationship. where that is very, very different than the kind of claims addressed in the paper. the u.s. paper took a different approach when mike and i were
working on it. we focused less on history and ideology and on institutions, actors and changing american perceptions, and how the changing set of institutions, the fact that the executive branch appears to be playing a much more consistently active role in both formulating and deliberating china policy, the fact that there's a broader set of actors in the united states influencing the u.s.-china relationship. we talked about the business community. we talked about ngos, and paul's great presentation reminded me of the importance of subnational actors, states in the united states, governor brown, fo for example, and the important role they can play in bounding competition, expanding cooperation. that raises the question, does any ideology and history doesn't play the role in american
perceptions of china? and i would say no. i would just the india's widow really call it ideology. what we call it is international relations theory. and what i mean by that is that there are different schools of thought in the united states about china strategic intentions. you have, and i would use disorder stylize schools of thought to make my point, the spectrum is obviously far more diversity on the one hand you have the offensive realism john mershon, china, china wants to re-create the sino centric to betray system and will do everything possible to become the hegemonic east asia. on the other hand, you have a group of china specialist. i would maybe point to somebody like michael, excellent work, who tries to point out that china has a much more nuanced approach to the region. it's not trying to re-create a sino centric system, but rather
it's trying to find greater space for its rise in east asia as a tries to protect self defined economic and security interest. but my point is in the united states we have our own competing schools of thought, and those have different influence on u.s. policy over time. so the chinese paper would benefit from a greater attention to actors, institutions, and how those affect perceptions. i think the u.s. paper would've benefited from a bit more discussion at sort of the range of schools of thought in the united states because we have own manifestation of ideological and theoretical lenses that inform our approach. let me end with this point, which is what does this all mean for the trajectory of use china relationship? and i'm very much of the view that the evolution of use china relationship is one that is going to be determined by a
series of ad hoc decisions by both sides. to put it differently, the future of use china relationship is a constant search for a stable, strategic between washington and beijing. but, unfortunately, the search for that stable strategic is not going to occur at a yalta type negotiation. i think many people in this room wish it were, that you could just have two leaders sit down, hash it out, and move on. or rather commits would be a series dog decisions, the question is -- ad hoc. with a political decision in both countries, institutions, actors, perceptions filter through ideology and history, allow the assorted series of actions to be one that takes the u.s. and china down the pathway toward a gradual convergence of interests, whether both
cooperation and competition, or one where the pathway looks darker? thank you. >> thank you, evan. and now mr. diao daming. >> it is hard, even dangerous for people to talk about -- [inaudible] politics. [laughing] i'm honored to participate in the writing of the chinese report and to attend the great panel here today. actually, my research is located on u.s. politics, so the process of writing for me is very good chance to reconsider about u.s.-china relations. how do i say, i read the u.s. report very carefully and especially the wonderful
analysis about the u.s. congressional role in the u.s.-china foreign policymaking. i totally agree with the idea of ups and downs of congressional power. compared with the two reports we have a lot of consensus. we all agree that domestic politics is one of the most factors shaping the u.s.-china relations. most importantly, we all believe that when the two countries, political goals are consistent, the relations will make significant progress. i think this is very important consensus. of course we have some difference. personally i think the most, may be the biggest difference
between the two reports is that the two sides seem to think about the world of politics in different ways. for the chinese report, we talk about politics as a very big issue, such as political system, ideology, or even political stability. but the u.s. report make me some impression that the politics is about the decision-making process, especially the key players during this process. i think just because of these difference, the chinese part is bigger political background and the culture of u.s.-china
relations, and that the u.s. report talk about, more discussion about the key details such as conquerors, such as community ngl, even personal factors of the leadership. first of all your asking, if you talk about, if you focus more on the details, it's very easy for people to find out some problem, even find out some problems. when you pay more attention on the overall history turned, maybe we will see, we may see a better field track. so why there's some difference? the reason for the difference may be the mutual trust is that china and united states still
have doubts how to look at each other, how to deal with each other. china is still worried about so-called political involvement of the united states and for the u.s. part, maybe the diversity of the decision-making. there are more and more different even conflicting views on china, on chinese politics. for a long time, there's a long history of u.s.-china relations. we had a long time to try to resolve the difference, gradually. both of us, both of these reports mentioned the subnational level relation. i think that is the trend now for us.
i think that is one of, it's a chance for us to strengthen the u.s., the subnational relation between u.s. and china such as the state to problems, the city to city, the county to county or the local level. the subnational relation cannot only bypass the so-called high politics disputes, and maybe can improve a lot of people to people exchange such as economy, trade, technology, science, and so on, and maybe it will -- the basis for the bilateral relations. in addition, i think that the chinese report mentioned that there's a situation that the
u.s. and china conflict, confront kind of the same challenge, the same problems. but the solution may be not the same. as we know china is continuing economy reform and improve, try to prove the people's welfare. and as we know the trump administration proposed -- concern more about the economy, the jobs, the immigration and other domestic issues. so maybe there's more room for some kind of mutual learning, mutual cooperation, mutual benefit between our two countries. so the new development of the political factors since trump
took place, i think on the chinese side there's no big change. on the u.s. side, maybe there's some new points should be talked about. one of them is that the so-called politics of the trump white house brings more uncertainty to u.s. foreign policymaking. outside world totally has no idea about who or at what time, how much influence on which issue. it's a big uncertainty even for united states. another part of like to raise, in case of trump's unclear policy, u.s. congress seem to once more dominate some foreign
policies. so we can see the sales. we can see various bill named taiwan trouble sponsored by marco rubio and steve and travel in the house. i don't think this trend is conducive to the stable development of u.s.-china relations. my time is up. i'll stop there. thank you. >> we have gone over our time. the panelists have raised some fascinating issues that we could usefully explore for the next hour or two. rather than eating into the time of the professor who is going to make concluding remarks, i will think our panelists, and if you have questions, maybe you can
call her, members of the panel, after the conclusion of our conference this afternoon. [applause] >> i want to thank the panel, especially ambassador roy, he is part of the steering group on the part of senior china hands and veterans of foreign and defense policy who provide overall guidance and worked with john hamre to produce an overview paper. the chinese had also had a steering group with a very distinguished scholars, diplomats, defense experts and also produced an overview paper, and the principal author was our closing speaker, professor diao
daming. so it's not over to you to sum up and tell us what do we do next? where do we go from here? professor wang. >> i'm not going to summarize and i'm not going to tell you what to do. [laughing] but i would have to say something. first of all, on behalf of the ambassador and all the numbers on the chinese research group who want to express our heartfelt congratulations on the release of your very comprehensive report. that is the u.s. side, a report on the u.s. side. and we also want to express our
sincerest appreciation to csis for its collaboration with us, and support to our joint effort. so actually we have two sets of reports, parallel reports. the beginning of this joint effort was the spring of 2016. the able stewardship of ambassador zhu feng we initiated the research work on future of u.s.-china relations. the initiative has been endorsed and financed by the chinese academy of social scientists global think tank. i don't remember the exact name of that.
it is called something like global strategic studies think tank. and we had been in touch with chinese foreign ministry and other government agencies, senior diplomats, u.s. embassy in beijing, and various u.s. counterparts, individuals and institutions, especially csis, where we are very much indebted to their advice and support. the research team on the chinese side was composed of about 20-30 researchers, scholars, policy analysts from numerous leading think tanks in china. actually not so good from beijing but elsewhere.
they include chinese academy of social sciences, china foundation, national strategic studies, the national defense university, the pla academy of science. of course my university, peking university, and chief university, chung i academy of social sciences, shanghai social sciences and many others. we help dozens of closed-door debates and discussions. some were small group meetings, and we also held many meetings with our american counterpart in beijing, washington, d.c., or new york city. the end result is the chinese
report publicized in both chinese and english, and we also want to thank csis for publishing the chinese report. and the chinese report in both english and chinese are already edited in the volume, which will be published by the chinese academy of social sciences. i hope it will come out pretty soon. and in may of this year we launched a rollout event in beijing, similar to the one we are holding today in washington, d.c.. we have people from csis and other think tanks from the united states. this is simply my story.
the chinese side of the story. equally important, or even more important, if after a few roundoff console -- consultation, csis made a decision to help us and to coordinate american think tanks to write a joint report, to write a report. the first idea is to write something called the joint report, like publicity of teamwork, collaborated by both sides. but because of the lack of communication, i mean we are separated so widely and we cannot reach consensus on every single issue.
so we decided to do something like that shanghai communiqué. that is, we expressed our views and they expressed their views, and you can compare notes. we compare notes in the first place. so the end result is to separate and parallel reports reflecting our views of several dimensions like trade and economics, asia-pacific, global governance, the impact of bilateral relationship, and military to military relations. and also of course an overview. and we are frequent exchanges of views between the united states and chinese teams, when we have
two, when washington, d.c., and another in beijing respectively. we compared notes and we improve the quality of the papers. substantively, we debated on the chinese side more than we publicized in. i mean, honestly we have different views among the chinese on some issues. we don't have identical views on issues like north korea, no sensitive issues in chinese foreign-policy. of course generally we have consensus, but on specific issues we don't have everything in such a group, such a large group of 30, 20-3 20-30 people e we cannot agree on everything. but what is available, if the generally the consensus on the
chinese side, but the consensus and not necessarily the government point of view, and this is our think tanks answer come we consulted the government but we did not seek endorsement from government agencies. in our cooperation, i'm talking about strategic oriented think tank cooperation. two things are striking to myself, to me. i speak for myself in this regard. first, the frequent substitute and the sustained dialogue, it's very useful. when we constructed the report, i cannot help of thinking about
earlier episodes of the u.s.-china relationship in the 1990s. the cultural exchanges were influenced by the political storm in beijing, and then in the mid-1990s our bilateral dialogue was suspended by the visit united states, and then in the late 1990s there was embassy bombing incident. and so the academic and the scholarly exchanges between universities and think tanks of the two countries was often, very often interrupted by political events. but nowadays, especially since the beginning of this century, we have very intensified and extensive changes of views
between think tanks. and i think personally speaking, i think the intensity and the extensiveness of the sustained dialogue between the two sides exceeds what i know as exchanges of views between china and other countries. we have very strong ties with countries like russia and europe and with many of the countries. but i don't think the intensive, the extensive dialogue less frequent than the exchange that deals with countries we have a friendly relationship with, like russia. and if i could be very honest, if i compare this relationship with our relationship with south korea or japan, in recent years,
unfortunately, sometimes the exchanges of views have been interrupted by unhappy events or happenings. what does this tell us? this tells us we have reached a new level of maturity. and in the words of evan medeiros, this reflects the resilience of the relationship. the second striking thing to me is, of course how much we are familiar with each others' abuse, and how much we know each other personally and individually. that includes some younger generation scholars and the think tank people. in fact, because of the deepening understanding of u.s. think tank like csis, a great
understanding. we are more balanced and more sophisticated views with our domestic, separate audiences. we are much less influenced by conspiracy theories because conspiracy we can think about among the audience here, if they don't have conspiracy, i don't know where we can have those conspiracies. and you know chinese people and chinese government officials much better than before. it is very difficult to believe in those conspiracy theories. i'm not saying there is no conspiracy, but they are not widespread. second, we have languages
which are cautioning against possible conflict between the two sides. we are helping government agencies to construct crisis prevention and crisis management skills and devices and this is what they are very good at, and also my friend finkelstein has also talked about that. and third, despite. [inaudible] the two countries greatly enhance their practical bilateral corporation and multilateral cooperation on global governors and are reflected on the papers of
trade relations and what is not talk too much about is the booming tourism between the two countries and the united states is more interested in the one belt one road and china's best students continue to come for studies and they are not extremely happy about that because i'm losing some of my best students who i want them to attend our graduate schools but instead they go to the best universities in the united states. but at the same time we have many good students from the united states studying in china. so this gives me somewhat more reason to be cautiously
optimistic. i don't want to neglect the differences and the difficulties ahead. what i see is a new normal relationship featured by increased corporation and increased competition, and i don't know if competition is greater. i think they are rising simultaneously. i also see increased degree of influence from domestic politics on both sides. what should we do next? i don't have any good advice but i'm thinking about more substantive and more collaborative projects. for instance we can be somewhat more specific in
discussing neutralization's, what to expect for investment, trade and we can talk also about more extensively security, multilateral security architecture in the asia-pacific region. they're al are already proposals in that regard. we can launch some joint programs and we should also try to bring countries like japan, south korea's, india and russia into our collaboration. we can even think of our joint effort to analyze our situation in the middle east. this morning i read very
carefully a publication from john on china and the middle east. that is something we can also think about. so, in any sense, the joint effort we have made so far has set up a good foundation for thin think tank corporation in the future. of course we are also trying very hard to reach out to other u.s. think tanks and we also want to reach out to other universities in china to bring them together to cooperate with you. thank you very much. [applause]
>> on behalf of the american participants, i want to thank professor wong and the ambassador who brought this idea to us a little over a year ago. everyone was interested, probably a dozen think tanks and universities heard her idea. it was an experiment and i think it worked quite well. for three reasons. one, the goodwill and the candor of all the participants for number two, we structured it in a way were each side had to really think hard about what they thought about the relationship and most importantly third, because of maria sinclair and example of an american university student going to work for you. we owe them special thanks for thank you for joining us. >> the u.s. economy added 222,000 jobs in june, the most in four months. the labor department release the numbers this morning. they also show the
unemployment rate increased to 4.4% from 4.3%. >> cspan, where history unfolds daily. in 1979, cspan was created as a public service by america's cable television companies. it is brought to you today by your cable or satellite provider. >> the heritage foundation yesterday hosted the conversation on reviewing the major cases from the most recent supreme court term and previewing next terms travel beyond case. we will hear from sick cream court attorneys and reporters in this discussion. it is about two hours. >> we welcome those who are joining us on our heritage.org website as well as cspan.