tv 2016 Coup Attempt in Turkey Panel 1 CSPAN July 10, 2017 10:35am-1:07pm EDT
>> good morning, everyone. distinguished guests, friends and colleagues, welcome. my name is kadir ustun. i'm the executive director of the seta foundation at washington d.c. we would like to welcome you all on behalf of our institution. thank you for joining us today in this important conference at the annual july 15 coup attempt. this conference will debate a subject that continues to define turkeys domestic and foreign policy in significant ways. the last years coup attempt to expose the extent to which the followers would go to grab power at the expense of popular will. the attempt made it clear for turkey that this organization was no longer of movement with networks within the state office he but ff applied terror as a means to achieve its goals by
eating attacking its own people. turkey continues to fight against this unique challenge, and the countries domestic and foreign policy continue to be defined by this challenge in multiple ways. today we will be fortunate, and it will be a unique opportunity to hear from general guler who is among us right in the audience. he's the commander of the forces in turkey, and i'll get a chance to talk about him more before his speech. but he was an eyewitness to the unfolding coup attempt. he was one of the people at the highest level at the time. we would like to welcome general guler, and appreciate his team effort to make them available for this meeting in washington, d.c.. we do recognize that -- and to
think of the unique opportunity to hear a first-hand account of what happened that night on that fateful day. we will have two panels with very highly qualified experts and distinguished speakers who will discuss the implications of the failed coup attempt. the first panel will be focused on the history of the coups and july 15 coup attempt, and we will proceed to the keynote by general guler, and then the second panel will talk about the security on foreign-policy implications of the july 15 coup attempt. i would like to welcome you all again, and i want to particularly thank our washington team, my colleague, our research director, without his help this would not have been possible, his effort to very much appreciated.
at our research assistance leslie ann jackson. i would like to thank them all as well. without further ado i would like to invite the first panel speakers. thank you very much for coming. [applause] >> thank you very much for coming today, and we will start our first panel. the first panel will be all the coups in turkey and specifically on july 15 coup attempt.
and we have formally qualified and expert speakers on the issue of the coups at last coup attempt. and i'm about to spend time with the introduction because they'ry are well known so we will start the panel immediately. i will not waste any time at this point. we will start with professor hakan yavus, a professor at university and he is preparing a book action on the july 1 15 cop attempt which will be published by university press probably in the fall, right? we will ask his perspective on the july 15 coup attempt and then we will continue with other panelists. please. >> thanks. what i would like to discuss today is for different conflicts and perspectives about the coup in turkey. there are different perspectives.
one, let me summarize these perspectives and that i want to examine each perspective and provide my own interpretation because most of my work what i did since my phd, dissertation, is very much islamic movements in turkey, especially the lawn movement -- golani. i would like to examine also bring the perspective of movement and its evolution, its networks and its role in the coup. these four perspectives can one perspective claims that google on himself carried out the coup through his networks both in the force and also within the military as well. the second perspective, the
first one is very much accepted by and debated, not debated but very much presented by the current government in turkey. the second perspective argues that the coup is carried out by a coalition of action within the military. and within the second perspective there are two views. first argues that yes, it was an action, a coalition of groups within the military, but the colonists where the glue. they organize, they brought these different groups together to carry out the coup. the second perspective very much promoted, later he changed his view little but in his book about 15 july, still you will see he debates about the coalition of the groups within the military which carries out
thcoup. i also argues that theyere critical in their formation of this coalition. the second promoted by a military analyst, retired military person, he argues that the coup is carried out by a faction coalition of groups within the military. gulenists did not play that prominent role. you have nationalists, some opportunists including the gulenists but what brought these factions together with the military while they were anti-erdogan feeling? that was the glue which kept this coalition of forces together. the third perspective argues
that the coup was, again within the third perspective you have two argument. one argument is the coup was staged by the current president or the wand. this is the argument promoted by gulen himself in his interviews. he argues that this was staged, this was from erdogan itself and they compared the coup to german, the firing of the german parliament of 1933, that hitler according to some historians, carried out the fire in 1933 in order to suspend the german constitution and i also violate the basic human rights. and within the same group they argued that yes, something like the german parliament fire happened, but it only provided opportunity for the current government.
erdogan, to expand his power. the fire was not organized by erdogan himself. so these are the two somewhat competing but the similar argument within the third perspective. the fourth perspective promoted by current opposition leader of turkey, he argues that the coup is a controlled coup. he also has an op-ed in yesterday near time but he is very clear that the coup was carried out by the gulenists within the military, but he says both the intelligence and military with information and support of the government, they try to control the coup and also
use this coup to expand their power. these are four different perspectives about the coup. now i want to move to the second part of my talk and try to examine each perspective in terms of the pros and cons on the basis of the evidence and let you decide. because it's the still ongoing debate what is happening in turkey. still we don't have anti-facts yet. i think it will take some time, at least five, six you to find out what really happened. as far as the first perspective is concerned that the gulen organize, terry doubt the coup, i would argue that by knowing the networ and the goal and evolution of the gulen movement, it is more plausible argument, it's more likely that googl guls
aware because of what took place within the military. there are several reasons for this. one, the gulen networks very much, there are three stages of the gulen movement. first what i call it. of -- from 1970-1993 under former president. the second stage is i call it the movement that -- becomes much more public network and set of activities. it moved from being a religious to more or less erodes economic and political activist on, it
became more clear with the death adamant because after all terry cavett. of coalition government, and that we could government provided opportunity for the gulen and its network to meditate. the academy i would say critical in the power of the gulen movement and that penetration into four started with the government when -- was the minister of interior, when the gulenists got control from the academy. when the academy in ankara became this operational center of the gulen movement i think it became much more clear in 2002 when they came to government and i would say more or less that party allowed the gulenists to
run the government. minister of interior, ministry of education, ministry of justice. it was a coalition between the gulenists movement and the party because the party has the manpower so they more or less relied on the gulenists movement. the academy is critical because by definition the job of -- so the gulenists movement by controlling the academy it penetrated into the cab me but the academy also penetrated into the gulen movement. yet mutual penetration. and i would say in that mutual penetration and mentality of the police activity, police work very much dominated the gulen movement. and in 2002, i would say especially between 2002-2004, entire police force more or less
controlled by the gulenists networks. so the third is i call it that. of, or became more or less political, criminal network. that transformation starts with the coalition with the other party, unfortunately. these are the realities that we need to come from an face. what i would say, the gulen movement went through three major transformations. the last stage more or less shaped by this close ties with -- so after 2002 the gulen movement came to conclusion it is more powerful, and in 2011
election the gulenists, they wanted 100 seats in the parliament. that was not, that was rejected by erdogan, and i would say that was the reason the conflict and confrontation between the two groups, the gulenists on the one hand, the party on the other hand, that the gulenists had too much to lose in this confrontation, but they were also somewhat confident that they would win this confrontation against government. i would argue that given the transmission of the movement, given in 2000, after 2007 transnational crisis, the gulenists became much more powerful. in 2010 constitutional referendum totally controlled the justice system in turkey.
they used justice to carry out the network and within the military with the support of our partner. so we have a section of the military, and the destruction of military through the court cases i would say very much carried out with the police and the judiciary, with other help. we had really a sad unfortunate development and situation in turkey. there's one thing about this coup i do not consider the current, the july coup military coup. it is a civilian coup the it is a civilian coup carried out, organized by the imams or the gulenists imams, and they use the military to implement what they wanted.
so it's a civilian coup carried out, organize by the imams, carried out by the military. and this is one of the reasons i would say why coup failed. because if you compare the previous coups in turkey, always it was organized, carried out by military. there was no civilian intervention. but in this case, in the case of -- who happen to be picky and critical imam, he's now disappeared. no one knows where he is, but he and a number of other civilian imams light an important role. there is no single military imam come this is something very important. all the imams are graduate of activity schools in turkey.
and because there is this -- that gulenists movement i was is very different than rest of the islamic movements in turkey, that in the contemporary turkey, if you take it from the 19th century to present, there are three ways of, this is just a footnote to my argument, you have the luxury movement, the -- movement which is very different. second, you had another movement. again, -- [inaudible] are the kurds but they were very loyal, very loyal to ottoman empire. he was a card also but he was very loyal to turkish republic. and then the third religious movement, the waves, the third wave of islamism is the gulen
movement. les islam, it is more about the powers that, it is less piety, more control. i think this is the gulen movement also represents the success of -- another contradiction we need to unpack. now, let me move very fast, to move to the second argument that work of coalition forces or i would say the second argument doesn't make sense. because the gulenists would never trust nationalists to even organize something such important because one of the key term in the gulen movement is -- in turkish means caution or to be very careful. and the gulenists would never
sit together the army officers to discuss organize of the national such a critical thing. i think it doesn't have the argument -- did not make much sense by knowing how the gulenists networks function. but there are some generals, i think like, or number of other people, they did know what to do. i would never count him as a gulenists i what i write of his background is very much a democratic oriented general. so you do have a number of people who are in jail because they did know what to do at that moment of the critical. so i'm hoping that eventually this will become clear. when you go to the third argument about that this is something like a german fire of
the german parliament taking 33, i would say this coup wasn't organized by erdogan because there was a reason for erdogan to organize the coup to expand his power because erdogan is very much in control of the parliament, the local power as well. so to risk he himself run away from an assassination attempt, the coup is very much attempt to kill him. but there was, the second part of the argument that this coup is used by the government to get rid of the opposition, there is a ground for that. unfortunately today in turkey what we are seeing, that some people are using this environment to silence opposition. i think this is not very healthy for turkish democracy or turkey. now, the third argument, the
first part doesn't make much sense. we analyze it in the book in more detail, but the second part, the exploitation or using the coup more or less i would say it makes sense, unfortunately. now, when we look at the fourth argument of controlled coup which is promoted by the opposition leader, i will sit argument also doesn't make sense. because to control something i will say it is not a controlled coup. on the contrary it is loss of control because the military new around 5 p.m., the turkish intelligence was aware of the coup around 3 p.m. both of them could do anything. it also shows the weakness and inept situation of the political institutions in the country of turkey that they couldn't do a
loss of control. in a way they could not try to take proper measures to stop the coup, and to control coup also requires that you would know what would be the next stage, and what we know from the events of the coup there was no control and everyone was shocked their way in which events were evolving. to conclude since i don't have much time, the coup carried out by the civilian, by i would say this is more a decision something like i coup could only be given by the gulen himself, by knowing how the gulenists networks evolved historically. the gulen is fully aware. this doesn't mean every teacher, every doctors a movement in the movement in germany united
states is aware of the coup. so we also need to be very careful not to treat the entire movement or equate and treat all that as a criminal activity. i think that is one of the mistakes, is made about, by the government as well. but the gulen very much made the decision. the coup very much carried out by the civilian, the order, planned by the civilian imams. and it was carried out by the gulenists within the military. each gulenists any military were very much, each officer had some imam he was working with an they didn't know each other was the gulenists is will. also there is an incredible story of the gulen movement, how it worked, the force and
military. there's a lot to be learned unfortunately of these networks using both the religion and modern networks and create such a powerful glue. to shape the future of the country. and i will and here. >> thank you very much. second speaker, ravza kavakci kan the deputy chairperson for a party and probably she will answer what some of your questions because she was in the committee for investigating jul. please. >> thank you very much. it's nice to be here. i think we need to take a step back and maybe look at a little bit how this all started. when we were in the committee investigating the failed coup attempt and also how it came about, how did they come about, how did it form, and out they came to the date of the coup
attempt and the aftermath. when we were investigating it we went back 40 years, documented, and maybe there's more that's not documented, back in turkish history. so when you see the first report as hakan yavus mentio mentionede the first report about this gulenists, members of the gulenists movement and i would definitely not call it an islamic movement. if i were to define it i would define it a as a mafia like cult mentality. it is definitely a cold, and can utilize anything that it can't in order to persuade people to do things, to brainwash them or to blackmail them into doing it. anyway it goes. if they need to look religious at some point in the utilize religious terminology. if they need to look secular,
then they would use secular terminology. anything goes because when we look at their lives we see that they may be religious people, but everything they do is against the rules of the religion. so i would definitely not put it together with islamic movements. it's a cold movement, a mafia type cold movement that utilizes religious terminology to influence people and others, other methods that they use among other methods that use as well. so a look at 1990s when you see the first report saying in the police force that if, if they are not stop they may take over the police. one thing that's important, and we had a lot of discussion related to this in the committee and a lot of arguments i may say with the members, distinguished
members of the opposition party as well. this did not start with that fight. this started 40 years before. and whoever was in power, it doesn't matter whether their ideologies matched or overlapped, they worked with them. we see it, unfortunately, at the end of 1990s during the february 28. we see it, another report prepared in 1999 by the secret service and ankara, ankara -- i cannot think of the names, so it's prepared in ankara saying that, that they need to be stopped in the military as well. so all of these at the time because we have a turkey where there's lots of coalitions, and,
unfortunately, there is no democracy as the democracy with its ups and downs, pluses and minuses compared to the democracy we had today. we still have military old rule. anytime there's a democratic change or a move towards democracy, we have the political elite working with the military, and then they give a signal and then the elected officials take a step back. so we still have an overshadowing of the political elite over the turkish democracy. so we cannot call that a turkish democracy when we come to the end of the 1990s. then what happens during the other timecards women don't like to tell the agent i tell people i am, i just, i'm in the tenth h anniversary of my 35th birthday, last year for some old enough to remember the 1980 military coup and i listened to my grandparents.
the first two years of the republic, the challenges they had after the war, and the things that they suffer through after 1960, and everything, the process even within my family i see what were the human rights violations and how did it come to this space. so after 2001 we see that there's many different factions in the society. we see the party come out and then they gradually gained power, and there's a struggle trying to get, also the democrat authorization process trying to get rid of -- that existed and that gradually happened. but even with a look at 2007, 2008 we see that he faces a closure case against him.
so when we look at really akp party may beginning party like their term, 2011, that's when you start to get to power and like you said, that's when the struggles start. in turkey, in current turkey any democratic group if you want to be a part of the democratic system, more than welcome to enter the elections, political parties, compared to the turkey i grew up in, there's much more freedom. anybody can establish acyclic a political party, and they had opportunitthe opportunity to bef the political system. but now you have this group come seems like a nice group. they have schools. isn't it nice to have schools? they have schools all over the world. and then they have people, nice people who speak good english,, but for languages come and they
are good, district they look like they are humanitarian people. and then when you have these people take orders, not from their superiors in the government or in the military and the police force, taking orders from civilian, from outside, and orders that are ordering them to the illegal things like blackmailing people, like threatening people, like causing them to lose their jobs or causing them, making them, forcing them to close their businesses. now we have a problem. then there's a struggle. it's not a democratic struggle. it is a power struggle. so the clash starts during the 17, 25th of december, 2016 -- >> 2013. >> 2013.
and then before is also the day when that's one of the new is out again. that's discussed a lot in the media as well. there's talking of -- stopping of the trucks that were bringing aid. it was national security services trucks being stopped by factions in the military. so these things do not add up. so the problems started. but when we come to, i don't how much time i have left so i will have to fast-forward and jump ahead. when we come to the date of jul. i wasn't, i will always regret the fact that i rushed to istanbul from ankara after the work in the morning on july 15, because i wanted to see my daughter which would only have that weekend. i wanted to spend time with her and i wasn't there in the
parliament when it got bombed. okay, imagine having f-16s fly over the capital when congress is in session. and imagine them bombing. imagine men in use of force uniforms, your uniform, your countries uniform, shooting at you. imagine tanks out on the street. but this is something my generation remembered vividly, but this was something the new turkey. children, the age of my daughter, 20 years old, they didn't know. they had no idea about something like this could happen. they couldn't imagine it. it was something they could see in the movies. so july 15 coup attempt was a violation of basic human rights, the most basic human right is
the right to live. of 80 million turkish citizens. and also citizens of other nations like the 3 million syrians that we support physically, and within our borders and outside as well, and of the people all over the world who are looking up to turkey for humanitarian help, or some of the forms of support. so this was one of the biggest attacks any democratic country, maybe within the modern history, has gone under and survived. so what was not logical was, i mean, i'm not a person who likes to dance. i grew up in texas so i know, i get a fee few about it. i have a feel but it's not logical for people to run towards the guns and tanks and bombs. it's not logical, but that date the turkish people, and this is
sosososososososososososososososd the concept of struggling, for democracy. all the previous definitions, i'm so sorry there's very distinguished academics year, all the previous definitions are no longer valid. and i'm saying this as a politician. not as a politician but also as a student of international relations and political science. so people literally took to the street. what happened afterwards? immediately, unfortunately, very, very disappointing we found out that our wonderful, wonderful allies and friends were waiting it out. some of them are the very allied and friends he would immediately travel to turkey when they hear about a rumor of some kind of
human rights violence, violations, or some kinds of violence. they would immediately be there. they would be ready to criticize turkey harshly. sometimes maybe rightfully, but no. we did not hear anything. this was very, very disappointing for the turkish people to see. and then the aftermath of the coup attempt. yes, it is difficult to understand. the numbers may seem vague, but turkey is not, as i mentioned, it is 80 million population. there are those who want to establish the argument that there is no rule of law, but believe me, the rule of law is upheld in turkey and it is not
just about gaining more power or punishing the opposition. believe me, i worked with them. we have opposition in the parliament and outside as well. but normally, no matter what your position is, you could be a doctor, you could be a lawyer, you could be a journalist, you could be an academic. you could be a high-level military official. you could be a member of parliament or you could be a doorkeeper in a building. nobody is about the law and this is not acceptable to promote terrorism no matter what your position is -- above the law. not any of it. if 1000 of its happen in the united states, and i was here on september 11, those horrible
attacks can or if it happens in a european country, things would be much worse. so the court cases, we are following the court cases, for the coup attempt an addition to the people who are either suspended or they are having to go to the court system, there's also a great number of people who are released or reinstated to the positions, but, unfortunately, we don't hear about that in the u.s., or in the european media. we hear about the certain part of the story picks i just wanted to tell about our part. i had a lot of those but i will try to get back to them, so thank you. >> thank you very much for your presentation. and our third speaker necdet
ozcelik is very much n not expet on security case and he's a research fellow. >> thank you. thank you for having me. i would like to do with two important issues regarding the turkish armed forces, touching on the sensitive issues, how the people were so effective in the turkish armed forces and how they affected the turkish combat readiness after the coup attempt. so there was a big problem of understanding who carried the military attempt, the military part of the coup attempt in turkey. so as was pointed out, that was not indeed a -- members or there
are many people, many opportunities people in turkey armed forces, more than you got involved in the coup attempt on july 15. i'm not sure about the number of haters. of course there are some, but the main body or the driving body of the military to was the members in the military. so i would like to explain, tried to explain the privilege of the infiltration in turkish armed forces, at i take five dimensions of that. so first of all, that strategy -- [inaudible] prior to targeting -- the first was the targeting the personal status of the turkish armed forces.
what i mean, the turkish armed forces -- personal system on different status, generals, officers, ncos. the contracted specialists and the servicemembers. [inaudible] in this strategy and operation status called the personal body of the turkish armed forces. those are the official closely. started from the minister of high schools and continuing until they get promoted to general. so that said, long investment actually for the members. the ncos, the contracted specialists and the servicemembers, they are mostly technical than the technical people. so the numbers did not put too much on those people.
so the main body just worked on turkish armed officers. that's the number of people in this room. they know how suffering, they know how long to get promoted, to get the commission of being officer in turkey. the other thing i can mention her say is the command forces. there are some military branches. there are some military command forces, and there is a military law enforcement branch. in turkey you see -- operated
under the control of interior ministry. to get infiltrated in. because of the approximate of the civilian people. and he has the intelligence supremacy comparing to the other traditional command forces in the civilian society. they are role enforcement military people. so they -- primary target to get infiltrated, it seems so. then the air force. because of the technical capacity, because of their maneuverability and mobility as well. the army, the land forces.
we see special forces also involved in the coup attempt. because of their unique training, unique capacity of carrying some special operations. we saw that, those special forces soldiers. just detaining some high-ranking generals. the third dimension, that's the key positions that how members just work on turkish armed forces. those are the personal directors, intelligence directors at the high level headquarters. then we see the personal
assistance for the high-ranking generals. and the close protection borders and others as well. they were important part in growth of military that the settled members just took those positions to keep close to the commanding generals, and to operate the personal strategy in turkish armed forces and the intelligence strategy as well. in personal case, a general staff headquarters, there's a personal management director. under that directorate there's a small branch of that.
that branch is responsible for promoting, promoting the generals, sending the military people, appointing, signed then to the foreign countries, to nato as well. that is a key location, and that was important for the coup attempt actually. and they, too, they were able to seize that office. he served in that office for many years after he got promoted, he got the status of being a staff officer. that was, if i'm not wrong, that was since 2003. he was in that position. as a major he started, and he was right over there as
brigadier general. that's incredible. he got so -- [inaudible] on directing and giving some recommendation to the high-ranking general. and the intelligence directorate as well. that starts from the battalion level and goes all the way up to the force command headquarters. those two directors were captured, seized by the members and the policy was directed to intelligence and personal strategy. the fourth dimension that i can point out is just to make some
staging during the service cycle of military personnel. so that starts, that starts from -- goes together with the military school in terms, entering the active-duty, and then the postal service. it is also important for the members. we see high level of motivation, and those people who are just motivated to get in the military school. at the age of 13, 14 before the high school. and they got trained. they got tutored. and during their military school
time, they kept their motivation visiting some certain saddle soft what i call, in the military or high school located. during the active time, the settlement and -- [inaudible] and then it becomes -- so the retirement discharges and resignation. all other religious motivated discharge people settled people less than a month who got discharged from military. this is interesting. the other dimension is the infiltration enter getting the capacity of operations. so that is studying the turkish armed forces. that is just before 1980s.
and then survival phase that it between 1980-2000. the infiltration starts in the middle of 1980s. and those brigadier generals who took place, who got involved in the military coup on july 15 were mostly at the rank of brigadier general. that means they get in the military schools in mid-1980s. that person i mentioned is one of them as well. then we see settling, expanding. this is right after the year
2,022,002,008. we saw lots of people were just discharged from the military service because of their potential opposition for the members. i remember, i remember between 2004-2008, more than 500 special forces soldiers got sent to regular army units. that's a big number comparing the whole body of the turkish special forces. and then you see the activities of members. just using the values, cases as
an instrument for purging those people. so that was a strategy, but the coup attempt itself, the preemptive military action. because the members were not able to reach their operational capacity to carry a full scale coup d'état in turkey. so that was the merit of their strategy. so that's what i'm calling it preemptive. and the final thing that i would like to put some notes on, how this affected the turkish combat readiness. definitely that harm the turkish military know-how, for sure. however, this charge of the seven members from the turkish
armed forces just east the fight against terrorism. since july it's almost 2000 pkk members got killed. that's an incredible number. of course there are some casualties, but the impact of the operation are important. the pkk members are now just operating in small technical elements, not organized in big numbers, so it is forcing them to act hardly in the mountainous regions. ..
establishment, these are the people and may have motivation. of course this does not make what they did legal, but they had the motivation. they have motivation most of the time to protect thursday from those people most of the time from those politicians who were not act being in the ideology -- [inaudible] for example, they had the idea how it should be done and, for example, sometimes they were
claiming that they were protecting states against the rising reactionary and turkey quote, unquote. for some time, they were claiming that they were protect in the state against radical left is her blaming politicians. as i said, the show was that there is some sort does society. some are supposed to because they had a certain inclination with one of those ideologies in the turkish society. they look at the former military attempts and turkey --
successful in taking control of the country. after taking control of the country, they then claimed they restored to order. the military rules and not for years and years. as i sat against politicians rather than being against people, but when we look at july 15th, what we see is the first of there is not an ideal in that sense. we have the communal group, what we call the terrorist group,
they have a certain ideology. i mean those ideological ring. for example, we cannot say they are leftists are that they are nationalist. they are islamists. in that sense, they do not have a certain ideology. but they have a desire. they only want to corrupt the power. the target of the july 15th example, ordinary people not only in the sense, but also in the sense that they were rejected to exist without being a member. certain members in a society,
every single individual should share the idea that they do not have different groups for a nationalist. how can i say this -- [inaudible] successful. turkey will not be a better player for any of these groups. it will not be better. it will not the for a nationalist. it would only be a better play and what i say more is for some of the other members of this community, terror organization,
not one of those members. they will not be for those people. [inaudible] >> for four minutes. >> i understand that something difficult to understand because, you know, we talk about the organization -- [inaudible] what is the opportunity that they largely answered this question? i can say the structure -- [inaudible]
the religious sect to woody's and religious identities -- [inaudible] all of the expressions of religious identity. and also they claim themselves to become the religious groups that turkish society supported and may pay the support of ordinary people. the number one advantage includes taking the state and also at taking ordinary people. both i will continue to question. >> thank you very much.
thank you all the panelists for this presentation i have been to use my right to moderate the panel, but considering the number of participants today, i have several questions that i may ask a few more, still using my privilege. >> thank you very much for a very good and informative panel. i have a couple of quick questions. you help us understand basically the different narratives about who was involved, but it doesn't exactly address the issue of why was there an attempt biology's potential forces that go to
either access individual collectively, to push for this kind of change in the military. why 2016 and not 2015, 201 the second question is there is no escaping the fact that the movement was not of the hepa 25th team and therefore enabling it is now a terrorist organization doesn't help us understand the kind they have in turkish society and also the alliances they had until then. this is a question that needs to be answered. not necessarily by saying they are engaging in criminal in committee. we need to understand the pilot of the alliance between the hq
ap and the golan movement and the parting of ways. >> another question from this gentleman. >> thank you very much. yes, it was a very informative presentation. there were many occasions when one of the panelists use the term federal -- [inaudible] one was not used in who invented it? >> well, i think that -- i would consider the golan movement as the islamic movement because there is no one islam. there is diversity of islam. the golan movement if you look at the original movement, the
reason why we allied itself or why the golan supports our party is because the data shared identity of islam. so they cannot ignore the the role of islam between these two actors to understand the relationship between the two. this is one of the issues of islam, there is the islam of, danish ad, the islam -- ahmadinejad. it has 20 different versions. given the history, the context of thousands of different interpretations. so the golan movement very much
shaped base islam because there are traditions issues, and they need be examined as well. now, when we look at what happened in 1917, actually the issue started in 2011 between our party and the movement in the referendum in 2010, they were really mobilize and make out what they wanted in terms of their hegemony by changing the constitution they became a dominant force and they come to the conclusion that now we control and can get started on to do whatever we want. in the 2011 election, they wanted -- i said no, i think the
struggle then, the president realize they are trying to accident some months what occurred in democratization of the country, but to try to stop him and then there was a struggle. just to tell you something. the movement they really did not want to control the political party. yes, the state started their relationship and then -- [inaudible] but they did not want to control the state institutions in bureaucracy. and they had succeeded in doing that because that their reach with the political structure enter e., especially after there was a period of weak government
in turkey that provides an opportunity. so the struggle started in 2011. in 2012, they wanted to pressure the government through the court case against the current turkish military intelligence. then to return to to their schools. [inaudible] and then it was the main source of an come. then in 23rd team there was the golan charges. they try to put the government in 23rd team. and then the confrontation took
a different form after 2015. why 2017? there is a high consult, usually meets once a year to decide the promotion. so it became very clear in the june newspapers to cover the story about the military concept to plan these foreign armies. so they were already the military ones that lost place. now they were about to be clans and they just used their last bullet against erdogan to stop camilla power.
[inaudible] i would like to give it to you before the attack as well, but i cannot remember who used it for the first time. but a couple of things to add. yes again, i beg to differ on the argument that this was an islamic movement. there are ways people practice their religion. the thing to get to the end with the basic principle of islam, to get to the end, that could be doing things that are not legal in the frame of work to doing things that are not the technical, political secure terms. so anything political.
struggle may be in addition to what you said is illegal activities. that is when the first trouble start. in order to have power, they don't care who is in power, but now there was a more democratized turkey and a government in power that would do anything they were asked to do. they were there to represent the people and do what they ask them to do. so that's when the question started. actually, part of that may be reason that the coup attempt to place when it did because we passed the law in the parliament
and the higher council would be meeting earlier than it was six acted. so it was related with the schedule as well. >> thank you. i have another question and then we have to finish up at 12:00. >> thank you very much. very interesting discussion. we talked about the democratic and the two nations. in this country, for example, calling the media for a number of years you had a journalist. you had government or colleagues of mr. erdogan taking over the media, editors at newspapers and so on. could you tell us a little bit of what seems to be the
situation, what happened to democracy, what happened to free speech post-coup. you had some of the situation, but now you have what seems to be accusations of illegal activity the journalists are doing. could you comment on that a little bit? thank you. >> all right. yes, of course there's a difference in the discussion here in the united states. we have a different one in turkey. of course, i am not going into discussion, but there are limited. it would not be acceptable anywhere in the world to promote come if you're a journalist, politician, artist, no matter what, nobody could say some mean
like they support activities daish, basis. would that be part of freedom of speech? the journalists and i tried to follow them closely and whatever information was available to the public. if i mentioned not really the with journalistic activities, but related to terrorist activities. of course their event as well. the knowledge is something interesting. in dealing with terrorism, we gave 260 lives in 2194 people
caught wounded. we deal with pkk terrorism that is recognized terrorist organizations guess they are able to protest and they aren't allowed to stay to the turkish citizens like germany and another land and we are dealing with daish, isis terrorism that many levels. so what is the definition of terrorists according to now i think anybody in the world would agree that isis daish is a terrorist organization. when it comes to the issue, interesting as they kill turkish citizens, most of them are of turkish descent, although they are fighting for the church, right and have grown up with the
horrible terrorist organization and still, they get support internationally, political or otherwise. as far as the journal starts, they are writing articles against the government we are all intelligent people. president trump, no matter what he says does he have the authority to physically the people. believe me, we do have the rule of law in turkey. that is why we still have a court cases going on. the people that you have absolute perfect evidence
because it's obvious they have killed innocent people on the streets. but the panelists in the dems watching. so, i just wanted to ensure that the rule of law. >> i have to admit fun time, so i will give a minute for each pin the last four final remarks and we have to start the keynote immediately after. >> what i can tell -- >> the key panelists came all the way from turkey in the fourth panelist is from utah. so they came all the way and they will be here all day long. if you have any questions, they would probably enjoy entertaining your questions. >> what i can tell regarding the
transformation of society and the security circle, daish -- the turkish military and the turkish society now claims the democratic values more than it used to be. so, this is what the most important consequence of the attendant. so about what he do construction, reconstruction or the security architecture in turkey. but will definitely take some time. but what the people, that focus in the military and security circles, they are expecting that should be run on a merit system. >> thank you. >> i will say some mean about
the democracy or freedom of speech in turkey. it is good to see that we have some friends i can definitely say the leader of the party but the initiative mark to istanbul, and march all the way with hundreds of people and he organized the millions of students as they claim that. the police forces assisted them all the way against provocations or in a terrorist attack. yes, you may have some friends
that have some concerns about our country. but the image is not totally true. thank you. >> the advisers here as well. i do make a point about production all knowledge. we see a lot of production all knowledge that presents turkey as the evil enemy. so i find that especially going back to the example europe, do you know that the social affairs minister wasn't allowed to speak another land and wasn't a lot to go the turkish embassy. this is against international
law. she was physically taken into custody in the morning until she was sent back to turkey. women's right. come on. doesn't a turkish minister after international women's day. so let's look at the knowledge and take our sources. >> thank you. unfortunately, we have a problem of freedom of speech in turkey. unfortunately, freedom mass media is also in the country, but we have to understand why this is the case. i don't think anything would justify limiting freedom of speech. that may be a challenge.
i am totally in favor of freedom of speech. unfortunately, we do have a big problem they are in turkey doesn't deserve the image. i do believe this is not going to be permanent. this is going to be temporary. there is also a larger problem i can agree that this delegitimization of turkey and president erdogan took a very religious farm that some of the people cannot analyze turkey because of this delegitimized to white the anti-turkey mode. i see it in the liberal media. there is i would say islam a phobic, turk of québec ideas that play a role. we also need to find herself.
yes, we have a major freedom of speech issue in the country. this is, i am again hoping that this is not going to be permanent. i think major has -- has a major crisis. turkey usually models through and i am hoping that this time, too, we are going to overcome the support of domestic forces inside the country or some external support from outside. >> thank you very much. thank you for the candidates. [applause] we will have a five minute break before setting the stage for the keynote. [inaudible conversations]
the commander of the military branch that is in charge of civilian security. after lunch, i find no panel on security and foreign policy implications. you can find the entire conference available later today on c-span.org. also to let you know, the senate will come in at 3:00 eastern time today back from a two-week july 4th recess, working on a nomination for regulatory affairs director of the office of management and budget and a confirmation vote on the nomination followed by about two advanced additional nomination. tonight on "the communicators" at 8:00 p.m. eastern, we'll take a look at what is becoming the 5g network for consumers and building broad and out to rural areas. that is on "the communicators" at 8:00 p.m. eastern tonight. [inaudible conversations]
>> good afternoon, everyone. thank you again for coming. we are going to be in a couple minutes hearing from general bishara caress, the commander of the forces in turkey. i just realized i've failed to mention the turkish ambassador who is here also. i would like to recognize our ambassador to the united states. the general has a long resume, but the one you have in the handout as a little bit out dated, so i want to read his full bio, the most up-to-date one. generally, born in 1954 come he graduated from the army academy with the rank of signaling and served as a signaling platoon
and company commander at various units between the years 1975 and 1984. the general graduated from the army war college in 1986 and from the armed forces college in 1988. ask staff officer, he served as the chief of operations at the internal regional command between 1986 and 1988 as the planning officer in inspection division of the army, as the chief of the operations and training branch at the 12th infantry division between 1991 and 1992 as the battalion commander between 1992 and 1994. as the project officer at the office of military senior account whether of the president between 1995 and 1997. in the signals that the nato
regional command between 1997. he also served in various european capitals as brigadier general, he served as the frigidaire commander between the years of 2001 and 2003. as the chief of the communications information system planner coordination department of turkish general staff between 2003 and 2005 and he was promoted to the rank of major general in 2005. he serves as the commander of communications in the school training center command and the training department between 07 and 09. he was promoted to the rank of
leader general in 2009 and then not he served as commander of several general command of not being between 09 and 2010 as the commander of the fourth quarter between 2011 and the general staff between 2011 and 23rd teen and he was promoted to the rank of general through the decisions in 2013 and kerry decided duty as deputy chief of the turkish general staff and was appointed as the general commander with the decision on july 28, 2016. obviously has a long, distinguished military career in turkey, but also as part of phase duties as part of nato. the significance of his present for this conference was one of
feelings and are convinced not to have them. and they made no choices of their own. they took direction. whatever probation they will choose, and hold on, or they would marry. [inaudible] the brothers and the sisters and the person could choose a spouse. they don't find it appropriate. the organization gave them a
role. for example, right now the marriage rate themselves have gone up. the organization are trying to to -- they are marrying people within the organization. that may give you an example according to the instructions. on the night of july 15, the pilots who on the nationalists, they told the course that they were innocent and they were only following orders. just imagine this. a fighter pilot and that bombing the parliament building after their own country against the direction. without questioning that, claims
in a sense. we are not talking about someone uneducated. it is a fighter pilot. this is a highly trained chemist seriously trained person. when we look at the terror organizations, golan struggle freezes the consciousness and this is unlike the perception of this and many other countries. if we look at this awareness, it goes to a period that preceded the incidents. if we get these experiences, therefore certain countries and certain allies, we see some of
our allies as a terror organization and they seem to be confused. because this is the type of organizational behavior that we are facing, overall this is a long period of organization and during that period, and they have the radical identities within the agency organization in a successful manner. they have approached powers by this strategy. somebody started the word, then they would send a security officer and then a regular white-collar worker and an higher-level officers, experts and so on. the people who last the guidance
is for the new one and the institution, there were people responsible for the organization. we have to look at the live of 30, 40 years and think about the power of institutions and the power of law and that they had the rights an opportunity to reach arms and everything. but they have kept us under control. that is to say they had to train militants and they have to put them right away. they are to have the west end, but they belong to the government, the planes, tanks, soldiers. they had members in the army to use them in the commander's to give comments so they could use
this for us any time they wanted. in the last 40 years, the way it infiltrated all institution from the lowest and highest has been successful in putting in its members. however, what is more important is these people, if we look at the years in the training, despite all that, they have managed to keep the organization alive. the 16th of july, the generals who joined in many of these people are colleagues worked together for years in their acquaintances. a general thinks about to start your career. these people for such a long time at the end they still could
turn into a robot. that night, when i saw the treachery of the camp, shows you the example from my due. this is the best example. when we look at people and what promoted with some of the best military schools in the world, when you enter the organization as a child and you are trained with certain techniques, the secrecy and the following order that we mentioned, you can turn into a robot easily. after what happened in my office, they wanted to take me out of the building, close my
eyes, all i got out of the building, i recognized they opened with her ears and when they try to take me away, the security, they didn't open the gates. he said, open the door or a shoot. conflict ensued. in the camp got killed in that fight. the person next to me, i put my shoulder to him and made him follow her. after the attempt the next day, there was no spot on the car that wasn't hit a bullet.
.. it was organize by a group that infiltrated the military and made it look like a fait accompli. this was action of a group, an organization picky t look at the number of people who joined this move, look at the ratio of these people to the general structural of the military, this is a small group.
the strategy they adopted was having tea traders in critical spots. and they use guns very distractible to the trinity. they followed the media communications and he wanted to convince our population that this was a military queue. but at this point it would look at our president and our government and our mighty nation, responded in a critical way and thwarted the scenario. the democratic reflexes one mighty nation is indeed respect to make sure the continuity of the state, our nation understood that this was a coup attempt by an organization and that we put down and they understood in a rapid manner and went to the streets. the coup attempt, if we look at the coup attempt, this was a small minority within the army
and they wanted to make this attempt look bigger and use limited number of aircraft and tanks. it should be noted, turkish military forces did not advance towards the nation. there was a group within the army that they wanted to activate the military forces and pushed towards the coup. perhaps this is a most critical points of july 15 analysis. it interpreters correctly, we can understand that it is a radical terrorist groups decision we can't understand that july 15 was a terrorist act. after what happened at the gate interested they couldn't take me out of the building by car. they dragged me into another car and transferred me to another building.
after we waited for a while, a helicopter arrived and the coup plotters headquarters i was taken to the airbase that was their headquarters. i was locked up, and afterwards i solve the f-16s takeoff from the ground. later on i was told that they were taking to the airbase was preplanned. they started the armed face of the coup. they wanted for me to be taken there. i learned afterwards that our commander of the forces were also taken to the air base to the next room. but eventually a man of honor in military turkey forces, he did not give any credit to the top of bandits and resisted. this is a hierarchical order.
the coup attempt that was planned by this organization and its leaders -- [inaudible] there are these ranking colleagues outside, for example, like the martyrs. their strength and courage is what hampered the bridge between the turkish armed forces and the radical terrorist organization. from my point of view, we should look at the particular issues of the failed coup attempt, is that failed connection between the military forces and the terrorist organization. july 16 around noon they opened the door of the room i was locked up in and heard a familiar voice that said hey, what are you doing here?
this was someone i worked with for a long time, for years, our families had met, the minister, the air chief marshal. he was wandering freely while i was in handcuffs. his aid aid to camp was accompag it. i give him orders, and he told me that he was surprised at my presence. i'm telling this to my american friends, we have something a turkish about fake friends. issuing a fake friendship towards me but at the same time it was interesting that he was free in that situation. if he had been on our side he should have been treated like i was, but that wasn't the case. they opened my handcuffs. he removed my eye patches and offered me that i could speak to my family. no doubt being a soldier we had
always on full alert as members of military and we should always be careful about struggle and this is our way of life. within a few minutes, despite these changing circumstances, i was not relieved or relaxed. i tried to focus on figure out what was going on, and the relations. for example, despite the offer they provided for me to call my family, i didn't move. i understood that every action i took would be an excuse for their crimes and murderers. they dialed my home with a fixed line and i shout out from where i was and i said i was okay. i did not approach the phone. they probably didn't detect any change in my attitude, so they
left me in the room. and the air chief marshal reminded me as he was leaving that there were guards waiting in front of the door. at this time, i felt bitter and sad, and i realized that the come what was facing this was a lot different than what we knew so far. the man in front of me was the chief marshal of the air force. as i said when a personal relationship that went on for years. a colleague for a long time. and despite these high degrees and a long career, he was using this good cop that cop role as he approached me. we understand that all elements of the radicalization and that's how they were within our daily
lives. radicalism isn't a brand-new problem. everybody can see it, nobody can't ignore it. and it is using all the same points and 5 billion people live on this earth. worst of all, it is expended using the technology and communication. if we look at this concept, this is just like combined of vessels. this is distributed evenly throughout the globe. loans are in baghdad, in berlin and in london. and more importantly, radicalism can distribute itself both as a result and as the consequences. these actions can be carried out
by single organization or different organization with a different purposes. if we look at the factor of radicalization, it might be different religions are different ethical regions. these people with average, above average education or above average intelligence can carry out some of the most bloodiest terrorist actions in the world. people who spent a significant time of the life in duties and on the other country may join radical positions in retirement, and turn all their experience into a problem. we, today, see radicalism in daesh or boko haram. however, if we look at -- with a per capita income of $42,000, their soldiers can come to, can come around and terry at
anti-immigrant actions. all i am trying to do is explain this. our problem doesn't have a daesh problem. it doesn't have a boko haram problem. it doesn't have a neo-nazi or other organizations problem that we haven't heard of. the world is a radicalism problem. the main study mentioned are the consequence of the problem and actress with in it. if we do not identify the problem correctly, we won't be able to identify the consequences accurately and we cannot find correct solutions. first of all we have to identify this radicalization is a process. it is a process where the idea turns into violence. it is the name of this process. radicalization, first of all it starts with an idea, is followed by religious ideological
indoctrination process, and this process is up in radicalization. that is to say, the mines could radicalize first and then the hands and then the fingers that pull a trigger or if you use. of course to defend radicalization you cannot prevent ideas. -- to prevent. if you look at the common features a process, then these structures and persons can be seen to have a hate about people, a people who do not share the same id. they accept their view as the only truth and the ignore different opinions and the identify everyone else as a single group or a single structure. furthermore, contrary to popular belief, people did not adapt radicalization. they don't get radicalize on
their previous beliefs and ideas. first of all they adopt radicalize mentally. they get isolated from society, then they find most organized radical structure they can reach and become part of it. then the process that it mentioned, the idea, from idea to violence takes place. today, the daesh terror organization, if we look at them finding militants in the central of europe, the biggest example of this, as a result, what defines radical action is the use of violence as a method. this sort of violence is what defines terrorism around the world. this is the radicalization of
the most terrorism. if you look at the theoretical framework i have provided for you, you can see this in all articles and books and analyses written on terror around the world. however, as a citizen in this ethical marginal radicalism, radicalism as a, someone who come from this country and representatives, this is the country that lives through all these, and as a citizen who joins this fight against the sort of terrorists and that someone who experienced what he experienced on july 15, i wanted to present you the practical results of this anxiety invited
you. in that room i'm not sure how long i stayed there. in the morning i started hearing the fighter planes, and then they bombed the compounds. then i understood the turkish armed forces intervened into the actions of the terrorist group and take care of them. and you might have followed within the media, the coup attempt was actually done faster, earlier time than previously planned. i want to actually respectfully disagree. they say that if it's what taken place at the correct out it could have succeeded. then everybody would be sleeping and that coup plotters would take precautions, et cetera. i want to ask you, with this
nation a cup on july 16, with people not get the same reaction they give a night in the following morning? with a be scared of weapons, they would've been scared of that night. i don't think the reaction would be different. i think would be incorrect to say that. to get the character of the coup attempt we can see this as a terrorist group and the people saw this clearly. and the events followed accordingly. thus, i don't think there would be a change in reaction and the fact that the action was realized earlier would change the course. i don't believe this. what we see, when they took care of the official channel of the government, they thought people would give up just like the old
coups that happened and the people would not show reaction, and the rest of the army would just agree to the situation that was created. however, at the call of our esteemed president, they, that they needed to take a more treacherous way of using arms, version of the plan. a lot of pain in the following hours but at the same time a lot of heroic situations. there were 249 people who were martyred. they were all sense of her people, our sons and her children. i cannot describe the agony in my heart. we have 2193 veterans in this event. may god bless them all and help them all.
and the position that were lost on the coup in the first years were taken back one by one. it was taken back, the plotters, and that was a signal that the coup attempt had failed. the bombs kept falling but the people did not take a step back. after third hour, army in the security units, the coup attempt, they suppress the coup attempt before morning. distinguished guests, what i want to draw your attention here is this. we're talking about a 40-year-old organization, and in the last three, four years they had been a conflict with the power. and thousands, tens of thousands who infiltrated in the states, organizations and different parts of the government and state tried to attempt a coup.
and they get forwarded i civilians who went to the streetstreetwith her hands -- s. security forces ordered them to the states and their attempt failed. the next morning at sunrise, people kept on with their lives. there was no interruption, no obstruction to the real-life. and on monday when the markets reopened there was no liquidity problems. there was no crisis in the stock market. people were going to the banks but not to pull their money out. they just wanted to convert their savings into turkish lira to just support their government in case of a crisis in the market. i want to say that this is real power. i didn't want to start my
speech, this has happened to us. rather, i want to say that turkey witnessed an ac active radical terrorism and turkey overcame this with its own internal dynamics. but there's a dangerous organizational structure, and the world should be on alert against this kind of organization and the sort of radicalization. and turkey is not the richest country when it comes to oil reserves. in economics ice it's not the most powerful country in the world, but if you look at competitive advantage that was talked about, turkey's competitive advantage is the struggle against crisis. it's struggle of counterterrorism and it's struggle against migration. turkey for a long time lived 70%
inflation for long years. thus, our nation is very sensitive towards economic operations towards it. our country was once a country that got at least influenced by the 2008-2009 economic crisis and it is inviting pkk for 40 40 years. and when we look at daesh and casey taken the expansion of pkk, it is also been fighting these. migration the came in from syria, it has a policy open doors and is hosted more than 3 million syrians and spent $25 million on these people. on top of all this we witnessed what i just described above on july 15, but in the morning the country woke up. this is real power.
it's not just economic power, but this is a power that was given to it thousands of years, civilization that existed there, and the political wisdom that these men developed here therefore, if we look at counterterrorism as a problem on a global scale, the world could benefit from turkey's experience and the power that it has and it should pay attention to its warnings and follow it's a guidance. turkey has warnings about pkk, pyd, ypg and daesh. it has warnings towards a global world. certainly each country come within its own internal structures and make decisions. however, it she pointed out that this not just turkey's matter.
when we look at the fact that leader speaks turkish at that the city that got bombed on jult mean that this problem just belongs to turkey. this is a problem of radicalization. even if it doesn't have actions of other countries, this organization can be an example for other terror organizations. this is like a sector, and these organizations are related to each other. we should not forget this. we look at the time before jul july 15, the fact that pkk was -- and that just shortly before the members were exchanging intelligence with pkk action, actions, was revealed in our investigations and recorded in the reports. therefore, the world public
opinion should come up with policies to counter the terrorist organizations and radicalization over principles, not of the persons and countries. in conclusion, terror organizations are becoming institutionalized and globalized, and they are trying new synergies and methods. the most intricate and the strategically organized structures, but it is the newest world. it would be a mistake to see this organization as a relief agency, and describe july 15 as a political action and not interpreted as a terror action, and to interpret it a as a struggle for power within the country would be a mistake. it should be noted that this sort of mistake shall cost our next generations to the extent
now, i know we have little time and our commander come we don't want to tie him to much but we want to have a couple questions if you would allow it. we want, most of the questions we prepared what july 15 but you talk about a defense of that and two provided detailed accounts of that evening, and you will witness of the events. if you look at the time following july 15, if we get the evaluations around the world after july 15, if we talk about this, the investigation that took part and a cleansing that happened, there were questions about how much that affected the forces. what would you like to say about that? [speaking in native tongue] >> translator: i would like to thank you providing me with this opportunity, truly this is not
just a problem for my own country, but it is actually the problem for the world. and i had a chance to say a few words about this, an opportunity for me. i want to thank you. if you look at july 15, the evening, and after having experienced that, people thought it would be chaos in our country. are allies and friends thought much. but that didn't happen. the forces under my command naturally up till today have been 4000 people have been thrown out. however, if we look at, it you can follow it, our struggle with terrorism, the gendarmerie forces or the police and military forces, they have the
most successful here of the forty-year struggle. and naturally our offices, we lost about 25 25% of it and we d to replace them as fast as we can. however, our heroes of our country, our heroic children will work harder, how relative relatively, and -- heroically, they will do better than the people we have lost in a country where we are fighting terrorism. they are really taking, fighting very big success of your so we can say that capacity has gotten better? absolutely. i want to say there's, numerically, we have lost capacity, but people who are full of faith, they are turning
this loss into success. our second question is about pkk. at this point is a struggle with pkk, what is its position in relation to this? there had been big successes, you have sadly, but the continuous operations, would you like to see something about this? >> of course i can't just been fighting the pkk for 40 years. the pkk is recognized as a terror organization at the u.n., at the eu, and that's by our american friends, but the last couple of years this, there's been talk about and we take them out of the terrorism list, and it saddens us.
pkk terror organization, if we look at our struggle against it today, is part of our forty-year struggle and this is been the most successful year of it. for many, many years, as someone who's a number of the turkish military he would been part of the struggle for years, this year in our military operations we actually a big success during the winter. every year pkk actually prepares for the next spring and the summer actions. they have a preparatory planning time and is what happened with them. but this year for the first time during the winter we actually, had a very successful action. it was a difficult situation. for the 15 and 20 member sages a
walk around together in this organization, in their current structure there were only three or four members who can wander around. if we look at the organizations right now, there is no violent action that they can take your they had some ieds orlando find the place and places, or they want a tank, military vehicles and suicide bombs. but if you look at the parts of these and look at the spring up till today, there are no big actions they can take. last question from me, just as security end, the military is a big topic after july 15, if we look at the gendarmerie,, actually got connected to the interior ministry, and how is it going to affect the security sector in turkey after that? [speaking in native tongue]
>> translator: i want to break something. gendarmerie is was been part of the interior ministry. however, when a look at this conflict with terrorism, if over the years the army started acting like a part of the military, and acting in an open after july 15, gendarmerie got completely connected to mitch of the interior, and this has been comcan we see the positive effes of this, all of our people can see the positive effects of this. we called the gendarmerie school and we started and coastal security. train has begun and modern education that will be followed in the next two years come we will see good people who will struggle on behalf of the country and will be trained there. it's 1 p.m. today i think i would have to be the bad cop about tommy today,
>> taking a lunch break in this discussion on turkey and then a final panel on security in foreign-policy. since last year to try to attempt in turkey. this mornings panel also available if you missed them online, go to c-span.org to watch them anytime. reuters reports austria said today it at bard a turkish minister from attending an event in the country to mark the anniversary of last years failed coup. austrian foreign minister saint they did not want the heated atmosphere that exists in turkey after the coup and the ways of purges that follow to take place in austria. calling it a danger for public order and security. you can read more online at reuters.com. >> and this week on "the communicators" we'r were pleaseo have with us the pde