tv 2016 Coup Attempt in Turkey Panel 1 CSPAN July 11, 2017 8:34am-10:01am EDT
wealth, the corruption, could get you in so much trouble. >> saudi arabian women's rights activist talks about her time in prison after challenging the saudi governments ban on women drivers in her book, daring to dry. >> we want to change this by this movement and the movement is going on, never stop. we are still campaigning for the right to drive. for us the right to drive is more an act of civil disobedience because women it's not supposed to drive. we show that we are able, we are capable of driving and being and a driver seat in her own destiny by doing this act of civil disobedience. >> sunday night at eight eastern on c-span's q&a.
>> that seta foundation for political, economic and social research hosted a discussion in washington on the 2015 failed coup attempt in turkey focusing on the causes and lasting geopolitical consequences. it's 90 minutes. >> good morning, everyone. distinguished guests, friends and colleagues, welcome. my name is kadir, i'm the executive director of the seta foundation at washington, d.c.. we would like to welcome you all on behalf of of our institution. thank you for joining us today and this important conference at the anniversary of july 15 coup attempt. this conference will debate a subject that continues to define turkey's domestic and foreign policy in significant ways. the last years coup attempt
exposed extent to which the followers of gulen would go to grab power at the expense of popular will. the attempt made it clear for turkey that this organization was no longer a movement with networks within the state bureaucracy, but had not applied terror as a means to achieve its goals by even attacking its own people. and turkey continues to fight against this unique challenge called -- and the country domestic and foreign policy continue to be defined by this challenge in multiple ways. today, we will be fortunate, and it will be a unique opportunity to hear from general guler who is among us right now in the audience. he is of the commander of the forces in turkey, and i'll get a chance to talk about them more before his speech, but he was an
eyewitness to the unfolding coup attempt. he was one of the people at the highest level at the time. we would like to welcome general guler and appreciate his teams effort to make it available for this meeting in washington, d.c.. we do recognize that it wasn't easy. and i think it will be a unique opportunity to hear a first-hand account of what happened that night, on that fateful day. we will have two panels with very highly qualified experts and distinguished speakers who will discuss the implications of the failed coup attempt. the first panel will be focused on the coups in turkey, the history of the coups and july 15 coup attempt, and we will proceed to the keynote by general guler, and then the second panel will talk about the security and foreign policy
implications of the july 15 coup attempt. i would like to welcome you all again, and i want to particularly thank our seta foundation washington team, and my colleague, research director, without his help this wouldn't have been possible, his efforts, are very much appreciated, and our research assistant leslie, and jackson. i would like to thank them all as well. without further ado i would like us to invite the first panel speakers. thank you very much for coming. [applause] [inaudible conversations]
>> thank you very much for coming today, and we will start our first panel, the first panel will be on the transit in turkey and specific on july 15 coup attempt. and we are for really qualified an expert speakers on the issue of the coups and the last coup attempt. and i will not spend time with the introduction because they are well known so we will start the panel immediately. i will not waste any time at this point. we will start with professor hakan yavuz, and he is preparing a book action on the july 15 coup attempt which will be published by utah university press probably in the fall, right? and we will ask his perspective on the july 15 coup attempt and then we will continue with other
panelists. please. >> tanks, kadir. what i would like to discuss today is for different competing and conflicting perspectives about the coup in turkey. there are four different competing perspectives. one, let me summarize these perspectives and then i want to examine each perspective and provide my own interpretation, because most of my work, what i did since my phd dissertation is very much islamic movements in turkey, especially gulen movement, and i will try to examine, also bring the perspective of gulen movement and its evolution, its networks and its role in the coup.
these four perspectives, one perspective claims that the gulen himself organized, carried out the coup to his cyclical networks both in the police force and also within the military as well. the second perspective, the first one is very much accepted by and debated, not debated but very much presented by the current government in turkey. the second perspective argues that the coup was carried out by a coalition of faction within the military. and with thin the second perspective there are two views, first argues that yes, it was an action of coalition of groups within the military, but the gulenists was the glue. they organized, they brought these different groups together
to carry out the coup. the second perspective very much promoted by -- later he changed his view little but in his book about 15 july, still you will see he debates about the coalition of the groups within the military which carries out the coup. but he also argues that the gulenists were critical in their formation of this coalition. the second promoted by a military analyst, retired military person, he argues that the coup was carried out by action coalition of groups within the military. gulenists did not play that prominent role. you had the kemalists and
nationalists, some opportunists, including the gulenists, but what brought these factions together within the military was they were anti-or erdogan feeling. that was the glue which kept this coalition of forces together. the third perspective argues that the coup while again within the third perspective you have two arguments. one argues that the coup was staged by the court president erdogan. this is the argument promoted in his interviews. he argues that this was staged, this was organized by erdogan himself, and they compared the coup to german, the fire of the german parliament of 1933 that hitler, according to some historians, carried out the fire
in 1933 in order to suspend the german constitution and also violate the basic human rights. and within the same group they argue that yes, something like the german parliament fire happened, but it only provided opportunity for the current government, erdogan, to expand his powers. the fire was not organized by erdogan himself. so these are the two somewhat competing but similar argument within the third perspective. the fourth perspective promoted by -- the current opposition leader of turkey, he argues that the coup is a controlled coup and he also has an off add -- op-ed in yesterday "new york times" b that he was very clear
that the coup is carried about the gulenists within a military, but he says both the intelligence and military with information and the support of the government, they try to control the coup and also use this coup to expand their power. so these are four different perspectives about the coup. now i want to move to the second part of my talk and try to examine each perspective in terms of the pros and cons on the basis of the evidence, and let you decide. because this is still an ongoing debate what is happening in turkey. still we don't have facts yet. i think will take some time, at least five, six you to find out what really happened. now, as far as the first perspective is concerned that
the gulen organized, carried out the coup, i would argue that by knowing the networks and the goal and evolution of the gulen movement, it is more plausible argument, it is more likely that the gulen was aware. because of what took place within the military. there are several reasons for this. one, the gulen networks very much, there are three stages of the gulen movement. first, what i call the period of -- second, 1970-1993 under the death of former president. the second stage is, i call it the movement becomes much more
public network and social activities. it moved from being a religious entity to more or less a religious economic and physical activity, it became more clear with the death of the former president because critical after all, turkey had a weak government and that we could government provided opportunity for the gulen and is networks to penetrate the police force. the police force especially the police academy, i would say, are critical in the power of the gulen movement, and that penetration into police force started with the government when -- was the ministry of interior, when the gulenists took control
of the police academy. when the police academy in ankara became the operational center of the gulen movement, it became much clearer in 2002, and i would say more or less allowed the gulenists to run the government. the minister of interior, minister of education, ministry of justice. it put a coalition between the gulenist movement and our party because i party didn't have that trained bureaucracy or the manpower so they more or less relied on the gulenist movement. so the police academy is critical because by definition the job of the police is criminal activity. so the gulenist movement where, by controlling the police academy, it penetrated into the police academy but the police academy also penetrated into the gulen movement.
so you had a mutual penetration, and i would sit and that mutual penetratiopenetration the mentae police activity, of police work, very much dominated the gulen movement. and in 2002 i would say especially between 2002-2004, entire police force more or less controlled by the gulenists networks. so the third time of this gulen is i call it the period of -- or it became more or less business, political, criminal network. that transformation starts with the coalition with the party, fortunately. these all the reality we need to confront and face. what i would say the gulen movement went through three
major transformations. the last stage more or less shaped by this close ties. so after 2002 the gulen movement came to conclusion that it is more powerful than our party and in 2011 election, the gulenists, they wanted 10000 seats in the parliament. that was not, that was rejected by erdogan, and i would say that was a reason this conflict and confrontation between the two groups, the gulenists on the one hand, our party on your other hand, that the gulenists had too much to lose in this competition, but they were also somewhat confident that they would win this confrontation against the government. i would argue that given the
transformation of the movement, given in 2000, after 2007 crisis, the gulenist became much more powerful. in 2010 constitutional referendum, the gulenists totally controlled the justice system in turkey. it was totally in their own hands and they used the police force and justice to carry out their network, and within the military with the support. so we have the section of the military and the construction of military to the court cases i would say very much carried out with the police and the judiciary with the help of our fighters. so we really a sad unfortunate development and situation in turkey. so there's one thing about this
coup i do not consider this coup, the july coup military coup. it is a civilian coup. it is a civilian coup carried out, organized by the imams or the gulenists imams, and they use the military to implement what they wanted. so it's a civilian coup carried out, organized by the imams, carried out by the military. and this is one of the reasons i would say why coup failed. because if you compare the previous coups in turkey, always a was organized, carried out by military. there was no civilian intervention, but in this case, in the case of -- happened to be the key and critical imam, he's now disappeared, and that windows he is, but he and a
number of other civilian imams played an important role. there is no single military imam this is something very important. all the imams are graduate of divinity schools in turkey. and because there is -- the gulenist movement i would say it's very different than rest of the islamic movement in turkey, that in the contemporary turkey, if you take it from the 19th century to present, there are three waves, this is just a footnote to my argument, you have a movement, which is very different. second, you had another movement.
again, inside are the kurds but they were very loyal to ottoman empire he was very loyal to turkish republic. and then the third religious movement, the third wave of islamism is a gulen movement. very different. less islam, it is more about the powers, less piety, more control. the gulen movement also represents the success of kemalism in turkey. this is another contradiction we need to unpack. now, i have five minutes. let me move very fast to move to the second argument that is the work of correlation posters. i was a the second argument doesn't make sense because the gulenists would never trust
kemalists or nationalists to even organize something such imports. because one of the key terms in the gulen movement is -- in turkey means caution or to be very careful, and the gulenists would never sit together with the kemalists officers to discuss organize, or the nationalists, such a critical thing. i think it doesn't, both the argument do not make much sense by knowing how the gulenists networks function. but there are some generals, i think, are a number of other people, they didn't know what to do. i would never consider them as a gulenist of what i know and what i read of his background is very much a social democrat oriented
general. and so you do have a number of people who are into because they didn't know what to do at that moment of the critical time. so i'm hoping that eventually this will become clear. now, when you go to the third argument about that this is something like german fire of the german parliament of 1933, i would say this coup was not organized by erdogan, because there was no reason for erdogan to organize the coup, to expand his power because erdogan is very much in control of the parliament, the local power as well. so to risk he himself run away from an assassination attempt, the coup is very much attempted to kill him. but there was the second part of the argument that this coup was used by the government to get rid of the opposition, there is a ground for that unfortunately
today in turkey what we are seeing that some people are using this environment to silence the opposition. i think this is not very healthy for turkish democracy or turkey at all. now, the third argument, the first part doesn't make much sense. we analyzed it in the book in more detail, but the second part, the exploitation or using the coup more or less i would say it makes sense, unfortunately. now, when we look at the fourth argument, controlled coup which is more divided opposition leader, i would say that argument also doesn't make sense. because to control something i would say it is not a controlled coup. it is of the contrary.
is lots of control. the military new around 5 p.m., the turkey intelligence was aware of the coup around 3 p.m. both of them couldn't do anything. it also shows the weakness and inept situation of the political institutions in the country of turkey that they couldn't do, then lost the control in a way. they could not try to take proper measures to stop the coup, and the controlled coup also required that you would know what will be the next stage, and what we know from the events of the coup, there was no control and everyone was shocked the way in which the events with. to conclude, since i don't have much time, the coup carried out by the civilian, by i would say a decision something like a coup
could only be given by the gulen himself, by knowing how the gulenist networks evolved historically. the gulen is fully aware. this doesn't mean every teacher, every doctor who is a member of the movement in germany or united states was aware of the coup. so we also need to be very careful not to treat the entire movement or a quite and treat all of them as a criminal activity. i think that is one of the mistakes is made by the government as well. but the gulen very much it made the decision. the coup very much carried out by the civilian, the order and planned by the civilian imams, and it was carried out by the gulenists within the military.
and each gulenist in the military, they were very much, each officer at some imam he was working with, and they didn't know each other who is the gulenist as well. also there is an incredible story of the gulen movement, how it worked, in the police force, and the military. there's a lot to be learned, unfortunately, how these networks use both the religion and the modern networks and create such a powerful glue. ..
>> when we were in the committee investigating the attempt and also how it came about, how did they come about, how did they perform and how it came to the day of the attempt and the aftermath, when we were investigating it, we went back to 40 years documented and the navy there's more back in turkish so we see the first report, we see this first report about members and i would definitely not call it an islamic movement, if i were to define it, i would define it as
cult mentality and it's definitely a cult and in order to persuade people to do things, to brainwash them or to blackmail into doing it. any way they do, if they need to look religious, they use religious terminology. if they need to look secular, they use secular terms. anything goes. when we look at their lives we see they're religious people but everything they do is against the rules of the religion so i will definitely not put it together with islamic movement. mafia-type cult movement that utilizing religious terminology to influence people and other -- other methods they use.
and when we look at 1990's, if they are not stopped, they make take over the police reports. one thing that's important and we had a lot of discussion related to this in the committee and a lot of arguments, i may say with members -- distinguished members of the opposition party as well. this does not start with our party but years before and whoever was in power, it doesn't matter whether ideologies match or overlap, they work with them, we see it unfortunately at the end of 1990 during the paperwork period and exhibit period. there's another report prepared in 1999 but the --
[inaudible] >> they need to be stopped in the military as well. so all of these at that time because we have a turkey that has lots of coalition and unfortunately there's no democracy as with the democracy ups and downs, pluses and minuses compared to the democracy we have today. we still have military, every time there's democratic change or move toward democracy, we have the political elite working with the military and they give a signal and then the elected officials take a step back. so we still are overshadowing of the political elite so we cannot call that a turkish democracy
when we come to end of 1990's. woman don't like to tell their ages but i tell people i'm in the tenth anniversary of my 35th birthday. i'm old enough to remember the 1980 military coup and i listen today my parents the first few years of the republic, the challenges they had after the war and the things they suffered through and everything, the process, it went within my family, i see human rights violations and how does it come to the state. so after 2001 we see that there's many different actions in society and we see as part to come out and there's struggle
trying to get rid of the democratic relation process, trying to get rid of military so it existed and that's gradually happened and even when we look at 2007, 2008, we see that our party faces cloture party against them. maybe it's like the third term 2011, that's when they start to get power and like you said, that's when the struggle starts. interestingly any democratic group, if they want to be a part of the democratic system, they're more than twok come and enter the election, political party, compare to the turkey i group up in, there's much more
freedom but now you have a nice group, seems like a nice school, isn't it nice to have schools? they have schools all over the world and then they have people, nice people who speak good english, good foreign languages and they are good commentators, they look humanitarian people and then, when you have these people take orders, not from their superiors in the government or in the military or in the police force, but taking orders from civilians from outside and orders that are ordering them to do illegal things like blackmailing people, like threatening people, like causing them to lose their jobs or causing them, having making them forcing them to close their
businesses, then we have a problem. then there's the struggle, it's not a democratic struggle. it's a power struggle, so the class start during this 17th and 20th period of december. >> 2013. >> 2013. that's discussed a lot, the talking of the trucks that were bringing aid, it was national security services trucks being stopped by military, these things do not add up. when we come to the day of
july 15th, i was there, i wasn't -- i will always regret the fact that i rushed to istanbul until the parliament worked in the morning on july 15th because i went to see my daughter which we only had that weekend, ii went to spend time with her. i wasn't there when i got bombed. imagine having f-16's fly over the capital when the congress, senate is in session and imagine them bombing, imagine u.s. air force uniform, your country's uniform shooting at you, imagine tanks out on the streets, so this is something and my generation remembers vividly.
children the age of my daughter, 20 year's old, they had no idea about something like this could happen, they couldn't have imagine, it's something they could see on the movies, july july 15th coup attempt was the violation of basic human rights, the basic human rights is the right to live of 8 to million citizens or citizens of other nations like the 3 million syrians that we support fiscally within our borders and outside as well and all the people all over the world who are looking up to turkey for humanitarian help or some other forms of supports, so this was one of the biggest attacks any democratic maybe within the modern history has gone under and survived, so what was not -- i'm not a person
who likes gun, i grew up in texas so i know -- i get a feel about it, i have a feel but it's not logical for people who run towards guns and tanks and bombs. it's not logical, but the turkish people and this is something for social scientists to discuss, they redefine the concept of struggling, fighting for democracy, all the previous definitions, i'm sorry there's lots of distinguished academics here, all the proven definitions are no longer valid and i'm saying as a politician, not as a politician but also a student of international relations and political science, so people go to the streets. what happened afterwards?
immediately, unfortunately very disappointingly wonderful, wonderful allies and friends were waiting it out. some of them are the very allies and friends who would immediately travel to turkey when they hear about a rumor of some kinds of human rights violence, violations or some kinds of violence, they would immediately be there, they would be ready to criticize turkey harshly, sometimes maybe rightfully but no, we did not hear anything. and then the aftermath of the coup attempt. it is difficult to understand the numbers may seem big but turkey is not as i mentioned,
80 million population, there are those who want to establish the argument that there's no rule of law but believe me, the rule of law is upheld in turkey and it is not just about gaining more power or punishing the opposition, believe me, i worked with them. we have pretty good opposition in the parliament and outside as well, but no matter what your position is and i will end with this, no matter what your position is, you could be a doctor, you could be a lawyer, you could be a journalist, you could academic and high-level military official or you could be a member of parliament or you could be a door keeper in a building, nobody is above the law and it is not acceptable to
promoteterrorism no matter what the position is. if any of it, if one thousand of it happens in the united states, and i was here in september 11th, those horrible attacks, or if it happened in a european country things would be much worse. in addition to the people that are either suspended or having to go through the court system, there's also a great number of people who are released or reinstated but unfortunately we don't hear about it in the u.s.
media or the european media. we hear about a certain part of the story so i just wanted to tell about about our parts. thank you. >> thank you very much for your patience, presentation and our turk speaker is much known and research fellow. >> thank you, thank you for having me. i would like to speak about two important issues on the iraqi -- turkish forces and how they affected the turkey combat readiness after the coup attempt. there's a big problem of
understanding who carried the military attempt, military part of the coup attempt in turkey, so as pointed out -- [inaudible] >> many people, many opportunist people in turkish army forces, more than coup attempt in july july 2015. of course, there are certain of them but the main body or the driving body of the military coupe for the coupe was the members in the military and so i would like to explain the infiltration in turkish army forces and i think five
dimensions of that. first, those -- that strategy to fix -- [inaudible] >> prior to targeting syria, the first one was the personal status of the turkish armed forces. what i mean, the turkish armed forces personal system on different status, general, officer, nco's, the contracted specialists and the service members. we see that the might bees invested in strategic operation of the status of the personal body of the turkish army forces. those are officers mostly. military high schools until they get promoted to general so for
the federal members. the specialists and military service members they are mostly technical than the technical people so the members did not put too much cost on those people to hire, so the main body of the member just walked on in turkish armed for the officers. people in the room and they know how suffering, to get the commission of being officer in turkey. that's a long run actually. probably mention that i can say, the targeting the command
forces. so there are some military branches, there are some military command forces and there's the military law enforcement branch as well. so in turkey, we see -- operated under interior ministry was targeted to get infiltrated because of the proximity to civilian people. comparing to the other traditional command forces in the society, they are law enforcement military people, so they -- they take the forces and primary target to get
infiltrated it seems so, then we see the air force because of the technical capacity, because of their vulnerable and the attack as well and army and land forces and air forces involved in the coupe attempt because of their unique training unique capacity of carrying special operations. we saw that those special forces soldiers, troops on certain headquarters and just from high-ranking generals, so the third dimension that i can talk
is the key positions that how members walk on the turkish law enforcements. those are the personal directors, intelligence directors at the high level headquarters. then we see the personal assistance for the high-ranking members and the soldiers. they will be important roles in military that members just positions to keep close to the commanding generals and to operate the personal strategy in
turkish armed forces and the intelligence strategy as well. personal keys, general headquarters, there's a director named as the personal management director, under the direct director there's a small branch of that. that branch is responsible for promoting and promoting the generals, sending the military people, appointing and assigning them to the foreign countries, to nato as well. that is a key location for coup attempt and they took, they were able to seize that office. [inaudible] >> he was the -- he received in that office for many years after
he got promoted, he got the status of being a staff officer. if i am not wrong that's since 2003, he was in that position as a major historian and he was right over there as a general. that's incredible. he got so dominant directing and giving some political recommendation to the high-ranking generals. and the intelligence directors as well that start from the battalion level all the way to force command headquarters. those two directors were
captured, seized by the federal members and the federal policy was directed through intelligence and personnel strategy. the fourth dimension that i can point out is just make staging during the cycle of military personnel. that start -- that start from preschool goes together with military school term and during active duty and then the postservice is important for service members and in school, high level of motivation and
those people just motivated to get into military schools at their age of 13, 14 before the high school. and they got trained, they got tutored in the houses as well. and during their military school, they kept their motivation visiting some certain settle self, what i call, in the vicinity of their military high schools are located. during the active period, the settlement and the common protection and then it becomes retirement and resignation and other related motivated discharged people, settled
people who got discharged from the military. so this is interesting. the other dimension is infiltration until yet, indeed, a capacity of operation, so that's studying the forces, that is just before 1980's. and survival phase that's between 1980 and year 2000. the mass infiltration starts in the middle of 1980's and those generals who took place -- who got involved in the military coup in july 15th were mostly at the rank of generals, that means they got in the military schools in mid-1980's.
the person i mention and is one of them as well. then settlers expanding. that's right after 2000, 2000 and 2008. we saw a lot of people discharged from the military service because of the potential opposition for the federal members. i remember doing -- i remember between 2004 and 2008 more than 500 special forces, soldiers got regular army units. that's a big number comparing
the whole body of the turkish special forces. and then you see the activities of federal members -- [inaudible] >> in such cases an instrument for purging those people. so that was a strategy, but that was the coup in itself, preemptive military action because the members were not able to reach their operational capacity to carry a full-scale in turkey. so that was their strategy. that's why i'm calling it preemptive. and the final thing that i would
like to put some notes on, how this affected the turkish combat readiness. definitely that harmed the turkish military for sure. however, the discharges of -- discharge of the members from the turkish army forces despite against them. since july, it's almost 2000 members got killed. that's an incredible number. of course, there are some casualties. but the impact of the operation are important, ptk members, are operating in small tactual elements, not organized in big numbers, so forcing them to act
highly in the mountainous regions. of course, they are still out there but the intelligence supremacy helped the turkish forces to carry effective operations and then the turkish military and security operations, security forces got operational elective supremacy, now there's a missing part here and that completes the fight against terrorism. that's the public diplomacy. so that's not just only a military term, that should be carried together with the civilian institution law. >> thank you very much. ..
we see that well-organized kemalists or nationalists establishment. these were the people who did try to attempt. they had motivation. of course this did not make, not legitimized. but they had a motivation. motivation most of the time to protect the state from those people most of the time, they were civilians, politicians, from those politicians who they thought are not acting for the
interest of the state. and ideologists or ideology, for example, they had, plotters had the idea how state should be done. for example, in some attempts they were claiming that they were protecting state against rising -- [inaudible] and for some time they were claiming that they were protecting the state against radical leftists are against terror, or they were blaming politicians for political instability. as i said this does not make with the good legitimate, but the show was they had some sort of roots in society. some people in the turkish society supported those trying to attempts because they had certain connection with indeed
one of those ideologies. they look at the patterns of former military threat in turkey or groups, what you see that they were, military was successful in taking control of the country. and after taking control of the country, they fix what they thought was networking properly, and then they claim they restore order and then they return. so military rule after trying to attempt in turkey -- coup attempt in turkey -- [inaudible] as i said, those former military
coups were against politicians rather than being against ordinary people in the streets. but when you look at the last coup attempt of july 15, what we see is that, first of all, there is not an ideology in that sense. we had a criminal group, what we call now a terrorist group, but they did not have a certain ideology. for example, i mean those ideological streets in turkey, for example, we cannot say they are leftist or we cannot say that they are nationalist or kemalists, or weise cannot say they are islamists. so when that since they did not have a certain ideology. but their motive was they had and will to power, a desire to power. the only wanted to corrupt the power. they targeted ordinary people the target of july 15 coup attempt was ordinary people. not only in the sense that they
killed ordinary people in the night of july 15, but also in the sense that they rejected the right to exist without being a member. in their imaginary society, every single individual should be, should share the ideas. they do not have any space for different groups. so for example, for islamist or nationalists or for kemalists. and how can i say this? if this coup attempt was successful turkey will not be a better place for any of these groups. it will not be a better place, for example, for a -- supported. or it will not be a better place for a kemalists or it will not
be a better place for a nationalist. it will only be a better place -- and what i say more is that for some members, the members of this community, this criminal community, terror organization, were not one of those members, one of those. turkey will also not be better place for those people. should i continue? >> yes. for more minutes. >> i know that, i know that something difficult to understand for an outsider. because, you know, we are talking about the secret organization as other speakers said, the infiltrated and stayed for 40 years. what was the opportunity?
if i lastly answer this question, i can say that radical secular policies in turkey, agree to the structure for these members. once, for example, blaming his religious activities, religious identity is a predominant pattern in turkey over the last few years. they take a sharp stance against a critical stance against all of these expressions of political identity. also utilize this case. they claims to ordinary turkish people, they claimed themselves to be one of those religious groups that turke turkey society supported. and they take the support of ordinary people.
number one advantage into their taking the state and also taking the support of ordinary peoples. let me stop here, then i will continue later. >> thank you very much. thank you for all of the panelists whether presentations and initial remarks. i happen to abuse my right to moderate the panel and ask a lot of questions to panelists, but considering the number of participants today, i decided to open the floor to the questions, and have several questions. then if i may add a few more still using my privilege. you can start. can we move the mic? yes. >> thank you very much for a very good and informative panel. i have a couple of quick questions for the professor. you helped us understand
basically that different narratives about who was involved but it doesn't exactly address the issue of why 2016? 2016? why was there an attempt by all of these potential forces that sort of either acted individually or collectively to push for this kind of change via military coup? why 2016 and why not 2015, for instance? 4014? the second question is there's no escaping the fact that the gulen movement wasn't an ally of the akp until 2013 and, therefore, labeling at now as a terrorist organization, doesn't help us understand that kind of influence that they had in turkish society and also the
alliances that had with the akp until then. this is a question that needs to be answered come not necessarily by say the criminal, engage in criminal activity. >> we need to understand the politics that brought this alliance between the akp and the gulen policy, the gulen movement. and then of course the parting of ways. thank you. >> we can have another question by the gentleman. >> thank you very much. yes, it was very informative presentation. there were many occasions when one of the panelists use the term -- [inaudible] i wonder come when was that term first used into invented it? >> thank you. >> well, i think that, i would
consider the gulen movement as islamic movement. because there's no one islam. there are diversity of islam's come and the gulen movement if you look at the original movement, and reason why our party allied with the glut of why the gulen supported our party, because of that shared identity of islam. so we cannot ignore the role of islam between these two actors to understand the relationship between the two pics of this is one of the issue that islam, but there's no one islam. as you know there's islam of -- [inaudible]
so just like christianity, i'm coming from utah, even in the utah, the more mature just 20 different versions. so given the islam, the history, the context of thousands of different interpretation, so the gulen movement also very much shaped by certain tradition of islam. because they are in the tradition issues needs to be examined as one. now, when we look at what happened in 1970, and actually the issue started in 2011 between our party and the gulen movement. because of the gulen movement come after the constitutional referendum in 2010, the gulenists were really mobilized and they got what they wanted in terms of the hegemony by training the constitution.
they became a dominant force in the judiciary. and they come to the conclusion that now we control the turkey so we can get erdogan to do whatever we want. in 2011 election they wanted 100 seats in the parliament, and erdogan said no. i think that was the beginning of the struggle. then the president relies at the gulenists are trying to abstract some of his open policies toward the kurds for further democratization of this country so the gulen to try to stop him. then there was a struggle in the bureaucracy. let me tell you something. the gulenist movement, they really did know what to control any political party. yes the gulenists started the relationship with -- [inaudible]
but the gulenists, they did not want to control any party. i wanted to control the state institutions and bureaucracy, and they succeeded in doing that because of the rich political party structure in turkey, especially after the death of the former president, there was a period of instability can weaken government in turkey that provide an opportunity for the gulenists. so the struggle start in 2011-2012. the gulenists wanted to pressure the government to the court case against -- the current turkish military leader of intelligence. then erdogan return i wanted to close at their schools. some of their -- [inaudible] >> yes. >> university preparation cour course. >> private university preparation schools, and it was
the main source of income for the gulenists. then in 2013 there was a corruption probe or gulenist judges tried to put the government in a difficult in 2013. and i think the confrontation took a different form after 2013. why 2017? because there was a military high council, usually it meets once a year to decide a promotion. so it became very clear in the newspapers start to cover the stories about the gulenist networks and the military, that the military high council is going to plan these programs from the army. so they were already cleansed from the judicial police force of the military was there last place. now, they were about to be
cleansed from there, too, and they just used their last bullet against erdogan to stop this process of cleansing gulenist from the military. >> do you want to add anything? >> there was a question about -- when was that term coined? i would like to give the credit but this was used before the coup attempt as well but i cannot remember who used it for the first time. but especially after the coup attempt it was used. but a couple of things to add. yes, again, i mean, i beg to differ on the argument that this was an islamic moment. yes, there are different ways to practice their religion, but the thing about gulenists was at this. to get to the end, at that doesn't fit with the basic principle of islam, to get to the end you can use any means.
that could be, you know, don't think -- to doing things that are not legal in the technical, political, secular term. so anything could go. and when does the first struggle maybe start in addition to what professor yavus said? it's when they started to do illegal activities. that was when the first struggle started. because in order to have power, they didn't care about who was in power as long as they had faith. but now there was a more democratized turkey, and there was government in power that wasn't going to do anything they were asked to do. they were there to represent the
people and do what they asked of them to do. so that's when the clashes started actually, i was part of may be the reason that the coup attempt took place when it did because we passed the laws in the parliament and we were done early, and the higher council would be meeting earlier that it was expected. so it related with the schedule of the parliament as well. >> thank you. i will have another question, and then we have to finish sharp at 12. >> thank you very much. a very interesting discussion. you talked about democracy, particularly you talk about the democratic institutions. in this country, for example, we have a president who is attacked directly to the media this country calling the media the enemy of the people.
in turkey, for a number of years you had the arrest of journalists. you had government i think workaholics of mr. erdogan taking over the media, various places. arrested media editors of newspapers and so on. could you tell us a little bit what seems to be the current situation? what's happened to democracy? what happened to freedom of speech post try to? i think before the tragic you at similar situation but now you have what seems to be accusations of illegal activities that journalists are doing. would you comment on that a little bit? and thank you. >> yes, as far, of course there is a different discussion here in the united states. we have a different one in turkey. i did kind of get into it a
little bit and, of course, i'm not a philosopher saw not going to that discussion. but there are limits to freedom. it would not be acceptable anywhere in the world to promote, if you'r if you are juf you're a politician, if you're an artist, no matter what your career is, nobody could say something like they support daesh, isis, right? with that be considered a part of of speech? no, it would not. when you look at the cases of the journalism, journalists, and i tried to follow them closely, whatever information is available to the public, they are not above the law. as i mentioned at the beginning, this is not related with journalistic activities, but this is really to terrorist activities. and, of course, there's this perspective as well.
production of knowledge is something interesting. what is terrorism? turkey, for instance, is dealing with terrorism. we gave a huge exam, passed as you descend by losing 250 lives and 2194 people got wounded, and we deal with pkk terrorism, pkk into wrestling is a terrorist organization by the united states, by the european union. yes, they are able to protest in most eu countries where turkish politicians are not allowed to speak to the turkish citizens, like germany and the netherlan netherlands. and we are dealing with daesh, isis terrorism at many levels. so what is the definition of terrorist, according to be now? i think anybody in the world
would agree that isis, daesh is a terrorist organization. but when it comes to the asia pkk, interesting, we live with them in turkey. they kill turkish citizens. most of them are of kurdish descent although the argument fighting for kurdish rights. and i have grown up with pkk being a horrible terrorist organization. my life. and still they get support internationally, medical or otherwise. i think it's a very great big discussion, but as far as the journalists are concerned, no, they are not there for writing articles against the government or other activities. but it is the courts to decide. i mean, i keep hearing that erdogan arrests people. okay, we are all intelligent people. president trump, the matter what he says, does he have the
authority to go physically arrest people? so believe me, we do have the rule of law in turkey. that is why we still have the court case is going on. the people that you have absolute perfect evidence, it's obvious that they had killed innocent people out on the streets, they are being tried in turkish courts with the families of the victims watching. so i just wanted to ensure that the rule of law is intact. >> there are so many questions but apology that have to be realistic on time. so i will give half minute for each participant, panelist to final remarks come and we have to start the keynote immediately after. >> what i can tell -- >> and one more thing, they keep panelist came all the way from turkey, and the fourth panelist
is on the top. so they come all the way and they will be here all day long, so if you have any questions they will probably accommodate and enjoy entertaining your questions. >> what i can tell about the consequences of the attempt regarding the transmission of society and the security circle as well. daesh, the turkish military and the turkish society now claims democratic values more than it used to be. so this is the most important consequence of the coup attempt. so yes, there will be construction, reconstruction of the security, that will definitely take some time but
what the people, what the soldiers, the military and the security circles are expecting, that should be run on a merit system. >> thank you. >> i just want to say something about these concerns about democracy or freedom of speech in turkey. it's good to see that we have some friends that have concerns about democracy in turkey. but this image in u.s. media, i can definitely say is not -- is one example. a few days ago the leader of the main opposition party just made his march from capital ankara istanbul. he walked all the way with hundreds of people and last summer he organized public the most participation of millions
of citizens as they claimed it. the police officers, the police forces assisted them all the way to protect them against provocations or any terrorist attack. so yes, you may have some concerns about the democracy in turkey, that's good. we have friends that have some concerns about our country, but this image is not totally true. thank you. >> i think this might,. [inaudible] i do make, do need to make a point about professional knowledge. -- production of dollars but we see a lot of production of knowledge. that presents turkey, our party and president erdogan as evil enemy. so i find that very disappointing that, especially going back to the example of
europe. do you know that our family and social affairs minister wasn't allowed to speak in the netherlands, and she wasn't allowed to go into the turkish embassy. that come as a woman minister, she was physically, this is against diplomatic etiquette. this is against international law. as a woman minister she was physically, physically removed and taken into custody, held until the morning until she was sent back to turkey. what happened to women's rights? delta, doesn't a turkish minister deserve? it was three days after international women's day. so please, let's look at the production, check our sources. >> thank you. >> well, i think, unfortunately, we have a problem of freedom of speech in turkey. unfortunately, freedom of media
is also limited in the country, but we have to understand why this isn't the case. but i don't think anything would justify limiting freedom of speech. i think bad medium could clean up the good, good media can challenge the bad media. i am totally in favor of freedom of speech and, unfortunately, we do have a big problem there. and turkey doesn't deserve this image outside as well. i do believe that, i am hoping that this is not going to be a permanent, that it will be a temporary but there's also a larger problem. i don't agree, that is dehumanization of turkey, and especially president erdogan. i think it took very rigid form that some of the people cannot analyze turkey properly because demonize anti-ideological attitude towards erdogan.
and behind those anti-erdogan, anti-turkey mood i see in the liberal media that is i would say orientalists, islamophobic, turkey phobic also plays a role but by saying this we also as turks need to question ourselves. yes, we have a major freedom of speech issue in the country, and this is, i am again hoping that this is not going to be a permanent and i think turkey is a major crisis right now. turkey did have crisis in the past as well. turkey usually models through and i'm hoping that this time, too, we will overcome this with the support of the domestic forces inside the country, also some extra support from outside as well. >> thank you very much. thank you to the panelists. [applause] >> we will have a five-minute
break before setting the stage for the keynote. [inaudible conversations] >> sunday on q&a -- >> in the country and absolute monarchy, speaking about the distribution of wealth, about the corruption could did you and joe, can put you in so much trouble. >> saudi arabia women's rights activist talks about her time in prison after challenging the saudi governments ban on women drivers in her book daring to drive. ..