tv CSIS Discussion on U.S. and China Relations CSPAN July 21, 2017 4:13pm-6:52pm EDT
at eastern on c-span2, c-span .org or listen on the free c-span radio app. >> our live coverage of the commissioning of the uss gerald r ford is saturday at 10:00 a.m. eastern. the super carrier named after our 38th president is the navy's newest nuclear power high-tech area carrier. president trump will attend the ceremony at the naval base in northern virginia and deliver remarks for more than 14000 people expected to attend. saturday at 10:00 a.m. eastern on c-span in c-span .org and listen live at the free c-span radio app. spin under. >> a panel discussion was hosted on the domestic military and economic policies impacting us china relations. panelist shared research from both the american and chinese
perspective on the north korean policies, asian-pacific securi security. >> thank you very much. i am mike green senior vice president for asia and professor at georgetown. we had five issue papers with others for each paper on each subject from the us and china. we split the panels up so that this panel will address the papers on us and chinese strategy in the asian-pacific region and also us china military issues. the next panel cover economics, global issues and politics. scott kennedy will try that session. we had a number of participants who helped write the papers or
who joined us in study groups to review the papers and this is a representative group with everyone involved in the key authors we will address in the panels. buddy glaser, senior advisor and director of our china project will talk about the asia-pacific papers and we will ask the panelists not to summarize the papers which identify between the american issues of convergence, divergence and some recommendations. my friend from the university will present on the asian-pacific strategy after bonnie and then will ship to the military relationship, david finkelstein. [inaudible] in the areas of convergence will
be discussed and what we identified and analyzed in military sears. as doctor henry said, we endeavored to make these papers were based on the us national interest and us national strategy on our side and on the chinese national and are stressed and we did these in consultation that on the asian-pacific picture bonnie and i talked about how we might structured the paper and what we try to address but we were very clear about several things we had no veto over the other side, it had to be an honest and forthright explanation of interest and strategy from that country's perspective. we informed and talked to our government but the us government and chinese government did not review or approve these papers in their independent.
we are all independent scholars and what we presented is not us or chinese government policy but we think it represents a pretty good consensus point about how these issues are viewed in this country. of course there are multiple views about military affairs, global issues, north korea in both china and the united states but for each of these we had three authors on the american side, three authors on the chinese side and a group of somewhere between six-15 other experts who weighed in and on the asian-pacific paper for example, i think this is true on our side for the military, there was an awful lot of consensus from experts hailing from think tanks across the ideological and functional spectrum. it was quite interesting.
between the us and chinese papers there wears a common theme. one was that we should strive to avoid becoming adversaries and that was consistent between both sites. there was a theme in all the papers that we should seek out and try to build powers of operation where we can and asian-pacific issues. many of the papers included that the united states and china need a substantive, honest and strategic dialogue for each side doesn't cover up its fundamental interests or concerns and presents those and goes from there to see what can be done. there are obvious strategic and structural differences the commodities papers. these are not differences that can be solved with a different six character labor on the label or a tweet or whatever you
choose. they are fundamental and structural. they are historic. we spent time on the history of these issues for countries. for example, there are between the two papers on the asian-pacific some different assumptions about the future orientation of the korean peninsula. not just disagreement on tactics but fundamental and how we respectively review korean and where it's going in the longer term. there are fundamental differences in terms of the south china sea or the first island chain that encompasses japan and taiwan in the philippines. about what it means to have influence, control, the nile this is not a small issue. there were differences about how strong american alliance should be. very basic differences, not so
much about the validity of alliances but how strong should the alliances in asia be. there were differences about what china should be doing to assert its sovereignty, not challenges over sovereignty but what china should be able to do to assert its sovereignty and what is destabilizing and what is not. there were big differences on both sides and we'll talk more about what constitutes a reasonable defense capabilities. i don't think either side drew that yardstick exactly the same. there were differences about how we should think about the future structure or order of east asia. there was more enthusiasm on the chinese side about the bipolar us china arrangement, condominium to manager manage and there was much less enthusiasm on the us side but even within the two sides there was some debate and disagreement. i will let my colleagues tell you more detail on these areas and conclude for now by saying
when you read the papers, i think, you'll find that these are papers that stand the test of time. they are not based on today's or tomorrow's news about the north korea problem or the we can talk about that. in some ways they may be a useful model about what the strategic dialogue would look like and how we should address each sides the mental interest and try to find ways to minimize complications but be realistic about fundamental interest is a trained interest we've unearthed. alternate over to bonnie. let me quickly add we printed out as many papers as we thought we would have audience and this is being fourth of july weekend and we were short about 50% short. so, this is online as well so you can get it online and check it out in chinese and in english, i think. with that, bonnie, thank you. >> thanks, mike.
this is a very interesting project and i would urge you all to read these papers very carefully. it's a privilege to be part of this. we have a very short period of time so i'm going to hit on some highlights and if there is time for q&a we will go into greater detail. first, some of the convergences and divergences. both of these papers on asian-pacific security say that there is a need for a rules -based order so, that is a good start. we should have rules but, of course, there are differences over not only what those roles should be but whether or not the international community is likely to allow even welcome and sign the participation in the process of shaping the rules. so, the us paper is quite clear on that score. it says that america is not calling on china to simply sign
on to the rules that have been written in the past but understands that the international community will draw the rules of together and try to join in the process. the chinese paper is very skeptical of the us willingness to do that. it says who's rules are these, how can these rules be defined in light of the changing situation, et cetera. a lot of suspicion and you find out the chinese paper in the asian-pacific security that there is a lot of skepticism about us willingness to include china, even though i would -underscore that the current administration prior administration of welcome china to be a responsible stakeholder in this rules -based order and that goes back to the george w. bush administration who coined that phrase. secondly, as regional security architecture and alliances and the chinese paper very much contends that the us alliance system is increasingly targeted china and it calls for the
united states to give up that attempt to build this anti- china coalition. it states that china favors an open and inclusive security system rather than an alliance pay system but says china can tolerate the alliances as long as they are not targeted at china. a little bit of ambiguity there so that ultimately alliances can be a part of the system but the bottom line is that the us lied alliance system can coexist with increasingly influential china in the region if the us gives up that effort. now, for the us, this paper doesn't betray in any way the alliances is aimed at china -- it talks about the allies as the basis of our regional position, it list lifts threat the allians are trying to deal with, such as, north korea's emergence in nuclear capabilities and
terrorism and maritime complex. when i was at the rollout in may in china the chinese version of this madam talked about the concern. i think this is a difference of the us and the chinese have but whether or not the alliances should be targeted rules -based order going forward. third, both identify areas of concern for the much the same as you would expect. yet north korea, taiwan, maritime issues and north korea i think the us paper claims that china doesn't recognize the new level of threat posed by the kim jong-un regime and as i said here today, events have transpired in the last couple of days and months really provide evidence of that. the united states is, i think, incredibly concerned about the launch of an icbm by north
korea. we are very upset about how us citizens are being treated and of course the most recent being the very tragic death of auto. i think the chinese recognize the danger but insist that it can't be addressed to sanctions alone and that diplomacy is needed. i do sense a gap between the two countries in terms of their assessment of the urgency. the us paper has some interesting policy regulations calling for not only more dialogue but very specifically aunt like noncombatant evacuation, interdiction of north korea's weapons proliferation, closing loopholes in the us and d sanctions and the chinese paper honestly doesn't have any of these, very specific issues of potential cooperation and i would underscore the need for discussions on crisis response
in the event of instability in north korea and that is something that the us has tried to do with china for several administrations, as well. there are solutions that are put forward by both sides and i want to highlight again some of the convergences and divergences on a comment. both insist on peaceful resolution of disputes avoiding military conflict. the us paper focuses much more than the chinese paper on the need to manage differences of course, we would note that we've talked about managing our differences so i think that's a common position. both papers call for more candid strategic dialogue on major issues in the asian-pacific region. the chinese paper proposes an institutionalized and regular communication mechanism between china and the us led alliance system. this is something interesting and we should recall this that there have been consideration in
the past for example of a trilateral us-japan china dialogue which was supposed to take place in june of 2009 and for various reasons did not. so, should we consider once again ways that we can offer china reassurance about our alliances engaged in trilateral dialogue. a couple of divergences between the two sides in terms of their recommendation. as mike mentioned, the chinese authors do not rule out e.g. to and they say either a g2 or through other forms of security cooperation china and the us need to establish a joint vision for the region that is inclusive and based on mutual consensus. i think that would be a very, very difficult thing to do and i don't know that we can establish a joint vision but certainly the us paper and i think reflecting
mainstream views in the us as a g2 arrangement that the us paper says washington is not interested in any sort of condominium that applies exclusive great power relationship. finally, the chinese paper continues to call for adhering to the component of the new type of great power relationship even though it doesn't use that phrase but it says we should adhere to the principles of no conflict, no competition, mutual respect and win-win cooperation. i think that accurately reflecting the late obama administration as well as where the trump administration has come to after its first several months in power americans in general don't like a bumper sticker phrase and they continues to be an enormous discomfort with some of the implications of this new model of great power relations
including: the d components. we share the goal of avoiding conflict but it worries that emphasis on core interests may be an attempt to create spheres of influence and that could be potentially destabilizing to the region. on that area i think there is some disagreement and i look forward to focusing on that. >> thanks, mike. thank you for your leadership organizing such an event in helping us. more importantly to encourage me in the past years to work together, thinking together with sports no matter how differently it's a reflection that we share the spirituality, share the vision, how the regional
security can evolve in a way in a compatible. i would like to respond to bonnie's excellent presentation. first of all, divergence and convergence is some sort of reality so getting through some very accurate reality checking and finally consent where we consider accuracy of the reality check and get back to the. [inaudible] the us has been a very positive security region and no matter how china matters in terms of status i think china benefits from american and the very constructive and the regional conference and.
second, if we look at the potential risk where we have a collision between the two powers then what is the leading element to create or drive that, the divergence. we have to say it's not a status it's issue driven. there's a lot of speculation across asia for the moment the leading challenge is that china is coming after the transition and i have to say it's a fallacy. yes, some chinese nationalist may see it that way so then you read a recently published book that's called everything and then china may.
[inaudible] i think for most of the chinese well-educated scholars it is totally gone. i don't think it will be seen in the coming days. yes, there is a level of hardship compared to the city years ago the us china power is such a disparity is truly significantly diminished by us. [inaudible] we don't think in the coming days such a power disparity will truly -- is getting on the path very, very tremendously.
from a chinese perspective, yes, asian-pacific area is a testing ground for us relations and a lot of interest now between the collision and we are competing on a past taking the solutions and methodologies but if we get back to centerpiece to be behind the strategy and we prefer to see the adequate and reasonable an issue driven and it's not the status driven. secondly, then we will see the asian-pacific across this place is a very important testing ground as i mentioned to you.
[inaudible] from a perspective that chinese methodology in the region remained largely some sort of domestic transition is not power competing base and i consider china's dpr k policy is smart and they suffer a negative spillover in the positive dpr k. why? it's very hard for china, very tangible and most important reason should be getting deeper into the china factor. before china can become a
successfully transformed power considered that china remains vulnerable at large and in the region we consider it will be some sort of ways of competing to further china into very assertiveness. we consider that no matter how way we converge not just a history but it's a lot of speculation in it over shadow of relations between washington and beijing and the chinese-americans will be giving to an inevitable conflict so the harvard professor just will cover a very incentive,
sensational book called destined for war but we don't see it that way and we consider us china can join and creates a new molding of power relations. conclusively, i have to say china is reports the asian-pacific is a very interesting challenge for us and on the one hand we have to balance and find some sort of policy narrative and on the other hand we like to bring about some sort of new inspiring points and it is not an easy job. i have to say the most formal tasks on the chinese side is not how we can just envision the policies between us china region but how china can overcome some
sort of. [inaudible] let me stop here. >> you contracted our papers wellin eight minutes and you fitted in three broker views. well done. i appreciate it. over to the military side of this panel to david speck okay, thanks. thanks again to john for providing the leadership of the american group. without him is the glue of the american side we would've been in a high state of entropy so, thanks for that and thanks to michael and scott kennedy. three of us comprise the military and defense writing team and myself from phil saunders from national defense university, all three were engaged in this and our personal and private capacities and i'd be remiss if i didn't state that nothing in the paper or anything i state today reflects the views
of cna or any of its sponsors. if randy and phil were here they would provide the same caveats. so, as you heard, we are not supposed to summarize our papers and ours is 25-26 pages long and you can take a look at it but i feel a need to at least provide it with a sense of overall assessment and the reason i feel the need to do that is that our assessment of the state and trend in us-china military defense is the major area where the us and chinese i did have convergence recognizing some of the negatives and positives. let me give you a justine of the us assessment and it goes like this. at the moment, relations between the us and relations are more stable than they have been in decades. the two militaries are engaged in a wide range of unprecedented
number of interactions from the strategic levels down to the tax level that they've never done it since relations were established in 1980. both militaries are working together at risk reduction to ensure that highly continuance issues to not result in miscalculation and that the us team assesses that neither military seeks a complex nor sees it in their nation's interest to resolve differences between us by military means. however, all is not necessarily wellin the military and and defense dimensions of the us china relationship. the us writing team has judged that the competitive aspects of the military relationship is growing and intensifying, both sides have deepening concerns about the others defense and military policies as well as uncertainty over each other's future intentions. the competitive dimensions are in the asian pacific region
where the us prominence in the maritime and aerospace voluntary domains and china's expanding offshore reach and increasing military capabilities are intersecting. strategically, the us is determined to sustain long-standing military prominence in the region and its system of alliances and partnerships and we assess the china, from a us perspective, is purposely developing military capabilities to challenge us military advantages as well as military, political and economic means to weaken the us alliance structure in some instances. operationally, this competition is being characterized by the development of weapons and technologies aimed at accruing advantage by adjustments to advance their effectiveness and by shifting force postures and appointments. beyond asia, and other parts of the world, there are and will be more opportunities for us military cooperation and we look forward to that.
we also recognize as chinese military footprint around the world steadily increases the potential for new misunderstandings beyond the asian-pacific region cannot be discounted. because of this intensifying competition carefully managing the military dimensions of the us china relationship has to be a top priority for american and chinese civilian, military officials to reduce the chances of confrontation and ensure that military tensions do not overtake other areas of the relationship that are cooperative in nature. those are the us sides and the bottom line. if you read the two papers you won't see a lot of daylight between them. on convergence into virgins, both sides agree that the relationship between the military is more stable but both also assess that this is taking place against a disturbing context that i laid out in which the us and chinese military are
increasingly wary and suspicious of each other's intentions and that both militaries are in fact hedging against each other's operationally. on this account, the chinese paper was a bit starker maybe than the us paper for the us paper, my paper, talks about intensifying competition and the chinese paper talked about serves both the potential for clashes over security interest between the two countries has grown rapidly. both writing teams did log at theirs of the pentagon to introduce confidence building measures into the relationship and both sides agreed that a military conflict would derail both countries larger, domestic and strategic objectives. both would acknowledge that each side is presenting significant security challenges to the other and that both are exacerbating each other's security situations in the asian-pacific region. on the virgins, the two papers converge on identifying the common set of problems but they do diverge in many ways in
explaining causality and impact. the significant example where it was raised already in the differences in respect of use time the motivation of us alliance system on the chinese as part of motivation behind chinese military modernization. very two different views different sites. the two papers, if you read them, will provide readers with very sound appreciation for the strategic perception gap that exists between the two countries on a wide range of military defense insecurity issues. readers should also come away with an appreciation that the military tensions are a reflection of competing national interests and fundamental policy decisions of civilian leaders in beijing and washington and not just the decisions of military officials. it is much broader than just military issues.
if you take a look at the paper we have found many ways where we can be cooperative in nontraditional security and some folks have mentioned already. the most important thing to zero in on is what both teams did zero in on and that is cooperation on a very difficult issue of north korea. i think if you read the papers both the us and chinese teams cited the need to engage in crisis management activities as regards the peninsula. that's an important potential opening that we need to pursue either to attract one or two level. the final points going forward, developments this january, 2017 the events of the past week have underscored that the us china relationship remains entangled in messy web of issues that compel the two countries on one hand to cooperate but on another set of issues that produce tension and competition and great tension between the two and that military dimensions are no different.
some of us are concerned that the competitive dimensions are in the ascendancy. it is clear that leaders in both capitals today recognize the competitive problem and are attempting to manage two sides of this relationship to include on the defense and military side and one of the recommendations in our paper is to conduct an assessment to the efficacy of military and security dialogs that have proliferated over the past few years to determine whether or not they were serving a good purpose. readers in washington and beijing have already voted on that account having dismantled the creating the new comprehensive dialogue with diplomatic security dialogue. after the defense and security dialogue, defense secretary mattis commented that the idea of the new venue is to quote elevate and focus the discussions and i think on defense military relations,
elevating the discussion and focusing the discussion is a pretty good idea. there is a new start to these discussions whether there will be a new solution remains a question and i'll stop at that point. >> i'm recognized to have a chance to participate in today's event. i will be focused on two points. first my viewpoints about the two reports. i think they are a logical consensus and similar in the two reports. for example, both sides believe the relations is a very complicated region with competition. this is a very, very different in that the former united states and another example is both
sides believe although in recent years the frictions and suspicions are increasing especially in the western region. however, neither thanks conflicts and tries to resolve differences by force. both sides have achieved cbm in crisis management regime. another example is both reports believe, in recent years, the military relationship is a highlight of the whole bilateral relationship and the best it's been in decades. this is not only reflected on what in the differences in crisis management but also in the keeping and upgrading talks, exchanges and more corporations
on the nontraditional security and the global governments. both sides have a partisan proposal has a convergence. however, both sides report have a lot of differences. i would like to point out two more striking once. first, americans report believes that asia-pacific strategy and the operationalization of the balance by the dod is inevitable and very positive in the interests of the united states, its allies and defense partners. however, china's report believes that military element policy mainly aimed at china and china
is one of the major security challenges and in result has the intensified military and security friction between china and the us and the increase tension in the region. certainly, chinese believe that the maritime friction for increasing one of the reasons for this is americans imitation in the us has to take sides. however, american reports believe that is the chinese ministry expansion and especially the maritime capabilities expansion in the china's policy and activities which are the roots of the maritime tension. both sides report pointed out a
lot of differences which tie to the taiwan, regional architecture, security architecture, cyber, nuclear relationship. now we ask a question why do we have this mere to mere relation? mostly the answer is the economic independence, the common, global challenges we are facing, but no conflict and no competition and all this decided that both sides will including the passive security cooperation. on the other side, because we have different political
assistance we have a different values and we have different national interests. it has decided that we must have some differences and especially in the new background of the changing of balance of power china's rising power in the us is a longtime power and because of this all of this has led to aggravation of military frictions and competition. then,. [inaudible] exploring the potential areas in both reports have raised a large proposals. in summary, these three points. first is we must always keep
expand dialogs of the military dialogs and exchanges. especially we should have new talks in the new strategic domains just like the nuclear talk, cyber talk in outer space talk. in this way we can increase understanding of both countries in the strategic intentions and decrease misunderstandings. secondly we must recruit a reduction of risk, a regional safety and crisis management at the center of our efforts to stabilize military relationship and avoid military conflict. the third is we must understand that nontraditional security. in this area we are in the same
vote. i would say that my second point is about a bilateral military relationship in the first half of this year. okay. i think in the first half of this year, generally speaking of the relationship, it was civil. we keep talks and expand new talks and especially earlier this year when the two presidents they reach a consensus to send cooperation and that korean princes peninsula. this is been an issue for the stability of the bilateral military relations however, in
recent one month there was elective elements. us has twice the so-called freedom of navigation operation in the south china sea and declared military to taiwan again. this has brought about active impact on the relationship. now the two leaders at the g20 conference both leaders will meet each other and very soon we will have first talks between the two joint staff and president trump will visit china in the second half of the year. i hope this will stabilize the relationship and stabilize the
overall relationship of our two countries. it's essential for our stability and regional peace. thank you. >> thank you. let me ask one or two questions on the panel and will open it up for audience questions. we covered a lot of issues in these papers from pakistan, hawaii and military dispense issues. let me focus first on one area which is in the news and that's north korea. out of all the issues we look at in the paper including cyber, ai ivy and all the things we've looked at the korean peninsula is the one where the united states and china could because of our interactions on the north korean problem in a few years become much more testing of each other across every issue for truly sensing the adversaries as
we work when the korean pencil was at war. it seems to me that that is the one issue you have the biggest impact on the overall sense of whether were adversaries or to work on problems that affect our security. were not in a good place right now in north korea. you mentioned part of the reason is it's very hard politically. the president announced his disappointment that the china side couldn't do anything and yet probably they are doing more than was done before but it's clearly not enough to convince the us side. we start with bonnie and ask you all -- are there concrete things we can do? questiothe us has proposed and announced it will propose secondary sanctions between
other banks of the chinese side hasn't policed crackdown on those themselves are we stuck in this is a very specific but is very broad deal political on what our relationship looks like can we expect more out of north korea cooperation? >> i think when they met at mar-a-lago after that meeting the chinese tried to identify what it was that the us wanted and the first chinese interpretation was compliance with existing us sanctions, chinese always opposed any kind of your adderall sanction and china has banned, of course imports from north korea after reaching the cap under the un
security resolution that was passed in the end of last year. the chinese also told the us that was tightening up in terms of border inspection but i think there's been a failure on the chinese side to identify what it was that was satisfied the united states and not meet our expectations because that wasn't in the cards anyway and it really goes to the issue of banks operating with north china that are facilitating north korean access to the international finance system and enabling north korea to engage in these illicit activities. there has been efforts by the trump administration to provide evidence on banks and front companies that are enabling north korea and the reaction as i understand it from china was not sufficient.
>> >> i think there is a potential going forward maybe with threats that may be have been articulated to see if they can deliver some of those things maybe there is a positive path might think neither government was the relationship touche said it will negative to shower over this issue and i think the best outcome for xi jinping added to the in
annual meetings and of course, trumps a visit to china wants to head in a positive trajectory. there is a way for dree will see if we get there. >> of course, china and the u.s. allows more but the key is how to measure or how to define the corporation. so also with the dp rk and also the it for beijing they will not overwhelmingly cut off trade relations because
crystalized. so manchin of the chinese americans but now a second korean war in the overwhelming majority say no. because militarily china will -- reach out it is a big strategic change. and now with this judgment it is a threat. so with that joint contingency plan with the dprk that is the starting
suspension of all provisions . or how to come back to international appealed and the escalating tension we also need to look at them economically and commercially. so i would like to see a trumpet and xi jinping a summit meeting. but then go to a more specified measurable corporation. >> it certainly is not what it was 20 years ago but the
changes are incremental compared to the growth. so with my chinese friends i can tell you cheney security services turned over several containers with those precursors and having worked on this in the white house over five years have a huge impact out in the administration thought about someone to give the audience a chance major hand a very briefly. >> i of from the university
diplomatic and military training. >> talking about something of a nuclear issue. is very clear in the interest of china because we think if for correa goes back to nuclear state that would be a disaster for china. north korea is a number one country but the family became a nuclear state. so that sets the very bad example to the of their
then for example, this mutually assured restraint that we should have some type of bottom-line mentality and somehow they are accommodating with eight mutually assured restraint so that visual of president putin and president xi jinping does not give me a lot of confidence to the prospect for the atf tried than taking the lead. so that is a non starter and does not give me a lot of confidence.
so if any country deserve the award then if not for north korea then china probably from 1950 people believed in and ask the professor here in the front row. and without those missiles would be from the defense cooperation back in 1998. and with those north korean missiles japan would not provide billions of dollars for ballistic missile defense is no rationale over 30,000 troops. that is definitely viewed by china as not a good thing so
how much is enough? the third thing is that dealing with north korea and also the united states also for china those decision makers must we struggling with those applications. up until now china has not had to choose between north korea and south korea sooner later and how it means to one side these are tough policy decisions and honest to god i am glad i don't
have to make that decision if you have the time might begin to 50 minutes why because that conflict in korea would be the most disastrous that we have had this century. >> we're almost out of time may be the conversation you say u.s. recognized north korea. they want to be recognized as day not simply justin that -- ties but to no figure was to take over the problem but it doesn't want china to take over the problem.
that we entry capability we're probably far closer to the goal. then that goes back to the issue of north korea and why this is so important to address about $300 million was laundered through these things to the u.s. financial system. so this is a place to start. you can cut down the of north korea laborers because the salary is going to the north korea you eat and we should take up at lookit issues like curve oil why we have to wait and tell the of
six test where they have enormous leverage? there is more that we can do with the overall trade will be on the trump administration agenda as 88% to of course, correa with the international community is with china and that is a sensitive issue with beijing. i hope the countries to have a more serious discussion not just about suspension or beings that are frankly not workable at this point because we reached a very critical turning point. >> links to the panel and those were not on the stage i did that asia-pacific paper from brookings with
they don't seem to be any good options. but with those trade imbalances and how the united states handles those economic issues with a major impact on the bilateral relationship. is china really out to do the of liberal war order? doesn't want to push us out of asia? to what role that plays in the united states
and china. politics is fundamentally important they do not support the government they show that they are more hostile aisle for the united states and china but when you think about it of course, to make claims toward china or are we supporting taiwan's in ways they are interfering in a territorial issue? we don't have any territorial issues in china the way the chinese see the issue. that will affect public
attitudes in the palest would get into this subtext for:i will be equally diligent to stick with in the time limits and the pressures are even greater there was a chinese participant of the economic side unfortunately he could not be present and that they would be dominating the presentation. and they would not be hesitant to do so. >> it is an honor to be a part of this project. as well as all the other contributors have want to talk about the economic
relationship and in that paper written jointly by myself that was published today and that they are driven responsible and also from the peking school of business because of the of family illness in this should be commended for a thoughtful analysis. but this will be on the web site which you will read. so that similarities
similarities and differences were recovered policy prescriptions as well everyone to try to be as balanced as possible so in terms of the analysis, both sides agreed that the u.s.-china commercial relationship that it has benefited both sides that despite the fact is a large trade deficit that should not be the number by which we judge if it is beneficial or not we also agreed on a full-size united states economy faces a variety of challenges and that emanates domestically in that this thing is united states needs to do that do not involve china.
should decide to the chinese industrial policy has a huge global effect on business michael -- business models not one company over another that is something that we focused on. so then to focus on the of benefits and the need to continue that and avoid any path with growing protectionism on either side. but our sense is the chinese
decorations all repeated consistently by china's leader officials are inconsistent with the reality in the ground -- on the ground in china. in addition we go see that equivalency between the challenges and with regard to market access i don't think there is much that would come close to those ongoing obstacles in with that analysis where china says it is opposed to protectionism so i expect we
will see at the dprk in germany is to those trade reporting measures and that is a good summary. as the ambassador alluded to we expected that after president trump came into office now based on everything that we saw in the campaign also with the obama administration with the need with an approach on china. but that is not what we saw but what we have seen so we'd describe the policy so far with cooperation and openness and that is a sight
the report -- reciprocity now there is a chance maybe the u.s. is shifting and to put more pressure on china to address those costs -- changes so we cannot be sure we are not clear what that policy is overall or the policy on trade but over the coming weekend a discussion what is going on with the chinese subsidies we will
have a better idea for this is really substantial turbot with those policy recommendations if you have that agreement in terms of policy we agreed that they should not participate with any convenient tool to plunge the united states for example, and we agreed united states needs to do a lot to improve the domestic economy horror dependent on china also needs to continue to reform and open up that nevertheless is the same all
bull's-eye it's. but where we differ so china is not living up to its commitment and much more needs to be done to come back into compliance and there are a variety of things the u.s. can do with sticks and carrots to push for that out. to rigorously enforce u.s. trade law by latterly with the death buteo. but we do think getting it is reasonable to strengthen the process with individual investments with concerns of
national security. but with that turn reciprocity and how china treats investment with that u.s.-china of bilateral dialogue that is in just about the bilateral track and in regional forum in the west needs to further engage the allies you cannot pick a fight with everyone at the same time on every issue it is important gold united states needs to pick its priorities so i can gauge
china more effected the that is a more genuine outcome that is a win-win. >> we will now mouflon do global governance. >> it has spent a privilege to participate and it is important to say that because this demonstrates how much there is to work hard to keep this relationship bomb the best possible path. it is good to participate on that. to be disoriented by donald trump's election of u.s. president and i will get to
that in a few minutes but the report reflects and demonstrates a surprising agreement of global governments and of those examples along the way but then we agreed those global challenges require global solutions and no country can address them effectively in isolation and it is the path it is better than the ad hoc for spell -- read ad hoc
response. was minister jesus of local governments so the chinese paper puts more emphasis on united nations and criticizes the u.s. but the u.s. remains strongly committed to the united nations and then to rabbah perfect record. so we agree to take account over like under power relations so yes there are differences but those reforms so there is a shared
agreement we should be talking about. fourth and we want each other to be active players even though the united states wants to be half full stakeholder in china wants to want it both ways but by both ways they've been been a partial stake holder but i don't think that is much of the concern anymore is very clear that china has been stepping up and has changed its own understanding and the conditions to play that global role that could
create problems for the united states ever more substantial than china being a partial state. fifth. we agreed those established institutions of local governments with those multinational governance and this is where more substantial differences have surfaced in the two reports the chinese have criticized the alliance that especially in asia has contributed to the stability of the region which has allowed china
itself to prosper and be recognized the alliance's than the broad specter ship but to applaud the ambition to make greater contributions to global development but also has expressed concerns of those chinese led institutions have transparency and governance others fleeing the u.s. to decline but as we indicated in the u.s. report the views and recommends the u.s.
considers ways of cooperating with a eib in the high-level u.s. government was recently sent to the belgium forum. the most complicated and difficult difference that has emerged in this area and what that implies that phrase is widely used and after the fall of the soviet union and with the rule of democracy and as day indicate with that mind set
it has been invoking inclusiveness and diversity and global governance institutions are not guided the welcome negative is political systems and we're not about the business of changing those liberal institutions that is a complicated topic we don't have time to discuss but is of one of great significance bell lastly where governments is needed with
economic architecture addressing occur reality and addressing issues of cyberspace and that last example that climate change crystallizes that central problem that currently in the field of global governance is our american president has already taken a sharp turn away from the decades-long path of american leadership the slogan is america first and
to scrap tpp and has given no sign to focus on the strengthening in building of those institutions so what is the fate of this project? '01 to close by simply mentioning reasons why annette's preventing those efforts of people like us to work hard and let me just mention the three factors we really don't know where this
administration will go. second united states of america is not just that period and tell the next election we will have a long future global governance is a response to a reality requiring a russian corporation and to have a future after donald trump which will focus of the war again of global governance. so right now the united states of america has enormous numbers of actors who were working in spite of what the national government may be doing so to have that
is to have sovereign powers. in particular after that announced withdrawal of the claimant and that 40 million people. but to meet xi jinping in beijing. that said president, i have a bigger role for california in u.s.-china relations. and then invited them to join in the initiative. company's. businesses with an
enterprise of global guidelines and the ngos. with a strong role in the united states to galvanize public opinion and sometimes even sitting at the table so there is work to be done i consider this and that group of working global governance to be a part of that. >>. >> in either working on global governance.
>> please be sure your close enough to the microphone. >> with china that believes that both countries made great contribution to the global governance such as protection of the environment and the proliferation that is why with the report invites them to have a more active role in the future also attaching importance to the bilateral cooperation. u.s. and china also reached
those future challenges some bulls sites with uncertainty of the of good cooperation so some of those conclusions are similar of of policy focus so that is on the future corporate - - corporation in some are very different for example, what impressed me the most that future of china to bring bad certainty to the global governance cooperation and to change that just because
also the reforms means that no stakeholder can do that on its own. it needs corporate. sova i think there are some differences between china and united states. because of these future challenges how to get the differences and enhance the corporation and global governance issues. so i would like to conclude
effectively difference issues. and they keep the balance between the global governance and domestic governance at the same time. so we should do something about this, i would like to end up with another little bit of pity from the u.s. side. when we're talking about this area with issues, we look forward to figure out how the u.s. colleagues think what is practical actions or the projects that are different under global governance issues. that's why we spend time to discuss this question. comparing with the china site i think u.s. colleagues make a
very general conclusion of the specific areas. i really look forward to hear more specific about the intel information about the different governance issues. i would like to stop here. thank you. >> thank you. will now move on to politics. evan. would you like to lead off? >> think investor roy. i like to begin by thinking csi my chinese colleagues. when we embarked originally on this project we're not sure exactly how it was going to go. have worked on collaborative projects between american and chinese scholars many times and it is a challenge for the obvious reasons. as a result they gave me the hot hardest topic of them all, politics. it was the hardest because it's
so sensitive. it's sensitive in america but more sensitive in china. yet, the two teams work together, persevere, and were able to generate very credible products. what i would like to do is make three points about how i think politics impact the u.s. china relationship and weave into those comments some thoughts about differences where views can diverge and hopefully make it policy prevalent. my first point is that when one looks at the u.s. china relationship, and i look at it from a practical perspective. i was fortunate to serve in the obama administration at the white house for six years. i had six years where i got to sit at the control panel of the u.s. china relationship and see the light splash and the buttons worland figure out how this
relationship operates. it was fascinating. one of the lessons i took away and there are many lessons and i'm still digesting them years later is that this is a deeply mature relationship but timing is as of 2017 this is a 38-year-old relationship. it is not a young kid or an adolescent, not even a 20-year-old. a 38-year-old relationship which means america knows china and china knows america. that doesn't mean we still don't have a lot to learn from one another. we are constantly changing and evolving as societies and countries. but nonetheless, there is a big and rich data set that both sides can draw from an understanding the pace, the scope, the tenor of the u.s. china relationship.
i think the scope, the depth and the quality of the papers on this particular project reflect that underlining maturity in the u.s. china relationship. look no further than the current time with the relationship. the u.s. took for major actions against china last week. taiwan, the north china sea, and all the sensitive areas. did the bottom fell out of the relationship? no. is the relationship and a rapid spiral downward? no, not really. both presidents talked a few days afterwards, they will meet on saturday. in other words, there are boundaries around this relationship that are shaped by politics. nonetheless it's important to keep in mind the maturity of the relationship. those point number one.
point number two. as we try to understand what the boundaries are and how we get things done and in the case of the work that myself and others on politics, as we try to understand how politics in both countries affect the u.s. china relationship there is one distinction that is critical to understanding how to assess this relationship. it's a distinction that i've used before and some of you have heard me refer to which is distinguishing between the structural features of the relationship in other words the features of the relationship that are enduring and probably will not change and will have a deep and profound affect on the ability to stabilize the relationship and to shape it, so
a distinction between the structural features in the cyclical features. another words, the issues that come up on a day-to-day basis and we talked about a lot of them today. north korea, taiwan, china south china sea. in washington it's fun and exciting and engaging to talk about the cyclical issues but sometimes they don't have a long-term effect on the trajectory of the relationship in a particular what is the shape of that curve look like. this is an important distinction because when one thinks about the issue of politics in the u.s. china relationship, that is deep structure. that is something that probably is not going to change anytime soon. it's important that we not always get caught up in the day today to eights about these areas and yet focus on structural features.
there's two structural features that came out of our analysis of how politics impacts the relationship the first is that it's clear that competition in the competitive aspects of the u.s. china relationship are coming forward. that's not meant to be a darker negative statement but rather statement about the balance of issues facing the u.s. china relationship on day finkelstein began to go down this pathways in his description of the military to military relationship. this is not a statement about issues we should shy away from. we need to embrace the competitive aspects of the relationship. that is the only way we'll manage them. in fact one of the attributes is that the chinese president has
been open and frank about the disagreements. they will generate competition, the question is not coming avoid competition, the question is what kind of competition is it, is it competition that leads us both to improve our game? or is it militarized competition that runs the risk of instability and militarized conflict. competition is one aspect. the second is what i refer to as resilience and instability in the relationship. from my perspective there's a big difference. while i find the u.s. china relationship is not always the most stable relationship, we disagree regularly it's a relationship that's quite resilient. even though there's disagreement and competition there is a core stability at the center that has
bounded these disagreements in this competition from leading to a free fall. that could change that is something i noticed over all of the obama administration and it's a cyclical feature that could become structural depending on how politics play out. what is that mean? i would say these papers are excellent complement. they do two very different things. they highlighted different aspects of the relationship. the chinese paper was very focused on history, ideology, and the way in which those issues affect chinese perceptions of the u.s. china relationship. the paper is a very good description of how china believes that ideology and in particular this feeling that china has been the victim and wronged by the united states and how that affects chinese perceptions of the u.s. and the
u.s. china relationship. it is clear from the paper that china holds onto these and even in 2017 these issues affect chinese perceptions of u.s. strategic intentions and the quality of cooperation that can be gained in the u.s. china relationship. i have to admit that i was surprised that there is so much discussion in the paper about the u.s. trying to change china's political system. and that is a continues to be a core fear at the heart of u.s. china relationship. i say that because of someone who is six years in the white house i was not in a single conversation with the president, vice president, national security advisor, where anybody said china's political system is
a threat to american national security and we have to do everything possible to change it. never once, of course we have questions and concerns about human rights in china, they clampdown on political freedoms because that is who we are and that's a structural feature, but that's very different than the claims addressed in the paper. the u.s. paper took a different approach when mike and i were working. we focus less on history and ideology and more institutions, actors, and changing american perceptions and how the changing set of institutions, the fact that the executive branch is playing an active role in formulating the policy. there's a broader set of actors influencing the u.s. china
relationship, we talked about the business community and ngos in paul's presentation reminded me of the present subnational actors in the united states, governor brown for example an important role they can play and bounding competition, expanding cooperation. does that mean ideology and history doesn't play a role in american perceptions of china? i would say no. in the u.s. we don't really call it ideology. what i mean is there are different schools of thought in the united states about china strategic intentions. and now uses to stylize schools of thought. on one hand you have the offensive realists, china wants
to re-create this tributary system and will do everything possible to become the hegemon in east asia. on the other hand you have a group of china specialist and i would maybe point to someone with excellent work who tries to point out that china has a much more nuanced approach to the region. it's not trying to re-create a system but rather it's trying to find greater space for its rise in east asia as it tries to protect itself to find economic security interest. my point is, in the united states we have our own competing schools of thought. those have different influence on u.s. policy over time. the chinese would benefit for greater attention to actors and
institutions and processes and the u.s. paper would've benefited from more discussion on the range of schools of thought from the united states. we have our own manifestation of ideological and theoretical lenses that inform our approach. let me end with this point. what does this mean for the trajectory of the u.s. china relationship? i'm a view that the evolution of the u.s. china relationship is one that is going to be determined by a series of ad hoc decisions on both sides. to put it differently, the future of the u.s. china relationship is a constant search for a stable strategic motive of envy but unfortunately the search for that stable and strategic motive of envy is not going to occur at a negotiation, i think many people wish it were
that you could have 2-liter sitdown, hash it out and move on. the rather it will be a series of ad hoc decisions. the question is, will the political institutions in both countries actors and perceptions filtered through ideology and history and allow that series of actions to be one that takes the u.s. and china down the pathway toward a gradual divergence of interest where there's both cost, cooperation and interest or one where the pathway look starker, thank you. >> thank you evan. >> it is hard for people to talk about politics. but i will try. i am honored to have the chinese
be a part into the ten the panel here today. i'm focusing on u.s. politics so the professor writing for me is very good to reconsider about chinese policy. i would say that i have rather the u.s. would go carefully and especially the wonderful interaction about the u.s. congressional role in the u.s. china -- i totally agree with the idea of ups and downs of congressional power. compared with the two reports we have a lot of consensus. we all agree that domestic politics is one of the most
factor shaping u.s. china relations. most importantly we all believe that when the two countries, those are consistent, those relations will make significant process, it's very important. also personally i think the most ambiguous different between the two so if we think about the word politics in different ways. for the tiniest part we talk about politics is a very big issue such as political system, ideology or even political stability. but the u.s. report give me some impression that politics is
about the decision-making process, especially the key players this process. i think just because of these difference the chinese part is bigger political background of the u.s. china relations and that the u.s. would be a part and talk about more discussion about the key details such as congress send the community ngo, even personal of the leadership. really asking a lot of issues if you focus more on the details
the three easy for people to find out some problem. but when you pay more attention on the trend may be -- so i there some difference. the reason may be for the mutual trust if that is china and the united states still have bouts, how to look and deal with each other for some distance china still very about political involvement for the u.s. part maybe because of the decision-making there more more different conflicting views on china or non- chinese politics. for a long time a long history
so long time we try to resolve the difference gradually but also they mention that at the national level relation it is for us to strengthen the relation between u.s. and china such as the states to province, the city to city or county to county. the relation in exchange not only bypass the politics and maybe we can -- such as economy
and trade, technology and science. education comments on. maybe it will become the basis of the particle relations. in addition i think that the chinese report mentioned that there is a situation with the u.s. and china some have the same challenging problems but the solution may not be the same. as we know china is continuing in the economy reform and as we know the trump administration proposed concerned about the
economy to drop the immigration on poverty and domestic issues. so maybe there is more room for some kind of mutual learning, mutual cooperation between our two countries. for the new development of the political factors since trump took place, i think on the chinese size there is a big change. on the u.s. side maybe there is new points should be talked about. one of them is that the inner politics of trumps white house brings world sutras to to u.s.
policymaking. outside have totally no idea about who or what time how, how much influence. so it's a big uncertainty for united states. another is that in case of trumps on clear policy u.s. congress seems to dominate some form policies for example the thailand policy. we can see the arm sales in a various bill that was brought up by marco rubio in the house. i don't think this trend is
conducive to a stable u.s. china relationship. my time is up so i will stop here. >> we have gone over our time. the panelists have raised some fascinating issues that we could usefully explore for the next hour or two. rather than eating into the time of the professor who will make concluding remarks, i will think our panelist. if you have questions maybe you can call members of the panel after the conclusion of our conference this afternoon. [applause] >> i want to think the panel in a especially the ambassador who
cheered the steering group and the veterans and for defense policy and provided guidance to produce an overview paper. the chinese also had a steering group with distinguished scholars, diplomats, and defense experts and also produced an overview paper. the principal author who was a speaker, it is now over to you, to sum up and tell us where do we go from here? >> i'm not going to some areas and not going to tell you what to do.
but, i will have to say something first of all on behalf of the ambassador and all of the members on the chinese research group who want to express our congratulations on the release of your very handsome report. that is the u.s. side report and we also want to express her sincerest appreciation for your collaboration with us and support to our joint effort. so, actually we would have two sets of reports, parallel reports the beginning of this joint effort was good 2016.
and they both stewardship we initiated the research work on the future of u.s. china relations, the initiative has been involved in fine finalized by the global think tank and i do remember the exact name of that, it is called something like the global strategic studies think tank. and we had been in touch with chinese foreign ministry and other government agencies, senior diplomats, u.s. embassy in beijing and various u.s. counterparts, individuals and institutions especially csi s.
while there are very much embedded for their advice and support the research team on the chinese side was composed of about 20 to 30 researchers, and policy analyst from numerous think tanks in china. freshly not just from beijing but from elsewhere. they include chinese social scientist the national defense university, the pla academy of student science. of course my university peking university and the shanghai
institute and social sciences, 19 university and many others. they held dozens of closed-door debates and discussions, some were small group meetings and we also helped many meetings with our american counterpart in beijing, washington d.c. or new york city. the end result is the chinese report publicized in both chinese and english and we also want to thank for publicizing the report and the chinese reports and both english and chinese are already educating in the volume which will be published by the chinese social
scientists, i hope it will come pretty soon. and you may this year we launched a rollout event in beijing similar to the one we're holding today in washington, d.c. we had people from csi us and other think tanks from the united states, this is simply my story, the chinese side of the story equally important are more important is that of a few round of consultations csi s took i made a decision to help us and coordinate american think tanks to write a report instead, but the first idea is to write
something called the joint report like the publicity of the teamwork collaborated on both sides. but because of the communication and we are separated so widely that we cannot reach consensus on every single issue so we decided to do something like the shanghai communicate which we express the views and you can compare notes in the first place so that result is to separate and parallel reports reflecting our views of several die mentions like trade and
economics and asia-pacific and global governments and military to military relations and also of course an overview. we have frequent exchanges of views the between united states and chinese teams when we have two in washington d.c. and another in beijing. we compared notes and we improve the quality of the papers. subset tivoli we debated on the chinese side more than we publicize them. we have very different views among the chinese and some issues we don't have identical views on issues like north korea
or sensitive issues and chinese foreign policy, generally we have consensus but we don't have everything, and such a large group of people that we cannot agree on everything. but what is available is generally the consensus on the chinese side. but the consensus is not necessarily in this is our think tank effort. we have consulted arctic government that did not seek endorsement from government agencies. in talking in the think tank, two things i think to myself is
that i think of myself in this regard, first the frequent substance and dialogue is very useful. and if when we constructed the report i cannot help but thinking about some earlier episodes of the u.s. china relationship in the early 1990s the economic and cultural exchanges will influence by the political storm in beijing and then in the mid- 1990s our bilateral dialogue was so suspended and in the late 1990s there is the embassy bombing and so the scholarly
exchanges on universities and think tanks of the two countries was often interrupted by political events but nowadays we have seen the beginning of the century we have very intensifies and extensive uses of use between think tanks and i think personally speaking i think the intensity of the dialogue between the two sites is sees what i know between china another country we have very strong ties between countries like russia, europe and many other countries but i don't
think the always extensive dialogue and the less frequent deals with the country and to have a friendly relationship like with russia and from there on if i compare this relationship in recent years and sometimes the exchanges of views have been interrupted and have the events or happenings. so what does this tell us, tells us we have a weekend new level of maturity. in the words of evan -- this is
the resilience of the relationship. the second striking thing to me is how much we are familiar with these views and how much we know each other personally and individually. that they include younger generation scholars and think tank people. a great number of chinese think tanks have been established in china in recent years. when we have specific issues to discuss or to debate we know who we are going to talk to and who we will seek advice from.
and i would like to mention a paper i did with my friend ken five years ago and we co-authored a report on china u.s. strategic and this was reflected whether it it wants to try the political system and the last five years seems we publish the report it has been reduced, i think the strategic trust is deepened and become more
extensive, but at the same time have the two countries move closer to confrontation. but then my answer is no. but why is that, i can give some reasons that are reflected in the joint report, first, we increase mutual understanding, we share more balanced views with a larger domestic audiences and we have much less influence bike conspiracy theories, because we can think about the audience here and we know
chinese people and government officials much better than before. so it is very difficult to believe in those conspiracy theories. i'm not saying there's no conspiracy as it's not so widely spread and -- with the we are helping government agencies to construct prices, and management skills and devices. this is what some are very good at. and also, my has talked about
and despite the distract the two countries greatly with bilateral cooperation the multilateral cooperation reflected in the global governors and reflected on trade relations, what is not talk too much about is the booming tourism between the two countries. then the united states is more interested and china best students continue to come for advanced studies. i am not extremely happy about
that because i am losing some of my best students who i want them to attend our graduate school but in stead they come to the best universities in the united states. but we have many very good students from the united states studying in china. so this gives a somewhat more reason to be cautiously optimistic. i do not want to neglect the differences in the difficulties ahead. what i see is a new normal of the bilateral relationship by increased competition. in another feature i have seen in bilateral relationship is an
increased degree of influence for domestic parties on both sides and so what we do next i don't have any good device but i think of more substantive and more collaborative projects, for instance we can be more specific and discussing, one aspect is through trade and we can talk more extensively through multilateral in the asia specific region. so there are proposals in that regard. we can mount some joints of the programs in a great number of
projects and we should also try to bring countries like japan, south korea, india, and russia into our collaboration. we can even think of our joint efforts and the life and the situation in the middle east. i've read very carefully the publication by john -- on china and the united states. that is something we can also think about. so in any sense the joint effort we have made so far has set up a good foundation for a think tank cooperation in the future. we will continue to rely on our
partner and when we are trying with our partner there are u.s. intense and we also want to reach out to other university in china to bring them together to cooperate with you. thank you very much. [applause] >> on behalf of the american participants i want to thank you and you for bringing this idea to us a little over a year ago. everyone was interested, probably doesn't think tanks were interested in hurt her idea. was an experiment and i think it works well. one, the goodwill and the candor of all the participants, number two we structured in a way that we had to think hard about how they thought about the others
and also because of marius sinclair. with american university going to work for you. so we'll them special thanks. >> tonight, sir huckabee sanders will discuss her involvement in politics as a governor of mike huckabee. and how she approaches the job as deputy press secretary. here is a preview. >> waswalk us her typical day. >> i don't know if there is a typical day. it starts early around 5:00 a.m. i get up, i try to see at least some have one early riser, my 3-year-old i use silly spent time visiting with him in the morning before i leave and get to the office early enough to read through and catch up on news said took place before i went to bed.
then we start with a series of staff meetings run 7:15 a.m. talk about the news of the day, prepping for what we want the message of the day to look like and responded to stories that may be coming up. from there every day's little different than the one before which is one reason why our love what we do. no two days are like. every day presents new challenges. it gives us a new way to be part of the administration. >> and you get home when? >> it varies. usually anywhere between 7:00 p.m. until 10:00 p.m. at night. >> as you take on this job sean spicer has made a few changes, how do you approach the job of deputy press secretary and relations with the median general? >> the same way i have relations with the media. i approach it the same way with any other relationship. i grew up in the south.
so be inhospitable is something that was ingrained in me at an early age. i tried to take it into my workplace with everything i do there. so even when i disagree try to be diplomatic and gracious about it. sometimes we have to be aggressive and push back on i try to do that in a way that is polite inhospitable. but also strong and not weak. >> during the interview sir huckabee sanders talks about life on the campaign trail. see the entire interview tonight at 8:00 p.m. eastern on c-span, c-span.org, or listen on the free c-span radio app. >> i think one of the hugest problems in capitalism today is the insane ceo pay. we can get into later how it became and say, but it is
harming the companies that you said, it is harming the employees. it is terrible for the economy. it is one of the principal drivers of increasing economic equality in this country. >> at 7:00 p.m. on book tv. stephen clifford, former ceo talks about his book, the ceo pay machine. sunday at 1:30 p.m. eastern, doctor willie parker, a christian and abortion provider talks about his book, life's work. a more try moral argument for choice. >> we push back on the morbidity of abortion. we push back on the claim that it is dangerous. we have not made the case that women have in people who are making decisions about reproductions, a process that occurs within their body and
their agency as human beings to make that decision. >> for more of the schedule go to booktv.org. >> i live coverage of the commissioning of the uss gerald r ford saturday at 10:00 a.m. eastern. the super carrier named after the 38th president is the navy's newest nuclear powered high-tech aircraft carrier. president trump will attend the ceremony and delivered remarks to more than 14000 people expected to attend. saturday at 10:00 a.m. eastern on listen live on the free c-span radio app. >> c-span, where history unfolds daily. in 1979, c-span was created by america's cable television companies that is brought you today by your cable or satellite
provider. >> the senate finance committee holds a confirmation hearing for david to be the assistant secretary treasury. he was asked about tax code changes that would benefitat it middle of income americans. >> now we will shift and we wiln consider the nomination ofe mr. david cotter to serve as assistant secretary of policy for tax policy.co mr. carter, welcome to the finance committee, we appreciate your willingness to appear before us today.il we also appreciate your willingness to serve in thiscit. capacity. i'm sure the significance at this crucial time is not lost on you. >> it's not lost on any member of this committee. tax reform has been a major focus of ourom