tv Hearing Focuses on U.S. Policy Toward North Korea CSPAN July 26, 2017 3:04am-4:41am EDT
>> the hearing will come to order. let me welcome you to the senate foreign relations subcommittee on asia and pacific international cybersecurity in the 115th congress on behalf of the committee i apologize for the delay of the beginning of the hearing to the witnesses have been here time away from work and those attending the hearing today. the return of senator mccain was a very poignant moment for the senate. it's the most urgent national security challenge in the united states and allies in east asia. the secretary said north korea is the most urgent and dangerous threat to peace and security. the former commander of the u.s. northern command stated korean
peninsula is that it's unstable point since 1953 when the armistice was signed. north korea conducted nuclear tests in a 24 ballistic launch. this year pyongyang has already launched seven team including a successful test of an intercontinental ballistic missile is capable of reaching alaska and hawaii. the policy of decades of bipartisan failure must turn to one of bipartisan success with pressure and cooperation in the peaceful denuclearization of the reading. the united states will not allow that to happen and i am not encouraged by the president's resolve. as vice president head of state during the visit to north korea since 1992 the united states and allies stood together for the
north korea through peaceful means but the options are on the table. time is not on our side. the policy should be straightforward. the united states will deploy every diplomatic and if necessary tool at our disposal to protect our allies. the only country that holds the leverage necessary to put the squeeze on the north korean regime. according to the state trade agency, china accounts for 90% of the trade including virtually all of north korea's exports. trade volume between the two nations has climbed more than tenfold rising from 448 million in 2000, to $5.4 billion in 2005. beijing is the reason that it acts so boldly.
the global power cannot simply throw up its hands and resolve themselves in responsibility. it's to ramp up the truck that has been utilized for its fullest extent. passed by 96 to nothing. the legislation was the first stand-alone legislation in congress regarding north korea to impose mandatory sanctions on the proliferation activities and malicious cyber behavior. it's doubled since the legislation came into effect on february 18, 2016. north korea ranked eighth, russia, iran, iraq, sudan and zimbabwe. even the 30% sanctions increase
after the decision passed the congress, north korea is only the fifth most sanctioned country by the united states so loyal they moved from an action to some action the trump administration had the opportunity to use to build the leverage on pyongyang and beijing. they designated the financial institution and this should all be the beginning. they have access to the u.s. financial system. the report released last month by an independent organization identified over 5,000 chinese companies that are doing business with north korea. they are responsible for $7 billion of trade with north korea. moreover the report found only ten of these companies controlled 30% of chinese exports in 2016. one of the companies alone was
responsible for nearly 10% of total imports from north korea. some of the companies were found in satellite offices in the united states. according to recent disclosures from 2009 to 2017 to use thanks to process at least $2.2 billion in transactions through the u.s. financial system. it should all stop now and it must stop now. the united states should not be afraid of a diplomatic confrontation for existing u.s. law and fact it should be more afraid of congress if it does not. as for any prospect of engagement we should continue to let them know in no uncertain terms the united states will not negotiate at the expense of the u.s. national security and that of our allies instead of working with the united states and the community to disarm, they called on the united states and south korea to hold military exercis
exercises. they must demand they first meet the denuclearization commitment that agreed to in the past and subsequently chose to violate. it is in both nations fundamental long-term interest. they want to work with the united states as a responsible global leader or bear the consequences of keeping him in power. i will turn over to senator markey as soon as he arrives but in the meantime the witnesses waited patiently for an hour to begin testimony. the first panel is susan fortin who serves as the secretary of state for east asia and pacific affairs and has assumed responsibilitresponsibility as l
deputy assistant secretary in february 2016 after serving for a year and a half for the deputy assistant secretary for joined the state department in 1991 as a career member of the foreign service. welcome and thank you for your patience and for being here. on this important issue for the united states and regional security i would say global security. the fourth intercontinental ballistic missile test is only the latest evidence of the desire to threaten the united states with nuclear weapons. it constitutes a serious escalation of nuclear and ballistic missile programs. our goal was to protect the country, citizens and allies died eliminating the development of nuclear weapons and the means to deliver them.
the strategy to achieve the goal uses diplomatic, economic and other tools to build comforted global pressure on pyongyang to abandon the internationally proscribed nuclear programs. they understand the only path to the legitimacy regime security and economic prosperity is a denuclearized korean peninsula. there are three components to the strategy the first is un action in concert with our allies we've called on all un member states to fully implement a strong sanction required in the un security council resolution 2321, 2270 and 2256. we will continue to work to increase international sanctions. the second component is the poetic action by un member states. we've urged countries around the world to take their own actions to express their condemnation such as suspending or downgrading diplomatic relations with north korea.
cordial ties with the country that threatens its neighbors and continues to violate the u.s. resolution is completely inappropriate at this time. the diplomatic missions to generate and transmit the resources for its weapons programs. the third component is economic pressure. we've asked all countries to cut ties as a way of increasing north korea's economic isolation and to prevent it from using the international system to support its illegal weapons program. the secretary has made clear in the meetings of its foreign counterparts but nations can no longer operate in a business as usual approach. it's the capitals around the globe. mr. chairman, we are not seeking the regime changed th change nok military conflict or to threaten north korea. the campaign is designed to meet the cost of the programs to
exorbitant. as it has been said, we want to bring north korea to its senses and bath to its knees however we will respond accordingly to the threats against us for our allies and remain open to the talks at the dpr k. but it must first see his its missile programs and bring an end to its pattern of dangerous and aggressive behavior in the region. we are not going to negotiate our way back to the negotiating table. while our partners around the globe begin to take steps to increase pressure on north korea, unfortunately we do not see any signs that they are willing to engage incredible talks on the denuclearization at this time. we will continue to appeal to countries around the world to take action in opposition to the unlawful ballistic missile program to make clear that pursuing its unlawful programs will only increase its isolation. it's the most pressing concern
we will not abandon the three citizens who have been unjustly detained by north korea nor will we be silent speaking out against the regime's egregious human rights violations against its own people. they travel in, through war to north korea and we seek to avoid a tragedy like that family endured. in very specific limited circumstances, american citizens can apply for labor to travel restriction to allow them to perform humanitarian work. we do not wish to punish the north korean people for the actions of the leadership and therefore plan to allow some exceptions to the restriction. we appreciate this and we look forward to continuing the cooperation in protecting the country from the grave threats o international stability. thank you again.
i just want to start with a couple of questions with the maximum pressure campaign do you think it needs additional tools the strategy we have right now the first is to make north korea the highest priority national security issue that we are facing a calming and you have heard the secretary and the president and secretary and others speak to this.
we are making this a global campaign and putting the onus on other countries in the international community to examine the relationships both diplomatic, economic and financial trading and asking them to make sure that not only are they implementing the sweeping un sanctions regime that's already been put in place, but they are going beyond that regime to initiate their own actions to show the north koreans they will not be able to seek solace or comfort in the community anywhere. this is part of maintaining a global network to show that we are unified in our efforts to thwart their ambitions. the third thing we are doing is working and putting the onus on china as you said 90% of the economies flipping through china in 14 or another and this is a departure from the approach is
obvious you. it's responsible global player and really upped the pressure on the regime in north korea and make clear that they will only accept the north korean peninsula and are prepared to impinge on the north korean economy. the tools we have at hand for conducting the strategy had a b-bravo for the already existi existing. it's sweeping the sanctions we can detect. they are violating the sanctions and have very broad authority to
do so. it's keeping us from prosecuting a very active sanctions campaign both in the security council resolution and also in our own unilateral kind of designation secondary sanctions to be violated. >> do you have what you need for both chambers in the commerce? >> not specifically but we believe that is our position, yes. >> have you had a chance to review the other pieces in the house or regarding the sanctions i've introduced with others in the committee legislation regarding north korea and the sanctions particularly relating to access and financial networks and systems. could you comment on those pieces of legislation? >> sure. there's quite a number of pieces
of legislation and we appreciate the interest of congress and this issue. what i would say is the authority that we have, again, i think they are quite sweeping authorities that were passed in the legislation from 2016, the enhancement act that you mentioned and the executive orders that followed gave very broad authority is to go after the entities that we find but are violating sanctions weren't glasswalled or the un sanction. so the new piece of legislation in the various targets on the travel restriction or travel ban servers different aspects they touch on, and i think in general we appreciate the interest.
>> the round of designations that you talked about sanctioning in the chinese financial institution and other measures of secondary measures, when can we expect the next round that included chinese entities and financial institutions. >> we have been working on coming up with a new list of entities that we think are violating and there is no specific timetable, but there's no specific hesitation to do that. we will be proceeding with those as soon as we can get the packages ready to go and get that sort of evidentiary area standards and legal standards met that we need to meet. >> can we accept additional sanctions in the next 30 days? said i would hesitate to predict the exact timetables but we will see something fairly soon, yes. >> will please be presented to
china or others prior to the enactment of the sanctions or will they be implemented immediately? >> we have been running conversations with china and other countries about information we have on entities and in some cases we try to coordinate own actions with them with local law enforcement to our law enforcement actions and in some cases we are not able to do that. i can't say specifically with regard to what we are considering, but we have done both in the past and we are not bound by any particular arrangement. >> when you see a report like this that shows the entities doing business with china, does that provide evidence that you can use and does that go into the conversation with the chinese government and what is the response? >> we've had a number of conversations with my chinese counterparts and whenever we have a report like this, we
bring it to them and they have done that. usually they come back with some kind of a response to either follow up on or not. usually, we definitely share that kind of information. >> and the testimony you talk and mentioned the service pillars of the strategy called on un members in the states to fully implement the commitment they made regarding north korea and the countries to suspend or downgrade diplomatic relations with north korea and hostile countries to cut i need code trade ties with pyongyang. can you give an indication of the success of the request? how many member nations have suspended or downgrade diplomatic relations but you have requested to do so? how many have cut trade ties that we have requested to do so? >> we have urged everyone to squeeze the representation or downgrade if they can.
there are a number of countries that have expelled the dpr kate representatives from their capitals who have diminished their presence of the diplomatic missions and to have expelled representatives of commercial offices or other entities that were transacting illicitly with the host government and that we provided information on. so, i cannot give you an exact number, but they are quite a number of the recalled to the diplomatic presence and we also have a number of countries responded to the call for diminishing commercial operations that are sponsored by diplomatic establishments, and i think that we have had for example germany has committed to take steps that was being run by the diplomatic mission -- provided revenue for the missions operation. we have a bunch of success on that as well.
within the coming week we will l publish the notice on the federal register. what we are proposing is a general travel restriction. that will be in the federal register for a 30 day comment to cope, and the proposal is fighting as you know to make u.s. passports not valid for travel into north korea unless you get an application made for a one time trip and a license or permission to make that trip. >> so the humanitarian exemption is the purpose of allowing? >> he would have to make him in person application for the trip. >> are we encouraging others to do the same and have others made the same decision? >> we have encouraged other people to make decisions about
restricted travel and other because tourism is also a resource for the regime that we would like to see diminished. i don't think so far there are other people that have pursued this but will be the initial one and we will keep talking to others about that. we apologize to everyone it's a very unusual day in the congress and so we apologize. it is an issue that has to be dealt with in the very near term, so thank you for convening this hearing, and to the three
witnesses for being here. you are the first trumpet administration official to testify on north korea in an open hearing before the senate foreign relations committee. since taking office from president trump and his policymakers have made inconsistent and sometimes conflicting public comments on this matter and i hope your testimony will provide needed clarity. north korea continues to develop its programs without constraint over the past 18 months has conducted its fourth and fifth a clear test with over 20 ballistic missiles and launched a satellite into orbit. july 4 north korea tested an intercontinental ballistic missile and this represents a startling advance in the arsenal and just hours ago the "washington post" reported the defense intelligence agency now
this is north korea could yield a reliable intercontinental ballistic missile as early as next year. sooner than previously thought. we and our allies must remain resolute and united to detour this threat. the reckless brutality leaves no doubt that he is homicide .-full-stop the samhomicidal atd survival strategy shows that he is not suicidal. like his father and grandfather before him, he knows an attack on the united states or our allies will bring in immediate and devastating military response. as the situation continues to drift without resolution he may eventually misread the deterrent
for the attack to topple his regime. that only increases the risk of grave consequences. the chairman of the joint chiefs said they would be perfect unlike any we have experienced in our lifetime and i mean anyone who's been alive since world war ii. it is clear there is no military solution to the problem and pressure without direct emblematic engagement will bring only continued drift. we need a new approach to bring
a solution to the problem. that's why i've joined the chairman in leading the north korean enablers accountability act. we believe that the united states needs to make it crystal clear our country will impose unprecedented economic pressure on north korea and its enablers and we need to get potent diplomatic tools with which to bring the north korean regime to the table a serious direct negotiation but pressure cannot bring north korea to the table unless we are willing to talk to them. the circumstances to engagement with north korea and how it intends to use the sanctions and other tools.
this is a very important heari hearing. >> part of the challenges they have addressed a policy of maximum pressure of engagement. it's not articulated as of yet what that means or the strategy for implementing it specifically with respect to diplomatic engagement. president trump has spoken of the chances of a major, major conflict with north korea but also said he would be honored to meet with him and he i that he a smart cookie. others have given similarly contradictory statements and
frankly your opening statement still has not clarified where the administration has to be or is today. you mentioned the lessons in the strategy that has three components that serve as the pillars but didn't elaborate on what they are. urging countries to isolate north korea sounds like things the previous administrations have also done so can you explain to us what they administrations current strategy is and how it is bringing us closer to the ultimate goal of denuclearize in the korean peninsula? >> thank you very much.
for your statement and these questions. this is a difficult issue some of us have been working on this issue for more years than we care to count and i think in the room here we probably have a millennia of experience on this issue. we haven't come up with a solution that has allowed us to solve this issue in th a way tht we hope to see it solved such as the denuclearization of the peninsula. it is the administrations goal and that is what we are going after. i think the secretary and others have made clear. it seems the regime is dedicated to developing these weapons and
any inclination to join us for negotiations on the dismantlement and abandonment of the denuclearization. >> the negotiated settlement of the ballistic missiles by north korea of the administration hasn't been willing to negotia negotiate. >> we haven't had a partner with whom we could negotiate. >> have you asked for negotiations with the north koreans? >> the north koreans know how to get in touch with us.
>> have to asked for negotiations to commence in conjunction with the chinese or the japanese have you asked for that specific negotiation to occur and construct a framework >> our allies and partners and others to cooperate and solve this problem none of us have gotten a positive response from the topic has come up so the
strategy is to increase the pressure on the regime to try to change its calculus surrounding the programs and we are constantly evaluating that effect and we think it's certainly the case it is a slow squeeze and we are definitely in the process of trying to elevate that pressure we think sanctions and pressure over time unified global networks are changing
that regime and some people say this won't work tha but we haveo test the hypothesis where we bring the amount of pressure. >> we want to intensify the level of pressure on north korea. they enjoyed a 37% increase in trade from year to year but has leled to a 10 billion-dollar economic sanctions. so from our perspective, the strategy that we have is not
working and we need legislation to ensure there is a tightening of the sanctions, but it can only work if it is done in conjunction with the negotiations with the sure and certain knowledge that the sanctions are arriving for the strongest possible results. >> think you and forgive me if i ask questions that i asked in the hearing. i think if the 21st of june as the diplomatic security dialogue. what steps does the administration take during that dialogue with china to urge them to increase pressure because
that was in classified settings so i won't go into detail we realize it isn't being deployed sufficiently there is much more that can be deployed and when we hear about china sanctioning south korea over the efforts it's taking just to defend itself it seems like not only are we not using our leverage but we are going backward. telbackwards. tell me about the dialogue between the u.s. and china about the north korean issue. >> thank you for that question n and first let me start by saying that we deploy and have spoken out publicly about how disappointed we are about the actions with respect to south korea over the deployment. to protect the troops it is certainly in the rates to deploy the system and we have made in
the context of the diplomatic security dialogue are disappointed again over that issue and insisted and continued to discuss it and retract all of the negative ramifications that flow from that decision. with regards to the sanctions and the discussion in general, i think what we had hoped to do in the diplomatic security dialogue up to that where there was active diplomacy is convince the chinese to take serious. once after the diplomatic and security dialogue we had a chance to talk through how we saw it and then we saw from that the decision to proceed in the sanctioning of a number of
entities and we've had a number of conversations with china where we said we would prefer to work through the sanctions because obviously if you have a un security council resolution is an international sanction that sweeps up the entirety of the network we are trying to build and going after the entities that we see in violations that are perfectly prepared to add onto our own to target and we find it necessary to target so we are going to go after the chinese entities if need be and if we find them to be in violation and that they can't cooperate going after those targets. >> this committee acted in 2016 to sanctions that were followed up pretty quickly not only through the body is signed by
the president been pretty quickly by the un security council and china didn't choose to exercise its veto on those that are there differences where we think that it should be more maximum and they are claiming that it's not? tell me a little bit about the relationship and the understanding of the sanctions. >> we have had six resolutions i have been for sanctions all of them adopted by the consensus in the security council, so no veto would show the degree that it is a complete outlier in the international system. the chinese vote for the un security council resolutions are opposed to all of north korea's violent behavior, but in the details of the sanctions, and there is a panel that deals with
the implementation and interpreted as we work very closely with the panel of experts and the chinese also works closely with them and have a lot more trade going on with north korea and so they have the first of alfirst of all differed interpretations of the sanctions and more tangible differences and how they can implement the sanctions. they have a lot more work to do to implement the sanctions obviously at the borders, with inspections, customs, tracking financial transactions etc.. so they are both having a difference with regard also to their domestic laws and how they enacted to implement the un sanctions then the system that we have. >> i'm almost up against my time. these guys have been on the subcommittee with experts in the
middle east and latin america and i just added t it to the subcommittees where i can ask questions of others know about already did help me understand chinese behavior on this. they do not need the sanctions as you mentioned, they disagree on application issues but that may not be quite so unusual around the border they are doing trade that affects us more than it affects a different point of view bu but then they sanctioned south korea for taking steps are defensivthat are defensive in n. that seems so much more extreme even than babbling about the un security council resolution. when south korea is taking steps that are clearly defensive in nature to protect itself against what everybody agrees is the sanctioned behavior in the context that should cause grave concern by the border neither as well as other nations in the region i have a hard time understanding the sanction and i can't interpret in any light
other than a hostile and unhelpful ones who helped me understand that. >> i think your interpretation is perfectly legitimate. we have the same conversation which is the chinese don't believe it is a defensive system, but we've tried to explain we can have a technical conversation and explain exactly why you're wrong but have not come to the same conclusion on that. so, i think that we continue to point out to them that this is a completely unjustified kind of behavior and i think on the reaction to that system i can't explain exactly why they are doing what they are doing but seeing it as unreasonable is perfectly legitimate. >> thank you senator mccain and just another round of questions i will be brief in my comments
and questions here. just to make it clear there will be additional sanctions issued on the chinese entities and others violating the sanctions, is that correct? and those will be issued shortly is the correct? >> shortly within the next -- >> the department issues and so yes, within, yes. >> wanted to follow-up on human rights including the violations by north korea's regime. >> what do the sanctions or other measures addressing the violations by north korea? korea's? >> it's possible. i'm not exactly sure which ones are going to be included but it's possible certainly we still have the human rights sanctions provided for in legislation and we have the authority to do th that. >> the final question before i
turn it over, cyber capabiliti capabilities. in the last congress had passed legislation when we find a violation by north korea under the terms of the legislation. in the conversations over the past several months we talked about the attacks that have gone viral. does the united states plan to utilize the cyber sanctions authority under the previous legislation plaques >> i believe that of course we are well aware of the malicious cyber activity emanating and we are very concerned about it. i think when we have the opportunity to use the authority we would certainly use it and wouldn't hesitate. this is a very important discussion and i continue my line of questioning.
ideally time is running out. once they have that ballistic missile nuclear capable ability, it will be very difficult to roll that back. the legislation is pending before the committee. does the administration support it, oppose it? >> we certainly would support going after the entities violating the sanctions and i can't say without knowing what the list is in having a lot more information about what they've been doing and what kind of violations they are looking at but we wouldn't hesitate to go
after companies that we have that kind of information on. i think we're sort of in the same mode of wanting to ratchet up the pressure. the accelerated reunification that we are genuinely focused on the denuclearization of the korean peninsula. we've done our part there are no nuclear weapons, and it's now up
to north korea to come to the table and hopefully encouraged by the sanctions and by other incentives. >> my question goes to what is the conversation between the trump administration and the chinese government. what are you saying to the chinese government about the intention of the united states to tighten in a vice like grip sanctions on those companies that are cooperating with the north korean government including the ten companies that include in this legislation towards the goal of moving to direct negotiations. so what is that conversation,
that is what we are trying to elicit because otherwise when there's a 37% increase in trade with north korea and china and a 10 billion-dollar a year economy as they cooperate with the united states, right now they are not feeling any pressure. it's just business as usual coasting towards that moment where they have a nuclear weapons program that is successful in being able to reach the country, so what exactly are you saying to the chinese leaders? >> we have had a conversation about our intention to tighten the grip of sanctions with regards to companies that are violating and we are also of course working on new international sanctions through the un, the u.s. un ambassador had a statement about that this morning that the chinese have proposed additional measures and
things were positive in the conversations we are having about instituting additional international sanctions as a response to the launch on july 4 we are also telling them quite up front that we will not hesitate to take additional actions against chinese companies that are violating the sanctions with north korea. i haven't told them the list of ten companies that is in your bill, but we have been talking about a lot of other entities and companies that we have information about that are involved with north korea and that we are proceeding to try to move against. >> what are you telling the chinese are the conditions under which we are willing to engage in direct talks with the north koreans?
the chinese have asked us to engage in direct negotiations with the north koreans. what have you sen said to china about what those conditions would be that would bring us to the direct talks with iraq's what are the conditions that you've given to the chinese? >> we haven't given them a list of conditions but i think i mentioned in my statement that they start would be a moratorium on testing of missiles and nuclear devices and the diminishing of provocative behavior. that would be the first step in moving toward a negotiation. we would like to see some seriousness on the part of north korea about abandoning its weapons program. >> you're saying they have to make concessions before it will begin negotiations, is that the position? >> north korea doesn't have to make concessions. it has to stop it un security
council resolution of illicit behavior and we don't see that as a concession. >> i appreciate that but you have to look at it from the perspective of the north koreans as well which is why we are going to direct negotiations with a tougher sanctions program surrounding its economy in cooperation with the chinese. from my perspective it's the perfect formula to get a result before next year when it becomes irreversible. thank you mr. chairman. >> senator portman. >> thank you mr. chairman. as the senator has described, we have the challenges with north korea and over the period of the last couple decades, a few different administrations we tried doing things which have not worked. i wanted to talk if i could for a moment about the possibility of redesignating north korea as a state sponsor of terrorism, and i raise this because you
will recall the designation was actually removed as a part of a negotiation and my understanding is the north koreans didn't keep their end of the bargain on the negotiation. i know you are currently pursuing a strategy of maximum pressure as it is called against the regime and i just wonder why this isn't one of the things you are looking at. the perry initiative and the administration was aware this was removed. the bush administration was discussed, the bush administration the removal was in 2008 and was based on the agreement with north korea to disable it plutonium factory and for the complete and correct declaration of its nuclear programs. none of those things happened. today we understand that the
production continues and it's an important part of the north korean program. if i'm wrong about that i would like to hear from you and we are nowhere near having a complete understanding of the program of course, so that removal from the list in 2008 was closely linked to the negotiating and it never happened. the director is now reminding us of the threat assessment that came out a couple months ago that the record is showing dangerous missile technology with state sponsors of terrorism including iran and syria continues to pose a threat not just to the u.s. but the environment in east asia and elsewhere. so sharing the dangerous nuclear weapon technology with iran a state sponsorship of them should seem to be an important link to terrorism. ..
>> the redesignation a of the state-sponsored terrorism. and what the status of that decision-making is, if you are not doing that, why are you doing that? >> thank you senator for that question. of course, let me start basing our hearts really do go to the family of auto warm beer. it's reprehensible tragedy and something nobody should go through.
i certainly appreciate the sentiment behind the question and i think we are all very concerned about the military and conditions inside and actions by the regime that are very much outside the bounds of any responsible state actor regarding this date sponsors of terrorism, we are reviewing that issue right now. it is an issue that the secretary is taken an interest in. there are a lot of technical and legal aspects to it, so i cannot tell you with great specific entrance mississippi where we are in that return. merely given the designation. i can't give you more
information, perhaps at a later date. >> i appreciate that information. i would ask you get back to me. i assume the chairman would be interested as to what the thinking is in the considerations are. the highly technical decision, i know you need to meet sirkin requirements to countries that we consider the top state sponsors of terrorism would be a link. not just other country citizens, but ours. with regard to otto warmbier, i want to thank you, i appreciate the deputies personal involvement. as you know the investor was critical to us been able to ultimately bring him home. we appreciate the state departments increased and highly personal efforts over the past couple months.
again, the process that we have gone through over the past 18 months with dprk with regard to auto indicates to me the level of the depravity that exists within that regime. one question, this has to with economic sanctions. many of us have talked about the imposition of broader sanctions by having more chinese companies brought into the sanctions regime because there are hundreds and thousands of chinese companies still doing business with north korea. some to deal with their military activities as well. let me ask about the sanctions that are in place. are they working? are they affecting the pace with which the country of north korea has been able to develop and test its nuclear and ballistic missile programs? and to what sources of funding has the regime resorted to in
order to get around some of the sanctions? >> thank you for the question. "we see is as we build this global network to try to increase the pressure on the regime and prevent proliferation, especially of illicit technology going to north korea, there has been some effect. we are affecting their ability to get things they need. it has not unfortunately slow down the missile testing program. we do see them needing to resort to new avenues of access to get imports and other things. i think that is one of the desired goals of the sanctions regime is to make things more difficult for them obviously to proceed with their weapons program, i think one aspect of
this is, as the pressure on the regime in sanctions and the inability to transact financial transactions and move things easily cross borders without being subject to inspection, they will start to look for new avenues of outlet. that's one of the reasons why we have been insistent on traveling out to countries you would not normally think of as being partners of north korea, to shore up the resolve of countries all of the world to keep north korea from accessing markets they may now be turning to when things get more difficult in the nearby neighborhood. unfortunately, we have not seen their missile program slowdown. in fact, seems their testing at the same rapid rate that they have been testing it lately. so, we're continuing to talk to
china about that. were continuing to impinge on sources of hard currency, financing, but we find that a lot of their production has gone indigenous. it has become harder and harder to stop this kind of activity in north korea. as we work with china, everybody in the un sanctions network is conscious. it's one of the thing the un panel of experts is doing and keeping track of items and dual use items that may be of use to north korea on trying to make sure we closed on those avenues. we have also started to work on this. i have a lot of conversations and capacity building to do with other countries. some countries have more capacity to catch these things that customs.
it's one of the things in her conversation with their chinese colleagues that we talked about, providing customs assistance for them on the border to catch the stuff that goes into north korea. were working with that is awesome bar other allies in the region. >> the alternative is frightening. that's just for the region and certainly south korea recognize that now. but also for the broader region including china and what could happen on their border with dprk. now with the new testing of the intercontinental ballistic missile, really for the whole world. i would hope that we would not only put more pressure on these countries, but we would apply that pressure in a way that is clear that it's in their self-interest to avoid potential calamity that would occur if we do not more effectively through sanctions and peaceful means
curtail what they are able to do their missile program in nuclear program. another chairman is holding the searing approach but attention on this issue. i actually hope that is a top priority of the administration. again, in the self-interest of these other countries to avoid a more drastic result. thank you. >> before he turned to the next panel, i would like to have the if we could get a timeframe from the state department on the designation of state-sponsored terror, think that's important. it is clear whether it's the murderous actions the regime has taken against its own people, others, the imprisonments that they continue to be responsible for, whether some missile launches her interaction with iran, this needs to be made soon. i believe a redesignation of that state sponsor of terror. thank you secretary thornton for
your testimony today. and apologies for the late sta start. i want to bring up the second panel to begin their testimony. the first witness is bruce, he serves as the senior research fellow at the heritage foundation. prior to joining that he spent 20 years serving at the central intelligence agencies and the defense intelligence agency focusing on the korean peninsula. including sca's chief for korea. welcome. our second and final witness for the second panel is mr. leon siegel who currently serves as director of the northeast asia project at the social science research council in new york. his author of numerous books on nuclear nonproliferation issues, has taught at columbia and princeton universities and is a member of the editorial board of the new york times from 1991 to 1995. thank you for being with us.
please begin. >> thank you mr. chairman. reagan member, it's an honor to be asked to appear before you on an important issue to our national security. the evidence of the icbm threshold has triggered greater advocacy for u.s. printed military attack to prevent north korea from obtaining its objective. the preemptive attacks on test flights the two that clearly poses security risk could trigger an all out war with catastrophic consequences. while the u.s. should be steadfast its defenses of his territory and allies, it should save a preemptive military strike for a minute north korea attacked. conversely, others push for returning negotiations. but, we have been down that path before and all were unsuccessful. north korea placed several agreements to another and have agreements. and then they promised to give
up the weapons they never built in the first place. the u.s. and allies offered economic developments. diplomatic recognition, declaration of non- hostility, turning a blind eye to violations, and not implementing u.s. laws. by word and deed north korea has repeatedly shown it has no intention of abandoning the nuclear weapons under present circumstances. it's difficult have a dialogue with a country that shuns it. north korea close in your channel in july 2016 summer in the last link between our governments until allowing dialogue to facilitate the return of the comatose and dying otto warmbier. they refuse to pick up the phone in the hotline and the osc. they have rejected several attempts at engagement by south korean president, they've dismissed them as nonsense. so south korea has tried
engaging them having 240 inner creating agreements. proposals to returning to negotiation such as the freeze for freeze option share common theme for calling for more concessions in return for a commitment by the north to undertake a portion of which is already obligated to do. the best way to engage in negotiation will be after a comprehensive strategy. such a policy polls u.s. laws and un resolutions and imposes a penalty and those that violate them. puts in place measures that make it harder for north korea to import items for the prohibitive programs as well as constrain proliferation. they must be held accountable and to refrain from doing so would be to condone illegal activity and give defective immunity and undermined un resolutions.
success of the administrations talk tough about it but instead engaged in incrementalism and imposing sanctions and defending u.s. laws. officials responsible will say that they have listened evidence of north korea, chinese and other entities that are in violation that they were right prevented from implementing those. although trump has criticized obama's north korea policies he has yet to distinguishes. trumps policy of maximum pressure to date has been anything but. he continues to pull american punches against north korean and chinese violations of u.s. law. the trump administration pressed frustration and took actions
against a bank. there are indications there'll be sanctions additional chinese violators, hope that is the case. we have to highlight having condemned the crimes against humanity. advocacy for human rights must be a component of u.s. policy. americans were rightly appalled by the death of otto, we must not lose sight of the brutal reprehensible human rights violations that the regime imposes on its own citizens which the un assessed constituted crimes against humanity. in july of 2016 they put sanctions on a handful of entities but since then no action. in conclusion, the most sensible is to increase pressure while ensuring the u.s. is sufficient defenses for itself and allies and leaving the door open to diplomatic efforts. at present any offer of economic inducements to entice north korea to abandon the nuclear arsenal has little to no chance of success. thank you for the privilege of appearing before you. >> thank you.
i forgot to mention to have sorry we are for the late start as well. thank you both for being here. >> thank you chairman. thank you for inviting me to appear before you today. the current unbounded north korea weapons program poses a clear and present danger to the u.s. and allied security. that makes it a matter of greatness to negotiate the nuclear missile testing and fission material reduction even if they're not willing to commit to complete two nuclear station out front. have no doubt complete denuclearization remains the goal. but demanding that they pledge that now only delay possible agreement, enabling it to add to its military wherewithal and bargaining leverage in the meantime. now, soon after taking office president trump resume to diplomatic relations.
those talks are in a in advance. restarting them is imperative. the experiences that pressure without negotiations has never worked in the past. there's no reason to think it will work now. the question to ask about people who prefer the sanctions only approach is, how long will it take for the sanctions to work, to get north korea to accept our negotiating position and to stop their icbm testing, there nuclear testing and their material production. how long? with that in mind it seems to me legislation now under consideration should not immediately trigger sanctions but provide at least a three-month implementation to allow time for talks. three months is going to make a difference in terms of the impact of the sanctions. may open the opportunity for
talks if we are willing to talk. washington is preoccupied with getting beijing to put more pressure on. but it's worth recalling on three occasions when china and the united states work together in the un council to impose tougher sanctions in 2006, 2009, 2013, north korea responded by conducting nuclear tests in an effort to drive them apart. that did not happen after washington and beijing agreed on a much tougher security council sanctions last november. instead, kim jong-un defied widespread expectations and he was soon conduct a six nuclear test is a signal of strength. if we delay talks we may get that test. the recent test launch of an icbm underscores how the prospect of tougher sanctions
without talks prompt him to step up army. a policy of maximum pressure and engagement can only succeed if nuclear diplomacy with his resume. and north security concerns are addressed. we must not lose sight of the fact that it is north korea that we need to persuade, not china. that means taking account of north korea strategy. during the cold war they play china off against the soviet union to maintain freedom of maneuver. 1988 anticipated the collapse of the soviet union he reached out to improve relations with the united states, south korea and japan in order to avoid overdependence on china. that has been the kim's objective ever since. from that vantage point that was the basis of the 1994 framework of the september 2056 party joint statement. so washington the suspension of
the nuclear missile programs was the point of those agreements which succeeded in shuttering the production of the material and stopping test launches. both agreements collapsed when washington did little to implement its commitment to improve relations. and of course they reneged on denuclearization. that past -- now indications that a suspension of north korea and the solon nuclear testing in missile production could be negotiable. in exchange the trading with the enemy sanctions be for a roast could be a relax for you a third time. energy assistance unilaterally halted by south korea in 2008 could be resumed. an agreement will require addressing pyongyang security needs.
kurt. the flights were resumed i want to remind you to reassure our allies in the aftermath of the north's nuclear test, those tests are suspended. b-52 flights without any sacrifice of deterrence. north korea is well aware of the reach of u.s. icbms. which by the way were recently test launched to remind them. the u.s. can also continue to bolster rotate next resize forces in the region so conventional deterrence will remain robust. the chances of persuading north korea to go beyond another temporary suspension to dismantle its nuclear missile programs are slim without firm commitments of washington to move toward political and economic normalization, engage in a peace process and negotiate security arrangements and a
nuclear weapons free zone that will provide a multilateral legal framework for denuclearization. in that context, president trump's willingness to hold out the prospect of a summit would also be a significant inducement. i miss enclosing, we know what north korea's lake with its one-man rule, personality and dogmatic devotion. it's a desire decidedly bad state. that's what we know about north korea. the wisest analysts i know once wrote, finding the truth about the north's nuclear program is an example of what we know sometimes leaves us away from what we need to learn. the best way to learn is to enter into talks about talks probe whether they're willing to change course. thank you.
>> thank you for your testimony. senator markey, if you have questions start with a brief question. you heard from secretary thorton talk about the pillars they laid out. he said houses policy in a different than strategic patients? if the actions they have laid out don't result in additional pressure it is strategic patients, is that correct? >> i think the real test is what actions are implemented. we've heard tough talk when president obama said north korea is most heavily sanctioned on earth he was wrong. so it's really the actions that carry through on these ledges of pressure. i'm waiting to see the length of the list of sanctions and entities that will be sanction sanctioned, not only north korean but the chinese violators of your small. >> what a more global approach
with access to financial networks be something that could actually work? >> i think we need to have a full spectrum of an integrated strategy. it sanctions versus engagement. there's two sides to the same coin. in a both of them working in conjunction with each other along with other measures of human rights advocacy, deterrence, et cetera. but i think we need to augment the sanctions we have. as you said propose legislation will plug holes which will augment measures. in many ways they're trying to induce this administration to use the authorities have long had to enforce resolutions. >> why won't china responsible for 90% of the economy while they simply go to kim jong-un and say, let's step down your nuclear program and begin the conversations you talk about.
>> i think mr. chairman, they have. the problem is the chinese i think understand the situation somewhat similarly to what i have tried to suggest which is the north koreans want to change their relationship with us as a hedge against china. they don't want to be dependent on china. they also understand that when they join with the u.s. at the un voted for tougher sanctions resolutions and in most cases implemented the police most of them, the north korean response was to test a nuclear weapon to drive us apart. so part of this is there seems to be in the chinese mind a different logic working, because they grasp what the north koreans seem to want. i think we have to unfortunately
grasp what the north koreans want which is an improved relationship with us because they don't want to be dependent on china. >> think mr. chairman thank you both for excellent testimony. it's often implied that the only way the united states can engage in dialogue with north korea is by giving it other concessions by conceding the ultimate goal of when he talks of complete denuclearization. what i believe there are many circumstances under which we could engage in talks with north korea that would not require concessions, that would not impact our ability to ensure the safety and security of our allies would not remove any options for the united states to deal with the north korean challenge. your testimony indicates you may feel the same. can share your opinion on some of the different ways the united
states can engage without having to provide economic concessions or without having our allies? commitment to their safety or security. >> yes sir, first of all, from the north korean vantage point, vis-à-vis the united states, this is never been about economics. spent about the relationship. the only interest they have an sanctions' not because they expect fortune 500 companies to russian into north korea. it's because it's a sign of them to entity. trading with the enemy act, how queer could it be. secondly, with respect obviously a lot of people worry about the first thing they will want his u.s. troops to go out. if that's what they want, we will not give it to them, are we. we'll only take her troops out
of south korea if south koreans ask us to do that. the north koreans know that. indeed the north koreans, for many years, it at least a couple years ago kept talking about essentially best, if the united states is our enemy, u.s. troops in south korea are a threat to us and have to go. but if the united states is no longer an enemy those troops are no longer a threat to us. and they can stay. and indeed, the north koreans on numerous occasions, the last of them couple of years ago talked about the u.s. a bridge too far north korea being allies. you can have two allies, you can be allied to south korea and to us. they were looking for formulation to change the relationship. that's what this is about. in a world in which the relationship is changed it is possible to imagine, i'm not
saying it's likely, but it's possible to imagine the north koreans, down a long road will become convinced we are no longer there enemy and they don't need nuclear weapons to protect themselves. i don't think there is a sign we can get there now because of our politics and because of their politics. but we have to stop the programs now to give ourselves a chance to do that. i know of no other way to get rid of their their weapons. >> thank you. mr. klinger, we convinced qaddafi to give up his nuclear weapon program. we convinced saddam hussein to give up his nuclear weapon program and then subsequently we participated in a process that led to their deaths. so if you're kim and you are looking at the united states and
the goal ultimately to do the d nuclear i, what does he need as a guarantee for his own personal safety in order to convince them that it is worth his while to engage in talks that could head towards denuclearization. and ultimately what other concessions are the commitments of the united states would have to make in order to get him to accept that premise? >> north korean has used those same examples as to why they will never negotiate away their nuclear weapons. they have set denuclearization is off the table. there's nothing you can offer us, were prepared to talk about a priest piece treaty, or fight. so, unless we change the calculus than they will not negotiate away those nuclear
weapons. the pressure, the sanctions and targeted financial membership measures are fulfilling objectives as we hoped we could get to a negotiated position. were no longer turning a blind eye to violations. were putting a place measures to constrict the inflow and outflow. >> when you look at this recent dramatic increase in trade between north korea and china? what is your message to the trump administration in terms of what they need to do, in terms of telescope in the timeframe to ensure that the north koreans economy is not benefiting from these chinese trade given the rapid movement that they have made towards integration of icbm
with a nuclear wire? >> i would say we need to distinguish between diplomacy and law-enforcement give that message to china. u.s. laws not negotiable. the entities that come into the u.s. financial system and misuse it violation of your small will be treated accordingly. with diplomacy we continue to try to convince beijing to fully implement un sanctions. we work with them to his readers their support for the regime. those things against you u.s. law is not negotiable. >> can we change the calculus in the north korean regime mentality that they don't want to have a repetition of what happened in libya and iraq affect them, without our legislation passing and without
the already existing sanctions being tighten in order to force a negotiation in the timeframe that avoids perhaps the reversible moment in our relationship? >> the first step is to change the calculus of the chinese banks and businesses engaging with north korea. you can wean them away from engaging with north korea. we seen that when the u.s. took action and have private meetings to introduce 24 entities including entire countries in the bank of china to defy the chinese government by cutting off its interaction. if we go after those chinese organizations you can have a few small number of influential actions you can take that have repercussions along a broader scale. you use those to take out criminal organizations and change the calculus for
legitimate businesses who see it no longer in their business interests. you can tighten the regime. >> so compared to the sanctions already in the books, and thus far there lack of efficacy in the proposal that senator gardner nine have introduced, what is your view about her legislation in terms of serving as an additional weapon in the arsenal, the diplomatic arsenal which the trump administration can use and how would this legislation complement existing laws on the books? >> very well complements existing legislation and executive orders and regulations, again the question will be, will the executive
branch actually use the powers they have been given? like the mayor saying i'm cut tough on crime but then not having his police department enforce those they have evidence against. my view is that if they don't, it will lead inevitably to north korean icbm nuclear weapons program that is completed. i don't think it's a nation there's an option. i think the president has to become tougher on the chinese. the release valve the north koreans are using in their punishing the south koreans rather than the north koreans. ultimately, unless we get more real about what is happening, then we are just on a collision course north korean armed icbm
capable posture for the rest were lives, do you agree that? >> i agree, but i think what you said earlier is just as important, which is, you have to open the way to negotiation. >> that is the key. and [inaudible] our terms, but talks about talks to get them to stop. in the circumstance in which they have suspended testing and their fissile material production. that is much more secure. we want to prolong the suspension as much as possible and go beyond it to get them to dismantle the facilities they have for producing more missiles. and then ultimately get the weapons.
the weapons are going to come last to come down a very long road because they need to be assured the relationship is changed. that's the structure of the different that is at least remotely possible. is it likely? i went bad on that. negotiations are not guaranteed. the sanctions seem to be a long road to nowhere. >> my view is sanctions with the direct. >> can you just both and i apologize, can you each give me one minute summary that you want the chairman and i to remember for your testimony as we move forward to in this very perilous time in our relationship with north korea. >> i would say, realize that all the hype that sanctions have been implemented and failed is incorrect. they have not been tried to the full extent.
the legislation last reduce the obama administration to do three actions against north korea because of legislation. we need to increase pressure. we want to get to negotiations but i would distinguish between diplomats as opposed to resuming formal negotiations where you lose control of the momentum. it often requires concessions and negotiations don't feel. of diplomatic discussions among the state department. but realize that has been tried before and they are the ones refusing to talk. >> i think sanctions are important, but they have to be married with negotiations. the only way the time that we need to stop and icbm. a boosted energy thermonuclear device by north korea is to get
get negotiations going and see if they will stop testing and stop the fissile material production. that takes both sanctions. >> thank you for this excellent hearing. >> thank you for being here. i apologize thank you for being part of this hearing, the record will remain open until the close of business on friday including for members to submit questi