tv The Road to Somewhere CSPAN August 5, 2017 10:01am-11:46am EDT
fans, hunter s thompson very cleverly sort of put in little allusions and references to fear and loathing in las vegas and others as well. and add a layer of pleasure to the book so thank you. >> thank you, politics and prose and brad graham and everybody, thank you so much. >> booktv is on twitter and facebook and we want to hear from you, tweet us, twitter.com/booktv or post a comment on our facebook page, facebook.com/booktv.
>> tell me when. >> welcome to the hudson institute. i am a senior fellow and director of the center for american common culture, john fonte. american leadership and global engagement for secure and prosperous future, we were founded in 1961 by strategist herman con, challenging congressional thinking to manage strategic transitions in the future through disciplinary
studies, defense, international relations, economics, healthcare, technology, culture and law. we are delighted to host david goodhart, head of policy exchange think tank, founder and former editor of the centerleft think tank the most. his previous book the british dream successes and failures of postwar immigration was a runner-up for the norwell price. he has been a powerful insight, "the road to somewhere: the populist revolt and the future of politics". you can get it on amazon. the united states is a culturally divided nation. he presents a sustained,
serious, cogent argument with massive data on the crucial issues of brexit, immigration, globalization and national identity. he takes on a lot of social forces that are not used to being criticized, fred segal recently said he is a man of considerable courage. my own review of the book will be a "national review" soon. i introduce walter russell mead who will have an exchange with david after david's presentation. there is little doubt "the road to somewhere: the populist revolt and the future of politics" will have a significant and positive impact on the policy debate in the english-speaking world. i will let you take it away. >> thanks -- any just discovered power points? i discovered their value, there we go.
as john said, the value of british society, i want to talk about the bearing on democracies including overseeing the united states. the value divides in britain have had a particularly destabilizing effect, a destabilizing effect that led to the unexpected vote to leave the european union. the fact that it was such a shock is testament in some ways to different bubbles people live in. you will be very familiar since
trump, the rise of populist parties in europe, there has been a lot of analysis in this area. a lot of it like my own analysis was an educational value divide, something quite familiar to you, though you will find some lines of argument in it. the important question, why is this happening now? some of these divides have been with us for generations. why are we experiencing this eruption now, how do we move on and create new coalitions in politics. let me give you a thumbnail sketch of the value divides i am talking about.
i talk about the distinction between what i call the people from anywhere, 25% of the population i'm talking about, not just -- 3, 5% of the population, the group has become a lot bigger in recent years, tend to be highly educated, mobile, a combination of two particularly british things that are overwhelmingly residential, most under the influence of london, a mighty cities it sucks in so many people. so this educated, mobile group, they tend to value openness, autonomy, social change, social
fluidity. they tend, partly because of mobility they tend to have weak attachments to place and group, this is contrasted with the other large value block in our society, people who has the term suggests are more rooted, less well-educated, tend to value familiarity, security and have much stronger group attachments to their own people as it were. and there is a parallel binary concept that helps to flesh out the distinction which comes from
the american sociologist tucker parsons. i mention his name in a few places. when i was a university people who studied sociology would grimace at the mention of his name, producing a doll functional sociology but he came up with a very useful binary when thinking of human identity, the spectrum between achieved and ascribed identities, primarily achieved identities, their sense of self comes from what they achieved, they have successful professional careers, your sense of your self is relatively protected and secure. you can fit in anywhere. but if your identity is
primarily done ascribed identity, white, male, british and come from a certain place, belong to a certain group your identity is more easily disturbed, rapid social change or large-scale immigration, this is an important distinction of the two key distinctions when talking about the new instability in politics, two key distinctions, the ability to observe social change, attachment to group, stronger in some ways. this may sound too simplistic and binary and in some regard in some respect it is. to boil it down to something simple, if you read my book you will find plenty of light and
shade. there is a huge variety, both on a spectrum, more extreme villages where 5% of the population, the kind of people, a global identity a small but eccentric group but at the bottom end of some ways, authoritarian, in a war against much of the water and world -- modern world. i talk about a large in between agreement, that i classify as neither in the broad somewhere or anywhere camp. two things i would emphasize, i have identified labels but have not invented the value blocks. they are there but i have done
the work focusing on britain, if you look at british social attitudes survey, the range of value surveys taken in the last decade or two and if you interrogate them you will come up with the kinds of proportions, you can argue about the exact portions attributed to the various subgroups, they are at the edges and the argument shifts over time but they are in the data. the other thing i would strongly emphasize is both of these value groups are entirely legitimate at least in the mainstream variation and therein lies the tragedy of modern politics, they
are in certain respects fundamentally opposed. onto the third, i will be back for the second one. organized this briefly and touch on why now? why is this emerging now? we always had these divisions, they have always been better educated, mobile, better traveled people, people who live more pinched lives, more fear of the outsider and so on and that is the truth. i would say there are two very important reasons, such central politics, the first reason
applies less to the us but first reason for the uk and much of europe is shifted in the last generation or so from politics through the postwar period by socioeconomic framework, social class, public spending, arguments about equality or any quality and those of not gone away by any means, the last election, surprise election in britain takes us back to an old socioeconomic two party system, does take it back to a two party system. the values analysis works very well applied to that, but what has happened is we have seen the emergence of socio-cultural politics, security and identity which looms much larger to compete with and eclipsed
socioeconomic policy in the last decade or so. this has happened in response to much greater openness of economy and culture, wto, globalization, european union integration in the uk and europe, more external interference into politics on the outside, feelings people have for national sovereignty and what follows from that. the rise of sociocultural politics and socioeconomic politics, you have also seen a simple increase in the number of anywheres, the product of the huge expansion, magnification of
higher education, a new are one in the uk. the whole rise of sociocultural politics applies slightly less in the us because of race and religion in us politics as many centuries -- but even so, here too, you might say there has been a reversal, the populism is almost a return to social class politics in america, we have been worried more about boundaries and ethnicity in a way that was much more familiar in the us. focusing on the uk, the sociocultural politics has created, helps to magnify the value divisions i am talking
about and led to this instability, the underlying cause of it, the surprise brexit vote. just to go back, to flesh out the value divide in terms of politics what has been going on, the anywhere value group, large though it is has come more and more to dominate our politics and policies over the last generation or so, the lose political ideology like progressive individualism fell
at -- left side and right side, value groups in general overlap, a lot of somewheres, the middle class somewheres, working-class anywhere. peoples affections derive as much if not more from value inspirations for traditional socioeconomic social class, when vital point i want to emphasize is one thing has led to disillusionment with politics,
withdraw from politics, large section of the somewhere value block. is it any worse to understand, sufficient -- without caricature, and i call the political ideology, and is somewhere group, and if you look at that, if you go back to the 1980s. now seems like the extraordinary reaction reviews people had about, and cultural life.
in britain, and homosexuality was -- 70%, huge liberalization as opposed to race, gender, sexuality in the uk, in the us. they got along with that. they haven't led it -- they are not liberals. it is not anywhere, they have stronger national attachments, much more strongly attached, the benefit of national social contracts which often don't, and broadly speaking opposed to large-scale immigration in the uk and europe, a bit more
complicated. opposed to large-scale immigration, often said to be such and such, sometimes they are but in my experience people are anti-large-scale immigration. and and were much more -- the argument was about sending people home, but reducing the rate of the inflow of people, sometimes also in some way a stronger attachment to common social norms, integration of minorities, free riding and so
on, or a traditional, not really old-fashioned views of the family but a compromise, modified gender division of labor. not going for the a gala terrien, with family responsibilities and so on. they want a reliable, the main breadwinner mail, they have no children. and it has been about making it possible to spend time with their families. i want to stress that balance, the central decency, and yet the
alienation, has been the defining factor in this populist surge. or the over domination, the over domination of culture and society than priorities. the country like britain, british common sense was somewhere. now it is overwhelmingly in the public realm, the main policy areas in british life, start with the economy, and this is an economy that works with highly
qualified people and meanwhile the emergence of this hourglass labor market are middling jobs that gave protection that disappeared, been automated away. one of the fundamental causes, broadly supporting cultural or economic analysis, trump economics, but tying the two things that serve intertwined, essentially the -- a huge reduction in non-graduate employment in the last few decades, huge reduction in employment and there were those, somebody said this to me,
someone -- we over romanticize, the manual jobs we associate, someone who did one of those jobs until a few years ago said to me something i found in lightning, the kind of job i like to do, cognitive ability to do it well. somebody couldn't walk off the streets to harvard or mit and do my job but i could do it. and that sense of experience gave you a status protection. so much of that is gone in the market. so much so i calculated the other day, back of the envelope, 85% of jobs in the uk require a university degree or can be done after half an hour's training.
what this is all about, absolutely central fact, the rise and rise of cognitive ability as the gold standard, socialist theme in our societies, something, a long argument, never as central as it should have been. in the end of the 1950s, the rise of meritocracy, critique of a society run by non-paternalistic, self-confident confident elites who think they owe nothing to non-elites, the opposite of the paternalistic of downton abbey. one of the main themes, the bell
of the signposts pushing people in higher education route, or other parts remain sort of cinderella spaces. we have had a huge opening in our economy and society which people are reacting against and promises that were made when the new labor promise in the 80s and 90s rising in the us with tony blair in britain, globalization, we turn you into software engineers and this promise was never fulfilled, the central issues here. take something like freedom of movement, one of the biggest reasons, think about how differently it affects my two blocks.
a lawyer in north london, they have offices in madrid, go and work in one of those offices, it is wonderful and easy, going the other way, if you work in the food production sector, the biggest manufacturing sector, 400,000 people, 120,000 people in east and central, quite extraordinary change, you don't have to dislike what is alongside, folding down your wages. you are unlikely to have a desire to work on the fish
finger factory and slovakia. why would you? i touched on it previously, and the policy was dominated by -- the huge stress, minimizing impact, completely legitimate cause, favoring more women on board, moderate and average men in place by bright dynamic women. with all the focus on that area, the working-class family is disintegrating in the uk and parts of the us too. in britain no fiscal support for the family. we do have some arrangements, people bringing up children are not allowed to share their
allowances. for various historical reasons, even the conservative party is not about to introduce it. and middle and low income families, as i said, a potentially popular policy making it easier for family life. the cultural bias against domesticity, what i learned most about in this book, just how far we have gone. and in turn to check on how many european union leaders were
childless, we got one more with leo, the new prime minister in ireland, childless, and 14 out of 30 european union leaders do not have children. and partly a testament for the enormous pressures modern politics, it shows how one of the reasons private realm has been culturally downgraded in our society, so many problems, not the only cause but social care prices in britain using that connection because of the weakening of family obligation, the housing crisis, so many
households created when they break up. one of the arguments people often make for large-scale immigration is populations are shrinking. why are they shrinking? why are we having so few children? we don't provide the incentive. we make it so hard for families to stay together and nurture. a technocratic state, a brief reflection of all this, let's have a discussion, issues of social mobility, talk about this more later, related to the cognitive ability, has come to be seen in the uk, and romanticized and talk about what
is by people, gone from the projects, the counselor state to the university, and by definition only relatively small number of people can do that. it is kind of depressing for the majority of people who can't make that huge leap, there used to be more opportunity for hierarchical that we neglect at our peril. in the uk the whole idea joining the anywhere class is about leaving your hometown going through part of this, going over
residential universities, you have to leave in order to thrive. that is such a sad thing. a lot of people don't want to leave. they like where they come from, where they get their free childcare from. that -- an absolutely awful speech given by the british education secretary, just a few weeks ago to the sensibility commission in britain and talked about south yorkshire. talked about how she used to dream of owning her own house, having a decent job, more challenging career and i realized i couldn't have any of those things. it is not a one horse town, it is a town of 120,000 people. you can't live in achieved life, these are very depressing facts,
the secretary of state thinks it is fine to talk in that way. let me wind up, it is pretty dominant but something to say in what is going on, the voice is not completely silent, probably reflecting a more than anywhere worldview. there are a few niches in the policy spectrum, influences played an important role, more draconian attitude on the part of somewhere to introduce welfare caps, coalition government and welfare caps, the fact governments have been
trying and not succeeding, continuously, immigration is too high or much too high, the overwhelming domination of culture, society and policy, i made that point. what do we do about this? what are the grounds? we had an unexpected back lash, the reason people were so surprised by brexit, 3 million people voted in the brexit referendum who have not voted in general elections for four five general elections which it took us by surprise. they haven't been voting because they said with some legitimacy you are all the same. the political parties all reflect the double liberalism
that emerged in the 18th and 19th when centerleft accepted the reagan faction forms, you had a new kind of anywhere consensus on liberal economics along with the argument, the right one and the left one that has been true until now to some extent. a lot of somewheres saying you went from canvassed, what is the point? you are all the same. the referendum was an opportunity to break that. a lot of it was a domestic argument that took this rather dramatic form, the european union itself is an ultra
anywhere institution we can talk about later, moderate nationalism and illegal to discriminate in favor of that. you cannot discriminate the same services, access to labor markets and so on. a couple thoughts, it has been an argument between more militants who say we are civilized people, they are the barbarians, this is a disaster, we must dig in. on the side of the admonished anywhere people who are saying we got this wrong. now we are experiencing a
backlash, lashed out and sorting out withdrawal from the eu. we have got to somehow build the somewhere voice more strongly into our politics. one way is compulsory voting, so focused on small number of constituencies, small number of states or districts or those groups that overwhelmingly voted last time. if we had compulsory voting it might help that. one of the crucial things is the way arguments about equality, racial, gender, sexuality, equality, have become separate, seen in opposition to strong group attachments. it is possible to have both and indeed necessary to have both.
few things remain creatures -- everybody knows there are certain groups they feel more comfortable among, people like themselves. people share a common set of interests and experiences, nothing wrong with that. anywhere liberalism has made people guilty about feeling comfortable among certain types of people, doesn't have to mean you dislike other people and we got that whole argument out of kilter, it has become too divided and associated with the two value groups to bring it together and ethnic minorities particularly in britain are one of the potential bridges as it were between anywhere or
somewhere value groups. and bridge groups, in the uk, and they are often more religious, and they are much stronger family connections. or physically where they live or more rooted, the whole population, 60% of british people, 20 miles from where they live when they are 14 and so on, social mobility in the us. there was an important role in coming years for ethnic minorities in britain because of their openness but were a trojan horse in some way.
environmentalism is another possible issue. just to finish, i was always very impressed a few years ago, same quote, daniel bell talked about being social democrat or economic, being american, regulated market, social democratic economics, liberal -- some of the conservatives on social economics and that corresponds to the hidden majority in society for all sorts of historical reasons, no party has ever emerged to provide that. the conservative party came close to that and for various reasons shared the vote or went up sharply, labor did unexpectedly well too which tarnished the conservative
performance. a final point, there are places in the world to get the balance better than we have in the anglo-saxon society. germany as a model -- getting the germans, do seem, germany, london, global universities, they kind of, they kind of, local middling has greater value in spaces than germany, lots of great technical institution this, great apprenticeship system this, even the lowly shop worker gets people prestige, the memory of those institutions, to give status to lower skilled
jobs. the lender system, even the way they talk from germany, that combination, if you are out and about in germany, if you come, incomprehensible -- a kind of settlement, it just occurred to me the other day, most represents the settlement between these value groups, is bavaria. one of the richest parts of europe. and leather things.
run by this very conservative, christian social union. and liberal and dynamic cities in the country and managed to be genuinely pluralistic. and in recent occasions, with family policy, with enough sensitivity, the economic and value and cultural needs or people who are not part of that group. thank you very much. >> walter russell mead will ask a few comments and questions.
james clark, professor of foreign affairs humanities, the american interest, written america and the making of modern world, his next book, the ark of the covenant, united states, israel and the fate of the jewish people will be published this year. >> the book publication. we have known each other for quite a while. i have admired your work for a long time and even more with the latest book, i thought you had something today that resonated in america more than you know, culture trumps economics in the united states particularly with a t on the trump.
i think we saw in the paper this morning donald trump overruled virtually his entire cabinet in order to impose tariffs on steel or to move in that direction. culture trumps economics. a lot of what you are talking about seems to come down to the question of elite failures or we created this kind of mass elite with math university system so that in both britain and the united states, many other countries, the elite is a bigger percentage of the population than it used to be but it lacks the sense of the paternalism of downton abbey. you refer to the queen as an example of the older elite,
privileged equal's duty, and duty to those who share your privilege, where the monarchy, a symbol of this, the new elite, is less secure than the old in the sense that downton abbey -- keeps turning up. downton abbey will be fine. and squeezing peasants that hard, for the professional building a career of public last professionals, you feel a little bit of siege your self and are more concerned, getting ahead and making for yourself, reflecting on what do you owe other people, your duty is focused on your career to some
degree and the concept of meritocracy is the opposite of privilege and it is just fine. if i'm better than anybody i'm entitled to be richer than anybody and the areas that don't make it our slumps and it is sort of defects, bad choices, low iq, who cares? am i getting this right? you are looking at elite failure as one of the key issues? >> absolutely. a kind of self regard. it is not all liberals and americans at all, many are center-right. there is -- they do share a kind
of failure of empathy and imagination, the old class system for all of its obvious failings perhaps requires that connection, literally physically disconnected from the middling and poor people, at one time, the elites use to avoid them when they had a face-to-face relationship, the decline of physical production and manufacturing. that relationship is no longer there, the armed forces, national institutions and value groups came together and had a relationship. not an easy one but they had a relationship that he wrote it. we -- that eroded.
we need a new language to talk about cognitive elites. and we don't want to lurch into liberalism and squash the anywheres, the most dynamic, we are all anywheres, we don't -- anywheres make social change and dynamism in our society. we don't want to tip over in the other direction. we require -- everyone has to do better and we have a chance now. we have been warned, we have these extraordinary eventss, donald trump, they may turn out to be blips and life will go on as normal. some people are claiming that.
the british election made brexit funnier. i think a kind of warning sign. could face even greater forms if we don't respond to the -- >> part of the critique of the elites you seem to be making, a radical anti-democratic sense of meritocracy, democratic in the sense of genuinely be leaving in the equal worth of all people regardless of iq or social class, and a religious context, the equality of all people before god who judges equally, the cleaning lady in your apartment lot is as important as
you are, you are accountable for your treatment to her and you better respect her. and that does need to be a little bit less present in the way some of the anywheres think of the somewheres. >> every day, democratic equality has weakened in recent -- because of this point about nomination of cognitive ability becoming the gold standard to social esteem, creating new forms of discovery in a way and to reinforce the point you made earlier, seeing research like this, it is my hunch that in britain, nobody goes to
half of all students live at home in the us, it may be that high school friends and college friends merged together in some ways. you don't have the same break we do in the uk for social networks. it was not dissimilar to professors and brexit. >> we should open. >> when you talked about parsons, a theory of two different types of characteristics necessary, foxes and the lions, the foxes were very much -- they were mobile
and innovative but had negative qualities, involved in financial fraud, and they had negative and negative characteristics, the lions prayed on using the term group or systems and these were attachments to groups. they had negative qualities, and the point was circulation, constant circulation between foxes and lions and the problem he saw was domination by the foxes. >> got them in the 30. >> it is almost total. >> you mentioned it in the review. the famous mineshaft gazelle
shaft. bearing on different ways to view society and meaning more intimate community translated into a religious community and gazelle shaft is community. >> this is on c-span, give your name and affiliation if you have an affiliation. we start with the gentleman. >> and one of the greatest roles given, and the truest translation into english in the new testament the world has ever known. and the 500 anniversary the
world will rediscover that. the title -- god is global, addressed the issue of as it affects the stratification of society. >> have you come to the question? >> got and gold. the loading of money and interest which created the stratification of the elites who could enforce contracts creating impoverishment towards death, i wonder, central banking as a retired customs agent investigating money laundering it seems the two this too big to fail banks are funded through money-laundering on a substantial scale traceable through drug trafficking. to draw this back -- >> got and gold.
>> usury is a problem. it is held in western civilization to be about excessive interest rather than interest at all. in general, levels of financial fraud, our problems. i would not say right now the big banks that are made large by drug money-laundering are in fact the dominant factor in our society. ..
>> is that they're not seeing the payoff of the investment in an education. you know, they were told to go to college, and there are inspiring stories like george soros who went to -- worked his way through the london school of economics and then got out dirt poor, selling trinkets on the british seaside and then eventually made good getting into investment banking. so it seems like maybe the anywheres are getting disillusioned with their own country, their own system, and they're looking the more liberal policies and the liberal world order, and they're just feeling disconnected with the somewheres who are, like you talk about, made a achievements, they've found kind of an identity, a way of life, a livelihood. and so it just appears that perhaps education needs to be
revalued. as a society, we have to revalue education. there's been a lot of discussion the last election about subsidizing education. candidate bernie sanders talked about free college for everyone -- >> [inaudible] >> yeah. >> so go ahead. >> yeah. i mean, i think i wouldn't be -- i mean, you've had both bernie sanders getting very close to political power in the u.s., you've had jeremy corbyn doing the same thing in britain, and one of their big appeals has been the dissolution of student tuition fees. jeremy corbyn was actually promising not only to abolish student tuition fees, but to repay people that had already paired back their tuition -- paid back their tuition fees. it's extraordinary. this is just writing a massive check to the middle and upper middle class in britain which overwhelmingly dominate higher education, as is no doubt the case here too. indeed, in the same manifesto he
was proposing that, he was also proposing not to unfreeze welfare benefits for the poor. i mean, this is jeremy corbyn, supposedly extreme leftist. i think actually as much by chance as by design, labour put together a pragmatic and appealing manifesto to lots of different groups. but nonetheless, i think, you know, i think our political classes will, you know, will have noticed the enormous popularity of this, of the policy of abolishing tuition fees. i think it's clearly a regretted policy. although, i mean, i think it's one of -- because it happens so relatively recently and quickly in the u.k., i mean, the cultural political power of higher education is a very understudied subject. and, indeed, we were just talking earlier about this. this last election in britain sort of brought it to the
surface for the first time. we talked about, you know, the university -- we've always talked about universities, we used to just mean oxford and cambridge. now about 20%, perhaps, of the seats in british parliament have a stable element not only of -- a substantial element not only of students and staff from universities, but lots of, generally speaking, liberal-minded graduates who sort of stay in certain towns and parts of towns, you know, bristol west, manchester, brighton. there are places in britain that you might say they're the kind of anywhere somewhere places. they're where anywheres go to kind of establish new roots, you know? anywheres generally don't, you know, they're not from, you know, they leave home, but they find, they find they become kind of rooted and established not as much group think, often they're better educated in some ways so
they can rationalize their own group think more effectively. but i think the whole, i mean, the massive case of higher education, my one joke about this is that i sometimes say, you know, explaining brexit i say, well, i blame the masses for brexit. [laughter] mass immigration and mass higher education have produced brexit, the two masses. >> okay. the -- right over here, lady with the white jacket. >> hello. thanks very much for coming. it's very enlightening. my name's cynthia butler, i'm an attorney in town. i've worked on a number of political campaigns. my question is what in the elite or the anywheres as you're calling is there in the nature of sort of sacred policy cows that we have here, sort of -- i mean, we've got things that the elites have wed themselves to
that, i believe, the last election proved to be completely objectionable to, you know, large segments of religious people, for example. i mean, i would say our elite sacred cows are things like planned parenthood, abortion and, you know, free immigration, you know? we have sort of things that people of an educated status would say are nonnegotiables. so what in the british, you know, value scheme do they wed themselves to in the nature of sacred i cows that have been policy-wise rejected? >> yeah. good, good question. i mean, not that dissimilar to here. i mean, you know, immigration would certainly with one of the issues that's a kind of, it's a kind of emblem. i mean, we don't have
immigration -- we have had immigration become much more open and historically we haven't thought of u.s. ourselves as an immigration -- of ourselves as the immigration company. we had the two great waves starting in the '40s, sort of tapering down in the '80s and '90s and a new surge in '97. and then a new, new surge after 2004 when a lot of people from former communist countries that just joined the european union came to the u.k. so by historical standards, we've had unprecedented levels in recent years, and that has become one of the central dividing lines. in this argument. and, indeed, it's become an emblem of -- i think it's a social change more generally. the idea that social change, novelty, these are sort of the good things, and this requires a very large amount of openness in your society.
a very large amount of fluidity. which, as i said right at the beginning, this is something that anywheres find not only comfortable, but desirable and look down upon somewheres for their inability to kind of handle and ride change. but, yeah, someone that -- what are the other kind of liberal mainstream ideas? i mean, membership in the european union was one of them too, you know, that the european union seemed to sort of crystallize that modern european openness. but, of course, it did so at the, at the price of reducing the democratic voice. now, you know, as i was saying, a lot of somewheres have stopped vote anything the elections because they felt -- voting in the election because they felt so many of the things that affected their lives were
imposed from the outside without any -- i think one of the key differences here, actually, is, you know, the way in which, you know, in trade negotiations, you know, global -- all of these kinds of global negotiations, anywheres, starting the assumption of anywheres is that some sort of deal to further open up trade and goods services and so on and, indeed, movement of people must inherently be a good thing and that we have to come together. this is more of a european argument, we have to come together in europe to kind of negotiate and to protect ourselves from, you know, from the kind of global bond markets. and, but i think to non-elites, elites even in my larger definition of elites, the top 15, 20% of the population, they
understand that, they can see the rationality, it often benefits them. but to the non-elite, you know, the cure is worse than the disease or it's the same as the disease. i'm bussed around by brussels or the global bond markets, it doesn't really make a difference to me. so, i mean, religious or issues play somewhat less of a role, i think, in u.k. politics. minority integration is probably another one of those touchstone issues too. i mean, in terms of sort of caring about it. like i say, somewheres are more easily disturbed, i think, by the feeling that their town has changed a lot, you know, there are whole neighborhoods where people different to them live, and they feel a bit anxious about it. you know, there will be schools that are entirely minority dominated. and to -- anywheres will think,
well, that's fine. that's modern world, you know? of course people will cluster together. that's, but because they have kind of less of a sense of a kind of, you know, you might say an ethnic identity themselves. the anywheres have less of a sense of common norms and a common way of life. so they're less disturbed by, by the consequences of large scale immigration. >> let me sharpen that point just a little bit, and this is on immigration. just bring that out a little bit. what struck me very -- when fred siegel said, well, this guy's rather courageous. i was thinking of one of your comments in the book which you would get tremendous pushback here from any american. you're talking about social cohesion and immigration and the assimilation of immigrants. and you said it would be easier,
essentially, to assimilate 100,000 australians as opposed to 100,000 afghans. you would get tremendous pushback here -- >> [inaudible] >> so this is the difference, i guess, between the anywheres and the somewhere attitudes, and i think it makes a certain amount of sense, what you're saying. but the question of social cohesion. so maybe the different types of societies that people come from do make a difference. the anywheres, apparently, would say how dare you even bring this up. the somewheres would say, well, this is common sense. we had the situation with gordon brown and the woman a couple years back. i'm giving you a chance to think about this a little bit. >> well, that's a really good point. and, actually, what it underlines is this, it's a return to this different attitude to groups and group attachments and group identities. liberals, i mean, the left tend
to, they tend to be groupist when it comes to economics. they still sort of believe in social class. but when it comes to the culture and society, the left -- at least in britain and much of europe -- becomes highly individualistic. it's, you know, society's just a random collection of individuals, you know? we're all just individuals, aren't we? so what difference it possibly make to have another 100,000 people from eritrea? but somewheres don't see it like that. they see society as a kind of home, not a shop. and as i said, it's radically sort of different view of society depending on whether you're looking at it through an economic lens or a cultural lens. like i said, the left groupist in economics, individualist -- they're almost saying there is no such thing as society when it comes to peoples, as it were, and how we -- [inaudible] peoples and cultures and ethnicities and all that kind of stuff. and, hence, they can genuinely believe, you know, what anybody
knows, that obviously it's easier to integrate 100,000 australians than 100,000 afghans. you know, language, culture, way of life are immediately shared in certain respects with australians in a way than with afghans. afghans can assimilate but, obviously, it's common sense that it will take longer, and it will be a more friction-filled and difficult process. >> gentleman right here. >> yes, i'm brian marshall. i'm semi-retired at this time. among british failures, i would think that the strong concern about the fact that the country was governed, has been governed for a significant period now by the e.u. parliament, and much of the legislation coming from outside the country. and to a considerable extent, i would think that would be a
major problem in the united states. i have not heard very much about that being a concern this britain. is that the case? it seems like most of the discussion has been relating to immigration. >> no. i mean, it has been. you know, there has long been a substantial minority of people who have objected very strongly to the erosion of sovereignty represented by the european union. you know, we have willingly given up powers to this body in the same way we do with other global, the same way we do with nato. but, i mean, what's happened particularly since the 1980 and the 1990s, the european union has been a remarkable success story in many ways. i think it took various wrong paths in the 1990s. its suck -- success kind of went
to its head, particularly at the end of the cold war and the period in brussels. it rushed ahead with a political rather than economic euro. it introduced this concept of european citizenship which subsequently made it so difficult to control freedom of movement. not only do we have large numbers of people coming, but when they arrive, they have to be treated exactly the same way as british citizens which to fedded against a kind of common sense notion that most americans would have. most germans, slovakians have of favoritism, the idea that national citizens should be first in the queue for public goods of various kinds in most segments anyway. and that, you've also had the over-rapid enlargement of the european union. and it turns out, ironically, that we're leaving the european union because of enlargement. we were the country that promoted enlargement more than any other because we thought it
would dilute the integrating force in the european union. but now, as you say, substantially because of the -- and i think role of parliament is very important here in the immigration story. post-colonial immigration, as i mentioned earlier, quite a few people came from the late '40s to the '80s, '90s. people from the former colonies, caribbean, india, pakistan, and there was some friction. gradually, britain became used to being a multi-ethnic, multi-racial society. but in the '80s, '90s, you know, politicians, government, parliament was able to sunday to the ang -- respond to the anxieties that people felt about it. by the early '90s, immigration was actually negative. more people were leaving than or were coming. and i think, you know, that was a proper response to -- and it made it easier to absorb the newcomers when the numbers were relatively low.
when after 2004 when we had the great surge from eastern europe, people suddenly realized that our parliament could do nothing about it, because this was part of the set of rules that we'd signed up to as part of the european union. hadn't been a big deal before 2004 because people didn't move, but suddenly a whole lot of poor countries joined. we were the only big country to allow immediate access to our labor market, so we were sort of particularly strongly hit by a big wave of people. and people realized that something as basic and existential as, you know, who comes into your country and in what quantity was -- we were unable to affect. and i think that -- and this is true a across a whole range of other issues too. like i say, the cure is so often worse than the disease. you know, you -- the whole point about countries is they have different kind of national preferences on things. you know, you have different
national preferences, different choices you make on your attitude to risk, say, whether it's financial products or gm crops. brits and americans disagree about these things. and we have different countries, it's okay to disagree about these things. but when you join a club -- and this actually applies to some extent even to the wto -- when you join a club like the european union, suddenly all these national preferences are harder to impose, you know? you have, you come to some sort of messy compromise. it hay -- it may be worth doing if the reward is big enough. you maybe are all getting richer and it works. there was a feeling with the european union that we were sacrificing national sovereignty and not getting enough back in return. >> okay. there were -- the fourth row there's two women here. yeah, you start and then over here. >> there's a guy who's been waiting patiently. >> my name is sarah brown, i'm a student from london, england. my question is how much so would
you argue that political language and our media has more of a say in our electoral vote and political participation than background political context and identity? >> media plays a bigger role than -- >> towards participation than background political identity and context. >> oh. well, i mean, i think the media -- the media plays a very interesting role in this argument, and it's possibly sort of part of the, part of the solution. i mean, we've had a very, we've had a narrowing of our political culture, probably here too, in the last two or three generations. sociological background of mps has tended to become more and more similar, a much more political political class, as it were. people who have worked as interns and special advisers who
then go on to become congressmen, senators and so on. so you've -- and you've seen, as i was saying in my talk, you've seen a narrowing of the kind of political ideology too. the liberalism has been so dominant in both of our countries. and yet the big countervailing factor to that now which is the intimate, which is, you know, the kind of somewhere trolls are somehow, you know, now released. you know, the kind of elite filters on political communication have been completely blown away, and it's very ugly a lot of the time, you know? your own president. it's kind of messy, but it is giving a voice to people who didn't have a voice before in some ways or felt they didn't have a voice. and, you know, i think it's too early to to tell quite how that, how that media revolution very, you know, the sort of populist democratic media revolution is
going to play out. and i think in some ways, you know, one could see this as a kind of optimistic development. and, you know, i mean, like i say, in the short-term it's certainly made the tone of politics uglier. but the people -- it's a bit like populist parties in europe. many populist parties in europe have been this government, you know -- in government, you know, as minorities and coalitions. and it's kind of civilizedded them. not in all cases, but the finns' party in finland, for example, it's had to compromise in government as one of the coalition parties in the government. it's lost a lot of public support, but it kind of learned that politics is about difficult trade-offs, and you can't just have simple populist slogans
that are an answer to everything when you're faced with real responsibilities. you change your behavior. and that's been, i think that's been a civilizing influence on european populism. and you might say the same thing about the kind of new media opening, the fact that everybody can be a publisher. everybody can have -- anyone can set up a blog or tweet or say things on facebook, and lots of other people might listen to you. that democratization of the means of communication. we're in the, because we're in the early stagings of it, it's kind of messy and ugly, but i think you may see, you know, the trolls become, you know, responsible people like, like my colleagues on the platform here. [laughter] >> role model for trolls. >> yes, go ahead. >> thank you, david. >> two seats down. >> my name's -- [inaudible] and i'm a student at the
st. alban school of public service. something that i've noticed in the united states, i'm not sure if the same is true for britain, that recently we've seen a lot of i guess what you'd call the anywheres or certain groups of anywheres kind of using anti-intellectualism or anti-expert sentiments as kind of a scapegoat and harnessing that to kind of gain populist influence. you mentioned in your talk that there are certain bridges that we might be able to use to find compromise between the value systems, and i was wondering if you thought that we could ever kind of reconcile that anti-intellectualist sentiment. >> did you mean that they're using -- who's using the anti-intellectual sentiment? that's, that was my -- i didn't quite understand that. how do you see that? >> for example, with the past election i guess we'd all
consider, say president trump as an anywhere, but i think he was very successful in kind of harnessing the populist sentiment. i guess that's more what i was referring to. >> well, the famous statement during the brexit campaign by michael gove, a leading british politician who said the people are fed up with experts. and he said, you know, he said that sympathetically. i think what he meant was that, obviously, we're not fed up with experts who, you know, keep the airplanes flying or, you know,ening nears and hard scientists. but -- engineers and hard scientists. but the media is dominated by people who are not hard scientists, people who are journalists or commentators or, you know, academics in political science or whatever.
and they, they are not neutral. invariably, they have agendas. they have lots of facts and figures at their fingertips, but they are not neutral. but i think it's also true that what we're seeing is a kind, you know, we've seen in the last generation or two this kind of final e eradication of the kindf politics of deference in our society. perhaps it disappeared in america a long time ago, but in britain you only have to go back a few decades, and there was more kind of structure and deference in politics. and i think the erosion of that is in some ways a good thing. you know, deference is not on the whole a valuable sentiment at least in a democracy. a democracy should be deferential in many ways. but i think that nondeferential
spirit has kind of got a bit too rampant in a way. it's sort of spilled over into, into finding any kind of, any kind of -- any form of authority, think kind of intellectual authority, any kind of, you know, just because somebodies has studied a subject -- somebody has studied a subject for ten years, i don't care, i feel different about it. and the much greater importance people attach to to sentiment and feeling and emotion, again, you know, perhaps reinforced by the internet revolution in many ways. my feelings are that i am right and you're wrong. even if you have a long list of let arers after your name. and -- letters after your name. obviously, that can go too far. a person who has a long list of letters after their name may actually simply know more about whatever the issue is. >> the last question also referred to a very common phenomena which is a wealthy
person who is the leader of a populist cause, we can think of franklin roosevelt, we could, in fact, go back to julius caesar. so this has been throughout history. the gentleman way in the last row, right here. >> james -- [inaudible] retired. david, you mentioned that germany, quote, had no great universities or great technical institutions. i have friends who teach at tu munich, and they tell me -- i think they're right -- they teach at great universities. so what are we missing? >> yeah. they have great technical universities. they do not have great global universities. you know, just look at the, look at the lists produced by -- the global university list is dominated by the u.s -- >> [inaudible] >> no, i said germany has great technical universities. but it doesn't have great sort of general, global universities -- >> [inaudible] >> yes. yeah, of course they are. i said with the exception of
technical universities. but the more, the broader-based, you know, general universities as it were doesn't really exist in, you know -- places like hiding burg does not -- hiding berg does not attract huge flows of international students -- >> which it did in the 19th century. i mean, germany did once lead these generals, now it doesn't. >> exactly. >> and it's actually a deliberate model of policy. the government doesn't stream larger amount ofs of money so that it doesn't have an oxford and a cambridge or a a harvard and a yale. >> yeah. and elite children in germany generally go abroad. they come here or they go to britain for their higher education. >> okay. this gentleman and then you after that. >> my name is joe patrick, i'm a student at the school of public service. so it seems that we're seeing a global trend in the rise of big men, be it president due tart in the philippines, president trump
here, erdogan. is how do you feel that the growing chasm between the anywheres and the somewheres is relating to this rise this big men? in big men? >> you know, there is an impatience, people are impatient at being governed by institutions, and they want to be governed by people. they want, they want a face on bower. you can even see that in china where after the death of mao they tried deliberately to move away from a personalistic system. but i think the threat that -- [inaudible] was able to the raise scared them, and you see xi jinping is behaving much more like an emperor than like the chairman of a committee. and this is, i think, it's partly a result of the kind of disintermediation through the internet of institutions and politics. i think one other point to make here about the relationship of
elites and non-elites is that non-elites these days feel a heck of a lot better and are a lot better educated than non-elites used to be. so that in 1920 the average school-leaving age in the u.s. might have been eighth grade, 15 years old. today you have many more people going through many more levels of education, and they simply -- and even in the u.s. many people going through two years of postsecondary education who don't go all the way through. they don't actually feel they need upper middle class professionals to tell them how to do x and y and z. they kind of think they know already. and you also had earlier in the 20th century with many people migrating from rural areas to urban areas to live. again, the urban area was unfamiliar. it was not what you grew up
with. and you looked to the public schoolteacher, you looked to the professionals to tell you how to behave in this new environment. you're now at home in this, and yet these people, if anything, they are bossier than ever. they have new ideas about child raising, new things about car seats or -- they're always coming up with new ways to tell you how to love better -- >> represented by hillary clinton. >> yep. i think so. and so people -- there's a pushback on that. >> we've got time for two quick questions. him and then -- >> yeah, well, he's next. the last one. [laughter] >> thank you very much. david, you made an interesting point -- >> would you give your name? >> sure. my name is jeff. i work for an investment company. you made an interesting point at least to me with respect to experience, and you said that there's a distinct difference
between an individual with experience and a person that literally can create an idea in 15 minutes or so. and somehow my analogy is sort of the self-made man viewed as a mythology in some respects given a lot of credit versus take the dow jones here in the united states many some respects where -- in some respects where there are very few companies that are on dow jones that are 20 years old or so. so that type of experience sort of is gone. if you can relate that, the type of experience versus the instant instant -- as walter said here -- with respect to the instant expertise that one can have just by getting 15 minutes on the internet. >> yeah.
i mean, yeah. when i was talking about experience, i was many a way talking more about status and the, those kinds of jobs that required a lot of experience to do well and not necessarily -- you didn't have to be very smart to do the job. but a smart person coming off the street couldn't easily do it. and i think, i think the disappearance of those jobs has helped to drain away status and respect and recognition, and you might even say sort of social honor, rather an old-fashioned praise. social honor from a lot of occupations. and what you say is kind of analogous to that perhaps in some ways. you know, the kind of smart, geeky kids who have produced all these massive digital companies. and, you know, that is a sort of analogy in the dow jones and,
indeed, in the industrial structure. and, i mean, how they will, how they will sort of settle down -- i mean, obviously, there are certain -- there are probably certain jobs in facebook, amazon, microsoft, google that are protected like that. i don't really know enough about that world. but, yes, i think that, you know, a part of that, the general shift to admiring and esteeming cognitive ability before other qualities, i mean, those other qualities that we need to sustain still, you know? character, moral standing, experience are things that everybody can sort of play that game. the trouble is with cognitive ability, you know, 50% of the population are always in the bottom half of the cognitive ability spectrum. you know? and you, it's keep in kind of ie way inherently un-meritocratic
to stress cognitive ability above all other things. >> last question, gentleman here. >> brad hally, stonehurst group. how do you explain why neither scotland nor ireland have any interest in joining england in brexit? >> it was a, an anglo-welsh vote, it is true. the welsh voted, and people talk about it as being a kind of english revolt, a kind of revolt to the english somewheres, perhaps the last great act of the english working class from chartism to brexit. and there is some truth in that, i think. partly because there is a kind of legitimate resentment to add to all the other resentments if you like about the kind of
downplaying of the english interest in the new arrangements that have emerged in the last couple of decades, you know, the much greater voice for scotland, the scottish parliament, same in wales. and the feeling that the english subsidized these places and don't have their own voice. now, the problem is it's very difficult because there's such an asymmetry in the english population, 5 million, scottish -- 55 million, scottish population is 8 million, welsh population is, i think, 3 million. we are the kind of big bear in the bed, and when we roll over, everyone else gets squashed. so there's a kind of necessary element to self-restraint. but that kind of self-restraint is not popular in a more populist age, and the english have been kind of slightly rebelling against it. but i would say don't forget 40%, nearly 40% of people in scotland voted to leave.
and this is not kind of an overwhelming voice. similarly, 40% of people in london voted to leave. you know, these two great -- in fact, all of the places, the places that were most leave voting areas like west midlands, i think, in the northeast of england also a had very large remain votes and vice versa. so everywhere was pretty mixed, actually. and, you know, there was a, there was a bias in scotland, as in london, and there might be, you know, and there's an element of not exactly anti-englishness, but given that scotland is being run by the scottish national party, the nationalist party has been trying to leave the united kingdom. there is a feeling that, odd
though it might sound, that they prefer to be kind of ruled by brussels and by london, you know, partly because of historic resentments and being the kind of little guy in the context of the united kingdom. but i think the last election has shown that there is no appetite now for a sec referendum in scotland -- for a second referendum in scotland. the conservative party did much better than expected in scotland. i think people are beginning to tire of is snp. and also the fact is it is much harder for scotland to be independent when britain is outside the european union. if we were both inside the european union, it would have been very much easier for scotland, i think. the costs, economic and otherwise, rise really quite dramatically. so i don't expect there to be a sec referendum anytime soon -- a second referendum anytime soon.
>> [inaudible] >> you said following england has never really been an irish goal. [laughter] >> one reason -- yeah, right after euro. >> an island decided to yet out of the bed entirely rather than risk being squashed by the big english bear. and a lot of irish commentators sort of complain about the, you know, the kind of irresponsible way in which the, you know, the english or the anglo-welsh have kind of, are now jeopardizing, possibly jeopardizing the good friday agreement and the open border between northern ireland and southern ireland. i mean, you know, but i think it's pretty unrealistic to expect english voters to place, you know, 55 million english voters, you really think 55 million english voters should put an anxiety about a complicated border situation which most of them don't understand anyway before their kind of fundamental desire for a
return to national sovereignty? i think, i think that's -- you're judging the english by unfair standards, i think, if you are saying that. you're judging by a standard we don't apply to anybody else. we certainly don't apply it to the smaller nations of the united kingdom. i mean, i think there is goodwill, you know, a way round will be found to -- maybe the people of northern ireland will have to have some sort of cross-border or border checks when they come to the mainland. and that will be unpopular in northern ireland. perhaps the irish government, if they worry about it so much, can, you know, we can have, we can have, you know, british customs officials working with irish customs officials on the irish border to resolve the problem or some sort of combination of the two things. as i say, i think it's sort of unfair to expect the english to suppress their interests. >> [inaudible]
>> last comment. >> i understand. i don't mean to be rude, but if i may, you have said nothing also about the differences between irish culture, scottish culture, irish education, scottish education with the english experience and how that broader argument fits in with your general positions on brexit. >> there are many arguments we haven't had time to make and many subjects we haven't addressed, and i think it may need to remain that way. >> thank you. all right. [applause] [inaudible conversations]
>> and this weekend on booktv we're live with author and attorney krisanne hall joining us tomorrow from 12-3 p.m. eastern to discuss her life and books including essential stories for junior patriots, in defense of liberty and sovereign duty. on our "after words" program, pretty inprize-winning journalist jesse -- pulitzer prize-winning journalist jessizinger. also this weekend joshua green details the life of steve bannon and reports on his political partnership with donald trump. from the annual libertarian conference, freedom fest, a debate on the late community organizer saul alinsky. a panel of industry experts discuss cyber warfare, and former tennis pro james blake
provides a history of activism and professional athletes. that all happens weekend on booktv, television for serious readers. for a complete television schedule, visit booktv.org. >> here's a look at some upcoming book fairs and festivals happening around the country. on saturday, august 19th, we'll be live in jackson for the third annual mississippi book festival featuring librarian of congress carla hayden as well as candace millard, mark dowden and many more. on september 2nd we're live from the nation's capital for the national book festival with author presentations and call-in segments featuring the likes of historian david mccullough, j.d. vance and former secretary of state condoleezza rice. and later that month look for us in new york at the brooklyn book festival and the baltimore book
festival taking place at the city's inner harbor. for more information about upcoming book fairs and festivals and to watch previous festival coverage, click on the book fairs tab on our web site, booktv.org. >> host: and now on booktv we want to introduce you to kevin young who's an author. his book, "bunk." it comes out this fall, but, mr. young, before we go too far into the book, what do you do for a living? [laughter] >> guest: i'm the new-ish director of the schomburg center this harlem which is part of the new york public library system, as you know. it's been great, we've had some great announcements. we just got the james baldwin papers which we announced in april, and we've just announced two days ago the sonny roll lins papers. so we're really excited to have those archives come home to harlem and be