tv U.S. Policy on North Korea CSPAN August 31, 2017 8:02am-10:01am EDT
>> this morning a look at building a secure and inclusive global economy and how digital technologies are supporting individuals financial health. live coverage from the brookings institution against at 10 a.m. eastern here on c-span2. >> c-span where history unfolds daily. in 1979 c-span was created as a public service by america's cable-television companies and is brought to you today by your cable or satellite provider. >> next, a panel on u.s. policy towards north korea and the implications of its recent nuclear threats. george washington university hosted speakers including the
chief u.s. negotiator with north korea during the clinton administration. this is two hours. >> all right. good afternoon, everyone. i am jisoo kim, a professor of history, international affairs and i'm also director of the institute for korean studies at gw. on the moderator of today's panel and have a great pleasure of introducing our three distinguished speakers, dr. robert gallucci, doctor amitai etzioni and doctor gregg brazinsky. the topic of today's panel is how to handle north korea. more specifically we mean how to deal with north korea issues and the recent rhetorical crisis. looking at what happened just a few days ago in the korean peninsula north korea firing another, this time three
missiles, short-range missiles from its east coast. i think it is very timely and important topic to discuss, and we are extremely grateful to have three experts here today. we also warmly welcome all of you. i'll make sure to have enough time for q&a, and hope we have fruitful discussions later. today's panel is cosponsored by the institute for korean studies and institute for humanitarian policy studies. first just to you .4 how housekeeping to what you think my colleagues for organizing this panel, and the two institutes for the hard work in helping organizing this event. i also want to let you know that the institute for korean studies future events are listed in the flyer. i hope you all received those flyers before you leave. we have many exciting events coming up so please check those
dates and subscribe to our mailing list, if you're interested. before we actually begin the panel discussion, let me take this opportunity to briefly introduce our institute that was just established last year. in a political town where most dogs are focus on policy oriented current affairs, the faculty of green studies at gw felt it was necessary to strengthen the korean humanities in the nation's capital. today's panel represents our mission by engaging into disciplinary dialogue by not discussing practical matter but also placing the north korean issue in historic context which dr. brazinsky will do. when negotiating with north korea jimmy carter once said he wished he had no north korea's history bed. i take this course are so thick in order to have a deeper understanding of current affairs, it is necessary to place in an historical cultural and social context.
as director of the institute for korean studies i like to ask for your attention to our future events and hope to see many of you. again. let me explain how we will proceed for the next 90 minutes or so. i will stop introducing our speakers. each speaker will have 20 minutes to share their thoughts and then we'll open up the floor for q&a. we have extremely distinguished individuals joining us today. their introduction brief are too brief compared to their accomplishments but let me highlight a few points beginning with dr. gallucci. he is a distinguished professor in the practice of diplomacy at georgetown university, so dusting of the school of foreign services for 13 years until he left in 2009 to become president of the macarthur foundation. prior to his position as the dean he served 21 years and of variety of government positions focusing on international security as ambassador at large
and special envoy for the u.s. state department, he dealt with the threats posed by the proliferation of ballistic missiles and weapons of mass destruction. he was chief u.s. negotiator during the north korean nuclear crisis of 1994. use also assistant secretary of state for political military affairs and served as the executive chairman of the u.n. special commission overseeing iraq over the first gulf war. he is published extensively in the most recent one is a book he the added to the title, going critical, the first korean crisis. next dr. etzioni a as a universy professor presser international affairs at gw. he also directed the institute for cometary policy studies. he served as the president of the american association, sociological association and was the founding president of international society for the advancement of socioeconomics. in 1990 he founded a network, i
nonprofit nonpartisan organization dedicated to showing up the moral, social and political foundations of society. in 1991 the press began referring to him as the guru of the cometary movement. is published 25 books, amazing, i won't be able to us all of them. i will just mention the most recent one due to time constraints which was just published in may 2017 and the title is avoiding war with china, two nations one world. finally but not least, my colleague dr. brazinsky is associate professor of history and international affairs and director the institute for korean studies. he also served as codirector of the george washington university, a specialist on u.s. east asian relations through the cold war. his work focuses on the social and cultural impact of the u.s. on east asia. he started working on several
projects, what i is the state of the cultural impact of the korean war in america, korea and china. another is a comparative study of american nationbuilding programs in east and southeast asian during the cold war. he is also written extensively but i will again just mention his most recent book, within the third world, sino-american rivalry just published in february 2017. from the university of north carolina press. without further ado i will turn the microphone to dr. gallucci. >> thank you. i want to begin by saying how please i am to be here with you, which is common for speaker to see if i to add something special, that is for me significant ice sitting next to dr. etzioni. i did my little calculation here. it was 50 years ago as a graduate student at brandeis and
i remember reading political unification, and have subsequent tried to keep up but he writes quicker than i read. [laughing] it's been a problem but it's an honor to be with you today. this morning when i was coming out, walking out to the car, i passed my wife who is finishing a book of her own right now, and she noticed i was not wearing jeans and a flannel shirt,, i will relate and the planes, and she said speaking today? i said, yes, i was. i said you might be surprised to learn what going to talk about north korea. she said, oh. and i said yes, i'm going to share with my very creative thinking, which led her to fall on the floor in laughter.
observing that i had not had a creative idea of the subject is 1993, and that is out i would like to begin, not with my lack of creativity but with the idea that analytically for me at least the korean situation hasn't changed. the panel is supposed to talk about options for the future. i say again, analytically there always have been three it seems to me and there still are three. it does to pin on how you count, i recognize that, but there are three. the character of the threat has evolved over decades and decades, but really three options. this is what i'm selling tonight. the first option is containment. it's been called lots of other things but it really is
containing the threat, managing the threat. one could call it most recently was called in a previous of administration strategic patience. you can wrap it up a lot of different ways, but what it really means is the united states of america will first attend its alliances principally with the rok, the republic of korea, japan, also other alliances but those are the key ones for the north korea situation. and tending the alliances means we will do military exercises and we will consult, et cetera, but we will extend our deterrence, a principal characteristic of our alliances to these countries. that's the first point in containment. and then after that in the military exercises they will be sanctions. americans i have learned over decades love sanctions. gives you the feeling that we are doing something. even if all evidence is to the
contrary, it still gives us that good feeling and sometime they can have an impact, but sanctions is a part of containment. the third element is china. every president has seemed to me discovers china at some point when he thinks about north korea and decides that that is of the solution to the problem. why are we worrying about it when it's in their backyard? as a it would be brilliant for us to subcontract this problem to a principal competitor in the region. but nevertheless,, china, going to turn and asking for chinese help in some way to mitigate the threat or solve it. then all the other i would say lesser things we might do that do not raise the level of military action, though they can be quite offensive. they can be cyber, they can be covert operations, all kinds of things but it is not war. all these things together, and
are probably other things, i'm not too managing the threat. it's designed to either limit it, push it back or drive us to the second of the three options, negotiations. negotiations are discovered by even administrations that start by disparaging negotiations. the bush administration, for example, was very tough on the clinton people who negotiated the agreed framework and had almost a decade of negotiations and they very -- start a very hostile to them but held them in place for a couple of years. and then decide to fall back to containment, and then decided containment wasn't actually containing the north koreans because, remember what i said was evolving was a character of the threat, and the character of the threat evolved in such a way exactly what the clinton
administration had tried to stop, mainly, nuclear weapons capability north korea, emerge not in the clinton administration but in the bush administration. it emerged just as the north koreans said it would if we abandon the agreed framework. we abandon the framework. they develop nuclear weapons and eventually ballistic missiles. the bush administration discovered option one, containment, after the discovered option two, negotiations and old ended up with containment. it is not clear to me the next administration, the obama administration, really, really pursued negotiations. they may have. they argued they did. seems like an awful lot of strategic patience to me, but option to was there to some degree. we now are in a situation which it is very difficult to tell what we're doing at least for me as an observer, and i try to watch this particular subject pretty closely but it seems like
we're involving containment option one. we are talking about the possibility of option two, negotiations, negotiations can mean almost anything. they can be very narrowly focused on a particular thing like, for example, now it might be ballistic missile test, nuclear weapons test, might be trying to limit the capabilities of the north koreans action reached continental united states with a ballistic missile armed with a nuclear weapon. it could be narrowly focused or broadly focused. negotiations might aim at actual normalization of relations between the two countries. it's the different enterprise than simply containing the threat. and then the third option is actually military action of one kind or another. i would like to do a service you and make a distinction between preemption and preventive
strikes. you may have heard this before but apparently he can't be said enough. i would like to say i hope everybody in this room is in favor of preemptive strikes. a preemptive stripe, as i understand it, is a stripe that one nation launches against another, just before the other is about to attack it. in international law, that's acceptable. under just war series of war, that's acceptable. but it must be just before the other side attacks. in other words, we don't have to wait to be wiped i for you walk the bad guy. however, if you are trying to prevent the other side from developing the capability you would rather not see them have and you strike them to stop them from getting that capability. that's not preemption.
i would like everybody in the show to thank that something you should think long and hard about doing before you do it. but preemption, yes. prevent a war, i am prejudiced against that. think of iraq for example. when we think about military action now, i think would be useful for your mind to go to the capability we would be thinking about preventing, north korea from getting. clearly it's not nuclear weapons that have nuclear weapons. clearly it's not arming ballistic missiles with nuclear weapons because it is quite possible, according to the analyses i read come nothing classified, that they can in terms of size fit the nuclear weapoweapons that they had desid for at least one of them to a warhead in a ballistic missile. whether that warhead will withstand the reentry forces in
iintercutting no ballistic missile is another matter, but certainly irb yams, yes is the proposition. so we have allowed that to happen. the question is, will we now tolerate, weaving the united states of america, tolerate a vulnerability in the way happy if that's not the right word, to allow our allies to suffer, which is being subject to targeting with nuclear weapons aboard ballistic missiles by north korea. i'm thinking of our allies japan and south korea. we may not wish to be in the position and we could claim a separate posture because the security of our allies depends upon our ability to extend deterrents to them and in deterrence theory our vulnerability adds an element of question to whether we are
credible by threatening north korea with a response if they attacked an ally. this leads to those questions would you trade the city for that city kind of thing. all in all, three options are open to us it seems to me. we've had essentially 40 years of containment. without about ten years of negotiation, now we're back about 15 years of containment. this kind of analysis leaves one side on the question that i regard as an overwhelmingly important question when we think about north korea, and that's the question of transfer. i myself personally, i will be clear, i am an ambiguous in my own thinking that i think deterrence works. we had a lot of experience, logically you would never know when deterrence works. it's a counterfactual. you know when deterrence fail. that's pretty clear, but i
think, not -- notwithstanding what i just said, it will work against north korea. where deterrence does not work, i don't think or we have good reason to believe is against terrorist and a worry about nuclear terrorism, and since i do i worry about transfer and i worry about particularly the kind of transfer that happened around 2006-2007 of north korea to syria where they actually built the reactor which if it were not for the creative israeli concept of nonproliferation, might actually be operating right now. so i worry about transfer as a separate issue from what we're usually talking about here. i think that lee's is really with a couple of pretty important questions, and one is what really is the north korean
motivation in all this? i would like to challenge you all and anyone else to answer the question, what is the confrontation between the united states and north korea all about? is it about territory? is it about ideology? is it about religion? what goes on? we're actually allies with a country that is contiguous to north korea, so this is not a geostrategic kind of situation. the north koreans only ally of sorts is not terribly happy with it. that would be china. so what is the source of hostility between us and north korea? to the get a lot out of that? do we? how would we solve this? oddly enough, and i believe this alone and i will come back to it if people are interested. i think the key for me oddly enough is human rights.
if the north korean human rights situation was not what it is, i think normalization would be easily imaginable. thank you. [applause] >> thanks for those three analysis. now we would like to move on to dr. etzioni. >> i'm fortunate to follow up dr. gallucci. first of all i found a soulmate. he left his genes behind, so did i, so maybe the future we can create a new norm, especially formal attire. and also he did a wonderful job of outline options, which allows me to move directly to speak to
what option which i believe is more promising than others. i choose my words carefully when i say more promising than others. i'm not saying there may be no great option but i think i tried to show that compares favorably to the other ones. and if i had to put it in one sentence, i would say that the united states offer china incentives which allow it to really use its ability to force north korea to give up nuclear weapons, not to change the regime. i think for now we need to settle for change in behavior. the good news, that the incentives we need to give to china to take on, heavy cost,
are not -- [inaudible] i use a new idea which are for two and explain shortly of the -- which allows -- i do want to exaggerate but to some extent to have your cake and eat it too. the first of all, clearly there is a clear and present danger if north korea can solve the problems. this is not some hypothetical fear mongering, something which may happen five, ten years from now. this is serious stuff, and it doesn't threaten on our allies and our forces in the area, also it could not a thing i can say we can just sit by and say let's he was going to happen next. the second, china has the means
to force north korea. because if we prevent north korea from obtaining essential energy sources and other material they need and prevent north korea from selling the stuff, north korea will not be able to function, that's my policy. but for china to take this extreme step from its viewpoint, undermining the only ally, major ally in the area, they are taking very significant risk. one risk which people often talk about is that millions of north koreans if the regime collapse will rush across the border to china. i think equally concerning or maybe more for china is that a
unified -- most people think -- united states withdrew its troops to the border with china. so in effect north korea acts like a buffer between china and the united states forces. and given the buffer, from china's you, considerable cost. so now let me explain this to concept i introduced. don't have enough time to go into details, but you can find more about it in my book. the essential approach is not to look for shared interest. it's not to look for consummate the interests. but to look for interests which are different. the idea that if you rank china's interest from what's really, really important to them but second, and lay low, and do the same for the united states, and then you want to have a deal which we give them things which
they think are very important to them but not important to us. if we asked them to give up things which are very important to me that they don't consider my high cost. you can find it then you have a very different kind of deal. it's not apples and oranges. i have a lot of apples. i don't even care for them. they love the apples, and they have oranges which i'm dying for and they can give them fast enough way. that's the idea. if you do this for a moment, what do you find? you find it important to us to stop north korea from developing its nuclear program and scaling it back. very important to us. for china it's not anywhere near, the talk of their interest. what they are concerned about, first of all, or at least near the top of the list, is the antimissile batteries we put in south korea.
we claim missiles are only stopping north korean missiles and cannot be used against him missiles. why this is important, because the whole idea of deterrence between us and china is based on a notion that china will be able to fire back. if we had the capacity to stop retaliation by china, china is very exposed, all kind of dangers in it. i hairtrigger alert, urges them to build up nuclear weapons. the essence of deterrence is billable to hit back. now, i looked into this, and they're claiming by minor modifications, these can be used against missiles. i'm a sociologist.
i called some people up, good americans, and they said well, you know, it's in his neighborhood. if you wish you can see me an email and i will send you the technical details. now you see why, if that's correct, why china is very keen for us not to have those batteries in south korea. very destabilized. here's the deal. you can tell china if you don't have to worry about nuclear weapons for north korea, there's a reason for us to keep those missiles. so here's the beginning of a deal. you help us and then we remove the batteries. second, we commit ourselves not to our troops to the border with china.
in fact, an argument can be made that it's time to take our troops home once north korea is -- there are other things, one of the things which drives the chinese dessert and angry is that we have daily intelligence flex up-and-down the china coast, practically daily. frankly, you know, i don't know what's more important to them but there's something about it that activates them. the intelligence we collect from this type of flight is really rather limited. for those of you who are not in the business, you need to know where every unit is. in the longer run in terms that's good. if need be, one more thing, in all seriousness, what we want
from china is a big ask. i think we should match with big give. i would even maybe consider declaring a tenure status quo and status. argue bu that what's included in the package but the main point is we have to go more creative, think outside the box and there's a difference. i think there's one that could be made. let me very briefly compared to the other options. the military options i think everyone agrees. a real attack is a horrendous risk to south korea, and sears to entertain. containment as you said in your previous argument is wonderful when it works, but then you deal
with somebody who we don't know exactly how balance is. we tolerated other nations with nuclear weapons, india and pakistan and i guess, but none of these countries threaten us, and so the difference here, somebody says twice a week and then during the weekend, they're going to attack us. he has a deep out the means. i don't think the response or government is just sit back and say, we know we have to go to work. the other notion, negotiations, and here comes interesting difference. when we sit down to negotiate with north koreans, we should get, we are not interested in regime change. it makes a huge difference between behavioral change and regime change.
look what happened in syria. since the beginning of the civil war in syria, united states said a precondition for negotiation that had the state has to go. now, if you want to sit down and negotiate with somebody and say the first up for negotiation, they have to leave them it's not a very good effect to start negotiations. and, in fact, of course north korea, iran and iraq are on our evil access list, what we've shown half when martin libby, afghanistan and iraq, we don't want only to defend terrorists -- defeat stairs or stop nuclear weapons. we also want to try to. >> translator: into kind of liberal democracy. one sense, one reason i think we should safely delay this option is because in spite of the huge
suffering, we don't have enough democracy in these countries. so not only we pushed into the limit by saying you have to resign before i talk to you, then spent 15 years fighting, by the end of the day we don't have democratic regime either. let's focus on behavior change for now and worry about regime change later, especially by the people rather than by us. let me stop here and leave the rest for question and answers. but i see no reason why china would not consider this option, and they have not offered. if you offer and china refused,
then we would be lost. actually i should add one more thing, because my colleagues at the school keep telling me that i'm too much into policy. i should be more theoretical. i would like to add, what is the three behind what we did recently? so i think trump talks to chinese, he thinks the international is a country club. [laughing] and he said would you please help you with this thing? it's like several club begging or whatever. extra flowers. and then the chinese didn't comply. he said that was not nice. and then he implied, you get an
a for effort and not for achievement. [inaudible] so that's what i tried to do. thank you very much. [applause] >> i would like to thank both of you for keeping your time. when i walked in i promised myself i would be a strict timekeeper and stop them when they go beyond 20 minutes i guess i don't have to. so great has enough time for you to speedy maybe i will take some of the time they gave me. but thank you for agreeing to do this panel. i want to start by saying that there was once an east asian rogue state with a long history of hostility towards the united states. the rogue states had carried out
successful nuclear tests and was developing missiles capable of hitting united states. president richard nixon visited this rogue state in 1972, changing the course of america's relationship with it, and transforming the international situation in ways that greatly favored the united states at the time. the reason i'm starting with this is not because i think the situations are completely analogous, but it do believe that there are parallels between them in the options we face. in 1972, there really was no way to make the people's republic of china give up its nuclear weapons or give up its ideology, although the united states had and everything in its power to prevent it from getting nuclear weapons before hand. but the nixon administration realized that it had two choices. the first was to have a powerful
and nuclear armed china that was completely isolated from the rest of the world and had no contact with the united states. the second option was to have a nuclear armed china that was integrated into the international community and work together with the united states, or could work together with the united states, on areas where there were common interests. nixon chose the latter, and while there are of course areas of conflict with the china today, and i'm going to talk about those, and the choice didn't work out perfectly, it was nonetheless vastly superior to its alternative. i believe that today the united states needs to make a similarly bold and direct diplomatic gesture in dealing with north korea. i'm not saying this will be perfect. i'm not saying this is going to change north korea overnight.
north korea is and will remain a repressive authoritarian country for the foreseeable future. i do not think that it will even fleet north korea to give up its nuclear weapons right away but it would give north korea more of a stake in its relationship with the united states and it would make it less likely to use its arsenal against america and its allies. international relations is a realm in which there are no perfect in which they are often no good options. the best we can do i believe is to reduce the risk of conflicts and improve the chances that east asia can continue to develop peacefully. i believe diplomacy in north korea with north korea gives us the greatest chance of achieving this. we all know what the other options are. i agree basically with the options that professor gallucci laid out. one is the use of force. i do believe that the use of
force is something that should always be in the background. we should make it clear to pyongyang that if it ever uses its arsenal on the united states, it will be met with overwhelming force, and we should work to continue developing counter capabilities. but as we know, a preemptive strike or unilateral effort, although preemption as bob defined it easy on the regiment that i've been thinking about it when i prepared these notes, but nonetheless i think a unilateral effort to disarm north korea is not wise here we all know what the consequences would be. unfortunately, seoul which has over 12 million people in its greater metropolitan area is within 30 miles of the dnc and is within easy striking range of north korea's artillery, even without its nuclear arsenal, north korea could likely inflict millions of casualties and give
billions of dollars in property damage. so i think, given the soldierly has the 11th largest or south korea coneheads 11th largest economy in the world, i think such a strike would have horrific ramifications for the world economy, in addition to creating a humanitarian disaster. it's seoul was not such an easy target, i suspect that the kim regime would probably have been taken out a long time ago. but as long as seoul in thousands of americans servicemen are hostages to north korea's artillery, the risk of a military option is simply too great. sanctions, i think sanctions also have their limitation. many advocates of sanctions always say that the problem is that the sanctions haven't been kind enough. if we just tighten them as a bit more, or if we impose stricter
secondary sanctions, they will have impact. i don't think there's any evidence for this. for starters, however much we dislike north korea's political leadership, if you can say one thing about north korea, it's that it has been resilient. the country has survived being raised to the ground during the korean war. it survived being abandoned by its communist allies, and it survived numerous families during the last 70 years. if we ratchet up the sanctions on north korea, then the north koreans are just going to do what they always do, tighten the belt a little bit and continue developing their nuclear and missile weapons programs. another problem i think with sanctions is that for them to work, the entire international community has to cooperate. if it does not, the north korea
will find a way to get what it needs. and i think i sighed from china, there are several other nations that overtly or more search officially evade the sanctions. and the more united states -- search officially. to enforce the sanctions, the more the united states risks itself coming across as bullying or domineering. finally, there's the china approach. i'm slightly more pessimistic than my colleague that this approach could work. i think this is been the approach taken by the trump administration during the first, it's first few months. i personally, having spent time in china and just written a book that professor kim mentioned about u.s.-china relations, i don't think china will ever give us what we really want on north korea. china especially whenever support the united states if it's a larger objective is to achieve regime change.
i believe that this is true not only for historical reasons, not only for strategic reasons but also for historical and cultural reasons. a lot of people when they talk about how china sees north korea, they tend to think china sees it as well, north korea and china might even allies back during the cold war, but today china mostly regards north korea as a nuisance. but i think the history of the war to aid korea and resist united states matters much more to china than people think. the idea that china stood up to and resisted the united states in 1950 is an absolutely critical part of the chinese communist parties raise on debtor. even today most chinese history instructors don't teach it that the korean war started when north korea launched an invasion
across the 38th parallel. they teach that it was a defensive war in which china played a heroic role. if you don't believe me, try having a conversation with any chinese diplomat about the korean war. to support american ambitions to promote regime change in north korea, i believe, what cut to the core of china's identity as a modern state. it would in essence make them acknowledge that the war was fought to defend an immoral regime. and moreover, i think the current chinese leadership xi jinping has probably been more sympathetic and how it sees mousy done and the early chinese commerce leadership than any other chinese leader since mousy done himself. finally if you look at what china has been doing, i think lately china as likely been
applying more pressure to south korea for taking actions that can be considered, to be in south korea's self-defense that has been pressuring north korea. there's been more hostility towards south korea over the back issue and there is been now towards north korea in some ways. so i think this really leaves us with diplomacy as the only option that is any chance of working. and i want to talk about this a little bit and how should we pursue a diplomatic option? there is a few aspects that i think are necessary. first, i think we need to coordinate very closely with our allies, especially south korea. our relationship with south korea to me is critical. there is no more critical relationship to the united states today that its relationship with south korea, in my view. it's important not only because of the north korea issue, but
also because south korea is a country in asia that shares our democratic values, and which is that united states has a deep history in helping to build up economically and a country where the united states invested a great deal into trying to spread ideas about democracy. in recent months, however, i don't think washington and seoul have always coordinated their policies as closely as they should. in fact, in south korea media has recently become obsessed with what it calls korea passing, meaning that the united states will seek to solve the north korea problem on its own without consultation with seoul. it hasn't been all bad. u.s. and rok forces recently carried out their joint military drills. i also think the visit here was as successful as could've been expected given the
circumstances, but i think that it's clear that trump and the new south korean president are not entirely on the same page, and they think they to get on the same page. when trump talks about fire and fury one day, the south korean president says that no one should be allowed to decide a military action on the korean peninsula without souls permission a few days later, he gives an apparent of disunity. and i think this is exactly what beijing and pyongyang want. also now eight months into the trap administration, but there still no u.s. ambassador in south korea, though it's been rumored that one of the professors colleagues at georgetown is being considered. [laughing] , but aside from that there's also several key posts in the state department for working on asia that remain unfilled. second, think the united states
to continue its information and propaganda programs that are directed at north korea such as the voice of america. while leaders in the korean workers party are going to remain antagonistic towards the united states, i think that these kinds of activities might at least change the view that some north koreans have of the united states, and those people who have been to north korea agree that they are having some impact. along with this, i believe that we should continue to managing work where it's possible in north korea, to try to make it clear that whatever political differences or disagreements exist between the united states and north korea at the political level don't affect our view of the north korean people, and that we don't hold the north korean people responsible for the actions of their leaders in anyways. third, i think if we engage in a
process of negotiation or diplomacy, it should be kept open ended. this was how things were done when the united states first initiated talks with china during the 1970s. the united states should be allowed to bring up issues that are of concern to it, while north korea should be allowed to bring up the issues that are most important to its leadership. finally, i think we need to have patience in implementing this policy. and i was any kind of policy we pursue, where the agree with me or disagree with me, i think we need to have more patience. we have to realize that north korea is a country that is very deeply missed trussell of the united states. america's allies, and also is somewhat mistrustful of its own allies, to the extent that it has allies. by saying this i don't mean to try to justify north korea's
authoritarianism or domestic repression. at the same time it's important to recognize i think that it has been emblazoned on the north korean national consciousness for the last six decades that the country once bought a horrific war against the united states in which millions of died, and to which 70-80% of someone north korea's largest cities were destroyed. and it is a country that can also remember very easily several decades of continuous american efforts to try to isolate it. and it can see other united states has pursued and succeeded in achieving regime change in afghanistan, iraq and other countries that became its adversary. so if we choose diplomacy, i think we must be prepared for it not to succeed immediately. suspicions about the united states and north korea are
unquestionably going to process. we have to understand as well that north korea will not abandon its nuclear weapons or its missile programs right away, and there may really be no way to get them to do it. this kind of patience i think is tricky. one of the reasons is because in a democracy the electorate is always somewhat result oriented. you have a new policy, they want to see results. if it doesn't produce results immediately they want to change the policy. this has been part of the problem. this is why we keep going back and forth between deterrence and engagement or some combination of the two. i think we need to have a more consistent policy pursued over and longer-term. this isn't a perfect option but i believe that it's the best option that we have and offers the best chance of slowly getting north korea to modify
its behavior. it offers the best hope of lowering the risk of a cataclysmic war on the korean peninsula, and it offers us the best chance of shifting the balance of power and interest in the pacific in a way that will favor america's interest in the long-term. i'll stop there. thank you. [applause] >> thank yothank you so much, g. i really appreciate how you put into historical context. listening to these three speakers, it seems like north korean issues have a change. it hasn't after 20, 30 years and we are still we continue to deal with them. one question that came to my mind is can we in this issue only with the two koreas? is at the only possibility? and also, one question, one
immediate reaction that had listening to dr. gallucci, was toward the end what is a source of hostility between the u.s. and north korea, and actually we historians, especially in the field of north korea studies, some scholars mentioned that north korea would not become a paranoid state if they had not experienced the korean war. and so then the kind of hostility between u.s. and north korea continues today due to the korean war. i was just wondering what your thoughts were on that and i guess i use the privilege of being moderated of asking the first question and then we will open up for questions. >> if i've got the question
correct, is what leads to dprk, north korean paranoia. i'd like to put in a word for paranoia here. you know, just enters common, even paranoids have real enemies. the north koreans, i've done a couple of track to with the north koreans as well as negotiating at another time in another universe a long time ago. they never tire come after they say good morning, they say what about libya? nnsa what about iraq? and they are pointing to regime changes. they see it accomplished by the united states against countries that dreamed of having nuclear weapons but failed to get them. and they tell me they are not going to make that mistake and they think it is bizarre that our three of negotiation is one
of which they would give up their nuclear weapons. so it's not entirely paranoia. as has been said inside government privately, we would i think be thrilled or official washington administration after administration would be thrilled to let the north koreans do in their atrocious human rights policy, and just sit north of the dmz if they didn't threaten us with nuclear weapons. we didn't want them to have them at all, that was what the agreed framework was about in the '90s, but then we got used to that even after they tested and we were prepared to go fallback to, in my schema, of containment again. because well, we could deter them and we work directly threaten so it determine -- deterrent was credible. the only reason i think we have
this thing tonight, people came to it, is because at any moment, for example, tonight, someone can walk in to the present office and say, we have definitive word that test number three of an icbm is about to take place, and in case you forgotten, mr. president, you kind of said this was a red line for you. this one can we don't know whether they're going to go up so high so that i had to go out so far so they will not be sticking a finger dreger in your eye, but pretty much it is going to nail down this capability and so, mr. president, if you want to do something about it you have about 15 minutes to make that decision. in a way nothing is changed, and
await everything has changed because we have made this something we will not put up with. on the north korean side, are they paranoid about this? they want to have the capability to deter us. we don't want them because we don't see them, i mean, it's one thing to pick the indians,, pakistanis and israelis, and another to pick the soviets who, a good book was written about our decision not to launch a preventive war against the soviet union when we still could have in the 40s, or against the chinese when we were really could have probably in coordination with the russians or the soviets against the chinese. and mao was you'd is pretty crazy and i have a lot to do with our first architectures and at the ballistic missile systems. so what i'm saying is we are
wrapped around his acts of right now and i think a key question for this group, for us, is, if this happens, and somebody walks into the president tonight, what do you want them to do? are the north koreans so crazy we can't draw the line on deterrence and we have to try -- is it not preemption, that nobody will be telling the president it will launch a missile at district ever and we trying to get the capability to deter us. do we want to deny them that? i have said, when i was finishing before, that i thought the human rights issue is incredibly important because i can see no other way, other than normalization of relations within the north in which we are credible. we have a narrative about the agreement in 1994. the north koreans cheated, right? with the pakistanis, and that's how the deal fell apart and the bush administration decided to call them on it, et cetera, et
cetera, et cetera. that's are noted. their narrative doesn't go that way. their narrative is refill to deliver normalization pick the only thing that could -- they could have counted on to ensure them they did need nuclear weapons to deter us, so they hedged with an enrichment program with the pakistanis. that's their narrative. i'm not telling you to buy it. i kind of like ours, i'm pretty committed to it, but i think if you think like they are thinking just for a few minutes, then the only way you would get at the concern come there's no other way to reassure them. but don't worry. don't worry but we don't care about you. just stop this nuclear weapons ballistic missile stop and you can do what you want. they don't believe us. you want to call them paranoid. fine, i think speech i didn't call them paranoid.
>> i would be happy to call it anything to what they call us all kinds of things so you can call them names back. doesn't bother me at all. what i'm saying is there is some logic to the position. anyway, it would behoove us to recognize that. interesting to me, the approach bypasses all this. all this is interesting and your approaches in that negotiations, but that's really messy. your solution is go to the chinese and have them -- i like that, but i don't believe it. ..
think precisely what they care about and we don't. is there a point for this? and a brilliant way of putting that. >> go ahead. >> very briefly. it really to some extent, is there clear and present danger or not? is it reasonable to think in a year or so they will have miniaturized missiles on top of ballistic missiles. if that is true, any talk about sanction is ridiculous on the face of it. sanctions either don't work or work very, very slowly, so questions are up. any question about diplomacy, i mean, takes us longer to agree on the side of the table and the agenda than two years. so, that is unrealistic.
now, talking to them and given what you just said eloquently, they don't have-- in my judgment, what is left? we're talking about-- is there anybody around who can make north korea cry uncle? we are not. and china at least has the capacity. i think this is not contestable. and so, if you look at the analysis, under which conditions would north korea pay the price? and that can be negotiated and discussed, that at least is worth finding out because if you go the other route of letting them have nuclear weapons, not only japan-- iran would dash for nuclear weapons.
so-- >> but them them now. they have someplace between 20 and 25 or 30. >> and you can't-- i said krethed. >> sorry. >> if you the lifls. anyhow, i think that a lot hinges on your question. one more line, we are good friends, how can you really compare to trump. >> well, we all know who is smarter. >> and trump talked about serious stuff and you never know what he's saying because five minutes later he changes his mind and the secretary of state says something different. it's difficult to complete a sentence, trump administration, and so my sentence can be completed. >> let me highlight where i'm disagreeing with you. it's not to the extent that you
are or not like trump, but i think where i have some disagreement with you. i agree that china has the capacity to bring north korea to its knees if it wants to, but i'm not convinced it would ever want to. i'm not convened there's anything we could ever offer it to get it to do that. because i think what it underestimates is how important north korea is to china's national identity and to the identity of the xhooins communist paeft. when you talk to chienees government officials, you still see that. i think there is still an underlying sympathy for north korea in china. i think that china likes to see the north korean embarrass the united states secretly, even if they don't admit it and say ha,
ha, ha. but i think that they at some level enjoy seeing this so i'm not convinced we can offer them anything that would be, you know, acceptable to us that would, in the end, get them to really, you know, really start putting enough pressure on north korea to get it to abandon its nuclear weapons. i'm also not convinced that you can get north korea to give up its nuclear weapons without getting rid of the regime. you may have to get rid of the regime to do this and again, i doubt that that's something that if push comes to shove china would be willing to do. >> one sentence. >> okay, one sentence. >> but there is no cost in finding out. there is no cost finding out china will not accept our offers. >> now we'll take questions,
oh, many, many hands up now. i'd like you to identify yourself first and your name and affiliation. >> my name-- [inaudible] of chinese cooperation was the permanent session of any arms sales to taiwan. is this something that the chinese-- this would be absolutely immoral, but putting that aside, was this trump the chinese narrative about the centrality of korea, the unification of taiwan in exchange for the regime change of-- in north korea? >> i don't think so. i think the way china sees it is taiwan is a part of china and it's something that the u.s. should not be selling arms
to taiwan in the first place, so they see taiwan as something that's rightfully there. why in their perspective put pressure on north korea to give up something that's rightfully there in the first place. from our protect, it makes a lot of sense. yeah, we're going to give you back north taiwan. that's why it's important to study the chinese protect for people who work on this issue, you know, to spend more time in china and reading chinese materials because i'm not c convinced that a lot of people in the beltway are doing that. >> and on the the other side, they look at it. on my package, i didn't have a chance to layout the goodies up
there. making explicit our implicit understanding that if china will not use force to integrate taiwan, that's are an apartment space. and moving on, time to correct this that couldn't cost much of anything, i'm going to add that to the pie. stop selling taiwan we shouldn't have in the first place. . >> all right, next question. >> i live in cairo 25 years, i'm on vacation. anyway, i love you gentlemen--
it seems to be this should be a central issue and i would ask the question, what would be the analogy for germans for unification. >> i know there's quite a difference, the evidence should be important. and people certainly, even the regimes or whatever, want union if ication in the end. in the long-run. >> thank you very much. >> i'll just say a couple of things that come to mind. first, american diplomates, when they talked to koreans about all subjects like this, always talked about the ultimate goal is the reunification of the korean people. after you've said that you go
on it talk about the world in which you live. in that world, i don't think many people who believed this usual previobelieve that it's g to happen soon. if it dids, it will be incredible violence so it didn't have the appeal of the phrase eion if i -- unification. and those who i talked about on-line, suspect that nobody is enthusiastic of the unification of the korean people other than the korean people. the korean people are divided over how that would happen. the south koreans think under sm nice democratic south korean government. the north koreans see that under some part of the kim
dynasty. the chinese people are not enthusiastic about a reunited peninsula. particularly if it's united under alliance of the united states. they're not looking forward to seeing the unification on their border. the japanese aren't enthusiastic, and suspect that we americans look at the divided peninsula as an excuse for forward-base of operations and part of our ensirlement strategy, they and the chinese believe we have vis-a-vis the chinese. this tends to be a not very
much discussed issue. i think because it's not front and center in practical terms in terms of policy and a lot of people see and think. >> i want to go back to a question professor kim asked and it's related and we didn't answer it before. that is, can you resolve this issue without the unification of the korean peninsula and i think you can never resolve the issues that the korean war was fought over and the basic political differences between north korea and south korea and the different is in fundamental perspectives about which mate-- -- i think you can have a discussion without reunification. that's what we have to aim for. what can happen now? i think that unification is
something many' pessimistic that we would see in our lifetime, but i think it's not too much to hope that there can be reduction of friction between the united states and nort north korea if the policies are right and the approach is right. >> [inaudible question] >> the topic of unification was brought up and having worked in the administration before, i appreciate the things that you mentioned and especially the frank comments right now, but when it comes to dealing with north korea, handling north korea, as the topic goes, i think north korea is only interested in meeting instead of sitting down with washington. it boils down to how washington and what washington is willing
to offer. doctor gallucci, you're one of the only people who have met in north korea. what would north korea be able to negotiating. and that they will never give up. i think we should look yoond that. that's the language that euse. and i personally think we're reaching that point because of the heightening tensions. that's the tell tale time for negotiations. you think from your observations, do you think that north korea in this regime under kim jong-un, which is different from kim jong il who wanted nuclear light water reactors, this is a different regime. what do you think it would
take? >> first, i don't know. [laughter] >> , but that usually doesn't stop me, so, let me barge in here. the last time i met with them was little less than a year ago in kuala lumpur in a track half kind of thing. they said, i want to underline what you said, they said we are a nuclear weapons state and made it part of our constitution. we will always be a nuclear state. we can't trust you. blah, blah, blah. i said words to the effect i could not continue in suggestio suggestions, because that would be the nuclear weapons, when we had two countries who
voluntari voluntarily committed themselves not to have nuclear weapons and join. >> and for us to forever accept the korean peninsula one in way that one country that this. i'd much prefer that we talk about negotiations and they don't have to say anything on the nuclear weapons issue except they'll never discuss it, that's one thing they can say. they kind of accepted that and decided this was track one and a half, it doesn't matter. i i'm --. we had to exchange and i imagine we'd have a version of that in discussions. and that the north koreans, said a number of things in 1993 and 1994, this means that this is going to cost you a lot. so, in this case though, that
you have-- most of us have one or two models in our commit, why the north korea are is he -- they want to deter the united states of america. it's a defensive posture, a deterrent posture. the other model spt so happy. they want to have weapons so they can jackson ale-- and that's not a happy image, by threatening u.s. cities. let's go to the happier image i probably believe is more accurate, but i actually don't know. and if you have that in mind, then you've got-- and the question is, what is it they want? they want some reason, some basis for believing that if
they make a deal that freezes their program and rolls it back and eventually eliminates it, some reason to believe that we will not turn over their regime with, other than we're swell people and rex tillerson says we will, scouts honor, really? that, they're saying is not enough so i'm dren driven to, there's no outstanding issue between us other than the way you treat your people, once you settle the nuclear weapons issue. >> now we tear about your nuclear weapons because of ballistic missiles and they can reach us. >> fundamentally, we have to do something about the way you treat your own people to which the north koreans said, that's
regime change. i wasn't prepared for that and i said, that's not what you meant before by regime changes. it's a change in their regime. and if you've been watching, if you've heard the human rights on this, they've made adjustments of their policies in responsible for the u.n. actions. the way they treat the disabled. when i talk about this, i'm going to stop in a minute. i said it's not making north korea into a jeffersonion. and i'm thinking here of saudi arabia, it's terrific not working for the federal government, you can say the names of countries. it's just, they cannot be where they are on a continuum of good behavior, they have to move more towards the center.
if they did, then the basis for hostility, i think would largely be relieved and all kinds of things could happen to address their concerns. this normalization would be the key. that we would have a situation where there are not hostilities. i wouldn't put aside the nuclear energy thing. energy for any developmental economist would tell you that energy is one of the premium problems they have. and not that a thousand megawatt reactors is a good way to address the project. it was very stupid, but also what they wanted so we're prepared to do stupid if it's what they want and there are better ways of doing this.
>> the list of things that north koreans want, it's not beyond the minds of men and women what they want and we could ask them. >> in a national situation, there are options. i hope you all listen carefully. professor gallucci said about a year ago he met with them of the listen to this, if it's true that they expect within the year and to have-- that phone call he mentioned earlier to the president, they're testing intercontinental missile which would be a nuclear war on it. you're talking here about a clear and present danger. and i think i'm the only on the panel, going to combat, this is serious stuff. to sit back and say, let's call a psychiatrist from cia and tell us is this guy completely crazy or pretend to be crazy or
can we trust him this-- >> talking about north korea here? >> yeah. >> just checking, just checking. [laughter] >> fair point, but i wouldn't call a cia psychiatrist. so it really comes down to this. two things which are wonderful, who can be against negotiations, solving differences and getting a-- who would be? they are aiming a gun at our head and so, anybody who wants to talk about anything for six, five years, answer the question. when the phone comes in and what are you going to do now to prevent it and one last senz. asking china under what conditions they'll be willing
to north korea's arms, based on energy, it's a question that can be out tomorrow, answer get an answer by the end of the week. >> all right. so, to take more questions, i think we'll take two or three questions and then we'll have our panelists speak. yes? >> [inaudible] . rather disappointed in hearing no expression of the need for credibility by the united states if we are to choose a realistic negotiation form of diplomaciment when the united states is disregarding international law by having weapons of mass destruction, 7,500, along with russia, and the obvious solution is for the united states to regain or earn
its credibility by eliminating the nuclear weapons which have spent-- have caused ten trillion dollars of your tax money, our tax money would be wasted and never used. thank you. >> i guess that was a comment. hearing from the gentleman. >> john burrton with the korea times. president trump moon right now is overseeing the biggest defense buildup, the south korean military forces. and he's made it quite clear that the person of this is to reduce dependence on the u.s. military. >> would you think that china
would look at, and he's appearing off the peninsula. and there's also been talk about south korea gaining its own independent nuclear capacity. do you think that south korea would go down that route and what would chinese reaction be? >> and you're talking anti-missile batteries. >> we'll talk more questions, over there, yeah. >> hi, my name is beverly holmes, i was a faculty people her at gw. i degree with dr. bryzinski.
my question, who is the present day negotiators. i was one of the early visitors to china and i published a paper at "the washington post" in 1dz what, '72. two days before nixon's trip to china. so, and i know the country well. before then, i did not know anything, but after that visit i have learned a lot and i agree completely with the doctor and i would like to know who would that present day kissinger be. >> thank you, maybe one more question from students. any student? >> okay. that lady over there was like waving her hands very fast.
>> hello, i'm a freshman at washington university. >> all right. >> and this is kind of tailing what you said. through your identity of diplomacy as a-- and what's the first step to build that relationship of trust and are the sanctions that have been imposed kind of hurting that relationship and making it more difficult to establish creditability with the dprk. >> all right, thank you. >> okay, those are both very good questions. first, dr. holm-fincher, who is the next kissinger. i don't know. i can say when richard nixon visited china people thought he was about the least likely person who would ever go to china because he had such a long history of being a
hardline anti-communist throughout the 50's. and a fierce critic of communism. nobody thought he was a likely person to do this, but, you know, history surprises us so i can only hope that there is a similar surprise in the next few years. but we also, one of the problems, i think currently, we still -- the state department posts that deal with east asia and other positions haven't been completely filled. so i think you have to hope that you have someone who has the knowledge and subtlety to deal with north korea, but i think even if you don't have someone with that kind of knowledge and nuance, you can still have things a lot better than they are and so that's
what i'm saying as well. i mean, the-- with china, it was an intimate and tricky process and i think, you know, i think you can have you know, some process of negotiation and dialog with north korea that could nonetheless improve relations even if you don't have-- you know, even if you don't have the most able statesman or someone of the caliber of henry kissinger when it comes to dealing with the chinese. incidentally in my work there's a lot of places where i criticize nixon and kissinger, so i'm not necessarily meaning to come off someone who is offering something for nixon-kissinger. so i would just put it that way. and then diplomacy.
what is the first step the united states needs to take with diplomacy for north korea. i think, first of all, there needs to be decreasing of rhetoric might put north korea in a better frame of mind. more likely for north korea would want it sit down at the table. there are american officials and former american officials, one is sitting at the table with me, who had contact with the north koreans. the north koreans do know how to get into contact with us and we do know how to get into contact with them through the u.n. and through other institutions, through the chinese, if need be. so, i do think there are methods of opening up negotiations with them. what is the best method? that's something i'm not completely sure about. i think we would have to look
at that very carefully and we would have to look for a solution or look for a way of doing to make sure we don't embarrass the united states or north korea. if we begin this process i think it will be a very delicate one and one which could be, you know, disrupted easily. so, i think we'll need to have an approach and need to have people who could, you know, deal with it carefully. >> very briefly, for like myself look for historic crimes and social forces and so individuals, not important, but much less important, so the question we would ask, what are the forces which are developing which may or may not carry out, that can negotiate
successfully. since you asked the question, we have a volunteer. president trump said he's already going to have dinner over a steak as long as it's a trump hotel, and so-- and so i think-- >> all right, if you could respond to the first and second questions and comments? >> so that first comment had to do with american credibility and whether we had any in light of our continued embrace of nuclear weapons. and i have bad news. it seems to me that while president obama made some commitments at the beginning in the prague speech and at the end at hiroshima speech, that
committed, i think, at least retorically to the united states of america reducing the number of its nuclear weapons and certainly avoiding introducing new types of nuclear weapons, to move to deemphasize nuclear weapons in the defense policy of the united states. that was declaratory. this, to be able to do that and to sign that agreement with the russians he committed to the united states of america to a program over 30 years that would cost about pa trillion dollars in-- and these are big round numbers and therefore wrong, but roughly. to virtually all of our strategic systems would be at least modernized and you have to put modernized in quotes because modernized to the extent that they look like new ones to me. but in any case, even president obama, if you will, who had a
commitment and awful lot of stuff built in strategic systems, maybe the actual numbers of nuclear warheads would not go up and maybe he would, in his vision, a future prison would be able to get the u.s. numbers down depending how you count, 1500 or so, which would be a dramatic reduction. that's not where we are now. that is not on the agenda of this president or this administration. i don't even think it's much in the news. i don't think that people are talking about arms control, god knows, not in disarmament, right, these days. so i wouldn't expect that to be a public policy issue of major moment except as a budget issue because these are very big numbers. the other point i want today pick up on, john's question,
the first question how would the chinese look at south korea's modernization? i don't know. i don't think they're thrilled with it, even if, in your mind, it's connected to a reduction and dependence on the united states. i think at the end of the day, the south koreans do not wish when there's a security issue for the united states to take a walk. you look at-- there are a lot of indicators of that, that the establishment, it varies with this-- the establish if i could use that for the south korean security thinkers are committed to the alliance. with respect to south korean acquisition of nuclear weapons, leaving ntp and getting their own nuclear weapons presumably because they could no longer defend on the deterrent from
north america. i think we're saying stupid things about alliances and their value and about us not caring if they acquire nuclear weapons or not that, that we could move them in that direction. i would hope that every a period of time, we would once again figure out alliances are worthwhile. they are key to a nonproliferation policy and that we have to be credible there. but i certainly think if you take south korean nonnuclear status, or japanese nonnuclear status for granted, you're making a mistake. >> thank you, all right. maybe one last round of questions. questions. >> hello, this is a junior at elliott school and i was a
student under professor bras sins sinski. you said that they had to integrate north korea like nixon did china. and if you do, how do you take an approach of the problems that kim's regime had done, purge or opening concentration camps. were there similar historical examination between the nixon administration and china, subject of human rights under mao still. >> and the gentleman over there? >>. >> before i get to the question, there's a news report the last few minutes that north korea fired a missile over japan. so, i just want to put that on the table, it just happened.
>> clear and present danger. >> the question, we have been talking about north korea. but north korea's basically its ruler. it's not a normal government and kim jong-un seems to be more ruthless, even than his father and grandfather, the murder of his half brother, association, whom he apparently saw as a threat. we talk about rationality in international affairs, but is this rational behavior? is he different from his father and grandfather. >> one more question. >> my name is bob grist. we have been talking about north korea as a rogue state
and our news media echoes that every opportunity they can. but the history of north korea and the history of u.s.-north korea relations could just as-- one could reach the conclusion it's the u.s. that is the rogue state and that has brutalized kor korea, certainly during the korean war where 30% of the population was decimated and all sorts of war crimes committed. but since then north korea has demonstrated a willingness to negotiate over nuclear weapons, both in the sunshine policy and in previous communication with the u.s. the axis of evil speech in 2002
is what terminated a possibility for real negotiation between the u.s. and north korea. is there enough in the history of u.s.-korean relations that if the american public understood how much of a rogue state the u.s. has been in this specific situation, that they could change the dynamics of the kinds of options that we're hearing about now, and actually demand the kind of denuclearization in the world, that 122 country in the general assembly, for example, a month ago supported. i am disturbed that the experts who are talking with us now all no i do appreciate the
difference between diplomacy and other strategies, although the doctor's approach sound like negotiation, too, but indirectly. but it seems to me that the american public has not really weighed in on the u.s. being a rogue state and i think this is a real missed opportunity for that point of view to be raised, especially given the clear and present danger that we see in this very explosive situati situation. [applause] >> all right. okay. one last question from there, two. >> hi, my question is for professor brazinski and
gallucci most. and both of your strategies seem to be approaching not exactly the issue that we are facing right now of having a gun to our head. professor brazinsky, you mentioned patience, i'm not sure if we have the timeline to develop that patience more in the united states pattern do we have the consistency to develop that patience which i think you noted had your self. how would we -- what, in your opinion is an effective first step and how do we deal with the current crisis and tying in longer considerations about human right challenges and normalization over time? >> one last question. >> hi, my name is kimberly, i'm
a candidate-- and going off your joke who was the unstable leader in this-- >> the question. >> my question is what-- and we've-- most of the panelists touched on this and maybe delve more deeply into what diplomacy looks like under the trump administration. >> okay. maybe start-- >> may i start. yeah, a lot of questions that could possibly take us a long time to talk about, but we don't have that much time so i'm going to try to be brief. alexandra, your question touched on something that some of the other panelists said that i'm also not 100% sure i agree with, and that is there is a gun to our head. if you live in south korea, they think there's been a gun to their head for 70 years and
they say so what? so the question is, is there anything different all of a sudden than there has been for the last 70 years and i think this is where i have some disagreements. and it also goes to the question, he asked if kim jong-un actually different from his predecessors, i think that's an important question. my sense is that kim jong-un will push the line further, at least there's still a line. there are certain things he won't do because in the end he doesn't want to see the end of his regime. and i think very very important. so, you know, this idea of how close and present the danger is is actually something which is debatable. again, these things don't have anywhere near as much, you know, impact on south korea.
i'm not saying there's no impact. the south korean markets will probably dive after it was just announced north korea firing a missile over japan. nonetheless, there's a question of whether there's a dinners and i think that's important because i still think we can be patient. i still don't see-- i still don't think that there's a war that's going to break out tomorrow or next week and that's why i've been advocating more of a long-term approach. i realize that a lot of people criticized obama for the idea of strategic patience and said, well, for eight years you had strategic patience and we actually didn't do anything at all. and i think that's a fair criticism. we don't want patience to mean that we don't do anything. we want it to mean that we do something, but we also have to-- you know, i think we also have
to be cautious. you know, i think the media likes to take these incidences and all of a sudden blow them up, and then, two weeks later, something else happens and we forget about north korea and it's not such a clear and present danger anymore. i think there's still time to have a more patient approach. i want to get to, you know, since one of my students is in students is in the audience and i'm happy to see that, one of my best students, the question about how we-- if we integrate north crowe how would we deal with the human rights issue and it's a very good question. when he talked to china we ignored some questions. jimmy carter who normalized relations to finally normalized relations with beijing was a big advocate of human rights, but when it came to china he
sort of said, well, we sort of have to be quiet about this so we can improve the relationship. i think with north korea it may be worse -- it might be worth it to do that first and set up relations later. why? because if you can set up contacts and exchanges and you have more information getting about the united states and the west inside north korea, you might slowly, slowly, you know, encourage more development in civil society there. that's very tough. i don't know for sure that that would happen, but i do think that that might be how we-- you know, how we have to do it. the point about who is the real rogue state, i'm not, you know, a defender of american foreign policy in all context, and i absolutely agree that, you know, during the korean war, the bombing of north korea was
something that was absolutely horrific and there were a number of atrocitied committed on the korean war, atrocities on both sides. one of the reasons they were that way during the cold war, the atrocities committed in the north korea than what the south korea and united states did. but this is debatable. one point that needs to be mentioned, who is ultimately responsible for the start of the korean war and this is something-- in china this is not tout. but there's absolutely incontroverted evidence that the korean war started because kim sat down with stalin sat down and planned it.
i strongly you look at woodrow wilson, and tle' someone in the audience, an expert on documentation of the korean war, i think that evidence of how the war started in the first place and who bears ultimate historical culpability is very clear. >> let me be brief. greg is completely correct. and a deal to say for 70 years. i'm not sure it's true for japan. we need to go back to the situation we talked about early, professor gallucci,
someone comes in to the president and says someone put a nuclear weapon on a missile, they talk about it ahead of him. but is now is the time, what do we do when that phone call come? my response is, this is not a situation which we can bet on optimistic interpretation. that he is rational, he is or maybe he's not. i want to hedge the situation where we find ourselves directly. as to what's happening in north korea, it's a kind of interesting development. i did my first visit to china in 1973. china had been allowed know the to do only what we're quietly
planning and bring to the state, they could tell them and the start of the vote. and that's enormously encouraged production and soon, first, only for consumer foods and then you sort of saw it was furniture and soon expanded more and more. and that's what's happening now in north korea. anybody who thinks that because very much agree, they are both leaders, that the north korean people are unhappy with the current regime, look what's aping there. it used to be extremely stark and opposed regime. and they're moving in this
direction. and it does make the chinese people, the north korean people fear they're in a brand new january -- >> if i could, the question on of the united states of america, the rogue state. i worked for the u.s. government directly or indirectly over 20 years and all of it in political military stuff. i can tell you for a fact we did not in all matters cover ourselves with glory, we did not, but i have no difference-- difficu difficulty, excuse me, i have no different telling the difference between united states and north career, me personally. second, what's the first diplomatic step?
that's actually a, i think, a very interesting question and one the administration has stumbled over. the last administration, much to my frustration had this standard of, well, the north crohn's really aren't serious. how do you know when they're serious? well, they're not serious. the administration had-- you know that every fall there used to be a peanuts cartoon where charlie brown ran and lucy kept holing the ball, really, charlie, i'm not taking the ball away and then the ball goes away. the administration had this fear that the north koreans were losing and after the infamous leap day events, it spilled over in this administration. you must have noticed that secretary tillerson said, well, they're not serious yet. we're looking for a sign when they're serious.
what's the first diplomatic step? first of all, to have talks about talks that are without pre-conditions of any kind. because real talks you can't have right after they test a missile and can't have it when we've done testing. so the first step, you do that and set the terms for what negotiations would look like and then, i think my colleague is correct. expect those negotiations to go on for a long time. we were at it a year and a half because things happen. it's not how long-- i mean, how long doing does it take for the free markets, a year after. the first step to have no pre
conditions in the talks and realize you can't engage on the heels of some aggressive move by the end other side. if they just shelled an island, you can't say it's a good time to have talks, and-- third point, diplomacy under the trump administration which i don't know why i wrote this down because i don't plan on addressing it, but it seems to me that among the many things, comments one could make is that it is confusing, right? it seems pretty clear that mattis says something, then the president said something, and then the secretary of state says something and they don't match up. so, if someone has been watching this, like an american, can't figure out who is on first, you can imagine how allies feel never mind.
so i would say they need some message control here. now, i've heard this said that maybe this is the plan, we're confusing them with our foot work. [laughter] >> i don't actually believe it and if that is the plan, i think it's a dumb plan. but, all right. the fourth is the most important point i want to conclude on and that's the-- you may not hear it, but he keeps saying clear and present danger, sometimes louder and quieter. that's what i want all of us to focus on the clear and present danger problem. i want us to think about-- i say it again, it's the guy that runs into the oval office says they've got a nuclear weapon aboard a ballistic missile. i hope to god we take it out on the ground because we can't
with confidence in the air. those of you who are thinking that's sad or perhaps the standard missile the aegis, or some of you may have dilutions about patriots, but none of these systems layered, should give you any confidence that we can take out a missile that we have not shot at our self, warned ourselves when it was coming and told ourselves the trajectory and made sure there was just one, all right? so now, if it's an enemy, they're unlikely to do that for us, so, the option, if it's got a ballistic missile with a nuclear weapon is take it out on the ground, right, and then make sure. i would think it's nuclear war 101. ...