tv 19th Chinese Communist Party Conference Preview CSPAN October 6, 2017 9:01am-12:24pm EDT
went home over break, all they heard was why aren't you doing more to help donald trump and fulfill your promises and that base of voters, however small it might be getting is still really, really strong. >> we'll take this group. and thank you all for joining us today. [applaus [applause] >> the upcoming 19th national congress of the communist party of china begins october 18th and we're here for the endowment in washington for a discussion on the possible outcomes of that meeting. and its implications for china's domestic and foreign policy. live coverage on c-span2.
[inaudible conversations] >> good morning, everyone, welcome to carnegie endowment for international peace. i think i've known just about everyone in the room one way or another and i'll keep the introductions short. i handle the program here and it's my opportunity on behalf of carnegie today to host a pair of panels that includes some of the people i admire the most in the field of contemporary china studies. we at carnegie and i think throughout the china-watching community have had tremendous admiration for the leadership
and the protection of the china leadership monitor, which is organized by professor alice miller at the hoover institution at stanford university. they have established a terrific record for hearing the facts as opposed to trends, feelings, things like that. so, whenever you want to touch base with reality i like to go on-line to the china leadership monitor and do precisely there. today we'll give you a sample of writings in form of presentations working ahead in the 19th party congress in a very short time from now. we have today two panels, the first one 0 will be people you see here, i'll moderate. michael flynn and allen romberg have been regular contributors to the china leadership monitor as well as making many other
contributions in the field and they'll speak for the first period until 10:45. james was here a moment ago, but has been called away by a family emergency and had to leave so he will not be here this morning. you can find his writings in the china leadership monitor and we're sorry he can't be with us and wish him well and all he's having to manage this morning. the -- oh, i wanted to mention, as you look around the room you may see no one here actively working for the brookings institution. that's not a protest. they've been called off to a mandatory retreat and would love to be here with us as well. so, in case you're looking for somebody you don't see, it's one of those things that happen. i'd like to get started, and the order we have is for you to
speak first, michael. and then to alan. >> thanks very much, doug. that's a pleasure to be part of this effort. i have been writing for the china leadership monitor now for, i don't know, alan, how long? >> quite a few years. >> how many? 172 years. [laughter] >> sometimes it seems like that. no, and yes, it's a tough job. you know, it's a very demanding schedule. the deadlines are really harsh and, but it's been a pleasure writing and my topic has been foreign policy and i have usually focused on trying to sort of dig deep in chinese views in the open media on foreign policy issues distinguishing between authoritative and nonaauthortative.
and they ignore what the government says in an active authortative way as if they represent all chinese viewers. they do in some sense, but what i'd like to speak about what i think will be the foreign policy themes, continuities and changes and issues in foreign policy that we might see at the party congress coming up later this month. now, party congresses are usually not occasions for getting into the details of foreign policy. most people will focus on them and we'll see that today for implication for leadership changes and broad national policy direction, but they do say some things about foreign policy, and some very important things. so what i've done is i've taken a look at the 17th and 18th party congress and developments
since the last, the 18th party congress in 2012. so i'll make some comments on the three general areas that these party congressing usually cover in terms of foreign policy. the first is general statements on the global environment that have an impact on foreign policy and these are programmatic statements about the external environment and the world and obviously its implications for china. and here, i think the party congress will continue to stress the development toward a generally stable international environment, and the concept of peace and development as what's called the underlying trend of the times. i think we'll see that's been highlighted in past party congress statements and i think we'll see this again or something similar to it, but this has always been paired with more negative concerns about the international environment and those in the
past have involved what's been called code word primarily for the united states and power politics, local conflicts, hot spot issues that keep emerging, imbalances in the world economy, which may be worsening, and then, of course, traditional and nontraditional security threats. i think you'll see reference to these kinds of factors as well in the party congress statement. now, there's always been a reference in the past in the 18th party congress something called neointerventionism. >> and that's to intervene without having the united nations. and this was prompted really, or at least highlighted in the 18th party congress and came out as a result of events in libya and syria at the time with intervention there by outside powers.
now, this concept interventionism might not be as prominent in this party congress because you haven't had as many new examples of this that occurred since the last party congress unless you talk about the possibility, the fear of a u.s. led military intervention in north korea. i doubt that that would be likely to be mentioned or the neo interventionism because it occurred after a development, but it's possible, i suppose. now, in addition to those concerns that we've seen before, both positive and negative. i think the party congress would highlight more recent potential threats to what it sees as peace and growing stability, growth in the system. and that will be this idea of growing imbalances, in economic development and more importantly, what's seen as a
troubling backlash against greater global economic intervention and this is a theme that has been struck by chinese leaders in recent year or so that has become increasingly prominent. and beijing in this respect will likely present itself as a strong opponent of a trend toward protectionism and a proponent of greater economic integration and free trade, which had become, as i say, a theme since the election of donald trump, and the rise of similar, what you might call "me first" nationalism or nationalisms in europe and just to sort of highlight this, last month the foreign minister said we live in a world that's witnessing profound changes in the international landscape. prominent traditional and nontraditional threat, global
growth and a growing backlash against globalization. there's mankind' pursuit of longstanding peace and development. i wouldn't be surprised if a statement like this appears in the party congress statement. the second area, getting more to the issue of chinese policies, in other words, how does china deal with this environment. i think you will see, again, in the party congress, a central focus in all realms on pursuing following through the so-called double objectives for china as we probably all know in this room, a moderately prosecutor press society in 2021. and the 16th party congress in 2002, reaffirmed in a report to the 17th party congress in 2007 and reaffirmed yet again in 2012. the second is the construction of a strong democratic
civilized hash harmonious. so these continue to be basic statements about chinese objectives, but i think these will be, as they have been within recent years, couched within the china dream, which is xi jinping's rej rejufiniization. and in terms of general characterization of china's specific foreign policies in the 19th party congress, you'll here hear the usual bromide, holding high the banner of peace, cooperation, mutual benefit, independent foreign policy of peace, following a win-win strategy for countries opening up sustainable balanced
growth, et cetera, et cetera. i think you'll hear repetition of new types of power relations. some thought that these two slogans, have been deemphasized somewhat in chinese leader's statements. and i doubt, however, that they will be lacking from the party congress statement because i think they still are a major element of china's view towards dealing with the united states, and dealing with developing countries, particularly neighboring developing countries and i also think that perhaps most notably, the 19th party congress will repeat the past 17th and 18th party statements of china need to, quote, firmly uphold china's territorial sovereignty, maritime rights and interests and national unity. this, of course, refers to its
disputes with its neighbors around its periphery in the maritime area that have become more direct in recent years and again, from a recent speech in this case by state counsel in july on this issue, where he stated that china must unequivocally make clear its position on taiwan, the south china sea and other issues concerning china's mainly core interest, we have drawn a clear line of what is acceptable and acted forcefully to defend our core interest as well as our legitimate rights, unquote. so the emphasis on this issue remains, and i think very much it will be reflected in the party congress statement. it reflects the larger emphasis by the xi jinping regime which began under the advancement of peace and stability alongside china's rights.
using china's greater influence to advance those interests. at the same time, i think there will be efforts emphasized both lateral diplomacy in the recent party congress and the idea about reforming global government which has also been a theme in past party congress meetings. in the defense and security realms in particular, i think you'll probably hear the phrase, which was again, which was made after the party congress on the search for a common comprehensive cooperative and sustainable security. in this regard, you might hear the-- for the first time the actual placement of the party congress statements of the three principles for dealing with hot spot issues and these were announced-- mentioned in 2015 and they include adherence to noninterference in internal affairs and opposition on the practice of imposing solutions
on others. in chinese foreign policy, upholding fairness and justice of the pursuit of one's own interest, which is kind of a dig, it seems to me at the trump administration, even though it pre-dates that administration and that political settlements and opposition to the use of force. now, i think regarding military policies in particular the 19th party congress will probably reiterate the 18th congress about chinese' military, military modernization where it said a strong national defense and powerful armed forces are needed that are commensurate with china's international standing and meet the needs of its security development interest and that the chinese military takes a more active role in political and security fields. this idea of china's greater more --
mo moretory, and cyberspace security which has occurred in past party congress. the reference to cyberspace was unprecedented in the 18th congress work report and also space in the context of security. of course, i think there will be a reputation of the concept, the objective that china should continue to build itself into a maritime power. finally, although no details are provided in party congress statements, it might offer individual references to specific policy initiatives associated with these objectives. and one road, i think, for sure will appear. the improving relationship with he periphery countries which was a major theme since the
convening of the 18th party congress could well affair again. increasing china's increasing involvement in a range of multi-lateral events that china will host and organize for votes and government issues, get a reference there. the new type of power relations before in relation to the united states. an interesting question is whether or not it will mention china-russian relations and the improvement in china and russians relations and crisis in particular. i'm not sure about either of those, china-russia relations have barely been mentioned in party congress in the past. they might be mentioned. the dprk nuclear crisis in particular are somewhat doubtful unless it's placed in the context of these hot spot statements that i said before. and that case, what i see are probably a lot of continuities
with some greater emphasis to globalization, et cetera, and free trade, open markets, nonprotectionism. but the real question in northern and defense is not so much what themes in the policy will be struck in the 19th party congress and the following national people's congress in the spinning of 2018, but whether a stronger, more come nant -- dominant xi jinping, or more confrontational china on maritime disputes, u.s., and possibly north korea. i don't subscribe to the view that xi jinping is primarily an autocrat with pushing the u.s. out of ray shah, as some think. yes, he wants china to be more effectively using its growing presence and influence
internationally to promote its national development and security interest as i've said, but xi jinping and the china leadership recognize the imperative for china to maintain relatively positive cooperative relations with the u.s. and the west. like it or not, china is integrating into the global economy and the global regimes, and highly averse to major shifts in the regional or global order that is threatened, such as confrontation with the u.s. xi jinping and the chinese leadership have yet to make a stable transition to a new normal of lower, but higher beneficial growth rates and equitable positions. and china must carry through
major structural reforms that demand a continued focus on domestic environment for years to come. it would be exceedingly foolish, in my view, for china under xi jinping have that posture after that 19th congress. and and over time, i think this is probably likely. as argued elsewhere. this will require, in my view, new approaches to regional security and more extensive cbm's than what we've seen hopefully leading to a balance of power eventually across the region. u.s. policy needs a strategy to deal with this changing situation and we haven't seen one yet. i hope one emerges in the not too distant future.
thank you very much. >> thank you, michael. i guess i've got an early test of propositions enumerated for when president trump and his entourage arrive in beijing shortly after the party congress. a lot involves whether there will be more aggressive, a less aggressive phase of the communist party under xi jinping, and fortified leadership going forward. this audience will have lots of good questions and challenges shortly. next we're going to turn to alan romberg. he's written the bible on contemporary u.s.-taiwan relations, and chapter and verse, what happens with its relations with the u.s. and others as well. i recommend-- released yet? >> you're in the process of editing. and ott the brink of the
precipice, and look in granular detail in what's going on in taiwan's relations with the west and today, it's our privilege and honor to have alan here to tell us some more. >> thanks very much, doug. it is my privilege and honor to be here. i think that the -- as michael indicated, dr. alice miller's leadership. i think we've been able to do some useful things through the chinese monitor. it's through my updating, things as i see them. as far as the party congress is concerned, despite all of the issues which michael very astutely identified, the congress is going to be overwhelmingly, in my view,
focused on domestic issues, both political as well as economic and taiwan has traditionally been limited in the congress itself to the half of a paragraph. the other half being hong kong and macau. there are also briefings go along and taiwan gets addressed in those press briefings, but i do not see, basically, a sharp departure from that practice. my own view is that basically in terms of cross trade relations, we have what is sort of it classic irresistible force and immoveable object problem in that beijing has chosen, i'm not entiring sure
why, but chosen to focus on getting taiwan to endorse china, be it under the 1992 consensus rubric or some other way. and we know from several years of conversations with the leaders that although they stress the 1992 concensus, it isn't that particular farmlation which is so critical. what is so critical is what they call the core connotation, which is that there is one china to which china and the mainland both belong. and they have not done that. what she has done is conducted her policy in a way that, in fact, is not inconsistent with what traditionally has been viewed as a one china approach. she's not provoked. if you go back and look at previous statements, it was quite different story. but basically since she became
a candidate for president in 2015, a lot of rhetoric that surrounded her has fallen away. i don't think the principal concern has changed, that is, first of all, i think spiked polls would show there's limited support for taiwan independence. based on the polls that i consider most reliable, not more than 23, 24% at either time to go independence now or after a considerable period of maintaining the status quo. nonetheless, my view is that if they woke up tomorrow morning, what happened to independence, be my guest. independence would happen quickly, there would not be a uniform to deal with this on the island, but that's not going to happen. i think people in taiwan know this isn't going to happen and
that's why we see the polls show support for maintaining the status quo so high. beijing looks at this with great suspicious and they look at thai with suspicious. and it really points to not a declaration of independence, i think that they don't fear that, but some may be concerned that with appointments of certain justices she wants to go to independence through a back door, but mainly, it's sort of covert or government or cultural independence, but very concerned about -- and that, i think, has been the focus of a lot of their policies in cutting off contact at authortative levels, the highest aspects of authortative levels. there's still a lot of communication at working
levels. but something out of this congress, although some point to a significant tightening up, maybe even use or threat toward use of force, i don't think so. i think there will be a tightening up unless there's some movement we don't see at the moment. particularly starting in taipei and in back channel negotiations, which would be to some kind of a deal. i don't see a likelihood that they'll produce major change in the direction of policy. in taiwan, if you go back a year or more, there was a hope actually that after the 19th party congress xi jinping would be more flexible, not on china, but on addressing this stalemate, perhaps in the way of trade negotiator, if you get stuck in a place, you enlarge
the topic and you find a way around it. my sense it, and some of you may have had different information, they're much more concerned now, that that's not likely to happen. that the statements coming out of beijing and the crackdown on communication does not suggest there's going to be an easing after the congress. xi jinping's attitude, i think, has been not to push for unification in a knowable time frame, although michael raises the point of the second 100 years, that is the 2049 target and a country that is essentially unified, territorial sovereignty, so forth. under that heading, one could say that's a target date and i
think a number of people on the mainhand -- mainland, in fact, achieve it that way. and unless there's a real change in the way the system works and when we hear that from our second panel, i don't think that xi jinping will be running things in 2049. i think he's put a great deal of emphasis on one china and on trying to consolidate adherence to an acceptance of one china in whatever way. again, i don't think it has to be at all in the form of the 1992 concensus, but it has to be something that scratches that itch and i don't see doing is in an indetect fashion is another fashion. xi jinping, despite the suspicions of thai and ongoing
activity as far as they are concerned for undermine through covert, cultural independence, i don't see him wanting to participate a crisis. i could say three reasons, i'm sure you all could come up with a lot more. one is the effects in taiwan itself. why make the problem harder? already you know there's a lot of backlash to the kind of punishments and beijing would dismiss that. and punishment imposed on taiwan and moving on to one china and to accept the common political foundation of china. secondly i think that focusing on taiwan would distract the leadership from issues which are clearly more urgent and in the current scheme of things, more important. and why do they need that?
i think they view taiwan in a very different context from foreign policy issues. it's obviously, a quote, domestic issue. they don't have the sa same necessity of imposing a discipline on their relationship as they do, perhaps, in some of their foreign policy in their neighborhood. and so, as long as they don't lose ground, as long as it's not a reversal of the current situation, i think they feel they have time, maybe it's becoming more urgent and i'll discuss that in a minute, but it's not something that is worse distracting from or pressing. and finally with the u.s., i
explored in the book as mentioned, taiwan was the obstacle to normalization of u.s.-prc relations for years. and only through acceptance of various and sundry terms that have nuances to them that we were able to move ahead and yet, we continue to hear from our prc friends that taiwan remains the most sensitive and most important usual in u.s. relations. that doesn't mean that it has the agenda, but it does mean if something goes wrong in taiwan, and taiwan relations, that that indeed could set usprc relations on a very negative track and i would argue and i've argued for years that i think that taiwan is probably the only issue that at the end of the day has the potential to have the u.s. and the prc come into actual conflict.
we can have problems in cree korea the south china see, but i think over taiwan is a possibility. in the congress documents or in the surrounding briefings, they'll talk about family as, i'll mention in a minute. they say okay, if they're my family at best, they're distant cousins. china doesn't generally buy into this notion. if there's a real movement towards independence that would be the real story, but there's not. like i said, i'm quite convinced the prc doesn't believe there will be. so i don't think they're worried about that. i do think that maintaining a military capability to deal with taiwan independence is
very important from their perspective to make sure that remains the case. we don't like the fact that they have their military importantly focused on a taiwan consistency, but it serves a useful purpose from their point of view and so i think that as long as that's the case that won't change much. some suggest he could be vulnerable over taiwan and the legacy. and again, my point of view is at least at this point, unless they lost taiwan, u.s. lost china today as long as he doesn't accept the notion that taiwan and mainland are separate and insists that part of one of the same state, whether they accept it or not. the focus, i think, will be on
2020 and elections in taiwan, that involves depending to some extent, an extent perhaps coming back and that's not the most certain read they have to lean on. we'll see how they handle it. within taiwan, now reiterated a need for a new model she hasn't said what the model is although she talks about greater reciprocity and working together with the mainland to deal with reason and so on. i have to say while i think it's perfectly reasonable approach, i don't think it's going to work. from beijing's point of view why would they accept joint responsibility for something that they have tagged taiwan with responsibility for. they've got the first accept one china and then do a lot of things together.
in that respect i don't see it working and second, there's what i call the factor. the former mayor of taiwan well-known for support for taiwan independence, famously while in the mainland stated taiwan independence is new premier. since he became premier he was asked to you support taiwan independence? he basically said yes. and there was quite a back and forth with the press and legislature and so on, at the end of the day, the premier doesn't have that h saying i'm going to follow taiwan's policy and stop asking me about my personal views. but the fact that he also, after that, made a statement that taiwan will not declare independence. i'm puzzled, i must confess, why if he's trying get away
from the issue, he's a lightning rod on itment and then he's going to talk about what taiwan is going to do regarding independence and maybe some of you can shed some light on that. by the way, one of the things he said is that taiwan is a sovereign independent country. that's not the mantra. the mantra is that the republic of china is a sovereign independent country. the party says that in accordance with the resolution of 1999, that taiwan is known as the republic of china, et cetera, et cetera, but the mantra is that the republic china and not to annoy or provoke beijing. that's another element in the stir that he caused pie his statement. i just say finally on taiwan. i don't think that anybody can be elected in taiwan that
advocates independence. the people did not elect her and she says she's admittedly with the status quo. i believe her policy generally speaking have been consistent with that. there are other issues this, the textbook issue, reading chinese history and taiwan history that need to be addressed, but i don't think that the people of taiwan are anxious to bring a disaster on their own heads. as many of you who have suffered through some of my articles and leadership monitor know i keep raise the issue of raising independence rather than what china, perhaps you could say that taiwan independence is not on the agenda. she hasn't said it. and when i raise something like this with mainland, they say, yeah, sure, that would be a
good thing, but she doesn't do it. and then there's the whole issue of the taiwan independence close and party charter. >> the u.s. role, it's important that we can't forget that, we're not just a bystander in this relationship. our goal is near and consistent, that is we want peace and stability to be ma in -- maintained. and on the way forward to dialog a stable basis for their relationship, and they can benefit. there are people that are in the region and so, the u.s. continues to say to be creative and flexible. it's commended sides, indeed, for what she has done and not done in terms of provocation. the hopes are that both side will work on finding approaches that will in fact work better. some people say, well, u.s. is
going to throw taiwan under the bus naturally, and some people say, well, we should. i don't think so in either case. if anything, i think the u.s. taiwan relations are becoming closer and the mainland notes this and worries about it and there's a thinned threat about arms sales not necessarily of the capability although there is that to some extent and also, it represents a representation of closer security relationship. and that is not the direction that beijing would like to see things go. so as i say, i think that a factor in beijing's not pushing to a crisis is the u.s. relationship, but because of what might happen in temperatures of a crisis and took impact on prc relations.
i noticed walking by a news stand, what i think remembering more or less correctly, china deadly headline, major concensus, u.s.-china. that's the way that beijing is trying to structure president trump ace trip and they don't want to upset that. we'll see what steps they're taking afterward. and i think it's incremental, i think it will, i think a year from now, taiwan's diplomatic parters are nod 20. how many beijing will try to take away, i don't think they'll do it wholesale, that would create a firestorm ap they want to demonstrate that they've got the power to do that and clock --
block in the space. the interesting factor moore me are who are running, and determining the nation's policy. and p xi jinping, and george w. bu bush, i don't know what the differences will make, i think some differences and other players so on. thank you. >> new very much, alan, for that come helps seive forecast for the party. you talked about personnel and i wholeheartedly agree that people make a difference in the system despite the fact that the system is very strong. >> we're not going to see, probably, many indications from what the people and personnel changes will be, march of next
year when they have a northern party congress. it will be a prolonged afterma aftermath, not that we'll see two, three weeks after. both of you have argued for considerably more continuity than change if i read you right. of course, if you systematically do what chinese monitors often do, you'll look at the stage of documents and meet up with the big party congressmen. you have a pretty good optic where they're going. and always in washington, new chinese military capabilities. now, david had unfortunately to leave and can't be with us now. i don't know what he had to say and my own thoughts are probably not too fast from him. is that china's dibb ration
dldz deliberation, and the change of generational leaderships, and has been appointed by predecessors of just two years ago, xi jinping announced a massive reduction in the armed forces, 2, 3,000 troops. and the massive reorganization of the way china organizations itself, both to creating a new rocket force. and china's defense and power capabilities and organizing the regional military structures. we're seeing increased activity by the pla, air force and november, around japan or like
a ship is going through there international space, literally around taiwan that we've seen in the past. we had a little bit of a -- between india and china on the border. reports out of northeast children up alongside the korean border. each may have its own explanation, but to me i look at it and i see a pla that's going through tremendous channing and expanded cape wi capabiliti capabilities. they're going to be involved in this for a long time. and under the gold, nickel reforms that took ten years to internalize it and new laws in reflections and they're aware
of their new functions. i have to think in china it's an a national challenge. and those types more and they do have interservice competitions and i would think in very quick summary, this is likely to argue as well for more continuity, and there need to be more active there object the periphery on the borders or beyond the borders, will be less than their need to work on their internal accommodation of the new instructions from the top, from xi jinping and other top commanders they've now appointed and that's probably not what you'd get out of the stories week by week in the u.s. press that china is on the march, and source of tremendous risk and taking preemptive
action to other things to address one of the changes coming at us. and do you have any comments on that,either of you? >> i'll just make a quick one. i think that michael will have a more strong one. first of all on personnel, i'll agree with you and it will be critical, but we can see some hints in terms of who is and isn't attending the 19th party congress, but it doesn't tell anything about where the people are in their thinking and what their role will be and how much they'll be treusted. and we heard for a long time xi jinping had problems beyond the corruption issues that now appeared. i'd be interested in doug and michael and others, i view and
there are folks here who have a deep klt background, even though i think that they take seriously their responsibility for national security in terms of fighting a real war, that is a major conflict they're the last if not the very last to want to do that. more aware of a consequences than other people are. it's easy to talk about it, but for those who watched the vietnam series, you get some sense of why people might take that view. so, i don't know, the pla talks tough and so on, but i-- i'm not sure that that indicates that they would be-- even if they were not in the midst of reorganization and things that -- they would be
particularly anchor -- achieve national objectives. >> i don't disagree with any of this. i think it's important to understand that the pla is an institution that's undergoing such huge, huge change from what it's done. how it has operated for decades and it's occurring orangesally, in new types of weapon systems they absorb and utilize and strategy focused by and large on the issue of taiwan and achievement and capability towards taiwan, but it's expanded its capabilities to go beyond that to a range of functions that include maritime security and issues beyond the
region, but not in a classic power projection foreign basis type of model of the united states, for example. so and currently i mean, alan mentioned the organizational challenges, it's going from an organize that was very infantry heavy and focused on the army in its organization, in its outlook to one that is genuinely joint, with a joint staff that operates in a much more effective way in coordinating the different services and that's a huge transition for the pla to undergo and it also is going through the process of, as all institutions in china, which led to the downfall of very senior military people and that, i think, has also affected where it's, you know, its abilities lie.
there was a recent story that came out. we were walking about it, about a recent book by eastton that a said the chinese military is preparing for the invasion of taiwan in 2020. this was a totally distorted interpretation about what exactly is going on. the chinese conduct planning and the military planning to achieve certain capabilities, as you saw in my remarks, they have certain benchmarks. they have placed the benchmark trying to an i chief a certain capability by a certain period, 2020, 2021. it does in the include a plan to invade taiwan at that point as it's portrayed to be. it's hard to see how children has the capabilities, if they
sustained an action against hud 1, even in the next several years w t-- . the actual invasion and seizing of that island. the china are not prepared to do this. they may ultimately think they need to, but in terms of their desire and intent. >> i as struck by we keep talking about china's new aircraft and capabilities, but looking at the taiwan scenario pointed out to me, i think to you as well, that china actually has fewer missiles today than three years ago, and appear to be aimed at taiwan and fewer amphibious vessels to carry army and the look
across-- that's worth bearing in mind. we talked about con newt in change and there are different kind of continuity, often the hallmark of the leadership monitor, distinguishing between what was left and what's left that's not authortative. i saw from commentary, i think the global times, that xi jinping being praised for his assertiveness in putting forth the northeast air shah -- station defense credit for island building in the south china see and for the forward leaning posture at the india border. and first, the means, or second
in the continuity, continuity of envelope pushing by the chinese leadershipment to y-- leadersh leadership. to you. >> i think these actions that we see, they are building as well, they are indicative of a china that believed it said it has for quite some time operated at a very distinct disadvantage in dealing with its immediate periphery and holding what it regard of sovereignty claims in that area. that doesn't mean that the conclusion has reached that, we need to decisively resolve these issues now and laying the groundwork for doing that as many people seem to think. i think it has a lot to do with hedging and a lot to do with
improving china's leverage in dealing with the other issues and in changing the path, what it saw, to its disadvantage, status quo, particularly around the island in the southern china sea and in the east china sea. and the chinese, i think, have -- i think they're fairly confident they've established a more, in their view, stable company, not just tore themselves, but in the region as well. because they have been left liab liable. now, the question is, is this simply a launch pad for a further move? will there be now the establishment of an adic in the subchina sea, will there be now
fortifications of the islands so they'll have personal basing for military deployment further down the road. one cannot say for sure that those things would not emerge. i think based on the context of what we've been talking about that the chinese would be very hesitant to move in those directions in a very, very deliberate way the and patient it way because i think it would jeopardize their larger interests and it would directly, i think, undermine their argument about their desire to maintain stability and continuing emphasis on negotiating these differences with these countries. so, i think their position is one of relative confidence at this point, but not a confidence that's going to lead to greater aggressiveness in a really radical sense. >> one point, i agree with all
of that. i also think, again, the u.s. is back. if china were to become really aggressive in south china sea, nearly the u.s. has signaled that it's not going to, to coin a phrase, sit idly by. so, i think that to undercut japan's claim to explosive basis of control which is our commit. there's a limit what the u.s. will tolerate with regard to that. it isn't the only factor one, the final tugging pattern, all of this in one way or another does divide the united states. i believe that china wants and needs not problems, but a
workable relationship with the u.s. >> and a question from the audience, the trump administration has, before coming into office and since coming into office, gone from accepting the phone call from taiwan and questioning about taiwan and china, to who wholeheartedly acknowledging the position and suggesting that trump won't talk to taiwan without permission from jinping. and what china has gone to-- and essentially security dialog by authoritying a large sale of arms to taiwan. is this coherent yet or stabilizing? >> from a u.s. point of view?
>> good bye. >> i think basically, yes, in the sense that having played around with the one china policy, i think that president trump has come back to-- he's not going to do that anymore, it's not in his interest to do that. on north korea sanctions, one might have thought that when china couldn't and didn't deliver everything he wanted on north korea that he was then reacting harsh and he did react. he did a few things. and the bank and the navigation and the arms sales and so on. but basically, to maintain, again, as xi jinping has a positive relationship to the extent possible acknowledging their difference. ...
my sense is something else happen. >> thank you very much. we will open the floor to your questions. ask you to raise your hand, call on you. please wait for the microphone so everybody can hear you. and then identify yourself and ask a quick question. remember this is on taiwan, foreign affairs and the related aspects of the second panel will give you an opportunity to dwell
on party history, internal dynamics, , the future xi jinpig and other such questions. if you look at the foreign-policy side of the cross-strait side for this round of questions, that would be appreciated. the editor of the china leadership monitor. in the front row. >> thank you. since the congress will do with the leadership and the military leadership, i wonder if either doug or michael or even alan has any thoughts on what the central military commission will look like an out of the congress. this was a set of reforms as michael notes that a really far-reaching and part of the purpose is to re-centralized command-and-control at the central level. it's created 15 subordinate units under the ce nc-51 how they will configure that in
light of these institutional changes? >> i'll be sure to convey that question to -- >> in the last few weeks there have been a number of reports that if come to me orally, not on paper, not in official documents or anything like that. suggest something very big is happening in that space. we don't know where it is there. we get numbers from 11, 15, and then be others. i see number 7-11 to 15 on the possible composition over all of the central military commission. the question is, we're pretty sure there will be a chairman and xi jinping will be the chairman. there's a question as to whether he will have one, four, or no vice chairman. whether there will be designated a vice-chairman will trip over
into your panel later, which is suggesting that person as the successor. do they want to indicate who the success is at this time or would that be something you want reserve for the next party congress? a lot of open-ended questions. >> for vice-chairman would double the number of vice-chairman that historically has existed and that would be a very interesting thing if they -- [inaudible] >> the late '70s -- >> microphone. >> does anybody know what the central intelligence commission is? it's the leading, it has a state of version but it is identical, the leading party body within china that directs policies regarding the military. and it is chaired by the general secretary of the party, and its vice chaired by the most senior use regard as the most senior and party status to military figures within the pla. this is represented, that it has representatives of the different
services and functional areas within the pla in its body. >> in recent weeks chinas publicize the departure and investigation of the head for the pla, and the prosecution or beginning of prosecution of the chief of the general staff, who is accompanying xi jinping tomorrow largo in april, as recent as that. they have departed and i'm hearing that others have been given warnings or are departing for other reasons, and that every significant move was made to exercise much stronger control over the top rank of general. 83% of the military representatives to the last party of congress are being replaced by new representatives to this party congress. that's, probably more than
anything not having all the details yet revealed. it's like to be a reflection of the fact that people were appointed to musical or earlier edits have been stepped at a time for new guys, new people to commit and assure there is lot of horsetrading and intimidation games played to backup the flexion of the people who would be chosen. there's significant turmoil within the pla top leadership from what i can see. >> something to say about the relationship of the military and to make reports to versus the nonmilitary side of the house and their independence. >> it's a steady thing over the last few years. one that xi jinping will not depart from as far as i can tell is the party will control the military, and the departure of some previous military figures from very high positions, they were in the end accused of political transgressions even though they were also found
guilty of personal corruption or misuse of power. there is an ideological fight going in the pla. they wouldn't publicize it if there were was not some resistance. there's something going on but it's one of the hardest diamonds to get into in the chinese communist system. thank you for your question. in the third row we have a question. >> thank you very much. i am with china news agency in hong kong. i still have a question on if this argument that the pla were attacked taiwan in 2020, michael, you have touched upon that, but i'm still curious about if this argument is
justified -- of the threat or is it real, , you know, sense of urgency in united states, how will it affect the u.s. policy toward taiwan? thank you. >> well, i don't believe that there may be people here who are affiliated with the u.s. government who have some greater understanding about how it is looked upon, but my sense is that, first of all, my understanding is ian eastin himself has taken exception to the interpretation that is presented our argument the chinese are going to invade taiwan in 2020. he himself is said that's not what i have been saying. i mean, this is based upon a report by bill gertz of the book, i think mainly based upon that and i wouldn't rely on
anything bill gertz says of anything to do with china. so his interpretation of ian eastin said book is quite plausibly completely incorrect. i think what he was trying to draw attention to is a fact there are plans that the pla has been developing, , contingency plans, third reich to achieve a certain capability by a certain time. these plans have been known, to my understanding, but u.s. government for some time. they are not brand-new. they've existed for quite some time and they apply to a lot of different areas. i can't recall exactly, maybe some other scan, that eastin's point in writing this book at this time was to i guess call attention to this planning in a more public way, and thereby increase desire by people to have a greater degree of response to it in some sense.
and beyond that i don't know exactly what his objective might be. i don't see it as particularly causing great agitation in u.s. government or elsewhere, because of the reasons i've already suggested. so i think it needs to be put in that context. >> taiwan -- if you look at the liberty times they published a comment by eastin explaining people were taking this way too much out of context. question here in the second row. >> thank you. i've been teaching in china, the discussion has raised many questions, and i'll ask, one is in terms of hard policy and the belt and road initiative.
what will be china's posture, position regarding afghanistan, for example? and you mentioned who will be advising china on u.s.-china relations? i'd like to turn that around. who in the united states is advising the trump administration on china relations? >> i'll answer your second question first. we three are the main. [laughing] >> you gave it away. >> we've got nothing to do with it. do you want to take the first? >> one belt, one road initiative is a very broad, very ambitious initiative as you know. it's both interior and asia, eurasia and also maritime. it's south asians manifestation at present seems to be primarily to do with pakistan and the china pakistan court or, and the
funding 50, $60 billion for pakistan to support that. i think china's position in afghanistan has been, to my understanding, i've not been following this in great detail but it has been increasingly involved in economic assistance to afghanistan. and increasingly cooperative in that issue, , that issue with te united states and other powers are trying to stabilize the country economically as a way of dealing with the internal threat that continues to exist there. and it's unfortunately, from what i see, it's not something that's working that effectively. you still of enormous unrest in the country with the enormous threats even cobble at times. so it's in process any think the chinese sort of see it that way. they want to stabilize that part of their periphery. that's part of what the whole
belt, one belt, one road enterprise is about, is both building up their west, which is extremely, is asymmetrical pensions of its deep element with the eastern parts of china, and in creating greater stability within its immediate eurasian periphery. and then influencing or increasing its political, economic leverage even as far as europe, hopefully through our participation in this one belt, one road initiative. it's a much bigger strategy than just giving with afghanistan and south asia. >> just a little more on afghanistan. the chinese, act in the late '90s, training under cancer were tolerated by the taliban, and china doesn't want that to happen again. meaning disruptions. so they have been fairly consistent in providing advice
on a small scale by people say it's good stuff on police training, to help afghan police be more effective and making to these problems don't come back to haunt china. there was an uptick in the u.s. seem to be departing from afghanistan, there was an uptick in the official activity to get more engaged economically and security talks, and regionally to talk to the parties who have an influence on afghanistan. we can do given the chinese relief from that because we have reinvested now, or recommitting to afghanistan so china can lean back a bit and let us handle the problem for them. this has a side benefit of keeping the u.s. focus on southwest asia and the middle east, or on korea and not on china. it's a double winner for than even though it is a small gain. >> your second question beyond the organization chart answer
and the go to add to that everybody has about almost anything regarding national good issues, for example, general mattis starting top of the list and maybe -- i don't know the answer to that. i would also say the president attitude towards china for example, and trade issues has a lot to do with his attitude on trade issues rather than about china specifically. we saw, for example, apparently that is seen economic team thought they have negotiated a deal on steel with china. the president said no, don't do that. i really, i don't know. and over time it probably changes. >> a question way in the back. >> central news agency, taiwan. my question is for out with regard to the number of the diplomatic allies taiwan may have after the 19th party
congress. do you mean is a sheen trying to set up a trap or provoke, trying to provoking president xi -- [inaudible] do you see any way for this? and does beijing really care how taiwanese people feel? thank you. >> i'm not suggesting they're trying to set a trap. i just think that if it is correct that they're going to continue to slowly ratchet up pressure, that when we're doing that we know there are other countries have different relations with taipei that would like to move and despite beijing's explanation that og, at the san panama just decided to move, that isn't the case that panama had long wanted to change and that beijing finally gave him a green light on that. there is a lot of potential. i'm casting it in that kind of
context. your final, does beijing care what people in taiwan think? i think they do care because endless a really want to have hardline long-term resistance, they've got to care. but it think they're willing to pay a certain price at this point because of their concern of where the administration they fear is going. but yes, if you try to swallow taiwan as a hostile element, that's of something they really want to do. went out, well, i don't know. i mean, i suggested one way out is to address the issue differently, a be picking up, fact what i i think in a sense, not specifically but since was just to try to find a way around not to resolve this not of one
china that both sides are determined not to move on, but i don't know. she has political issues to deal with, and we will just have to see how that goes. >> in the back here. keep going back. >> dennis wilder, georgetown university. alan, you asked a question about does xi jinping want a legacy related to taiwan. but i didn't, maybe i fell asleep for a moment, but i didn't think you answered that question -- >> very astute, dennis, very astute. [laughing] >> if we assume that xi jinping in some way, shape, or form is going to be with us as the leader of china longer than five years, would we have to assume
that he is going to want to take on this issue at some juncture, that patient in beijing may run out, that without a kmt that concerted move the situation back? it's hard to see where this goe goes. i guess i would just like you're a little more of your thoughts. >> i would start with what i said which is i don't think he can afford to be seen or formal to the charge that he has lost taiwan. i think that's the most immediate issue for him. i think in terms of legacy, if you go back and look at statements that he has made over a long period of time, setting aside the 2049 date, and i don't know how that plays in his thinking, i do think a commitment to one china in some
form, or to no independence in some form, is what he's really trying to get at this point. that would be pretty significant step forward, i believe at this point. unification obviously is the goal, and as a sheen keeps money everybody, don't mistake that, we haven't given that up. although i had to say i don't know what that means. what does unification look like? and i think that's a critical issue that both beijing alone but beijing together with taipei will need to mess with an exit me time i think they need to redefine what one china means, what unification means, what sovereignty means. and unless and until they can do that, i don't see, here's the question, i don't see a way out in essence. but i think they can do that and think they have had time to do that. michael i think is exactly right rather than on the 2020 date, i
don't think it's a meaningful date and i don't think based on ian eastin's followed state expense been meant to be a a follow-up date in his mind. but i do think he wants to go beyond not losing taiwan before he leaves office. as i said i think it's focused on one china. they have been trying for a long time well before tsai ing-wen came into office to get consensus in taiwan. i don't think that's changed. i think it's become somewhat more problematic and in a way more urgent. so, yes, i think he wants a legacy but i don't know how to define it beyond what i have just said. >> i mean, dennis, you and i were both in a meeting recently in beijing, and there was a considerable amount of expression of some concern among the chinese dissidents about the trend developments in taiwan.
it was very much in line with this point out it was making, not about what you call hardened piggy was what they called soft independence. changing the rules of the game in a very gradual but discrete but very meaningful ways, that alter the perceptions of the status of taiwan and the minds of not just the taiwanese public but the american government as well, and i agree with alan that it's unlikely that xi jinping will make a decision that the time is right for them to do something momentous on taiwan because the cost of doing so will remain extremely high. but if they really fail to reinvent itself in a meaningful way, you have successors to tsai ing-wen who are dpp people. they have cabinets who are very
pro-independence .3 even though they keep talking about the status quo. and then you have a deterioration in u.s.-china relations, which is to my mind the most critical factor affecting this whole taiwan dynamic. if the u.s.-china relationship begins to really get seriously problematic, then china's confidence in the american position towards taiwan and its resistance to movement in the direction of independence, its resistance to all kinds of actions that the united states government could take to increase its relationship with taiwan, all that becomes problematic for the chinese. then, then you have pressure, you mentioned this in a meeting, among some to revise the anti-secession law, or to invoke the anti-secession law. pressure could begin to sort of bubble up in the system. why aren't we reacting to this more deliberately asked i'm not predicting any of this will lead
to an option to use force against taiwan, but i'm saying you can see a pathway have this becomes much more problematic. it becomes much more serious crisis to get as was back in the early 2000s. >> just great points. on the kmt, obviously they were rendered, they are in terrible position coming out of the november 14 local elections and the 2016 presidential elections. but i think we might make mistake if we assume that they cannot stage a comeback to the point of if the administration is seen as failing at although the appointment has boosted the numbers somewhat, they still of these create, the latest polls i saw are still around 30%, and sinnott would you call great,, have to look at the trend.
so there may be i think a focus of activity may remain trying to convince the voters and i want they make the mistake last time. my gut is, and i said this many times, i basically think they kmt lost the last election rather than some out the dpp overwhelmingly winning it. so it's a bear to be done, but we will have to see. not only are people talk about invoking the anti-secession loss, if also also talked about the next npc perhaps looking at unification law. but have to say that while i'm sure there's a lot of chatter about this, i am concerned that we rely too much on some of our academic friends in the mainland and the views on this some of them are very tough-minded and will not let taiwan get away with this, so when it so forth. the essential point remains the one that michael just articulated, which is the was relationship is critical.
i think that xi jinping fully understands this, at a think that is among the factors that leads him to want to continue to have a workable constructive relationship with the united states so we don't get into a position where taiwan is the kind of divisive problem between us. i think they're convinced and got convinced the united states is not interested in promoting taiwanese independence. but i think they do believe many, many, many of them do believe u.s. is not arrested insane -- either. -- interested in seeing it either. the interest of use and its relationship to taiwan, support for taiwan in a variety of ways including military and also other ways is real and is a factor. >> i will add one little nuance to that, which is xi jinping spent considerable time in the
province working with taiwan investors and business people, other responsibilities that he had on his way up to the center. in that time, i'm told repeatedly that he came to the conclusion, much as the emperor of the ching ch'ing dynasty dih earlier that the cultural power and economic rule of mainland would be the long-term guarantor that somehow taiwan welcome back and you don't have to take precipitous action to get to that result. that will be tested and events will make important differences but that's the thought. we have time for one more question before we take a break. up -- >> this is a question that may say quit over into that second panel, but i think it would be fair to observe, and i'm sure certainly prepared to take a
position on this question, xi jinping likes to control things. whether you want to talk about economic small groups or information or history or south china sea islands or whatever, the guy likes to be in control. so we're talking about possibly as result of the 19th party congress is being even more in control. and i think they're probably are some foreign-policy implications that might spring from that and i would like any of you or all of you to speculate briefly on that, to include the notion he wants to control the diaspora as well. but that's a subject for another -- >> the last part of the, the diaspora thing is really interesting. i don't think it starts and stops with xi jinping, however. we saw with the russian affair, russian volvo and europe, american politics and we're still learning the dimensions of
that. i spent some time in europe this summer teaching, and was given insights into the amount of efforts china has been making to influence elections in european countries. they are actually investing in the politicians and other campaigns. we have a kerfuffle in new zealand right now over someone who is accused of a one-time spy for china, never be honest about it, and then defended by his prime minister who has been fully candid about it. the truth is some in between but it's a hot topic especially in australia where the media group has launched a major investigative program to look at where china might be trying to spend it so. here we fetterman debate about confucius institutes and whether their tools of chinese propaganda or they are really disinterested efforts to
propagate chinese speaker will get back to this discussion surely. the senate is about to meet and a brief pro forma session. no legislative business expected the presiding officer: the senate will come to order. the clerk will read a communication to the senate. the clerk: washington, d.c., october 6, 2017 . to the senate: under the provisions of rule 1, paragraph 3, of the standing rules of the senate, i hereby appoint the honorable john boozman, a senator from the state of arkansas, to perform the duties of the chair. signed: orrin g. hatch, president pro tempore. the presiding officer: under the previous order, the senate stands adjourned until 9:15 a.m., on tuesday, until 9:15 a.m., on tuesday,
senators in our state work. over the columbus holiday in the week the senate will be meeting every couple of days to prevent a research. when they return the following monday they will debate the nomination of calista gingrich for us ambassador to the vatican. i've covered here on c-span2 when they return. we will take you back now to the discussion of the upcoming chinese national congress coming up the 18th of october. >> i think from a national interest point of view you can make a strong argument that china needs to and i made the argument that china needs remain cautious, pretty conservative and how it behaves. you can argue that they haven't been the least bit conservative and they've been aggressive and more will come. i put that in a somewhat different context and a lot of this depends on xi jinping
personality and if he has power to push things that the leadership in general would not support for a variety of reasons. i have not seen a lot of evidence and others may contradict this but there are hugely divisive issues in foreign policy that exist within the chinese leadership. i think in general they look at xi jinping as someone who is more of a take charge, decisive guy and they like that. i don't think they necessarily think he is out to get me. i'm talking about those senior people who are coming in and if the congress consolidates his backers in this regard than that will be even more so the case. i don't really see it as leading to a major transition and how
they look at foreign policy issues. people who had many meetings with xi jinping say he is very alert to fax and he's attentive to what people say and he is not dogmatic in the way he talks about issues and he seems to be relatively open-minded about things. at the same time, you no, he's dedicated to strengthening the position of the party. his primary focus remains domestic and i think that will tend to tailor how he looks at these foreign policy issues in a variety of ways. if he is stronger -- it's funny, you have this weird argument that people make that if xi jinping is really strong then he'll go out and be assertive because he has freedom to do that now. if xi jinping is weak but will be defensive and bolster support for himself and use
foreign-policy to become more assertive. he'll be assertive if you strong, it will be assertive if he is weak. >> that covers it all. >> it covers everything. i thank you have to to take both of those arguments with a big grain of salt based upon national interest and what i know about the divisiveness or lack thereof in foreign policy within the chinese leadership. >> it says something about this gathering today that we have spent hardly any time discussing north korea where as the media and my life has been held for the last three months because of the media coverage on north korea and i'm sure that is true for a lot of other people here. we are going to take our break in a moment but, you no, if you need the china leadership monitor or its predecessor and you come across a word you don't here in ordinary conversation. [inaudible] and the party congress happen every five years and five years
ago for the last party congress i invited joe smith and alice muller to talk about what they thought would happen at the party congress so will have another reprieve of that effort in a few minutes. will have a 15 minute break, please take advantage of the restrooms and refreshments during that time and come back to the next panel. please join me in thanking our presenters today. [applause] [background noises]
[background noises] >> as you may have heard, the discussion at the carnegie endowment continuing in about tenants. they will take up the issue of chinese leadership and possible changes their. their meeting will begin in mid-october. will have black coverage here on c-span2 when they return. here in the us we lost 33000 jobs in september says mainly due to hurricanes closing businesses. labor department any on implement rate so went down to four-point to percent and the job loss this month to report for the forced drop in six years. a look into our schedule coming
up later today, discussion on russian efforts in influencing elections, not only in the us but other democratic countries. that will be at the center for the national interest and live coverage at 12:20 eastern on c-span, c-span .org or the free c-span radio app. saturday night former first lady michelle obama is interviewed by shonda rives, creator and executive producer of the television shows scandal in gray's anatomy. the event took place to stay in front of a crowd of about 12000 at the annual pennsylvania conference for women in philadelphia. representative linda sanchez who is vice chair of the house democratic caucus is our guest this week on newsmakers. that is the fifth highest democrat in the house and she says it is time for new leadership in the house. here is a bit of what she had to say and you will see this again.
>> personally i think that the leadership does a tremendous job but i do think we have this real breath and depth of talent in our caucus and i do think it is time to pass the torch to do generation of leaders and i want to be a part of that transition and i want to see that happen. i think that we have too many really great members here that don't always get the opportunity they should and i would like to see that change. >> nancy pelosi when a caucus leadership bite you were challenge. >> i don't know. i mean, there are a lot of members in our caucus and everyone has their opinion but i don't know what the answer to that is. >> but by saying it's time for generational change that you are suggesting is win or lose after next year it's time for her to go. >> i don't want to single her out. i think that -- >> what about all three of them, jim clyburn -- >> guest: i think it's time to pass the torch. they are all of the same generation and their contributions to the caucus in congress are substantial but there comes a time when you need to pass the torch and i think
it's time. >> representative linda sanchez and she is interviewed by reporters from "the washington post" in los angeles times in our newsmakers conversation. see it sunday morning at 10:00 and in the afternoon at 6:00 eastern on newsmakers on c-span. >> this week and on c-span stupid tv. saturday at 4:30 p.m. eastern, michael waldman, president of the brendan center for justice at nyu examine the history and debate surrounding the second amendment in his book the second amendment: a biography. starting at 7:00 p.m. a look at current works on education and reform with john morrow, author of predicted to report. sam with her book, they are your kids and cathy davidson, author of the new education. nobel prize-winning mohammad
yunus talks about how to solve the problems of global property, and employment in climate change. for the complete cspan schedule go to pick tv .org. >> he will be back shortly for the live coverage at the carnegie endowment in washington. they are looking at the upcoming 19th national congress of the communist party of china that begins october 18. when they resume the conversation they will look at chinese leadership and will have for that live when it starts. in the meantime, some of the conversation from earlier this morning. >> on the global environment that have impact on foreign policy and these are problematic statements of the nature of the external environment in the world and obviously is the occasions for china. the party congress continue to stress the development toward the multipolar world a generally
stable international environment and the concept of peace and development is what's called the underlying trend of the times. i think we'll see that has been highlighted in past parties and will see this again or something similar to it. the statement has always been paired with more negative concerns about the international environments and in the past, it has involved hedge amid is him which is covert for primarily the united states in power politics, local complex, hotspot issues that keep emerging. imbalances in the world economy which may be worsening and of course traditional and nontraditional security. i think you see reference to these kinds of factors as well as the party congress state. there's also been a reference in the past to the 18th party congress as neo- interventioni
interventionism. that, of course, has been a tendency for states to intervene in the internal affairs of other states without having the temperature necessarily of the united nations. this was prompted for, or at least highlighted, for the 18th party congress and came about largely as a result of the events in libya and syria, at the time with intervention there by outside powers. this concept intervention might not be as prominent in this party congress because you haven't had as many new examples of this that occurred since the last party congress unless you talk about the possibility in the fear of us-led military intervention in north korea. i doubt that would be likely to be mentioned or caused the mentioning of interventionism but because that's occurred after the filaments but it is possible, i suppose. now, in addition to these concerns seen before, both
positive and negative, i think the party congress will also highlight more recent potential threats to what it sees as peace and growing stability, growing growth both in the international system. that will be this idea of growing imbalances in economic development and more importantly what is seen as a troubling backlash against greater global economic integration and the forces of globalization. this is a theme that has been struck by chinese leaders in recent years that has become increasingly prominent and beijing in his response will present itself as a strong proponent is a trend toward protectionism and a proponent of greater economic integration and free trade which has become, as you say, a theme since the election of donald trump and the rise of similar what you might
call me first nationalism or nationalist movements in europe. just to highlight this, last one, foreign minister said we live in a world that is witnessing profound changes in the international landscape and balance of power, prominent traditional and nontraditional threats insufficient driving force for global growth and a growing backlash against globalization. there are unprecedented challenges for mankind's pursuit of lasting peace and sustainable development. i wouldn't be surprised if some variation of this kind of statement appears in the party congress statement. a second area, getting more to the issue of chinese policies and in other words how does china deal with his environment. i thank you will see, again, in the party congress a central focus in all realms of pursuing following through this double centenary objectives of china which is, as we probably all
know in this room, a moderately prosperous society by the 21 and this was a project that was ratified in the report in the 16th party congress in 2002, reaffirmed in the report for the 17th party congress in 2007 and reaffirmed yet again into the. the second is the construction of a strong democratic, civilized, harmonious, socialist country by 2049. these two things have continued to be basic statements about chinese objectives but i think these will be as they have in recent years couched within the context of the china dream which is xi jinping personal temperature on the whole concept of regionalization of china. that will have a prominent place, i would imagine, in the party congress statement. now, in terms of general
characterization of china specific foreign policies in the 19 party congress you will have the usual bromides and she heard over and over again in party congresses, holding high the banner of peace development cooperation, mutual benefit, independent foreign policy of peace, following a win-win strategy for countries opening up sustainable balance growth et cetera et cetera. you will also here, i think, a repetition of the desire for new type of international relations a new type of great power relations. some have thought recently that these two slogans and particularly the power grid relations have been deemphasized somewhat in chinese leader statements and i doubt, however, they will be lacking from the party congress he was. i think they still are a major element of -- [background noises]
for agreeing to host and set this thing up and to the carnegie institution and alex taylor for all his logistical support. i'm grateful also to michael and to alan for their contributions to the monitor, from very early in its inception and i'm sorry that james got pulled away. he was a founding contributor and would have been the guy to talk about an reconfiguration of the central military commission coming out of the congress. i'm grateful also to joe smith and for agreeing to do these presentations and. [inaudible] barry has backloaded his classes to the end of the weekend couldn't rearrange his schedule to come and so i regret he wasn't able to come.
i'm sure everyone knows who joe smith is, professor at international politics at boston university and a founding contributor to the china leadership monitor, retired from a couple years ago we were arguing about when that was walking over here. i'm glad he agreed to do this as a veteran contributor and he was one of the few guys that hit the deadline for draft which was as editor, a key consideration for me. jessica lights on governance affairs, political reform and other related issues for the leadership monitor and is our newest computer. i got to know her when she was in you can candidate at stanford and from her colleague that she was a terrific analyst at the
state department and is now working as a senior editor with china in new york city. i'm grateful to both of them for their contributions this morning. our order of battle will be jessica, joe and then i will try to contribute thoughts at the end. myself and opened the floor to comments and questions. jessica, would you lead off please. >> thanks so much for having me. i will say first that i'm suffering from terrible jet lag so if i fall asleep while talking it is not because what i am saying is boring. everything i'm about to say is thrilling but i would ask that you throw something at me to wake me up. unfortunately, the title of this is demystifying the chinese leadership and i don't know that i will do much to demystify.
i'll probably do more to mystify so that going in i will say up front that i look at governance affairs and domestic social policy in china and it's really hard to know how any given lineup that might come out of the party congress is going to affect the overall trajectory of the social policy. we don't know a lot of the potential candidates that will be on the popular standing committee. the party does a really good job of facing personal details about these people. they do a very good job of replacing those details in public himself. i think a lot of times we fall victim to our own hope and expectation about what we want to see in leaders, you no, just because a leader speaks confidently and fluently with we like to think that means they are open and secretly want the reform we would like to see but i don't think that is usually the case.
or at least not often the case. really good example would be protecting our hopes and desires in anticipation onto leaders that we don't know very well and. [inaudible] xi jinping father received a watch from the dalai lama many years ago and apparently wore it for many years and that was used as evidence that xi jinping would be much kinder and gentler and that has not happens. that story encapsulates what i think we have so little information and grab on to whatever we can and usually filter it to what we hope will happen. this isn't to say that it doesn't matter who is on the policy standing committee and it doesn't matter, people matter but it's hard to know how it will matter because i don't personally feel like i have a good grasp on what these guys are thinking about any particular domestic policy. that said, unless something
truly outlandish happens like. [inaudible] decides to be a breakaway province or something or something crazy happens it is hard to see how there will be any major swings or u-turns in domestic, social policy. i think for any party congress everyone likes to say x thing happened and this vpn ban happened and this is tied to the 19th party congress. maybe or maybe it's one of a series of steps that just happens to be time sequential to the party congress. i was recently in china and there were some rumblings that may be exactly this that the restrictions and vpns are related to the 19 party congress and they would be listed "after words" but i just don't see a lot of evidence that that is happening. the reason is because it's a
question incentive. there is not a lot of incentive to back off from the source of social policies which they are working on and specifically as we look at information control and internet there was an article in september that had a important quote that said if our party cannot traverse the hurdle represented by the internet, it cannot traverse the hurdle of remaining in power for the long-term. [laughter] there may be spikes in terms of information control in china but the overall trend is pretty clear. i like to think of it as airport security in the us. right? except it's effective. there is no incentive to be the guy who says okay, in my airport we can stop taking off her shoes and stopped going to the weird make it people scanner and that doesn't when you anything because when something happens you are on the hook for it. so, i think a lot of what is
going on with social control policies and what were talking about the internet in particular as in that vein. the difference being, of course, what they're doing is much more effective than our airport security here. it is achieving the goals they want which is keeping most people away from most of the information that they don't want them to see. i think we will continue to see codification or role of long-standing social policies and we saw this very recently when they issued new religious regulation. this is an update to i believe 2004 regulation and we saw this last year with the release of both the charity law which governs domestic ngos and the foreign ngo loss which -- and again, were seen this with a bevy of restrictions on online constructions right now. i think you could in general transfer that trend line across domestic policy. i think with regard to.
[inaudible] there is less incentive to change or reverse court. at this point, both of those areas are cause i'm militarized and you have loads of people out there, people police. they have managed recently to stamp down on self emulations and attacks or at least news of self-regulation and attack. i believe they feel they can wait it out until people assimilate, leave or there are so few of them comparatively that it doesn't matter anymore. it's a question incentive and i don't see incentive for change there. they think they've got the situation however unpleasant it is, more or less, under control. so, because i've been given permission to go beyond my brief i think what we should be thinking about is this notion of
domestic policy trajectory is more or less correct and we should be thinking about the extent to which domestic policy and internal affairs are also playing out internationally. i think domestic chinese policy is increasingly being practiced beyond its borders. sometimes it's by the chinese and preemptively sometimes by us. i think there is long been a good example of this is long-standing example of the dalai lama, people not wanting to post or meet with the dalai lama any times because of over chinese pressure. in fact, the dalai lama situation is a harbinger of what we are seeing and what is to come. right? people willing to back down over chinese pressure and i think there's a sense in china that they are more entitlement to levy that pressure against other governments in other individuals and groups outside of china. there is a really benign example
of red dawn which was the movie that was supposed to be about chinese us and chinese and was changed to north. the last minute so as not to offend china. but there's a much more insidious example of this going on and i'm sure all of you heard about the cambridge university press situation. of course, this was when china sent them a letter saying we'd like you to send these articles and they reversed course after a big public outcry but because of this outcry we know about this incident and i have to assume that there's a lot more happening that we don't hear about because it was quietly acquiesced to. also, more recently in terms o of -- sorry, jetlagged. another example i would say is. [inaudible] was a tie one citizen who was put on trial in the province for social media postings that he
made in taiwan. he was taken into custody while in china but the evidence used him again at his trial was posted he made in taiwan on a non- chinese platform. that's examples of china implementing its domestic policy slightly outside its border. i think we should also be thinking about this term that i learned last year in germany and professional european affairs dollars can tell me how you gotten this long but it's a term that means preemptive obedience and its about what people live in authoritarian states do and defining the will of what is happening at the top and rushing to obey it before being asked to do so. i think everyone has heard stories of young academics in the west very logically for
their career decide not to work on controversial issues related to china so they can continue to get visas into china. this makes sense. but i think it's an example of this preemptive obedience and we don't really know how often it is happening and how often people are doing things without being asked. this is a. [inaudible] and i think we should start thinking about how it's affecting people outside as china, as well now. it's hard to quantify and largely silent. there's also an increasing to act outside its borders on internal issues. we have seen this with ethnic leaders were taken from egypt and china's chairmanship are heading up a pitcher paul has raised issues and other using red notices to get other countries to pick up political dissidents, as well as people being picked up in hong kong in southeast asia for political reasons. i will leave it there and i
don't have a solution to this but i think that we should be thinking more about how chinese domestic policy is affecting what we do outside of china. >> inc. you very much. it's a pleasure to be back here at the carnegie endowment. as doug mentioned, five years ago alice and i did a program here just for the 18th party congress and what we said was absolutely correct. at least that is how i remember it. [laughter] actually, i hate doing these presentations just before the party congress because there's a chance that you might actually remember what we say and say joe, you got that wrong again. >> they complained about that when i invited them this time. >> in any case, i think the first thing that is interesting about this upcoming party congress is that we are paying
so much attention to it. this is like china's midterm election, right? who paid all that attention to the 15th party congress? [inaudible] the big news, of course, was that. [inaudible] was a little fated to the successor position and that was it. it didn't draw that attention and if you look at the 17th party congress, 2007 walt that was a little more interesting because xi jinping were elevated to the standing committee and that set the tone for that succession. this is, i think, join more attention than either the 15th or 17th party congress is dead and it's really because xi jinping seems to be something of a different animal. he has been shaking up the political system in china.
i wanted to say in it and unprecedented ways but i also want to say that happened in 1934. any case, he has been shaking up the political system and been setting new tones, new themes, i think. the anticorruption campaign -- it's 150 so-called tigers which are defined as vice ministerial level and above. well, you no, there might be what 202,500 people at that rank so if you say 150, that percentagewise is not all that much but it's a lot of good percentage of active people and that includes 17 full members of the central committee and i do think that is unprecedented in at least the reform era. it includes 17 members of the central committee.
by the way, the four members of the central committee i did check on and only four of those 17 had to retire by age limits which means that you have expanded the number of people who will retire normally by an additional 13 people so that is an additional 13 slots that presumably xi jinping gets to help. also, as i said, 17 members of the alternate list. it has been a very sweeping change including in the military which was referred to in the last panel, i believe, when lee chung wrote about the military changes about a year ago he had 56 senior military people who had been removed and just this year there's been an additional six or seven top-ranked military people. these changes do warrant the title unprecedented. so, we really do have a major
changes in i suppose one of the really important questions is to what extent is staging pain breaking norms, institutions of the party and sometimes it is hard to tell because norms tend to be ambiguous and this is something else and i've talked about, more or less, but in any case one of those issues is whether or not he will name a successor at his party congress and it seems to me unlikely that party congresses may indeed have surprises like that and i think the way to view this 19 party congress is a combination of what we have seen over the last five years and that is certainly includes the anticorruption campaign. it also includes things that we
don't pay much attention to in the media which is taking over critical positions and that certainly includes the military but of course the first step is to take over the general office which is like the chief of staff in the secret service and it's the heartbeat of the system. we have also seen major changes in the ministry and state security which is logical because that was so related to. [inaudible] you have seen less movement in the ministry of public security which i find very interesting and the head of that and this is a little inside baseball that we like to watch as these party congresses happen and the minister of public security, griffin. [inaudible] , his wife's grandmother was.
[inaudible] 's mother's little sister. did you get that? i will not repeat that. but those are the things that make you wonder about alignments in the political system and what happens and what doesn't happen to people with those sorts of relationships. [inaudible] clearly was promoted by. [inaudible] for a number of times and he was secretary of the ministry of electronics when he was minister and a few other related associations but that he worked with xi jinping for three years and did a good job and he was recently appointed party secretary so that should be a position. that fits along with paying people that he knows while in beijing.
[inaudible] that is fourth bureau positions that he seems to have secured for his friends. any case, obviously, the discipline inspection commission is another vital organ which. [inaudible] has been there is comrade in arms and so forth. we have seen him promoting an unusual number of close associates and i guess we say unusual because they are easier to track because he didn't seem to have a wide ranging network of people and when people have worked with in and they move up the ladder like. [inaudible] has gone moved up four or five positions the last few years you say that's pretty obvious.
that he is putting friends. this is quite interesting to see who came to power with no particular visible power base which is probably why five years ago we predicted that he would be very cautious. you no, he has managed to, in fact, build that powerbase rather quickly and beyond my expectations. i think the reason he has been doing this and the reason he can't do this is because five years ago the party really faced serious crises. that crisis was, of course, the apparent alliance in him and. [inaudible] that is something that xi jinping himself has called a political conspiracy.
that is really extraordinary to have a major civilian authority apparently, in some way shape or form, and we certainly don't know the details conspiring with the vice chairman of the military affairs commission and that's quite extraordinary. this gets you into an issue of the norms. my reconstruction of it which is purely my own fantasy and i have a factual no factual basis but circumstantial evidence but remember those two weeks were xi jinping disappeared? he canceled in a payment with hillary clinton and disappeared and the only rumored explanation was that he had hurt his shoulder swimming. the water was unusually hard that day. whatever the reason was. [laughter] of course, after that, shortly after that, his disappearance came three or four days after.
[inaudible] was removed from the central office and moved over to the united front department which suggested the party really had some issues to deal with. my guess is that xi jinping went and had meetings and phone calls and said look at this corruption issue or the conspiracy issue is really serious and you need to give me a strong hand to deal with that. [inaudible] said yes. is this following party norms or not? it seems to be following ended when they gave question do they really mean that 150 tigers would go down and 1.14 million other being punished and so it raises questions about what we mean by norms and that swimming by being ambiguous. it was just after the 18th
party congress that the bowling pins began to fall,. [inaudible] was the first one and use major party deputy and obviously an associate of. [inaudible] and raises questions about th the -- he must've said they were coming for me and it's two years to go up that trail to go up to. [inaudible] and there's nothing we can do about it. fascinating that he had to sit there and wait for the trail of evidence to pile up and get him. this is one major crisis and actually i think for china leadership monitor was tracing the factionalism in. [inaudible] province where. [inaudible] was from and it became very obvious that you have these tight networks of power and
money and occasionally based and it was where. [inaudible] was from, promoted people and you have these, what? stovepipes of power relations there and became quite obvious what the central government and it was not just xi jinping but the previous government would send in -- and there is nothing they could do. it's so tightly controlled and it's so tight that you can't stick with it. [inaudible] seem to have been that way so two years ago when i wrote that article there was over 15000. [inaudible] that had been replaced and not trying to make the province respond. when i ask you to do something, you do it. an insertion of control and we don't see very often.
then there was the fear that xi jinping made probable of the ccp into the dustbin of history. remember the first trip he made out of beijing was to. [inaudible] and he said why did a great power, great political power collapsed because people lost their faith and confidence in the system and i think that everything we have seen since reflects that determination to revive the party and make it strong and responsive. as i interpret it, it's really all about the party and only the party can save and only xi jinping can save the party or something like that. what will happen in the 19 party congress contract let me go out on a limb here a little bit and
obviously all the eyes will be on the standing committee of the bureau and my assumption is that we will continue to have a person and that is subject to change. i remember being in beijing in january of this year and the rumor then was you would go back to one party chairman and two vice chairman and even at that time it struck me that that was one of those bargaining ploys. if you don't like my personal arrangements then i won't have anybody and i'll just do it -- there's been a lot of rumors about what will happen but i think the chances are that it will remain at seven. my guess is that. [inaudible] will retire and that everyone will say it's made him do that although it probably won't be and it will be for a variety of reasons including age and maybe
xi jinping would like to things himself. someone mentioned his desire for control. my guess is that. [inaudible] will stay on his premier in my guess is that he will continue to have very little to do with economic policy and i think the only thing that outside observers seem to agree on is that. [inaudible] will move up to the standing committee. he is the head of the general office and he will certainly move up to the standing committee perhaps to replace. [inaudible] as the head of the discipline inspection committee and there are a couple of her positions he could come to but the interesting thing is unlike past congresses there are ten people other than. [inaudible] who are age eligible to move up
to the standing committee and unless you expand the standing committee to what would that be? twelve, i don't think they'll be all elevated to the standing committee. this gives him some flexibility and if we do things according to past practice it would all be moving up by age so there are a number of people who are 67 years of age and therefore age eligible but anyone want to take a bet on the chance of. [inaudible] being elevated i would not count on that one. [inaudible] cannot move up because she's a girl and as alice would say you don't allow girls in the boys club house. [inaudible] is military so he can't -- in other words moving other people up from the standing committee
and one interest question is who is replacing. [inaudible] as executive premier. [inaudible] seems to be a popular choice but. [inaudible] is another viable choice. these personal choices will matter a good deal and some believe that. [inaudible] , the young secretary will make it and it just doesn't seem likely to me because it would be naming a successor or at least those who jump to that conclusion and she has just gutted the communist youth leave over the last five years and it seems unlikely that he would promote a product of the standing committee. it is fun to play these games and i'm sure there will be some surprises and it is possible that she will reach down in the
party system and bring up someone not on the bureau and that would be a surprise and that would be something that we would write a new trainer leadership about and give us something to do. at any case -- the other issue which alice just wrote an article about is whether he will get his name in the party charter and if so, what name and how it will be described. i'm pretty sure that he will get his name in the party charter but whether it will be. [inaudible] or some other thing but if it is. [inaudible] which is seen to put them on the par that to my way of thinking that says i am not retiring and if you are the spot of all political wisdom it seems to me pretty hard to retire and at any
case we only have to wait two or three weeks to figure out if these speculations are true. if the last five years have really been about consolidating power what happens over the next five years and this is where i can stick my foot in my mouth and to vigorously. what i really expect is to have xi jinping trying to set out a more positive agenda and what he defines by the china dream. i don't know exactly what this will take but i think you can get a clearer sense of what you mean by the post. where we will try to get definition to that. i think that remember when we were talking a year or two ago about the periods where xi jinping had this long thing
about two. >> thirty year periods where it did not count for much but when you had the two, 30 year periods and i think everyone at the time thought you were clearing the deck for the 30 year period and that would be the xi jinping era. i think that is my speculation and i think that xi jinping is about is defining that next. of what -- mao era is building socialism or the revolution in the. [inaudible] was prosperity and now this third year will be about what china will in the world and what it is domestic policy and it will be defining that. i think xi jinping has given indication that he will draw on
china's gradual. [inaudible] it doesn't mean he will go back to confucianism, it will get kicked around by one more autocrat i think and he's got 2000 years to practice on this so but, you no, i would also argue that it is different, remember when confucius statue showed up in tiananmen square and i don't think xi jinping like that because that said that the revolution was perhaps not important, illegitimate or something like that and i think what he's done his try to reaffirm that revolution and part of the. in the mouth, 120th anniversary commemoration and the socialist core values and clearly you bring in china's cultural tradition behind that and i think he's been pretty
clear about doing something along those lines. i don't see that is anti- western but i do see it as trying to define something that is a distinct chinese path different from but something that should be defended against these terrible western values and they are terrible according to the academy of social sciences and we've had several books out now on the critique of neoliberalism and i don't know what lyons liberalism is but in any case the critique of western constitutional government and civil society and the critical one is the critique of historical nihilism. it's a term that doesn't roll off the tongue very quickly and easily but that means don't do good history. do propaganda.
don't want to go back in the archives and find that the communist party was doing in various periods in the past. in any case, that is going to try to define a chinese path that is distinct between western liberalism and i think that is what you will see in the ideological realm. i think i have overshot my time but the implications of what we are seeing is a very strong tendency toward centralization towards power and with that goes one of the difficult jobs which is the lack of innovation at the local level. in past years, party secretaries have been given a greater freedom to address the problems for a variety of experiences which included interparty
democracy, including some elections at the township level. those have all stopped. after local party officials have less room to innovate and i think that is a problem because they do face problems and the solution seems to come from beijing, not from the localiti localities. as just mentioned, we will see continued control over thought publication and those types of things. chinese society would be more diverse in the central government seems to be more centralized and less innovative controlling than in recent years and that sets up the contradiction for the 19th
party congress when i assume we will be back. >> thank you. i get to wrap things up here. let me just declare at the outset that i should be regarded as the sarah palin of china analysis. if you follow what is said about chinese politics in the community and in the mainstream media i can rightly be characterized as going rogue in going rogue and getting all like a maverick. my views on the chinese leadership depart from much of the conventional knowledge that you hear about. i will suggest that i see basically two lines of interpretation and dare i say a two line struggle over how to interpret it what is going on in the xi jinping leadership and what it represents for the evolution of the chinese political system. my expectation is it might be
misguided but that perhaps the 19 congress will offer us an opportunity to evaluate whether either of these two lines is valid or not. maybe a misplaced hope as i suggested earlier and still trying to find out what happened with the fair in 1971 and you never get the answer to. that is the situation and what i am calling the predominating interpretation of the two line struggle and what are referred to as the words walk reactive line has several basic points. xi jinping has consolidated more rapidly and more thoroughly than anyone. he's been building a culture personality, something that's been explicitly banned and party regulations since 1980. he's under the collective leadership structure implanted by. [inaudible] in the 1980s and followed and elaborated by. [inaudible] and. [inaudible]
he's asserting control over all the major policy sectors and chairman of everything and dominate the old central leading small groups and created new ones now that he is taking the helm of the maoist cast to xi jinping policies and the 2013 campaign and other approaches for purging adversaries. he is deployed in anticorruption campaign through weekend rivalries and in the larger dynamic of politics is largely explains in terms of the power struggle driven by factionalism and she has been successful in neutralizing factions associated with. [inaudible] communist youth league and also with. [inaudible] game. in sum, xi jinping is most powerful leader and probably since. [inaudible] i have reservations about this picture and in some cases, quite
severe. i can't see xi jinping as a maoist. i may be, except for maybe joe, the only person who has read all 79 of the speeches and talks in xi jinping a book on governing china and i did read them all and i've gone through them in quite a deal. he mentions amount here or there but usually poetry and if you count the references in the substantial references to. [inaudible] , they are all over the place. it's very hard for me to see xi jinping as a maoist. you see no reference to any of the ideological predilections, class struggle is continuing on the dictatorship of the proletariat making weeks in development without the regard to economic conditions or a readiness to go outside the party into rally society to eject the party and it seems to me this is blessing this
leadership wants to do. also, xi jinping is not chairman of her. it's this leadership of leading small groups and she leaves only two workgroups then. [inaudible] did and those are the supergroup and the leading small group comprehensive deepening form in that group she does provide over and i don't know who accepts the general secretary who would do that because it covers seven areas of reform laid out in 2013. three members of the standing committee said as vice chairman or vice director of the small groups any of the majority of the standing committee at those meetings. the other is the internet group. the internet and i can't say this but. [inaudible] that was also set up. people like to point out that the state security commission and the national security council or however you translate but that's an upgrade, substantial upgrade of the
national security lead that was vice chair and that perception that is command of everything doesn't stand up under closer certain screening. the factual approach to chinese leadership politics, i endorse and i grew up in the good old days of factional conflict in the mouth. but the factional politics these days, at least as it is practiced more generally not caught up with the changes in the political order. joe, i think, did a brilliant article in the monitor that mentioned. [inaudible] that does apply this approach to understanding significant and leadership politics. more broadly, the analysis that many have done argument with one party, to coalitions or however he describes it as to keep adapting it. it doesn't stand up very well and while i endorse the idea of
factional politics we don't do it very wellin part because the leadership has made a concerted effort to vary the differences that are easy to sort out in the good old days of leadership analysis. finally, our biggest complaint about this approach doesn't tell you anything about policy and doesn't explain where policy conference and who advocates and so forth. it is a sterile approach to understand politics and certainly in washington dc. people want to know about policy and what its roots are in implications are and they don't care about who is up for what is down list has some connection to policy. also, i have an impatient with this argument in part because much of the evidence is reduced to xi jinping power is irreversible. for example, if he is so powerful how come he needs so many titles. mount didn't have many titles. [inaudible]
why does xi jinping need so many titles? don resisted getting titles. he said he should become party chairman and he turned it down in they wanted the post abolished which they did in 1982. if he is so powerful, how come you can't get anything done? we hear all the time these days and there's a broader consensus that much of the reform package enunciated in 2013 hasn't gone very far. if he is so damn powerful how come you can't get these things done? what we hear in the press and the complaints about the opposite and their blocking success in a more centralized power to drive these reforms forward. finally, if she has absolute authority and support from it why does the army stressed with such emphasis the army's absolute loyalty to the party these days, particular emphasis on why heading into the
organizational reform in the pla and i'm glad to hear that alan talk about the scope of these changes in military organizations are wrenching and their changing careers and admissions and their affecting their prospects in the wrenching ways and why do they need to emphasize and convene a. [inaudible] conference on the eve of these are forms that stressed the loyalty to the party and why does xi jinping need a chairmanship responsibility system to focus authority over the army into the cmc especially under his personal control. all of these things strike me as not as indications of xi jinping supreme power but rather the insecurity and the broader leadership over the compliance of the army and more broadly
over the country. what to do? fortunately we have what i call chairman. [inaudible] political line and the revolutionary line. i didn't want to say editor but whatever. this line i have sent out successive issues and begins with the basic observation that the overarching policy agenda of the xi jinping pursuit since the 18th congress in 12 was set down explicitly in the court delivered in the congress and this became visible with a series of company as it performs laid out in the decision and endorse in november 2013. the agenda was set down firmly
which i suggest reported a broader leadership consensus behind the leadership to push through these forms in parts because or mainly because the second term was a period of relatively clear paralysis in the leadership and its ability to decide major policy departures with several obvious departures. joe and i disagree on the overarching arc of the. [inaudible] terms since 2002-two to thousand 12 but the second term after zero seven it appeared relatively little guy decided and accomplished despite several clear problems that the university needed to deal with. the congress started to sit down a consensus policy agenda and implanting new leadership authorized to pursue it and these were correlated under the overarching goals through completed by 2020 of making china into a what you call?
[inaudible] that goal was% down in 2002 in the report through the 16th party congress and was strongly reaffirmed to the 17th congress and again in 2012 at the 18th congress and is laid out a set of guidelines and policies that were reaffirmed across the successive practices that bring the policy agenda of each of those terms of leadership under. [inaudible] and now under xi jinping. i expect the 19th congress will strongly reaffirmed the 2020 goal and we will see a new push behind their forms that were laid out in 2013 and new forms were certainly energy behind several of the old ones and. [inaudible] twenty-six party speech was built around the same.
it also leads to this third period in history that joe was just mentioning and that is to say this 2020 goal will be completed under xi jinping leadership and i'm assuming will be reappointed as general secretary and they're already thinking about laying out the guidelines for the second goal which was enunciated in 2002 and there is the 2049 goal of the people's republic. i expect to see a strong reaffirmation of the policy agenda of the achievement of the moderate prosperous society and initial guidelines on what to do in the. there are 22049 and i agree that the previous panel that i don't expect him to be general secretary in 2049 and that we can all agree on. the congress in 2012, at least in my view gave the sheet leadership the tools it needed
to pursue this policy mandate and included first and authorization of efforts to revitalize and centralize the party apparatus and to make a much more effective driver of policy that was under the leadership and. [inaudible] second, a far-reaching campaign against corruption and on party work style to accomplish the same goals but also to attack vested interest now that's aimed at her. xi jinping doesn't have 750,000 factual enemies out there now that the target of the campaign is much too big to simply be that. it's an effort to restore the vitality of the party and to put power over resistance to the reforms they are trying to achieve by 2020. third, they agreed to a stronger role for the general secretary to break policy deadlocks and seems to plague the. [inaudible] term and to make the front man
for this reform effort that was authorized at the congress. all of this it seems to be suggests that xi jinping is not a model like and instead working within a thoroughly. [inaudible] fashion and speeches -underscore this and the methods they pursue same to not become thoroughly consistent with the approach that undertook in rebuilding the party after the cultural revolution. the hallmark of same, again, i read all the speeches and the xi jinping has been constraining power within a caged institution and he is, in my opinion, withholding the basic norms that develop across the. and. [inaudible] he was. [inaudible] what people forget about the
idea of the correlator is that when he said a collective leadership needs a core and this idea of a core is not contradictory to the idea of a collective leadership and in principle and it wasn't accidental and therefore the story the title of core at the six plan revised the. [inaudible] strongly reaffirming it. in sum, to me, the watchword of the xi jinping leadership is insecurity. i see this leadership as worried that if it can't push these reforms through the party will be in jeopardy of losing its grip on power in the entire regime is sinking and there is the message that joe suggested of the lessons the collapse of when the soviet union and this is a party that lost its way and that did not have leadership
with sufficient to maintain discipline and push through the kind of policy that a party like a communist party ought to be able to do. in sum, i think the question of whether or not this the most powerful leader is misplaced and certainly the most powerful leader and. [inaudible] and his been sidled to complete a project that the broader leadership sees as critical to the regime's survival. looking at the congress i expect to see an opportunity to clarify and maybe assess interpretations
and what should we watch for in the monitor i want for party affairs and let me list the two things that joe has really put forward his suggestion on what we should see. first, how will the party constitution be revised? it is already clear that in chinese media that the four comprehensive in the five major development consequences will be written to the party constitution. i presume this will be in that section lower down in the preamble for the review of what the current party leadership outgoing leadership will be, has done. that may come but i presume it will have. [inaudible] name attached to it. whether they go beyond that in and to the parties guiding ideology and i think is a trickier question. if i were pushed to make a guess, i would suggest no. this will. [inaudible] will xi jinping get another title? how many does singing, i guess. has been suggestion that he will
take the title of party chairman. no, that will not happen. will the party structure get changed and there's been suggestions that we will see abolition in the parties standing committee may be re-created in a vice chairman but i don't that happening. whether that was floated as suggest as a middle of the mastery and congress, i just don't think it will happen. will there be a successor or successors to the point that the congress will prepare successes in training and take his place in 2022 and. [inaudible] place in 2023. everything is simply on norms and this is one of those ones that might not work that way but one thing for xi jinping not to
appoint a successor get the idea that he intends to stay on formally longer. i can't imagine why you would do that now to signal this already and face the accumulating political competition and conflict that would invite. why not wait till 2022 that is your wish? also, i think and i think joe is absolutely right in saying that at least on previous occasions that he doesn't have to remain party after he retires but he'll be a powerful leader behind-the-scenes and effective and i totally agree with that. i think we will. i'll go even farther out on a limb and suggest that the two successors will be names and will be. [inaudible] my instinct is and it's total speculation of who would be the successor for party leader and. [inaudible] would be prime minister.
he has been praised in the press for his promotion of innovation down there in. [inaudible] which is help the economy and it's what you associate with prime ministers and. [inaudible] has been a party secretary for a while now and. [inaudible] province. that is what i expect but i'll probably be wrong. another thing to look for is the standing committee be appointed as -- among the surviving one retiring members that is with the internet and they change the age criteria in 2002 but they had maintained an age since and with the exception of success in planning every new crop the
standing committee has come from that most senior cohort within the non- retiring members. i expect they will do that this time and i think joe's calculations are right and the group includes. [inaudible] they do not allow girls in the clubhouse so i don't understand the objections to him but they have attacks that people he worked with but he's a brilliant guy, a mathematician of the highest human calling and why you wouldn't want someone on their committee but i go along with joe's analysis of that. [inaudible] is a caretaker position and expect he will retire but that
leads. [inaudible] i believe like joe we will see seven members successors in training and that will leave and i don't think. [inaudible] in here that name a lot but he was back in 2012 and i had a bet with jeff was saying that long was saying we make to the standing committee and i got one right and i expect it will be that long but he's the next cohort and will see him in 2022. so that is then the pattern and i will stick my neck out and say i will continue that approach. the age criterion will lead to 68 and yes, if you move it up to 69 to accommodate whoever else it opens the door for other people to say why do i have to retire and this invites a time
of struggle and leadership in this position wants to avoid. that doesn't, i think that [inaudible] will retire and [inaudible] will stay on as prime minister. finally, i expect leadership collective leadership to be strongly affirmed as it was in 2012 and again with xi jinping as the court leader. that is my 2 cents and for whatever they are worth and maybe i should offer you guys a chance to comment. joe, jessica was he plans to retire i feel like this obese destabilizing rather than not. >> one thing i want to say about appointing a successor because it's in the press a lot and it drives me nuts is that this notion that if a successor is appointed then xi jinping is one
of political victory but sorry, the reverse. if he [inaudible] i feel like that assumes way too much knowledge about what xi jinping wants. if anyone has talked to him and knows for sure what he is planning that i'm sure we can talk "after words". i feel like just because a successor is appointed doesn't mean that xi jinping lost. we don't know that his goal the whole time was to not appoint a successor but that seems to be the wind lost economy that has been set up in a number of news articles i think recently. >> i would comment that you set up now and [inaudible] as two bottles there and you are forgetting about my hero, leo. it's time to be out how to bring a good communist. that is what xi jinping is about. >> i totally agree.
they talked about the cultural revolution in the [inaudible] line. >> but [inaudible] wasn't a part of that. >> yes, okay .-period-paragraph let's open up the floor for questions, comments. wait for the microphone to come around to you and tell us what your question is. >> hello, i'm from china and ever question from [inaudible] i want to know about do you think the institutional change for policymaking policy in china especially power distribution in [inaudible] and an idc pc because we bear a lot of rumors that msa is not being important role is is supposed to be [inaudible] do you think this
situation will continue after the 19 in bc? thank you. >> thank you. it would've been a better question to ask when michael is here and maybe you should ask doug to answer this. you no, so many questions are up in the air with regard to the cmc and how it is organized and therefore how it will operate and there will be reconfigured in ways that may reaffirm the elemental struggle and the basic struggle that we have seen since 2004 but there are other major changes and the new theater commanders and we want to know october 205th of the central committee and the military commission announced. that is the broader foreign policy and my own view for a long time isn't that important
in policymaking and it's based frequently among americans on the idea that it plays a role comparable to the secretary of state in the state department of america. it's not as important as the basic fact that [inaudible] is an economic apology. there is that. whether there are broader changes and may be done and better equipped to respond to this any comments? thanks for your question. anyone else? that we killed all the interest? >> you mentioned that one of your reservations about the first thread was its lack of
policy implications and could you talk about policy implications in terms of economic for in the second thread and what [inaudible] is a party operative is. >> the own implication of my own revolutionary line was the policy line in the broader lines that were laid out at the party congress have guided much of what the she leadership has pursued and these are very broad formulations in the political port and a are assigned even though in many ways ambiguous and in the 60s but you could attribute those policy lines directly to a consensus established back in 2012 as responsive to understanding issues and how those issues wants to be dressed this time around is anyone's guess and it's very difficult to see
clear-cut policy differences within the existing leadership over economic policy and i know there's rumors and stories about differences and [inaudible] and central bank people and so forth but the validity of those differences doesn't stand up clearly when you look closely at public leadership statements. in the good old days it was easy to see a clear-cut difference and it wasn't that easy and i worked hard [the leadership is much more careful about exposing those kinds of views and what we're left with is the speculation on rulers and some of them may be valid and they have a kernel of truth but separating the week of wheat from the chaff is hard.
joe, what you think? >> i'm basing this mostly on articles and i was with the conference in london a week ago and i'm not so sure it's a matter of policy difference but she seems to have taken over a large portion of economic decision-making and overridden or marginalized the [inaudible]. this has had that great effects on the economy. >> i have nothing to say on economics spirit okay. bob. >> a question about the secretary. this is an often misunderstood and often maligned institution but it is often played an important role in seems to be
during the xi jinping five years it's been put under [inaudible] under the bunch of other people from inner mongolia. it's hard to see it as a power execution but it could be revived upon who is put in charge of it. it generally hasn't gotten a lot of attention but an important way of making an otherwise unyielding political process central committee chairman worked a little more efficiently. i wonder if you could speculate about what you think might happen to that body of the 19th curtis. >> i can offer my thoughts. the secretary has had a checkered past, as you suggest and when [inaudible] stored the decision-making process and the institutional components of it in the early '80s, late 70s from what had been set forth originally in the 56th
congress, the eighth congress, that was basically set up in the structure would be the body that would ratify decisions made by the standing committee and the secretary would be the implementing body and would push those policies through. the link between the two, as was the case of the six, would be different what's his name? [inaudible] who was a member of both the standing committee as general secretary but also the leader of the secretary. that secretariat had 11 members if i remember correctly and got [inaudible] and the reason was that the perception was in 86-87 was that [inaudible] had use the secretariat to circumvent and usurp prerogative of the standing committee in making decisions and they crippled that body down to four members. it started to grow again and
during the [inaudible]. it's back up to six or seven people but it hasn't been a suggestive body. that has to do with the mechanics of how you push policy and who's going to do it. will be members of the standing committee or is going to be members of the secretariat that takes their point of departure from the standing committee. i don't see the apprentice to
change about. secretary looks like a bit of a hodgepodge these days, and it's hard to make sense of what exactly it does with regard to the latter. i don't know, secretary advocate, i guess i'm a pessimist. joe, do you have any -- >> i i basically agree with what you said. right now there are a number of institutional representatives on there as opposed reflecting a more cohesive policy agenda. it may also reflect differences between one's xi jinping and tsai ing-wen, i've never seen them close to xi jinping. i may be wrong on that but that he would rather implement policies to other channels. that may be one of the changes that we'll see at the 19th party congress.
>> i can say the sector unless never came up in any conversations i've ever had about the leadership until today so thank you. >> alan and then doug. >> thank you. i wonder if would be right or not to connect some thoughts here between the retirement and economic policy, for example, it's often said that the implementation of the campaign is really stifled economic initiative. and whether there is any view that biting regular order to take a phrase popular in the city, take effect and retire, will then allow the anticorruption campaign to assume a lower profile and, therefore, maybe give get somee impetus even if the local are not given the leeway to do much
on their own. because it seems to me that unless the parties able to stimulate the economy better than it is doing, they are going to run into problems doing what you all say they want to do in assuming this revitalized central role. i wonder if there's a reason to connect the dots or if it's coincidental or if it's just the wrong thing? >> well, my assumption, if it's right or not, is the anticorruption campaign is going to continue but it might be much more regularized. building what is a comprehensive governance oregon this post to take over some of the cdi c functions in the organization department, and that will i think regularize some of the anticorruption. it may in some ways expand it because the cdi seasonally supposed to go after party
people and just as date oregon could go after not party people. but i understand that the local officials a few months ago were criticized for being lazy. and so they better start popping up local investment. i think i have been paying attention to the lack of local investment. i guess i don't see that as directly related to either staying or going. >> i'm inclined to agree with that. they are making complementary steps to institutionalize cdic bureaucracy to effectuate the campaign in advancements. that may be, you know, and invitation in making the anticorruption campaign more regularized and perfunctory overtime. but given the push to enhance the ability of the party
apparatus to get effective compliance, i doubt that. whether it affects the ability to push innovation and risk-taking and economic policy and all those good things that make the market economy go and so forth, i inclined to agree with the contradictory about. and you certainly hear stories about people being afraid to make decisions that are going to really push things ahead in a policy direction, but they seem to be satisfied with that. maybe that will doom the effort in the longer run, but we will see. institutionally i think they are trying to, beating up the proxy so even if wang isn't there things will continue. >> michael, you've been describing a fairly orderly and
transparent process over time, how do you explain the sudden axing of that candidate? sort of like game of thrones, because there's a successor yet got to die. he disappears. what your attitude on that? >> i don't see if that's a violation of norms. i think that is flatly, you know, the effort on xi jinping to raise up somebody among the two people who i am projecting will succeed to the standing committee on charges of corruption. get rid of that guy and i want my guy. i don't deny politicking goes on, our politics is real. the actual politics are real although i think we do it badly. real politics goes on. these are politicians and they play hardball and all that good stuff, but my insistence is they do it within party processes and institutions and this is legitimate way to do it.
they use corruption charges and disciplinary charges of all sorts, you can build a nice list. list. i don't want back on the list and he was powerful enough to use the campaign, to get rid of them and pull up a guy at least as a member of the politburo and maybe the standing committee. so you know, these guys are politicians. in some ways even thugs, but you know, i don't see how it is, changes their commitment to a set of processes that if they violate are good at significant costs. otherwise we are returning to cronyism. for example, a selection of politburo standing committee members. that's a dangerous again. you could do back in the time when china was weak and poor,
and under tremendous security threat. you can't do in a country that's big and powerful like china is now without shoes costs pretty quickly. and so it kind of lens instance to uphold the system and work within rather than outside of it. >> i guess i tend to see the notes of a bit more flexible. the seventh party congress of the fourth revolutionary army, june 1929 when mao zedong and others had their famous fight. mao is upholding party norms which somehow coincided with his own personal interests. so i can to see the building of the leadership to conflate personal interest with party norms as a fairly strong and honorable party tradition.
>> another question? way in the back. the woman in the back. >> thank you. report from voice of america. i to questions. you mentioned wang qishan has to retire so my question is did you see any signal that he has to go, other than the reason of age? use any of the reason has to go? the second question is for professor. you mentioned -- [inaudible] does that mean you see xi jinping is a more -- [inaudible] thank you. >> with respect to your first question, i am going on the age norm. principally, i don't see any evidence that wang is any sort of political trouble. some people notice that he didn't appear very much this
past summer, but wang never appears very much in that city, see cdi role. so ongoing simply by my projection that the age norm will continue. purely that. >> on the analogy, i see a lot in what xi jinping has been doing some occluding the phrase of putting power in a cage. that seems to me to resident with the how to be a good communist. that calls for discipline, self cultivation, office good communist confucian values. rather than saying he's upholding xi jinping or mao zedong, i think the model is the ultimate party guy. so i see that as sort of the precedent for what xi is doing. >> someone else had a a comet a question for the back?
yes. the man in the light shirt. >> thank you very much. i've been an observer since undergraduate days, 50 whingers ago. some going to look at this very, very broadly and with personality specific. can you comment on a couple things come one, the generational changes? there's a new younger generation that's been giving its education abroad. when will they come into their own? when will they come into power? secondly, in a political philosophy sense, if you could speak very generally without attaching it necessarily to personalities, historical or present, is there any form of what i will call a jacksonian democrat or the philosophy of jacksonian democracy as opposed to jefferson democracy on one end of the spectrum, being discussed in our beds or books or by political philosophies --
op-ed -- and another set of the spectrum is the purest brand of modern-day communism. is this to have been written about? is at present in the political or philosophical dialogues that are going on in contemporary china? thank you. >> thank you. by jacksonian democrats, you mean a -- >> by and a only by analog. >> but you mean a popular -- >> yes. >> i guess i would -- alleys as close as we could get to it. >> is it present today in any of the discourse? >> there certainly is a a degre of populism in china, and certainly nationalism, but you know, well, jackson of course overturned the first, what was that, the elitist background of
the first six presidents and brought in a very different thing. he created the spoils system, preserve slavery. he's not my hero. >> i did not mean it that way. i was 20 see if there was a referential analogy that you could identify in contemporary china to persons talking about populism, democratization. >> not democratization. >> i thought that was part of a 2049 goal. i heard that mention in the first segment. >> china already has democracy as they say it. >> and the higher level. >> that's right. >> and the critiques that were published, are they published in english? this was mentioned earlier, critique against neoliberalism. >> i think you can find articles in english. the ones i'm referring to,, there's a set of four books that
the academy of social sciences put out this past summer. i may have the only for copies in the united states. >> in english? >> they are not in english. you only have to read the introduction. they are not a very good reading. jill wrote an excellent book on strains of political thought, especially in the '90s. china after tiananmen change the roots of many of the strains of discourse. >> that's exactly what i'm looking for, for 2017 going forward. >> well, joe -- >> not personally. i mean in a professional academic sense. >> well, i get back to kind of leadership monitor or something like that, i'll try to bring in these thoughts. >> thank you. >> you had a question about leaders with foreign educations. and i presume by that jimmy
western education because there's been a whole generation of leaders who educated in the soviet union who came to prominence especially in the 1990s. and in the current leadership, he has his advanced education in north korea. he is a degree in economics from kim jong-il university. i crap that's economics degree may be, but your question -- i grant you -- the people in the west as inspiration for your question, the new might be inclined towards liberalism. i think is apparent that western education and american educations don't necessarily disclose to insist that here towards liberal democracy, for example, and some of them go back convinced china has its own way, needs to find its own way and can't copy foreign models. a western education doesn't necessarily come from one direction.
we will see more leaders who have been educated abroad but i wouldn't expect it necessarily to shift their political orientation dramatically. >> i remember talking to one of my classes a year or so ago saying in this country we tend to debate that issue that they will come over here, it more liberal ideals and they go back and change china, , and others argue they will go back and just fit into the system. when i mentioned that all my chinese students said yes. so they understand that they're sort of a reprieve, a sabbatical, and that ultimately they do have to go and fit into a a system. that's how you make a a living, get by in life. i think that's pretty widely understood. >> it's not just a matter of having to fit in. sometimes experiences can kind of make you feel more patriotic or appreciative of your system.
there's a lot of arguments right now to be made about our system networking particularly well, and the other thing i would say is i feel like from what i've heard it's harder for mid-level government officials to go abroad and have experiences abroad and so that is also i think the countervailing force beyond going to school when you're younger. but as your rising through the ranks, you are not going just on these jobs abroad appear to not having those informal interactions. >> the only one i can think of who studied in the states for i think a year and maybe not quite that long, and then is risen to very high position on the politburo. but i would not describe him as a liberal. >> we are out of time, regrettably. i'd like to thank my comrades for joining this presentation and their thoughts. [applause] >> we will find out what the answers are, , i hope, in about8
[inaudible conversations] [inaudible conversations] >> former first lady michelle obama interviewed by tv creator and producer. will be showing the conversation in its entirety saturday night here's a preview. >> do you think you have, the women in general had less chances to fail? you fail once, people start labeling you faster than a label and than ever.
>> absolutely. i think that's true for women, minorities. i think the bars are different, you know? we express that all the time. we experienced that over the last pictures. i joked when i was on the campaign trial, the barges kept moving, you know? just like you meet it and then the bar would change, you know,, and we're seeing that now quite frankly. the bar is -- [laughing] [applause] >> i mean, that's ours. >> it is amazing, amazing to watch. >> the conversation held in philadelphia at the yearly pennsylvania conference women before a crowd of about 12,000. you can watch the entire interview saturday night at eight eastern on c-span.
>> c-span cities tour takes booktv and american history tv to peer south dakota with our cable partners who works for the rich history and literary life of the states capital city saturday at noon on booktv, author nathan sandison talks about pioneer cowboys and limit in his book controlled recklessness. >> he was involved in expansion of that cattle ranching industry primarily in western south dakota which was essential along with mining expansion of the railroad and the growth of our state in the early part of the 20 century. >> director of the pioneer go project explores the memoirs and inspiration of laura ingalls wilder. >> pioneer girl project is a research and publishing program of the south dakota state historical society that is designed to study and publish a comprehensive addition of laura ingalls wilder is pioneer girl,
which is her autobiography. >> on sunday at 2 p.m. eastern on american history tv we will tour the south dakota state capital. >> if you look up, there are also four corner areas with flags argosy the south dakota flag, there is a flag from dakota territory, like the united states of course, there's also flags for spain and france because a controlled this territory at different times. in each corner has come one corner has a white flag, want a red flag, one black and one yellow, and those are the native american colors the similars the four directions of the compass. >> here about lewis and clark and why that meeting was so important to the area. >> watch c-span's city tours up your south dakota saturday at noon eastern on c-span2's booktv and sunday at 2 p.m. on american history tv on c-span3.
the c-span cities tour working with our cable affiliates and visiting cities across the country. >> a quick look at the jobs report. the u.s. lost 33,000 jobs last month mainly due to hurricanes affecting businesses. the labor department says anna palmer rate still went down to 4.2%. the job losses in this latest report on the first in six years. vice president mike pence visiting puerto rico in the virgin islands, two years territories damaged by hurricane maria. this is a picture of the vice president meeting on air force two with transportation secretary elaine chao and congressional representatives from puerto rico and the virgin islands, along with fema. reporter with bloomberg news also on the vice president play took this picture of the approach to st. croix with a look at the debris, trees and roofs ripped off houses.
president trump hosting a national hispanic month event at the white house this afternoon along with first lady melania trump. we will have live coverage starting in about ten minutes before we had to the widest the with the glue to some of the issues surrounding the 2018 federal budget colluding discussed in congress. >> president of the committee for a responsible federal budget. join us after the house passed its 2018 budget resolution. explain where the budget goes from here and why this is important to the republican taxi from effort trying to it is very important to the taxi from effort. passing a budget is also very important for running a country and it should be noted to anybody that we're passing the budget now after the country system has already begun. this is way,gu way late in the process. i think that speaks to the problem that so often we these budget deadlines. that