tv U.S. - China Relations CSPAN October 10, 2017 10:03am-12:11pm EDT
here recaps of the political events on washington today, weekdays at 5 p.m. eastern. and get the latest from congress, the administration and about events from across the nation. c-span radio app is available in washington on 90.1 fm, on our website c-span.org, or by downloading the free c-span radio app. c-span radio, 20 years where you hear history unfold daily. >> next, future economic and trade relations between china and the united states, look at north korea's nuclear program and the upcoming meeting between president trump and the president of china in beijing. >> good afternoon. i'm vali nasr, the dean of the johns hopkins university school
of advanced international study, and it is my pleasure to welcome you all today to a conversation on u.s.-china relations during a time of rapid change. geopolitics, economic relationships and technology among so many other issues are transforming at such a pace at long-standing foreign policies and traditional power dynamics are being tested like never before. that, combined with populist and nationalist forces all over the world, including here in the united states, means that what we came to expect of the international order is now open to question. given the history of johns hopkins, sais, and its establishment in 1943, it is only appropriate for ambitiously look forward to our global
transformation might once again reshape the international affairs. furthermore, today's conversation continues and injuring traditional dialogue on the study of china at johns hopkins sais. we have long understood and appreciated the importance of china's relationship around the world, and especially its relationship with the united states. since the hopkins center opened its doors in 1986, we have shaped over three decades of u.s.-china relations through our alumni who have gone on to the global leaders. similarly, the scholarship of our esteemed experts on china has influenced both policymaking and the private sector, and we're privileged to be hearing from some of them today. joining the panel discussion will be our own professor david
lampton, professor lampton is one of the leading scholars of china today, through the years many students, faculty and institutions have benefited from his wise counsel and scholarship on china. we are also joined by cui liru, former president of the chain institute of contemporary international relations. he currently serves as senior advisor to multiple institutions for the study of national security and foreign relations. he specializes in u.s. foreign policy, u.s.-china relations, international security issues, and chinese foreign policy. and it is wonderful to be welcoming him to sais today. it is also my great pleasure to introduce amy celico, a
principle of albright stonebridge group and leads the firms china team in washington, d.c. drawing on her expertise in u.s. government, she has deep understanding of nonfinancial service sector in china, intellectual property rights, and u.s.-china trade relations. we're also proud to say that she's a graduate of johns hopkins sais and a graduate of our hopkins center. thank you to sais china, johns hopkins sais for policy institute, and our friend, the china-u.s. exchange foundation for supporting and organizing today's event. finally, i would like to thank and also introduce our moderator today, dr. john lipsky who is aa senior fellow at our foreign-policy institute and a peter g peterson distinguished scholar at the henry a kissinger center for global affairs.
now without further ado please join me in welcoming dr. lipsky to the podium. thank you. [applause] >> i can assure you i deserve no applause. i have the second easiest job. you have the easiest job. you get to sit and enjoy a wonderful presentation i'm sure by our three distinguished speakers, but i'm just here to explain how we're going to go about this. first, we will hear from each of our speakers in turn. i won't take time to introduce each of them individually. they are all very capable of, doing when it's time to come up, and you are very capable of knowing how this program will unfold. we will start with professor cui
and then professor lampton and then amy celico, who just to amplify what dean nassar said, but only as a graduate of sais and the hopkins council but attended if i'm right all three sais campuses, washington, bologna, and, of course, in china so we are especially proud of her accomplishments. so we will have our three speakers at this event, individually, then i will rejoin you and they will join us on stage. we will have a brief discussion and then open to questions from you, the audience. so without further ado let me just add my welcome, thanks to the china-u.s. exchange foundation, and to tell professor cui how audit and please we are to have been here with us here today. the floor is yours -- how honored.
[applause] >> thank you very much, professor, and i also like to thank u.s.-china, and thank johns hopkins university. it's very much honorable for me to have this opportunity to have these presentations and have discussions with very distinguished specialists on china in the united states. my topic today here is about china-u.s. relations. that is, to manage the transition and form new
accommodations. the keywords in my topic today, and they are transition and management and accommodation. i think they are also three questions or three points of my presentation. now, let me start from the first keyword, transition. china-u.s. relation now undergoing historical transitio transition. we established a balance of this relation has been changing because of the evolution of the power equation in the deep interdependence developed between china and the united states, including power structure rebalancing and the
vastly growing ties between the two countries. this is an unprecedented evaluation process of the two major countries. which has wrought a number of more competent issues and some uncertainties of the future development. -- complicated issues. the change of the balance being driven by the change of china's economic growth, the most demonstrative has been the year of 2010 when china's gdp surpassed japan and becoming the number two largest economy. since then china has consistently strengthened the number two position by enlarging the gap, gdp gap, with japan,
and the narrowing of the gap with the united states. after the year 2006 the gdp of those three countries are, respectively, 18, 11, and four actually in u.s. dollars. it is widely predicted that this momentum will continue in the foreseeable future. and china will very likely surpass the u.s., becoming the largest economy in about next ten to 15 years. of course as china's population is much larger, so it's per capita gdp is far behind that of the united states and japan. the dramatic economic development with high-speed consistently in about three decades -- modernization process
and comprehensive national power to a new level. and equally important, all of these have happened with a parallel process of china's engagement with outside world. with the tremendous spillover effects, china's peaceful rising has become the most important development in the globalization and the multi-polarized, polarization process after the cold war was over. china's horizon has changed the parity of rather special balance in the dynamics of the relationship between the two major countries. on one hand, america's power superiority of the political
predominate have relatively declined. while china's capacity and the diplomatic positivity has been extended. on the other hand, there has been deeply growing interdependent china-u.s. economic relations, but for most americans, the first is of far more greater importance and should be taken care of, while regarding the second aspect rather as a sort of normal development. of course due to such an attitude, there must be corresponding policy implications. the impact of the change in balance have been reflected on
all three dimensions of china-u.s. relationship, namely biological, the asia-pacific regional and global issues. constantly, consequently, there has been growing tensions and new issues between washington and beijing. but in my view the general situation of these newly developing balance has been a mixture of two further parallel growing trends. that is of the strategic competition and the pragmatic cooperation. this is something unprecedented in the history in terms of relationship between two major powers. that i i regarded as a kind ofw configuration emerging. now, let me turn to the second
keyword, management. observing china-u.s. relations, a relation between the two largest economies and the global actor with comprehensive power. the most prominent and the worrying development nowadays is the growing strategic competition. washington regards china's rising with its gross capacity, with its growing capacity international inference and proactive diplomacy as a major challenge to u.s. primacy in asia, and the world leadership. they indicate strong now should be tackled as peer competitor. therefore, a strategy of rollback and hedging is
required. the major china policy readjustment has been carried out under the asian rebound and strategy, including substantial military and economic measures. they of course are met by china's reaction to strengthen their national defense capabilities and regional strategic countermeasures. growing strategic competition between china and the united states lead to more defensive and hedging and into place with each other, which cause further national in fact, on each other's perception of the strategic intentions from the other side.
always make politic coordination more difficult when it is required. at the same time, the third-party factor, factors, are becoming more problematic. all these have added more complexity into the situation, when close coordination, cooperation are required between china and the united states to tackle the challenges of the regional hotspots. a typical case of such a situation now is occurring in korean peninsula, when china-u.s. cooperation is urgently needed to address dprk nuclear issue. strategic competition has also constitute the important backdrop of u.s. first time intervention into the dispute between china and japan on the
china sea islands. such u.s. intervention in the name of taking care of its asian ally countries security against china's sovereignty. pose series of challenges between the two governments of these kinds of issues. therefore, china could not raise questions about the role of u.s. military and its light system in asia. that is if it is going to be an asian -- against china. and in fresh review of u.s., very much irrelevant to development is that there is a power struggle for the primacy in asia-pacific region going on
between the u.s. and china. the former is the established power is to maintain the status quo. while the latter is rising power is to revise the status quo. there is an increasing danger that the competition will develop into a confrontation, a so-called -- like history has repeatedly demonstrated. it's all for realistic possibility. but it seems not so important to debate if such views are really of valuable reference or not. when both sides are making preparations based on such perceptions. the most important thing is to avoid the tragedy that happened,
then the possible way out would be either one side change its course as the other side requires, or both sides make necessary strategic compromise. so far we don't see any such signs that could let us be obvious enough about the future development. that means what we can do is to manage the strategic competition to ensure that damaging confrontation can be avoided. so the two governments have reached the agreement of no confrontation, and that to be engaged on confidence building measures and the crisis management dialogue.
the high-level dialogue mechanisms have been set up to ensure as first important objective, effective communications, proper handling of disputes, and the discussion of crisis management uncertain urgent issues. besides mentioned on security risk, another challenge, in my view, in the transition time, that both countries shall pay attention and handle properly is in the political area. that is to be strong and smart to confront the pressure from domestic or political aspect. four different reason, in both china and the united states, nationalism and the popular reason are rising. and the domestic political
issues in the foreign-policy issue have become ever more closely related as the economic interdependence and the social ties between the two countries have developed further. the successful development of china-u.s. relations over the last half-century tells us that in every historical juncture the top leaders responsible politicians and the policymaking branches in the governments plays extremely important roles with their strategical insights, political will, and their diplomatic wisdom. to ensure this most important relationship to developing the right direction and the long-term interests of the two nations. the same is true in the current
transition of our relations. the same is true. a few words about the china-u.s. future accommodations in asia. the configuration of china-u.s. relations has been changing, and the balance is shifting, which probably is irreversible. based on that understanding, i believe the accommodation of china and the united states is the only prospect we should strive for. and also should be based on more stable framework. i also believe that kind of
framework is also important part of order, of multi-polarization. before that could be realized, i think there will be a pretty long transition. and how long that will be depends on how the interplay between the two relations, between the two countries, and they handle their differences. of course, fundamentally speaking, i think it depends more on the development of each country itself. the ideal situation of the development process that could be in the transition, management, technically mainly
for avoiding the damaging confrontation step-by-step to develop into a positive, constructive management. then to have more in the more consensus to promote our cooperations, which will be beneficial to both countries, and that will pave the way for a stable framework of a future accommodations. and that process could be what dr. kissinger said, the co-evolution. because either china or united states cannot expect the other will change likewise, and that each country will maintain their own course, but at the same time to accommodate with each other.
and for that idea goes the politicians and the strategic and the diplomats should not only study the past experience in history, but also should have very much constructive vision of the future. and we should develop our relations physically, but at the same time we should also develop our relations in a kind of value level. i believe we should find that kind of higher values, we can reach consensus to surpass our differences or disputes, which we cannot solve them right away.
before that could be realized, i believe china-u.s. relations will be pressed for balance between the tensions of the power structure and the resilience of interdependent practical relations. and in the past history, several decades demonstrated that the pragmatism and the calculation based on the rationality will always prevail on some important historical junctures, and important issues. i believe this is something given by the history and the
the which are very much like an article he wrote in 2011. and that is about six years ago in a very rapidly changing world. i think it is a measure really are the deep ness ave. is odd that he could ride in 2011 something that's meaningful essentially today as well. in 2011, he said china could no longer remain a bystander beyond the seas. that was a quote from now. he called for china to play a greater role in the world in a responsible way. and mike today, talked about how power in the world was rebalancing in china's direction
i think it's completely obvious. the united states and china needed to jointly manage what you call the volatility to be hotspot global economic volatility and so forth. so i want to go from i think you framed the problem really well. i want to rest the question, how do we think about doing that? i think the united states has some things to do and i want to talk about more what i think we might do to be more pragmatic, place importance on interdependence at the same time we have this strategic competition. i think it is probably no surprise to anybody, that of course both icon and most americans, would prefer to adjust to a changing balance as little as possible. we would like to see our decision diminished in some
sense or at least balance to the minimal degree. we have a lot of interest in managing volatility. i would add the global economy to that list of things and certainly north korea. it seems to me however, we have to start with a premise and that is at the moment i don't think the environment is becoming more conducive really any other country to the management you called for six years ago and that i think you are calling for now. i think we have to start from a kind of realism about what some of the problems are and we share the goal that the environment has its problem. i think we have leaders in both our capitals, frankly, that are more assertive than the management we have had previously. think about it, but i think in the subject to a reality. i think a second thing is that
it is very important to americans and to americans in their foreign policy they kind of look at the direction of evolution internal governance often put this sort of human rights related, political rights related issue. i think not all americans agree about anything, but i think there's something then says that china is not moving -- is moving in the more authoritarian direction and i think we have to acknowledge that as a problem. i think if we look at how it's viewing the united states, every time i go to china, people tell me why is the united states trying to slow us down? containment is a repetitive word. in some sense, we both see each others' internal policies going in the direction that are not very conducive to the management and as you mentioned, this environment includes a third-party going in the
direction that are problematic for the bilateral relationship and not of course would be north korea. and the trends towards economy are deeply disturbing to china. so i would just say, we have an environment that is not conducive necessarily to pragmatism and farsighted management issues. let me suggest three things the united states needs to do react team to a mr. marx as well. how feasible or how trouble some of these reactions might need. first of all, economically. i have been doing a research project on china's really impressive effort to build railroads in southeast asia.
what really struck me is the degree to which the united states economic president in this region is not nearly as great as it needs to be. and i think the united states ought to begin to be more supportive of the idea of conductivity not only to china, but the infrastructure participating more actively in trade agreements, multilateral trade agreement that include hope china and the united states. in short, ics assert a retreating economically where we need to create more interdependence in asia. it can include china, but it can also include india. japan, republic of korea appeared we are going in effect in the wrong way. we should try to create a balance of economic power to some extent knowing china will always be the most weighty
single actor they are. but we need a balance of economic power to weight think underpin interdependence they are. and was opposing, in the asia infrastructure the wrong thing to do with the interdependence been a shock absorber almost inevitable strategic competition. the policies from world war ii on involvement, development, importance of infrastructure, multilateral, trade agreements and so forth. i am willing to be disabuse, but i don't think we are going in that direction at this point and i can't with confidence say when we will. but i think that is what we should be doing.
this is probably both americans and chinese. one of the many things china has gained power is the world is open more for china economic trade terms than open to americans. whether you agree that's true or not, i can guarantee you that is that americans think to at least a lot of americans. they have to sit home and find particularly troubling areas of non-reciprocity. i will give you a few examples to signal what they mean. i think china has to open up and i don't mean just in terms of global trade balances. bushes take the media for example. china has a very good president, media presence here with dozens if not hundreds of television
print and other media here in washington. it would be absolutely inconceivable for the united states to set an equivalent presence in china. if you look at these as for research not equal in terms of the duration for which visas are given, we have people here were we've cooperated for 31 years with the hopkins center in a great cooperation which we are very proud of the we've got faculty members they cannot get a visa to go to china. this is the problem maintaining support for the relationship. the whole issue of market access, i'll just give you an example that is kind of amazing to me. last month i was driving from long show to hong kong. of course we get to the border
and first prc immigration and then there is the hong kong and lighted no man land of 100 yards. when you get 50 yards into no man's land, suddenly all of your electronic equipment begins to work properly again, by which i mean you get access to all the things you didn't have access to. two. china's openness on the part of the united dates but we don't find that reciprocal. what i am seeing if and not pushing him in a particular issue. i'm saying we have to sit down and find areas of an equity where we can level the playing field were some areas are going to be possible and it's going to be a problem. we will have to be pragmatic. particularly in the trade area and access for american companies and the china considers pillar industries, we were very concerned by an industrial policy and select new
barriers against areas we are most worried about. if we are going to improve the relationship and manage volatility and do all these things, has to be restored basic sense of fairness in the relationship and of course who thinks what is fair is complicated to be arrived at by negotiation. nobody would get everything they want. i understand all of that. but we've got to make some progress. americans are pretty patient when they see progress and they are not very patient when they see it going the wrong way. somehow we've got to establish a little more equal playing field. finally in north korea because you raised that and i didn't want to talk about it. certainly, i don't speak for anybody other than myself. i will tell you what i kind of concluded and i would be very interested in what cheney's reaction might be. and that is after 25 years
almost watching the united states, china, north korea and others interact on the weapons program in north korea, it seems very clear to me that all the various six party talks, conferences, threads, patience, policy of patience, all of this has not deflected the north korean program very much at all. we have just seen steady progress on both the warhead and delivery vehicles of missiles and so forth. so everything we have done to this point hasn't made much if any difference. that is the first point. secondly, after all of these years i've sort of concluded and i think it started with a conversation in 2002, he also said this, but i won't attribute this to him. the conclusion i've come to really recently is that china
would rather live with a nuclear korea dan achieva nonnuclear peninsula through instability or violence. and therefore, china's bottom line is that it is willing to live with a nuclear north korea because i believe anything short of forceful possibly destabilizing action will not get them to give them a. and so i think in a way china has decided to live with nuclear weapons there. that may be the right decision. so then the question is okay, wouldn't a policy of deterrence work? that is just as we had with china and the soviet it.
maybe we can negotiate limits to keep it from spiraling ever more up, that would be good. maybe we ought to have a peace treaty. and we had to gradually improve trade. politicians don't want to say their policies fail and that is true both in china and the u.s. maybe we are just going to have to live with something we don't like like we did in india and pakistan. it is not my preferred outcome, but i would like to know how we are going to move in a positive direction and bless someone says north koreans will actually get rid of their weapon. they've come too far to do it. the lawn in the short as the short of it as i very much agree
we ought to try to build interdependence. we need to do that by anything creating a more feeling of equitable relationship. we need to somehow get some progress on this north korean issue and americans need to get their finance trade policies, not to mention domestic policy under control. so i hope you heard here a recognition that america needs to do a lot of things here. but we need some cooperation from china. thank you very much. [applause] >> it's really great to be back at sais and i am honored to be with my fellow panelists and former professor here, talking about china. and in fact, and i am going to
pick up a little bit more about of course the economic relationship with china and very much dig deeper into what professor lampton was just saying about fairness in u.s.-china relations and specifically market access issues. our economic relationship with china as professor cui mentioned has of course never been so important to both of our countries and their economies have in fact never been so intertwined with so much more opportunities for expansion. it took real political leadership in beijing and washington 20 years ago along with a hugely supportive american business community to set this economic relationship on the incredible growth during the through negotiation of china's accession to the world trade organization in 2001.
however, despite this even integration and a relationship i did at around $600 billion a year, i am afraid that i can't be very optimistic right now as i'd like to be about the bilateral trade and investment climate between our two countries. maybe it is because this past weekend i spent time reading the strip to six sets of testimony submitted by chinese and american stakeholders to the u.s. government as part of the trump administration section 301 investigation into, and i quote, china's past policies and practices related to technology transfer from intellectual property and innovation. jamar of course there will be a public hearing on these issues at the itc. even before this weekend long set of readings and for the u.s. launched its section three
investigation into chinese policies that may be harming you pass, we have seen challenges become more and more contentious on the trade and investment. over the larger relationship rather than what commercial tires had provided in u.s.-china relations. while the scale in the scope of our economic ties have of course expanded, so has the imbalance in the relationship. our two countries have also increasingly been at odds over what rules should govern access to our respective economy. in the aftermath of the global financial crisis, protectionist policies in both countries and around the world have increasingly challenged accepted principles and rules over international trade. the u.s. and china have more to gain from enhancing our economic
relationship and act in concert to deal with global economic growth. but this will require commitment, accommodation for both our countries to find common ground on contentious trade and investment issues, including the national security consideration should impact the market access in both our countries. but 20 years ago, political leaders of both countries will take our economic relations to a renewed level of benefit. we have the opportunity next month when our two presidents meet in beijing, but the only way to make progress is to make accommodations in how we govern bilateral trade negotiations going forward. china must continue to make policy changes that enhance rather than restrict market access goods and services in the u.s. must recognize the validity
of international trade rules to govern our bilateral trade relationship is govern. i'm not sure they will allow for this kind of accommodation and neither of our capitals next month. but i'm sure cooperation in this trade area would help our two countries faced many challenges we confront across the spectrum of u.s.-china ties. my perspective on these economic issues is absolutely shaped by my current work, helping foreign investors navigate rapidly changing china market. for all of my corporate clients, american come a european and asian from a development of u.s.-china relations is a sick sick and interest. our advice is don't bridge group to counsel on ways that accompany between its corporate goals in china and is that by
the government. this will help clients demonstrate interest and value into the china market for the long term. the rather precarious state of the u.s. economic relations in 2017 is complicating this work and increasing the number of corporate clients are concerned their business could be directly and not per se a fact they buy a downturn in commercial relations or heaven forbid a trade war. when i step back from the issues and look at trade and investment opportunities and challenges for the u.s. and china, of course it is possible to be reassured by statistics given the size and breadth of our commercial relationship. china buys one in four of the soybeans grown in the united
states. china is responsible for 33% of global demand for finished u.s. nurse. for the first time in 2015. then i step back further still and i look at the global environment for trade and investment are they see the rising protectionism that has led to an impulse to throw out rules will chew grow economic cooperation. we've seen this in the united states, europe and china. the u.s. decidedly more protectionist sentiment in the trump administration reflect a growing protection that they've been hurt by globalization the american presidential campaign
since his election, president trump has focused on renegotiating trade agreement in reducing deficit. with china, the trump administration of course has been pushing on to friends. i mean u.s. exporters and investors in china and enhance protection against unfair trade coming from china into the u.s. market. as we all heard, president trump when they met in china and florida and it seems again they will be a focus of president trump's trip to beijing next month. following the mar-a-lago summit ended disappointing first comprehensive economic dialogue meeting this summer, trump administration officials have reiterated that if the u.s. can't achieve balance, trade by
convincing china to reciprocate higher levels of market access, and the more defensive means will be employed. concern over global capacity, the administration has begun investigations into whether imports of aluminum or steel are detrimental to u.s. national security. in august of course the u.s. launched its investigation under section 301 of the 1974 trade act to examine whether china's ip protections and technology transfer requirements constitute unfair trade practices that burden u.s. commerce. all of these investigations resulted in imposition of unilateral sanctions against imports to the united states. there are rumblings that his actions of course start a trade war. distinct from years past come to the american business community
is unlikely to fight for a positive economic relationship unless it sees the prospects for real progress by some of the market access challenges it faces in china. a big shift for the u.s. business community. once the uniform cheering section ties. from an american business perspective, progress has flown on key economic initiatives launched by succession to the wg euro. while trade flows with china of course continuing to grow, the american -- the ability of american companies to compete in china is increasingly limited. despite working on it for eight years, bilateral investment treaty between the u.s. and china has been repeatedly stalled by chinese and american roadblocks and its future is uncertain to the misgivings of the trump administration.
enhancing openness to both of our markets was one point made by the u.s. and china at the mar-a-lago summit. but there are sticking points on both sides. as both of our countries seek to enhance protections of domestic market and promote trade and investment ties between our two countries, and they want american companies to enjoy the same level as chinese enjoying the united states and the chinese government wants more assurance that the u.s. market remains open for chinese investment. in the u.s., there is broad bipartisan support to enact tougher policies with china, including potentially instituting the principle of reciprocity to govern trade and investment. when he was in beijing late last month, commerce secretary roth talked about rebalancing the lopsided relationship with china
and section 301 investigation launched will certainly be part of the process. reading through the 301 testimony, all 56 of them, i was struck by a few things. most downplayed the existence of policies are harming american investors in china for almost all of the u.s. stress challenges that have existed for years. on a more hope of note, almost all of the 301 admissions also had two common themes. one was the recognition of the progress china has made in improving the environment for i.t. over the past 20 years and the positive impact deepening u.s.-china relations have had on our two countries and of course on the world. second, almost all of the submissions include a fully that
unilateral action by the u.s. government inconsistent with wto rules would harm the overall relationship much more than it would help at. it is not the way to deal with the thorny issues existing in bilateral trade today. we need this common themes and goals among academics and industry, particularly if the governments are increasingly willing to diverge shared goals in the international arena. in 2016, president exide and obama noted that change had become a pillar of the u.s. bilateral relationship. yesterday her epa administrator here in washington and announce he would recant repealing the obama administration climate change role for finance undermining a key part of the u.s. commitment to the paris agreement. when the administration announced it would pull out of the paris agreement, china said we will go it alone. we don't need you.
has china trade face unprecedented challenges, we need positive areas of cooperation and positive breakthrough to help us with the disagreements. cooperation simply is not enough. the meeting in november between our two presidents is an opportunity to make commitments and accommodations to one another. i hope the u.s. government was governed the existing 301 investigation, underscoring that the u.s. wants to overcome bilateral trade imbalance and enhance trade, not to increase the domestic market. i hope the u.s. government will relaunch high standard bilateral treaty negotiations and push for enhanced openness of the chinese economy and reassured that the
u.s. economy, the most open economy in the world will remain open to chinese participants. i also hope that china will take practical, pragmatic and concrete steps to reduce bottlenecks and barriers to its market for u.s. goods and services. just yesterday, china's state council announced a measure that will speed up approval for foreign drugs and medical devices by allowing overseas clinical trial data in china drug registration application. ..
rising above the fray the us and china have profound long-term interest in committing to an expanded utility beneficial, bilateral trade and investment types. to achieve such an outcome, both sides will need to resist a continued focus above section and in words and actions. thank you. [applause] >> first of all, thank you very much to all three speakers for their appropriate, substantive challenging remarks.
short period and in the research [inaudible] i think they are still weak inexperience and another word is vulnerability of china's economy. the government policy stands on the complexity of china and another point is of course, there are different interests in the groups including the bureaucracy and the defense of what they would like to defend so sometimes the outside pressures and give a certain sense to help china make
improvements. this is what i use this opportunity. thank you very much. >> thank you. >> i want to ask amy to elaborate on the point and if i understood and i agreed with but to clarify you said in passing talking about trade, equality and more fairness in the relationship, north korea is not enough was your face. i assume you are talking about president trump earlier on saying if we get more cooperation on north korea we can ease up a little the implication was on trade and i think he even said taiwan. so, what did you mean by that and i think that's a very important point. you are saying this is strategically important is korea to us it will compensate the business community is what i
thought you. >> that's exactly what i meant actually. just thinking about what we really have been prioritizing this year in 2017 and us china relations the president was explicit in linking those issues and so for the administration, certainly, i think the president has made that one statement but i don't think one of the business community agrees with that and two, i don't think we can rely on that in a healthy way to think about us china relations. i have to admit i harken back to the obama administration where the us and china were focused on so many ways where our two countries are cooperating on global issues of import and that was a foundation for the relationship and incredibly
pillar as trade ties were becoming more contentious. what i fear going forward is without those commonalities of global, economic interest and instead we see diverging views over whether and how the united states and china should cooperate on global issues. we are just not going to be able to rely on that much north korea is certainly not enough. >> i will just say that it was very helpful the way that you put together that framework about us china relations. i have to say in washington it always does strike me when i hear your self and other china scholars talk about a new era into the world in that era being the end of american dominance
and what does that mean for an american ability to deal with china. i very much agree that it is difficult for the united states to think about but what it does require is keen management in the phrase that you used, accommodation. i think professor lampton said this at the beginning of his remarks -- the environment in beijing and in washington doesn't seem terrifically conducive to accommodation right now and i think that is probably going to be one of the areas where we struggle in the near future. >> thanks very much. now i will take advantage of my role as moderator and of course, these are three great experts on the specifics of the topic, much
greater than myself. on the other hand, i like to think about this in terms of what is the structure for this engagement and cooperation and in thinking about it in terms, as was described, global, regional and bilateral. it seems to me that if we start at the bilateral there is a structure, the strategic engagement certainly on economics that already exists. in other words we don't have to create a format or a venue for engagement. the substance is another matter. the progress and cooperation is another matter but the venue exists. let me jump to the global level. do we have structures in place that are adequate to deal with global issues in global engagement. here, of course, we start with the postwar trinity of the
united nations, as a venue for dealing with political and security issues with the international monetary fund to deal with financial issues and originally the wto to deal with trade issues. the three great challenges whose failure to engage led to the depression and world war ii. where do we stand in terms of these global engagements? i would say things are not looking as great as they might. we could start with the un and where we can see, the un, for whatever reason, was agreed that it would be the venue for dealing, among other things, with climate change issues.
the united states has just announced its intention to pull out of the climate change or pull back from the top 22 agreement in paris undermining the clarity of the commitment to this global venue. the wto here we can see, in the wake of the global financial crisis the principal institutional response was the creation of the g20 and at the leaders level which exists but i doubt that all of you would think it has been a huge success in producing substantive engagement in progress and certainly, there is a sense in the four areas that the g20 set its goals. number one to restore global growth, which hasn't happened to the degree that we are not back to precrisis pace of growth.
two, to repair and perform the global financial system. i don't think anyone thanks that is a job that has where the mission has been accomplished. three, the initial agreement was to complete the development in the wto, prevent new protectionism and promote new lines of trade liberalization and i don't think anyone thanks that has happened. finally, to reform the international financial institutions and instead of what has happened is a new one has been formed that is a partial, not a global institution that seems to be uncertain in terms of its relationship to the pre-existing multilateral development banks and by this i mean the largest infrastructure project at a global level today
is one belt, when wrote. this was created and is being financed completely outside the pre-existing network of multilateral development banks calling into question the relevance of the pre-existing order. and in the imf, it although it is not widely recognized, inherent in the ims articles agreement which is the constitution a mandate for periodic reevaluation of voting shares based on economic weight that are intended and were intended inherently to rebalance voting power as a matter of course. there, i think is a general sense that it hasn't been as complete as it should be.
so, a problem at the global level, the institutions exist but on certain what the commitment is in final point, it strikes me, however at the regional level, we don't have institutions that you could say the fastest growing region for the last 25 years, 30 years the fastest growing region economically has been asia. when we look forward i think most people think that will be true for the next ten years. there's been a huge change in both economic, financial and political power and yet there are no pan- asian regional institutions that seem adequate to deal with political security issues, financial issues or trade issues. there, it seems to me, there is much to do. that is my point. thank you for indulging me and now it's time for all of you. we have some time set aside,
plenty of time for questions so please free. i will recognize you. though, please wait for the microphone and as a matter of courtesy to our guests and our speakers please identify yourself and your affiliation before you ask your question. let's start with this gentleman right here. >> i'm roger. of the center for nasal naval analysis. so i was in a big way reassured by these presentations although i don't think that was the intention because everyone started out by talking about the fundamental problem of the us and china getting along in the world but fairly quickly we devolved into some fairly specific and technocratic issues
where i mainly worry about the war and so, my question is could any or all of the speakers speculate a little bit about what potential triggers for military conflict might be and in particular, whether or not there is a pathway that leads from these seemingly innocuous technocratic issues to the type of competition and friction that could result in military conflict. >> challenging question. would like to start? >> thank you for your questions. my personal view is that i don't think it's dangerous for our two nations. the point is in the north korean pitiful.
we have long had taiwan had the potential problem for us but i think in the last decade we have reached a very agreement and that maintains the status quo and even in the united station nations takes a strong position that is important and since then i think the situation is stable. i think that will continue. in the korean peninsula -- i agree with michael's point about if we cannot sink out think out something more effective we are facing a dead end of these issues but i think the danger is
that these positions and escalation of the rhetoric and the leaders are determined to develop their nuclear weapons. i don't think it's an outside force that can enforce them to stop. unless you take military actions. the military action is not feasible at all and i think the leaders, the people in the south korea will not agree and if the united states wants to take that action only based on that kind of threat that threat is directed at the united states. then the united states can surpass and they have the right from the south koreans to launch military. i don't think that situation will come but the missed
judgment in these kind of exclamation sometimes put the trigger of something unexpectedly so this is the only danger. that is why i think the circles both in china and the united states we should have from the discussions informal discussions about that kind of situation and what we can do for the preparations. thinking. >> i guess the way i would approach it is there is a low probability of war and i will get into that briefly a couple things where there is some probability but where there would be war it would be high impact. you told a lot of attention to a low probability event because it would be so bad if it happened that it is justified trying to
prevent a low probability. now the ones i worry about in the category of i can see the us trigger in pathway question certainly i can see the one trend where we might call more autonomy minded taiwan and that covers a lot of real estate and an increasingly vigorous, muscular china and some development internally that triggers china's need to act in its own political million. i think that whatever that risk is probably over time it seems to me to get bigger but maybe from a low level. i agree that if you look at the current government in taiwan that seems to me it is trying to reduce friction points broadly speaking but it seems to me china is turning up the pressure on them economically and otherwise. so i do worry about it and i
think it's a low probability event but it certainly would be an absolute fiasco for regional stability and us china relationship where it happened. i think we need to carefully manage that and when the president cavalierly says maybe we can trade off the one china policy i don't know what universe he is operating in so, i think we need to be responsible in our rhetoric and behavior not to exacerbate it and that is the taiwan. korea i could see and because you have well, you have a number of things that could lead to a scramble in north korea that would be rather perhaps controllable particularly if we don't each, china and united, talk to each other about how we would manage a collapse or some
other unstable event there because we have to get control one way or another. whatever the number is, nuclear devices and so forth order would need to be reestablished and the dr okay would demand a very motivated to stop refugee flow its way and find its way so you'll have a lot of actors they are in relatively confined space with a lot of weaponry and i could see maybe not a war but some clashes that would be very unfortunate for we got control over whoever the wii is so i am worried about what a collapse in north korea would produce in terms of bringing american troops into proximity potentially with chinese troops in a very volatile situation. there is there is a lot of reasons we should still even if it doesn't lead to war be
concerned about all of these things. first of all, they can lead to incidences like the ep three incident and the inadvertent sort of collision of forces and so on and that can have unfortunate consequences. i think we need to try to manage this at the lowest possible level of fiction. war is a low probability but not a no probability. between two nuclear powers, i would say low probability is unacceptable. is that, roger, enough of an approach? >> let me follow up with mine. you mentioned the idea that inevitably will have to get used to the idea that north korea will be nuclear armed and we have to think about arms control and things like that. what do you consider it likely that one of the responses to an acceptance of a nuclear north
korea in the long term will be nuclear arms japan and potentially other asian countries. >> there are more people to know about japan than i will ever know but i would say you have to be willing probably with the proposal i advanced there will be proliferation's among some body in asia because the japanese will be very worried and depends in part how credible the us nuclear umbrella is so we have something to do with that and we should try to be more credible rather than less. the japanese will be worried about it and the republic of korea we've already stopped and effort in the direction that leads to one. taiwan we stopped once or twice so there is a kind of underneath it thought in these societies and it certainly at the japanese got it you can be pretty sure that the south koreans will be thinking about it again so i don't know exactly how it would unfold but with the proposal i advanced i think you would have
to say undesirable to have this kind of proliferation but is so is a war on the north korean peninsula. >> the thought underneath all of that is again the lack of a regional organizations to deal with this and how they will evolve and what the us role will be in the long run with regard to those organizations. >> i wanted to say because i thought your point was very good on the regional and that is yes there is a birth of institutions on the security side but you can say there are some institutions and they are the five us alliances that originally were aimed at china and now don't include china so there is a structure that is explicitly exploit china and that's the first thing. the trade structures -- and we both have been acting to create trade agreements to keep the other out. we are working with the china us education exchange fund to build
a specific community structures that in the economic insecurity area have both china and the united states. it is menace to try to have a regional governance in which the two major powers in the region are either by force of history or current policy trying to exclude each other. it is madness. >> i think unfortunately the us had been working under tpp to think one day it would include china and it seems like two and half years ago the chinese government was coming around to the concept that one day china would be a member of ttp so in your remarks talking about the disintegration of the american presence in the region in ways that actually help the region itself is unfortunate.
now sitting in washington dc we are waiting to see if the current administration is going to pull back even further from the way it is integrated economically and adhering to wto and the other regional free trade agreements to things like binding dispute settlement and that doesn't look good for the us in filling this very much needed role in bringing us together, including with china where president said we are here and let's pick up this mantle of globalization which is again very well, but we want to see what the actions in that regard being.
>> exactly right, or you could say tpp was a good idea only in the context that it was a way station to something else but it itself was hardly an end in and of itself. it was going someplace. yes. >> thank you. with the chinese agency of hong kong. president trump visited beijing in november and i think there's a touched upon the issue and you are expectation in the economic area and i'm wondering what we can expect in the security area that on north korea issue or taiwan issue or military issue. what can we expect from that visit?
>> my opinion is that in certain areas the key word is management. manage your disputes on the issues and there will be fundamental breakthrough on these disagreements but we do have some areas where we can cooperate with each other. i think the full dialogue in the high level will play a sudden role on that and my observation is that the trump administration has prepared the strategy when they came to the office and they had some very rough ideas and some campaign rhetoric. now their politics is a mixture of the campaign rhetoric with the established apology there.
the establishment policy in the united states is roughly that we balance strategy and we reach the conversation. that's where it will continue and the established inferences is still very strong there but the protest of administration is different because of the new president. the [inaudible] between the two countries is finding the balances between the two differences. the continuity in china side is still very much a staple. >> i am trying to envision this meeting between the two. [laughter] i guess the operative phrase which would be if i understood correctly was no breakthroughs. did i hear you correctly?
yeah, no breakthroughs. i would say that. i don't think and first of all, when negotiating with anybody and i would say of the chinese in this case it has to be clear what you want. if you just look at the internal division on trade policy and security policy and the president, not long ago, countermanded a draft agreement that is owned congress secretary came up with. if i were the chinese i would say what can we give you that we can give you that would satisfy you that you would even internally agree about. i'm hard to see what this would be. i think the chinese will find a few things like making electric cars or some more market access in some containable areas and it will be something like that on the security side. i'm sure we'll try to look like
we are cooperating with north korea but the point is whatever we do with. it will produce proceeding to the eventual purpose of the new correlation and serious proceed in that direction. i think your operative phrase is no breakthrough, as much as a little cosmetic confessions going in the right direction which i am all in favor of. >> [inaudible] >> right, but i think americans very rapidly get jaded because when we met at the mar-a-lago summit we promised 100 day negotiation. and then we met in july and all we got was a promise and we got a delivery on a promise that they made one or more previous times on -- amy, i lost track. were getting jaded on communiqués from bilateral dialogues that don't get
implemented. in any case, it's better that we talk then not talk. >> i mentioned hope for both sides and not probably and all of it being achievable progress and deliverables. i completely agree with no breakthroughs although i think in washington i've been watching the commerce department try to pull together the ceo trade mission to china and very much focus on deliverables and specifics but these are very specific and individual than market access. >> in the back, first, all the way back. >> stanley, every march price waterhouse coopers publishes a
report on the hundred largest company in the world by market capitalization and this year 55 of the 100 largest were american companies. this is up from 42 in 2009. china has remained static at 11. if china is overtaking the united states, how do you explain these numbers? >> that's a great point that the us stock market. [. >> when i talk about chinese gdp that does not mean china will take over american and they are two different concepts but i think the united states will maintain the superiority in many areas for a very long time so i think the china is how do i say
realizing that kind of fact but china confidence is that we will keep moving and be confident that we will finally reach our goal there. the goal is not to beat the united states and it's not to be the number one. of course, there are very strong nationalism x in china too but i think the government policy is to realize chinese national modernization and that could be beneficial for both of us to rethink your. >> stanley, i just wanted to ask question. if i understand, maybe johnny you know, but if we start
looking at banks and world capitalization around the world aren't there a huge number out of the top ten chinese and. also, i think if you ask why the us was relatively small population is still totally disproportionate share of the big countries i would say that we are at least structured for innovation and entrepreneurship and china has a, i would say, a very heavily industry pillar industry industrial policy sort of orientation so i think we have a lot of things that help account for that but china has a lot of capital, training a lot of human talent and i think that people would see an erosion are looking at when those other things would kick in. right now the united states is still given 4% of the world's people we are purely
contributing more on the innovation, big companies, technological advances and we have two ideas to come in mind. momentum in time and current situation. >> in a way, you can summarize china's economic challenge in a nutshell. china invests almost double the percentage of gdp in any other country and today there is growth and productivity and the it's the only average for emerging markets so the challenge is they are investing not very efficiently right now. that needs to improve but that is not something the chinese authorities have noticed. that is exactly why this form is necessary. there was another question,
yes -- >> my name is kelso horn, student at texas a&m university. they stated that within the next couple of years they wanted three aircraft carriers for their fleet and since then we've seen them purchase one aircraft carrier in ukraine and in april we saw them build their own aircraft from the ground up and in the first chinese aircraft carrier to use a catapult rather than a ski jump system. given their strategic concerns of the south china sea, as well as their continued economic growth, do you see them continue to invest more money in their seapower and do you see them in the near future matching or even overcoming our current naval position in the pacific region?
>> i think there are an idea of maybe i can put the paradox and china realizes it's a big world and in the largest sense. then, their learning the concepts of international politics and my understanding is that most chinese students and the professor's that are studying western civilization of international politics and they tend to consciously or unconsciously understand this world based on the realism. so, that comes from the understanding of china's policy
on this world and understanding its policy so when we see china's what the statements of the government about this world and also that is a sincere belief and idea but when we see china's practical conduct which is a gap from you may call the rhetoric of her statement and actually china has been doing for the two. this is based on the realism and this just describes the post world order established based on the american predominance so china has to face the fact but
at the same time the ideal vision is that we can find as i pointed out a kind of accommodation which can get rid of these big power struggles. but with a practical policy you cannot [inaudible] it is not impossible so based on that understanding china defense capability will develop and as you say the aircraft carrier if they want to develop these things no one is not enough, to will not be enough. by understanding is that is that we do not have to develop it but we are developing these things at least three masterly. that's my understanding. >> twenty years ago i was at
site studying their modernization and it was amazing to me thinking 20 years ago but we were thinking about a blue water navy and how china could develop one and i completely agree with you professor. sounds right and probably won't be enough but as we think about china in 2017. >> i have a couple of points. one is that as china's modernization becomes more urbanized society along the coast and gdp is more concentrated along the coast china quite naturally wants to push conflict as far away from its territory as possible and that means having it in the distant seas and in the distant airspace so i think what china is doing is perfectly predictable and let's put it
that way but the trouble is the us has dominated so if you are to push back that will create friction than the previously dominant power so the the fact that we are worried about it is perfectly protectable but what i was going to say is when you start ratcheting up the numbers of aircraft carriers which i think they will and when you talk about an aircraft carrier you're talking about 14 or 15 support ships and probably the biggest investment is protecting the carrier as opposed to the carrier when you get all done. you are talking about a massive financial commitments and you have indicated here which is true that china has a lot of internal development needs so china will face the guns with the with internal security versus external security problem and also i would consider one other thing. the united states has the luxury of only having an effect canada
on one side and mexico on the other side and a fairly specific regional environment. china has many neighbors were much smaller than china and his china acquires this capability you will set off reactions in all the smaller, insecure states. some of them like singapore will buy their own means of defense and others will seek protection from a big power, japan or the united states and so i thank you have to ask where does this begin in what are china's real security interest. >> my name is jake up from the johns hopkins university. i have a question for i came from south korea so this is an issue for me. north korea issues is a mirror
of how power [inaudible] i recently the south korea government decided to bring [inaudible] it created tension between south korea and china. odyssey, china is not happy about it and giving economic pressure on the south korean side. my question is for united states is the united states going to intervene in these issues and if the united states is problemat problematic. >> well, i couldn't hear it clearly but you were asking about the terminal high-altitude anti- ballistic missile system. and that the united states has been providing south korea
against the north korean missile threat. so, course, the us sees that as a purposely defensive and defensible chance for a technology to an ally to protect you from a nearby threat for which this might be at least somewhat effective. there is not much debate in the us about whether this is appropriate and there has been some debate in south korea about that but the point of the present discussion is china is now, i will say, in your post punishing south korea for agreeing to provide the place for these to be based on the peninsula. south korean department stores and i don't know the company locate a not[inaudible]it has dy
are worried about and it's not simply aimed at potentially north korea but aimed in their view radars into china and it affects their deterrent. it has an argument but the point is south korea has a demonstrable need in the current environment and china has decided to inflict punishment for an understandable decision. i think this is an example of china not managing its neighbors very well. i am sure that an arrangement can be worked out and if the threat goes away maybe we don't need the defensive means, right? but china is not being very reassuring to its neighbors when it publishes them for protecting themselves against what seemed to everybody else to be a
demonstrable. even if you conceive the radar of this which is not fully conceded. >> as an american sitting here in washington dc i have to say that south korean residents also probably are questioning the us commitment to south korea on that may be because the us is also calling into question the free trade agreement and talking about reopening that and so while i agree that certainly is an in the united states has made a decision to provide its defense unfortunate that china is punishing south korea for it but i think south korean citizens are worried about the extent of the us commitment to south korea right now and are free trade agreement.
>> blood china has evolved in the complexity of this has several [inaudible] technically speaking, it is not that kind of directly useful to defend south korea but i think the positive part is that the united states in south korea asked to do something when it is provoked by the dp arcade. another reason is, i think, the united states wants to deal with these defensive systems and that is important for the united states for the long-term interest in the security and in that aspect and something has is
threatening the strategic balance that china and the united states in the northeast asia area and that is -- the other thing is the earth and the system deployed is [inaudible] and to the us army and it puts a lot of money in chinese market so that is one of the reasons china punished. >> my name is [inaudible] in the first year undergrad at the international affairs my question is harding president xi. since now they have typically taken to, five-year terms and during their second term they name a successor and five year
into his term we haven't seen any successor who is clearly going to take his place once he goes. in light of the upcoming 19th national congres communist party you believe this is the case that he hasn't named a successor and what does this indicate about his reform in the future of china. the second question is how does his [inaudible] thank you. >> i was going to say i have a few but you're the expert. >> i don't think anyone can answer about the successor question but i don't know. to be frank with you. there isn't a legal limitation for how long a chinese leader to stay in power.
it is a tradition that two ter terms. so, but my understanding is that this is something very much concerned that enough concern is that is interested by the out side world and that president xi will stay longer than two terms. from china's point of view if he decides to stay longer it is very much understandable and it will be supported by the majority of china appellation. but if he has some successors of two terms and steps down that will be fine so that is not very
much the controversial issue in china and this is my comment. >> i don't know how controversial it is for my observation. i certainly hear a lot of people talking about it and i think the interest level suggests people are paying attention to that issue but the question was also asked how will this affect us china relations in this is uncertain. first, at one level you can say it is one of our business but we can be concerned about the that aren't quote business and i would say companies that are thinking about long-term relationships, militaries that add two or more decades planning and we feel very much more comfortable with governments in which there might be an
institutional succession process. in a way you might say the most fundamental thing the government can do is to have a place eight widely recognized process to move power along with either human mortality or political change in society. i think what this signals is for [inaudible] we saw the beginning of what we thought were the development of norms and remember britain doesn't have a written restitution. it runs entirely on the norms and it's one of the most stable modernized countries in the world. to us, it is partly because we feel comfort with law but we also can feel comfortable with institutional norms so what we see is now an individual coming along that seems to have the capacity and we don't know the will but the capacity to change
the norms. that almost instantly is a less predictable country in our minds. i think this assumes a great importance just the mere debate about it. china is under now and he went through four successors including [inaudible], right? [inaudible] we thought china was beginning to move in the norm -based direction and this is raising the issue of is this accurate or not. >> just one thing i would add specifically on us china trade and investment is that i think many of us are waiting to see after this party congress this month will that then set the stage for a refocus on the chinese economy and putting in place many of the economic
reforms that were announced and for one reason or another haven't taken place although i think the goal in the rebalance of the chinese economy to promote more consumption rather than investment growth still remains investment chinese government for overall economic development and so in some ways after this month whether or not president xi jinping has young people understand who could be potentially a successor i think many foreign investors are saying well, this now and that process will complete it setting the stage for five years or longer of some standing committee members and then allow the chinese government to refocus on liberalization's that have been promised and so many of us are very hopeful we will be able to see that after this party congress concludes. >> this will be the last
question. >> paul wong. reporter. amy, you mentioned during the obama administration's eight years there were many commonalities that obama administration would work with the chinese and i wondered if you could elaborate into what sort of commonalities where they are other than the climate change agreement, perhaps with a security related or trade related and the progress that you made and having been entrenched, how, the feeling i got from today's event was it's a common feeling that one year into the trumps administration it could easily reverse all the progress made in the last eight years. how come this is the case? thank you. >> one of those fundamentals that was a tenant of cooperation was through the g20 and with other partners to focus on focus
on our government and supporting economic growth through the existing mechanisms that existed, the wto, promoting trade and investment, liberalization and although i was working for the us government a decade ago at ustr when it we had already had said the [inaudible] was dead we didn't think that the members large economy in the international community would walk away from the wto itself and maybe not more liberalization but i think that was one tenant that president trump has been clear in saying he may not want to support the wto in the future and some of the restrictions that that puts on the us system. i think that is one divergence for the chinese government, of course, continues to say we
support the international system, rules -based order, the wto is one of the founding principles of that rules -based order and so, yes, it is amazing to me, too, how these things can change but they have. i think the president trump has proud his first day of office to back out of ttp and that really was his only his first thing when it came to our american commitment to multilateral and bilateral trade agreements
>> but that's their very diffet think about the obama administration talked about the u.s. and china in the world together. >> very brief. i think, generally speaking, if we way president trump's policy based on his campaign rhetoric to be a very much different conversation. but if we judge from things that, not as bad as people worried about, just in the middle. he changes a lot. for example, about his rhetoric obvious the light system and nato. and now it is very much
different, a the policy, from t he said. but on the china-u.s. relations, i think from the results of the civil dialogues between the top levels in the working levels, i think generally speaking not fundamental changes. i think that will continue. >> i guess i which is like to end on a positive note. you said this is the last question, and that is we focus a lot on all of the problems and i think there is bit and net deterioration, and i would just say yes, it's encouraging that president trump backed off a lot of his initial campaign rhetoric, but it's been ratcheting up the more disappointed he has become in cooperation in other areas. i think the best think we can say is that this is a very fluid administration and what you see today may or may not be entirely compatible in the near-term
future. there are positive things going, and i want to end on note of interdependence. we really are financially very interdependent. china is doing things that are contributing to employment in the united states, as well as probably some things that are not contributing to employment. we've cooperated on health issues around the world, ebola and so forth. i think the united states on climate change, we got the state of california. it's not changing its policies because of trump. part of the strength of our system, but every think it changed by the president. yes, i think we need to be concerned in the ways we talked about, but let's keep in mind there are some equilibrium dating mechanisms here. >> and one of those mechanisms
is education, and the record number of chinese students here, and american student in china, and, of course, this is the growth of understanding is one of the key goals of this institution. and on that cheery note, i would like, please join in thinking our terrific panelists for a great session. [applause] and i hear rumors that there is a reception to follow. is that true outback or am i mistaken? no? no reception, okay. [laughing] you can call that fake news. [laughing] >> what the right hand gave the left. >> must be. thank you very much. [inaudible conversations]
[inaudible conversations] [inaudible conversations] >> live now to the atlantic council washington d.c. for discussion about the security of computer voting machines. technical specialist talk about the vulnerabilities they found in voting machines that they tried to hack but are still used in u.s. elections. and some of the weaknesses in the voting system in general. they will also give recommendations for how to secure voting equipment and online databases. ahead of the midterm elections next november. you are watching live coverage
[inaudible conversations] >> you are watching live coverage here before the attendees have filled the room, this is atlantic council in washington, d.c. going to be hearing a a discusn about the security of computer voting machines, a group that technical specialist or hackers dig into the vulnerabilities of voting machines that are still in use in u.s. elections to try to find a spot with us weaknesses were in the voting system in general. they will be giving recommendations for how to secure voting equipment and all my databases ahead of next years midterm elections.
we will let you know as were waiting for the group to come together that at 1:45 p.m. eastern we expect to take you live to the white house briefing scheduled within and then 3:30 p.m. a discussion about the iran nuclear agreement which president trump says he may and. and ashes could advisor h. r. mcmaster will be joined at 5:30 5:30 p.m. with three os predecessors including henry kissinger to talk about the national security council. looks like things are getting underway at the atlantic council. again a conversation about hacking and u.s. voting machines. [inaudible conversations]