tv State Department Officials on Arms Transfer Policies CSPAN August 10, 2018 11:17am-1:16pm EDT
rights attorney on the border named jennifer and she had obtained the tape and thought it was important and shared it with me and asked what i thought about it and i told her that i thought we should try to publish it. it was -- it wasn't an easy decision for the source of that tape who felt that, you know, the tape could put them at risk for being identified and fired but the source ultimately agreed to allow me to publish the audio. >> thompson talks about covering méxico and u.s. government's immigration policy. sunday night at 8:00 eastern on c-span's q&a. >> up next the acting assistant secretary of state for political
and military affairs on the top administration's efforts to boost the u.s. arm's industry while using weapon sales as diplomatic tool. we will also hear from other government officials and representatives of the arm's industry. this is two hours. >> good morning, everyone and thank you for joining us for today's event on the u.s. arm's transfer policy, we are very excited to have ambassador tina with us to give us remarks on that and a really stelar panel after that. i'm going to begin with security announcement because we have thought through what to do in the case of an emergency i want to let you know that we have plans and if something were to happen i will be your security guide where to go either where you came in or out the back depending on the emergency that might arise but we don't expect
that today. i also want to thank the sponsors who make the events at csis possible, including member support which has a big role to do with today's event and also a sponsor lockheed martin that helped us make it possible to do today's event and i want to thank our friends at the state department very much for -- for supporting us in being able to talk about this topic. and i think it's very timely, obviously change is a foot in the world of u.s. arm's transfers, you are seeing dramatic growth in the level of the dollar value of u.s. arm's exports and also changes in the world market, so the focus of where exports are going are shifting as demand around the world changes. we are also seeing that our arm's exports and security cooperations more generally are a major focus of the strategy both in national security strategy, the national defense strategy and no doubt related to
that there's a huge leadership focus on it, it's something that we see the president of the united states personally engaging in and addressing on a regular basis, it's something that's been a focus for the secretary of defense so it has leadership focus that is pretty unparalleled in the last year and a half. so there's been a major new policy announced. at the start of the year, updating the previous conventional arms policy and we are now at the tail-end of the implementation review for how to make the policy practical in the way the arm's process operates and i hope we will hear about that and remarks coming up. without any further due, i will turn it over to ambassador now and after she's done we will bring the panel up and have the discussion, so the floor is yours. >> thanks. great. [applause]
>> thank you very much, andrew for the kind introduction and it's a very good crowd for august, my god, i love being introduced by emergency announce ment, i promise i won't cause the emergency, i hope not, i'm just kidding, it's a pleasure and privilege to be here today to talk about some of the issues that we are talking about because arguably is as andrew pointed out this is really front and center both in terms of the president's agenda and more broadly throughout the u.s. government. so it is timely and something that is worthy of longer discussion, i will apologize to you because after these remarks i am called off to a meeting at the white house but my colleague laura who is in front of me, sitting, the state department will be represented together with some other folks that you've got, folks that you've
got from government and the industry. with no further due, let me say as andrew mentioned and i know that most of you are aware, in april of this past year the president issued memorandum announcing revised conventional arm's transfer or what we like to call a cat policy, the cat policy provides framework under which the u.s. government and all of its agencies will evaluate proposed, preserve peace through strength by reforming regulation to facility ailt the exports of u.s. military equipment, to strengthen partners and allies, to facilitate u.s. economic security and innovation, we will talk more about that and respect for human rights and u.s. nonproliferation objectives. in short, new cat policy to
expand american industry, create american jobs and maintain u.s. national security ensuring that we review thoroughly. it was only first step in series of what we believe will be practical results focus initiatives to transform the way that the u.s. government works to support and grow our defense industrial base. the r through that memorandum, the president ordered to summit implementation plan within 60 days, following the release of policy my colleagues from across the executive branch and i met with stakeholders from industry, from civil society as well as congressional staffers to collect all of their input and
hopefully closely align implementation plan with real-world challenges. in april i met with group of scholars and think tank community at csis to discuss new cat policy, we are grateful for everybody who contributed feedback to that very important process. as directed by the president's national security policy memorandum we did, indeed, submit implementation plan, one that aligns conventional arm's transfer with national world and economic interest and built on three specific lines of effort, first, the plan calls for prioritizing strategic and economic competition through a paradigm shift from the current reactive posture to proactive posture but actively develop partnerships and capabilities reflective of u.s. strategic and economic objectives.
we will use the policy tool to ensure that u.s. products can win in competitive global marketplace. second, the plan envisions organizing efforts for success and ensuring position, staff and resource to best support execution of the conventional arm's transfer policy and processes are also similarly constructed. third the plan calls for creating conducive environment through engagement with congress, industry, international partners and other stakeholders to foster the efficient operation of u.s. defense trade. but all of this ultimately means and what the initiative makes clear is that under this administration there will be no active advocate for u.s. sales than the u.s. government itself thus top priority of my bureau, bureau of military affairs at state department is maintaining the united states as a security partner of choice for many
friends and allies overseas. that's just one example of this effort, not even a month ago i attended air show in the uk where i met with defense industry representatives from u.s. companies of all sizes to discuss the cat policy implementation plan and to seek feedback in real-time. let me say, again, those companies were both small and medium as well as large so we tried to hit on array of companies that were represented all of which were present. i also met with counterparts of strategic partners and allies, some from europe and other parts of the world to brief them on the president's new policy and advocate strongly for ongoing and perspective defense sales. for years u.s. embassies and consulates have been committed to supporting u.s. companies' efforts to grow global exports. u.s. products and services have best possible chance to compete
abroad. through participation, defense trade focused on this tradition of economic diplomacy and direct the u.s. government to support america's defense industry by strengthening our advocacy for defense sales that are obviously so critical to our national interest. the state department through my bureau has played central role in the development of the cat policy and implementation plan because arm's transfers are and must be tools of our overall foreign policy objectives, through the responsible oversight of arm's transfers were supporting existing allies and partners or in some cases establishing and expanding new security partnerships that we hope will last for generations. the complexities of our operating environment are clearly manifest, the issues we tackle every day at state are at
policy, regulatory, economic and congressional imperatives. as we endeavor to faithfully implement policy, we are anchoring our transferring in larger framework and protecting security and integrity of technological advantage and defense industrial base. in terms of that larger policy framework let me speak for a moment about two important global issues that we take into account on every arm's sale, human rights and proliferation or nonproliferation. in terms of human rights the cat policy requires that every sale be assessed for the risk that it may contribute to a gross violation of human rights. let me repeat myself, we will not provide arms where we believe they will be used to conduct gross violation of human rights. for sure, there can be
complexities in any sale, for instance, not all of our partners are as discriminating as we ourselves are when it comes to conduct of military operation, for that reason, the new cat policy requires us to work proactively with partners to reduce civilian casualties in military operations. we also regularly use sales as opportunity to engage with partners to address the human rights conduct of their military. these are often imperfect situations but we always work to reduce the chance of the misuse of u.s. arms, simply cannot be said for most other suppliers of military equipment around the world. in terms of proliferation we also work to strike a balance between providing our partners with the capabilities they need to defend themselves and ensure regional stability while limiting the proliferation of new military technologies and
creating regional imbalances that can lead to arm's race. in doing so, we work within the context of the multilateral regimes to which the u.s. is a party. that does not mean that some of these regimes do not need sometimes updating, for example, the missile technology control regime, so-called mtcr, design today prevent proliferation of missiles never took into account a role that unman we -- aerial system, we must ensure that we are not accelerating the sale of weaponry and creating opportunities for competitor's economic and strategic to expand the space for their own defense trade to our ultimate military economic detriment. it's also the case that we care deeply about creating u.s. prosperity. in fiscal year 2017 the state department authorized, licensed and provided oversight for
$41.9 billion worth of government to government sales and 112 billion in direct commercial sales. these sales help support over 2.4 million people across our nation who work in america's defense industry. we are spending every effort to maintain america's status of preeminent global exporter of defense goods. by specifically recognizing the link between economic security and national security among other changes, the new cat policy provides us the tools to continue this important work, that said while some aspect of transfer can change with cat policy the state department will continue to carefully evaluate each potential sale or export. in addition to the nonproliferation considerations and the human rights concerns that i discussed earlier, we will continue to weigh a number of other important factors including the appropriateness of each transfer in responding to
legitimate u.s. and recipient country security needs, the effect on u.s. capabilities and its technological advantage and the degree to which the transfer supports u.s. strategic foreign policy and defense interest through increased access and influence, allied burden sharing and importantly inopper ability. the administration's engagement with members of congress which is coordinated by state department, we are communicating with our colleagues from the house foreign affairs and the senate foreign relations committee on an almost taillie basis as part of congressional notification process which is required by law with arm's transfers that meet certain thresholds. i would to emphasize the fact that we take role in regulation of arm's transfers exceptionally seriously. this is why we have worked closely to the white house to help drive the cat policy
forward understanding that we must always evolve policies and processes to meet the challenges of today but also to prepare ourselves for what is over the horizon. these steps are among the first in series of efforts to streamline the process. i can assure you that my colleagues and i at the state department but also again more broadly in the usg will continue explore to go cut red tape and give u.s. industry every advantage and increasingly competitive global marketplace while continuing to ensure the responsible export of arms. in conclusion, do i want to underline the fact that each delivery of u.s. defense articles and services sends a message to our friends and to our foes, act of support and trust in our partnerships and our allies. it provides necessary capabilities to defend themselves, support the security and stability of the region and when necessary to participate in
u.s.-led joint operations. i think we all can attest here that american companies produce the most technologically sophisticated and effective defense systems anywhere in the world. the cat policy and national implementation plan are vital first steps in a series of initiatives to strengthen ally, to support national defense industrial base and to drive american job creation and innovation. the state department will continue to be a leader in these efforts into the future of that i can assure you. so with that, i know that today's panel discussion will constitute a very fruitful dialogue and as i said a timely one, i really want to thank you for your attention and thank you per great attendance, i think that's very encouraging and we will do everything as i said from state department to drive the agenda forward which is obviously an important one from the administration's
perspective. so thank you very much. [applause] >> well, thank you so much, ambassador, i have to apologize because it completely slipped my mind to introduce you before your remarks, so my apologizes but thank you so much for those comments and we set a great foundation for our panel discussion. having neglected to do earlier i don't know if it makes much sense to do so now that she has departed, acting assistant secretary at the u.s. department
of state and therefore has had the leadership role on this conventional arm's transfer policy that was rolled out in the spring. unfortunately she has left with us her abled colleague, laura cressey who played a role in that part. i am going to introduce the panelists for the discussion and kind of take our discussion in two parts, we have the luxury of about 90-minute time frame to do our panel discussion, so we are going to do in two sections, the first focus primarily on the policy changes that are underway and how they are going to be implemented and likely impacts and the second, then maybe broadening out and looking at the strategic context for the policy changes and -- and how it's going to play in that strategic context, so let me
begin by introducing the panel, to my left is laura cressey, deputy director in the office of regional security in arm's transfer in bureau of political affairs, she works for ambassador kate now, transfers of excess defense articles and third-party transfers and she's had distinguished career in the state department as well as a career in private sector so she's one of those. i shouldn't say rare but one of those wonderful people who has brought private-sector experience and government experience together. to her left is alex gray, who is special assistant to the president for the defense industrial base and deputy director of the white house office of trade and manufacturing policy. he previously served on the presidential transition team for the u.s. department of state and as a senior adviser to u.s. representative randy forbes, who
was senior member of armed forces committee and someone who i worked for when i was in staff, alex, great to see you again, great to have you with us and we appreciate that the white house saw fit to bring its -- voice to the session today. he's responsible for guiding development of the defense and aerospace efforts to strengthen u.s. defense and aerospace exports including advocacy and analytical work on behalf of council members and their work, putting their positions in front of government broader business community. before joining the chamber keith with department of defense where we were colleagues and once upon a time office of acquisition technology and logistics and his
office has survived, his old office survived transition as part of under secretary of us -- prior to that deputy assistant secretary for army for these kinds of issues. deeply knowledgeable about this and government service and also now in private-sector capacity. to his left is melissa dulton. director of csis project, her research focuses on reinforcing principal foundations of united states defense policy and military operations, she conducts research and writes on security cooperation with allies an partners and u.s. defense policy in the middle east. prior to joining csis she joined department of defense and senior
adviser for forth planning for 2014 review. to her left is jeff abrahamson who a year joined senior fellow for arm's control and conventional arm's transfers, he manages the land mine, and organizes the forum and arm's trade, prior to these duties, policies adviser to secretary of control arms and also the former deputy director of the arm's control association and former managing editor of the publication arm's control today. and to his left is dak hardwick, aerospace industries association of america, his primary responsibilities international defense and space trade and oversees ai's role in bilateral
and trade relationships in key regions, international cooperative programs. before joining iaidak was at the harris corporation working with government and international officials to ensure timely for allies and partnered nations and began careers in marines headquarters budget analyst. thank you for joining us, as i mention we will divide the discussion a little bit so we have opening comments and interactive discussion and another set of opening comments and interaction discussion and then we will have interactive discussion with the audience with your questions, we want to make this as interactive as we can, and so i would like to kind of start with a focus on the policy itself, the implementation review, how we think it's going to operate, what we think the impacts will be and i'm going to kick it off laura with you. >> great, thank you, thank you andrew for your kind introduction, to you and melissa for hosting us, it's wonderful
to see all of you here today, i look out and see familiar faces, looking forward to a lively discussion and i'm also very excited to be on the panel which -- with such a distinguished colleagues, so looking forward to talk today, today's actually the latest in our continuing efforts to engage stakeholders in arm's transfer policy discussions, we value these discussions as ambassador kate now mentioned in her comments and we value the input that we have received from industry, associations, think tanks and we will continue to solicit feedback as we move forward in -- in our implementation plan and trying to look at processes and policies that we have in place in the arm's transfer realm. ambassador outlined how cat policy and national
implementation plan for that policy both reflect national security strategies and national defense strategy, she also discussed how the cat policy designed to expand opportunities for american industry, create american jobs and maintain u.s. national security. what i want to do in the couple of minutes is delve a little bit deeper into the implementation plan and let that plan contain and try to explain those a little bit more in-depth, the three lines of effort that she mentioned and to remind you, those three lines of effort are prioritizing strategic competition, organizing for success and creating conducive environments. so the implementation plan that we were tasked with putting together in the cat policy is -- is an effort by us to really carry out the president's
vision, it's an effort to better align our convention arm's transfers with our national security and national economic interest. so under this first line of effort the prioritizing strategic competition we are trying to take a more proactive approach to arm's transfers, specifically we are trying to improve our ability to compete with our adversaries by providing our partners with viable alternatives to foreign products in order to maintain influence in key regions throughout the world. we are going to be working with our partners and allies to identify critical capability requirements that they have and then trying to expedite transfers to support these essential foreign policy and national security objectives. the second line of effort, the organizing for success line of effort is actually really taking a close look at how we are organized within the executive branch and how we are doing day-to-day work and what we need to do to focus on and best
position to facilitate transfers that meet our national security objectives. for example, we are going to continue to update the policies and regulations that provide uls the -- us the framework for decisions, specifically streamlining the international traffic and arms regulation and control list. we will also be looking at the day-to-day processes to ensure that we are as efficient as streamlined and as effective as possible. so some of the things that we are looking at and that folks in industry and associations have asked us to look at is establishing milestones and timelines for the foreign military sales process, improving and speegd up -- speeding up processes within the defense department, trying to
increase competitiveness by building in exportability to design and development and also by expanding support for what we call nonprogram of record systems. we are looking into potential financing options that could make our systems more obtainable for some of our foreign partners and also examining existing policies to ensure that they don't unnecessarily detract from our ability to compete in the international marketplace. finally, one of the other things that we are looking closely at is our advocacy process to make sure we are the most effective advocates for u.s. industry. the third line of effort creating conducive environments is aimed at addressing things that are outside of the executive branch, outside of purview and control, what that means, for example, is working with the state department's committees of jurisdiction to address any legislative fixes
that could increase efficiencies in the system, also working with the other -- the other committees to with the dod committees to see if there are any fixes that might help as well. working with our partners, international partners to help define requirements and need so that can help speed up the processes, addressing overly burdensome policies that create barriers for u.s. entry such as overly restrictive offset policies of foreign partners. and also working with industry to try to increase production capacity in order to decrease the lead times for u.s. defense items. in sum what we are trying to do in this whole government effort looking at the arm's transfer process really from soup to nuts is really trying to ensure that once we have decided that a
transfer of a defense capability to a partner is in the national security interest of the united states that we are able to effectively compete and efficiently deliver the equipment to our partner as quickly as possible. i will close by underlining the fact that while some of the aspects of arm's transfer processes will change under the new cat policy as ambassador said, the state department will continue to evaluate arm's transfer or potential sale on case-by-case basis, we continue to work with committees of jurisdiction on the hill to help them carry oversight responsibilities. the cat policy provides framework under which u.s. arm transfers whether they are commercially licensed sales and does not change regulations regarding export of u.s. defense items.
the other thing i wanted to add while the cat policy is very important for us, this is the fifth iteration of the cat policy, the first cat policy was signed by president jimmy carter. for us, i think, the really exciting thing is the implementation plan which really musters efforts of u.s. government to harness the movement and momentum that we have to try make processes as efficient and effective as possible and with that i will turn it over to alex. >> thanks so much to andrew and his team and csis for having me here. it's been a pleasure to be here with my inner agency colleagues, laura, in the state department, great collaboration on cat throughout the agency, dod, white house, state department, i particularly one to ago
knowledge that have been incredibly skilled at pushing this through. i'm here on behalf of the white house trade and manufacturing policies office and our submission to work with our interagency colleagues and national security council to expand trade and opportunities abroad encourage policies that buy america and hire america. the arms transfer policy encapsulates all of the objectives. i'm going to talk a little bit about out cat fits into the administration and the president's broader agenda and some of the -- some of the connections and connectivity between different aspects of that agenda. cat was designed in response to a shifting strategic landscape that's increasingly characterized by great power of competition across the
political, economic and military spheres, cat prioritizing staying ahead of the competition by responding proactively instead of reactively to the defense needs of allies and partners. it also recognizes one of the president's signature security is national security, by removing some of the previous administration's barriers, the u.s. export policy being one example this administration is strengthening hand in ongoing strategic competition while stimulating growth at home as well as job creation. it should be noted that the u.s. aerospace and defense industries contribute almost $1 trillion annually to the u.s. economy and support about 2 and a half million american jobs. just as one point, the international usas market alone worth more than $50 billion a year within the next decade. those are the stakes we are competing for, key objectives of
cat going forward and laura outlined most of these working closely with allies and partners to identify the capability requirements they have and undertaking a hold of government response to meet those needs, one of the things that our office has been involved is advocacy piece of this and ensuring compiveness that defense export broad for economic and security purposes is maintained. i would note as ambassador did that the administration dispatched delegations to air show several months ago which demonstrates just how committed the whole of government approach is to that -- that particular aspect. we are working with partners to ensure that u.s. barriers to entry are reduced and that policies like offset requirements do not threaten american jobs our reduce certain technological edge and like laura said, continuing to update the policy and regulatory
frameworks that underlie the policy including revising outdated policies and updating regulatory fame works like itar, the cat policy is part of administration effort to stretch the connectivity of economic and national security. another being the assessment of defense industrial that was mandated by executive order which we are hoping will be released in near future. defense experts are important tool for maintaining healthy and resill yaint defense industrial because including one capable of surging in crisis. also wide variety of critical labor skills that are required u.s. base as well as allies and partners. i look forward to continuing in interagency process as cat progresses and i look forward to continue dialogue with stakeholders here and we want the dialogue to be france, honest and ongoing, i would particularly urge u.s. industry
to engage with the inner agency in this process by offering specific quantifiable steps and i want to thank interagency colleagues and nsc for hard work and dedication. thank you. >> thank you, alex. keith. >> andrew, thank you and thank you to csis for this opportunity to speak and first of all, i would like to put in context the defense and aerospace council which was recently launched a few months ago in april at the u.s. chamber of commerce. it's a unique opportunity capitalizing the administration's changes to put forward a brand-new council that's focused on influencing the government, both u.s. government and foreign governments and working with industrial sector to advance opportunities for industries globally. it's honor for me to be part of that initiative and my executive
director ben schwartz as well. i have experience, roughly 33 years of experience in this very issue of arms transfer and cooperative research and development work with friends and allies globally. and what has changed in that 33 years the united states and industries although having military equipment is not the only game in town. we were seeing the emergence of the chinese and military industrial complex, we are also seeing russia continue to advance some of its capabilities on the global market as well as others friends and allies who have created military industrial complexes. so when i started in this business 33 years ago we had a strong corner on the market for
advanced capability. that's no longer the case today. there's a paradigm shift. specific to cat changes, we at this council at the changer are welcoming of the economic impact considerations as an element of the arm's transfer review process in my 33 years it's the first time that the policy has been expanded to include this consideration, economic impact, it is not an overarching consideration but it is allowed now to be credible component of consideration in transfers. we also encourage consideration of foreign availability as an element of the arms transfer review process as we are witnessing china as an example, not alone but china filling voids the u.s. left with a denial to friend or ally. the consequence of a denial filled by china or others is as follows, the u.s. loses market share that is not easily recaptured and in some cases
will never be recaptured. the u.s. loses control of the capability. the u.s. loses the opportunity to train, influence and maintain a military relationship with foreign forces who are now introducing into their inventory a chinese, korean, israeli, et cetera, capability, and finally, with the introduction of let's say a chinese or russian system into the military inventory of that friend or ally, we now have a far more complicated future arms transfer decision process that is now compounded by a prior u.s. denial demand some instances we complicate the potential for expanded diplomatic relations. let me explain what i mean here. india, let's take india as an example. i worked very closely with india over the recent years for dr. carter. years ago we denied radar for
the fighter competition several years ago and the french clinched the deal. now, i like the french, don't get me wrong but i like american industry better. now, several years later, and i worked this initiative with dr. carter, additional aircraft capability in india and now we are all in. we have revised our policies, production of aircraft, it's possible but we are behind. now, because the french beat us out. another example with india is we never answered india's request for ballistic missile defense capability, went unanswered and now india has been force to consider and made potentially -- potentially the russia s-400 system, similar to what turkey is buying or they said they were
going to buy. now we are rushing to put together a proposal for india to counter that situation and why is that a problem for us, we have legislation on the hill in 2017 which penalizes friends and allies who lane towards russian equipment specific, fortunately there's been carve-out for india but created anxiety. so india in 2019, national defense authorization act for fiscal year 2019 is said to the president, export council are encouraged with the language in section 1752, that reinforces economic consideration in this review process and also requires as well the consideration of foreign availability, a recommendation that we published in 30 proposals to the administration on june 8th, so we are excited about the
language. finally the council is working closely with the administration and congress specific to 30 recommendations that we published on june 8th. we are encouraging the administration to use tools it has to affect real change, to issue executive orders, direct ifers and hold the system accountable that we have debated since the defense news article wrapped in red tape that was published in 1997. ..
some questions. and i want to start with the question if i could posted in its most general form, about how you implement a policy and process that is a case-by-case review process. because these cases come up his individual transactions or deals, they may not be single transactions but involve multiple transactions but they are reviewed if we are lucky as an overarching case. so, any individual situation has its own unique bumps, hurdles and roadblocks and that can lead to an outcome that may seem inconsistent with the policy statements that are being made. in terms of how you implement
this policy approach, i take to heart the paradigm shift referenced by several about proactive rather than reactive. i strongly resonate with keith's remarks that we had a situation where us products were so much in demand, so much the pinnacle the world was seeking that reactive probably worked because you had what everyone wanted and could afford to be in reactive mode. that has changed. how do we do a proactive process on something where it is case-by-case and we are trying to balance? if anyone on the panel has thoughts? >> i will take a first shot. i think, looking at a case-by-case review, that provides us with an element of flexibility. it does not mean we are going
to ignore arms transfers, that we are going to turn a blind eye to any precedent. what it does give us is a bit of flexibility. all of those various considerations in the policy that we have to take heed of when we are looking at potential transfer, what is great about the policy is it does not prioritize any of the considerations, it just lays them out for us to consider. as my boss was saying in the chamber of commerce event yesterday, my undersecretary said the world changes from week to me, month-to-month, and something we may have been willing to provide two months ago may be something that changed. some things have changed that
we are not ready to approve the transfer today. that is the kind of case-by-case review we are talking about. it is not just mean we are not going to be considering precedence or looking at past licenses. if a company comes to us and says this is the third of ten transfers we have planned, we are not necessarily going to take the transfer and look at it without thinking about the whole picture. hopefully that allays some of the concerns. we do have a bit of a balancing act with a case-by-case review and our desire, alice was talking about looking proactively at what we want to do with partners and allies. that proactive strategic look is different from what we are
looking at on a case-by-case basis and it is trying to take into account what are the things we want to accomplish is a country, what are the things that have been outlined in the national security strategy and national defense strategy and how do we work proactively with our partners and allies to realize those goals and objectives? >> it is a great leadoff question for what we are talking about and it is illustrated in reform proposals that the submission to the us government, how do you rationalize the case-by-case of the overall policy change and one of the best examples is you look at existing processes, talking about the concept of the program license and instead of licensing on a case-by-case basis, individual licenses for an entire program and any of
the associated licenses. and these licenses have already been adjudicated by the united states government. and all of that is adjudicated. that allows these licenses, which is already burdened to move through more quickly than you would do on a case-by-case basis. it is a good solution for one of these thorny issues, and consider that structure going forward. >> to build up that point, the capacity and workforce perspective in terms of the
arrangements taken into consideration. it has been multifaceted. are there additional layers of complexity they are endeavoring to incorporate which is the right approach but perhaps, as a similar but broader effort that they recommended, the types of challenges us national security community is going to encounter when it wrestles with arms transfer policy decisions, based on the complexity inserting the foreign-policy trade-off, a range of archetypes that move along a spectrum, european or east
asian allies that craft a fractious debate surrounding partners in other parts of the world. that might be an approach to consider, and industry, chamber of commerce, >> it is important to keep this is part of your approach. the desire here is important, the responsibility with the sales, there is this case-by-case.
>> when addition to what laura said, maintaining the case-by-case review. it is important we do have these big picture policy statements not only because they have a sense of the president's intent on this policy, the whole government approach but also having these economic -- having all of that is a signal of intent to our allies and partners, that is really important. and the big picture signaling and case-by-case nuance, that is really important. >> this discussion brought to
mind when keith and i work together is the permit of the fence, i was head of the revit acquisitions cell and what i was doing was trying to facilitate the provision of equipment to the afghan national security forces so they could succeed in their missions and keith tried to manage some of that process and that would bring home to me the answer to the, the solution to the problem was to make the easier path. things that had been approved innocent the context, much easier to prevent trying to create some brand-new path, not to say the brand-new path can't be done but it is a lot easier and quicker to do something that has been done before which bring to mind, and if we communicate, the government, some of these broader policy ideas, what is more likely to get yes then know, we can cut out some version and there is a
role for broader policy statements and communication but that brings me to my next question which is how does the panel see it should be or will be that we can facilitate this kind of communication mechanism referenced by several folks, wanting to get feedback from industry, sometimes the us of inventors challenged to communicate back to industry and its processes for a variety of reasons. i throw that out to the panel. how do we get this kind of dialogue process with industry with partner nations working effectively? >> a couple thoughts. this issue of transparency, some of our members, as the administration works through the details of the implementation plan.
there is greater transparency on details of that information plan. some of it is classified but there is a chunk that is not. one of the things i worked hard in the pentagon for many years that is critical to my various assignments is viewing industry as a partner. at times the bureaucracy will try to keep industry at arms length for a number of reasons. in order to succeed in this, and the associations, it requires an understanding of the technology, program
management as well. it is part of the acquisition technology with the community, frank kendall or ash carter when he had a position was beholden to the president and the war fighter for not approving a transfer or supporting a transfer capability that would somehow disadvantage us forces, the conversation we would have with that industry and that capability within five years, will there be a next generation of something that minimizes the risk of a transfer today? in some instances the answer was yes. we felt comfortable supporting the administration's desire to transfer cutting-edge capability that might be risky in some instances, the answer might be no. that is the dialogue you need to have to move forward in some of these areas.
precedent is critically important, industry knows where they had licenses improved in the past, where the swim lanes, go or no go. there are opportunities that press against those that create the opportunity for new precedent. india is a great example of the last five years. it came with a great deal of discussion and dialogue and slow partnership with industry and f-16s and f-18s etc.. we need transparency and strong open dialogue. >> let me give an example. i think there is an existing mechanism that is ongoing right now that aia has been a part of for a number of years and this is through a series of dialogues that occur at multiple levels in the government and industry. we have a ceo level of dialogue we hold with secretary or deputy secretary of defense and undersecretary level that is
held and a mid tier dialogue we continue to run with other associations as well. there are multiple levels of conversations that are ongoing. we can formalize, continue to pursue with the us government in such a way that achieves the reforms the we all agree need to go forward. the key for us is to make sure we focus on security cooperation, defense trade, overall trade as the topic that is selected. the challenge you start to have is at the senior level, under the very senior level, you have competing demands from multiple issues across the range. not just security cooperation that the secretary of defense or secretary of state and undersecretary of state is responsible for. they are responsible for a number of things. very specific about what you are trying to achieve in
defense trade is very specific. we can focus on security cooperation and defense trade at the senior level and have it be baked into the bureaucracy, then we will make some real change because right now we are having dialogue that tends to be episodic at best but if we can formalize those and have them be enduring going forward you can see the level of change in order to accomplish the reforms that will be part of the national implementation plan. >> i want to add on, we have a number of standing meetings with associations, aia and others where we try to engage the broad spectrum of industry stakeholders. with the consideration of the new policy and implementation
plan the administration has tried to make a next her effort to increase that engagement. we have had a series of roundtable meetings with associations bringing in their membership trying to make sure we are reaching out not just a prime but small and medium-size companies as well, to get a range of input. we also understand that in these broader dialogues, folks may be reticent to talk to us. so our doors are always open to folks whether it is associations or think tanks or companies to meet in our various offices, state department, assistant secretary or office level, whether it is the defense security cooperation agency, whether it is undersecretary lord, all
across the security cooperation landscape. there has been a next her effort to make sure we engage to understand what the various concerns are. we had said when we started on this process that we were not just looking for input to the implementation plan, right the plan, put it out there and talk to you later. we really do want to make sure this is just the beginning of our engagement and we reach out to folks. i told some of our colleagues that last week, we held the first meeting of the interagency working group that was reestablished pursuant to the implantation plan. in our first meeting we said one of the first things we need to do is reach back out to industry and through the association to find out what is the perception of offset, the perception of what the us government should be doing as
an offset policy, what are the countries out there where offset policies are perceived to be incredibly onerous, such that our companies cannot effectively compete, that situation where you see this ongoing engagement from us. on a number of different issues. >> if i could follow up on the topic raised by ambassador kaidanow about resourcing the process. i'm loath to criticize my former colleagues but i would say there is some challenge there and i would point for instance to some of the early stages of this year's defense authorization bill, targeted, defense technology security administration, to be folded into other aspects of the department that abolishes an independent entity. there is pressure on the system, the department of defense and department of
state, to streamline, be efficient, reduce billets in certain areas and in particular the kinds of things that support arms export policy like contracting, technology, security reviews. how do you strike that balance? how do you make sure resourcing that is required to be proactive rather than reactive? i would postulate or argue that may be harder to do. it takes more than a staff effort to be reactive. >> i should add some of the early proposals were not in the final conference report. there were some reductions mandated. >> resourcing is a concern among all of our agencies. i can't necessarily speak to
dod that they have concerns, contracting especially as one area we collectively point to as a need for increased resourcing. in the department, the bureau it is well-known, the director is quite understaffed, down considerably. we had vacancies here and there. something we were very much aware of and we will be seeking to try to fill those thoughts. there are stresses on the system where we are asked to do more with less and we prioritize our work. for me this is a top priority. we have a fair number of folks that are working on the realization of these in the implementation plan.
>> i will raise this up a level, not to preclude anyone talking about implementation, but shift us up a level to the more strategic perspective, and it fits into the strategic framework and it has been addressed several times already in terms of national security strategy and leadership focus and the need to be prepared to engage in pure competition. to give us an opening, i start first -- >> thank you, i am delighted to be joining today's panel in partnership with andrew. starting in march, we launched an effort to unpack the defense
trade agenda with the event at csi s featuring lieutenant general huber and mike miller, from palm mill's bureau and continuing this project stream. and from this discussion i also want to thank the staff for organizing today's event. too often, we think about and approach arms sales in terms of input to the partner and output for the united states and i think we have seen in recently congressionally mandated reforms for security cooperation that are underway at the state department and that the permit of defense that encourage the whole committee to think more and drive towards outcomes. indeed, if we want to compete and win in the ways that have
been framed by this administration, it hinges on our ability to articulate and achieve those outcomes. the fact is, as ambassador kaidanow stated in her remarks, arms sales are a foreign policy tool that may well reap economic and strategic benefits but are fundamentally a competitive act with political outcomes and in shaping the monopoly of the use of force within the partner country we are working with and how that force is used so as we are thinking about the outcomes we are seeking to achieve politically, you take into consideration the broader suite of consideration. i believe the intent is there in terms of how the administration is designing its security cooperation reforms mandated by congress and as
reflected in the framing and priorities but it is worth underscoring that arms transfer should be designed to build allied and partner capability and interoperability to mitigate risk in us plans for managing crisis and contingencies, deterrence and coercion against our adversaries, counterterrorism and other national security objectives. this will necessitate greater linkage between the planning community and the security cooperation community and joined planning with our partners beyond what is currently practiced. there are impediments to this from a classification perspective, in terms of tech release consideration and cultural barriers not just between the united states and its partners but between different cultures that exist
within the us bureaucracy and the planning community and the security cooperation community. but in order to break through those barriers, and ensure stronger alignment with defense and national security priorities we need to think about ways to better streamline and provide top-down direction for the imperative of thinking about security cooperation as a way to achieve our planning objective. arms transfer policy also needs to be reconciled with two other priorities that have been articulated by the trump administration. the first is the return on investment for working with allies and partners and why context matters in terms of avoiding being embroiled in protected conflict including those that are pursued by our partners and to whom we might be providing arms.
to start with return on investment, in the last two in the aa cycles there has been an emphasis on reforming requirements for planning, for assessment, monitoring and evaluation, security cooperation and the president himself and members of the administration have been quite strong in encouraging allies to step up and do more, to invest in our collective security, arms transfers are a form of security cooperation so in thinking ahead of how we frame and reconcile the imperative of seeking return on investment with the need to be streamlining arms transfer processes and policies to provide those arms to other partners will need to be wrestled with at the highest levels of our government. if we are treated as separate
policy decision-making processes we run the risk of the country of parallel and possibly conflicting outputs and outcomes that we have to deal with. context also matters, arms transfer, relying on allies and partners and common security objectives. and not just by this administration, and with good reasons our partners often times with better understanding of the way of the land with complex operations, they speak the language, hold the keys to the country's future in terms of providing security over the
long-term and ensuring interests are met. arms transfers may achieve common objectives for the united states and partner, that are sustainable and supporting the policy objectives in this context. to elevate partner expectations. and whether it is the type and sophistication of arms, the political implications of continuing military cooperation with them. and not empowering bad actors, not reinforcing predatory governance and not exacerbating conflict dynamics that may undermine collective security in certain regions or were causing civilians harm. i went to applaud the administration for strengthening the civilian harm
provision in the new policy and that is hopefully well implemented. i would like to point you all to the administration's stabilization assistance review that came out in june. collective effort by the formative state, defense and us agency for national development which links some of these complex scenarios where we are conducting stability operations with security cooperation and the need to be thoughtful about how we are designing security cooperation programs in this context. for this administration context does matter but it does seem to be in tension at least from an outsider's perspective with some of the imperatives driving in the arms transfer policy. while we need to design a policy that is responsive and
adaptive to the landscape of the 21st century, to support our common objectives, this decision is incredibly multifaceted. you can see that csr is challenging the length of csi panels in an attempt to bring together the dimension of these issues. given the greater reliance on us allies and partners heightens the importance of calibrating our approach to consider these different policy objectives, providing feedback opportunities, to refine them so we are achieving our desired outcome. >> thank you. >> thanks for inviting me to this panel. i may be the most unhappy with
the policy on the panel. a role i happily take on. there is a lot i would like to talk about. i have been taking notes because i would like to tailor it, there is an issue brief i offered to the arms control association it came out a couple months ago which lays out some of the points i will make. i'm also part of the forum on the arms trade which is a network of 70 people around the world a third of which are in dc who initially responded to the transfer policy when it came out. you can see reactions in ongoing things that have been written since then. there's a great deal of concern about this policy. every conventional arms transfer policy is a word, you can find almost anything you want, priorities are not needed. i'm concerned the optics of how this might be implemented are looking at the wrong problem. i went to frame a few rational
transferring a trade commodity. these are killing machines, easy to talk about them in the abstract but that is their purpose. in our economy there is not a huge piece of our economy and pastimes transfers make sense and no longer do and that is the problem every conventional arms transfer policy should take at its root. how do we do it responsibly.
and ambassador kaidanow's message the we do this responsibly, and each delivery sends a message, when we stress the economic side of this that is seen. when donald trump meets with the saudis and the announcement fails, the message being perceived in the world is the human rights, other concerns, it is a transactional approach, it is faster and more, a recipe for disaster. these are some of the concerns that need to be taken into account. this idea, the expert control which is briefly mentioned which i find alarming, the
prospect of making it easier for semi automatic weapons to go around the world. these were used in conflict. the rationale that these are not high sophisticated weapons and we don't pay attention are driven from this idea that our approach needs to be more and faster and protect only the crown jewels which is a continual the obama administration that never got to these people. if we do create responsibility, to discuss this. there's a lot of discussion about timelines. and wanting to move faster. most of us are disappointed that none of our suggestions
are more transparency on these timelines and milestones and this issue would support that. i think also if we are going to move faster and more, we need to have a better sense of how to use restrictions and monitoring and have better transparency afterwards so we can test and a much greater push to assess whether our security assistance or efforts are achieving the goals. we are not going to improve our transparency or processes such that we can assess later whether this was an experiment. it is critical that along the process of there are not these milestones those are insertion points to reevaluate the deal that was made months or years ago. a small piece of this could be a predelivery notification.
it could be a standard process. and foreign military sales, my thinking is if we are going to do this, this is the drive that we need to have a more transparent process that the public can engage in more frequently. i think we are seeing in the first two years of the trump administration, paying more attention. you have holds that are concerning, weapons to saudi arabia, some holds on appointments and so on and so forth. it needs to be helped by the public. it can be worked into the policy but the message of the policy is not one that promotes
your - international responsibility but transactions in sales, not human rights. that is very alarming. >> thank you. >> obviously i can't thank you enough for the opportunity to be here today and my us government colleagues on the panel and the audience, i want to thank you for all your work in the arms transfer policy, the aerospace industry association has been working on this particular item for a number of years. please understand aia and its member companies across the country are appreciative of your efforts today. i would like to call out ambassador kaidanow, a stalwart partner with aia and the aerospace industry for a number of years. her team has been outstanding. laura's presence on the panel should not go unnoticed. they have been very responsive to issues we bring to them. i went to go through a couple
things, the strategic linkages andrew spoke about and what the recommendations were for government action and talk about the country relationships and trying to wrap this up, where does it lead? the conventional arms transfer policy we thought was the first critical step in addressing key reforms we need in the us defense trade this summer. it has been a color of us foreign policy for decades and it will continue to be a pillar of foreign-policy going forward. member companies have focused on this issue for a number of years and we are excited to see the progress we are making now. at its core the conventional art transfer policy and reforms associated with it is in support of foreign-policy and national security objectives of the united states as laid out in the national security strategy and national defense strategy. and the national security strategy the reforms that we
see the coincide with those reforms are renewing america's competitive edge and reducing the regulatory burden. in the national defense strategy we find key objectives like strengthening alliances and attracting new partners, interoperability and fostering a competitive mindset to be central to the goals of the congressional arms transfer policy. so the point of going through that is there is direct linkage between national security strategy, national defense strategy and conventional arms transfer policy that have been identified so we see a strategic linkage from the direction of the united states, the united states government, conventional arms transfer reforms, you see those linkages as key to reforms going forward. earlier this summer, aia sent and recommended government actions as a result of dialogue with member companies, large and small and in 11 different areas. if you're interested the aia
website has those recommendations but it fell into key areas that include identifying specific priorities, addressing key reforms, specifically contracting nonprogram of record and reform to fms only related transactions, examining the arms transfer technology review process, licensing and industrial cooperation we refer to as offset. those are 11 categories a recommendation aia recommended. a fact sheet came out in the middle of july, we saw many things associated with those recommendations carried forward by the government, very excited to see those themes coming forward but the next step and critical step is the implementation. you heard it referred to as the national implementation plan. one thing we need to do is have a key system set up where industry provides feedback
during the implementation stage. on one of the other questions, we really need to bake in a feedback mechanism to realize some of the changes being recommended in the conventional arms transfer policy. effective coordination mechanisms between industry and government are going to be key because the objective is to reduce the burden on the system. a question we had earlier today was about resourcing. one of the easiest things to handle resources is identify the things in the system you don't need to do anymore. so we did that as part of the export control reform industry. one of the things we don't need to do anymore, how can we reduce the burden? if you have a resource issue, look at the system you currently have, see what you don't necessarily have to do anymore because the situation has evolved. that is how you get to the resource peace. where does all of this lead?
one of the things missing from this discussion i would like to emphasize is the role of the ultimate end user of the items we are transferring and that is foreign partners. how do our foreign partners, if you were to take off your shoes and put on their shoes, how do you think our foreign partners feel about us conventional arms system? what i would submit to you having talked with a lot of foreign partners is they are as frustrated as we are because their objective is to control their own national security to meet their own national security objectives and to be key partners with the united states. we want key partners and allies. our partners went key partners and allies and the main partner for many of them around the world is the united states and we want to make sure we are meeting their national security objectives through our military just as we are meeting our own
national security objectives. where does this lead ultimately? at the end of the day, this is a competitive market. there are four competitor countries, there are foreign companies, they are all looking to get a leg up, all looking to take market share from us companies but it is not about market share. they are looking to expand the global influence. so the race we are actually running as a race for global influence. for 50 years the united states has set the standard for the race for global influence. the question we have that we think by some of these reforms we see that are coming as part of the implication plan is who will make the rules for global influence for the next 50 years and as an industry, a country and the government, we feel the united states will set the standard and make the rules and
that is why we are excited about the change in the transfer policy, reforms that are coming forward and we set the stage for good action going forward. i will stop and answer any questions. >> thanks. i want to follow up on what you said. there was a common thread to your comments and melissa's comments, how do we evaluate whether our policy is succeeding or failing in promoting strategic objectives that it is designed to support in our broader strategic framework. there were some critiques with the metric, arguments, assessing what we were achieving and a lot of other potential metrics but i would be interested in the broader panel's thoughts in how you assess that in a year's time, a
year's check in farther down the road and say to ourselves the policy is working, having the intended result and i mean that as critique. how do you see the assessment process tying out and it has been referenced, fy 17 national defense authorization bill expressed strong congressional interest in trying to understand the strategic context of this and bring more visibility whether we are achieving our objectives and security cooperation efforts. i would like to tap you first. >> one metric the president himself has said it is he would like to see more sales that are successful, he would like to
see sales that meet requirements that are laid out in this policy that are evaluated with all the criteria and interagency deem appropriate but he would like to see an increase, the most vigorous advocate of doing that and a record for defense sales, 2018 will continue in that trajectory and that is a metric, an important metric and as to strengthening our strategic partnerships, it is partly qualified but we will continue to see more sales are consummated, that is going to be a sign of the continuing strengthening of strategic partnerships so those are two metrics showing themselves since the start of this presidency and as we continue down the road you will see more of that.
>> metrics are difficult in this area in particular. quantities of sales is one way to measure how we are doing but it is not the only one but for us in this business, we are not looking to sell items to countries. what we are looking at is trying to build capabilities, not selling and walking away, to work with us when we need them to be more effective to defend themselves. it is hard to quantify that and that could be very squishy, technical term but it is
something we need to do. how are they implementing the things we are selling, our country is better able to perform with you as war fighters and various operations alike. that needs to be factored in as well. at the end of the day sales are important but making sure we are building the capabilities of our partners. >> building on what laura was saying, you have a national security strategy, military strategy, combatant commanders globally with wartime training documentation, all classified but they know what they would like to see, partners and
allies in the region. in my time in the pentagon when there were very spirited debates about highly technical capability for a first-time introduction, we would always go back to wartime planning doctrine and look at how the capability subordinate the national security strategy. that is another way to measure success, something that is not discussed publicly but it is a way to measure success as well. >> i forgot to say when i was speaking before that i speak on behalf of myself, not the arms control association. it is a tough question because weapons, as part of any security solution are a long-term proposition. hard to say after six months whether it succeeded but you have to pick your metrics
properly. one of those is our recipient countries using or changing their practices. this is one of the pieces that was sold to the community and concerned about the policies. interest in protecting civilians, training required for transfers to nigeria and saudi arabia will be a critical component. ambassador kaidanow talked about human rights concerns. those would be the metrics i'm looking at. are we seeing countries who receive us weaponry if we are concerned about the behavior, changing the behavior. we have this believe if we are a partner with a country we have control of what they do but often times that it doesn't the case. the saudis of not been good actors to act on them as they are reacting to the situation
in yemen and often we end of getting captured which melissa was talking about. the countries we sell weapons to we embroiled in. how you measure that, pay attention to those places and see if you see progress. ultimately it is about security which is a hard thing to measure. >> thanks. as i allude to in my opening thoughts, there are processes underway and good thinking happening in terms of how to conduct assessment monitoring evaluation. it is a congressionally mandated task, dnd has to create a framework for section 333 title x, building partnership capacity activity. over time there will be an effort and there is a desire to
encompass title 22 grant-based security in similar frameworks and attempts underway to do that. what i was trying to stress in my opening remarks is that whether -- regardless of the input, grant assistance or arms sales, we are achieving the same effects in the country, driving towards interoperability, building partner capacity capability, retaining access, retaining influence in relationships. not using the same framework to evaluate our outcomes or objectives with our partner regardless of input to the system. my sense as an outsider is those processes are being bifurcated right now. >> i want to open up to audience questions which you have been a very patient audience. we appreciate that.
i torn, i am wishing i had a hill person on the panel. it didn't work out but i can only imagine how long we would have to keep you if we had. let me start with colin. >> colin clark, breaking defense. i am a grizzled veteran of watching these. i go back almost as far as keith on the security initiative, wonderful ideas, they were going to change everything, everything was going to be faster, better, more wonderful. not to be snide, but a lot of this is similar though there is less focus on process than there was. my question would be okay, the laws and regulations haven't changed. how do you actually, aside from
pushing people to say yes more often, actually get things done? >> you were looking at me, right? excellent question. i think i try to allude to this when i was making my opening remarks where we have a situation right now where for the past several years before this administration, we were hearing from partners, a lot of folks, can't compete and take too long to produce our stuff and we produce wonderful stuff etc.. mostly focused on the foreign military sales process and defend security cooperation
agency under then director admiral lexi - ricksy tried to reform the process. he ran into some bumps along the way. now what we have is we have a top-down direction from the white house that we need to take a better look at how we are doing things and have that top cover to implement changes that will make the fms process smoother where we try to address real contracting issues, where we look at non-program of record items that take forever to get through the technical disclosure process. what has really changed is the buy-in from the top level, the white house but not just the white house.
you talk to the secretary of state or secretary of defense or deputy or undersecretary and everyone is aware of all the different things we are doing and behind this. in the absence of other documents and legislation and the like you really do have a changed situation with the top down direction. >> if you would like -- so -- the reason i agreed to head this council at the chambers, it is a unique opportunity of interest by this administration at the highest levels in a level that is unprecedented, look at expert control reform. it was tried by the clinton administration, the george w. bush administration. it wasn't until the obama team came aboard with secretary gates's support that export control reform happened. that is what it takes.
the proposals we put forward to the white house were very detailed, 16 pages based on my experience and the experience of others. it does not mean that is the only way to get this done but it has to be a very specific, driven, solution driven, detailed written, on someone, to see it through. that is the only way we will see true transformation. contracting takes 300 days to make a major system on contract under an fms case. you have a contracting community and the pentagon that is decimated and grossly understaffed. they are overwhelmed with current fight supporting us forces and supporting allied forces in the current flight and fms comes along as a third
priority which is why you have unprecedented use of contracting actions. that is an opportunity potentially with the administration to look at carving out the congress's support of unique federal acquisition procedures for fms contracting to have a truly rapid process. that is going to take a lot of community support. that is just one little example. if you look at export control reform, two decades, how did that get done as a roadmap for how to get this done, to talk about it? >> i want to say one thing. what has changed? a great question. the answer is the global security environment has changed. our us government colleagues see it in bilateral discussions.
our industry members see it when they meet with customers. we see it in the daily media how great powers are emerging in certain countries are moving to align themselves, the global security environment is changing and continues to change in its dynamic. .. we need to make some key reforms in order to ensure that we are meeting the challenges of the next 50 years. so the global security environment has changed. and after 15+ years of conflict, we should expect that the environment should change. it is going to continue to change. that is why we think some of the recommendations be put forward allow the u.s.
government, allow industry to be flexible, to be nimble, to be able to react quickly, to a world that is going to change and change very quickly. >> thank you, northrop grumman. this is for keith webster. consequence of a denial still by china. what is the will at the white house and state department to make changes to his aggregate that is filled with a number of policies that seem to need some significant changes like a sovereign decision, for instance. and to treat aircraft like aircraft and missiles like missiles. what is the will to move on those challenging, very hard choices? >> i think the will is demonstrated by the level of engagement that you see publicly and privately on this issue. the fact that you have principal level officials talking about these issues on a
regular basis. yet my boss, peter navarro, there have been two national beds. you have got the ambassador going to numerous forms both chamber of commerce and elsewhere to talk about these events. keith was talking about his experience going back 30 years and not having seen this level of administration engagement on a topic like this. i think it is actually true and to your point about, what is a level of commitment? i think it is demonstrated by the personalities involved and what their public statements. i would direct you to those. >> right here. >> good morning.
thank you. my name is veronica. i am with the security sector including nuclear policy. my intention is in the future, that is what i would like to focus on. my comment is, the policy should include -- policy and the security should be considered which is primarily focusing the future risk for example. how could we be so sure after we transfer the weapon not to be retransfer somewhere else? and the second, does united states still have the technology control of the transfer weapon? i think that is primary.
as we all know that the changing world, our allies become adversaries and vice versa. we should consider that. thank you. >> risk. how does risk fit into the policy? >> risk is something that we have two i think factor into every decision that we make. all of my colleagues are very aware of risk whether you're looking at the release of a technology, the sale of a system, the situation within that country, the situation within that region. i would say that the assessment of risk is into the entire process from the beginning to the end. including monitoring, whether it is a direct commercial sale or foreign military sale. we also have very strict
retransfer provisions that are within, whether it is again, direct commercial sale or whether it is a foreign military sale and built into the contract or the letter of offer and accepted. so in order to retransfer an item you have to come back to my office at the foreign military sale to get that kind of approval. and if that does not happen then we have other provisions to deal with countries that transfer other agreements. i would say we are very much aware of risks. we are dealing and we are not in my paper, not document transferring. we are talking about transferring legal equipment. i think risk is baked in every step of the way. >> jeff? >> it is easy to forget the
u.s. is by far the worlds largest arms dealer. and growing its share if you look at the report, the us is not suffering. it is growing. and it has for decades, has argued for responsible arms trade. i think as we assess the policy, this is setting the standard for next 50 years, is it the standard we want other countries to follow? i think if it is, we need to make that portion of the case. if we are concerned that some countries are not acting as responsibly as it should, had to be convinced them to act more responsibly? and that's why we stress the monitoring and we stress pieces of our continuing process that we want other countries to follow. it is an unfair criticism to say this but i don't think the administration of this president is particularly proud refund of multilateralism but ultimately, it is i think, the approach of the take here. there is an arms trade treaty
and 100 countries almost all of our allies included. they are part of it. and had to be figure out ways to build a multilateral system at the same time because if the problem is other countries acting poorly, then we are presenting a model, is a model when they want to replicate? if we find how to do faster and better had to take account of all of the risks? >> if i can quickly come out to say something differently about risk. then what i think other panelists are saying. risk can be mitigated by processes that part is true. i think that's what you have heard. but risk is also mitigated by relationships. and i want to emphasize that because the government to government relationship that occurs between united states and other countries is so critical to ensuring that whatever risk we think there is an transferring item is mitigated it's really important. the other relationship develop that we don't talk about very often is the relationship between the industry partner and the country in question.
because those relationships are baked in for years. because what happens is, as soon as you start working with a country, you also start working with their supply chain with their in country partners and those relationships are developed and continue and endured even beyond the government to government relationships. we don't necessarily talk about those relationships very often. what you'll see is that risk reduction occur both on the government to government level as well as the industry to country level. it is so important in making sure that you make the right decisions when it comes to sales and countries around the world. i just want to make a couple of quick comments. yes, our defense industries do an incredibly good job internationally today. the focus of my work is ensuring that they do as well 15 to 20 years as they do today. and part of the change in the dynamic is that the evolution
and success of competitors like china and others, who are going to make that more challenging for the industries 15 to 20 years from today. also, i want to point out that our defense industries ensure that innovation continues to be or to progress. we cannot sustain our position in the world without security and in order to have that security, must've continued innovation and innovation comes from revenue. our defense industries lead innovation in spite of everything he read in the press. they do amazing investments with the money that dod provides them. money they make from international sales, dod just announced this week that the 2020 budget for the president will probably be flat. it is no surprise. r&d has not been cut over the years but remains flat.
we need our industries to continue to be vibrant and to reinvest that revenue as they do in research for next generation capability for our forces and allied forces to dominate on the battlefield tomorrow. >> fortunately we are running short on time. in order to get a few more questions and i want to recognize a couple of people. ask a brief version of your question. let the panel react and see if we will have time for a few more. i will come here and then over here. >> war because the microphone first. [laughter] can go first. >> valerie, there was not a lot of discussion today about -- but if you talk specifically about what is in the implementation plan to enable that. and can you give us an update on any changes the department
is proposing? >> you talked about changes and what was the second one? >> thank you. you and alex both talked about efficacy being reinforced under the policy. when i was a foreign service officer advocated for defense sales overseas under a very strict set of rules. now the defense contractor, i feel we are hamstrung compared to foreign embassies. have you issued new guidelines for embassies and commercial counselors on what they can do? >> i will start with your question on advocacy. we have not yet issued new guidelines. look at which our role be. i know that the cooperation agency issued guidance to their secure corporation officers in
the embassies around the world. because it is another point of confusion. we have our security corporation offices, foreign service officers and foreign commercial service and congress department. but it is definitely something that we will be looking at and hopefully issuing something as the process goes on. >> and then who wanted to tackle the next question? i am getting that is your. [laughter] she mentioned in remarks, the mtcr that we are trying to reinvigorate with respect to uab and have proposed something to her partners that we are working to try to gain acceptance that we hope will open up some market space for our, for the producers in the united states and also abroad but it is
something that we are working towards this fall. i hope to have more later. >> just one quick piece on the advocacy point. one that we talk about strategic competitions as a larger geopolitical impetus. i think one of the tools that has been used as part of the competition is advocacy by our rivals, by our competitors. and when you look, would not say just by our competitors as well as friends and allies. have had very vigorously advocacy, high-level advocacy effort going back decades. i think as you have eluted to, in recent times we have not been as aggressive with high-level advocacy as may be we could have been. i think one of the thoughts behind the larger policy is driven by some of the folks at the highest levels of the administration who personally
identify with advocacy as being something they want to undertake. that is a way for us to be strategically competitive. to have that high-level advocacy. as state and other agencies continue to work on that, revising the guidelines and working on the implementation of that, there is a huge desire at the highest, the principal level to undertake the effort. >> i know there's a lot of questions left unanswered yet but at the end of our time, it was a long events i do not want to hold you too long. thank you very much to the audience for coming. thank you again to the supporters that made the event possible. thank you and please join me in thanking the panel. [applause]
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