tv Assistant Defense Secretary on U.S.- India Relations CSPAN August 29, 2018 10:03am-11:29am EDT
>> good morning, everyone. let me welcome all of you to the carnegie endowment for international peace. i'm ashley tellis, senior fellow hit at the endowment and it's a great opportunity for us today that we have randy schriver, the assistant secretary of defense for asian and pacific affairs joining us this morning. the topic as we have advertised is a conversation about indian, the 2+2 dialogue that's going to happen within about a week in delhi. it's that event that was very important in the political calendar because the relationship has really come a long way since we first began working on the transformation about 20 years ago. i'm particularly delighted that we could snag randy to speak about it, because he has the action on this issue in the
pentagon. randy as all of you know has had a long career in government, and public policy, analysis and in business. prior to his current position he was the deputy assistant secretary of state for east asia, and the chief of staff and the senior policy advisor to the deputy secretary of state under bush 43. he also served as the ceo and the president of project 2049, whose website you haven't seen, i strongly committed to attention because it does superb work on east asian security affairs. and randy ran that for a long time before he came into government. he also was a founding partner source covered all the basics of everything from policy to cover. and this without fear of contradiction one of the
nation's premier analysts of asian security issues. so welcome, randy. it's wonderful to have you. >> look forward to the discussion. >> look forward to that, too. i want to start by just saying a few words of treatment to senator mccain, because he actually graced this very room at carnegie twice in the last decade, if i remember, speaking on the very subject that we are about to have a conversation on. without doubt he was the powering figure in america's public life and he certainly left the country stronger by his presence and by his contributions as a soldier and as a public servant. very strong convictions about the issues that we care. he reminded us that our values are really the most important
part of who we are as people and as a country. and that our strength is essential if our vision and values are to be protected. and on the two occasions that i too spoke at carnegie, he made a very strong plea that a strong u.s.-india bilateral relationship. and so it is a particularly important thing i think that we recognizes spirit in this room as we have this conversation. i want to start this conversation with randy with a quote from senator mccain's 2010 speech which was remarkable as i'such is going through it last night, and he said in 2010 if the united states and india are to forge a true strategic
partnership, our senior leaders in government must prioritize to areas of cooperation above all, security and values. in short, the creation of geopolitical conditions that secure and expand the community of countries that value political and economic freedom. i think of regional chief for the conversation this morning i think this is great. i want to start on that note, randy, asking you to talk about the broader issue in which we think about the bilateral relationship which is the free and openness. the president surprised me because of the fears raised during the campaign of isolationism. when he came out and embraced the free and openness. and yet this is been a subject that is been flouted by some.
i wonder if you could spend a few mostly at what the administrations vision is and then sort of hoping as think how you are seeing as fitting into that. >> thank you. can i just start by thanking you for the invitation, giving me this opportunity to talk about this relationship and the upcoming 2+2. thank you so much for opening i paying tribute to senator mccain, somebody who is a great american hero and meant so much to so many but particularly for those of us who work in the indo-pacific whose leadership was just tremendous and counted on, and now there's a real hold their that i don't know that can be filled, but we certainly valued his voice for so long, so thank you for that as well. i've got to also say it's a little strange for me to be sitting here being asked questions by ashley tellis about india. [laughing] ashley tellis is the person that
we all go to to ask questions about india, and have for a long time so i'll play along. >> that's very kind, randy. please. >> we still in the department of defense and because the government count on his expert is but i'll play along today and do my best. so we've begun to publicly articulate aspects of the indo-pacific free and open indo-pacific strategy. secretary mattis did that primarily with his speech at the shangri-la dialogue recently at the indo-pacific business forum. secretary pompeo, secretary of energy perry, secretary ross, opec president washburn all started to articulate the economic and energy and development aspects of that picks i don't need to repeat all that funny think at the core is our belief that we are promoting a positive, affirmative vision
for the region. it's not necessary at that anybody, cannot anybody. actually affirming and promoting the principles of a free and open indo-pacific. so by free, the core of that is we believe country should have complete and sovereign control of the countries to make decisions on capital, free from coercion and under pressure. we also meet free open transparent of reciprocal trade relationships. by open we are talking about open areas for commerce, for freedom of navigation, for broad participation in the life of the region, commercial, economically. so we think this is something that is u.s. vision and strategy, but one that countries can readily sign up for in a variety of ways, but particularly this aspect of the voting sovereignty.
because we know that there are threats to that. we know that one of the principal challenges we're facing is the potential erosion of poverty coming through predatory economics, coming through intimidation and coercion, through military means. so at a minimum sort of baseline we really want to promote that idea and be a partner. we don't seek influence or control of anybody's territory. we feel better off if country have their own sovereign control and the ability to protect that. so how does india fit in? that's a subject of continuing discussion and we will be featured in the 2+2 but i will suggest just lay side-by-side secretary mattis speech at single law and prime minister modi's speech at shangri-la. this is not a situation where we are really searching for common ground and convergence. this is where a situation where
as our leadership articulates the vision we see a lot of convergence and believe these are principles we both share and want to promote. so our goal is really do operationalize that with india as a partner. specifics i think will take form. some of that will be in the defense area, some of that may be the area development assistance period but that's old working on. at the foundation we can see our leadership roughly has the same vision as articulated by prime minister modi and secretary mattis, and that it's our job to really operationalize that. >> i actually found prime minister modi's speech at shangri-la quite remarkable, because he emphasized the same teams that we have. therthough we seemed to draw the
distinction between the vision and strategy, and i'm not quite sure what is intended by the emphasis of that distinction. but clearly on the headlines he emphasized a complete comfort with what the united states was trying to achieve because i think he sees that as being in of pieces of us will get is that the sense you get as you prepare for the discussion of 2+2? >> yes. i didn't come we see least on the vision, a convergence and a lot of common ground. in terms of the strategy, i think that something that we need to build out. we've been putting this together but it's taken us while to articulate this. secretary mattis speech at single law was a year and a half into the administration and that we have are other agencies articulating that in the indo-pacific business forums. these things take time to build out. as we do that side-by-side in parallel with india i think, i
can use the same phrase, operationalizing this strategy. we need to fit what the division of labor might be, where the partnership but become where the opportunities that include both the united states and india may be, and that's basically what we're discussing. >> let me come back to this question in a different way. the former indian -- deeply engaged in the negotiations of some a nuclear agreements wrote a piece two weeks ago i think in one of the indian newspapers where he made the argument that although the u.s. and india share many strong convergence on the indo-pacific measure, let's not kid ourselves, at the end of the day there is a common challenge. and that common challenge is trust. if we did not have challenge of the kind post by china in the of economics in the area of sovereignty, independent of its own military capabilities, the
indo-pacific concept would sort of be less salient. how do we think of china? the one country that has tremendous problem in the region, that has a gravitational field that is attractive in some areas but also repelling because of some of his behaviors. you mention this is not against anything but there is of you both in india and even in the united states that we cannot sort of have rosy tinted classes would think about china so how does china fit into our common vision for free and open indo-pacific? >> on rarely pictures of rose tinted glasses when it comes to china, but look, i don't think we want to lose the idea that this is an inclusive strategy. and we would prefer china embracing the same vision.
i think if you are against free and/or open, there's an always there to explain exactly what it is you don't like about it because then you're getting right to the heart of threatening countries sovereignty and ability to have a free flow of commerce, freedom of navigation, et cetera. i it's not so much again countering any particular country but china's behavior, things that articulated and sometimes we call china opaque art difficult. in other ways that very clear and their clear and public statements, clear in the actions and their behavior. they are demonstrating they have different aspiration and indo-pacific region, and its manifest in the economic strategy belt and road initiative, the militarization of the south china sea, a lot of the coercive approaches to the internal politics of others.
maybe there's a counterfactual where china isn't doing these things have trouble getting countries to align on and indo-pacific vision and strategy but the world we live in, it is, in fact, helping countries coalesce around this. i suppose that a residual sort of benefit of china's behaviors. our preference would be inclusive strategy that includes china as a constructive participant in regional affairs but that i think larger demonstrated by their behavior, not the world we live in. we want to be parte part of wita and other countries at looking how to have alternatives. you don't necessarily forge or counter something like belt and road initiative. you shine a light but you have to have an alternative and would talk to india about coordinating development assistance and looking at how we can be partners in providing that alternative. same would go in the military and security areas. how do we prove ourselves a
preferred partner anymore trusted and reliable partner in countries and indo-pacific region rather than saying you shouldn't have relationship with china. that's just unrealistic. even china's size, influence and geography so this is the conversation we're going to have in delhi or i should say continue to have in delhi and i think china will be a fact and most of what we do going forward. >> the government of india certainly does not want to have a relationship that is what it completely alienation with china anyway because china exists on its borders. it has a civilization relationship going back centuries, so one is so forth. but i think there is a common effort being made with respect to an effective response, and the effective response we take it different in the strategic area, different from other economic area.
do you have a sense that our relationship that is mature enough that we could begin to think of things that we do not only for the other but also for third parties that might be implicated in both the strategic and economic realm? so, for example, are we ready to work together in a place like africa or in southeast asia, in the economic realm? in the strategic realm? what do you imagine the two countries being able to do? >> it's a great question, and to do think our relationship has matured to that point and these are items on our agenda. so we will talk about as i said the coordination of development assistance. i think we try to find some key areas where individual countries or regions are facing particular challenges and how we can find
common effort or were synergies exist if india and the u.s. are involved in development assistant or economic activities trade. that is where our relationship is and i think we can both promote our respective interest and shared interest by doing that. that wil would be true in the security area as well. we've seen exercises not just bilateral use in the exercises but multilateral exercises. obviously you exercise fo for a reason. you exercise to improve readiness and training of your own forces but you think about contingencies, think about real-world possibilities. and so multilateral lysing those opportunities is part of that as well. >> let me ask you a specific question about the 2+2 because it's in this context that the 2+2 has received incredible attention in india, partly
because it's the meeting between leaders of the two sides and setting an agenda for sometime to come in terms of activities competence of programmatic people potential and so forth. can you tell us something about how this 2+2 will be structured, what's on the agenda for the conversation and just walk our audience what's likely to happen in delhi and week or so from now? >> for civil it is is a historic meeting, first ever 2+2 between our country's. that's significant in and of itself. i think beyond that we have an opportunity to really advance the relationship in significant ways. you were kind enough to go through some of my bio and my background. i've seen a lot of high-level exchanges. sometimes you meet, talk, you go away and don't have a lot to show for it. in this case i think we're meeting at this high level to talk about regional issues and
strategic issues but also can have a set of actual concrete outcomes. it's a very good combination of strategic high-level dialogue and concrete outcomes that will serve as enablers for advancing the relationship well beyond the meeting in delhi on september 6 and 7th. the conversation on strategic issues, regional security issues certainly are shared interest and understand china and how to respond to that will be front and center. other aspects of promoting the free and open indo-pacific, how we approach southeast asia. i think will talk about afghanistan, our shared interest in their and driving it to a political settlement. but some of the concrete areas and maybe i will just stick to the defense areas, we are working on a set of enabling agreements. it's a bit of an alphabet soup of the grievance but collectively what they will allow us to do is have secure
communications, protect technology, protect information. getting those enabling agreements in place will allow security assistance cooperation to go forward, will allow us to exercise training and more meaningful ways. so again those are really key concrete outcomes that will set us on a good course for the future. i think will expand the scope of some of our exercises, increase the complexity and the elements that participate in these exercises. that's a very good outcome. we are going to talk about augmenting the 2+2 to include perhaps at my level i 2+2 and my at state department so that as valuable as those exchanges are they tend to be once a year at best so we can augment that with other senior-level dialogue so that's a very good outcome. the elevation of india to strategic trade authority here
one status is a very important outcome because again that's enabler -- tier one -- enabler for trade and technology cooperation because it lists some of the restrictions on our ability to do that. so there's just a number of things that again will really set us on a great course as a goforth. >> the augmentation idea is critically important because it's hard to imagine the strategy of defense and his counterpart in india being able to mee be as frequent as of wan. if we can't at the working level have continuous dialogue i think that would be extremely productive, so kudos for doing that. let me come back to the strategic aspect at two levels. when is the region itself. india lives any sort of trouble the neighborhood and we suddenly have a common project with respect to success in
afghanistan. there have been the last two weeks in afghanistan have been troubled with taliban activity, the attack and so one of so forth. where do you see the president's decision to sort of stay the course in afghanistan? how do you see the future of u.s.-india cooperation in light of that decision? what are the expectations of india at this point? >> i will leave the strategic policy decisions to the president and secretary pompeo, ambassador bolton for the future of our approach it but i think what secretary mattis said yesterday and general nicholson, outgoing commander had said is looking through all this recent activity we nonetheless see signs of the committee opportunities to move the political process forward. president ghani initial
cease-fire was very revealing in a lot of ways. first of all of the pulled it off and someone to say it was only three days but, in fact, there were sort of localized fires that extended beyond that and again was very revealing. there's a growing interest in on the taliban side maybe for accelerated reconciliation. so we're seeing some signs that the political process is moving. president ghani is pursuing another cease-fire and we'll see if the taliban are willing to step up to that. so i think where we could be good partners with india, first of all i think our goals are shared in common. we do want to try this to a political settlement. india has a lot of experience in the and multiethnic and multiracial just democracy and matches almost complexities very well. there's things that afghanistan can surely learn from that but then there's the more country, the economic and development
assistance election, training and potentially monitoring. some logistic support that make it into the security area, although i think our indian friends have some limitations that they want to honor and respect for regional security interests there. so i do see that this is an area where we can cooperate and that will be an agenda item at 2+2. >> what about pakistan? a great deal of the prospects of success in afghanistan are determined by the choices that pakistan makes which is one to make into the issue with of the dimension is pakistan as a factor in u.s.-india relations where india has used its of his being a victim of pakistan supported terrorism over the years at the top administration has really come quite forthrightly and chance of holding pakistan to account for these misdemeanors. how do you see the triangular
relationship? >> i probably don't want to say a lot of that because we want to give the new prime minister, a new government in pakistan space to explore where there may be opportunities to improve relations with india many new governments come in with the power and want to do that and then run smack dab into reality and all the difficulties. but in terms of separating what was said during the campaign and what he said since the election, we want to give him space to find the opportunities to improve things with india. i think on the questions about how this all relates to afghanistan and shared interests, there's a question we need pakistan's help in encouraging, persuading, pressuring the taliban to come to the negotiating table to deal with a national unity government under president ghani and talk about a future where they are
included but not through force but to a political process. we have made decisions on curbing assistance and put a constraint on our relationship with pakistan as a means to try to persuade them to adopt that course and use their influence on the taliban. we are still evaluating as to the impact of that. it is certainly not what we want it to be but it's something that a think we will stick with, and certainly the in-state should be one we can all agree on. so i think it's a matter of do with suspicions and distrust and mix of all this. i think the best thing if we can get some momentum behind this initial cease-fire, sorry, the second cease-fire offer and have that lead to some political dialogue i think i would go a long way in producing --
reducing suspicions among all these other actors and placed. >> that by definition would be a long-term process, right? it's not likely to come to any happy conclusions. >> it may be. i mean, we've moved our afghanistan approach to the conditions-based approach, not a timeline. but it secretary mattis were sitting here i assure you he would say 17 years is long enough to be involved in the war. we need this to end. we want this to end. we are not on a timeline. it is conditions-based but we do see through president ghani's initiatives some of the reaction from the taliban to the initial cease-fire. we do see an opportunity there that we really want to seize. it may be long-term ultimately to get afghanistan took place we all wanted to be but this is a potential inflection point that we want to seize. >> can i move the aperture, take a broader for a second? i want to talk about the country to india's west, which is the
concern into. that is a grant and that is anchored in the change of course that the administration is pursuing. i suspect this is an issue that will come up in the 2+2. india's concern about iran of course has to do with changes in u.s. policy and the implications for india's own relationship with iran. what are we asking india on iran? >> well, i am on most days for the week happy to leave iran to my colleague robert care, my counterpart at assistant secretary of defense but you're right it very much does bleed over to my area of responsibility and it will be a topic of discussion i believe at the 2+2. without going into a lot of detail, because i think we did hear from the indians, this is still a relatively new development and what that
ultimately may mean for a variety of things, potential sanctions, et cetera. i think we will go to the table and look forward to hearing from the indians about their relationship there and what they see as key priorities to try to preserve if they can, but obviously the president made his decision on iran because of concerns about the agreement and having an rv and need for something much stronger and dealing with iran's not only nuclear program but their behavior. we need to sit and have that very open, candid, sobered by a see what you come out on the other side but we understand india will raise these issues and would welcome that and will have that discussion. >> there is discussion also on indian mites and that is russia. the administration is struggling to come to terms with the whole
problem of russian interference in u.s. elections. while the president of his income is made overtures of outreach to russia. the specific concern to india at the moment is the threat of sanctions on the russian indian defense could i make this is one of the issues that will also have to be discussed at some point. how does one work with india to achieve a common goal which is is restricted india's capacity in the indo-pacific without letting india's relations with russia become a problem in u.s.-russian relations? >> it's a complex issue so let me just say a few things. we understand the historical nature of the relationship and the legacy of that relationship as it applies to the defense ministry and the military, so a lot of legacy platforms and the need to support those.
i think what we want to do is have a conversation with india that is not about the past and the legacy but about the future and look at the nature of this regime. look at crimea, ukraine, i called the longer list when i was in manila, the chemical attack in the uk. and look at russia's own future, the demographics. this is i think not a country that you really want to have a strategic partnership well into the future. we can be a more reliable, better partner so that a sort of at the macro level. to deal with issues like potential sanctions, i think we need to be very careful here. secretary mattis did, in fact, go to capitol hill and often used india sort of a flagship, an example as to why we want away for the secretary of state
because i think that create a certain impression that we're going to completely protect the interrelationship, from any fallout from this legislation the matter what they do. i would say that's a bit misleading. we would still have very significant concerns in india pursued major new platforms and systems. i can't sit or anti-that they would be exempt, that we would use that waiver. that will be the decision of the president the key is faced with a major new platform and capability that india is acquired from russia. all i know is i can't sit or take that the waiver will be used in that case. so that's the specific thing that we will have to navigate. i think overall one of the reasons secretary mattis used india as a flagship example is he knows where he wants the relationship to go within india.
he wanted to go forward. he wanted to improve, strengthen, be more capable as a partnership and he doesn't want these impediments. so whether it's finding ways to persuade india to go a different course, rely on us as a trusted partner and supply a defense equipment, whether it's giving consideration to a waiver. we know the direction we want to go and we don't want these to be impediments. >> i hope we get the opportunity at the 2+2 dapl strategic conversations because the strategic conversation is truly fundamental. if india understand russia's own evolution and recognize its own limits for india's own self-interest, that would be productive opportunity for us to see how we can break through some of the logjams of operations. >> well said. i think we will endeavor to do that. >> i have two last questions before i go to the floor. one has to do with the change
that is occurred in the trump administration with respect to economic policy not only towards into but towards a range of other countries. at the specific question to india is the following. the department of defense has gone out of its way, the ports of the strategic partnership as has the administration, the national security strategy and national defense strategy documents. but how can we sort of work with india when in the economic arena we still have a series of difficulties while we appear to be making much greater progress in the defense space. because the trump administration has made economics so important and central to its engagement with the world, how do we sort of keep both these elements and the relationship insync as we move forward?
>> it can be a challenge and i would just say in support of my colleagues to do the trade and economic issues, we need that channel, tha the ongoing dialogo be successful because these are long-standing irritant. i would say this is not just the trump administration. maybe the trump administration is taking this more head on and applying differentials but but you know better than i some of the long stranding trade irritants. i would say from a defense perspective the economic and tribulation can be supportive, additives, conflict and what we can do on the defense and security side, and that's the optimal environment. we certainly have history and are able to walk and chew gum at the same time. i'm old enough to remember the difficulties we had with japan in the 1980s when we have members of congress smashing
toshiba products on the steps of the capitol, and credible trade irritants and dispute the with japan. all the time our relationship was evolving at a very good pace, driven by our security interests. we are able to compartmentalize if we have to. i think the realities of the security of art will create a national convergent and give us opportunities to respectable it's happening on side. i'm not saying that's what we want, but i think our interests are very compelling and persuasive on the defense and security side that a think will be able to continue momentum even in that environment. >> that is actually a consultant image because you japan, also a useful example of the united states having face the situation before and have come out both the united states and japan have become a better forts i hope we can end up with the same place
and in key. the last question i have before it opened to the floor is, going into 2+2 how would you judge the health, take into account all these difficulties in some cases, opportunities and others? where do you see us today? do we have the foundations in place for building something that is truly substantial or peace and security and indo-pacific over the next decade? >> we are quite bullish as a asa u.s. government and department of defense in particular. and i should've said this earlier, we are really the beneficiaries of decades of great work, the bush administration, your contributions, ashley, working through the civil nuclear deal, the obama administration particularly on the defense side. sometimes referred to ash carter as the india desk officer.
but the creation of a major defense partner concept under the obama administration. and so this is sort of evolutionary in its nature but i think all that good work amounts to is the creation of the foundation you talk about and asking about. i think we benefit from leadership on both sides that are willing to take some risks. having articulated a vision, talk about how to operationalize the strategy. we are quite bullish as i said. we will be able to navigate some of these challenges i believe and come out the other side with beinthinkable say our administrn continued the momentum that previous one started and some pretty optimistic. >> i wish you and your colleagues all the best of the next couple of weeks as you will have these conversations, and for whatever comes after.
i'm going to open the floor to our guests. and if you could identify yourselves and make the question, comment sort of pointed and brief so i can give us many people a chance. yes. >> how india is getting caught up in the sanctions against russia, but you didn't talk as much about the sanctions against iran some hope you can give us a little more detail and how you plan to navigate those sanctions, particularly with regard to the wheel. and also what to just pressure on in terms of purchase of the s-400 and doesn't the u.s. plan to seek a waiver for the s-400 for india and if yes or no, what is the precedent that sets?
>> nice to see a face-to-face. we had a communications. i'm going to resist the urge to talk more about iran as a separate i think we need the opportunity to sit down with our indian friends at this high level and have a good exchange on where india thinks it's interests are at best the relationship with iran that if you they need to protect or insulate and will be able to explain our point of view on that. but again it's a relatively new development, leaving the potential imposition of sanctions as relates to that. so i will leave that for the future to talk about after the 2+2. on russia, catsa, s-400, obviously we have this legislation, catsa, not because of anything india is doing
anything we're doing. it's because of russian behavior. i went through the partial laundry list, but the congress felt the need to take action to demonstrate not only in words and in spirit why we think this machines activities are so troublesome but i could take concrete action to kind of a consequence and punishment for this behavior. i think most people know it was flawed legislation for the reasons that some of our partners, friends and allies themselves might end up paying a price that was not intended. so congress was very good at working with us to create this waiver opportunity and now we have a little more flexibility for the secretary of state and the president to make those determinations. i come as a set i cannot sit here today until it india by its acts that we will be used or won't be used. i think s-400 in particular is a
system that is strictly telling for a lot of reasons, and i think our strong preference, in the is a friend, is a sovereign country they will make their own decision but our preference is to seek alternatives and see if we can be a partner to indy and addressing those defense needs. if they choose to go down that route, like i said i can't sit here and tell you today that the wave would necessarily be used or it would be a topic discussed at the highest level by our government and it would make some determination. [inaudible] >> well, it would be some weighing of the concerns that that acquisition creates and how that could impact of the right of things, including the future of our defense cooperation, put limitations on it, versus wanting to political space and ability to build up the strategic partnership with india, the more rapid pace.
>> wait for the microphone. >> thank you for coming. reagan foundation, heritage foundation. two in my opinion, two of the most important allies we have, japan and india, no doubt about that, my question is -- my question is, do you envision trilateral summit type of things in terms of security, including economic issues? ten q. we do have trilateral interactions with youth japan and india. i joined, by state department, colleagues earlier this year in delhi for a trilateral discussion our level. taking that to higher levels is certainly a possibility because
i think, as you say, these three great democracies ally on quite a bit of issues. we'll see about the future of that interaction, with its system at high level and i think we would be open to that. >> yes. i'm with the pakistani spectator and you mentioned something about getting some space to newly elected pakistani president ram nath kovind. do you think your department of defense's willing to use its influence to give pakistan -- [inaudible] that it needs to prevent president kovind from defaulting? as you know iran -- but he is so many limitation. he really cannot -- only america can print. they cannot provide jobs to millions of young kids who were
uninvited to this country. he cannot get money to pay on his foreign debt. in other words, pakistan seems to be collapsing very soon. so my second question is, in the case that it happens than what role do you perceive for india? because no other country has better intelligence, human intelligence and india does. i know your department has a very elaborate -- to recover atomic bomb in case of pakistan collapses. does your department see any important role for india to help your department to help united states recover those? thanks. >> i was, upon returning to governmencomein january i was ro longer have to answer hypothetical question for future questions, so i think i will heed that advice that there's a
lot of hypotheticals there about future collapse, nuclear weapons. what i said about giving him space was really in the context of the india-pakistan relationship. what sort of like to give him space to make the right decision on a bright thinks but i think our approach of having assistant and pressuring pakistan on the relationship with the taliban, persuading them to come to the table, dealing with terrorists networks, that would be sustained. when i say give space it's not changing our approach for our policy. i really meant it in the context of developing opportunities between india and pakistan. i don't have a good answer on the economic difficulties and challenges that pakistan finds itself in. what i can say is, if you look at other examples where
countries went all in or largely in with china, the results have not been particularly good and there's been an erosion of sovereignty and an erosion of control. and for many examples of that. so if our friends in pakistan want to talk about a way out of that will want to talk about ways to strengthen their economy and deal with that, i'm sure we would be open to that and trying to work with pakistan, either bilaterally or through international institutions to try to get them on a better path. we are not interested in the field pakistan by any stretch of imagination. we want them to be successful. we wanting to sovereign control and not cede that you can as a party including china, and economic peace will probably be seen to that. [inaudible]
>> i am a columnist for the economic times in india. i wanted to press you further on question of s-400. with the u.s. be willing to offer something that, you know, if it doesn't what india to buy s-400, does china already have got delivery come first few deliveries on s-400. the other questions about the quad. do you detect a certain hesitancy on part of india? because the prime minister did not even mention it in his speech in shangri-la. >> officials love questions that start with let me pressure further because you thought you addressed it.
i think, let me just say that sort of a general level, yes, we are willing to talk to any of that meeting requirements and alternatives. there may not be an exact system that we can produce, the exact specification and capabilities that your systems not to have systems cannot to platforms but to address defense requirements and needed capabilities. i can say we would certainly be willing to enter into that conversation with india, and we have. how we can be a good partner and addressing what the real requirements are. in terms of the quad, i come at am a little different perspective. my perspective, i believe the quad was born on december 26, 2004, which was the date of the great tsunami in southeast asia wendy for countries that responded were india, australia,
japan and the united states and we responded because we are like-minded. we saw the tragedy unfolding and felt compelled to act. we had capability to break the bear and a quick, time of fashion and greater willingness to cooperate with one another. so in a way it was born in reality and in an operation before it was even more in concept. i think now we are talking about this this potential vehicle for how we can address a range of her interest in the indo-pacific. i think we find general receptivity particularly when we talk about economic issues and development assistance and the like. but i think it will move in a pace and scope that all formats are comfortable with, and the limiting factor historical. sometimes it does. sometimes it's been japan, it's been off chile, it's been india. i think we will work through all
that. if you stare at an iceberg, you don't necessarily see the movement but if you look away and looked back again, i can see at this quad discussion is moving forward and in the right direction. you do not at the pace we would like but i think we will get there. >> i started the defense practice for one of india's largest industrial groups. my question is twofold. india is a democracy and the longevity of the administration of the party is dependent on the local economics. india is going through a massive issue of employment. so if any strategy needs to succeed between the u.s. and india has to include the local perspective as well. the second is a lot of the
forces driving the geopolitical climate is china. and china's relations with india have never been that good, but russian and iran are gravitating towards china because they see certain, how shall i say, access materializing in the geopolitical framework. how do you plan to counter the chinese threat, if you want to call it that, it's not really a threat. it's, unfortunately china has a copy-based model and their biggest hurdle in my opinion is their inability to be innovative, which is where the u.s. really thrives. so how are you going to be able to use india india is very strategically located, and by alienating iran the other chokepoint which is the strait of hormuz has now or will
materialize in my opinion. suggest your comments on that would be very interesting. so twofold. >> the second one first. you said how are we going to use india -- that's what he said. [inaudible] >> you went where i was going to go. this is a subject of intense discussion at the highest level between the united states and india, and we both find, we've got enough get all those complexities. that's being a practitioner. that's the real world that you live in. you've got to develop policies, come up with activities. we will work through all that. it is complex, no doubt. we note that india has a better relationship with china this year than last which last was pretty bad and they talked about having a normal year. we support that. by the way, we want a good relationship with china, too,
and secretary mattis went to beijing with a good discussions. it clear there is a disagreement on the south china sea and taiwan and other issues, but we ultimate all want a more stable constructive relationship with china. we will work with our friends in india to try to navigate all that and develop common approaches. i don't know that i can get into much specificity at this point but i'm confident we can work through it and get there. your first question on local politics, domestic politics being supportive of the relationship, i think all we can do as a partner is articulate why we think the relationship is important, what we think capacity to work with one another may be and articulate a future vision for the relationship. i don't think we can spend a lot of time trying to gain out local politician in utica we will have to leave that to the central government in delhi bu but i thk
we can make a compelling case while this is important and rely on our friends in the national government to deal with a local politics for the most part. [inaudible] [inaudible] -- from the economics of the country. so, therefore, if there has to be a last relationship there has been economic element to it as was a defense element which is what the witches were restricted i just want you to amplify because ultimately it's the grassroots that will define the strategy because jobs, technology, industry is not really, india is basically a
consumption story but we are not supporting that consumption with local investment in industry. there has to be some element in your discussions i feel. >> you are talking the issues that are beyond my purview of the pentagon. i can agree with you that the economic component needs to be strong and that is key to sustaining broad support at local levels for relationship go into the future. one of the recent were interested in expanding defense and special cooperation, why we have programs, for example, we have what used to be diux, now dl you because were no longer experiment. you have the opportunity of indian liaison officer there. we're looking at a way to expand the fence and daschle cooperation so that we can be seen on the defense side as contributing possibly to positive development india. we see from the defense perspective joint projects,
collaboration between defense industry creates better opportunities for interoperability which is enabling for training and exercising so on and so forth but there's a domestic benefit for india if we're involved in that kind of collaboration. from the defense department, i can only appreciate your comment and say that i agree it's important but i will leave that to my colleagues elsewhere in government to really focus on that dialogue. ..
will that be on the agenda and the upcoming talks thank you for raising this. this is an issue of concern. and as you say, it's still simmering so i don't want to go into great detail or specificity about potential responses it is a dynamic situation to some extent. i think we will, we have been discussing this in terms of india and very well, and we come up with 2+2 but i think a number of things you can count on. we need to shine a light on what's happening there because i don't think it's well understood or well-known outside of small circles who
deal withthese issues but there should be broader concern because it's not only about the unfortunate people there seen drug judges thrown in jail, opposition leaders jailed or exiled . it's a matter of a broader regional problem when you fold in a china piece to that. they don't have any particular concern about freedom of political liberties there and the future of the people they are, they have concerns about their own influence so we need to shine a light onall that . and bring in the experiences of others and look at djibouti, sri lanka, look at other issues where countries brought the chinese and under certain circumstances, certain understandings and that quickly evolved in a
direction where china was exerting undue influence and eroding the sovereignty of countries in question. the leader may not care, ebay may be making a deal that's going to financially benefit him and make sure he can maintain political control but isuspect the people would care greatly about why shining a light is so important . we saw a lot when stories started to emerge about the chinese negotiating and the backlash there, so shining a light on that is important. beyond that, looking at particular measures and what we might be able to do, what we might be able to do on economic consequence. those are all things that are underconsideration but as you noted, it's a dynamic situation so i wouldn't go into a lot of detail . >> i'm with hong kong phoenix tv, great to see you again. could you please give us a broader picture about how did
the us and india military cooperation move forward and specifically on military sales, do we know that india wants to get the us system which is the electronic catapult system for their aircraft carrier and also, how likely, how possible is it that the us would want to sell the f/a-18 to the india or their aircraft carrier? >> i think the security assistance aspect of our relationship is going to have an upward trajectory. we certainly want to convey to our indian friends that we want to be a partner of choice when it comes to their defense and security needs. there are several prongs to that.
we've got to get these enabling agreements in place so there are certain things you are talking about we are not in a position to do right now because the enabling agreements are there, we need to do that. we need to make clear where we can provide capability and alternatives to what they are considering now, we get into this discussion about their air defense needs so clarifying what we can do as an alternative. we need to build confidence and trust over time. we've gone from zero defense sales, i forget the exact time to $18 billion but we are still feeling comfortable with what we are learning about our very complex fms system and how we support those programs. so again, i think the
trajectory will be upward. i don't want to get into specific details, those will all be discussed. i think on the exercise training side, we're going to see about the complexity and scope of those exercises and our ability to do that in a multilateral environment as well so overall , we are very cautious as i said earlier and defense security cooperation will be apriority . >> my name is ron ash, today's wall street journal says that both china and russia are working hard to surpass the us conventional defense capacity and they want to create an equal situation there and then the space difference system is of
importance. india made good progress on its side, do you see any potential for india and the us to cooperate on developing space race infrastructure? >> it's a very good question. the first point i would make is you've articulated the main reason we produced a national defense strategy that we did.pillar number one is to make great competition a priority and how we put our defense posture and doctrine, etc. and propelled prepared to deal with creditors. having that in our national defense strategy is empowering for bureaucrats like me but with services for our combatant command so we are thinking long and hard about how to be prepared for
whatever china and russia made you on the prevention side as well as the strategic side . it's been an effort that has enjoyed senior leadership, president trump and doors the national security strategy which talked about china as a competitor, you'll see a steady flow of military strategy coming out at some point in the not-too-distant future so that's the general point. the specific point, i think we'd be interested in exploring possibilities in the area of the space. i'm sure you're following the developments on our side and the interest in creating a space, possibly a separate service is what secretary mattis will discuss with congress but a space command
is the interim step. that's beingdone for a reason, because we realize the growing challenges in space and having good partners with capabilities is truly going to be of interest to us as we go forward . >> us security cyber force. site is cyber security a mutual topic of discussion and do you plan to have this 2+2? >> i don't know how specific or what detail we would get into on cyber security but as we talk about regional security challenges and you obviously gravitate towards some common, shared concerns about china and north korea for that matter, there is definitely a cyber component to that so it's something that again, looking broadly for partners in capabilities and ideas about best
practices, we need to do better on cyber. we're going to have another symposium on cyber for the department. we've created a cyber command though it's an area where we need strong partners with good ideas and i think we will be compelled to talk about thateither in this forum or elsewhere . >> let me add to that, we had that in the wake of homeland security for many years and the interesting question is considering a defense component. subject to interoperability and integration, we need to bring that under the specific rubric of defense so that's something to think about. >> i think there could be and we were, the expression we were trying to fly while we were building the plane and fiber is something that we aren't particularly organized well for but we are trying to get more thinking of the
defense components of that, it's now positioned as the top partners in the defense. >> sorkin gassman with the international energy partnership. you mentioned how important it is that we give space to india, given the situation with pakistan, given their recent elections on certain areas. i wanted to ask you a bit about how our strategy in india can be affected by our own elections, given that
every four years there's a chance our leadership who determines our approach in meeting our objectives and even the objectives themselves can change so i wanted to ask you a bit about how that timeline, from bush to obama, obama two trump affects your strategy. >> where i sit, it doesn't enter the calculus much because we've seen consistency, understanding the value of each relationship and trying to push where the potential is and i would add in congress, which used to be the largest, i don't know if it still is, still the largest caucus and its bipartisan and i've participated in some discussions with them with secretary mattis and when you go into one of those meetings it's any given moment so that leads me to think this is not a partisan issue, it's not one administration versus another issue and there's large consensus in the united states about how to build this relationship and it gives me confidence that we
do that nomatter the outcome . >>. [inaudible] thank you very much, benjamin, no current affiliation. you say something about your comment on iran about possible us collaboration, us india collaboration or lack of it in the middle east? i'm thinking specifically of egypt, palestine, israel, syria, turkey. >> i think the conversation that i've been involved in, thepreparations we are making are largely focused on the in the pacific . i think secretary mattis, secretary pompeo have
different responsibilities and thinkglobally in a way i don't , so i would assume that those topics do come up, it's 2+2 or beyond, we would have interested parties on our side to have that discussion cause we see the us india relationship as grounded by a sharedvision, shared interest . coming from a, to a large democracies so if we can partner with one another in those areas, i'm sure we would be interested in having that discussion. >> i'm going to take onelast question . >> thank you, the one with mt and tv tv. dod released the congressional report on china . this report is different from the report we have seen before so can you offer your
thoughts while preparing for this report and the methodology and so on? >> i'm not sure i would have shared that characterization but it's interesting that you know that. what's different is china continues to develop and prove change so our reports reflect that. we tried through the china military report to do a very objective non-politicized description of what china is doing to advance its capabilities. i gave myself by saying joe friday, just the facts but that's how we approach the china military power report, just the facts but the facts are china's been making rapid progress in certain areas. that's what you get when you have double-digit increases to your defense budget for
almost a decade now. you get improvement and you get advancement so the power report looks at things that previous ones didn't. that hypersonic development, anti-ship ballistic missiles, a range of things we didn't have to talk about a decade ago so i wouldn't have characterized it that way, i just would have said reporting facts here and that's what the facts are. >> let me thank you for not just taking the time which of course i'm grateful for but for the extraordinary effort and commitment that you brought to this position on the job. at a time when there is considerable flux in the united states in the international community and to the evil in the face of those circumstances to stay the course and do the work that you guys are doing. i really want to thank the civics and i want to thank you on behalf of the economy for spending the morning here. you are welcome anytime you want to come back.
>> let's do this, run the gauntlet again. >> we would love that, appreciate. >> thank you for cominghere, stay tuned . >> mister schreiber, give us a preview of what is likely to happen in the next weekend i'm sure at some point we will have an opportunity to continue the discussion. thank you very much and have a good day. >>.
mccain. today would have been the senator's 82nd birthday. we will be live at a ceremony at the state capitol in phoenix . speakers will include jeff flake of arizona. senator mccain's body will lie in state where members of the public may pay their respects. thursday it's a funeral service and we will hear from senator mccain's colleague and former vice president joe biden at 1 pm eastern and following the service, senator mccain's casket will be flown to joint base andrews outside washington dc. friday morning, congressional leaders will speak at a rate money at 1 pm eastern and at 1 pm editor mccain body will lie in state in the us capitol rotunda or visits from the public. saturday at 9 am eastern, cindy mccain will lay a wreath at the veterans memorial in honor of her husband's military service and at 10 am we will be live for the national memorial service for senator joe mccain. include george w. bush and barack obama. >> join us for book tvs live coverage of the 18th annual
library of congress book festival. saturday at 10 am eastern, our coverage includes your call ins on are set at the washington convention center with pulitzer prize winning biographer john meacham and his book the soul of america: the battle for our better angels. doris kearns goodwin with leadership in turbulent times. ron turn out with his book grant and fox news host brian kill need with his book andrew jackson and the miracle of new orleans: the battle that shaped america's destiny. watch the 18thannual library of congress book festival live on c-span2's book tv saturday at 10 am eastern . >> i'm here with sadness to say judge cavanaugh, you don't belong in this building as a justice. >> the on an extraordinary career, and an extraordinary
intellect, and an extraordinary record of this, you find a character . and a humility combined with strength that left me just profoundly impressed. >> the point i'm making is that 35 month period of time where brett served as staff secretary to president bush was a period of time that was rife with issues of great constitutional moment. it's a reason why the american people have a right to know what he said, how he invited the president, what he wrote . those are things which the republicans are hiding from the american people and keeping secret. let's not waste anymore time. there's not evidence that even the most committed partisans, that judge cavanaugh is supremely qualified for the supreme court. so stop playing politics and join us in supporting his
confirmation. >> watched day one of the senate confirmation hearing for supreme court nominee brett cavanaugh live tuesday, september 4 on c-span three, watch anytime on c-span.org or listen on the free radio app. >> now a group of policy advocates offer their views on the trumpet ministrations policies in areas affecting transgender military service, people with disabilities and the criminal justice system. the forum was nominated by sixth circuit court ofappeals judge bernice donald and was part of the american bar association in chicago. it's just under 90 minutes . >> . [applause] >> kick that down with you. >> well, thank you so very much. i have the task of introducing first of all, a highly talented, experienced l