tv Former Military Leaders on the U.S.- Japan Alliance CSPAN August 6, 2019 9:10am-11:10am EDT
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alliance with regional and global security challenges, this is from hosted by the international strategic studies. [inaudible conversations] >> good afternoon, everyone. thank you very much for coming. it's friday afternoon in august and you know, i'm delighted that your summer vacation plans include csis, but it's really a testament to how important, influential and respected our panel today is. i'm the senior vice-president for asia and japan here csis at georgetown. before we get started we always do a brief safety announcement. and we have about ten four-star admirals and generals in the room, but this former boy scout will be in charge.
if there is a need to evacuate and i'll let you know, but we'll head out and head around the corner to national geographic down 17th street. out the back. we have simultaneous interpretation and there should be headsets on your chair. if you have a problem, wave and someone will help you. please leave them on the chair, if you take them home we'd send the new rapid force to your house to retrophy them tonig-- to retrieve them tonight. we're hearing from eight distinguished flag officers from the united states and japan who participated in this year's u.s.-japan military statesman's forum which was established by the asia-pacific initiative and i will introduce
now who will tell you what we've been up to the past few days. the doctor is very well-known in washington and around the world, an award winning journalist, columnist and author and written extensively on international affairs, u.s.-japan alliance, geostrategic and geopolitical dynamics in asia. he was a correspondent here in washington, '80 to '81. excuse me in beijing '80 to '81, and washington '84 to '87 and he was here when i was a graduate student and he had a great adams forum and he would take the japan speaking military officers, foreign service officers and when the prime minister of japan, the foreign minister came to washington, he made them sit down to breakfast with us in japanese which was wonderful. he's been a great mentor and friend to many of us in this business and today hires
georgetown grads of mine and we've probably had ten people go back and forth between his asia pacific initiative and csis and georgetown. api was established after 311 after the initiative did a seminal report on what happened with that triple tragedy and how we responded. and then changed the name in 2017 to asia-pacific initiative because the mandate has broadened to a whole change of economic and geopolitical issues. please join me in welcoming our first speak. [applaus [applause] >> thank you, mike, for the generous introduction. i'm very glad to be here. on before of the asia-pacific foundation i'd like to express my deep appreciation to csis,
dr. michael green and the others hosting us. asia-pacific initiative foundation was founded in 2011 after the 3/11 tragedy. we pub published the report on fukushima nuclear disaster. and in that report we emphasized the critical role which japan's self-defense forces and the u.s. military played in fighting against adversity, particularly we are very much grateful for the united states dispatching more
than 20,000 marines immediately to that disaster area for rescue operation. that crisis was that most existential national crisis for japan in over 70 years. and it was that civil defense forces and the u.s. military which really saved japan. that was a rude awakening to us japanese. so i thought that from military to military dialog and also, would be very much crucial for the future of japan and the
u.s.-japan alliance. that's a backdrop why we initiated this endeavor, to launch the japan-u.s. military statesman forum. a core group members who are and still are retired admirals and generals, both japan and the united states, over the past six years, it has expanded that scope of the participation and expanded to include the active duty officers. and civilian policy makers. and the experts. and we have very much extraordinary-- fortunate to have that government officials, both from the united states and japan for
this year's sixth military forum and we have very fruitful, stimulating policy discussions over the past two and a half days. so i once again appreciate the guests of the military statesman forum to come to washington to get together to exchange views on those in very much informal manners. mike green has been very much extremely helpful from day one. after dr. hammer and dr. green about this enterprise and so without dr. howard's strong endorsement this would never have started and also without dr. green's continued support,
it would never have grown to this extent. so, once again, thank you very much for dr. green and the doctor at csis, thank you very much. [applause] [inaudible conversations] >> thank you, thank you. we're going to turn now to a panel discussion. i'll ask a series of questions to our distinguished visitors and we'll try to save some time to open it up for your questions. there's a lot of experienced people in this alliance in the audience i see.
let me briefly introduce the panel. admiral mike mullen for sprint and the bloomberg family foundation and on the advisory boards of tech met and affinity. and he retired after serving as the jint joint chief of staff after 40 years in the united states navy. and to his right a special advisor to japan's national security council staff. he retired from active duty in 2012 after serving as the third chief of staff in japan's joint staff, which of course was during 3/11 and he had to show leadership for the japanese people, the forces and our alliance and earned enormous respect for that. saw the self-defense forces rise to be the most reexpected institution in japan in public opinion polls and to his right
danny blair known to many of us here. admiral blair served for intelligence. retired in 2002 after 34 years including as commander-in-chief of u.s. pacific command. admiral blair's right is gener general, japan air force self-defense force. he's special advisor to the cabinet retired in 2014 after serving as fourth chief of staff of the japan's joint staff and air defense forces. to his right is general vincent brooks, who currently serves on the board of directors of the gary sinese foundation. he served as the 15th commander of the u.n. command, combined forces command and u.s. forces korea during a very consequential time, 2016 and
the four star in command of u.s. army forces in the pacific, in the indo-pacific and last but not least, admiral now executive advisor to the minister of defense, retired from active duty in 2019 after serving as fifth chief of staff 2014-2019 and before that chief of staff of japan maritime force defenses. so this is a very distinguished panel with a lot of experience across a whole range of security challenges that have confronted our countries. i'm going to open, if i could, by asking admiral mullline and at admiral who co-chair the military statesman forum just to give us two or three top take aways that you have from this past three and a half days of discussion we've had. i'll start with you, admiral, if i may? >> thanks, michael and thanks for your leadership and continued participation in this
forum. i think, with respect to the last two and a half days that-- the number one take away for me has been the ability to frankly explore in depth and in breadth the issues that-- with which the alliance is challenged. i can tell you this is my fourth year and each year it's gotten deeper and broader and actually they're much more frank discussions. very rich in terms of the challenges and we'll talk about some of those, but more than anything else, there's a trust here that's very real, it's very-- it happens very quickly once the conference starts, and it's really bred out of friendship, long-term relationships and a passion and a commitment to the u.s.-japanese alliance and even though what we talk about is broader than just the alliance
itself. it's particularly important to me, not just because of my longstanding relationship with japan, but at 3/11, while i had known the general, my counterpart when i was chairman, we went through-- he led in that crisis like very few leaders i have seen globally over the course of my career and so to be paired with him again in this kind of forum was very special. so, that's-- the breadth and the depth i think is the first thing. secondly is-- and i try to follow things geostrategically, but i had no idea that the relationship between japan and korea had deteriorated so badly and we're at a real low. we could argue about whether it's an all-time low, and when you -- when he incorporate the
overall geostrategic criticality of that area of the world, that this particular challenge, which is not new, but this particular challenge just opens the door for china to drive right through it and that's what's going on right now to the detriment of south korea, to the detriment to japan, to the detriment of the alliances and the region. i was very struck by that. we've had some very healthy discussions with respect to it, this to include a very clear representation on the japanese side that right now we're at a-- in japan we're at what i would call sort of korea fatigue. we cannot let korea fatigue and all that is associated with that stop us from the point of achieving a solution here
pretty quickly. and as was pointed out earlier today, this has seen the political support for both leaders go up, which is an incentive not to solve it and yet, longer term, the dangers are pretty significant. so that that came loud and clear, and one of the points that was made is korea needs the time right now to be able to work through this and from my standpoint, japan needs to give them the spouse without overreacting in what it has moved to what i would call sort of the emotional phase in which we're operating in that phase, it's not likely anything good is going to come out of that. so i hope the korean and the japanese leadership can actually pause, get to the point where they can pick up
meaningful, constructive negotiations and resolve this as rapidly as possible and i'm sure you'll hear more about korea. the third thing, and i'm sure someone will talk about china. the third thing, the take away is china. it's all about china in that region. in many ways to include our relationship and what's going on there. but this is more of an operational war fighting focus. we've met many years. we've all -- we've talked about figuring out how to work together and vote exercise together, which generates a much stronger deterrent against the potential outbreak of conflict, but it also puts you in a much better position if conflict should break out and that's very real. my take away, again, from this week was that there needs to be a sense of urgency on how we plan and exercise together.
not just japan and the u.s., but also, our coalition partners, and to do that pretty quickly. we are challenged, as we always are, in this kind of work, the potential warfare and with information sharing. that's built on trust. we talk routinely about these gray war-- these gray war zones, cyber, electronic warfare and we've had discussions about that. those are incredibly complicated domains and we've got to get to work to have mo more, again, planning and exercising in these domains to understand how we're going to operate together. my experience is that if you've done none of that conflict breaks out. it gets very bad before it gets better. you can mitigate a lot of that
with practice ahead of time. that also puts a lot of pressure in the region on china, which is, i think, exactly what we need to do. those are the three things. >> well, thank you. >> i would like to speak to you in japanese today. and we are very grateful that there are many participants here today. regarding what we are trying to carry out, i believe that admiral mullen has covered them comprehensi comprehensively, there's not much i need to add. however, when i was on active duty with admiral mullen, i had to work with him very much and as mentioned, after the time of 3/1 is 1 when we encounter a major disaster, at the top of
the u.s. military admiral mullen had provided us the strong support that we have been able to develop a personal trust relationship, which i personally believe is extremely strong. however we can say that relationships during active duty and when we are retired are somewhat different. that is we carry out the same mission in the same environment, but once you are retired, i believe that maybe you will have different view and perceptions and in this regard with the use of the forum such as sf, i think we can further the trust relationship that we had and build on it and i have participated in nsf six times and i have been able to feel
that this -- i don't know how admiral mullen feels about me, but i have a total trust in him and such relationship. if you look at the south china sea or activity of the chinese armi armies, from the military perspective i think we can share more even now. not to say that just sharing information, but i think we can sort of perceive and recognize the information and i believe that this forum has given us the opportunity to be able to sort of share that kind of perception even before the information. each time as i participate from the u.s. side and from the stf, we do have more active members
participating. we started that we will have the forum between the retired officers and we will talk about the government officers, as well as what the japanese as well as u.s. active duty military can cooperate and we wanted to provide the bridge between these people. that was the original objective and i believe that we have been able to accomplish that. earlier there was some reference to japan-korea relationship. although i will not be talking about relationship with south korea since three years ago we have general john participate in this forum. in that sense as well we can
have the objective exchange of views. i believe japan-u.s. are okay, although we only have one participate from rok, i believe that position is extremely important and this year we had an australian guest also take part in our meeting. so although started with u.s. and japan, now we do have korea, south korea, as well as australia and there are four countries involved in this forum and maybe the origin tension and objective may have changed a little bit, but as the situation and environment changes extremely fast, i believe we are now meeting the needs of the time and i believe that that results in an extremely important result. so that is my view.
thank you. >> thank you. let me turn to admiral blair and general, you get the hard question. with the militarization of these artificial islands in the south china sea by the pla, the unphiing of commands on the chinese side, the increasing operational tempo in the east china sea, not only operating in the chain, but beyond the island chain, there's a problem. some people say we have lost the south china sea and we are losing the east china sea. starting with you, admiral blair, is that right? how would you characterize it? >> no, it's wrong. [laughter]. >> thank you. >> let me go a little beyond that. wonderful to have former secretary, former u.s. trade
representative carla hill is here with us. she and i co-chaired back around 2003 a study on the future of u.s.-china relations and a couple of conclusions that we reached back then i think are still very important. we agreed that the only country that could contain china was china. and our policy at that time was to try to give china room so it would not contain itself, that it would join the world-based order from which it had benefitted so strongly to that time. ever since it was open to the world. but what i now see china doing is containing itself. they are taking such aggressive action. they're getting such a wide range of areas, that the countries of the region who are
there, the countries outside the region nonetheless have presence and interests and vital interest in the area, are really banding together to oppose this chinese, very aggressive posture from the military point of view, from the economic point of view, from the diplomatic point of view. so a few smile islands in the southern part of the south china sea are really inconsequential, compared to a strategic level, a unified concerned about china and banding together in order to-- in order to offset and to-- and to contain this offensive by china. so, i think basically china is causing a reaction now which it will regret. now, in my experience, the chinese are very practical and
if something they're trying is not working, they will try something else. and there are certainly elements within china who think it was the more they're aggressive, the more we push, the more we demand and bully we'll get a point with the other countries, okay, you're a big guy, just do whatever you want. >> i don't think that's the way it's going to turn out. i think the countries. region and those of us who are allies in the conduct and the region and partners who support them will show china that this is a losing strategy that they are on and that they will say, okay, it was working better last time when we tried to work with the organization and try to make changes in a peaceful and noncoercive and nonbullying manner and we will get back to that point. on the specific issue in the south china sea, there is far more military activity by other countries, the united states,
japan, australia, france, the u.k., than there was a while ago. why? because china has raised its tempo there. in the east china sea, again, japan is building whole classes of ships. japan is forming new types of military operations, amphibious brigades that they were not doing above in reaction to this chine chinese, at the tactical level they've gained no advantage and on a strategic level beginning to box themselves in to a disadvantage. that's why my answer was no. >> thank you very much. i believe that admiral blair
talked a long time so i sort of forgot the question, but in view-- in thinking about china, we need to fully understand what kind of country china is. many times the chinese people say that we have history of 4,000 years and chinese people are the type of people who look at things with a very, very long-term view and think about it with long years in mind. i believe it was in 2008 general or admiral keating was present, i believe, in 2008, that he visited china and admiral from the chinese navy said that chinese navy will not
be able to control the eastern side of hawaii, therefore, i will have to ask you to take care of that, but on the west side of hawaii we will take care of it, therefore don't worry and i believe that admiral keating said that he did not know what this chinese was talking about. he was not talking about this admiral from chinese -- he was not talking 10, 20 years, maybe 50 years and 100 years was in his mind from 1960 to 65 they actually came up with the territorial waters act. and a domestic call, not friends outside of china, but as you know, there was the first line, as well as the second line, islands change. in the first island chain i
think it was about-- they were thinking about 2010 and they were going to control inside of the first island chain by china. and when you look at the status and the capability of the navy of 1990, we did not think that they could go outside of their immediate territory, but they were saying that within 20 years they will be in control of the first island chain. so this island chain covers a very close island to japan, but chi china's navy, they are very confident about in the future they'll be taking control in this area. at that time we did not believe the south chinese officer at all, but let's look at 2010 and
on. china had made passes to western side of the pacific ocean and also, modern times every ten years, they pass this and also the island chain to come to near the island. with their behavior like this, we would think about midterm to lo long-term. we talk five years to ten years. with chinese it's 50 years to 100 years. and china has long game in mind. when we think about china we need to think about that and the chinese political system and we are democratic country, of course. but when china thinks about their armed forces, but in japan for the self-defense
force we have to negotiate our bugetary needs every year to the legislative branch and we make plans and then the executive branch, they will execute the policy in an initiative. and so we have to take two to three years to implement the actual ideas that came out of one year, but when you think about xi jinping, he can make an order and it will happen the next day, so that's the situation in china. and when i look at china's behavi behavior, so i think i should stop. should i stop? [laughte [laughter] >> so china is really good at where power vacuum is, that may
be political and also economy and they can find those vacuum points so that they can expand themselves into those. and this happens in the east china sea coming close to the chain of islands and on the south china sea without our knowledge china has been making reclamation to make runway and also anti-air assets and such and so that they have been able to take, seize that part of the ocean. so we have to think about how they think about the game and so-- and also we will be able to handle that. so dr. green talked about this question, as the south china sea, and my answer, i completely agree with admiral
blair. my answer is no. china, even though that china has made the approach to the islands, but we, of course, provide 24/7 p patrol to protect our land. so we have a similar capability in terms of patrol ships and we have been using our military or defense capability to protect these islands and seen many invasions or approaches from the chinese vessels. and so, also china has been taking rotations, which the kind of ships that they use to
keep their constant presence, but japan is not backing down at all because we provide continuous patrol around these areas. in terms of the south china sea we respect the sovereignty of each country and china's occupation is illegal, but i do not think that these are not lost to china at all. >> let's turn to korea. we'll ask general brooks and the admiral about that. the u.s.-japan alliance was signed in the middle of the korean war and the u.s.-korea alliance might have ended if the u.s. and u.n. forces had not been able to operate from japan, i think that south korea might not be free today. if korean forces didn't hold the line on the peninsula,
japan would be a much less safe and prosperous country today. the dna is intermingled, but it's complicated. the general was reminding me in the middle of the korean war that the president at the time said if japanese troops landed on the peninsula to help, he would order the korea army to attack them instead of sending korea. it's two deeply dependent alliances with complicated history. i'm not going to ask general brooks to solve this problem. >> good. >> because the admiral is going to solve it. [laughter] >> and it's a political problem, not military problem, but it is a military problem in the sense that you know, well, you tell me, what are the consequences for us, for the defense of japan, for the defense of korea and the united states when our forces are not
able to operate, train, share intelligence, exercise between these two alliances? start with you, general brook. >> thank you, michael for the privilege of being able to join such an august body here of patriots who have done tremendous work for each of our countries and for this cornerstone alliance. and it's a tremendous privilege to be with them and the whole week has been like that so it's just been wonderful and this is a good continuation of it. military issues often become geopolitical issues and sometimes they can make the situation worse or make the situation better. and i would tell you first, it's been my experience both at u.s. army pacific and subsequently as the commander of the united nations command to be able to see and witness and encounter these two critical alliances in northeast asia. and in many ways, as we watch the political tides ebb and flow as they are right now, we
find what is continuous is the military relationship. and so while these are, indeed, two distinct alliances, the u.s. japan alliance on one hand and the u.s. korean alliance on the other hand, there is coordination, there cooperation the excellent that politics will allow among all three. it's not a triad alliance. that's not the case. and while that would be militarily efficient, it probably would not be very effective politically, socially, it has consequences, nevertheless. so as we see this current situation where the relationship is bad and i think i describe it any other way. bad and getting worse if you want to add an i -- additional words to it.
the military communications ongoing will have to stop or slow down leaving a lack of coordination on very important information, like did you know that there are chinese aircraft that are flying into the overlap air defense identification zone at that both countries share? did you know that we're reacting to that now or are you reacting to that now? very simple things we take for granted. did you know we had an aircraft emergency and of course their international aviation communication that occurs, but may be recovery that occurs as well and also we're going to find the military element might be the first to respond and the positions on patrol in that area. how do you share that information if you can't talk? and i'm not talking from a technical means, i'm talking from a social and a political means. so, we do see big consequences to the cornerstone alliance, which is u.s. and japan, and the linchpin alliance, which is
the united states and republic of korea when they can cooperate. and we saw that just last week as the russians in a coordinated exercise with the chinese decided to demonstrate that they have the ability to fly in international air space and to fly to within 12 nautical miles of a contested point on the surface of the water that is the point of friction between south korea and japan. in other words, russia deliberately exploited the friction between those two countries. there are significant consequences to that militarily and geopolitically. it's important that this is worked through and as has been commented it's not having that happens quickly or easily. it's a very deep problem and requires the united states to understand the nature of the problem and assist both countries in the painful things
that underpin, that is not completely resolved, but it believed to have been and the great disappointment that happens on both sides. we want to make sure that through conferences like this, that military leaders can keep a conversations going and that we don't lose the agreement that's up for renewal between japan and republic of korea and why that's so important to not destroy the channel, even if you limit what information is being shared. it's unwise to destroy the channel of communication and i certainly hope, loving both alliances that that will not happen, that it will not destroy, there will not be a destruction of that channel of communication. >> thank you. >> admiral. >> regarding japan and also south korea, relations that we share are similar understanding, which is very tough situation.
i think that's-- that self-defense force and then also the rok's forces have been having a very good relations. and the defense chief is now in office and he was the chairman of the jcs in korea and when i was on active duty officer, i had spoken with him very much about our situation and we remain on a very critical trustworthy friends and we spoke to each other often. however the relationship between the self-defense force and rok forces, that was an unfortunate situation that happened last year from my perspective. so we were invited to attend
their vessel review, however, we were asked to take down our flags to bring our ship closer to south korea. you probably know this, but all defense and military people, our flags are our pride so we wanted to show our pride by flying our flag and come to rok. so, i think this is a very common sense room that we should respect to each other. so our conclusion was that we shou should-- we should reject invitation to attend their military review. but we chose to stay in japan and not attend the review because we wanted to maintain what was left between the relationship between rok and
also japan. and also, i have to mention that there was an incident between rok and also to the japanese aircraft, so based on that incident japan requested korea, south korea to make their investigation and also make corrective action so that this will not repeat, but so far -- but so far, the reactions and happening from rok have been beyond our imagination. of course we're here that we're opening to close this -- resolve this issue so we stopped having consultations at the end of january over this incident. so this is a very unfortunate situation, however, we still
remember and also know that the collaboration between the united states, rok and japan is still critical. yes, we understand that situation between rok and also japan is very tough, but this 1965 agreement should be the guideline or guidance for us to move forward, but i think that's destructive incident or destructive communication happens to move us away from what needs to be talked about and also result. so, i really hope that we can still move forward by resolving what is happening right now. >> thank you. i'd just like to put an exclamation point on this particular issue in a three-day conference of the most experienced former military officers in united states and japan, surveying a field of
geopolitical, technical operational challenges for our security, that japan create itself occupy a lot of time and attention, it's that important. as general brooks put it, he loves the u.s. alliance and the korea alliance. we just had an army-navy team, u.s.-japan. we're going to do navy, navy now and ask admiral a question and then admiral blair. the question for you admiral is about the defense forces. as i said the most respected institution, organization in japan right now in polls, but one of the biggest challenges, of course, is people, getting enough people and i've heard that in order to fully staff
the defense forces, japan will have to have the level of women participating in the military that, for example, the u.s. and australia have. the u.s. and australia have about 17%, i think, 17% of the force are women. and japan i think is 6% or so. so i'm asking in part because it's rare at csis, in fact, we never have panels that are all men anymore and i'm certain-- we will probably -- we get a lot of heat for that. and i'm certain before too long we will have prominent representation not om only from the u.s. and japan for senior leadership women. it's a question for defense forces how to get more women empowered, engageled promoted in the forces. and you must have thought about that as chairman yourself. what are your views? >> first of all there is a
declining population because of the low birth rate and the appropriate aged people to recruit is rather difficult, very difficult. but when you look at the security environment surrounding japan we do need to enhance defense capability. now, therefore, we do need to provide the extended defense capability and that cannot be supported by male alone. in the future, we do need to have women's ability and women's capability included in the future. dr. green talked about the figure for the present level of participation now, 6%. when i was still in active duty our aim was 10%. i believe that they are now moving and taking measures so
that we can increase it to 10%. very recently they was some area that was close to women which was submarines and now it's open for women to take part. we do have women jet pilots. ... we need to have something like -- we need to provide some type of security which would be required uniquely to women. on this we can provide those
services. i think women will have a very hard time trying to fulfill their responsibility. therefore, we cannot make a major leap but we would like to continue to increase the percentage of women participation. >> at important factor in japan's ability to provide capabilities in this alliance. turn to admiral blair, on the u.s. side the force is under stress. budgets are limited. the chinese military buildup is unlike anything we've seen in recent memory. there's a debate among the experts about whether the u.s. for present in the western pacific and in particular for the navy, whether it should be, how much of it should be focused on height and war fighting and how much can we afford some of the traditional presence missions shaping this and showing the flag? what your take on the proper mix
of capabilities and then the nt between that presence and a zero shaping mission and actual ability to prevail in the conflict? >> i think we must be able to and we can walk and chew gum at the same time in the western pacific. we talked a lot about, you can say deterring china or i would prefer to say making china aware they should pursue their national objectives by nonviolent methods. that requires not only a certain number of the very best platforms in the navy and the air force forward station, but also capabilities in base and cyber warfare and all that are making clear, if military
aggression goes too far, it will be stopped. but that's that the only thing in the pacific. there are several items i would site. number one, the cooperation among the armed forces in the region and natural disasters is very important for the region. we talked about the 311 tragedy. i am also reminded of the christmas tragedy in 2003-2004 when the tsunami devastated the east and sri lanka to the west and the response of military forces related -- were really decisive and saving many lives in aftermath of that and it was tremendous operation of many countries that did that. that's a responsibility on forces not onto the own countries but to the countries of the region.
the capable peacekeeping capability from among the countries of asia is also i think important. when i was in command we deployed that and i think it had a very decisive role in bringing a happy outcome both for the people at timor and the people of indonesia. that's an important activity that should include china, simply not directly to china. finally i would say even in this competition with china as the term greystone tactics, this operation of forces below full military conflict level is something that the other countries in the region and the united states which is interested in that part of the region must present alternatives, bus compete and
china and this takes forces which are not the very top end. i think american involvement can be, must be across the scale of capabilities of the armed forces and i think he can be with smart management and resources that can be provided. >> we can walk and chew gum at the same time. we will still need more gum though. >> and more shoes. >> so let's go now to the joint air navy task force with the general iwasaki and admiral kawano. collective self-defense. i worked and been gone 20 years ago when the defensive guidelines were revised, and a lot of us thought finally we can do transplanting. then we hit a wall called collective self-defense. but now prime minister abe is
opened up that issue, recognizing the right of collective self-defense. are we ready for joint planning and joint operations? and for you, admiral, the new defense plan in japan emphasizes cross domain cyberspace. what are your thoughts on where wendy to prioritize and focus in those areas? start with general iwasaki if we could. >> translator: this is a very difficult area. when i was still in active duty we have received orders from the prime minister, and under the present constitution could we actually exercise collective civil defense was the question. under the present constitution, only the individual of self-defense was something that we could exercise.
that was a thought for a long time. however, as we think further, may be part of the collective self-defense could be exercised and that was some of the results of the research. three years ago we have actually introduced a peaceful security act, and under that law that is something we could do at the most under the present constitution. so compared to the overall collective self-defense, this is only part of the overall collective self-defense. but now we can exercise some self collective self-defense. if we utilize present legislation, under what circumstances, to what extent could we exercise such?
for example, they may have to be considered individually. regarding the cyber to me what kind of cooperation can we have between japan and use? re: space what can we do together? or maybe possibly in the strait of hormuz what can we do together? so individual cases must be considered to see to what extent self-defense forces could be utilized, and those decisions will have to be made on individual cases. up until now the use of self-defense force will change from what it used to be in the past. >> over the many years that i have operated with an strategic a bit with the self-defense force, i've always been impressed with the capability. we have some history in the self defense course for collective
sense. those operations went pretty well. add in particular what i would call the navy to navy, the maritime operations and then the maritime domain. that's a significant part of the challenge right now just because of the theater laydown itself. i'm actually hopeful that if we could both now collectively plan and exercise, and i'm specifically, i believe we need a permanent joint, joint and combined task force in the region which we could use regularly to test these things. interoperability is always challenging, no matter when you start, and ringing that out early evening coat unquote the conventional days. it just takes time, a lot of effort to do that, and you can't theoretically get at that. you have to practice regularly.
the level of professionalism, and i watched this in the 311 response, the level of professional, professionalism inside both of our forces is extraordinary. i think we could solve that relatively quickly when you specifically ask about the gray zone peace, , the space peace, e cyber these, we started to talk about the electronic warfare peace as well. those are all, in terms of operating together, they are very new. the thing that drives that particularly insider is the speed. you don't have a lot of time to adjust. there is a serious issue of defense and offense, and constitutionally right now the japanese constitution will not allow offensive operations. we in the u.s. have very
recently from my perspective i think with this administration got to a point where we are much more open about either using it or certainly planning to use offensive operations in the cyber world, which i think we need to do. again, we have given certainly the russians and the chinese, the iranians and the north koreans far too much runway in the cyber world. they need to be pushed back pretty hard, quite frankly. that's all right there. i think we know what we need but we'll just have to practice together. it isn't just the constitutional -- it isn't just the constitutional requirements in japan with respect to something like cyber going on offense. i think what americans need to think about is the history in this country with an understanding of that history
evolution over the last 70 years. it's topical right now in the south korean, japanese challenges that are ongoing. but to make sure that we have an anderson of that as we look to how much we can actually get done, , how quickly we can actually move. and that creates additional complexity that i think if we consider that, there's likely to be a much more rapid solution to these very, very challenging problems. i talked about information sharing earlier. we've networked before. we've shared information before. so the basics i think are there. it's a question of now can we give them the threat, and its considerable and its growing. we need to work together and it's not just the two of us or the three of us. there are others that you can't do that on paper. you've got to actually practice
it, and i think that's what we've got to do. >> when you mentioned a standing joint task force, are you thinking bilateral u.s.-japan for maybe bigger? >> my view of this, this needs to be joint combined. certainly there's a bilateral peace as well but we've just been in too many coalition operations in the last, i mean since the '90s that i can count, where that just becomes, that almost becomes a mandate. and critical to success because all these things in the end have to end politically. in the political capital that a country puts into a coalition with its forces is considerable. and without that i also believe you have the political resolve to achieve what you're trying to achieve. i think it's much more in the long run, and hopefully not so long, but the long run it's
much, much more beyond just the bilateral relationship between us and japan. i think it's got to be a lot of other countries as well. >> this is a very purple stage. these distinguished officers have all had some of the most come in many cases the most important joint jobs you can have in either country but i'm going to be parochial at the end and english army and ask about the role of ground forces in this competition we face with china to both defense of the island chain but also shaping the environment. people often think of the pacific as the navy air theater from washington. that's not the whole picture at all. general, start us off, how do you think about ground forces, u.s. and japan? >> certainly that was the focus my attention as the command of u.s. army pacific come just as was windows command of u.s. army central in the east and central asia. the space is more concentrated
in the middle east and central asia but it requires a joint approach to get the job done. i found that to be the case certainly as well in the pacific if not more so. i'll just highlight a couple of reasons why it's critically important to think about this in a joint approach. first, that's a decided advantage for the u.s. and any of its allies to operate in a joint context. that may change over time and with fine potential adversaries, like the people's liberation army, are pursuing joint news in their own way but they are studying our model because it's an advantage at the present time. we need to do it because that's how we operate. secondly, we think about the interdependency that happen among the various services and their capabilities, we would be foolish to go without any one of them. whether it's recognizing the way the geographic space is in these island chains, as you call them,
part of the pacific we are describing is all about archipelagoes. formulations all the way down to indonesia. and there are pieces of ground that are separated by water. that's hard look at as a landsman that's also the people who live a look at it as we talking populations you. we also find on the landmass, many of the countries are dominated militarily by their armies. and having a relationship with those continental leaders is critically important if you want to think about access, spacing, overflight, , longer-term relationship that creates stability in the region that is deterrent in nature. you want to have a relationship if you want to have that. land forces play a very, very important role and that is both u.s. and japanese, and i with the others in the region as well as we knitted together a tighter community of armies. lastly, i will say we see an
emergence of some adaptations of forms of war, and for example, the multi-domain operations concept is really about land forces being able to have an impact on the domains that would normally be dominated by other services. so land forces can impact air, sea, space and cyber, if their position in the right places with the right systems and are integrated into a joint operating concept by whatever committed you have come a standing joint force committee, a combatant commander, a life commander. they have to be integrated in. with its long range fires or air defense systems or electronic warfare capabilities or landing different communications, all these things are dependent upon a connection to land forces to enable the joint fight. it might well be, and we saw this when i was at u.s. army pacific within what was then called a calm, now into pacific
command, that we did better in her exercises when we thinking that my -- pacom. how could i as a land component commander enable the operations of a time component commander? how could we all use the capitals we had in space and to protect them at the same time in the collective weight? we see these concepts now resident in the national strategy for the indo-pacific as released by the u.s. department of defense and we see also in the defense planning guidelines from japan as well. so recognition that this is a requirement for the way we're going to operate for the rest of the century calls for a much closer integration and we can see. let me make one last, on the previous question. i am neither from the navy nor am i a woman but in from the first class that included women abuse military academy, and trustee, you will be glad you did it when you make the change, okay?
you want to do it, do it soon, don't fight it, take advantage of it. it will make you much better and i look forward to seeing the future highly improved japan self-defense forces that have a 70% or 30% composition of women. >> thank you. [speaking japanese] >> translator: if i can continue on, when you say army and marine, i think they receive less spotlight than the other armed forces. but i have to say the most hard-working people are actually the armies because they have very difficult missions because they have to face other soldiers face-to-face. so then when it asked for more, then the tells what are you
doing? you don't really need that much. that's the response we received. what i have to say from the ground, we take so much and also we are prepared for so much. when we look at the security environment, our marines and also air, sea and also ground, and we are now including cyberspace. and when we look at latest technology, 5g and also ai, so those are adding more complex aspects to what security means. that means we cannot just conclude our mission within the lands and we cannot silo our missions within our limits. we always have to invigorate to have joined forces so that we
can have the most effective war fighting or strategies. i think this is what joint planning and also joint operations means to us. and what is the heart of this joint work? we have to think about commit and control. this is the core and the heart of our joint operation and also joint collaboration. this is what it means to us as control. from control then we have to spread out some of the work to our units and also smaller groups so that they can work on their tasks. so in this era all the aspects are interdependent, and then not only all fighting but that the same time the fence and also
deterrence. we should think about from the system and also what kind of concept we have to have for our joint capabilities. and not only japan and the united states, and also asean included. and when i think about this region from different perspective, i think japan has three pillars to look at the indo-pacific. so, for example, on trade and navigation and also prosperity in terms of economic aspect, and indian ocean is the scores connected to the middle east. we are not only talk about the economic activities in the asian region, , but we are looking at the global scale and also the
stability and also our prosperity. japan's self-defense, we should contribute to the global prosperity in so many different ways, including freedom of navigation and also a economy and also security. we have been working on as the defense force is we've been working together with southeast asian countries. we have dispatched engineers and also healthcare professionals so that those countries can learn and also grow their expertise in those fields. and, of course, we are not just dispatching people for a short period of time but we're sending them so they can assimilate or maybe be included. and, of course, u.s.-japan alliance is the core, for
example, australia, the philippines should be included in our perspective. and also we should look at the multilateral cooperation surrounding us. this is the stability and also securing peace in the region. and also last year we saw some special activities. we sent four units to india for credit. so this is a very encouraging sign that we have been very active to communicate with those southeast asian countries. and also the relationship with u.s. army. we have done some joint exercises. two weeks ago or so i was asked to give a keynote speech in
tokyo. at that time disaster recovery and human, humanitarian assistance, so this was, this keynote speech was held by a huge think tank and also other organizations in japan. many countries came and also many ngos came to hear my speech. those types of geometric assistance and also disaster recovery are very much interested by so many different organizations and also they come together in that same mission. and so i really would like to see the united states and also japan to leverage on that
because there's that sense of mission already growing. >> i just asked the mic if i can make a comment about our army and its not a natural question. you might think, but it was a few years ago actually when i was running our navy that i obloquy made a speech in the middle of war. this was in the middle of war in iraq that i was completely convinced, and this goes to the comment about the criticality of armies globally and the upside and the downside of army presence. but i made a speech saying that, contrary to my training as a young naval officer, particularly the budget world, what i realized was our army in the united states, my army when i became chairman, was the center of gravity of our military. i believe it then. i believe it now.
i also commend this just an antidote, again, about how peoples around the world feel about armies. when we had that tragic earthquake in haiti and we were, everybody was moving as many forces as possible to try to help them we set a regular grade of the 82nd airborne down to haiti to help. i visited them a few days later, and in my interaction with the haitian people, i was stunned at the numbers who thought we were going to invade them or had invaded them. and it was a very serious concern and discussion. i could not really that concern, literally until all the 82nd airborne soldiers were off the island. that was a message to me again
about the impact of armies, both again the upside and downside, and the fears and concerns that they raised, again, for both good and for concern. and then lastly, in this world that we are now in, remote weapons, unmanned capability, the kind of precision and lethality we see in these weapons, when we're in combat one of the things, and this isn't a perfect solution, one of the things i learned is i really need people on the ground. i really want to have a level of knowledge about the destruction that i am about, in particular in a world where as precise and as lethal as these weapons are, there's oftentimes collateral
damage. so i value, back to what i said earlier about my army being the center of gravity of our military, i value that was done ever thought i would, and they bring extraordinary capability. however you would distribute them, whatever impact they have in countries around the world, we cannot do this without them. even in a theater that is oftentimes characterized as a navy and air force theater. >> thank you. if i would try to wrap a written around what we've been discussing -- ribbon -- number one, we need the army but the team would be joint notice and, not just saying joint is as a kind of lip service but talking about it because it's a rapidly
increasing capability. north korea is expanding its nuclear arsenal. our budgets are not going up at the same rate as the chinese, and joint news is capability, is a multiplier and not just use in japan but also that's what a relationship with korea. that's why india, australia, others manager just an observer and participant the past few days that's the magazine. that looking at the problem whether new domains like space and cyber, increasing interest in spending and capable is by c, the answer is increasing ability to work together a special japan and partners elsewhere. let's take questions from audience. we had microphones. if you could identify yourself and you want to pick some and asko go ahead otherwise i will toss it to someone on the panel and others can weigh in. let's get way in the back there.
>> thank you very much. wonderful panel. also thank you for the wonderful panelist on the stage. i'm a president of the peace foundation you say. my question is with regard to korea, japan relationship. particularly to the possible role that the united states can play. the question is addressed to admiral mullen and admiral blair. i think most people in japan agree korea-japan relationship is critical important for korea-japan, stability of the region and also united states. number two, that is a series state that we need to do something. as admiral kawano said there's a gap between the two countries. number three, if you don't do anything, it will take offense of it. having said that, it looks like
korea and japan have delisted they can solve this on their own. did you discuss any possible role for the united states to better the relationship between korea and japan? japanese have been i think frustrated to the extent that they have been basically asking americans for some time to play a role. the situation has come to the point where we witness today. so is there any role that the united states can play, and did you discuss a possibility of united states plate in mediation role? thank you very much. >> i think, fundamentally, this is a situation that koreans and japanese have to resolve. we have an incredibly strong relationship with both countries, so i have obviously
not been involved, but i guess i'm comfortable enough to say that this is not out there by itself, that we are paying a lot of attention to it and there are individual involved because i think we all recognize the series this is and the direction that it's heading is very dangerous point but in the end i think probably, and i'm not on the inside, i would work very hard to support the solution that independently, the koreans and the japanese need to figure out, and there are ways to do that. i'm not involved enough to know how much there is, but there certainly is activity that we are very much aware of from that standpoint. so it's not out there by itself.
>> we discussed some of the principles that should guide american participation, or the american role in trying to help two of her closest allies in the theater. one principle is the united states should distinguish carefully between what should be done publicly and what should be done privately. the issues between korea and japan have a high historical, emotional, lyrical, social context, and an outside country comments prescribes in those areas our peril. i don't think we should. on the other hand, on the private basis i think the united states, and we discussed this in a group, should provide a sense of urgency for working on the problem here and in many cases
of venue and a sympathetic third-party to help solutions be achieved by both countries. i think as far as our public role, again that sense of urgency is important to talk about publicly, the issue to the united states should be talked about publicly and we should emphasize it. when one country or the other takes an action that affects the long term repair of relations between the countries, i think we should call it that. i agree completely with general brooks that eliminating existing channels of military information exchanged between japan and korea is a terrible mistake. of course the information that goes on that channel can be regulated and would be regulated based on whole bunch of factors, but we are publicly against
that. we don't think korea should terminate that agreement. and so those are the principles that we discussed and that's the role i think the united states can play. finally, i would say there's an overall feeling among us americans who have service and friendships with koreans and with japanese that this thing is not going to lead to file and total the rupture. there is too much that the three free-market democracies in the most important part of the world share for that not to eventually over time overcome these very difficult historical problems.
[speaking japanese] >> translator: let me express my view. if the u.s. was try to intermediate between japan and korea, it may temporarily improve the situation, but i think that will not solve the issue from the root. >> an important point can we just heard from the admiral, what i heard from admiral mullen and admiral blair was the u.s. has a role to play but it's not to broker this, which ultimately will have to be done by japan and korea. at csis every few years we surveyed serving hundreds and hundreds of foreign policy expert in asia about their vision for the future of the region, ten countries. the countries that are most closely aligned, almost indistinguishable about what kind of indo-pacific they want, with democratic rule of law and strong american presence, the
two two countries with experts are most closely aligned is japan and korea. even more so in australia, sorry, michael, although that may say more about australia foreign policy and this trillion people. it's remarkable almost identical the responses from japan and korea about the role of the united states, about the democratic values, about the kind of economies give what to see and the institutions they want to see, almost identical. about what you would like this region to go. there is an underlying set of values but also interests that really hopefully will get us past this. let's keep going. yes, we have to -- we can always count on you to ask a question that makes me glad i'm not in government now. >> i want to ask the question about president trump. very simply. is president trump strengthening
or weakening u.s.-japan alliance? to anyone who wants to make a comment. >> you don't want to ask about inf or something easy? [laughing] that's an earful. anyone can go for it who wants to. >> i'll take a crack at it. from this week were heard from a number of administration officials, and what i was struck by was the continuity of policy in terms of lots of things are going on, specifically our national security strategy, our national defense strategy, the guidelines that just came out and japan recently. those documents play off each other and i think that has strengthened the relationship, put us in a position to strengthen the relationship. and then i would go back even
before what i said earlier in terms of, generally continuity, not perfect continuity from one administration to another, but the values of the relationship. i think very publicly there probably hasn't been a leader in the world that has worked harder on a relationship with our president than prime minister abe. and great success for the alliance specifically, and then for the region because of the criticality of that alliance. it's almost easier now to criticize because the vulnerabilities that have always been there, china being one, that challenges we're having right now with respect to the relations between south korea and japan, what's going on in north korea, a lot of it is more public than it's ever been so it's easier to see.
i mean, overall, i'm taken back by the continued strength of the alliance in an evolving time. on balance i i would say it certainly is as strong or stronger, or getting stronger over time. >> all that being said, withdrawing from tpp i think was a very big mistake, and one that we're scrambling to recover from. it's been, i think admiral mullen correctly fairly characterized some of the positive aspects. that one big put shot i think was a mistake by this administration. whatever one thinks of the possibility of treaty passage, had it been passed.
>> there's a lot of ranchers and farmers who would agree with you. [laughing] [speaking japanese] >> translator: i'm not sure if anyone knows the details of that treaty, but in summary, if japan is attacked and the united states comes to the rescue. however, in return, japan offers its military facilities to the united states, so this is balance. when you bolt it down, the operation part is still fairly imbalanced. in my personal opinion this operation domain should be reviewed so that the balance should be a little bit more equal.
so that peace legislations was enacted so that we can get support to protect the united states ships and also aircraft even at peacetime. so what president trump said about u.s.-japan alliance is about he was very shocked to point that out comments i received that message personally. >> except he was wrong about sony tvs. [laughing] >> i don't think sony may tvs since the 1980s. >> thank you for coming. japan native, u.s. citizen. i heard through the grapevine that japan's military budget is
1% of japan's gdp. i feel that their hands, the military hands are tied in the back for some reason. that's the way i feel anyway, but how do you feel about that, increasing maybe up to 2% of gdp? [laughing] [speaking japanese] >> translator: everyone is looking at me to not have to answer the question. yes, the 1% that you mention, it is not legally bound. it has been just a political trend. and also we have to think about the growth itself of the gdp and
said to that meet even though it may be remaining at 1%, the gdp itself has been growing, meaning the defense budget is going as well. we cannot really achieve 2%, whatever we want to take, and so we can probably have 1.3% and then also it depends on what kind of populations are you using, but i do understand your point and so the japan renews its midterm defense build a program and so within that we now have included different types of activities, or new activities. so we should not think about what percentage point that we should employ in terms of the defense budget, but we should look at what kind of capacity and also what we need to do as defense. that's my understanding. we can just throw out some numbers, 2% of whatever it is,
but it doesn't come 2% doesn't really give us any justification. that will be the budget . we should have. i think this comes from president trump's comments to the nato that every country should contribute by 2% of the own gdp, but this doesn't really give us justification to have that kind of discussion. if we would like to achieve 2% over ten years, that means we should increase the actual budget by 7% or 8% every year to actually achieve 2% of japan's gdp. so when we look at the actual economic status of japan, increasing japan's defense budget 7% or 80% every year is very difficult. we should not just look at 1% of japan's, japanese gdp, but we should look at what we truly
need to do in the sense, and so that's why i was trying to explain that to the treasury ministry in japan. >> be careful what you wish for. i like the way admiral mullen, this is have a joint combined task force works. admiral mullen designated the general we mealy jump right in. that's the right vision for an alliance. >> i think one of the important points here is, i agree with the general, be careful of random numbers but these are not new numbers. we've been trying to seek all of our alliances to commit to a level of effort that is reflected by a 2% baseline. that's the objective to get as once been at about that amount. there's a deeper underlying question that's behind that, that is what is a reasonable amount of support to u.s.
forces? what is a reasonable amount of commitment to self-defense through every aspect of that? i think we still have a lot of work to do globally, especially begin with the alliances to understand what that means. we had some discussion about that during the forum this week on our recounting everything properly? are we including everything that is being done in basing, , and access, in tariffs, and trade, everything, i would really including it all in a way that is comprehensive enough to go to see what the true level of effort is? i would submit to you having carried this message around the world to a number of militaries for a number of years, we don't include everything that ought to be included. we have work to do to refine our understanding of what that fair load, commitment really is. in some cases we missed things
have been very beneficial to the united states. we just don't acknowledge, walk right past them because we are looking for a specific thing which is a percent has been on procurement or what have you and that's a adequate. we need to be a think much more insightful in this part of the century and beyond as we invite you refresh the alliance structures that are so important to stability and prosperity in the world, got to look at anymore comprehensive way and we have in the past. >> that, general, sounds like aa good nation for a national security think tank. >> yes, maybe csis. >> i am a former diplomat. we mentioned radar. equally important are perhaps even more important is tracking summary coming out of north korea. passing that contact as he goes along the coast of korea on to japan, i want to be assured that
capability is bulletproof, that no amount of political exigencies are going to disturb that, but that is permanent infrastructure. can the mantle here assure us that that kind of tactical effort is, in fact, sacred? >> no, we're not going to answer that question in tactical detail. the overall assurance that the united states and other countries that we operate with can handle the embassy domain. i can tell you it's good but i'm not going to any detailed way with you. >> its right to think that domain is one of our real advantages going forward, particularly when you look that own and use daily capabilities but the maritime self-defense forces for us joy and so forth. >> yes, this is an extremely,
extremely complex and difficult part of the navy operating space, which, in which equipment is part of the equation. chinese equipment is not as, is not made, is not as advanced as what the other countries have. but even more than that it is the long years of practice and training that go into that. >> and it's not subjected to political whims? >> no. >> no, it's what i said earlier, just as we what i've seen, hearing from this administration and then doing what existed in the administration before, all of that continues to be in place, and i would argue mostly undisturbed. >> in politics, if you can't see it, it doesn't exist. i see a hand way back there.
>> i have a question for our japanese friends. so japan once to acquire a new fighter jet. i was wondering what you think japan should prioritize in capabilities for this new aircraft, and perhaps how you think the acquisition should be procured. thank you. [laughing] >> you are the only, you are the only force guy up here. [speaking japanese] >> translator: this is a question i really wanted to avoid. when we think about the fighter aircraft in japan, we do not have a large fleet at all. when i count the number of
aircraft, then that means less than 400. and the mission that we receive is meaning that protecting the air off of, for example, china, russia can be threatening and so we have to protect our territory to counter them. when we think about the threat in the current situation, we have to expand our capacity, that's for sure. so i think it is more effective to have one type of aircraft rather than various types of aircraft for cost benefit and also efficiency. if we had one type of aircraft
and we have an issue because if the type of aircraft has an issue with the wings, then we to ground all the aircraft of that same type. when we have a scramble situation then have to be able to mobilize our aircraft as well, as i think that's what we should not just rely on what type of aircraft but we have to have those types maybe after three types of aircraft. even if we acquire different types of aircraft we would not be able, we would not have the expertise to operate them efficiently. so we should seek technical support as well. so that's why we have decided that we will maintain three types of aircraft into the future as well. when we talk about aircraft,
we use of f-1 by mitsubishi. this is going to be retired. so japan is planning to update the design of f-16 and also produce them in japan. this is agreed upon between japan and the united states. looking toward 2030, so there may be some type of aircraft that are retiring. but we just started the new design of f-16 and also i think that will take about ten years to complete the program. and so we've been working together with the united states to complete it. and last year we renewed our national defense program guidelines and also midterm
defense buildup programs within the literature. for our next generation fs, japan should take the primary role to actually produce and also maintain the aircraft. because we would be able to customize those aircraft for our unique needs. mr j is produced by mh i. now it is called space object. in magi produces space gets domestically. there is some confusion these are produced internationally but these are domestic produced. so in magi has worked with 18
companies to produce these, and so some parts, for example, wings in such were technically supported other companies. so what we are trying to do right now is how and also what kind of aircraft that we can design and also produce so that the japan can take the primary role in this. but at the detail detailed levi cannot share more than this. did the answer your question? >> can ask, you know, the fighter aircraft is only one example, systems integration with each new generation of a platform gets almost exponentially more difficult so that, for example, the joint strike fighter, you know, allies
can't afford to do some of these alone anymore. i'm directing the first two general works because in the u.s.-korea alliance or nader with something close to a joint requirements dialogue. it's not quite joint in reality but we think about requirements and how this effect procurement and a little more in a good way that a think we do in the u.s.-japan alliance. you know both alliance as well. is the room for us to think more jointly about requirements than we do now recognize will not have joint requirement process like native and u.s.-rok necessary. >> i don't think because for set at least in their term but as working through exercises we can see that, first, there would have to be and integration that connects the japan air self-defense force and its aircraft, the full fleet, to the ground self-defense force.
if japan is to secure within its own archipelago, maneuver within its own archipelago to defend japan or respond to a crisis within the archipelago, waiter situational awareness is important in many of these new generation aircraft and weapons systems have these capabilities built in, what are the to connect to another domain? and so we see that as a very important part of the design. i'm confident japan will take that on as they think through their own approaches to improving joint news and joint interoperability. but when you get to the alliance part, there's an added complexity because that's hard enough finding ways to move awareness from one domain into another in a way both operative with the best possible knowledge and understanding. it's even harder when you do it in an alliance so what exactly can be shared? what protocols, what technical mechanisms make it possible for
this awareness to be moved from one countries database to another? for immediate use without latency, which is the expectation and modern warfare and modern response operations. and i would say it applies to both of those by the way. how do you do that and how do you have that kind of a conversation? this is what these relationships are about within an alliance. we need to have hard conversations about our ability to work together and oddly enough we have limitations even on long-standing alliances, nato as well as in the u.s.-korea allies, and that applies in the u.s.-japanese alliance as well. we have to find ways to work through that. [speaking japanese] >> translator: if i may make a comment. our fighters obviously, when i was the air chief of staff, i decide to introduce f-35.
>> a couple thanks before we wrap it up. sorry, go ahead, quickly. >> a very blunt approach. the dialogue between japan and the us, my question is when china is bullying countries in southeast asia my question is about leveraging in the role of japan and taking a regional military leadership role in the region because from what i know, china is staunchly defending its 9 m defense and -- there was recently a meeting among southeast asian nations.
china has a special relationship with japan. there was an agreement that before china attacks a signal, to alert for japan. my question, the second largest trade partner of china. my question is honestly what japan -- how can you leverage your insider rule in the region with this country being bullied by china, its original military leader in that region promoting democracy and western values to that. >> you are thinking more broadly. does anyone want to respond how they can play a leadership role
in southeast asia. >> i will start. a couple of things i need to correct. the chinese 9-line on the south china sea, all countries operate. china does not successfully exclude countries, civilian and military aircraft to their side of japan. many of them are challenged by china and china boules philippine fishermen and so on. that is an area as big as the mediterranean. a huge area and countries do operate there. >> they are bullying. >> they are not winning. more countries are putting more and more ships out there. is it the way to handle this
unilateral chinese approach with a combined coordinated effort that goes to other countries that are to be free and open international space in accordance with the un position and they need to work together to assert that right? and the balance between outside countries like the united states and japan and countries who live there like the philippines and vietnam is a delicate balance. i think both united states and japan are treading that balance pretty well by helping build capacity and resilience within a country's concern, areas like increasing maritime awareness, helping to understand what is going on, increasing coast
guard capabilities and sending coast guard ships and aircraft into the area. i think china is encountering push back, which you correctly site and claim the entire area in the 9-line which encompasses the south china sea but what we are seeing now, this is a movie, not a snapshot, is a strong push back with a lot of individual activity by outside seafaring countries, support for countries in the region and cooperation among them. the movie has gone on and it will be favorable over time to the united states and japan and countries in the region who don't want to hold course by china but more work is required.
>> translator: japan is a free nation surrounded by the ocean and need to protect defense. we need to defend these freedoms of see. japan is a country surrounded by the ocean and the values. >> we are going to leave the last few minutes of the forum on japan. you can watch all our programs online, c-span donald. going to the heritage foundation for india's ambassador to the us, india's government stripped kashmir of the time a status after 7 decades and cashmere is in lockdown. live coverage on c-span.