tv Politics Public Policy Today CSPAN June 3, 2015 11:00am-1:01pm EDT
>> thank you. let me thank all of the witnesses for the testimony today. the service they have given our country. thank you very much. i'd like to stand on something, i disagree with something the ranking member said. clarification about whether or not isis. two kiscases, queens, he attacked police officers with a hatchet. he was responding to a director from isis. two women, somewhat longer
process, also in queens, ieds in their apartment and their means of radicalization was isis use of social media, am i correct? i'm not trying to disagree, i wanted to add on to that. >> i would suggest congressman that you are absolutely correct in their -- they believe they are able to operationalize people solely through social media. they believe that they can enter into the dialogue i referred to earlier and provide the tools and they're not getting into very complex tools. what they're telling them is here are tactics and procedures you should use. here is some easily available, readily available information online that you can exploit. in other words, they believe that they can provide them everything that they will need to undertake some kind of lone actor attack. >> let me add to that. i think you hit on an important point, diversity of the threat. you've got a slow burn but individuals who flash to bang which is very quick.
we've seen more of this flash-to-bank with isil and their online efforts. again, it's not just going some place on the internet and looking it up. the soshl immediatecial media push is coming via your pocket, your smartphone. there's a diversity of threats. you're right, it all depends on the individual but we have to be prepared for both types of situations. >> i think -- all eloquent as far as the dark areas where you just can't go right now. and it would seem to me in those instances, it's more important to have human sourcesen the ground to fill in those gaps. with the constant criticism of law enforcement and constant talk of snooping and spying for instance, to me it makes it harder to recruit people on the ground. like in boston, if this had been two days ago and the associated press, "new york times" uncovered the fact that the boston police were following those alleged terrorists that
would have been snooping and spying. now after the fact it was effective surveillance. i think that the use of those terms really are doing a tremendous disservice, as far as enabling law enforcement to recruit people on the ground. you said you wanted to work with the community and you do, but at the same time there's onslaught coming from the media and certain people in politics talking about snooping spying, harassment undozen a lotes a lot of the good you're trying to do. if anyone wishes to comment, fine. >> i agree with you, sir. you have to have a multitude of chirp wires online and in person. we try to insert sources in situations where there's a predicated investigation but it's a challenge. >> thank you. >> sir, i would add to what mr. steinbach has said and indicate that this is a total team fight. it takes human, what i call
transaction ent looking at travel patterns and those sort of things to come to this. certainly in communities, communities sometimes feel you're looking at us too much as opposed to another community, and our response is generally, the bad guys are trying to recruit your kids, takes why we're talking to you. it not because of your religion but it's what the bad guys are try doing and that's why we're here talking to you about strategies to defend yourself. >> my time is running out. if you can comment, isis, one thing they have been doing is encouraging use of hoax threats. are you in a position to say yet whether or not -- i what happened on memorial day, ten different hoax threats were called in to the airlines and again this weekend called in if that is any response to isis, are these lone wolves or a person carrying out a hoax? >> i would say we don't have any
credibility information there are threats to aviation right now. yes, ones so far appear to be hoaxes. tracking those back to an individual or group is an ongoing process. >> but isis has said the hoax itself is an effective means of attack. >> i yield back. thank you. >> mr. richmond is recognized. >> i guess i'll start with mr. taylor. maybe even mr. mulligan. you mentioned that there were about 1,700 mess amounts sent out by isil. if you had to estimate how many people did that reach? zbl>> certainly tens of thousands. 1700 separate publications, be it video release or online magazine release, but certainly in the thousands to tens of thousands.
>> the people who start to follow and engage in the social media, even if it's on the front, we're not seeing any similarities or any consistent traits across the board in the people that start to engage or are we? >> well sir, it's partly about what the actual publication is or the video is about or what they're trying toen incite. we're particularly concerned when we see someone who is let's say, twitter feed being followed and they are really strongly advocating violence i think the fbi is paying particular attention to those. it's important to note that in some instances, a lot of the followers, they're paying attention, media's paying attention to some entities, a lot of video releases, obviously, tracking and reporting on it. i would like to pos it pause it, they're trying to generate buzz themselves. we've seen multiple instances in
which they have if you will collaborators who will retweet messages to try to in crease the numbers so it makes it look like they've got a yes very large number of followers. they're effective at using social media and, if you will manipulating social media. >> well knowing that they're experts at manipulating social media and using social media are things that we can do or things that we should encourage others to do or not to do to protect themselves? i guess now i'm going to get into the sensitive area of i'm not commenting whether it's their first amendment right to have a contest to depict or make fun of islam but in my mind i encourage my mother not to walk down dark streets at night because it's dangerous. i would get upset if someone
drew krarcartoons of jesus or called mary a slut. if they're good at using social media to get their message out, are we inciting some of this with our or some people's hatred towards their re ss religion and other things? are we fueling some of this fire? >> sir i think i would answer that question simply by saying, the dungsconstitution of the united states of america and rights and freedoms are something that stands in the way of our enemies' effort to create a global caliphate. so i don't think any one event fuels this. i think it's coming at our
system of government, our freedoms, is what they're trying to undermine. they are in the news cycle. >> you don't see any spike in people following after events look this or any rise in social media conversations when you have a contest like that going on? >> of course you do. >> i guess that's my question then. >> but again in america, those kinds of conversations happen every day. as a part of our constitutional rights in this country. and so saying that we should stop doing something here would cause them to stop doing it there, they'll find somewhere to look for a reason to you know, attack america. >> no i agree with that. but i guess my question is and i think that a guy that's going to rob a lady walking down a dark alley is going to rob somebody but i'm going to encourage my mother not to walk
down that alley so it won't be her so it's not easy prey. i guess, it's our constitutional right to say whatever you want but i promise you, if you call my mother a bad name, there are going to be consequences and repercussions and i don't think we're having that honest conversation talking about young people, angry people, talking about people who feel picked on 0. if, you know, there are some words that will trigger a response, but you have the absolute first amendment right to say it. and then it's up to me whether i want to exercise my discipline or hit you in the mouth. the question becomes how often are we going to get hit in the mouth before we realize that we may be playing into it unnecessarily by just being callus and cruel, i think, in some instance. thank you for your questions. thank you, mr. chairman. >> mr. perry's recognized. >> thank you, mr. chairman. thank you, gentlemen, for being
here. this is a, i think this is a difficult subject trying to fine the line between privacy and security, as we've -- i think everybody's alluded to. let me ask you this. there are folks that might wear their heart on their sleeve regarding this circumstance radical islam, attacks and so on and so forth. and they might be having a conversation openly on the social media where they espouse their opinions which might lead them to be a target for some of these individuals, if you know what i mean. and maybe even some of the folks in the building, somebody that's having this hearing today or asking questions like this. do you folks have any way or do the platforms have any way of monitoring traffic about those individuals that might have had a conversation with a friend
openly on open source, online about their disdain for radical islam, for attacks, and might have been disparaging about it, did they become a target? does that individual become a target? any way that the social platforms have a way of monitoring it? any of you folks have a way of monitoring it. do you collaborate on that? and is that a -- is that a chill, is there a chilling effect for free speech if people feel like they might be targeted because of their thoughts posted openly on social media? >> so i'm not sure that i fully understand the question. so i think that social media platforms usually abide by the terms of service agreement. they've got small compliance department. the answer to the first part, no i don't think social media companies are doing anything along the lines that you speak. as far as the intelligence community or law enforcement,
monitoring those individuals or exercising expressions of freedom and then being targets, we don't have a mechanism in place to track them. we would track it from the other side if we see threats coming toward them but not necessarily -- that is the question you're asking, sir? >> essentially. >> we are not tracking it from the other end. now if somebody comes to us and says i feel threatened, of course we'll look into that. as for as a data pool of large scale to look at that, no. >> are there -- is there -- go ahead. >> if i could offer another bit of context to what mike said. when operating on social media, particularly public platforms you're in open space. you can be monitored by anyone entity out there by commercial entities educational institutions media, anyone can be looking at that. that's one of the challenges that i think people are often concerned about going back to
this point that you made. frequently, within this country, we are trying to encourage credible royces to contest the ideological extremism that is being advocated and those folks are reluctant because they're concerned they'll be a target. what we've been trying to do collectively as a community trying to change that retirement, at least from the perception of the u.s. government's monitoring of their activities. but i do believe that, again, it is open space, so any person that enters into that space needs to understand that. >> so, when you talk about -- you talked about encrypted direct messages and dark space can you give me some examples, sengs sengs essentially texting would that be considered off-limits to monitoring by the united states government, even in cases where there might be an imminent
planning and plotting? is there any way -- if this is classified, that's fine, too, but i'm wondering from that perspective, you know, if it's not on facebook if it's not on twitter, do we have the capability, the federal government, do they have the capability and/or do the providers have the capability are there algorithms that pick this stuff up? >> the answer is no. there are 200 plus social media companies. some of these companies build their business model around end-to-end encryption. there's no ability currently for us to see that. if we intercept the communication all we see is encrypted communication. >> anybody else? some examples. talking straight texting i know a program cyberdust. once you send it it it's received, it disappears. and that would be -- is that an example of the dark space, or is that just encrypted direct
communications? what that is? >> so dark space is a general term. so, yes, there's lots of models out there. there's models, social media that go point to point, once you read it, it disappears, it's not saved. some companies can set -- you can set how long a text is saved. some of them are encrypted from the start. most are text-type forms, some are photographs that send. all kinds of different models. some are more like bulletin board formats. lots of formats. >> all of that is off-limit with the federal government as far as -- >> it's not that it's off-limits. there are more and more of these companies are building their platforms that don't allow us. we will still seek to go to those companies and serve them legal process, but if the company's built a model that even they can't decrypt, it doesn't do us any good. >> thank you, mr. chairman. i field back. >> mr. watson coleman's
recognized. thank you very much againlemen for your information sharing here. i want to tag on to what congressman richmond's questions because i want to get at something that i've not heard a lot about. i'm reading that there really is no sort of common denominator here, not any religious zealot, individuals who are being radicalized don't even necessarily know what the islam religion is all about. it's not socioeconomic, it's not racial or ethnic, trying to figure out what exactly is it. what is enticing about beheadings and violence and this very angry assault that our young people are being exposed to? what is tripping them and their attention to that kind of radicalization? what is it about isil?
>> so, ma'am, if i can give you a little bit of context on than you're right to describe, and i think one of my colleagues described earlier, the range of how can i say it experiences and if you will, ideological knowledge, religious knowledge varies incredibly widely. what there seems to be is they are appealing in some instances, to if there is a sense of victimization, that they are the individuals who are those who you know, will conquer those who have been the victimizers. so it appeals to that underdog nature. they really do an effective job in communicating that sense. and as i said in my remarks, they couple that with an ability to present here is the idealized vision of what our religion presents and if you really want to leave the trappings of all the challenges and troubles you're having in your current life, and join us we will offer
you more direction and more means some that is how they seem to be succeeding. >> so they seem to be attracting young people. are we talking about middle school age? are we talking -- what ages? when we say youth, how young are these young people? >> i would say any -- i would say we're seeing ages in the teens, probably upper teens, into 20s. it's also important, we have deemed this a new generation of terrorists because, as general taylor was saying a lot of them are extremely converse entant in social media. this is the means they use to reach that generation. >> i can understand that. i don't understand what is enticing them. what appeals to you when you see someone beheaded or you see these nasty threats or you see this violence? the victimization is something i'd like to just carry on a little bit. i don't -- one of my favorite programs was about the fbi
profiler. so i'm wondering, is that a real thing? i know there's police profiling, i've got to be concerned about. is there such a thing a psychological profiling? are we looking at those kind of things? are we identifying some traits that have nothing to do with ethnicity, socioeconomic or whatever, but other traits? are we able to, like identify any sort of red flags in the children and the young people in school and in college? i just wonder whether or not we're expending enough energy and resources in trying to identify early on and intervening. >> so, yes the fbi does have a behavioral analysis unit and there is within the national center for the analysis of violent crime, there's a unit dedicated to terrorists and it spends a lot of time looking at the parts of radicalization and
mobilization, what attracts folks, but like mr. mulligan said, it's a very complicated piece. quite frankly, what we've seen as far as a profile, the lack of a profile. there's just so many reasons, you know, we don't -- we don't see disaffected -- we see some disaffected. we see some well-to-do. victimization is a common theme. younger and younger individuals are drawn into this messaging. i would say that isil's done an effective message versus al qaeda in that they have said publicly, the caliphate is here today. you can come now to a country where sharia law rules, bring your family, they've really messaged it across the spectrum to a wide walk of individuals. let me just ask this last question, if i might. should we be engaging the department of education, higher education, in identifying
programs and approaches and sort of learning devices that would be able to anticipate and deal with our younger people who are affected by whatever it is that's turning them on here? >> yes ma'am, we should and we are. beginning to work with the department of education on these kinds of issues because it's a whole community effort. it not just the police. not just the churches but it's education, it's civic organizations as well. >> thank you mr. chairman. i would like for us to explore what more can be done proactively in identifying and sort of intervening at an earlier state. thank you for your indulgence. >> thank you. mr. herd is recognized. >> thank you mr. chairman, ranking member for holding this hearing. i think a number of these issues we can talk all day long about that. we're packing a lot in a very short period of time. first question to mr. mulligan
and ambassador taylor. talking engaging incredible voices throughout the communities, how do we blow it up? how do we make it bigger? how do we accelerate those projects? >> we've been developing a partnership community awareness briefings and moving it out slowly initially to make sure we're having a degree of success. we have had some success in that. now we're trying to train the trainer so that we can get into a situation where we're propagating it more broadly across communities because going back to some of the other observations made, it is at the community level that we need to have this success. and also we need to have i think the ranking member said, levels between government and local. a lot of instances, particularly family members as you know, people are reluctant to engage any sort of authorities and we need to try to find that middle ground. >> i appreciate that. we need to be anying about this in terms of week, not years because that's the speed at which we need to counter this
threat. ambassador taylor, any remarks for that? >> and it's a global phenomenon. our outreach international has been important as well. i'm leading a delegation to australia next week to further communications with our partners about this phenomenon how to engage communities across the world to better -- so they better understand what this risk is. >> because, in order to make the fbi's job a lot easier this lone wolf idea the way we're going to stop that is countering that violent ideology and extremist ideology and that's going to take a whole lot government effort. who in government is responsible for this? the cve activity? >> it's actually a shared responsibility between justice then tell against community, dhs, and the fbi. our deputies meet to regularly formulate those strategies and to implement those strategies
within the u.s. >> my suggestion there would be looking at unity of command. when you have three people in charge of something nobody's in charge of it. that's something we're plagued with in the federal government on a number of occasions. my next set of questions is to mr. steinbach. terrorists are trying to do two thing, kill a lot of people and elicit counterterrorism responses in the government to upset a population to foment discord. with that as the background, i'm nervous when we start talking about ka leeka lea expansion i get nervous because of the privacy aspect. my question not to get too technical, does end-to-end encryption provide by many companies prevent your ability to do attribution? >> in some cases yes. >> but not in all cases.
>> not in all cases. >> so are you suggesting that when you have a court order on someone connected to terrorism that will are companies that aren't cooperating with helping to get as much information as they can about that individual? >> no what i'm suggesting is companies have built a product that doesn't allow them to help. >> but if you are saying it doesn't prevent attribution because the key here is to try to fine as much information so that we can -- to exhibit the success that you've had in boston, you know, you're able to identify someone and use other tools to track him you know, stop and prevent this from happening. and that's, you know it's a difficult task. don't get me wrong. i know how hard you guys are working, maintaining the operational pace that you've maintained since september 11th is unprecedented. you're the men and the women and the fbi should be patted on the back and heralded but we have to make sure we're protecting civil liberties and borders at the same time. when you talk about reviewing
applicable laws around the technology challenges that you are facing in calia expansion you're not talking about putting a back door in software, are you? >> no. look i said if n. my prepared statement, talking about full transparency, going to companies who could help us get the unencrypted information. the attribution piece is important to understand, depending on the technology involved, this requires quite frankly a technology discussion, there are tokens used that do not allow for attribution. so it's not quite as simple as just using other techniques or attribution. sometimes attribution is not there. i'd be happy to discuss if a classified setting in more detail exactly what we're talking about. >> i would love that. thank you. one other thing we've been talking about the use of social media and digital tools and how it's made it easier for isis to recruit people. but it also gives us an opportunity to do double agent operations against them to penetrate, you know, their
ability. chasing al qaeda, ten years ago if you were anything close to an american, you would get your throat slit. now we have new tools in order to penetrate them. i know i've run out of time, i yield back that to the chairman. >> if i can briefly -- we have a delegation on investigating foreign fighters to the middle east and europe. we found that there is a counternarrative out there. this is more not online but foreign fighters who have left the region, some return inspired, more radicalized and some return very disillusioned from the experience. i think that narrative in this may be a state department issue, the more we can get the narrative out there, the better off we're going to be. so, the chair recognizes miss rice. >> thank you mr. chairman. mr. steinbach, i want to ask you a couple of questions. how does the intelligence
community qualify an elevated threat from online-en spired terrorists? we all know when they raise the threat level but specifically with this online communications, how do you rate what the -- what level the community indication, how it rises to something that you really are worried about? >> it's a, i think simple question with a complicated answer. there's a lot of pieces. the volume the specificity whether or not they've identified willing sympathizers who will do something. a lot of pieces that go into it. many of those factors are present now. >> so, are there any difficulty -- what's the biggest difficulty in terms of being accurate when you are trying to rate the level of a threat? >> so, as mr. hurd stated social media's out
there, it's develop luminous, it's volume. trying to weave through thousands of individuals on social media and find all of the noise out there identifying the signal. it's a volume piece. you know looking at social media requires a different business process that we do things with going from there to finding a credible threat, it's a very difficult process. >> yeah, i mean it seems like it would be. we've been talking this whole time about online communications online radicalization. is there any physical presence of either isil or al qaeda doing face-to-face recruiting here in this country? >> so, i would say we don't -- we have, of course, a number a small number, of returned foreign fighters. we have individuals who have been overseas and return to the u.s. where they are, who they are is an intelligence force.
our best estimates we don't have isil sitting in the united states. we've got individuals who have taken up the call to arms based on isil's messaging. >> right. but not everyone who has gone and come back becomes a recruiter. >> correct. >> i'm curious whether there are people who don't go anywhere aren't on the internet are in a physical place actually doing, whether in tandem with online recruitment, face-to-face recruitment. >> talking about the homegrown violent extreme if, the loernlone wolf. it doesn't have to be online. it could be a friend, associate other factors may cause that person to become radicalized. online happens to be when you look at the spectrum by volume, the highest percentage. if you're asking do we have core al qaeda coming to the u.s. sitting here or core isil, i
think we look to that -- look that the intelligence gap all the time. i would say, for the most part, no. >> thank you. i yield back my time. >> mr. duncan is recognized. thank you, mr. chairman. al qaeda led the way with inspire magazine, i think. which was an online publication. are we still seeing "inspire" as prevalent as it was, as isil adopted that media? is there a way to track? you've got a website platform like "en spire" is there a way for you to track who visits that page who takes and forwards that information if you can answer that for me? >> sir, to answer your question "inspire" still comes out
periodically. it has been that model has been successfully copied by another, by several of the other affiliates and other terrorist-related entities. they see that process of like an online magazine being an effective model. it's been adapted by isil, they have a publication, it's a variation on that. they put out their information, they put it out in multiple languages. to answer your question about our ability to track its propagation, it's not -- we're not able to do that. they put multiple links to it. it appears -- as you imagine once something starts to propagate on the internet it's there. it it can be -- it can reside in a number of places. that model does exist. it continues -- they're continuing to employ it. again, it's extremely difficult impossible to track really. >> for the freshman members and people that have just started following this issue, i'd recommend you get the "inspire"
magazine, take a look at what some of the information that's being provided. i've never seen the information you're talking about that isil or others, if there's a way to share that with the committee, even a classified setting i'd take a look at that. i'm interested in the foreign fighter flow. i went last year to europe to delve into these foreign fighters coming off the battlefield from syria, whether they transited through turkey. when i was there, right before i got to brussels a foreign fighter came back, shot up the jewish museum shot up three or four people, tried to flee to north africa through france. the tombliness of my travels. this is the very beginning, you didn't hear about isis as much in may and june of last year. not like you hear about them now and at least over the last 12 months. at the time that foreign fighter that shot up the museum in brusselss, germany knew apparently knew about it.
failed to let the belgiums know or the french know because they were suspicious of u.s. intelligence gathering through monitoring phone calls and all of that's come out after snowden. what are some of the challenges of tracking these foreign fighters? you talk about core al qaeda and core isil. i'm talking about the fringe guys that maybe get radicalized on a battlefield and decide you know what, i can do this back home. how do quee trackwe track those guys? >> ironically, that's an incredibly unifying factor among the counterterrorism community across the globe. a lot of our western partners they've got substantial foreign fighter flow issues. as mike indicated -- >> in europe you get there -- >> yes, sir. again, that's something they're trying to confront in europe with regard to how do they manage with this the shengin flows. we've been sharing a lot of information back and forth with
means and processes we're trying to employ to track foreign fighters. what's also very clear to us, it needs to be, particularly with our foreign partners a whole of gloft approach. we're trying to share within the benefits we have experienced by ensuring the free flow of information among the inner agency. we'll develop an effective relationship with a foreign partner only to discover the partner flow within their own nation is not optimized to ensure that appropriate law enforcement authorities have been alerted to that foreign fighter flow. things are trending positively in the information sharing. >> bilateral trade -- >> multilateral, sir. but the other challenge is again, so we've -- we estimate there have been 4,000 in total foreign fighter flowing from the west. but what we've seen again, foreign fighters from over 100 countries, and some of our our partners closer in that region have developed very effective mechanisms for both tracking the foreign fighters and developing rehabilitation programs.
going back to some points that the general made earlier we need to do a lot of information sharing about their experiences at rehabilitation, their experiences at tracking and incorporating them into some of our own process. >> in essence of time, north africans are trying to get across the med and italy and spain. once they do they've got pretty much free travel throughout europe. so, how do you target those? these are migrants getting on boats and coming across we don't know about. >> interestingly, some of the drixds direction given over last several months over isil leadership they're urging fightered to remain in place. they've been trying to establish branchs of the caliphate in other countries. so they are trying to say, hey, don't move. you don't need to move across north africa. stay in libya, work with our branch there. so that is one part of their strategy, that's how they're
trying to offset that. >> if i might add, we're working closely with our european partners on that flow from italy and then into the northern parts of europe. it is a very big concern for us not only from a counterterrorism perspective because eventually some of these people might end up applying for visas in our country. it is a high priority for our intelligence exchanges with our partners in europe in terms of getting our arms around that particular flow. >> thank you. i'm out of time. i would ask that we delve into the effectiveness of jttfs with regard to some of this that might have to be in a classified setting. >> we have classified briefs with fbi and homeland, social media monitoring and on encryption challenges. jttfs would be right. the other flaw i noticed in my travels european partners don't screen eu citizens past any
watch list as they fly from, say, istanbul back into europe and i think that's a big security gap. we urge them to change that. the eu parliament is addressing a change in their law. >> it's -- it's -- it's in work. it's not moving as fast as we would like it to move. but there are some glimmers of hope that, based upon the recent activity threats and actions in europe, that the europeans understand the importance of pnr and other sorts of data tracking of citizens internal to the eu. we some home there will be a light at the end of the tunnel going four on that. >> i did, as well. >> thank you mr. chairman. i want to thank our panel for the testimony here today. i apologize if any of the questions i'm going to touch on have already been asked.
i had to briefly take a call from our committee general in afghanistan to get a briefing from current status of things over there in my armed services committee role. if i could begin with this, as some of you may know, i spent a lot of time and are concerned about cybersecurity issues particularly as they relate to critical infrastructure. can you tell me in your role and with respect to seeing this stepped up effort in using social media, recruitment using cyber as a tool what you're seeing in terms of recruitment or efforts to use cyberweapons to attack critical infrastructure, and can you also describe what measures, if any that are also different when combatting the threat of a homegrown terrorist entrusted in cyberterrorism rather than more traditional physical attacks?
>> so, i think it's a great question. i think, first of all, we're seeing more and more blended threat the cyber intrusion piece with the counterterrorism piece. where we're at now we do see those same counterterrorist actors terrorist actors, using cyber intrugs as a tool. we've seen most recently in the last less than a year, them becoming more and more adept at cyber cyberintrusion type activitied. >> i would say that this is a very high priority concern for the department of homeland security, our national programs and protection division work with the critical infrastructure community every day across this country about the cyberthreat in general, and specifically about the threat from terrorists actors so that they are prepared
for and understand the potential for that threat and have means of mitigating those sorts of attempts within our critical infrastructure. >> mr. mulligan, do you have anything to add? >> yes sir. i mean i would agree with those points i'm would pause it again it is inevitable kind of trend they would move into that realm. they would move into that realm because it's a means which they could effect damage in a cost efficient way. and they are operating largely, they have a high degree of maneuver ability in cyberspace. it seems quite logical they'd attempt to pursue than we need to develop heckmechanisms for those sir. >> have you seen stepped up efforts as we focus on that as a tool now to be used to go operational? >> yes we have seen stepped up efforts. >> thank you. mr. mulligan, if i can turn to you, i'm very supportive of
efforts to incorporate countermeasuring into cve strategies and the use of public/private partnerships such as peer to peer as you mentioned in your testimony to make sure messages are heard. at the same time, central to any effective countermessaging strategy, though the credibility of the messenger which can be greatly undermined if government is involved. so how can we assure that there are independent voices that can counter extremists' messages without compromising the independence that gives their statements weight? >> sir that's aexactly some of the outreach efforts that we're trying to make with regard the community advising piece. it is also -- i mean it's a question of establishing processes by which people will be able to feel free they are able to have the tools to do that kind of countermessaging. the challenges that we have again, is there are still trust
definites that need to be overcome. as you said we need to find intermediaries who are willing to take up that effort. >> for the panel before my time runs out, social media platforms play a prominent role in all of your testimony. obviously, can you describe the relationships that each of your agencies has with the private operators of these networks? are these relationships institutional or more based on personal relationships? what kinds of requests do you make of these companies? >> so, i won't get into specifics, sir. i would say that we have relationships with every company that's in that environment because we have to. we have to serve them process. it's based on personal relationships as a starting point, but we develop more than that. i think each company is different. i don't think it's appropriate in this setting to talk about those particulars and with that company. >> sir, i would add that homeland security in our
cybersecurity role has relationships with all of these companies and, as mr. steinbach mentioned, we probably want to have this conversation in classified environment. >> hopefully we can perhaps follow up on that mr. chairman at a later date, then. >> if i can quickly follow-up. a lot of people asked me why don't we conduct a cyberoffensive attack to shut down the social media program. i guess two problems with that is, once that's done they'll open up another account rather quickly and, number two, i guess our intelligence gathering capability goes down quite a bit. you don't have to comment on that. but the chair now recognizes mr. ratcliff. >> thank you, mr. chairman. i want to thank you and the ranking member for holding this critically important hearing and of course i thank all of the witnesses for being here. today and for all of the important work that you do every day to serve our country.
this attack in garland seems to underscore and demonstrate unique challenges that isis is posing today. in garland we saw two dead terrorists and no civilian casualties, and we saw law enforcement do exactly what they should have done, which is protect the public. yet we're living in unprecedented times where a failed attack by isis in that regard is still spun as a win, where a failed attempt still plays into the narrative that they want to sell. as a former terrorism prosecutor, who handled the number of matters involving al qaeda, i've noticed something that appears to me to be an important difference. i between ask you about that. you know al qaeda and isis have both been encouraging lone wolf attacks, but al qaeda's been doing it for years with very little success. it seems to me that isis has been very effective in this
regard in a matter 0 of months. we're at a situation, it appears to me that isis' sophisticated use of social media is essentially having a cascading effect, if you will, where it's become a terrorism multiplier of sorts. one where lone wolf attackers like mr. simpson or soofi or rahim can use the isis brand without having to join isis. and in that regard it concern me that it would appear that isis has essentially created a terror franchise. so i want to very quickly ask you each whether you think i'm accurate in that assessment. >> congressman i think that's an excellent characterization. i would agree with you, that is precisely, they have effectively leveraged that capability. they have exceptional capabilities and they claim they
are making maximum use of every opportunity to amplify effect. off-season them using it in terms of representing their victories on the battlefield and the way that they have obviously treated our hostages. they they've treated our hostages. they attempt to squeeze every bit, if you will, of perceptionual power out of social media. >> i would agree in that regard. i've been this a long time, 45 years. i've never seen a terrorist organization with the kind of public relations savvy that i've seen with isil globally. and they've been very effective in using it. >> i think my colleagues hit the main point. i would add to in addition it's a focus on a western audience. when you look at the social media tweets in english versus
al qaeda or others they are that much higher rate. it's a great pop began da message focused on a western english speaking audience. >> we're talking about the effect of their message. i want to focus more on the cause and director steinbach, you both talked about this the unique narrative that isis has created, a false narrative. one that involves a sense of community, a sense of adventure, maybe the ability to find a spouse. we know how ridiculous these claims are for those that are susceptible to radicalization. it seems to be an increasingly successful narrative from their standpoint. i'm curious, since isis grew out of al qaeda in iraq, why did isis become effective at crafting this message when al
qaeda and other terrorist organizations really hadn't been previously? we have any insight into that? >> i don't want to oversimplify it but i would point out the demographic. they have attracted a younger generation of fighters much more conversant. they are in a situation where they have initially occupied territory in which there was fairly advanced infrastructure that could then be leveraged. i mean if you think over time as you know al qaeda has in some instances, they were not occupying optimal areas to leverage that infrastructure whereas isis did position itself very well i think they have a fundamental orientation too action that dominatures their psyche and how they move. >> i think social media wasn't as robust when al qaeda started as it has been since -- actually
since 2010 arab spring and how social media was used in those events and how it's propulgated its use and used by other groups since that time. >> just to further clarify what frank said, he's absolutely right. when you look at the internet four or five or six years ago, it's anonymous but the individual living in the u.s. had to reach to a forum and identify that forum and go into that forum. social media it's pushed to you. it's so far advanced in comparison to the anonymous internet. >> my time expired, i hope you'll indulge me and ask one more question. i think what's important here, we want to find out -- we've talked about their effective messaging and the fact they created essentially a winning brand that is a drawing the disaffected and disenfranchised to them. what are we doing to counter that message. what can we do besides -- in
other words to create a losing brand for them and i realize part of that is a kin etic military operations on the ground. but from a social media standpoint, is there a counter strategy? >> i would posite there's a three prong strategy, we're trying to negate this image of the caliphate which they are successfully representing. that's their center of gravity. the second piece is the whole cyber online media piece. going quickly back to what frank said, the range of options of over the top applications they are able to deploy, going back -- what were the options available to al qaeda? not so great, now we're in another universe of operational activity but nevertheless because they are operating in public space they have vulnerabilities there and we should move aggressively to counter that. finally the third area is this idealogical space we talked about, in terms of finding
voices that can contest the ideal logical message. >> i yield back. appreciate it mr. chairman. >> thank you. ms. torres is recognized. >> thank you, mr. chairman. i'm looking to raiding that brooklyn institute study on terrorism and social media. i took a sneak peek at it while we were in this session. i understand that as a -- as of october of last year, 22,000 twitter accounts if that account was correct and thousands disabled. in some ways i think it's good to be able to view what is being said and what is being planned is one way that we can try to prepare and prevent.
mr. taylor, there's been a lot of talk about community outreach programs. there's been a lot of talk of community awareness and community policing. this is nothing new. we've known that there have been a lot of issues in the past that need to be addressed from a neighborhood level. but somehow we have not been able to translate that want to do neighborhood community awareness to actually doing it. we've seen a lot of tensions arise between community groups and this is nothing recent. this has been ongoing. so what have we changed? what is community policing look like in my neighborhood versus the northern part of california?
>> ma'am, your question is a good question, i think community policing is community policing, i don't think it's about relationships with the communities we serve. it hasn't changed in 20 years that i've been involved in community policing. it's the outreach that happens with people who are from the community and that's what community policing is all about and i dare say it happens in diverse communities and happens in majorities but has to happen the same way build a relationship. >> you have to have the trust. >> and the trust. and part of secretary johnson has spoken eloquently about this, when he goes out to do these community engagements, he's met with skepticism. he receives complaints about profiling and other sorts of
concerns the community has, but you have to have a discussion to build the trust. we're talking about things the community needs to know to protect themselves. >> mr. steinbeck i know that -- i want you to know that i represent the ontario airport which is controlled and managed by lax i would like to hear more about the fbi's joint terrorism task force in los angeles and how they are working with my local police department in ontario. and that training is happening not only for those officers at lax or lapd but also happening for those officers who would be the first responders should an incident happen. >> l.a. fbi joint terrorism task force is a very large task force, does not just include lax
but all of the major airports in orange county and ontario. i would suggest you make an appointment to tour those. dave would be happy to give you firsthand understanding of how robust that task force is. it is a -- i was just out there a couple of weeks ago and discussing with him and meeting some of the folks in his task force but i would advise to see firsthand. >> i would like to continue this discussion with you off the record here to bring to your attention my staff recently went on a tour and i was saddened to discover this is happening among other agencies they have not been invited to participate in much of that. >> i would be happy to have that conversation with you and happy to bring those concerns to mr. babish's attention. >> ma'am if i might as well, in
our community outreach role in dhs, we are working hard with police agencies throughout california. there's a deficit of training and something that dhs might be able to -- in ontario more than happy to have that discussion and the training is available. >> thank you. >> thank you, mr. chairman. i want to thank each one of you for being here today. i heard from some of you in the past and i'm constantly amazed your depth of knowledge and dedication to your mission. i echo the sentiments of my colleagues and very much appreciate what you're doing to keep our country safe. mr. steinbeck i want to talk just a minute about the comments being made and make sure we're
clear. afs a federal prosecutor for 20 years and participated in electronic surveillances and our investigations benefited greatly as the cellular telephone industry developed there were many technologies that were interest dugsedroduced to the market that we could not at first monitor. for those internet sites and places on the -- out there that are dark, if you will you're simply talking about being able to have access to them so not to monitor them without a court order but obviously to use court orders if there's probable cause to then monitor those sites, is that what you're talking about? >> absolutely correct, sir. >> this isn't talking about just forcing them to go public so we can monitor everything going on. you're talking probable cause. >> we go to the court with the court order, criminal courts order the fists.
>> you mentioned about cve probably being our best defense against the violent extremism and the reaching out to people that it programs to be our best defense. i couldn't agree with you more because i was with a chairman because we went oversees -- see firsthand about the foreign fighter task force and there are security gaps overseas that we can't control. it leads me to conclude that our best chance of stopping those instances on behalf of the united states unfortunately are going to be on our soil. with that being said, if you can expound, what would you envision briefly as to what would be the best way to build this program, i know we've got pilot programs nationwide but what would be the best way to build this program? you mean here in terms of community engagement in our own country?
>> yes. >> i think this is all a part of a broad set of strategies, community engagement in this country is one part of that. i think we've learned a lot of lessons from the pilot studies we've had in los angeles, denver boston, and minneapolis. >> minneapolis yes. >> and now the challenge is to prop polgate across the country which we are continuing to do. we believe that the first line of defense from radicalization is the family and the community and build from there. and the propulgation we believe will help us achieve a betterout come. >> we have the jtf model for the law enforcement side but for the community outreach side, most of the attorney offices have lecc type coordinators do you
envision them playing any role in this? >> absolutely, it's a shared responsibility between dhs and the fbi, nctc and justice department. it's a whole of government and local government effort, not just the federal government. it has to be a whole community effort. >> i want to talk all three can answer this question the jtts has been the backbone of our anti-terrorism efforts and done a terrific job. it seems to me lately they are under more and more stress with the additional things they have to look into on a regular basis. and it seems that there may be more of a reliance on getting state and local law enforcement involved with the jttf's. is it a concern going forward, are there staffing concerns going forward and is there a concern that there's not enough federal agents involved going forward? >> i would be happy to answer that question. >> it's fbi, you're going to say yes, right? >> i will say as the head of the
counter terrorism division of the fbi, the media reports last week were completely wrong. the jttf is fully staffed and relies on a robust partnership. those resources are there. they have not waned and we are certainly not struggling to keep pace. it's a challenge. we have to priorityize our targets and we have a structure in place that relies heavy on the agencies around the country. >> i agree completely i happen to have been the commander of the air force office special investigation with jttf concept was created. i supported it back in the '90s and still support it today as the best law enforcement process
for getting it -- terrorist issues. i think the other thing we've done and it's not just with the jttf. jttf relies on fusion centers and 18,000 police organizations first responders and we've done a significant amount of training of those individuals, see something, say something, so that they become force multipliers for the jttf investigators as they focus on the investigation of specific cases. so i can't speak for the resource part but i can speak for the part that says homeland security nctc fbi invested a significant amount of training and effort to -- so people understand the threat and understand the risk and what to look for and report that information on a continuous basis for follow-up investigation or for intelligence to go into the ic. >> mr. chairman one brief
question, so the takeaway from this, if there's a resource issue it's on the cve side and the community outreach side and that's something that if we can help you with, that would did he have in thely help with the messaging? >> it certainly would help with the messaging and with our ongoing efforts. >> thank you all, gentlemen very much. >> thank you. >> mr. king is recognized. >> thank you mr. chairman. two incidences this week demonstrated to me the pref lance of this in terms of internet and that as a recruitment device and hit really close to him. one of them was the killing of ahmed abu zam ar he -- he was educated and went to school a few miles from where i went to school, where my children went to school. and became radicalized and as
you're aware, he was among -- he was on the fbi's 10 most wanted list and he also was the architect, one of the major architects, what we're discussing here today where he was fashioning the internet message and -- in a very sophisticated way. he was killed in northern iraq during the last week. then secondly in the area i used to represent a legislature in the neighborhood in boston where the terrorist incident occurred. and want to congratulate you on your work, finding work and dealing with that with the reports where that was linked at least the reports out there in an ongoing investigation. that was linked to this kind of ongoing recruitment through the internet. so i look at those things and i understand the importance of
information sharing on one end and what we concluded with the boston marathon bombing, the importance of both the local state and federal government working together to share that information. i want to congratulate you all on moving that forward and improving that situation. i think it's very clear although not happening at the moment, maybe in terms of actionable threats or incidence that have occurred. we'll have to expand that to local governments, state government, federal government and international because it's just the matter of time before many of these linkages materialize that concrete fashion. i want to ask two questions, number one, given the fact that it's going to be four areas not just three of information sharing, we came back several
members of this committee and understand the difficulties in particularly in the europe area with our allies and not moving forward with passenger name records which we take for granted here. when anyone takes a reservation, having port security on the exterior of european union board borders and that's not moving as quickly as it should. even the tech support we offer as a country to some of these countries as to how to deal with it is not being utilized. so i want to ask a couple of fronts, number one, i still think we can work together with countries, even if the european union isn't moving. i want you to comment on how we're dealing with that information sharing local state, federal and with those individual countries because we also found that some countries are more receptive and moving faster than others in terms of
information sharing that will make us all safer not just here and when americans travel abroad in europe but here at home too. and the other thing is the idea that we're -- doing a good job swatting mosquitos here at home when it comes to the internet, but we're not drying up the swamp. as much as we can. can you comment on what we're doing in counter messaging through the internet to try to have competing messages and what you think more could be done? those are the two questions and anyone who wants to address those. >> i'll jump in on first piece. from a national perspective we're very consciously trying to push intelligence and knowledge that has been gleaned from our
assessments down to the locals so they are more fully informed. that is definitely -- and we need to do more and keep pushing that. on the international piece you described, it does become very unwieldy when you make it a multilateral issue. so we have established a number of very close bilateral relationships in terms of information sharing that's been very, very positive. but the challenge is if you really are going to try and address these challenges in a time efficient way, you need to ensure that a broader range is -- that you have the equipment that you can be passing information about. that's a longer term objective in that regard. in terms of the overall counter messaging, the government, our government, our federal government has an interagency process involved in which we're moving to do counter messaging. that counter messaging works at the speed of government. it is -- as you understand, it has constraints in that i think the real secret is going to be
to broaden that overall counter messages and include those folks outside of the government to participate in that process. >> i would make to comments. first, this committee has been very clear to me in my role that the core customer for the intelligence we do is state and locals and we have worked very hard in the last year to try to transform how we approach the dissemination of data to state and local partners with our ic colleagues and with the fbi and others and nctc but specifically focusing on getting relevant information out quickly o our state and local partners. i don't hoe how many joint intelligence bulletins we've done this year but i think it's a record over last year. so that is our commitment to move this information and get it
into the hands of our first responders at the state and local federal tribal and private sector. when we talk about our foreign partners, you mentioned the eu the eu is in some cases reluctant to use pnr across all the eu, we have individual dialogues where certain countries are moving forward to do that within their own country. i would think at the u.n. with secretary johnson we talked about resolution 1267, i think there's more pressure on those communities to do that and we'll continue to press to get those kinds of laws passed for that kind of information. i would also emphasize that all
of these waiver countries and that's most of the eu have independent bilateral agreements with us on information sharing. that may be through the intelligence service and may be through the fbi or law enforcement, those are very robust agreements that we're continuing to press for the exchange of that kind of information. it's not a perfect scene yet but the information change both within our country and also with our foreign partners continues to improve on a daily basis. >> thank you, mr. chairman. thank you all for being here. this is -- of all of the hearings we've had, this has been one of the most productive and informative i've sat in on. one of the things that we're going to be doing in my office in the coming weeks visiting with law law enforcement and infusion centers within the
district. what i'm seeing with lone wolf attacks is going to be a reliance on local law enforcement. it is a reminder to me and all of us that these attacks are not against us as sit zens, their attacks by those threatened or diametrically opposed to what we are as a people and what we have which is freedom. freedom of thought and ideas and freedom of religion. and in the case of garland texas, was the freedom of speech. that was really what was being attacked. with that in minds it seems to be as some have said and understanding what happened with "charlie hebdo" in paris which i was there a few weeks ago in paris, it seems to be a
potential target. first question how far in advance of the event did our ic or counter terrorism know this event was happening? and how do we find that out? was there coordination with them or did this come from local law enforcement? >> we knew about it several weeks in advance. and more specifically i will say in this event the event in phoenix last friday, we do layout the threat and potential and we of course don't try to talk them out of it and if you do x, this may happen. we knew several weeks in advance. >> you know that these are coming and how much interface do you have with local law enforcement going into this? >> it's multifacetted, we put out a joint intelligence bulletin which lays out -- in garland, a week in advance laid out the events and threat to the event. in this case and events like it
we push out a communication tool called the collection emphasis message, that collection emphasis message asks agencies to collect intelligence on the event and the threat. we put out tactical reports. we have many in many cases depending on the size of the event, we have preparatory meetings with state and local, identifying who's going to have lead for control control emergency response tactical resources, it's a multilayered approach. we take with every special event. >> we have 15 years of tracking terrorism -- terrorists and their activities and threats to all of the chatter. we kind of got to where we can filter through what's a valid threat. is how responsive our local law enforcement to the threats we're laying out, do they tend to take them seriously? >> yes, we spent a lot of time
and and pushing that local level to the field offices as well as at the executive level two weeks ago we had a video teleconference led by the director of the fbi and we laid out again the current threat. we do that periodically, there's multiple levels of engagement. today i'll talk to major city chiefs on the same topic. >> i would add, sir that the -- we created a network across this country whenever an event occurs, there's someone up on the net saying what's the impact on the community? that's done on the homeland security intelligence network or law enforcement network or the fbi. our local law enforcement partners understand their primary responsibility to protect communities and understand the risks threaten
their communities and they are hungry to help them prepare. that's what we've tried to design. >> gets that information out to them and once they get it as they did in garland. >> if some of this, these questions we can respond to those later because i understand and appreciate being in the intelligence community in the past. of the communications we know that happened between the attackers and other bad players, how much of that did we know before the attack versus as forensic information and how much of that played into what we sent to the local. >> i would be happy to answer that, but not in this segment. >> the last one is, the reverse flow, do we have good channels of communications for intelligence gathering from local law enforcement from boots on the ground in the community?
this was a national event per se because it was an organization -- you may have a local event that could be a high threat target. so do we get a flow of information from the locals? >> it's a great question and again, under the direction from this committee, we worked to expand from local intelligence that's gathered and reported into the ic and relevant with the ic working with the fbi and independently with our fusion centers in the field, we've created a new process what we call field activity reporting where fusion centers working with dhs and fbi will do reports from a field -- state level perspective on threats and risks in the community. so i think we have created that opportunity for the local state and local partners to report up for us to report down and for all of us to share information
on a continuous basis. >> are they actively reporting? >> absolutely sir. >> let me highlight that more, sir. >> the reason we are pushing information out is to make use of the 400,000 law enforcement around the country, they are the first response doing the car stop and going to the house as first responders. seeing it before we see it. it's incumbent, we have the guardian process that allows for reporting and e guardian process allows reporting of information into the fusion center and jttf model to act on that. that's the crux and really the foundation of this process. >> >> we appreciate this part of our task force on commenting terrorism and foreign -- we've had other information in classified settings.
the question i have today is about first one is about the recruitment of women and girls from our country, it seems jihadi women are actively recruiting, western girls can't imagine what the draw would be except of course being lied to like most of the recruits. here we have american girls being recruited to potentially flow over there for a life of rape and slavery. there's 200 that we know of americans that have flowed over to the region. how many of them are women and girls and are there specific targeting efforts that we're doing communitywide or others in order to address specifically what's going on with targeting of women and girls? >> i won't get into specific numbers but when you look five or six years ago, the number of female recruits is almost nil. right now it's 10% i think is
probably a good ballpark. it's a minority but the fact it went from zero to where it's at now is a significant uptick for us. we look at the reasons why individuals are recruited, the specifics young adult males, young adult females what's drawing them that's part of our process to understand what the motivations for radicalization. we find a wide variety not the classic you see on jihadi other reasons that are motivating these young women to take a advance and go overseas. >> as part of the countering of it and engaging with communities, do we have messages of no, you are going to be in slavery and repeatedly raped when you get over there? and actually countering that and you know, the graphic realities of what they are going to get recruited into to include potentially testimonies of individuals that have experienced this, the way you counter a message is with a stronger message. >> absolutely. >> we're doing some of that?
>> absolutely. >> at the local level as well snl. >> yes we're reaching out pushing the message out to the communities, to the schools, having conversations about the dangers of being online, not just online because of pedophiles and cyber criminals but online for fear of recruitment and enticement. >> thanks. the next question is about the use of social media for fund raising. and i wonder if you can comment on how isis is using social media in order to raise funds through crowd sourcing and other attempts to raise funds using social media. and are you working with the department of treasury specific offices of asset forfeiture specifically how successful have they been and how are we countering fund raising? >> i would characterize it it's
a very ard uous process to build our understanding of the financial processes that isis and isil is employing currently. i would also point out as you're very well aware, that they are -- in their expansion of the caliphate, they are literally taking possession of a number of resources and then exploiting that. to a large extent, they've been able to draw on a lot of those resources for a lot of their financing and funding. but nevertheless, it's a long -- because of the fact that they are an extended organization, they have to manage that financial infrastructure, that's an intelligence effort that's under way, we're working aggressively with the treasury department. >> their online fund raising is min xul? i know black market and stuff they are doing in the region and ransoms and things we've done we're focusing on but specifically the online fundraising. >> i don't think we're seeing the same degree of online fundraising we have seen in the past by other entities.
>> i would concur with that. my last question quickly, isis has been trying to motivate people to attack military bases or attack military members. i was in the military those are some of our most secure areas. there's certainly softer targets they could go after if they would recruit somebody with access major hasan, we could have a major impact from an insider threat. have we seen isis attempting to recruit military members or those with access to bases and are you working with the department of defense in order to counter that threat? >>. >> as the chairman mentioned in his opening remarks the department takes this threat very seriously. they work very closely with the fbi and nic and dhs around how those risks are might manifest themselves within the country.
your point earlier, it's a pretty secure place but they've even identified people by addresses and we've worked with the military on strategies for those individuals to protect themselves at this point. >> any other comments. >> >> it's reasonable to expect very aggressive effort by isis to be trying to derive military targets. part of their overall narrative, they want to draw linkages and make those correlations, we have to be vigilant with regard to military members. >> thank you, my time has expired. >> let me thank the witnesses for your testimony and your service to our country. the numbers may have additional questions in writing. pursuant to committee rule 7-c the hearing will be open for ten days. without objection the committee
campaign announcement in arlington, virginia. a form republican turned independent running for nomination. 5:30 p.m. eastern. more about the 2016 race from the hill. bobby jindal is expected to announce his presidential intentions on june 24th according to a top adviser, the two-term governor and former congressman considered a long shot contender for the gop nomination has faced a spad of negative headlines writes the hill about his state's budget problems. but with louisiana's legislative session scheduled to end in june jindal will be free to hit the campaign trail more frequently. you can read more at thehill.com. energy secretaries earnest moniz testified outlining the findings of the quadrennial energy review which provides recommendations for modernizing u.s. infrastructure and calls for
billions of federal spending to improve pipe lines and electric grids and energy storage capacity. the hearing looked at proposed energy legislation and the potential for u.s. oil exports. >> i'd like to call the hearing to order this morning. the title today is the hearing on the quadrennial energy review and discussion drafts including energy diplomacy. we'll have two panel of witnesses this morning and on the first panel we have our secretary of energy mr. moniz who is no stranger to committee or to congress. so we appreciate him being with us very much. we look forward to his opening statement and then we'll have some questions relating to his testimony as well as other
issues. and at this time i'd like to recognize myself for five minutes for an opening statement. everyone is very much aware that this subcommittee and congress has been working on a bipartisan energy bill for several months now. many people are even asking not surprisingly is there enough common ground between our efforts and the obama administration to enact meaningful energy legislation. i do believe this question was answered with the a clear yes when the department of energy's first installed its quadrennial energy review was released last april. this detailed study focusing on the infrastructure implications of america's new energy boom and many of its recommendations overlap with provisions of our draft energy bill. so we are excited mr. moniz is
here so we can explore the perspective of the department of energy as the country makes a dramatic changes in its energy distribution, production and transmission system, we have a lot of infrastructure needs. we're focusing on the diplomatic diplomacy aspects of energy which is becoming more and more important to our friends in the european union who find themselves reliant on natural gas coming from russia. so we have many opportunities in the united states to come forthwith a good energy policy. and i think that most of the provisions that we're focused on in this energy bill democrats and republicans agree that they need to be addressed. and one of the biggest is infrastructure needs in trying to improve the permitting
process for example. so i look forward to the testimony of all of our witnesses today and we have a real opportunity here and we don't want to drop this ball. so we're getting close to the end of drafting this legislation. coming up with a final product and look forward to moving it in a productive way. >> i want to thank you, mr. chairman for holding this important hearing today and as well as the other energy issues. mr. chairman let me first by welcoming the honorable secretary of energy mr. moniz here to the subdivision. welcome, mr. secretary. mr. secretary, let me commend you for the outstanding work you
have been involved in on a myriad of issues all important to the american people. mr. chairman -- mr. secretary you might not accept this and you might not think this is not something you see but in my mind and mind of a number of my constituents you are indeed a superstar secretary. we're proud of your work on behalf of our nation. mr. secretary, from your leadership from the talks with iran to establishing the much needed minorities in energy initiative and overseeing the development of the comprehensive qer, among your more important accomplishments and i have no doubt that you will go down as one of the most significant and impressive energy secretaries of
modern time. see, i'm a fan, mr. secretary. as you may be aware, i have a bill that i will soon be introducing that would amend the department of energy authorization act to replace a current requirement for biannual plan quad drenial energy review. it is my hope that this bill like its senate counterpart recently introduced by secretary coons of delaware and senator of tennessee will attract bipartisan support. in fact, mr. secretary, i am held off introducing the bill as of yet so my office can continue to hold talks with the majority side in order to find language that both sides can agree on.
mr. chairman i'm continue to reach across the aisle for support on this nonpartisan issue of quad drenial review. qer addresses many areas that are also covered in the discussion draft of the comprehensive energy bill we have all been working on. issues such as increasing the resilience yens, reliability and safety of the grid as discussed. initially there are many similarities that qer and in discussion draft regarding anywhere in north america energy markets, modernizing it and enhancing the employment and workforce training.
there's still much work to be done in bringing together in areas where there's some disagreements such as inciting and permitting and addressing the environmental aspect of transportation -- transmission, rather, storage and distribution infrastructure. specifically in a discussion draft, i have some concern the approval process described in section 3104. in this section, the burden shifted away from private company and on to agency officials to issue so-called certificate of quality unless the official finds the product not in the public interest of the united states. another concern i have is section 3102, sense of
interagency task force to evaluate north american energy -- however, the task is missing representative for being the environmental quality and environmental protection agency as well as the departments of interior or transportation among others who may weigh in on environmental issues. mr. chairman as we move forward with the goal of putting forth a truly bipartisan energy bill, it's my hope that majority side will work with us to find common ground and put presidents -- precedence in doing the right thing above doing it quickly. mr. chairman i thank you and yield back the balance of my time. >> thank you, mr. rush, for that opening statement. at this time i would like to
recognize a chairman of the full committee, mr. upton for five minutes. >> thank you, mr. chairman, i want to say in response to mr. rush's comments, i look forward to working with him and and all of the members on both sides of the aisle to do this right. we appreciate those kind words. we're delighted to welcome back secretary moniz to the committee to discuss the first installment of the quadrennial energy review that focused on energy transport in infrastructure, something we need to do. america's energy picture is rapidly changing and laws and regulations need to change with it. longstanding concerns about declining domestic energy output have been erased by rapidly rising oil and natural gas production. 2013 alone according to the qer added u.s. added 1.2 million barrels per day of production. domestic production of natural gas and liquids experienced equally dramatic increases.
2014 u.s. became the world's number one energy producing nation. it's time we start acting like it. unfortunately the scarcity mindset is embedded in our policy rising energy in production requires more energy infrastructure, what i have called the architect tour of abundance. both of energy legislation and qer included a number of ideas for upgrading and expanding the nation's energy infrastructure. in light of the pipeline spill in california i would add both aim to ensure this new infrastructure is biltd with state of the art technologies which reduce the environmental and safety risk. energy abundance can be more than an economic success story. it indeed can be a foreign policy success forstory as well. recently released discussion of our diplomacy title is so important.
the discussion draft builds on extensive work done by the subcommittee on lng exports. we've heard from many allies who would rather get their natural gas from us than the likes of russia or iran. that was underscored last month. we came away with a profound new understanding of how vital these partnerships can be. in established parts of the eu, leaders are coming together to promote a unified energy market because of its potential for security affordability and innovation. in ukraine with the commitment to freedom and democracy is hard fought each and every day, it's fundamental to dreams for the future. it encourages cooperation and cross border infrastructure, opportunities for energy diplomacy extends well beyond their own continent. for example, there's broad
recognition that the u.s. lng exports will benefit the u.s. economy our consumers and our allies, while the same could be said for oil exports and statutory ban prevented us from pursuing benefits for the last four decades. and it's time that congress considers revising the ban on crude oil exports. as with natural gas, america now has enough oil production to make increased exports feasible. especially to prove the qer notes have the most rapid supply increases, economic and foreign policy experts believe that expanding the markets for american oil would be a net jobs creator at home on enhancing our geopolitical influence abroad and stamts reports from the energy administration point to reduction of gas as a result of increased oil exports, in other words oil exports can be a
win for the american people and a win for our allies. the energy secretary has been the most significant job creator in recent years but with the drop in oil prices, 100,000 positions have been lost, and case by creating more jobs by expanding market for american oil is a key reason why oil exports should be on this committee's agenda this year. while we're not currently considered any such provisions in this pending legislation, i do look forward to working with my good friend mr. barton and others on both sides of the aisle to ensure we get the policy right. i yield back the balance of my time. >> the gentleman from new jersey mr. palone for five minutes. >> let me welcome secretary moniz back to the committee and congratulating you for completing the first installment
of the quadrennial office review. it's recommendations will help us chart a path forward in the rapidly changing energy sector. this installment relates to the transportation storage and distribution of energy. these ts and d connections between suppliers and users can impact our energy reliability and security and affect our ability to meet environmental and economic goals. ts and d infrastructure is vulnerable to a wide and expanding array of threats from natural disasters to physical and cyber attacks. so it's important we thoroughly understand these vulnerabilities and how to mitigate their impacts. at the same time, this modernization can help achieve meaningful greenhouse gas reductions and enharsing safety and security and reliability. oer recommendation the forward thinking we need to ensure a smarter more resilient cost effective and environmentally
sound energy system for the future. i look forward to working with you to translate these important ideas into legislation and law. i wish i could be as upbeat in discussing the majorities energy diplomacy discussion draft. rather than building on the strong relationships with our northern american neighbors the majority has chosen to resurrect controversial legislative proposals that have already drawn democratic concerns and presidential veto threats it would eliminate the current premise for liquid and gas pipe lines and electric transmission lines that cross the border with u.s. and mexico and canada and replaces it with one that effectively ub rerubber stamps permit applications. now it will only take effect after president obama leaves office it specifically excludes the keystone pipeline and allows transcanada to reveal itself by
reapplying with a revised route and limgts federal approval to a small segment of a project that physically crosses the national border and creates a this all but guarantees permit approval and eliminates the opportunity for protective permit conditions. the draft bill also recycles lng export language designed to address nonexistent delays at the department of energy. in fact, doe recently testified and i quote, that right now there are zero applicants sitting in front of us for a decision. the last application that came out, we turned that around in one day. nonetheless, the bill would make changes to an otherwise successful process. and finally, another provision would create a task force
burdening federal energy regulatory actions with additional red tape and environmental considerations. in fact, it speaks volumes that the agency is task with natural resource and environmental management like epa owe doi are excluded from the task force. i hope this committee can work towards consensus legislation instead of resurrecting problematic issues of the past. but thank you, mr. chairman. i yield back. >> gentleman yields back. that concludes the opening statements for today and, mr. secretary, thank you for joining us. we do look forward to your insights on these important issues and i'd like to recognize you for five minutes for your opening statement. >> thank you, chairman upton and whitfield and ranking members pallone and rush. >> i'm not sure the microphone is on. >> yep. okay. >> start again. >> okay. well, again, chairman upton and whitfield and ranking members pallone and rush, distinguished members of this subcommittee, thank you for the opportunity to
be with you again today. i really appreciate the leadership that this committee has shown in working towards comprehensive and bipartisan energy legislation that includes many of the topics in the qer first installment. i look forward to working with you to move these ideas forward and really appreciate in the opening remarks the statements about common ground and the opportunities we have to work together. as was already stated, the u.s. has reaped enormous benefits from our energy revolution which i point out includes carbon production and renewables deployment to energy productivity gains. this has produced changes that are challenging our energy infrastructure and, to be direct, we need to modernize and transform our energy sectors and shared commodity infrastructures. this will require major new investments and we have to get it right. we should acknowledge that while the choices we make and the decisions we take today and in the near future are critical, we also have to acknowledge that the choices and decisions that we fail to take in a timely way are very important for
generating our infrastructure for the 21st century. to help guide these investment choices, the qer provides recommendations based on the 15th month multiagency process that included 14 public meetings across the country and consultations with canada and mexico the. qer focuses on ts and d, including the network of railroads and other facilities that formed the backbone of our energy system. i asked the chairman's permission to submit the summary version of the qer into the record. the full qer is available online and you have my written testimony. so let me just take the opportunity to highlight five crucial tasks that we need to take. first, the infrastructure investments and energy security in a broader sense than the oil centric focus of the last several decades. an example is found in the definition of energy security that the u.s. and our g-7 allies developed after the russian aggression in ukraine that includes seven critical elements in a modern view of energy infrastructure. supply diversification, for sure, but also transparent markets, greenhouse gas emission reduction, infrastructure modernization and energy response.
this doesn't mean that oil disruption is not a concern. indeed, modernizing the sproe, as well as the authorities for the use is a major area of focus. markets, greenhouse gas emission reduction, infrastructure modernization and energy response. this doesn't mean that oil disruption is not a concern. indeed, modernizing the sproe, as well as the authorities for the use is a major area of focus. through its analysis of resilience and modernization, the qer goes beyond the single focus of security policy leaving, for example, recommendations for fuel disruptions as we have seen across the country.
more coordinated state planning is also essential and, most notably, we feel that state planning grants to help states update and expand their emergency preparedness and security exercises to enhance reliability, to accommodate several changing factors are all critical. other ways to improve energy security include programs to make our energy infrastructures more resilient to range of hazards and vulnerabilities. these are addressed in part for the qe's recommendation of a predisaster hardening grant program, transformer reserves and systematic program to ensure unaging natural gas distribution pipes. second, qer and its recommendations underscore the indispensable role of states. these really are test beds. we need to advance studies such as a new framework for evaluating energy services to help things like rate structure development. third, the qer analysis showcases the importance of complexity of how our energy
revolution challenges our shared transport infrastructures. frankly, when we started the qer, we did not anticipate that we would end up with this as a major area of focus. however, the dramatic oil production increases in unconventional locations coupled with things like the rsf and impending exports of natural gas have placed strains on those transport infrastructures, rails, bars, locks, port facilities and the like. the qer includes recommendations focused on innovative funding mechanisms for these infrastructures and, for example, recommends a program for port connectors being stressed by new energy supplies. fourth, the qer recommends coordinated efforts for skills training and recruitment of workers to build and staff our modernized energy infrastructure
system and support jobs for working families a national job driven skills system with standards that include a special emphasis on training for veterans, on minorities in energy is critical to our energy future. i might note that yesterday, 85 minority interns started working at d.u.e. for the summer. i will look at how we can capture the energy sector opportunities that we have for new jobs. and finally, we need to acknowledge the critical federal role in incentivizing our investments. while the bulk of the qer recommendations fall under this committee's jurisdiction, the cross has other equities and infrastructure, especially in shared infrastructure and north american energy integration. i would just note, in closing, that the administration's most recent budget request includes a down payment for funding qer at
$500 million and sequestration has placed artificial caps on spending and the corps of engineers and others, frankly placed these critical problems in competition with very restricted budget allocations. for example, the house appropriations mark does not meet our needs for energy infrastructure. in closing, the department of energy and all the agencies that developed this report and it is recommendations see great potential for benefit and we look forward to working with this committee again to find a bipartisan ways of advancing our ts and d infrastructure. i would be pleased to answer questions. >> thank you, secretary moniz. and at this time i'll recognize myself for five minutes of statements and questions. we all recognize that the clean energy plan has been at the very center of president obama's initiatives and i think everyone
recognizes that the tension between the obama administration and republicans in the house and senate as well as elsewhere has been -- many of us feel that the president is moving so quickly through regulations without adequate communication with the legislative body. and while we all recognize the need for an all-of-the-above policy, we look at europe and see how some policies over there and which countries like germany made decisions to eliminate nuclear energy has created
extremely high retail prices and, as a result, europe has some real economic problems. so what we want to be sure about in america, we made this mad rush for change and we do so in a way that we can protect the reliability, the affordability so that america can continue to be competitive in the global marketplace. mr. mckinley, who left, was just saying that in west virginia, they've lost 45% of their coal jobs. this economic impact affects all of us and that's why we're trying to move this energy bill and that's why this quadrennial bill is so important, to look at all aspects of everything. because everyone knows that we're fortunate, we have an abundant energy supply and natural gas and oil as well but we have infrastructure needs and it takes years and so as we're shutting down coal plants