tv Key Capitol Hill Hearings CSPAN August 1, 2015 4:00am-6:01am EDT
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congress has until september to have view the iran nuclear agreement before voting on whether to approve or reject it. on capitol hill this week, secretary of state john kerry was joined by energy secretary ernest moniz and treasury secretary jack lew to take questions from lawmakers. the house foreign affairs hearing was one of three appearances that all three secretaries made together before a congressional committee with
this hearing will come to order. today we continue our review of the nuclear agreement the oobama administration reached with iran. a critical hearing on one of the most sweeping dmoemtic initiatives in years, some say decades, demanding the committee's thorough review. the global threat from iran has been a focus of this committee for as long as i can remember. last congress we passed comprehensive sanctions legislation via vote of 400 to 20. it would have given iran's supreme leader a choice between its nuclear program or economic collapse. but the administration was successful in blocking that legislation. so instead of us considering a verifiable, enforceable and accountable agreement we are being asked to consider an agreement that gives iran
permanent sanctions relief for temporary nuclear restrictions. should iran be given this special deal? in september committee members will face the important decision of approving or disapproving this agreement. we will have that vote only because of the iran nuclear agreement review act passed in may which the administration did not want. to be frank, the administration's preference has been to sideline america's representatives. so i was not entirely surprised when the administration went against bipartisan calls and gave russia and china and others at the u.n. security council a vote on this agreement before the american public. that is backwards and wrong. we've heard serious concerns from experts about the substance of this agreement. first, iran is not required to
dismantle key bomb making technology. does that make the world safer? second, it is permitted a vast enrichment capacity reversing decades of bipartisan non proliferation policy. does that make the region more stable? and third iran is allowed to continue its research and development to gain an industrial scale nuclear program once this agreement begins to expire in as little as 10 years. 10 years that is a flash in time and then the iranian obligations start unwinding. does this make the world more secure? we appreciate president obama's effort to secure the most intrusive inspections in history. but it came up short. instead there is managed access with iran, russia and china having a say in where international inspectors can and
can't go. the deal's 24 day process is a far cry from anywhere, any time. and this provision expires too. while the administration is professed absolute knowledge about iran's program it is a fact that we have been surprised by most every major nuclear development in iran's history. and iran has cheated on every agreement they have signed. so i ask, mr. secretary, has iran earned the right to be trusted? this deal guts the sanctions web that is putting intense pressure on iran. virtually all economic, financial and energy sanctions disappear. and where does all that money go? to the largest terror network on earth. gone are the sanctions on iran's nuclear program. but also on the bad banks that have supported iran easter
ritual and ballistic missile development. and two our dismay iran won a late concession to remove international restrictions on its ballistic missile program and conventional arms imperilling the security of the region and our homeland. if this agreement goes through iran gets a cashcarbosh bonanza. with sweeping sanctions relief we have lessened our ability to challenge iran's conduct across the board. as iran grows stronger we will be weaker to respond. yes the u.s. would roil diplomatic waters if congress says no to this deal. sanctions that iran desperately
needs relief from. sanctions that continue to deter companies from investing in iran. i understand the stakes but these are about as high stakes as it gets. so the committee must ask if we made the most of our pretty strong hand. or are we willing to bet, as the administration has that this is the beginning of a changed iran? these are complex issues. and i look forward to what should be an extremely informative hearing and i nowturn to the ranking member. >> mr. chairman, thank you for convening this hearing. secretary kerry, secretary lew. secretary moniz, welcome to the foreign affairs committee. thank you all for your dedicated service no matter what side of the irkssue is on i don't think anyone here doubts your commitment to the united states and the good intentions on this deal. thank you for the time you have
taken to engage with members of congress on the proposed deal can and thank you for your testimony today. congress gave itself 60 days to renew this deal. and i sincerely hope my colleagues take full advantage of the time to study this agreement torques ask questions and to make an informed decision when the time comes. we've had many months and hearings to discuss the different aspects of a nuclear agreement with iran. but at this point we are no longer dealing with hypotheticals. we have a specific deal on the table. and we have to decide if that deal advances the national security interests of the united states and/or allies. to answer that question to be fair we also need to ask ourselves what is the alternative? absent this deal or the international sanctions regime and the p5+1 coalition hold together? if this deal fails how o would we get the iranians back to the table? would new sanctions have to be coupled with the military
action. as i continue to review the deal there are a number of issues i find troublesome. i hope the three of you will address them in your testimony and as you answer the committee's questions. first i continue to have concerns that international inspectors are not will immediate access to undeclared sites. under the agreement iran has 14 days to grant access. if iran refuses access after that time then members of the joint commission could take another week to resolve the iaea's concerns. after that iran has three more days to provide access. so we're already nearly a month after inspectors first wanted access. if iran continues to say no another month could go by while this is resolved that. potential length of time gives me pause. i'd like to know how we can be sure iran cannot use these delays to sanitize sites and get away with breaking the rules. already we're seeing iran's
leadership declare military sites will be off limits to inspectors if this is their version of transparency to implementation of the agreement we're getting off to a bad start. also how the arrangement reached between iran and iaea how partchen will be inspected. second concerns about the ballistic missiles and the advanced conventional weapons. my understanding was these weren't on the table during the talks. so i was disappointed to learn that after a maximum of five and eight years respectively they will be terminated. i'd like to understand why we allowed this to happen and what we can do to ensure this doesn't make a terrible situation in the region get even worse. i'm also concerned about what iran's leaders will co-when sanctions are phased out and new resources come flowing in.
we're talking about tens of billions of dollars. of course i'd like to see iran's leaders use this money to help the iranian people. but even with tough international sanctions in place, iran has bolstered hezbollah, shia militias hamas and the assad regime. if this deal goes through how would you propose to keep this newfound wealth out of the hands of terrorists and tyrants? next, while i'm glad that iran will be limited in its development of advanced centrifuges for eight years i worry what happens down the road. after the research and development ban expires, iran could quickly move towards the next stage of its enrichment activities. i'd like to know what other provisions in the deal, if any, will mitigate this risk. finally i have a fundamental concern that 15 years from now iran will essentially be off the hook. if they choose iran's leaders could produce weapon's grade
highly enriched uranium without limitation. they could use advanced centrifuges to speed this progress even further. this amounts to iran being a legitimatized nuclear threshold state in the year 2030. my big question is this: what happens then? are we back to square one? is this deal just pushing pause for 15 years? i also must say i have trepidation. barely a week after the iranians signed the deal there was the supreme lead erer ali ayatollah chanting death to americans. how can we trust iran when this type of thing happens? it is very disconcerting. so i'm looking forward to hearing from our distinguished
witnesses. again thank you for your service and hard work. and i yield back to the chairman. >> thank you mr. engel. this morning we're pleased to be joined by john kerry, ernie moniz, and jack lew. prior to his appointment secretary kerry served as the united states senator for massachusetts for 28 years. before being appointed secretary of energy dr. moniz was professor of physics and engineering at mit where he was a faculty member since 1973. from director of the office of management budget. secretary lew now serve as the secretary of the treasury. without objection the witness's full prepared statements will be made part of the record. members will have five days to submit statements for the record. and before turning to the testimony we have most members present here. i know we all recognize the
gravity of this issue. we want everybody to have a chance to question the secretaries. to accomplish they would ask everyone members and witnesses respect the time limit. and that means leaving adequate amount of time for witnesses to answer your questions. and nothing requires full use of your time. so we will begin with a summary of secretary kerry's testimony. mr. secretary. >> well chairman royce, ranking member engel and all of the members of the committee, thank you very very much. we genuinely appreciate the opportunity to be here to, frankly, clear up a lot of misinterpretations, some element of public distortion that exists out there. there is one ad i've seen on tv has at least three or four major absolutely, totally incorrect facts on which it bases the ad. and with all respect to both the chairman and the ranking member
there are conclusions that have been drawn that just don't in fact match with the reality of what this deal sets forth. and we happily, happily look forward to clarifying that of course at this hearing. that is what it's all about. and we welcome the opportunity. we are convinced that the plan that we have developed with five other nations accomplishes the task that president obama set out, which is to close off the four pathways to a bomb. and i think as you listen to ernie moniz particularly on the technical components and see the whole deal i really believe that that is a conclusion that everybody can come to. not saying they will. but can. i'm joined by obviously two cabinet secretaries. both ernie and jack were absolutely critical to our ability to do this.
the treasury department's knowledge of the sanctions and application of the sanctions has been exemplary, and they helped us understand the implications of all of these sanctions. and as jack will let you know, we're not talking about 150 billion. we're not talking about 100 billion. we're actually talking about $55 billion that will go to iran and we'll go into that later. but from the day that our negotiations began mr. chairman, we were crystal clear that we would not accept anything less than a good deal. one that would shut off all of those pathways towards fissile material for a nuclear weapon. and after 18 months of very intensive talks, the facts are pretty clear that the plan announced this month by six nations in fact accomplishes that. i might remind everybody all of those other nations have nuclear power, or nuclear weapons.
and all of them are extremely knowledgeable in this challenge of proliferation. so under the terms of this agreement iran has agreed to remove 98% of its stockpile of enriched uranium, dismantle two-thirds of its installed centrifuges and destroy by filling it with concrete the existing core of its heavy water plutonium reactor. iran has agreed to refrain from producing or acquiring highly enriched uranium and weapons grade plutonium for nuclear weapons forever. now, how do we enforce or verify so that that is more than words? and particularly to speak to the ranking member's question "what happens after 15 years?" what happens is forever. we have an extremely rigorous
inspection verification regime. because iran has agreed to accept and will ratify prior to the conclusion of the agreement and with if they don't it is a material breech of the agreement to ratify the protocol. which requires extensive access as well as significant additional transparency measures. including cradle to grave for the country's uranium from mining to milling through the centrifuge production to the waste for 25 years. bottom line, if iran fails to comply with the terms of our agreement, our intel community our energy department which is responsible for nuclear weaponry, are absolutely clear that we will quickly know it and we will be able to respond accordingly with every option available to us today.
and when it comes to verification and monitoring there is absolutely no sunset in this agreement. not in 10 years not in 15 years. not in 20 years, not in 25 years. no sunset, ever. now remember two years ago when we began these negotiations -- and a lot of people are kind of forgetting conveniently sort of where we are today. people are sitting there saying oh my gosh in 15 years this is going to happen or whatever. iran is going to have the ability to be, you know capable nuclear power. folks, when we began our negotiations we faced an iran that was already enriching uranium up to 20%. they already had a facility built in secret under ground in a mountain that was rapidly stockpiling enriched uranium. when we began negotiations they
had enough enriched uranium for 10 to 12 bombs. already. already they had installed as many as 19,000 nuclear centrifuges and they had nearly finished building the heavy water reactor that could produce weapon's grade plutonium at a rate of one to two bombs per year. experts put iran's braektdeakout time when we began which remember is not the old time with arms control. breakout time as we have applied it is extraordinary conservative. it is the time it takes to have enough fissile material for one bomb. but for one potential bomb. it is not the amount of time to the bomb. so when we say they will have one year to a certain amount of fissile material, they still have to go design the bomb, test do a whole bunch of other things. and i think you would agree no
nation is going to consider itself nuclear capable with one bomb. so if this deal is rejected, folks -- by the way that -- the existing when we starting negotiations the existing breakout time was about two months. we are going to take it to one year and then it tails down slowly. and i'll explain how that provides us with guarantees. but if this deal is rejected we immediately go back to the reality i just described. without any viable alternative. except that the unified diplomatic support that produced this agreement will disappear overnight. let me underscore the alternative to the deal that we have reached is not some kind of unicorn fantasy that contemplates iran's complete capitulation. i've heard people talk about
dismantling their program. that didn't happen under president bush when they had a policy of no enrichment. and they had 163 centrifuges. they went up to the 19,000. our intelligence community confirms -- and i ask you all to sit with them. they will tell you that is not going to happen. so in the real world we have two options. either we move ahead with this agreement to ensure that iran's nuclear program is limited rigorously scrutinized and wholly peaceful. or we have no agreement at all. no inspection, no restraint no sanctions, no knowledge of what they are doing and they start to enrich. now to be clear, if congress rejects what was agreed to in vienna, you will not only be rejecting every one of the restrictions that we put in place. and by the way, nobody is counting the two years that iran has already complied with the interim agreement. and by the way complied
completely and totally so that we've already rolled their program back. we've reduced the 20% enriched uranium to zero. that's already been accomplished. but if this is rejected we go back to their ability to move down that road. you will not only be giving iran a free pass to double the pace of its uranium enrichment to build a heavy water reactor, to install new and more efficient centrifuges, but they will do it all without the unprecedented inspection and transparency measures that we've secured. everything that we have tried to prevent will now happen. now what's worse? if we walk away, we walk away alone. our partners are not going to be with us. instead they will walk away from the tough multilateral sanctions that brought iran to the negotiating table in the first place. and we will have squandered the
best chance that we have to solve this problem through peaceful means. make no mistake from the very first day in office president obama has made it clear that he will never accept a nuclear armed iron. and he is the only president who has asked for and commissioned the design of a weapon that has the ability to take out facilities and has actually deployed that weapon. but the fact is iran has already mastered the fuel cycle. they have mastered the ability to produce significant stockpiles of fissile material. and you have to have that to make a nuclear weapon. we can't bomb away that knowledge. anymore than you can sanction it away. now, i was chair of the senate foreign relations committee when we -- a lot of us joined together and put many -- most of the iran sanctions in place. and i know well, as you do, that the whole point was to bring
iran to the negotiating table. even the toughest sanctions previously did not stop iran's program from growing from hundred and -- hundred and what 63 to 400 to 5,000 more 19000 now. and sanctions are not an end to themselves. they are a diplomatic tool that has enabled us to actually do what sanctions could not without the negotiation. and that is to reign in a nuclear program that was headed in a very dangerous program and to put limits on it. to shine a spotlight on it. to watch it like no other nuclear program has ever been watched before. we have secured the ability to do things that exist in in other agreement
-- no other agreement. to those wondering what might happen in year 15 or 20. i say this. if you walk away year 15 or 20 starts tomorrow. and without any of the long-term access and verification safeguards we have put in place. what is the alternative? what are you going to do when iran does start to enrich. which they will feel they have a right to if we walk away. what are you going to do when the sanctions aren't in place and can't be reconstituted because we caulked awalked away from a deal that our five fellow nations accepted. i heard ask that the vienna agreement would somehow legitimate iez iran's nuclear program. that is non sense. under the agreement iran's leaders are permanently barred from pursuing a nuclear weapon. and there are permanent restraints and access provisions and inspection provisions to guarantee that. and i underscore, if they try to evade that obligation we will
know it. because a civil nuclear program requires full access 24/7, requires full documentation and we will have the ability to track that as no other program before. the iaea will be continuously monitoring their centrifuge production as those centrifuges cannot be diverted to a convert facility. for the next 25 years the iaea will be continuously monitoring uranium from the point it is produced all the way through production so kit not be diverted to another facility. for the life of this agreement, however long iran stays in the npt and is living up to its obligations they must live up to the additional protocol. and that additional protocol as we can get into today greatly expands the iaea's capacity to have accountability.
so this agreement, i'll close by saying this agreement gives us a far stronger detection capability more time to respond to any attempt to break out towards a bomb and much more international support in stopping it than we would have without the deal. if we walk away from this deal and then we decide to use military force, we are not going to have the united nations or the other five nations that negotiated with us. because they will feel we walked away. and make no mistake, president obama has committed to staying with the policy of stopping this bomb. so in the 28 years a little more, that i was privileged to represent massachusetts, i had a 100% voting record on every issue for israel. first traveled there in 1986. i have great friends there. members of my family others who
care enormously about israel. i understand the fear. i understand the concerns that our friends in israel have. but we believe that what we have laid out here is a way of making israel and the region in fact safer. and i emphasize we do not lose any option in 15 years 10 years, 20 years 5 years that we have available to us today. we will push back against iran's other activities. we've laid out a very detailed policy for working with the gulf states and others. and we look forward to working with israel in the effort to do that. our current security cooperation with israel is at an unprecedented level and it is why we have a robust military presence in the region and it is why we're working so closely with the gulf states. so mr. chairman, we will continue to push back against
iran on every front available. but the fact is it is a lot easier to push back against an iran that doesn't have a nuclear weapon rather than one that does. that's been our principal strategic objective. deal with a nuclear weapon, and then you have an easier time dealing with the other issues too. the outcome here is critical. we believe this makes our countries and allies safer. it will guarantee iran's program is under intense scrutiny. it will ensure that the world community is unified in backing this up. and in the end it will guarantee iran's program has to be peaceful and therefore is a good deal for the world a good deal for america a good deal for allies and our friends and we believe it richly deserves your support. >> dr. moniz. thank you secretary kerry. secretary kerry has been very
thorough. dr. moniz if you could be brief and we'll get back on time and recognize you at this point. >> thank you chairman royce ranking member engel and members of the committee. and thanks for the opportunities to discuss the nuclear conventions of the agreement reached. the jcpoa prevents iran from getting a the nuclear weapon provides strong verification measures to give us time to respond if they violate its terms and takes none of our options off the table. i was backed up in the negotiations by the nuclear competency built over decades at doe and supported by this congress. america's leading experts at doe labs and sites were engaged throughout the negotiations. nine labs and sites in seven states took part in supporting our negotiating position. these experts, again were essential. and as a result of their work i am very confident that the
technical underpinnings of this deal are solid and the department of energy stands ready to assist in implementation. the jcpoa will extend for at least ten years. fissile material being reduced from 12,000 to 300 kilograms. stringent constraints on iran's enriched uranium stockpile as i said for 15 years. a strong containment and surveillance measures on all centrifuge manufacturing and the uranium supply chain for 25 years. the verification is forever stronger than it would be without the agreement. the iraq reactor redesigned. and further more the irradiated fuel sent out of country for the
life of the reactor. thus the parameters are maintained and all paths to a bomb's worth of nuclear weapon's material are addressed. in fact lazon is materially strengthened in the p5+1 vienna agreement. one important area and only one of that strengthening is that iran will not engage in several activities that could contribute to the development of the nuclear explosive device including explosively driven neutron sources and multiple point detonation systems. these are indefinite and in addition iran will not pursue plutonium or uranium or uranium alloy metal lur ji for 15 years. mr. chairman, i cannot agree that the agreement does not dismantle iran's technology efforts or relevance to nuclear weapons. in fact every aspect is rolled
back. the iaea will be permitted to use advanced technologies such as enrichment monitoring and electronic seals technologies that doe national laboratories have in fact developed. much has been made about a 24 day process for ensuring iaea inspectors getting access to undeclared sites. in fact the iaea can request access to any specific location with 24 hours notice under the original protocol. which iran will implement under this deal. the deal doesn't change the baseline. the jcpoa goes beyond the baseline recognizing disputes could arise regarding iaea access and provides a crucial new tool to resolve such disputes within a reasonably short period of time so iaea gets the access it needs within 24 days. again this is the first time there actually is a cutoff in time. most important to complement that is environmental sampling
provides extremely sensitive measurements of the microskop ek traces of the nuclear materials even after attempts are made to remove the materials and a 2003 example found undeclared nuclear material even after iran delayed access for six months. the combination of the agreements eagreement s technical measures and the coherence of p5+1. any time must earn a sharp response by all necessary means. in fact a steep response must be clear from the start for any violation of the agreement. blocking the convert path i should emphasize will always rely on the work of the american intelligence community and those of our friends and our allies. the deal is based on science and
analysis because of its deep grounding and exhaustive technical analysis carried out largely again by our highly capable doe scientists and engineers i'm confident this is a good deal for our americans and allies and global security. individuals dedicated to stlenging the bonds between israel and the united states. and i quote this landmark agreement removes the threat that a nuclear armed eded iran would pose to the iran and israel specifically. we see no fatal flaws that should call for the objection of the agreement and have not heard any viable alternatives. as stated by many thoughtful analysts the big gamble would come in turning away from the agreement rather than in implementing the agreement. so thank you for this opportunity to be here.
i look forward to our discussion. >> thank you. we go to secretary of the treasury, secretary lew. >> thank you mr. chairman and ranking member and members of the committee. the powerful array of u.s. and international sanctions on iran constitutes the most effective sanctions regime in history. these measures have clearly demonstrated to iran's leaders the cost of flouting international law, cutting them off from world markets and crippling their economy. today iran's economy is about 20% smaller than it would have been had it remained on it pre 2012 growth path. united states government stood the forefront of this effort across two administrations and with the bipartisan support of dock. congress. we created a web to --.
international consensus and cooperation to achieve this pressure was vital. the world's major powers have been and remain united in preventing a nuclear armed iran. that the point of these sanctions was always to change iran's nuclear behavior while holding out the prospect of relief if the world's concerns were addressed. accordingly, once the iaea verifies iran has completed key steps to roll back the nuclear program and extend the breakout time to at least one year, phased sanctions relief will come into effect. there's no signing bonus in this agreement. to be clear there will be no immediate changes to u.n., eu or u.s. sanctions. only if iran fulfills the necessary conditions will the u.s. begin suspending sanctions
on a phased in basis. sanctions that target third party countries doing business with iran. of course we must guard against the possibility that iran does not uphold its side of the deal. that is why if they violate once we've suspended sanctions we'll be able to promptly snap back both u.s. and u.n. sanctions. and since preventing requires an affirmative vote from the u.n. security council, the united states has the ability to effectively force the reimposition of those sanctions. even as we phase in sanctions relief we'll maintain significant sanctions that fall outside the scope of the deal including our primary u.s. trade embargo and other measures. with very little exception, iran will continue to be denied access to the world's largest market and we will maintain powerful sanctions targeting iran's support for terrorist groups such as hezbollah, the destabilizing role in yemen.
backing of the assad regime, missile program and human rights abuses at home. just this week, sanctions were made. and we will not be relieving sanctions on iran's revolution guard core, it forces subsidiary subsidiaries or senior officials. some argue the sanctions relief is premature until iran ceases activities and funds recovered could be divert forward malign purposes. but the concerns is exactly why we must keep iran from obtaining a the nuclear weapon. the combination of the two threats would be a much worse scenario. if we cannot solve both concerns at once we need to address them in turn. jcpoa will address the nuclear danger. by contrast, walking away from this deal would leave the
world's leading sponsor of terrorism with a short and decreasing nuclear breakout time. we must also be measured and realistic in understanding what sanctions relief will really mean to iran. iran's $100 billion in restricted reserves will many feel will be direct forward nefarious purposes constitute the annual savings not the budget. over $20 billion is committed to projects with china where it cannot be spent. and tens of billions in additional funds are in non performing loans to iran's energy and banking sector. as a matter of financial reality iran can't simply spend the usable resources as they will naturally be needed to meet international payment obligations and financing and
debt. and the president there faces a political imperative to start meeting unfulfilled promises. he faces over a half trillion dollars in pressing requirements and government obligations. iran is in a massive economic hole from which it will take years to climb out. meanwhile we'll aggressively targets attempts to fund hezbollah or military proxies. backing away from this deal to escalate the economic pressure and try to obtain a broader capitulation from iran would be a mistake. even if one believed that extendingextend extending sanctions pressure was better course than resolving the threat of iran's nuclear program, that choice is simply not available. our partners greed to impose kostzly sanctions on iran for one reason, the put a stop to its illicit nuclear program.
if we change our terms now and insist the countries escalate the sanctions and apply them to all of iran's activities they just wouldn't do it. they wouldn't balk. and weed be left with no nuclear deal and additional sanctions. it's impractical to turning down a deal our partners believe is a good one. the joint comprehensive plan of action is a strong deal w. phased relief after iran fulfills its deal, and it's terms achieve the objective it was meant to achieve that's blocking that.
thank you again, and we look forward to answering your questions. >> thank you, secretary lew. to get back to a point that was made, as i read it, the 24-day suspect site process does expire in 15 years. the iaeau additional protocol alone, i think that point stands. the other question i would like to ask secretary kerry relates to what the secretary of defense said in his testimony about the i in icbm stands for enter continental, which means from flying from iran to united states. simply countries develop icbm's to deliver a war head and they will be aimed at us and not at
moscow and at the same time these restrictions are coming off, those involved in the bomb work are also coming off so how is that making us safer? seems to me the winner here is russia which demand and won on the lifting of the sanctions, and why did we concede on that? >> we didn't concede on that, mr. chairman. in fact, we won a victory because the -- we have seven nations negotiating and three of the seven thought the sanctions ought to be lifted immediately, iran russia and china and four thought they shouldn't. what we succeeded in doing was keeping both the arms embargo and the missile component, the missiles for eight years and the arms for five years, not
withstanding the fact that iran has a very legitimate argument which they were making that the u.n. resolution 1929 which is what created the sanctions and the structure that we were negotiating under said that if iran comes to the table and negotiates, all the sanctions would be lifted. now, they just didn't come to the table and negotiate, they made a deal, they signed an agreement and came to an overall agreement, so they felt that they were in compliance with the u.n. resolution and we felt on the other hand, their behavior in the region was such it would be unconscionable to lift, and we don't feel we lost anything in that, mr. chairman, for the following reasons. the u.n. resolution 1929 is a
nuclear resolution. susan rice put the -- she was then at the u.n. and she put the arms piece in at the last minute. it was a throw-in at the last moment into this nuclear -- nuclear resolution. and the nuclear resolution always contemplated if the iaea came to what is known as the broad conclusion that iran was not engaged in any elicit activities in it's declared or undeclared activities, all san sanctions were lifted, and no matter what happened we would lose that arms under that component, and here is what we have done in the meantime that we believe actually takes care of this issue. first of all -- >> mr. secretary i followed the arguments that you made about
the laws that we have to defend against iran's missile program, and i understand the steps that you took here. i am just saying big picture, big picture, when we end up with a bottom line where in eight years they get the missile, it doesn't look like a victory to me it looks like -- >> but -- >> they may not get the missile at that time but they can buy the material at that time. >> but they can't. we have several other protocols that prevent that from happening, we have an executive order by the president of the united states that in fact presents the transfer -- >> i would just point out, there's a reason why russia pushed it, and there's a reason we did not want -- >> because they did not want the u.n. component of this, and they
know we have separate capacities and would apply them. >> i would hope that we could strengthen our hand in this as we go along, but the bottom line is iran is getting a financial win fall and increases terrorists support for proxies and they announced that recently and it upgrades its conventional weapons and i think it upgrades its ballistic missile program in this over the time of the agreement, and has an industrial nuclear sized program in ten years and that's the timeframe only if they don't cheat. when i look at this, and i see that iran's neighbors who know it the best, trust it the least, i just ask -- we're presuming iran is going to change its behavior and that behavior did not change last weekend when they were chanting again "death to america." >> with all due respect we are
not presuming any such thing. there is no presumption about what iran will or won't do. there is one objective. make sure they can't get a nuclear weapon. on the backside of that, we have a very robust initiative that will push back against iran's other activities. let me be very specific -- >> my time expired. >> it authorized u.s. sanctions that material contribute to the materialization of missiles by any person or foreign country of papaw paw live ration concern. >> my time expired and i will go to mr. evenngel, but thank you very much. >> i want to get back to 15 years because that disturbs me the most. the truth is after 15 years iran
is a nuclear threshold state and they are legitimized in this agreement as being a nuclear threshold state which means they can produce weapons with uranium without limitation and i know you say they are at that point now, but why not negotiate a deal where they couldn't have those things in 15 years. i also want to mention a nuclear agreement doesn't whitewash the fact that iran continues to remain a destabilizing actor in the region and continues to fuel terrorism around the globe. our friends in israel rightfully are concerned that iranian funding of terrorism would continue to affect them and one of the issues i had in this agreement from day one it limits irans nuclear program. with this agreement, the way i look at it iran's financing of
terrorism will continue and could become much worse. the iranian revolutionary guard corp. can take advantage of any relief between p5 plus one. so i would like to know how specifically will we work with our allies to minimize the potential win fall from terrorists organizations and protected israel. and the lifting of the arms embargo and the sanctions around iran's ballistic missile program further destabilizes the region, and i was disappointed the sanctions had been lift, and i was told they were outside the scope of the negotiations, so in my opinion the changes to these sanctions should have been outside the scope as well. what that means when the arms
embargo expires iran can shift weapons to president assad so he can continue to torture and kill his own people. would the administration be open to further congressional consideration of new sanctions on the missile program, and the arms embargo and missile sanctions are not specifically mentioned in the jcpoa, only the resolution governoring and does the snapback of sanctions apply to violations of the arms and missile embargoes if iran would continue to ship weapons to hezbollah before the arms embargo expires and would they be in violation of a jcpoa? >> congressman, there are so many questions in there. obviously we are very happy to come back to you on the record and i want to answer every
single one of them. let me try to take on the biggest ones, first of all. let me just call to everybody's attention here the irgj opposed this agreement. they are not sitting there thinking they will get to do what they want to do. i invite you to talk to the intel community about that, they will document it they see themselves losing for their activities. there's nothing here to prevent us from pushing back the irgj and others going forward. congress and others were all free to work together to build the pushback against the destabilizing activities. let me ask you a question, was
iran stripped of that and us coming in with a whole new set of security arrangements and push back? i think the answer to that is crystal clear. you asked the question of what happens with respect to year 15. folks, according to the modified code please focus on what happens. there's not a break-off at the end of 15 years and they are remarkable constraints specifically the comprehensive safeguards agreement they have to negotiate with the iaea that goes on forover provides the aiea with the obligation to insure the material is not diverted to nuclear weapons and all nonnuclear weapons states
party have to bring it into agreement, and that requires iran to maintain detailed accounting records on all material subject to the safeguards operating records and all facilities subject to the safeguards, and all public facilities in their program are subject to the safeguards, and it provides for a range of iaea inspections, including verifying the location and the identity and quantity and composition of all nuclear materials subject to the safeguards and the design of nuclear facilities, and it requires the board of governors to take action without delay. that's a quote in a situation where it's essential and urgent and provides consequences for a finding of noncompliance. that's just on the side of the declared facilities. there's a whole set of requirements for access and inspection and accountability on the undeclared facilities. congressman, they are forever
under enormous constraints here with respect to inspections and accountability. they have to provide accountability for all the nuclear research and development activities not involving nuclear material and manufacturing the production of technology, and construction of hot cells and useable for plutonium separation, and uranium mines and concentration camps and nuclear waste and all kinds of things. >> may i suggest this mr. secretary, we can respond for the record mr. secretary to the ranking member's questions but if we can go -- the time has expired here and we will just get for the record. >> thank you very much mr. chairman. last week the "los angeles times" reported the iran's foreign minister told the parliament under the deal iran
can deny access to military sites and the defense minister also stated that he would not allow international inspectors to enter iran's military cites and yet president obama said the organization responsible for the inspections will have access where necessary when necessary, end quote. can the iaea really have access to all and any military sites suspected and do they have the power to access the sites, and dismantling iran's infrastructure used to be the administration's goal. the administration repeatedly told us that it would focus that
sanctions only on the nuclear portfolio but in the deal we have over 60 pages of individuals, companies vessels that will be de-listed, specifically mentioned. many of these sanctions are not nuclear related. the administration has always stated that all provisions within this agreement has to be agreed upon by all parties which includes the eu to lift san shbg r -- sanctions. what do you think to the family of the wounded and killed due to saul money's actions in iraq, and the u.s. agreed that the group responsible for countless deaths will be getting billions to support their accounts of
terror throughout europe. i'm glad it's only $50 billion. i feel better already. secretary kerry, you will be in cuba soon. i remain extremely worried about allowing cuba a license to open here in d.c. every cuban official so-called diplomat that wants to come to washington and will we reject any cuban official that wished to be posted in d.c. if our law enforcement officials have information related to their espionage apparatus? finally, secretary kerry when announcing the deal president obama said quote we will continue our unprecedented efforts to strengthen israel's security, and will you guarantee the u.s. will veto any measure at the u.n. security council on palestinian state hood that
calls for anything except a two-state solution between israel and the palestinians and nothing else? >> so madam chair let me come back to you on the record on a bunch of those because, again it's more than we have time to answer but we will answer them all. i want earnie and jack to get in here on two things the money and highly enriched uranium. there's a confusion of the dismantling of the nuclear weapons program versus the nuclear program. it was never the goal by this administration, not even the bush administration. the bush administration in 2008 -- >> mr. secretary, with all due respect --
>> i want to be very clear that we are achieving what we set out to do which is dismantling their capacity to make a nuclear weapon. with respect to the military sites, yes we will have access. >> we will have access to the military sites? >> if they don't provide that they will be in material breach of the agreement and the sanctions will snap back. >> we consult with iran before we get access? >> there's a procedure in place but it doesn't rely on iran or russia or china saying yes. >> so iran is wrong when they say we won't have access to military sites? >> no they are taking care of a domestic constituency in the way they feel they need to -- >> thank you. >> what they say is not as important as what they do. >> i will remind the members, we have five members. ask the question and give enough
time for a response. >> mr. chairman -- >> what we are going to do is have a response for the record. we are going to go to mr. brad sherman of california. >> we have to remember that this is not a binding deal. this is not a treaty. this is not binding on iran. this is not binding on the united states. it's not even an executive legislative agreement and these question here are not even asking for congress to approve the deal. i think they would appreciate it if we didn't pass a formal resolution of disapproval. it might be at most morally binding on this administration. so what may be important for us is to look to see whether it's a good deal in the next couple of years, because i think the administration plans to follow it unless we prohibit that, and also try to see whether we will have congresss and
administrations in the future that will take the action necessitated by our national interest. the deal may be opposed because that's the best thing they can do for congress to support the deal or maybe they genuinely oppose it. i want to focus on your remarks, secretary kerry about dealing with iran's nonnuclear behavior. you say we will be in a stronger position to deal with that. assad is killing 500 people a month at least and the blood is on the hands of the men intphin tehran. you are not going to be able to persuade them to change just by charm, you will need to threaten them with new sanctions unless
they change their behavior. we have seen sanctions cause iran to change behavior even on very important things to iran. i am not asking you whether you think new sanctions are a good or bad idea and whether europe will follow or not but i will only focus on what is legal under this agreement. you were asked about this in the senate and you said we will not violate the agreement if we use our authorities to impose sanctions on iran for terrorism human rights, missiles or other nonnuclear reasons, and then the provision in paragraph 26 that commits the united states to refrain from re-introducing or reimposing the sanctions specificed, which are the best sanctions we have got, although we could probably come up with new ones if you tell us the old ones are forbidden.
so you were also asked if we reempose sanctions on the central bank of iran, would that violate the agreement and you said no. but i would like you to clarify. is congress and the united states free under this agreement to adopt new sanctions legislation that will remain in force as long as iran holds our hostages and supports assad? >> we're free to adopt additional sanctions as long as they are not a phoney excuse for just taking the whole pot of the past once and putting them back. >> secretary kerry, it's my time and i have a lot of other questions. now p. we have got a number of entities listed on the -- for their nuclear activities that deserve to be listed for their
terrorists activities, it's just you have not had time to put them on that second list. will you be putting entities that are on the list of sanctions for their terrorists -- for their nuclear activity on the terrorists list if they deserve it and can you get that job done before this agreement becomes effective? >> we have terrorists sanctions right now. we are free to add -- >> and we are free to add -- >> we added some 60 entities during the course of these negotiations. >> let me get to one other question. you strongly do not want us to override a presidential veto but if we do that triggers certain american laws. i would like to give you an opportunity, you know, you don't want us to do it and you think it's terrible policy and you think the rest of the world would be against us, but let's say congress doesn't take you advice and we override a veto
and the law that is triggered then imposes certain sanctions. will you follow the law even though you think it violates this agreement clearly and if you think it's absolute terrible policy? >> i can't begin to answer that at this point with only the president determining what the circumstances are. >> you are not committed to following the law? >> no i am not going to deal with a hypothetical. that's all. >> we're out of time. we're going to have to go to mr. chris smith of new jersey. for the record -- >> mr. chairman on the financial issues and sanction issues there's a lot of responses to answer and we could answer. >> there's articles written by the assistant secretary of state
back in 2003 make it clear that north korea is kau lab rating with iran. what happens if north korea conveys nuclear weapons to iran and other capabilities they have at their disposal? the issue of the arms race is real and this incentfies saudi arabia and egypt to acquire a bomb and the middle east becomes more of a powder keg. and the hostages, when are they going to be free? you said if they break out they have to design the bomb. iran has been stonewalling the iae on this point for years, and inspectors have been denied to the military site where it's believed raup tested detonators for nuclear warheads and iran has refused inspectors access to the site for years in 2013 or
even images showing bull dozing of buildings and removing roads. is the iaea being pressured to not accept full access? and yesterday at the t.i.p. report release you spoke eloquently and boldly about combating modern-day slavery and while the report is accurate, i am concerned that the designations for several countries missed the mark and a number of countries got absolutely unmerited upgrades including malaysia and cuba. i went back and read the reports and in china there were 35 convictions of trafficking and that's a watch list country now, and cuba, 13 convictions for sex trafficking and if the narrative gets it right, none for labor
trafficking, and they say it does not exist which is nuts, and a year ago there were ten conventions, and thailand by contrast had 151 convictions and they are still tier 3, and malaysia had three convictions for sex and labor trafficking a decrease of nine from last year and they were tier 3. did the narratives get it right? the designations miss it by a mile. >> i would be happy to sit down with you and talk that through. since time is so precious here i want to stay on iran and i want my colleague to be able to address a couple key issues. >> mr. chairman, if i could respond to a couple issues that have been raised. congressman -- >> this is my time. i would really like to know -- >> mr. smith, we'll get answers here to everything. let's let -- >> on the question of the flow
of money to iran there have been a range of estimates of why the money is locked up and it's locked up because the international partners worked with us to take iran's money and not let iran get it. the highest number that we see, there's $115 billion that is available. in reality 58 to 59 billion is unavailable, and roughly $20 billion is tied up in contracts like china and the balance is nonperforming loans. i am not going to say $56 billion is not a lot of money but it's not $150 billion and it cannot be all used because they need foreign reserves for the economy, and if you look at the economy for the use of the money, we see at least $500 billion of demands for that $50 billion, so any kind of allocation of that resources and they managed with sanctions in place to put several million a
year towards maligned purposes, and the order of magnitude is way, way smaller and it's in line with the kinds of spending they have been doing anyway. you compare that to to an iran with the nuclear weapon and the bigger threat is iran with a nuclear weapon having the same kinds of objectives. sul money is not delisted. there are few entities whose identity has changed over time and whose leadership has changed over time and privately we are happy to go through the individual cases but we kept in place our sanctions regime on trpl terrorism. >> we have three answers you need to answer for the congressman from new jersey. >> congressman the greatest incentive for an arms race in the region or egypt or saudi
arabia or one of the other countries to try and get a bomb is to be if this agreement is rejected and the reason will be iran will go back to enriching and we will not have inspection or incite, and they will say, oh, my god, now they are going for a bomb and now we have a reason to have to get one. they have, in fact, told us these countries, they are not going to chase a bomb provideing the implementation of the agreement continues and providing we are working with them on the other push back issues, and there will be access as appropriate under the agreement between the iaea and iran and that is an agreement which is normally entered into con tpau -- >> that's the problem. americans held captive conveys a bomb to iran and what happens
there? >> i believe i heard you say, congressman, that iran set off a nuclear explosive and that is incorrect. >> i didn't say that. >> really? at least get that right. >> on the americans being held captive, and what happens under the agreement? >> my last conversation with prime minister sau reef and the brother of the government was about the people being held and we are in direct conversations. that's all i am going to say here today and i hope they will be returned to be with their families. >> north korea and obama and they convey bombs to them -- >> what? >> if north korea were to provide nuclear weapons to iran, what happens? >> they can't do that. iran and north korea would be in
gross violation -- >> they tonight seem to care. >> we have the senator from new jersey. >> thank you mr. chairman. thank you for being here. there are deep divisions in iran evidenced by the comments made by the hardliners and the prime minister and the foreign minister and the supreme leader. there are these decisions likely to resurface and what are the consequences of these divisions for the implementation? i keep reading they are going back and forth and i am concerned we get an agreement -- >> so congressman, that's a very, very good question and appropriate in understanding that dynamic here. we saw the exact same divisions of things that were being said regarding the interim agreement,
if you recall. what we learned, it's not as important as what they say but what they do, and make sure their actions are held accountable. every aspect of the interim agreement has been lived up to, not withstanding denials that came out publicly from certain politicians or leaders and we have seen the same thing here, there was a red line and wouldn't be able to do it and etc., but the agreement is the agreement. that's why we have been so clear. mr. chairman, nothing in this agreement is based on trust. nothing is based on an expectation of some change of behavior. this agreement is 100 and whatever pages nine pages because it's specific with its annexes in declaring what is expected of whom and when, and that precision is what gives us confidence that would be able to hold them accountable. >> thank you.
secretary, you said it's only $56 billion for them to really -- >> that's accessible. >> accessible. but really, they don't need a lot of money for some of these groups to start it up again. they don't need billions. they can't absorb billions, some of these groups, and there's a lot of money to start problems. >> they are finding the relatively small sums of money that it takes terrible acts and support of terrorism so they are doing that now with the sanctions in place. what i am saying, i don't think you are going to see the shape of that support change, though there will be some more resources available and it will be on the marchin and along the lines of what they are already doing and that puts the burden on us and our allies in the region to shut down the flow of money and the flow of material to align forces and what we discussed with the gulf allies
when we met with them at camp david was to how to work more effectively together to shut down the flows of money and things happening today with the sanctions in place. the problem exists today with or without an agreement. the challenge on the money that is iran's money locked up overseas is it's not in the united states, and a lot of the money is in china and india and other places. the p5 plus one agreement, if it's rejected i don't think we can rely on the other countries keeping the money locked up so you could end up iran getting access to the money without the agreement, and we have to keep it in perspective and we made the commitment to continue designating like we did last week, and we will to do that, and we have sacknctions in place, and that's not a reason to not
have an agreement to keep them from getting a nuclear weapon. >> what they have been doing over the years so -- i think that our objective here was to make sure they can't have a nuclear weapon and secondly, to work with our allies and friends in the region to do a greater job, a much better job of pushing back against those activities. i will be going at the end of the week meeting with the gulf states and we are laying out within the very specific steps with regard to the pushback and what we can engage in for security and bushback for the activities you are talking about, and it's hard to put them all in a pot at one time, and first step nuclear weapon and the next step we have time to
push for changes if we want. >> thank you, mr. chairman, and thank you, mr. angle about the leadership. let me note that while you are receiving quite a grueling today, let us note we appreciate the hard work that you are making and you are looking to make it a more peaceful world, but some of us realize that in the past we have seen people are very sincere in seeking peace and creating a -- unfortunately, setting things off in a direction of led to war and more refreshen and did not create a more peaceful world. one of the efforts i noted when i was part of this is how reagan ronald reagan succeeded in ending the cold war and during that time period we
reached weapons agreements with the soviet union, and let me note while we were making those agreements with the soviet union to put a lid on nuclear weapons in europe and etc., we ratcheted up our support for the democratic elements in various parts of the world whether it was in the soviet union or nicaragua or afghanistan we were increasing our efforts to support those people. we also denied them hard currency, much less had any agreement that would have bolstered the soviet economy. because we had that approach the soviet union fell apart and in the long run that's what made them a peaceful world, the elimination of that regime, and
i am afraid this treaty you are talking about today and you are promoting will do the opposite of what we saw that succeeded and that is that it will empower them instead of making them more a peace regime. empowering them will create more chaos and the likelihood of war because they are the main proponents of terrorism and they have hate -- hatred for the west. we have been aware of the refreshen and the brutal retreatment of people with iran and like the mek who are suffering and you noted this in the past yourself, the brutality that these people that oppose the regime have had to face.
did you confer in any way with the democratic elements in iran or these other people who are struggling for a free iran and how this agreement will affect their long-term goal for a democratic iran and thus a more peaceful world? >> as you know, this was a nuclear negotiation but i have on many occasions and met with and had discussions with folks representing different interests and as spapirations within iran. you have to make a hard judgment about where iran is. president hu -- >> your answer is no, you did not confer -- >> no, that's not what i said.
i said i had plenty -- >> but you are conferring with their oppressors instead. >> i didn't say that at all. >> in the money, the fact is, part of the effort that worked under reagan was supporting the democratic element and undermining the economy of the soviet union. in the long run what will bring peace to this part of the world is not for us to have short-term arms deals with the regimes and the other people that hate the west and are supporting terrorism but try to support the elements in those societies that want peace with the west and aren't preparing some sort of holy war against us. i am sorry, mr. secretary i appreciate your sincerity and what you guys are trying to do, but i believe this treaty will
empower the mullah's and make power more likely. >> i find my friend from california, i find his words ironic, because ronald reagan was nothing if not a prag ma 'tis and was quite capable of compartmentalizing relationships for the greater good. it's exactly what is in front of us today. something is overriding. nuclear capability in the region. shall we deal with it or not? samuel taylor described fiction of the willing suspension of disbelief. i must say i find a lot of fiction involved, the willing suspension of disbelief in some of the criticism of this agreement. it's not perfect.
it will hurt israel. it will give them a nuclear capability some day. it doesn't do enough and it doesn't deal with horrendous behavior. who said it would? and here's the bottom line. valid those criticisms may be and imperfections we can find by the score. what's your program? you know what i have heard in a series of here hearings here let's go back to p5 plus one and say let's start over. that was one of the most monumental naive statements for sure. let's stick to the facts. no, the willing suspension of disbelief is at work. it's alive and well here. including the issue of the
threat to israel. walking away from this agreement, you need to take responsibility for the consequences of israel whether you are netanyahu or a member of congress, and you have to weigh it carefully. what risks am i willing to take before i make that vote on behalf of our country and our allies like israel? i think it's an extraordinary job you have done and i would like to give you the opportunity to talk about two problems, and you, too secretary, and if we walk away from this agreement what is likely to happen and secretary moniz the 24-day problem, that's not the robust kind of inspection we hoped for.
>> i will be quick because i want earnie to get in here. it's not speculation, it's clear. if congress rejects this, iran goes back to its enrichment and the ayatollah will not come back to the table. anybody that makes that judgment has not talked to the intel community. there is no way given his feelings already about the west and his mistrust of us and his reluctance to have engaged in this discussion that he will re-enter if we reject this and moreover the sanctions regime falls apart and the folks we relied on to provide a united front and we will have set our folks back, folks. i don't know how i would go out to another country if that happens and said you ought to negotiate with us or you ought to talk to us about any issue whatever it is with the reliance that we could actually deliver,
because they will sit there and say, well, you have 535 secretaries of state in the united states we don't know who we are negotiating with and whatever deal we make is at risk of being overturned and that's not the relationship that has been between the executive and the congress. iran will say we're free, and we can go about back to our program. what i said about earlier about bringing year 15 to today or year 20 or whatever and they will take their 19,000 centrifuges and can enrich. >> for my five months at the negotiating table i doubt our p5 plus one partners would be interests in going back to the table. the 24 days is a new tool in the sense there has never been any
limit at all. so the key is in getting enough of a compressed process where we feel confident in being able to detect any use of nuclear materials, number one, over the time period, and in the classified environment we could provide more evidence than i already discussed today. >> thank you, mr. secretary. >> the congressman from ohio. >> thank you. the president specifically called isis famously the jv team, and that clearly was not true. this administration cited yemen as the model approach to u.s. counterterrorism, and that was shortly before yemen's near collapse into chaos, so that was not true either. president obama declared al qaeda to be decimated on the run and broken apart and on their heels and weak, and those are all quotes, by the way and
that may be wishful thinking but it certainly wasn't true and isn't true. why should the american people trust the administration now on this deal? >> we're not asking them to trust but look at the deal and look at the components. like i said, nothing in this deal is built on trust. nothing. it's on very specific steps that have to be taken. for instance, iran gets zero relief from the sanctions until iran has implemented the one-year breakout time by destroying the clan diaw and undoing the electrical and piping and they have to do -- >> as you know i have limited time. i will move on. when you say it's not depending on trust and that strains credibility, and there has to be
trust in a deal. you said, i quote, this is a term that honestly i never heard in the four years that we were negotiating, now, in fact in april of this year deputy secretary rhodes said the anatomic energy agency would have immediate access, immediate access, to any site the agency wants to inspect. immediate access sure sounds like anytime to me. also in april energy secretary moniz, the gentleman sitting next to you there, he said, and i quote, we expect to have anywhere anytime access to places that are suspected of out-of-bounds activities unquote. there's that anywhere anytime once again. so again why should the american people trust what they are being told by this
administration about this deal? >> may i say, my quotes have not been anytime anywhere in the sense of a well-defined process scale and that's what we have. >> that really clears things up mr. secretary. thank you. go ahead mr. secretary. >> we never had a discussion in the context of these negotiation negotiations that talked about anywhere anytime. nowhere on the planet earth does any country anywhere under the mpt have anything called anywhere anytime. what we have is called managed access and it's a process by which we get in. >> this proper days -- >> please, let me answer. >> 24 days is an outside -- for 24 years or longer 2400 years they would not be able to hide the remanence of the nuclear material, and ernie moniz will
tell you that. >> i only have five minutes. if this is such a good deal why is israel so opposed to it? >> well first of all, i understand when you say israel. there are people in israel who support it. >> the prime minister, okay he is the representative, like president obama is the representative of our country on these types of things -- >> you will agree president obama always talks for everybody in the country. >> he is sure speaking for us in this agreement and he seems bound and determined to go forward with this thing whether the people elected by the american people are for it or not. >> as i said earlier, we fully understand every israeli has concerns and fears and there are concerns about the region they live in, about the nature of the rhetoric that is used, death to israel and death to america.
everybody is concerned which is why this is not based on some element of a dream they are going to change or some element of trust. but, i will tell you there are people in israel who -- >> you are going to name a couple people. the prime minister is against it and i am almost out of time. this is one of the main reasons as a representative of the american people i am concerned because israel could be directly affected but with the icbms and the technology that could be coming the whole -- >> excuse me. we have to do to mr. ted deutsch of florida. >> thank you, mr. chairman. thank you to all the witnesses for being here, and mr. secretary kerry thank you as well for continuing to raise the polite and that of three other americans as well, and i agree it's time for them to come home. i want to talk specifically
about pmd if we don't discuss that it's impossible for us to believe the iaea can go forward. the nuclear related activities set forth in order for there to be sanctions relief, they leave out the most important point which is the one that the iaea has to have final resolution of pmd. i have two questions. the first question is, will we have access -- will the iaea have access to per cheng. am i right, the satisfaction of pmd will not be a prerequisite to iran's getting sanctions relief? >> it is. it is a prerequisite. if they have not complied and
lived up to the dates in the program, august and october, they will not get relief. >> mr. secretary i acknowledge that. by october 15th they have to have activities where they need to set out what they are going to do but it's december 15th by which the director and the board of governors will assess whether they complied and that's not -- >> they will be in breach. >> i understand. i would just point out it's specifically omitted in the list of past and present concerns. it's not a requirement. >> the outcome, if you are talking about the outcome, it's not dependant on the outcome because the outcome we have no way of knowing which way -- >> that's the issue mr. secretary. >> no it's whether they comply or not. we know what they were doing. we have drawn our conclusion about 2003. we know they were engaged in trying to make a weapon. it's not the --
>> you are saying that if they comply with the iaea and the iaea ultimately concludes that they have not -- they are not satisfied on pmd because they don't have access or didn't get access to the sites -- >> they are not in compliance. that would be a breach. we would not do sanctions relief. they know that. >> i respectfully suggest it's not at all clear in the agreement. we can talk about that, but i would like to move on to the issue of specifically the sanctions. this has been brought up by a number of my colleagues. the annex to the lists, lots and lots of individuals and entities getting sanctions relief under the deal and many of them are involved in not just proliferation activities but also involved in terrorism, support for terrorism and human rights and they went on the list because it was easier to get the european allies to go along with
the proliferation sanctions. secretary lew i appreciate that we will continue to sanction hezbollah, but will be be able to and are we going through the process of scouring the list for banks and shipping lines to re-impose sanctions -- >> we have not listed for relief many entities. >> i understand. i am asking about this list. >> there are institutions that were designated for their acts of terrorism that have not been relieved. >> mr. secretary i understand that. i have a very specific question. >> will we be under this agreement to reimpose sanctions on all of these entities if we find -- >> we have retained all rights to designate -- >> including everybody listed
here. >> what we cannot do and this is what secretary kerry was saying a few minutes ago we can't put in place the nuclear sanctions -- we have given up no ability to target -- >> i hope we are going through the list and scouring it right now. i have a few seconds left. i would just -- i just ask for some acknowledgment when we say iran is engaged in all of these terrible activities now and it doesn't cost much money, and it has been reported that $200 million a year is the amount they use to fund hezbollah. so if only $1 billion of the 56 were to go to hezbollah we would double the amount of support for five years at which time the arms embargo comes off and they are considerably more dangerous. we have to acknowledge -- >> congressman, we can put the arms -- there are plenty of opportunities to deal with the arms. there's a resolution preventing them from sending weapons to
iraq -- >> at this time we have to go to joe wilson of south carolina. thank you. >> thank you for hosting this hearing and i appreciate the panel being here today. secretary kerry i share the concerns of an op ed by david hoar wits of the time of israel where he says the nuke deal is a catastrophe for the western world. we need this as a response for the american people so as we vote in september the american people will know as you stated a few minutes ago, the correct facts. one, was the iranian regime required to disclose the previous military dimensions of its military nuclear program to in order to insure inspections of all relevant facilities?
no. two, have been been made to halt the enrichment facility. >> have they been required to shut down the plutonium production plant? no. four has the iranian regime been able to shut down the even richment facility regime been required to halt its ongoing missile development? no. six, has the iranian regime been required to halt research and development of the faster centrifuges which will enable it to break out a bomb far more rapidly than is currently the case? no. seven, has the iranian regime been required to submits to anywhere anytime inspections of any and all facilities suspected of engaging in rogue nuclear-related activity? no. eight, has the international community established procedures
setting out how it will respond to difrtferent classes of violations to insure the community can react with sufficient speed efficiency to prevent the break out of a bomb? no. has the iranian regime been required to halt the test army in lebanon? no. tens, has the iranian regime been made to surrender for trial for the alleged involvement in the bombing by hezbollah suicide bomber of the amia jewish community center in buenos aires, argentina in 1994 resulting in the deaths of 84 people? no. 11 has the iranian regime undertaken to close its 80 estimated cultural centers in south america from which it allegedly fosters terrorist networks? no. 12, has the iranian leadership
agreed to stopping hatred among its people against israel and the united states and stop its relentless calls for the a annihilation of israel? no. has it halted the production of three a day, the highest rate in 20 years? no. 14, does the nuclear deal shatter the painstakingly construct ed constructed regime that forced them to the table? yes, 15, will the deal usher in a new era of global commercial interaction with iran reviving the community and releasing resources iran will use to bolster its military forces and terrorist networks? yes. 16 does the nuclear deal further cement iran's repressive regime in power? yes. i'm going to be submitting these for the record. i look forward to receiving them during the next month.
in the meantime the american people need to know there's bipartisan opposition to this deal. i was really grateful two weeks ago. we had senator joe lieberman here, who addressed my concern and that is that the secretary of state designate iran a state sponsor of terrorism over 30 years ago in response to the hundreds of marines who were killed at the marine marebarracks. i asked senator lieberman, has there been a change in course. his quote, directly this iranian government, the islamic republic of iran has the blood of a lot of americans on its hands. marines alt ss at the barracks ipbeirut, and i would go on. incidentally, hundreds of american soldiers were killed in iraq by shia militias that were trained in iran by the irgc. so your question is a good one. has the government changed? there's no evidence of change. mr. secretary has there been evidence of change? >> yes.
in that the president of iran sent his foreign minister to negotiate an agreement to which i could pose you a lot of questions that i can give you an answer to that are yes, too. does iran have to give up two thirds of its centrifuges? yes. >> mr. secretary those are words -- >> if the gentleman -- if the gentleman will suspend your time has expired. >> yes. >> i have suggested to the members, ask the questions and leave time for response. we're going to brian higgens of new york. >> thank you mr. chairman. the snapback provisions in this agreement are real and powerful. and i think are born out of a deep distrust of iran. snapback provisions as i understand them, allows for any of the six powers to the deal to flag what it considers a violation. that concern would be submitted to dispute resolution panel. if those concerns remain
unresolved, sanctions would resume or snap back after 30 days, preventing a resumption of sanctions would require a vote of the security council from which the united states and its western allies would have veto power. it's unprecedented, and i think very very powerful and speaks volumes to this deal. under this deal iuranium would be cut by 98%. a level of enrichment for what remains is 3.67% a long way from the 90% enrichment it would need to occur to achieve a weapons-grade material. centrifuges would be reduced from 19,000 to a little over 6,100 for ten years. there would be no enrichment and only centrifuges permitted for use would be older first-generation centrifuges. plutonium, the iraq facility
will be reconstituted so it can't make weapons-grade material. materials that do exist there today would be sent out of the country entirely. number four iran may try to build a nuclear weapon in secret. mr. secretary of energy, i would ask you through robust monitoring and verification and inspections, the deal would allow inspectors access to inspect any suspicious sites. i heard critics of this plan say, well that's why because of the 24-day period, it's like a police officer calling a drug dealer to say that we're going to raid your apartment in 24 days, so they can clear all the evidence. would you speak to that, within the context of physics and talk about the half life of both uranium and plutonium?
>> i'll start with the last question, if i may. first of all technically, on the half life, the half life of the uranium isotope is roughly the age of the earth which is why it still exists in the earth. that of the uranium 235 which is the isotope that you would want to enrich for a nuclear weapon, is somewhat shorter and therefore is more rare in nature. however, the issue of the, first of all the analog to putting the drugs down the toilet is not very applicable to the use of nuclear materials, and as i have said, in both unclassified and classified regimes we have extraordinarily sensitive ways of finding minuscule amounts that are left over from using nuclear materials, whether it's enrichment or in an explosive environment to understand the nuclear weapons behavior. on that, we're very, veer clear. in addition, we have other
constraints on them, some of them forever, in terms of other parts of weaponization like nutron sources where we also have some interesting signatures should there be a suspicious activity. >> secretary lew, you had dealt with the issue of the projected amount of money that would be available to iran once the sanctions are lifted. iran's currency has lost -- my understand is most of the money is most of that money is iranian money in foreign accounts. frozen foreign accounts. in that iranians -- iran's currency has lost about half its value over the past three years, was that factored into your estimate about the amount of money which will be available to iran once -- >> i was addressing the specific issue of their reserves that are tied up overseas because of sanctions. we have done enormous damage to their economy.
it will take them years to get back to where they would have been if sanctions had not been put in place even if they got that money back. they're not looking at breaking out into a period of great growth. and i think the challenge here is, we have a pretty good understanding of what the pressures in iran are right now. we can't know with certainty what decisions they'll make. we know, for example, just to get their oil fields up and running properly would require an investment of $100 billion to $200 billion. i can't tell you how much of the $50 billion they'll apply to their oil fields, but you have to assume that one of the things they're going to want to do is get their economy moving. so that money will quickly be used for a lot of purposes. i wish i could say that zero, not a nickel, would go to malign purposes, but even with the current sanctions regime, they're finding the money to put into malign purposes. the question is do they do it with or without a nuclear weapon. >> thank you. secretary kerry, the countries that know iran the best fear
this agreement the most. and the reasons why are that for the following reasons. it lacks the necessary verification. measures to insure iran doesn't cheat. it lives the restrictions on their intercontinental ballistic missiles which the ayatollah himself said they would mass produce. international sanctions on iran's revolutionary guard corps, its terror arm, will be released, and the european sanctions. this deal could also in my judgment spark a nuclear arms race in the middle east as the saudis told me when i recently visited there. as chairman of the homeland security committee what concerns me the most is that the deal frees up hundreds of billions of dollars to the leading state sponsor of terrorism. susan rice the president's national security adviser said, quote, we should expect some portion of the money will go to the iranian military and could potentially be used for the kinds of bad behavior we have seen in the region. now, you're asking this congress to indorse an agreement that the
president's own national security adviser admits will spread terror in the region. finally, iran's deputy foreign minister confirmed we will provide weapons to whomever whenever we deem appropriate and buy weapons from wherever we can. chairman royce and i sent a letter to you and the president of the united states asking you to submit this deal for consideration by the american people through their representatives, first, before this deal was submitted to the united nations. instead, you went around the congress and the american people submitted it to the united nations and then china russia, and venezuela got a chance to vote on this and approve this agreement before we have had a chance to deliberate. my question is this. if the congress overrides the president's veto, what effect would that have on this deal? in other words would it kill the deal? >> yes. we said that many times.
let me come back to your earlier comments. >> but, this is a very important point. will the u.n. and eu sanctions be lifted? and that will relieve iran of these burdens? or if we override the president's veto will it collapse the entire international deal? >> the -- the sanctions rely on the international community's participation to be able to enforce them. our sanctions alone did not do the job alone. it wasn't until we went out and worked with other countries diligently, china for instance in order to persuade them not to buy x-amount of oil countries in the middle east would thought be trading underneath the table or otherwise. there were a lot of different things necessary to make these sanctions work. if the united states unilaterally through congressional decision pulls away from this deal, they're not going to continue to apply those sanctions. they have no reason to. they're gone.
they have already said they're gone. and with respect to saudi arabia, there was an a.p. article the other day when ash carter visited saudi arabia. saudi arabia's foreign minister said iran's nuclear deal appears to have the provisions needed to curtail iran's ability to obtain a nuclear weapon. >> i have heard otherwise but let me -- that's very important for us. >> that's a very public comment. >> for us and the congress to understand if we override the president's veto, it will stop this. that's is important for us. i have one more question. it's been debated by secretary lew and yourself that you did not approve the delisting of the kuds force commander, the iranian terror arm from the european sanctions list. i'm looking at the agreement right here. they're taking off the list of the european list, which is an agreement that was approved by you that could force you -- they killed americans in iraq and
afghanistan. what do i tell my gold star mothers back home whose children were killed by these iranian forces and tell them that this agreement will take them off the list? >> tell them that the united states of america will continue to keep the sanctions on him, specifically. he remains designated by our country, and we will not ever lift them, and that the united states will be pushing back on them. but look, here's what -- >> my final question. this secret deal between the iaea and iran -- >> there's no secret deal. >> we have never seen this. are you going to present that to the congress? >> there's no secret deal. there is an agreement which is the normal process of the iaea where they negotiate a confidential agreement, as they do with all countries between them and the country. and that exists. we have briefed on it. >> are you going to present that to the congress? >> we don't have it. >> have you seen it? >> we have been briefed on it. i have not personally seen it. but can i say something? you know we hear these
complaints. we hear, well this agreement doesn't do this, doesn't stop their terror. this agreement is going to give them money this agreement is going to do this. what this agreement is supposed to do is stop them from having a nuclear weapon. now, i want to hear somebody tell me how they're going to do that without this agreement. i would like to know how you're -- >> we're going to go to william keene of massachusetts. >> what's the next step for the united states? nobody is answering that question. >>. >> thank you, mr. chairman. thank our witnesses for being here and their hard work. three threads i'm going to throw out there and one of them there have been reports in the media that surfaced that among our european partners in this there was reluctance. those reports centered on france, in particular. i'm curious, and you can answer all three at the end. i'm curious what issues might have, that you can detail, they might have had guam qualms
about, i want you to comment on those reports. number two, if you could, generally comment about the cooperative actions of north korea and iran and how this might be impacted. number three we have had witnesses before on this issue, and they really were forceful, including ambassador burns, forceful in saying it's important that we send a strong military message should any agreement go forward. and when it comes to sales and transfer of arms and other things, you began to speak to this. i want to give you the time to address, what military options, what are our strongest saupgzoptions that we still have and how we can act on this. i'm going to give all three of you the remainder of my time so you can answer some questions and i won't be interrupting you. >> thank you congressman. let me say quickly because i want my colleagues to have a chance to catch up here. but on the europe