tv Politics and Public Policy Today CSPAN September 14, 2015 9:00am-11:01am EDT
that's all for this edition of "question time wrap." thanks for watching. tonight, on the communicators, gary epstein, chair of the fcc's incentive auction task force discusses the upcoming broadcast spectrum auction allowing wireless companies to bid on air wave space. >> a congressional determination that was made in the spectrum act. one thing i do want to emphasize, that we are not taking spectrum from broadcasters. it is a voluntary auction on behalf of the broadcasters. broadcasters consider -- continue to be an extremely
valuable service. congress passed the act where broadcasters on a one-time-only basis will be able to relinquish spectrum rights in return for a shares of the proceeds of the forward auction. so, what it is is congress' determination and the fcc's implementation to use market forces to make available more low-band spectrum available to meet needs. the need for broad band spectrum is burgeoning exponentially. there is not a lot of good low-band spectrum left. this is a new and novel method that congress has put in place and the fcc is to implement. tonight at 8:00 eastern on the communicators, on c-span 2. live here on c-span 3, a day-long series of discussions on taiwan hosted by the center for strategic and national studies and the brookings institute in washington d.c. talking about the issues and politics of taiwan's upcoming
elections and also u.s. policy toward taiwan. first we'll have introductions and then the first panel of the day on current policy issues in taiwan. that's expected to be about an hour and a half. the moderator will be bonnie glaser. she is the director of the project on chinese power at the center for strategic and international studies. expected to get under way here momentarily.
live here, day-long series of discussions on taiwan ahead of their 2016 elections. first panel of the day is going to be on current policy issues, and then around 11:00 they'll be talking specifically about the elections in taiwan with a number of professors and fellows from the chair and taiwan studies at the brookings institution. we just showed you an australian prime minister's question time event. you can find that anytime online c-sp c-span.org. breaking news from the prime minister of australia has been ousted from his position by an internal government challenge and the party's former leader was elected to replace him.
we're going to go ahead and brings things to order. if folks could take their seats. if folks could take their seats. my name is chris johnson. i am the chair here at csis. i'm pleased to have the opportunity to open this outsiding conference that we'll be having today which we're doing jointly with the brookings institution. thank you to richard bush. our coconvener of the conference. pleased to be working cooperatively with brookings on this. thanks as well to my colleague bonnie glaser for her assistance in helping us to pull this together. we have got i think a very solid set of presentations and discussions for you today. very robust set of topics and presenters. i think we'll move through the
day by starting off looking at some of the current policy issues in taiwan. and what they're facing domestically and how they think about that in the context of cross-strait relations. then we'll have a very interesting panel secondly on the 2016 elections in taiwan, how that is shaping up, how we expect that to affect cross-strait relations. i think it's fair to say that there is a lot of speculation with regard to what might happen in the cross-strait relations context, should either the dpp come back to power or if the kmt manages to win and stark commentary out there about how the mainland might react to those scenarios. it will be useful to get panelists' impressions. then a luncheon speaker with shelley rigger, a distinguished scholar in the field. she'll talk to us about how to think about the state of cross-strait relations and what that means for the various
political pieces that are going on. this afternoon we'll wrap up with a presentation on the u.s.'s taiwan policy with several of our colleagues here at csis but also folks from outside who are long-time watchers of cross-strait relations and of course the u.s.-china-taiwan triangular relationship. with xi jinping's visit here in a couple weeks and with everything that's been going on between the u.s. and china with regard to cyber, south china sea, even human rights issues. i'm just back from beijing where it's clear there is nervousness with regard to the summit. we felt this would be a particularly good time to give taiwan and cross-strait relation es the spotlight and not forget how important that is in the context of our bilateral relationship with china and taiwan and the trilateral context. with that i'll invite bonnie glaser to come up as the
moderator of our first panel and her two panelists to join her. we'll have several minutes of presentations and then we'll have an open time for q & a from the audience. i'll remind folks, as per usual, when asking a question, please identify yourself. where you are from. and do confine your question to a question rather than a soliloquy. i'll ask bonnie to come up and our panelists to join us as well. thank you very much.
good morning, everyone. i'm bonnie glaser, a senior adviser for asia here and director of the new project that we are standing up on chinese power. so you can all look in the future for some of our products and things that we're going to be doing related to that project. this panel is going to focus on the situation domestically in taiwan, some of the challenges, opportunities in the context, of course, of the upcoming elections. as you all know, the elections will be january 16th, and there are three candidates. tsai ing-wen is the dpp candidate currently leading in almost all the polls by double
digits. hung hsiu-chu is the candidate. she is in third place and. an independent candidate polling second. there are many issues to talk about, i think, today. of course, cross-strait relations are on the minds of many of us, and so i am sure we will talk about the candidates' policies towards the mainland and how the election of the dpp might alter the landscape and the dynamics across the strait. but i would really also like to talk about some of the internal challenges that taiwan faces. we'll talk about the economy and perhaps some of the other issues that pertain to perhaps, you know, employment prospects, energy, nuclear power, for example is something that is
very controversial in taiwan. so there's lots of things on the agenda, and i -- really, we could not have two better speakers, and we're so pleased that they both flew out from taiwan to join us to have this discussion today. so speaking first to my right is tung chen-yuan, who is distinguished professor at the graduate institute of development studies and director of the center for prediction markets at national cheng chi university. from 2006 to 2008, tung chen-yuan served in the mainland affairs council as vice chairman. that was during the prior presidency. to my left is professor ho szu-yin, currently at the graduate institute of
international affairs and strategic studies at tamkang university. in the past under the first administration of president. he served as national security council from 2008 to 2010. i very much look forward to great presentations and a very rich discussion afterwards. i'll ask you, professor tung, to start first. you may speak from there if you wish. >> good morning, everyone. i would like to use a powerpoint to explain my presentation. thank you very much. bonnie's warm introduction. good morning. i will try to present the next page, you can see who is most likely to win election in taiwan
next year. secondly, why is taiwan so popular? third, most people are concerned about cross-strait relations so i'll discuss this issue in two respects. first one is what is the president's legacy on cultural relations? finally, if taiwan win the election -- what will taiwan's winning of the election influence cross-strait relations and trilateral relations among taiwan, the united states and china. so who is most likely to win the election? as most have observed the polls in taiwan, you can see that ing with wen is in the lead. about -- her average rating was
about around 40% or higher, sometimes to 50%. then 20% and even below 20%. it's highly possible that ing wen will win next year. most people expect her to win the election. more than 80% of people expect so. also, according to the political futures market in taiwan as bonnie pointed out. around 90% of probabilities is that ing-wen might win the election. why is she so popular in taiwan? first of all, the president has major responsibility for this outcome. according to opinion polls by taiwan indicators of research,
over the last three and a half years the president's approval rate on average was below 20%. so people are -- were so dissatisfied with the current policy performers of president ma. so this quite important reason let be so unpopular in taiwan. over the last three and a half years most people in taiwan perceive that president ma is leading taiwan into the wrong direction. if we compare in terms of
personality and capability. if you look at the polls most people believe that tsai ing-wen is more capable in terms of overall running the country and in terms of tsai ing-wen's ability to communicate relations with china. policy, crisis management and particularly even people were asked whether which one -- which candidate will be able to maintain peace. most people still believe tsai ing-wen will do a better job compared to the others. if this is the situation, then as people will wonder, how this kind of outcome impact relations? now i'll shift to the subject of cultural relations. first of all, we need to understand the legacy of president ma in the past seven
years, over the last seven years cultural relations has been stabilized and there has been open negotiation. there are already 11 meeting in china. in addition, both sides sign 23 agreements already economic cooperation framework agreement. recently they signed another agreement between china and taiwan. the political foundation for this interaction, most people have heard that the consensus is the best foundation. if we look deeper, the foundation for china and taiwan to interact is so-called zero at
consens consensus. the so-called consensus is one china with different interpretations. the so-called consensus is one china principle, period. so that is quite different. there is very fragile but it is feasible foundation for both sides to interact with each other. there is no sufficient mutual trust and the political foundation for further talks on political issues. this will undermine the current comprehensive changes between china in taiwan. over the last seven years, china has maintained more open and convenient changes and also taiwan can maintain stable diplomatic relations with our allies. we sign a lot of peace agreements with other countries and also we signed two quick
cooperation agreements with new zealand and singapore. furthermore, taiwan has participated in war heads assembly spatial observer and joined as an observer. people in taiwan did not appreciate this kind of result very much. if we look at the policy approval rating for president ma, president ma experienced negative approval rating over the last seven years, particularly over the last three years at around 30%. so this is quite serious for president ma to continue to deepen exchanges and also sign agreements with china. from my perspective, i would say there are six impediments to
president ma's communication with china. he paid too much attention on cross-strait consensus but he paid less or insufficient attention on current position. i would like to explain later. secondly, president ma tried to continue to deepen cross-strait relations. on the other hand, most people in taiwan are quite concerned about economic security. and third, president ma overall would like to effect current interest in terms of promote -- from taiwan's people point of view most people are quite concern concerned. most people would say president ma's policy is more pro large enterprises in taiwan instead of public interest. in addition, president ma
cross-strait relation will bring about problems for taiwan. most people are not satisfied in this respect. fifth, president ma continue to interact with china very open. i just mentioned to you, you know, there are -- 23 agreements have been signed between taiwan and china. in addition, kmt has been active and open in positions with xi jinping. but most people in taiwan has a lot of concern on the so-called supervision and the transparency issue in taiwan. and finally, president ma tried functional negotiation is necessary in the beginning but we require or request taiwan to conduct political talks in
china. without the political talks it will be impossible to resolve the differences between taiwan and china. also this kind of situation will undermine people's confidence to deepen exchanges and sign agreements with china. so this is what people in taiwan perceive president ma is more pro-china. around 60% of people in taiwan perceive president ma is pro-china and less than 30% of people in taiwan disagree. if we look at cross-strait economic operation agreements, most people have a lot of concern on the so-called economic security issue. even from economic perspective, more and more people in taiwan still have concern on the benefit. around 50% of people believe that the benefit -- the cost of
cross-strait economic operation or changes will be of benefit. particularly, the last column shows that, in terms of security and the sovereignty issue, a lot of people have a lot of concerns on the so-called security and sovereignty issue. if you look at the polls, around 50% of people in taiwan have raised that concern. but president ma don't think this is reasonable or justifiable position to stop him from continuing negotiation with china. looking at the contribution issue. most people in taiwan believe that cross-strait economic changes will benefit large enterprise most and will hurt blue-collar workers and farmers and fishermen. you can see that more than 70% of people in taiwan believe that
cross-strait economic changes will be most favorable to large enterprises. so this will be a very strong concern in taiwan. these changes will not benefit taiwan's economy from people's perspective. so this will stop -- will jeopardize further negotiation and even passing the agreements in congress. the fourth concern is about taiwan's international participation. over the last seven years compared to the prior president's period. maintained at around 44% in taiwan. largely speaking, people in taiwan are quite concerned about the military threat from china and also from china's objection to taiwan's international participation. so in this perspective people in taiwan do not approve of
president ma's foreign policy achievement as well. so you can see that president ma's approval rating on foreign policy is around 31%. the disapproval rating was around 56%. just this year, couple months ago. so this is quite serious, if president ma would continue to proceed with cross-strait participation between taiwan and china. in terms of transparency and supervision, a similar result. people still have concerns on this issue. that is why some movement in taiwan occurred in march 2013. and then, president ma always mention that there is no consensus in taiwan so taiwan should not proceed with political talks with china. on the other hand, i think people have fairly less
ing-wen's and hung hsiu-chu's positions. fundamental political policy. if she win the election. this is most important -- this position has been elaborate on april 9th in taiwan. in addition, he also would like to continue to defend peaceful relations on constitutional order. this position has been elaborated in june in washington d.c. a couple months ago. regarding hung hsiu-chu's position. just couple months later, she
tried to -- she did not just change her position on this statement. so she will continue to advance so-called political talks with china. in her recent statement. most people believe that president in taiwan would maintain status quo. instead hung hsiu-chu might change status quo in the future. that's very important for people in china to support tsai ing-wen since 85% of people in taiwan support to maintain status quo. you look at cross-strait policy. approval rating for tsai ing-wen were also much higher than hung hsiu-chu.
you can see tsai ing-wen's policy is much higher in terms of approval rating. almost 63%. in terms of people's confidence in tsai ing-wen's negotiation with china to maintain -- safeguard taiwan's interest is the same, almost 40% of people believe tsai ing-wen will be much better than hung hsiu-chu. we asked people whether next administration negotiate a new initiative to repress consensus. around 60% of people believe the next administration should negotiate a new initiative or consensus. if tsai ing-wen wins the election, and a lot of people give mandates to a new president to conduct political talks with china. so my overall judgment on the future of cross-strait cultural
issues is follows. continue changes in negotiation would depend on if present negotiations are resolved with the mediation of the united states, particularly in the wake of the presidential election and cross-strait operation. third, cross-strait challenges and cultural changes will continue with minor impact with china's sanctions, reducing china's tourism to taiwan and investment to taiwan. so how do i come to these conclusions? i look at the priority for xi
jinping policy. xi jinping's priority. first, he would like to avoid any possible independence in taiwan, which is quite impossible because of taiwan's public opinions and policy to maintain the status quo. secondarily, china would also like to maintain peace and stability of trade so china can focus efforts on domestic issue. recently china's economy's has been in a downturn. xi jinping would also like to avoid any impression or results of chinese current policy failure over the past 14 years since 2002. if tsai ing-wen win election and continues to insist on the
current policy approach toward china. fourth with political conditions for taiwan, tsai ing-wen would like to maintain functional negotiation with china. and would like to conduct political talks. if tsai ing-wen wins, the policy would be follows. avorr avoiding china's military annexation. quite impossible. china's policy on domestic issue. this is consensus between taiwan and is also a consensus within china. china -- taiwan would like to maintain peace so it can focus efforts on domestic issues and assure our allies' interest in the region. and third tsai ing-wen would
like to maintain peace and stability. finally, would also like to conduct political talks to resolve political disputes without any pre-condition. from china's point of view, china has to avoid any impression or result of this policy failure. china's government will tern continue to expert pressure on the consensus and negotiate a new consensus acceptable to both sides in the future. secondly, it is quite possible for both sides to reconcile to reach a new tacit agreement or consensus because china's policy towards taiwan is so realistic when you see the adjustment -- china adjusting its policy in '96, 2004 and even 2008, in the
past. but, from taiwan's perspective, 7y wins election, the challenge is quite staggering because she needs to balance the six points for president ma and embrace the identity. i will show you the figures afterwards. in addition, i would say the most important job for tsai is to force consensus and public opinions and international powers. finally will be be acceptable to china. this figure shows that power between taiwan and china has changed over the last 20 years.
in around 1992 on the scale of united states to japan and china was 27 times. right now, last year, it's only barely above two times. you can see that power change. and this will have impact on our negotiation power with china. relatively speaking, taiwan's is scared versus china. last year this increased to almost 20 times. so you can see that, you know, we face tremendous challenge in the future. as bonnie pointed out, we also have a lot of tests in taiwan to reform structure and face domestic issue. this is a challenge for tsai ing-wen if she wins election. i'll stop here.
i welcome your comments. thank you. [ applause ] very comprehensive. you raised lots of issues. i'm sure we'll have many questions, from me as well as the members of our audience today. before that we'll listen to professor ho szu-yin. >> thank you for your kind invitation to this event. actually, i'm going to sit here if it's okay. >> that's just fine. >> professor tung chen-yuan's analysis is very much based on numbers and figures. i have no qualms with his analysis. i actually agree with him on most of his analysis. my analysis will be very much based on power. the currency, the currency of international politics. power, both in domestic level as well as in cross-strait level. so i'm going to talk about the
day after after the new president is sworn in on may 20th of next year. i assume that kmt will lose its majority in the legislature. given this power configuration in taiwan's domestic politics, there are a number of concerns that, of course, and i have a tremendous ramifications for cross-strait relations. taiwan's politics since the last year especially, after the sunflower movement last spring, has drifted in a very much toward taiwan independence. i will say that is not -- let me put it in a better way.
the undertone of this election has a lot to do with taiwan independence argument. and if you look at the polemics in taiwan right now, it pretty much reflects the thoughts of taiwan independence. so once tsai ing-wen is sworn in as the president of the roc, i think the movement, the political -- right now politically correct thought will carry the momentum into taiwan's domestic politics. that will be a major issue now for tsai ing-wen. professor tung chen-yuan stated clearly that tsai ing-wen's is committed to maintaining status
quo. i pay close attention to the articulations by dpp scholars, politicians, and basically they believe that it will not do anything provocative to china. i believe they are true to their words. but the cross-strait really is, now -- will -- in cross-strait relations. i'll elaborate on that point later. if the taiwan independence undertone carries its momentum after the may 20th inauguration, i think the question really is will tsai ing-wen be able for willing to stifle this momentum, which was -- which it, by then, would have been tremendously
helpful for her -- for her being elected into the presidential house. that is one thing. and then -- then i could imagine that the -- i said earlier that the kmt will probably lose its majority position within the legislature. then you cannot count on the dpp -- i mean the kmt legislators to exert a meaningful check and balance against any proposals to amend the constitution. and then, in that case, it would be up to tsai ing-wen to stop this call for constitutional amendment. and i, at this point of time i don't know if she is able or willing to do that. and then -- then we take a look
at the kmt. i think the kmt by then will have suffered. it is also suffering three major deficiencies, i think. one is it has an ideology that does not provide identity comfort to a lot of taiwanese people. especially not the younger generation. that is very important. and the second point is, kmt will have a -- should i say -- leadership vacuum because its current chairman had said -- had announced that he won't serve as the party chairman after the general election. the third thing is, kmt now, because of the lack of strong leadership, because of the lack of a suitable ideology that it
can provide identity comfort, it lacks the ability to mobilize the general public. thus, i said, kmt could not be expected to serve as a check and balance against any tide for constitutional amendment. that is extremely important. and both have -- i mean, the tsai ing-wen's policy as well as the lack of meaningful check and balance within the system will have tremendous implication on how china perceives tsai ing-wen's policy. i want to say a couple of words on china's domestic policy situation. china is having -- is encountering tremendous difficulties in its economic
development. we all know that. 30 years of imbalanced development could not be rebalanced overnight. or even over a couple of years. the longer the economic imbalance, as incurred by the economic trajectory china has had for the past 30 years, would need a lot of rebalancing efforts. and i don't see china can do that. so that leaves china's leadership. leaves a national -- nationalism as the only thing to -- for the legitimacy of chinese leadership. that i think is -- i'm pretty sure about that. so if nationalism is the only
problem for the ccp, then i think china has -- would have a natural tendency to treat taiwan more strictly rather than more leniently. that's my thinking. of course, on top of that is xi jinping's leadership style. he concentrates all the power in his own hands. he is much more assertive than most of us would think three years ago. and then, he -- he has that kind of decision-making style that can pretty much catch one off guard. so this is power politics in chinese domestic politics. now, for taiwan's domestic political configuration and
china's domestic political configuration, i think both will have tremendous impact on our cross-strait relations. the kmt's ideology is pretty much operationalized as the 92 consensus. this 92 consensus, the whole concept is actually edifice. it's not just a four-character idiom for expediency or for convenient uses. actually, it is an edifice that integrates the national positions of foreign policy, even down to the ministry of education it be guidelines. and actually ma is very good at that. to make the 92 consensus as
logically consistent and integral as possible. that is his strength. whether that edifice, the 92 consensus, can provide comfort to taiwan people, that's another story. but that thing, the 92 consensus is an edifice, is extremely useful to stabilizing cross-strait relations. and the edifice includes some big items such as i wrote here. the roc, national title, the adherence and strict, firm adherence to roc constitution, mutual non-recognition of sovereignty and mutual non-denial of governing authority. and no reunification, no taiwan
independence and no use of force. those are the big items. there are smaller items, such as the symbols involved in ma's various speeches. ministry of, ministry of foreign affairs protocol in dealing with the chinese authorities and not international occasions. and then, of course, china as mainland rather than china, and that is part of the edifice. now, this is integral. so when they would adhere to status quo and then it doesn't recognize it doesn't want the tenets of the consensus, she still has to deal with the various components, big items, small items, medium items under
this consensus. so it is very possible for her to do anything that would deviate from this consensus design. and then that, of course, would have an impact on how china perceives her administration. and i would have to say, i digress a little bit. i have to say that international politics, if you incur audience costs, in our disciplines, then you can have credibility to the other side. that is, you draw a line. you tell the other side, if i pass the line, i will be
suffering domestically. i will suffer tremendous costs. then the other side will believe you. and then this is where credibility comes from. so say in international politics, one side can say that, okay, look. my domestic politics, especially the parliament, especially some other constitution or designs will give me tremendous cost, if i give concession to you. then the other side will probably believe what you say and give you concessions rather than asking you for more concessions. this consensus is actually tying one's hands approach to cross-strait relations. and it is this. of course, we know that the dpp and some of taiwan's
international friends criticize them for not being active and not being on the international scene. but the thing is, if there is no such hand-tying approach that is based on the consensus or diplomatic truce, then there couldn't be -- there couldn't be stability across the taiwan strait. so this is actually a dilemma -- i shouldn't say that. when a small state faces a strong state, a great power, this is always the case. so i said this 92 consensus as an edifice creates a lot of hand tying for the administration and at the same time creates a lot of credibility across the taiwan strait as well as internationally. and now, there are several -- so the real question is, i think
true to her words, we are trying to mend the status quo, and we will not do anything that will be provocative to china. he just said that very clearly. but the question really is wh when -- that really is the question. will china buy that? i tend to think not for several reasons. the first thing is china right now does not give any benefit to china. so that means taiwan's initial footing in the administration, in the cross-strait relations, is even lower than that. that is very important. and that's the first thing.
the second thing, china will not because it wants to avoid what i call quote, unquote -- what i would call racing toward the bottom in taiwan. that is deterring to put pressure on thai, can serve some deterrence purpose. that is, prevents the worst from happening, further happening in taiwan. the third thing is great power credibility. it is not just regarding taiwan. it is some other neighboring countries. and i think a great power of credibility might be on china and its policy toward taiwan. and then there is leadership can be underlined if china shows -- if china now looks the other
way. when they do not recognize the consensus. we are all familiar with that and the foundation is not firm, then there can be an earthquake. the autocracy of bureaucratic politics in taiwan. when the leader of an authoritarian regime is as strong, the bureaucrats are involved with the taiwan. i think not automatically move toward that guidepost. the great leaders. so the bureaucrats would direct the decision-making process, the implementation process, the
interpretation, the policy analysis all toward that direction. that can be tremendously humbling for cross-strait relations. the fifth thing is this. taiwan is the first in two or three years will be overlapping with xi jinping paving the way for the next party congress. he needs to consolidate further in his power. right now he's not consolidated in my judgment. his anti-corruption campaign encounters -- creates so many enemies within the region. so he will have to consolidate his power so that the next generation leaders, of course, will be of his appointment. can be put in place. now, in the next party congress, and during this time, i think xi jinping will not make it easy on taiwan.
so what will china do? i don't think china will take drastic measures against taiwan. instead, china will tighten the screws gradually. that would, of course, hurt taiwan people's feelings. taiwan people are very sensitive to what china has to say or do. so even though the measure is not that drastic, it is relatively mild, of course, in a former chinese perspective, that will hurt taiwan's feelings. what concerns me is that this will have a negative impact on taiwan's domestic politics which will, in turn, have a negative feedback loop on china. so that would be the thing that we have to pay very close attention to.
so of all the measures, the mild measures, china may undertake against taiwan, i think the stoppage of communication between -- would be the most important one. it is even more serious where on the surface is looks okay. but in reality, it poses a tremendous danger to cross-strait relations. this is because, when there is a secession of an official channel betwe between, that pretty much presupposes the stoppage or the uselessness of a backdoor channel. that presupposes the failure of
a backdoor channel. that's my imagination. and then the thing is if there is a stoppage of formal communication channels, then i think -- now, any small incident across the taiwan strait can be brought out of proportion. because, now, both sides do not have the communications, channel communication channels to really to downscale this incident. so i can see that this is a very, very serious measure that china will take. chinese officials have said repeatedly too many times i care to count that there is no basis to consensus, then there's no
way for china not to conduct communications with taiwanese authorities. they have said this so many times. so that leaves what i just said, that will leave crisis management capability and self-restraint of each side extremely important. my guess is, the u.s. role will be very important at this juncture. so we have to -- we have to remember that the tangent of the campaign to enter under the name of taiwan was relieved by china's self-restraint. and this self-restraint was pretty much based on china's perception of taiwan politics. because china really thought that they had a good shot to
winning the 2008 election but not this time around. as i said, by then we'll be very much weakened. so this is what china sees. in taiwan. china also sees this increased young taiwanese. china pays attention to taiwan's identification surveys all the time. and china will, of course, hear the vocal support for taiwan independence and these other trends. china sees will have signal in taiwan. and then if the trend analysis or window of vulnerability in the studies of chinese foreign policy makes some sense to us and for us, we who study chinese
foreign policy, then you know china will not assure much leniency toward the new administration. so my guess is -- this is my best guess -- and that is the war and peace will turn into a code peace. and if the negative feedback looms, continues, then there will be some cold war across the taiwan strait. so i'm not saying that there was a perfect storm in the taiwan strait, but i do say that the weather patterns can be conducive toward it. thank you very much. >> very interesting analysis. much food for thought here. let me start by -- and first may
i ask all of you reporters out there to please, if you are going to quote somebody, to please quote them accurately, not out of context. i'd greatly appreciate that. so the future of the cross-strait relationship, as you noted, is essentially a product of the two sides, the policies that the future president will take towards the mainland and then, of course, the mainland's approach. i don't think this is necessarily preordained. i think what we hear from the mainland now is in a period before the elections. we then have a lengthy four-month period after the elections before the inauguration and then, of course, what begins in the new presidency. and i think we saw even when he was elected, there there was an
effort by both sides to offer some preliminary reassurances and mainland was willing to wait and see. and so there might be opportunities. and so what i'd like to start by asking both of you is if we assume that he will not accept the 1992 consensus and that is so far the case, i'm not going to say what she would do in the futu future. based on my conversations with people on the mainland, although, of course, they would prefer that she embrace the 1992 consensus, nevertheless, there has been recognition, i think, for many years on the mainland that the 1992 consensus was a useful understanding between the chinese communist party. and it is -- i think they
believe difficult, very challenging to get the dpp to accept this. and so my understanding is there has long been an openness on the mainland to consider some kind of new formulation and i believe it would have to be consistent with one china, but i don't want to put words in anybody's mouth here. i'd like to hear and start with you. if you have any thoughts on what a new formulation could be, what kind of new understanding that would ensure smooth cross-strait relations going forward. i assume this is something that scholars in taiwan and particularly in the dpp have put some thought into. >> thank you very much, bonnie. actually, in the past i advocated for dpp, power and
independence platform and also the revolution on china in taiwan, but never -- the dpp is not my position, so this is not a feasible solution. however, dr. ho mentioned that i cannot speak on behalf of taiwan or china, but my observation, taiwan might be a little different prior to election and after the election. if we look at august 1st, 1999, china was so critical of the consensus. at the time they said that in a news release in public saying that taiwan is going to manufacture the consensus, so china was different, but now the chinese government, criticizing this consensus. so i think china's government will be more realistic and
dramatic in dealing with taiwan. after the election. before election, i think china would praise taiwan to a consensus and try to reduce with china's government pressure during the election. but after the election, i think china -- and also taiwan needs to face the reality in china. so maybe they can come to some mutually acceptable solution of continued dialogue in china but at least it can maintain a peaceful stability relations on mainland china in the future. secondly, initially china mentioned that taipei needs to accept the '92 consensus as a foundation for the future forum.
afterwards many taiwanese did not accept at all the '92 consensus. he said that he respects and understands the chinese position instead of the '92 consensus. so it was quite realistic in dealing with taiwan. china would talk to taiwan or continue negotiations with taiwan, but i would say that china will figure out some way to maintain stable relations with taiwan in the future. thank you. >> your thoughts, professor? >> three points. first, i think an alternative to the '92 consensus is a large impossibility. think of it this way. this is china's goal for national reunification, and this is the '92 consensus, and this
is taiwan independence. for anything to be acceptable to both china and taiwan on the dpp administration, well, to be acceptable to china, it has to go above the '92 consensus. to be acceptable to the taiwan administration, it has to go below the '92 consensus. you cannot achieve that at the same time. so it's a large impossibility. and it has good proof. it is not a large impossibility. people aspire or have already thought of something to replace the '92 consensus. so that's my first point. the second point is really what i just said. the '92 consensus is not just a character concept. it is a huge edifice and touches on various aspects of taiwan.
every aspect of it. so the thing is that if -- even if you can design, then there is things that china pays close attention to. taiwan's sincerity based on how china, how taiwan's policy moves at this point. okay, that would be a very high hurdle for taiwan under taiwan's administration to pass. that's my second point. the third point, actually, bonnie, you mentioned that in your opening remark, we also want to on this panel, in the session, we also want to talk about the economic development, the social policies the various national policies for taiwan. the thing is, i am a very
pro-dpp scholar, and i have a lot of respect for his observation of taiwan politics. it basically said that any low politic issue with high politics in cross-strait veelrelations. so we look at this and can imagine, even the equal distribution of benefits -- of benefits from our business exchange with china. that can be a national issue. even though we are no doubt -- well, some people make more. some people make less. so this is the issue. so the social inequality, now, the economic inequality, the interpretation of history, the speeches that taiwan will have
made on, say, the national holiday, all these things will add up to the new formula. we'll put a lot of weight on the new formula so that china will judge taiwan in a month positive light. it's a state facing a great power. >> let me ask you about the future. one of the things that i've heard recently from chinese officials is great concern about the potential for a real splintering of the party and the scenario that you paint of winning and potentially the legisla legislature. and of course in the democracy,
it plays an important role of providing check and balances. and the mainland is quite concerned about the future. of course, their own thais are with them, but they're also worried that there will be fewer constraints on what they can do as president. so perhaps you can tell us something about what you think is going to happen in the future based on the scenario that you have set out. >> well, in the short term, i'm very concerned, but in the long term, i'm not that concerned. if you look back, if you hark back to the early years of the administration, then they were considered to be a permanent failure. there would be no way for them to come back. and then if you look at the 2008 where they assumed the presidential office, there was a
lot of talk in town saying that the dpp would have been -- would be a terrible situation forever. so at this time around, i think that has a lot to do with the political pendulum. >> sure. >> so it's hard for any president to maintain a high level in american politics. it's very difficult. and after four years or eight years, you're automatically, so many social groups and this and that. and people may vote for or against you based on his or her single concern. say not enough pension, not getting a good job and things like that. so i believe in the longer run, four years or eight years later, we may talk a different -- we may have different perception of
long-term sovereign ability. that's another thing. i think every aspect of life in taiwan, political, social, economic has to do with china. well, we are too close, not too connected. so whether they can handle cross-relations satisfactory will have tremendous impact on its policies, whatever policy, educational, as i said, a foreign policy, educational policy, social, economic and so on. so i think that as long as china is there, as long as taiwan is not located in hawaii, we have to face china. and then there is this market. you want to rebel against klech
or rebalance against china. there are two choices of taiwan's grand strategy, one way or the other. so once you have this grand strategy and another grand strategy for balancing toward independen independence, you naturally would have two markets. and i believe even if the knt will have suffered lack of leadership, there will be some new leaders in order to take advantage of this vacuum. advocating with china. so this is -- i think it's politics sometimes that is considered as a market of opinions. and so in the longer run, i'm not to worry. >> may i add one point on this issue? >> yes. >> i think a lot of people are concerned about a checks and balances issue in taiwan because people expect the majority in
taiwan for the next election. however, we look back, a lot of people are concerned, i try to persuade people in taiwan where taiwanese-americans, we'll be constrained in taiwan. so he would not pursue, you know, to appear during his presidency afterwards. so he said a substitution in taiwan, even if he wins the election, he needs to face reality in power with china and particularly more than 85% of people in taiwan were allowed to main stain stabilitain stabilit quo, so this is a very huge constraint. during the administration period, they rectified how it's
named. he claimed not to amend the so-called taiwanese nation. so i think this is the fundamental constraint in taiwan. so even, i still think that taiwan will not be appealing to so-called in taiwan without any constraint. thank you. >> one last question before we open it up, if you look at nguyen's policies as she has articulated them so far, could you tell us a few things that she would do fundamentally different from the current president, particularly, you know, economic social area? what are the real changes that we would expect to see and if the mainland were to take this
policy that professor has said of freezing seth erat's talks and presumably between the taiwan affairs office and the mainland affairs council, how would that affect her ability to achieve what she wants to achieve domestically? >> well, i cannot speak on behalf of taiwan, but i try to share my thoughts with you based upon observation. april 15, when she declared to participate in the election, she basically made a lot of points on domestic issue. she would not pursue social justice. inequality in taiwan and would like to reform economic model in taiwan. so that is quite an important subject for her to implement her
priority in the future if she won the election. on the other hand, if she win, she would try to balance so-called vision for taiwan and mainland china and taiwan's international participation. for instance, taiwan -- the president might not pursue too much on negotiations with mainland china, and they would try to negotiate and, you know, put more emphasis on taiwan's economic operations with other countries. from this perspective. so basically, i would say she would balance the six i mentioned in my presentation previously. >> okay. do you want to comment on that? on the feasibility of this agenda? >> i think other than mainland policy, the difference or should i say the positive platforms
between the dpp and the knt to paraphrase alabama governor wallace, it's worth dying -- or not worth dying. so actually, i don't see that much difference between the two political parties. but when it comes to economic development, that really worries me. that is taiwan's economic development as facing tremendous barriers or hurdles to upgrade itself. we have talks about the red supply chains which will ultimately, i think, replace a lot of electronic businesses, export businesses in taiwan.
that would be a major concern for me. and taiwan almost has never experienced that. economic development, that can cause tremendous social tensions. that would have put even more demands on the government. and unfortunately, for any economy to struggle in this kind of a situation, there is no quick fix. you just have to start enough from your education to start from your legal system that sometimes would stifle innovation, and you have to start a lot of things from the basics. and in the past, i think taiwan has not been paying enough attention to that. >> okay.
we're going to open it up to questions now and please wait for the microphone. please state your name and affiliation and please make your question short. who would like to ask the first question? okay. over here in front. wait for the microphone, please. >> thank you. jane fr jane. i just got back from taiwan. and i wonder, for the last few years, we saw a lot of social movement or citizen movement in taiwan. and younger generation tend to show tremendous enthusiasm to a politics. how would you -- and they tend to be more mutual or even against pem blue. how would you, as a professor, explain this phenomenon to america? and especially there's going to be 1.6 million so-called the
first voter to the 2016 election. what would be the impact? thank you. >> very good question. who would like to start? >> last december when i was at a major university, a lot of people talk about the election and, you know, they criticize. but then afterwards they say i'm going back to india. so it's quite possible for young generation more against pem blue and pen green. that is because as i point out in close relations, most people, young generation people, believe that president ma is too pro-china and the young
generation people lost some hopes and optimism regarding taiwan's economic future. i totally agree with dr. ho regarding the future of taiwan's economic reform. it's quite important. we need to pay more attention on structural reform. instead of just on the so-called industrial policy because we face tremendous challenges from globalization and a lot of people emigrate to other countries. over the last -- over the first six years during the presidency, the cumulative net outflow from taiwan to our countries was 260 billion u.s. dollars. during the administration period, that figure was around 158. excuse me, 105.8 billion u.s. dollars.
so we -- you know, also throughout the country. so we need to reform the economy, and consensus between the party and the opposition party. so as i mentioned, taiwan needs to consolidate the consensus. that is the most important issue. if you win the election. otherwise you cannot focus on domestic issue without stabilizing closer relations. >> i like the question. i like the political participation by the younger generation. as a number cruncher myself, i have access to election study center of a national university. i like the longitude starting from the early '80s. so 30 years of longitudinal data
has told me one thing. young people grow up. and gradually they become more conservative. and there are more young people. so i'm not -- yes, actually, let me put it this way. the young people's impact on taiwan politics, young by definition from 20 to 24, in the election study centers studies. their impact on taiwan especially in recent years is they increased their voting turnout. it's not necessarily their enthusia enthusiasm. i retract my statement. they were as enthusiastic as ever as their predecessors, but this time around, they came out to vote, especially in the last taiwan's local elections.
then they are very good at using website to mobilize. and i think that is the gist of their political participation. but as i said, that's why we talk about a periodic effect and generational effect as well as life experience effect. sometimes you have to consider all the three effects on the generation -- on the political participation of one generation, young or old. >> okay, next question. i can't see over there. >> mike fonte, the director of the dpp's mission here in washington. thanks very much for two great
presentations. doctor, i, too, just came back from taiwan. her main thought is to maintain the status quo, and of course we have to get back to what does the dpp consider the status quo which is taiwan's already a sovereign, independent state. if you want to change that, you have to have a referendum of all people. and i think that's an important point because the doctor has made it a point of saying that she's going to be the president of all the people of taiwan, not just the 40% that are mostly dpp supporters. and i think in that sense when you look at the numbers -- and this is where the doctor confirmed with what we see, the taiwan consensus now is to keep the status quo, but it's not for taiwanese independence. for the real reason that they understand that there would be severe consequences if there was a formal declaration of independence. so i think that's an important point. and i think the other somewhat minor point but not unimportant is that -- >> can we have a question, mike,
please? >> somewhere in there, yeah. you need two-thirds of the l.y. to change the constitution. no way that the dpp is going to get to two-thirds, i don't think. so i guess the question i have is u.s. policy seems to have shifted about taiwan. i wonder if you would talk a little bit about that and about some of the recent statements at brookings that both mr. burkhardt and secretary of assistance thornton have made. >> we are going to have a panel this afternoon on u.s. policy. and i'm not going to take that, but would either one of you like to comment on what mike fonte had to say? no. okay. let me ask, is there anybody from the mainland that would like to ask a question? i'm going to give some priority over here, and then we'll move on to others. right over here. >> thank you. thank you for your great presentation. i have a question for professor.
>> please introduce yourself. thank you. >> i'm sorry. a visiting scholar at johns hopkins university. about three months ago, the doctor was here delivering a speech and proposed she would continue to maintain cross-strait relations in accordance with the constitutional order of roc. but according to rco constitution, it includes two parts. first is chinese mainland, both sides belong to china. my question is does taiwan -- will taiwan recognize this point? that means, will taiwan recognize roc constitution? that means will they recognize china policy? that's all. thank you. >> thank you very much for your question. they would have to abide by the
constitution, but, you know, they said we will not go by a set of one principles. there are differences between the constitution and the consensus. it means that one china maybe -- in the international arena. but the china constitution has been amended by taiwanese people seven times already. so even in a china constitution that's been introduced in china and all the territory including mainland china, taiwan and also mongolia. don't forget mongolia. and also our current sovereignty legal constitution. but on the other hand, this constitution has been amended by taiwanese people. so this also represented the taiwanese people.
so this might serve as cross-strait action basis. >> when you heard dr. thai say that she would preserve the roc existing constitutional order, what did you interpret that as meaning? >> i'm not sure. now, constitutional -- really, i'm not sure. well, my first thought may be a little bit too willing on my part, and that is she will not amend the constitution. but, of course, we don't know, as i said earlier in my remarks, there can be some political pressure on her not to amend the constitution. she at this point in time cannot agree for a clear-cut answer to that. then there is this constitutional order that is the legislature should be
accounted -- i mean the executive branch should be accountable to the legislation. that would be fine. but if you look at the dpp's strong support would refuse to attend the city con sol, that, i think, is not very constitutional. yes, i know the speaker of the thailand city council has the tremendous problem, corrupt problems. but that doesn't mean that you do not attend the council. that is the fundamental constitutional order at the local level. so i would hope that in the future, they will not create any excuses and not to be accountable to the legislature. okay. that's another thing. another thing -- another thing
is, i have -- with the current system inside the legislature. that is called the negotiation -- various negotiation rounds and i've been training other caucuses. i think that is a practice that does not hold up to the standard of accountability within the legislature. so i'm hoping that two-thirds or not, whichever party is going to be the majority party, but this part should be deleted from the political operation. you need a democracy to function especially in taiwan's situation. everyone has his or her own opinion. and unless you want to have a military rule, then that's another story.
but as long as you have a democracy, you have to stick to the rules of law. you have to stick to the general practices of a democracy. that is extremely important. that's why it's a tactic that is argued by this and that. i don't think that that would be good enough for taiwan's long-term development, political development. and i think we need to be more mature so that we can have more appealing to china. i've looked at opinions and i've talked to chinese lecturers, they are not terribly enthusiastic about their political system. we can do better than what we are doing right now to provide more moral, if not for them, at least for ourselves. >> very good. okay. next question.
shelly richar in front, please. does somebody have the microphone? >> thanks. thank you very much. this is so interesting. i'm shelly rigor from davidson college. i have a question, it's mostly just to clarify and make sure i heard you correctly, but i also will append a question to the end. on the textbook revision issue, you said that that kind of issue is part of the edifice of the '92 consensus and that it is important to show sincerity -- the kmt shows sincerity or taiwan leaders in general show sincerity to the prc by acting in ways that support that edifice. that comes close to saying that the reason for the textbook reform that was proposed earlier this year and created the backlash this summer was, in
fact, as some dpp friends have suggested too curry favor with the prc government. i want to ask, you though, what you think about that. is that -- is that -- am i interpreting what you said correctly? and if so, did the backlash against the textbook reform turn what was intended as a gesture to secure the relationship between the kmt and the ccp into an occasion for further deterioration of that relationship? thank you. >> i'm not sure that is the case. to my knowledge, of course, my knowledge is from the minister, what the minister of education had to say and what the government had to say. and i think they all managed that the guidelines as
incongruence with roc constitution. whether that will -- i don't think in the very beginning, they wanted to use this to curry favor with china. i said very clearly that the whole edifice with various components in it is holistic. i think that is a strength as a legal scholar. he wants everything, every component in the edifice and not in the consensus to integrate and as logically consistent as possible. but i have to emphasize that whether this could provide identity comfort for taiwanese people, that's another story. but for that legal system, it's quite logically consistent.
>> question? over there. >> thanks very much. chris nelson, nelson report. great discussion. i participated in a similar one a couple months ago up in new york. with a very senior chinese think tank not entirely academic. that's all i'm allowed to say, i guess. the guy in charge of the taiwan program said in english quite clearly we will not tolerate -- his word -- will not tolerate the failure to endorse the '92 consensus. so i said, you know, in english, not tolerate is pretty strong stuff. are you telling me you're going to fight over this? you're going to do something. no, we're not going to fight, but we're going to do things. and they discussed some of the things they might do. it was similar to what you've just been saying. i took the thrust of that remark to be that the xi jinping
administration will really demand, will really insist something on '92 that just the status quo, just saying, you know, the constitution, and we talked about david rounds' question, too. they had studied that. no, they wanted to hear her say the '92. do you think that's really where we're heading? and if that is really where we're heading, how do we head off some of the down sides that we're worried about here? thank you. >> we already talked about this, i think, to some extent, but i'll ask both of our speakers if they'd like to add anything else about how we head off a crisis. >> well -- not exact, china will try to put pressure on the new administration, no question about it. and whether the new administration can design it to
the '92 consensus, it's a logical impossibility. so that's all i can say. >> maybe i can enter some -- one of my observations in the past. may 17th, 2004, they issued a very strong statement by saying that there were only two ways for taiwan. one china principle and then there will be so-called peaceful on cross the strait. on the other hand, if he continues on his own, they will be destined to vanish in the future. after just one year afterwards, then the chinese government, you know, negotiated with taiwan in terms of issues, general director labor, mainland china, which is unprecedented compared to the period. before 2000, they could only
negotiate with china. but afterwards, our official direct negotiator with china. so i think china's government was quite realistic that we are facing reality in taiwan. and also taiwan, they need to face china. so they need to figure out some way to interact with each other. if peace and stability can be maintained, they might need official change in mainland china. >> okay. we're going to have one last question. the gentleman over here. >> my name is samar, save foundation. the taiwan model is very interesting for those of us who have observed taiwan for a long time since the time it was the china, which was 150s, probably. and to this day.
and being from -- being born in india, we are interested in these models because we saw hong kong ultimately peacefully british handed it over to them. and now this is a process going on where america is gradually handing over, and you are discussing the coming road bump after the 2016 election. so given that, i would have liked you to -- i would like you to comment on how it would have been better if pakistan was in that same situation and india was using one of these models, either the hong kong one or the america/taiwan one to solve that problem. >> i have no answer to that question. i have no expertise on this issue. >> i'm afraid that they're not experts on this issue, so maybe you can get some comments from other people. we do have about two more
minutes, so i'll take one more very short question. ray bourqurkhardt. >> probably not needed. >> it's right behind you. >> thanks. >> please make it short so i don't have to interrupt you. >> that would be so embarrassing. >> it really would. >> ray burkhardt from ait. if i understood you correctly, at some point you said that at one stage, assuming, saying one wins the election, one stage after may 20th, i think you were talking about when seth arat's talks would have been ended. you talked about -- you said the u.s. role will be especially important at this juncture. i know we're having an afternoon session about the u.s., but since you slipped that comment in there, could you, before we lose it, could you expand, please?
>> really, this is extremely interesting phenomena for me to observe. and how the u.s. could use its influence across the taiwan strait. to persuade both sides to stop the negativity in the feedback. that's important. so or you can do a number -- you're in foreign service, so you know, the great power has a number of ways on a state, and you persuade, you cajole, you try to make taiwan or the other side and china understand the situation better. you go between. that's what i think. and because at that stage, i think china and taiwan are
already at an impasse, and both sides wouldn't talk to or listen to or understand the other side. so that's why i said the u.s. i assume is important. >> and we will have more discussion about that issue, i'm sure, this afternoon. but i hope you'll all agree, this has been a really terrific discussion. and this is a great start for the rest of the day. we will be continuing, of course, after a 15-minute coffee break. but before we do that, please join me in thanking the professors. thank you.
a short break in this day-long discussion on taiwan, about 15 minutes or so. when they return, there will be a panel discussion on the 2016 elections. later, today's keynote speech from davidson college east asian politics professor shelly rigor. again, 15-minute break here. while we wait for this forum to resume, we'll show you a portion of remarks from earlier today. >> -- is encountering tremendous difficulties in its economic development. we all know that. 30 years of imbalanced development could not be rebalanced overnight.
or even in a couple of years. the longer economic imbalances as incurred by economic for the past 30 years, would need a lot of rebalancing efforts and i don't see china can do that. so, that leaves china's leadership -- the only thing for the legitimacy of chinese leadership. that i think -- i'm quite sure about that. so if nationalism is the only problem now for the ccp, then i think china has, would have a natural tendency to treat taiwan
more tightly than more leniently. then the leadership sometime, he concentrates all the power in his own hands. he is much more assertive than most of us thought three years ago. and then he, he has that kind of decision-making style that can pretty much -- so politics in chinese domestic politics. now for taiwan's political consideration and the chinese political domestic political configuration, i think both now would have tremendous impact on
our relations. the ideology is pretty much operationalized as to the '92 consensus and not even consensus, that -- it's not just a four character idiom for convenience. actually not. it is integrated that integrates the national symbols and positions on foreign policy and even down to the ministry of education in textbook guidelines. and actually very good to making the '92 consensus as largely consistent and integral as
possible. whether that edifies the '92 consensus to come to taiwan people that's another story. but the value to consensus as edifies as extremely useful to stabilize in relations. and it includes some items such as, the roc as the national title. strict adherence to our constitution. mutual recognition of sovereignty. mutual denier of governing authority. and no taiwan independence and no use of force. those are the big items. then there are smaller items such as the symbols involved in
various speeches, ministry of foreign affairs, ministry of foreign affairs in dealing with chinese authorities on international occasions. and then, of course, according to china as the mainland rather than china and that's the most important thing, it's part of the edifice. now this is integral. so when taiwanese say they adhere to a status quo and then doesn't recognize, doesn't want to know the spirit or tenets of this consensus, she still has to deal with various components, big items, small items, medium items under this '92 consensus. so it's very possible for her to
do anything that would deviate from this '92 consensus. then, of course, would have impact on how china perceives her administration. and i would have to say, i digress a little bit, i have to say that if international politics, if you tie your hands, if you incur costs, then you can have credibility to the other side. that's enough. you tell the other side if i pass it i will be suffer tremendous costs to the other
side. this is how real credibility comes from. so, say international politics, you know, one side says okay, look, my domestic politics, especially the parliament, especially some other constitutional designs will give me tremendous costs if i give to you. the other side will say what i give you concession other than asking you for more concession. this '92 concession is actually tying one's hands approach. and of course we know that the tpp and some of taiwan's international friends criticize for not being active enough in the international scene.
the thing is if there's no such hand tying approach that's based on '92 consensus, then there couldn't be -- there couldn't be stability across the taiwan strait. so this is actually a dilemma -- i shouldn't say that. when a small state, for instance, a strong state agree, this is always the case. so i said this 25'92 consensus creates a lot of hand tying and creates a lot of credibility at the same time as well as internally. and there are several -- the real question is, i think true to her words we're trying to
maintain the status quo and not do anything that's provocative to china. say that very clearly. but the question really is, when -- that really is the question, will china buy that? i tend to think not for several reasons. the first thing is that china right now does not give any benefit of doubt. so what that means, in the administration, in the cross administration even lower, that's very important. and that's the first thing. the second thing, china will not -- that's because it wants to avoid what i call reason
towards barter in taiwan. to put pressure on taiwan can serve as some kind of deterrence, prevent further happening in taiwan. the third thing is great power credibility. it's not just regarding taiwan, some other neighboring countries and i think great power credibility might be on china's mind in its policy towards taiwan. and then there is the leadership and can be underlying, china looks the other way when it's not recognizing the '92
consensus. well we're all familiar with that and the foundation is not firm then there can be earthquake and a corollary to that is this autocracy of the politics in taiwan. when the leader of the authoritarian regime says as strong -- the bureaucracy, the bureaucrats involved i think are not automatically involved to move that guide post. the great leaders as this. so the bureaucrats would direct the decision-making process, the implementation process and the interpretation, the policy analysis towards that direction. that can be