tv Politics and Public Policy Today CSPAN September 14, 2015 11:00am-1:01pm EDT
that and the foundation is not firm then there can be earthquake and a corollary to that is this autocracy of the politics in taiwan. when the leader of the authoritarian regime says as strong -- the bureaucracy, the bureaucrats involved i think are not automatically involved to move that guide post. the great leaders as this. so the bureaucrats would direct the decision-making process, the implementation process and the interpretation, the policy analysis towards that direction. that can be tremendously harmful
for cross relations. the big thing is this. taiwan now with xi jinping has created so many enemies. he has to consolidate his power so next generation of leaders will be, of course his appointment. during this time i thing xi jinping will not make it easy on taiwan. what will china do? i don't think china will take
drastic measures against taiwan. instead china will tighten the screws with gradually. that will hurt taiwan people. taiwan people are very sensitive to what china has to say or do. so even though the measure is not that drastic, relatively mild, in the former chinese perspective that will hurt china. what i'm concerned this will have a negative impact on taiwan's domestic politics which will internally have a negative feedback loop on china. so that's the thing that we have to pay very close attention to. so of all the measure, the mild measures that china may
undertake against taiwan, i think the harbinger of communication between the two are the most important one. even more serious, on the surface it looks okay. but in reality it imposes a tremendous danger to cross relations. this is because when there's cessation of official channel that pretty much pre-supposes the uselessness of back door channel, that pre-supposes another failure of any back door channel. that's my imagination. and then the thing is if there
is a harbinger of formal communication channels then i think any small incident across the taiwan strait can be brought out of proportion and because both sides do not have the communications, channel communications, channels to really to balance the scale incident. so, i consider this as a very, very serious measure china will take. china's officials have said repeatedly too many times, i care to count, there is no basis to consensus, then there's no way for china not to conduct communications with the taiwanese authorities. they have said this so many times.
so that leaves what i just said, that will leave crisis management capability and self-restraint of each side extremely important. my guess is and u.s. role will be very important at this junk tur. so we have to -- we have to remember that the tension to enter under the name of taiwan was the relief not by china's self-restraint and this self-restraint was pretty much based on china's per accepts of taiwan politics, because china really thought that, mine you, they had a good shot at winning the 2008 election but not this time around. as i said, by then will be very much weakened.
this is what china sees in taiwan. china also sees -- there's increased stabilization of young chinese. china pays attention to taiwan's survey all time and china wishlgs of course, have vocal support for taiwan independence and these are the trends. now china sees, we have seen that in taiwan. okay, and then if now the trend analysis, or window of mobility in the studies of chinese foreign policy makes some sense to us and we who study chinese foreign policy now, there you know, taiwan, china now will not show much leniency towards the
new administration. so my guess is -- this is my best guess and that is the warm piece will turn to a cold piece, and if the negative feedback loops continue, then there will be some cold war across the taiwan strait. i'm not saying there is a perfect storm in the taiwan strait, but i do say that the weather patterns can be conducive to one. thank you very much. >> thank you very much. my name is richard bush. i'm the director of the center of east asian policy studies at the brookings institution and on behalf of brookings we're very pleased to be co-sponsoring this
program with the chair of csis. we had a program that we did together back in may, i think and for that one brookings had the home field advantage and now csis has the home field advantage. and i would like to thank all our friends at csis for the rou outstanding job they did in preparing the home field. our first panel was an excellent discussion of high policy, and we had two outstanding presenters and one outstanding moderator. we even got into some discussion due to bonnie's insistence on domestic issues which was good. this session is not about policy. policies are important, but there's more to elections than the respective views of the
candidates, and so what we want to look at in this panel is in effect the horse race. even though president ma whose name means horse is not running this time there's still a horse weighs, and there's a lot about elections that is very important to the outcome, and affects the way people vote, but don't have that much to do with policy positions. so for example, the quality and charisma of the candidates, the party identification of voters and how that shapes who they vote for. the larger balance of ideological sentiment that exists in society. contextual factors like the
public approval of a party and leader in power, whether or not that leader is running for re-election. the state of the economy at the time that people go to cast their vote. the state of the democracy's external relations. and i think extremely important are organizational and mobilizational issues. how capable are they competing parties at getting out their own message, fighting to control the agenda and on election day getting their supporters to a polling place. doesn't matter if you -- if your party has broad support in society if you can't get your guys to vote, you're not necessarily going to win. so this is the general scope of this panel and i think each panelist will talk about these issues in different ways.
we're very fortunate to have three outstanding presenters. david brown, i think we all know. he's an adjunct professor at johns hopkins school of advanced international studies and someone who follows taiwan domestic politics very closely. dr. timothy rich who is an ant professor of political science at western kentucky university. and dr. julian han, who is one of taiwan's leading political scientists. he's present of a foundation, a distinguished research fellow at the institute of political science and a professor in the department of political science at national taiwan university. so, our first presenter is david brown and dave do you want to stand up?
>> yeah. well thank you, richard, for that introduction, and thank brookings and csis for inviting me to participate in this panel. and as richard said, i'm an adjunct professor and that's the capacity in which i'm speaking. i'm sometimes misrepresented in the taiwan press as speaking for someone else. i'm not. i'm speaking on my own behalf and my colleagues in government may be happy for that. anyways, it seems very clear from the information that's been presented already that taiwan politics which has gone through in the last quarter century some dramatic shifts in political power is in the process of going through another one. this process started with the
'91 local elections in which there was an unexpected degree of loss and that seems to be carrying over into the presidential and legislative elections that will be taking place. i've been asked to talk a little bit about the campaign so, let me do that. on the one hand, the dpp has nominated young. she's a sophisticated international personality with experience in both government and politics, the chairman of her party. and she is running with a united party behind her. and her campaign is proceeding, it seems to me, smoothly, with very few mistakes. on the other side of the green/blue political divide in
taiwan, the campaign is not going so well. it is running into repeated issues and problems and does not seem to have adjusted very well to correct for those things. and as it stands now, the knt party, the leading party on the blue side has a candidate that is polling between 15 and 20%. how did they end up in that situation? well i think there are a number of steps in that process. one was that the natural person to be the candidate for the knt, the party chairman has chosen not to run. instead he set up a process, a sort of primary process within the party which would be based upon conducting a public opinion
poll to see who should be the party's candidate. none of the main figures in the party chose to stand for election and perhaps for wise reasons. the one candidate that emerged at the end was chu, a relatively less well-known personality in taiwan who has been recently the deputy speaker of the legislative taiwan. before the public opinion poll to determine whether she would qualify to be the party candidate was held, the party did not arrange any time when she would present her platform to the public. and so when the voters that were polled, not the voters, the people who were polled reacted to her, what were they reacting
to? they were reacting to her personal story which is quite compelling and interesting, and they were reacting to personality as an outspoken and atypical knt politician. when the poll was conducted, she surprised many people, including myself and got a 46% support rate which was well beyond the threshold the party set for a potential candidate. shortly afterward, however, her poll numbers began to collapse. why? because the more the public learned about her policy, the less attractive she appeared. she laid out, as has been said, at the core of her platform was on cross strait relations and she wanted to move beyond ma's
one country interpretation to reach an agreement with beijing on one china common understanding, and she said she wanted to open political talks with the eventual goal of having a peace agreement. not a new idea but one that ma handled very carefully and she was putting it back on the agenda. i think the more people learned about that aspect of her policy the more rapidly her numbers slipped. and as they slipped the knt party was moving towards its congress in july and voices began to appear that maybe the party ought to rethink who its candidate was and find a more attractive candidate. none was available. because once again eric chu, i think, reiterated that he was
not going to run and he managed to pull the congress together to the extent that they unanimously adopted her as a candidate. her campaign has not gone well. just two weeks ago she announced she was going to have a pause in that campaign, it took everyone by surprise. she was going to meditate about the future, decide how to proceed. three days later she came back and she essentially said i'm on the right path, i'm going to continue the campaign the way it was, and i'll do my best on behalf of the party. her poll numbers have remained in the 15% to 20% range. this led to another figure entering the race, james so. many of you will remember he was
a knt, very successful knt politician who in the year 2000 ran as an independent, almost won. afterwards formed a new party. and has participated in the 2004 and 2012 elections without being on a winning ticket. he has always considered himself fully qualified to be president. and i think he saw this, and i respect james so. and i'm not criticizing him on this, i'm just saying that he is a man that has great experience and he's understood himself that way. and so at 73 he probably concluded that this was his last chance. so because young's numbers were so low and the knt party was not well organized, let's put it
that way, he jumped into the race and it's now a three way race and in this three way race the outcome is like try to be what you would expect that taiwan's poll numbers have been largely a combination of james so and chu. the outcome of that race s-i think, quite predictable. since richard told me not to talk too much about policies, i will dropout of my talk, the part i was going say about that and shift to the legislative area on the election. in some ways that's the more interesting and the more consequential point. can the dpp win a clear majority
in the ly either alone or with the support of a live parties and i don't know what the outcome is going be. there are many who predict the goal of dpp victory is within grasp. here again i think you see a difference in the way the two parties are running their ly campaigns. the dpp seems to be well organized, is methodically going through the process of identifying good candidates and constituencies where it can win. it is leaving a little bit of space for others in areas where it might not win on its own but where it can support other parties with the hope that they would win. these parties, the ones that they have been working most closely with are the tsu and the new phenomenon, new power party formed by activists who are
involved in the sunflower movement and earlier student activities. so they are doing well. the fall out from the presidential campaign has had a very negative effect on the knt's campaign for the ly. as soon asthma d madam hung's pm became better known, candidates who might have run for election on the knt ticket had decided in some instances not to run because she's at the head of the central ticket. others have left the party to join the pfp and several have am amalgamated into a new party which is based around the
candidate in shinzu who had the largest electoral support in the last ly elections. so the knt side is, again, badly divided and its prospects, i think are poor and really do open the possibility that the dpt with allies could win a majority. the ly election is also interesting because as i said you have new parties participating that have not participated before. the knt side of the spectrum is not a new phenomenon, i don't think, but certainly the new power party and the coalition that's emerged between the green
party and social democratic party is an interesting phenomenon of people trying to take advantage of the environment created by the sunflower student movement, the demand for more openness, the success of chu running as an independent in taipei, with dpt support of opening up the possibility that these smaller parties could succeed. listening to people in taiwan who know these issues better than i do, it seems that there is a possibility that the new power party may pass 5% threshold in the party list part of the ly election, and gain some seats in that way and conceivably even win in one or another constituency with dpt support. so this is, i think, a very interesting new phenomenon.
do i have time to say a few words about -- about the prc, because that is really interesting. at the beginning of the campaign, maybe eight, nine months ago speaking with taiwan experts from china, you would sometimes hear that oh, national level elections in taiwan are different than local elections and therefore there is a possibility that the knt might do well in the elections in january of 2016. i do not hear that kind of analysis any longer. it leads me to believe that thoughtful people in beijing understand that they are going to be confronted with a dpt government possibly even a dpt controlled legislature. what has beijing been saying during the campaign? i think it's a mixture of what i
would call hard messages and soft messages and that's a phenomenon we've seen before in the way beijing has dealt with taiwan at a time when it's not clear what is the best policy on the way forward. some of the hard messages, i think, were the comments that had been referred toby xi jinping in march and may of this year, and the fact that they have conducted some military exercises that have been interpreted as aimed at sending a message related to the election and the softer message is, in part, also xi jinping because his comments have been, i would say, not always clear just what he was saying. there have been times when he talked about the importance of
unswervingly maintaining continuity in the peaceful development of cross strait relations which has a certain soft message in it. and that's the way he spoke to jon when he was in beijing recently. and i think the way they have dealt with taipei mayor shows a certain flexibility on issues which would not apply directly to the dpt because the dpt is different than an independent mayoral candidate with no background, no history of relations like the dpt has, but it showed in my mind as was said a certain a flexibility on beijing's side. so, i am left a little uncertain. i think on the longer term, when taiwan won and not in a mode of trying to influence things but
of having to deal with a new situation, beijing will be confronted with many difficult choices. one of them basically is are they going to stick with the peaceful development policy, or shift to a much more military focused coercive policy? i don't know the answer to that question. in part because i don't know that i fully understand a man who is going to make the decisions on that which is xi jinping. but my personal bet is that they will move to find a way to try to keep the peaceful development policy going but with many adjustments to that policy. why do i think it will be a difficult set of decisions for
them? it's because i see them on the horns of a dilemma. on the one hand they will want to show that electing a government that does not accept the '92 consensus or the idea that taiwan and the mainland are both part of one china, which is xi jinping's core requirement has to have some costs. they will have to deal with that government differently than they dealt with cho. to the extent they do things as seen punishing taiwan they undermine their long term goal of having a successful peaceful development policy leading in the direction of some form of integration in the future. so i think they face great difficulties and i will leave it at that. thank you very much. [ applause ] >> thank you very much, dave.
now we have tim rich. >> good morning. i would like to structure my talk today around, into two broad sections one placing the 2016 presidential election into more of a comparative framework and second part focusing on the legislative end which has received considerably less attention but will likely be much more competitive. i'm a comparativist at heart. most of my to discuss on taiwan, japan more broadly. one thing that sets this presidential election apart in twain is the likelihood they will elect the first female president. this is not unusual in asia. in fact if you look over the period from 1945 to 2014 there have been 11 female presidents or prime ministers elected in asia. the side note here is all 11 were either the children of a
former leader, the wife, the widow, et cetera of a former leader, former president, former prime minister or a member of a democracy movement. hung would be the first without this familial ties. the other fer male prime ministers since 1945 only three of them outside of asia had these family ties. some examples for example in asia, park geun-hye. she's also unmarried and when she ran for the national assembly shfs a major issue. she said she was married. she was married to her country. that sort of died off later. another point much comparison with taiwan is there's arguably greater opportunities for women in lower level elections and thus for legislative elections and thus presidential elections than in other countries in the
region. part of this is party quotas, part of this is ease of access at lower levels. frankly in terms of legislatures only scandinavia countries on average have more women in the legislatures among democracies, stable democracies, the philippines is the only country within east asia, southeast asia that has a similar percentage of women in the legislature as compared to taiwan. another area that i like to go is to compare the 2016 election here with some initially superficial similarities to the 2000 election. some much these are obvious so bear with me. three candidates including james so pushing the election towards dpt. the knt didn't run their strongest candidate.
arguably to avoid the is sacrificial lamb. here's where the comparison with 2000 should end. the pan blue split handed the election to the dpt whereas the election in 2016. less of a focus on cross strait relations since 2000 if anything it's an indebt influence in the 2016 election. i don't expect recent attention to the '92 consensus to change that election focus in the long term. another point that i think has been largely overlooked is james sung's motivations are different between 2000 and 2016. i would argue his rationale for
entering '16 is similar to entering '12 and that's to bolster his party. however he's a more viable candidate than in 2012. a reminder he only received 2.77% of the vote in 2012. other sort of clear differences between 2000 and 2016, the dpt candidate is not painted as the one that's extreme but hung is playing this role largely because of her positions on cross strait relations. she's not appealing to the sort of blue base but the deep blue. the growth in taiwanese identification even looking just since president cho took office, 20% growth of those who consider themselves taiwanese as opposed to chinese or both. and which tends to be overlooked still early enough although
highly unlikely for a pan blue ki coordination over the candidate. but that's highly unlikely. my expectations for the presidential election is no different than anyone else's. i see the '91 elections have energized the dpt. sentiment may not necessarily translate into pro dpt sentiment however short of a scandal or an outside short term event seems poised to win. a sort of follow up to this is that the third person coming in, a catalyst for internal reforms especially in terms of recruitment, something i brought up before today is not the question of why didn't eric cho run but why are there not other
eric chos ready to one. now shifting to the legislative election. here's where more attention needs to be placed. where sung favored to win the election, the balance in the legislation is less certain. this should be a much more competitive race than 2008 and 2012. but i do not expect it to necessarily end in a dpt majority. in both cases in 2008 and 2012 the pan blue coalition obtained super majorities. 75% of the seats in 2008, 69% of the seats in 2012. the dpt currently have 40 seats in 113 seat legislature. they need 17 seats for a majority on their own. i would argue that the structure of the legislative especially after having the seats, having the seats in half starting in
2008 have created structural conditions that make it difficult for a dpt majority. first six seats that will in all likelihood go. you have apportionmen of district boundaries that benefit the blue camp more than the green camp since each traditional county or municipality gets one seat. that means places get one seat. another place could be underrepresented. even assuming a national shift that means in terms of proportional representational seats the dpt could pick up two or three seats there. they need seats in competitive district elections. a shift of 2% or 3% would bring them closer to the number of seats that they need. but this also assumes that smaller progressive parties like the ntp or tsu don't gain
ground. it means coordinating with them in these districts. they may benefit for that matter if the pfp runs a larger slate of district candidates than they have announced so far. and what i see are a handful of key select districts that make it more probable that the dpt will come close to that majority on their own. i think 17 is really pushing it, frankly. my current prediction and i hate making election predictions because my track record is not good. i was very happy as a graduate student to predict the 2004 presidential election. but that was a coin flip. i'm stick tight. it was planned. my current prediction is there will be a slight, slight pan blue majority in the legislature. what i mean by that by a one or
two seat majority not the 75% seat, 69% seats. this largely, of course, depends on the level of both blue and green coordination of the four party list seats but most importantly district seats. let's take one step back here. let's assume i'm wrong. as my wife says i'm often wrong. what would a unified government look like if the dpt wins the presidential election and the legislature. this is the first time that the dpt has ever been close to a majority in the legislature. i don't see that this would galvanize the party to push towards a more independence oriented sentiment. i think as many have already stated, the expectation would be a maintenance of the status quo although the particulars of this might be defined slightly different. i do think, however, it's a chance for the dpt to move the party and show what it can do,
for example, on social issues, on social welfare, social inequality, on areas of this nature. one other point and this is not a salient point in the current election but the dpt does have an official stance supporting the legalization of same-sex marriage. the rest are ambiguous at best on this issue. supporters are more supportive of same-sex marriage than dpt members. marginally. why i don't have an answer. what i expect if the dpt do win in both areas you'll see these subtle shifts for future debates on issue of social policy not so much of issues on cross strait issues and i'll wrap up there. thank you very much. [ applause ] thank you very much. thanks to both of you for paying
so much attention to the race. han? >> okay. >> good morning. thank you you all for coming to this conference. it's difficult to prepare my remarks, knowing in advance i'll be the third speaker of this panel. but i tried to post a few points and try not to repeat what dave and tim have already said. i think it's probably useful to offer you kind of a historical perspective. remember that this is not the first time taiwan entered the presidential race, neither is james sung. if you look back, you know, what
happened four years ago, at that time -- this is the poll figure that you can collect you know during july and august, roughly, you know in the same state that are current in comparing years right now. and at that point you can tell that actually james sung he posed a formidable challenge in this three way race. i'm sorry, i pushed the wrong button. this is the one. 2011. okay. this is the july and august of four years ago and james sung at
one point gets at much as 18% support in this three way race in july and i list all the, what i consider established polling agenci agencies. and then the taiwan actually in the running, just slightly behind ma for support for quite some time. and in the end, obviously, i think tim mentioned, you know, earlier that soong won only 2.7. a three way race eventually will
end up as a two way race. okay. whether this scenario will repeat itself, well obviously hard to say. this time, you know, the pan blue voter will feel very confused unlike last time. ma was clearly winnable, electable candidate. in the end the pan blue voter simply abandoned him and switched to ma to avoid easy victory for him. ma is a stronger candidate. tai's support hovers around, can be as high as 46% ever recorded. sometimes can be as low as 34.
so undecided voter and also fluctuate a great deal from one to another. what she suggests actually a sizable portion of our electorate. their move is quite volatile. it manifests to the fluctuations. and that make the pan blue vote even more confused especially when they try to pick which one is more winnable between soong and ying-wen. at one point in a three way race get as much as almost 30% but sometimes it's light like 12 or 13%. so this is what has happened july and august. now whether this was stay this
way. or if ma eventually the pan blue voter can identify a clear cut runoff. so that was shaping out the scenario and dynamic of this election in very significant ways. i think a very important point is that tai is a much more stronger candidate than she was in 2011, and the reason, you know, is that the widespread disenkmaent with kmt and the ma administration, which leaves among the middle class voter and united states and kmt suffered from internal feud in setting an agenda in cyber space and media
world. and tsai should be reckoned with. i believe her campaign is best financed, best organized since 1996 in which they won the election by a very convincing landslide. and this is not well-known here. actually tsai in the last four years as a fourth time candidate for the 2016 has actually built up a very robust and elaborate grassroots support organization. in a way that would have nothing before. last time she was quite frustrated but she has to rely on the faction. not the local faction but within the dpt there's the new faction. everyone has their faction.
so they have to, she could really have, you know, a firm grip on the grassroots organization work but this time she learn her lesson. she established more than 800 friend of local chapters throughout taiwan and also there are more than 1,000 groups, you know, to own the line, the social media. so that's why i know she searched on the very top, in the early stage of the campaign. so this is the most interesting question whether this will be going to be replay of 2012 or 2000. obviously i agree with tim it's very likely to be a replay of 2000 rather than a replay of 2012. so on that scenario the pan blue voter will be torn between hung and soong and can't make up
their mind towards the very end. under that scene judge, dpply will benefit notoriously from tsai's election. and that deals kmt with a humiliating loss. but another probability scenario in which hung and soong emerge in the next two or three months as the more clear cut runoff and that might trigger a massive round of voting. so in that case both the credential in the presidential races will become more competitive as a result. in that scenario, you know,
three, there's one little known party set up just recently by a former member. it was very interesting. and according to the taiwan future of change, it will become a mental image of current seed distribution. so it is likely that the ddp can get as many as 63. also that means a clear majority. and they may end up with only 43. an eventual setback. the third party may get as many as five.
the only new party that might get a very small part could be the new power, but according to a lot of poll figures, it is very unlikely that the new power will be able to get the walk across the 5% threshold. so this is one scenario. another scenario that suggests that, you know, that -- sorry, let me see. scenario one. under this scenario, i will argue that thai will become the most powerful president since -- okay. that will also trigger a
generation shift in dpp leadership and that should be completed. that means that -- the exist in infection will become weakened. the position will be much better. under that scenario, i guess that the executive branch will be under -- the scheme will center around the speaker, mainly speaker one, will be curtailed if not dissolved. so this is a very specific
development in terms of politics. actually, since day one, they will have to listen to a co-president, who is speaker one, who is not a friend of the present. so under this scenario, what has taken place over the last 15 years in speaker one will be arrested if not reversed. however, this scenario is completely under which the dpp couldn't win the majority outright. and actually, the first party might turn out to be the critical swing in there. why? the kmt might do slightly better than the first scenario. if that's the case, i will
predict that there will be pressure in the coalitional government. under this party he will become a critical voting bloc that can make or break the dpp's control. and they could retain the cohesiveness and avoid breaking up. it is hard to say, even the pfp in the beginning -- it was hard to say whether the dpp will last. could they last through the policy, it is very difficult to
predict. and under this scenario i think the dpp government will be haunted by its mirror image in the sense that revenge will be disrupted with detectives. something we are all familiar with over the last eight years. and then let me use some political science benchmarks to show you the importance of this coming election, whether this 2016 election will become a critical election or electoral politics. usually you can apply these four criteria, okay. and i would say the election is important for a lot of reasons. although it probably -- the first criteria is, you know, whether this election would trigger a major party realignment and reconfiguration
in the party system. i was say that's unlikely. taiwan will remain a two-party system plus one, a minor party, and its questionable whether tsai can survive. and despite the media attention, it will get a very small port n portion. they are not a significant third party. so that is probably a first criteria there, but it will not apply here. however, it will introduce a restructuring of the relationship, as i just mentioned, which is very important to the day-to-day operation of our government system. and i think it will accelerate generational parties.
and to what extent will this re-election define the party's parameter of competition or even change the underlined image? to some extent. the issue will stay as a dominant portion for some time to come. or the distribution issue, how they got the wide income gaps, things like that. that will get atensitention amo the young voter. my last point, what kind of challenge is there for our next president? i have to say, i wouldn't envy the job of our next president. a whole array of economic challenges await our next
president. the slide in international competitiveness. whether we can sustain the growth momentum. it's going to be a huge challenge. and we are facing an unfavorable demographic trend, just like japan. asia is in a low reproduction rate. and the next president will have to face a huge tradeoff between growth in the environment, whether they can guarantee a reliable supply of water and power. with the nuclear power plant, it's probably not going to run in the future. and we have the huge mismatch in the labor market. we have too many college graduates with marketable skill. and we are facing brain drain. a lot of people with skill and transportable assets. they might be attractive in --
there also being the wide income gap. and it is frustrating. and also the challenge of this itself. it's quite serious. now they have to deal with the deteriorating fiscal health. and now high juan has the phenomenon of the new term. we have witnessed the proliferation of the many single issue groups. strong minded and botched a bit with any chance for compromise. they want to make it the latest
expansion in the park. the whole project was held up for many years because of one group in the region wanted to protect the old trees. okay? and on that issue alone, okay, the whole important multi-billion project has been held up. and finally, obviously, we need to handle an external challenge. in taiwan we have to navigate very carefully when this competition began in china. and we have to worry about our status in the regional process of immigration. whether we can get membership in tpp. and there's the modulation issue. especially for dpp's president,
it might be very pressing and a challenge. the next dpp president might accept it in china. but they could be facing a major diplomatic setback in economic change. so my prediction is that it will be tough for the next president. i'll stop right here. thank you for the attention. [ applause ] >> thanks to both of you for outstanding perceptions. you have covered a lot of ground and have covered all the right issues some didn't think about. we have a half hour. i'm sure you have lots of questions. i have lots of questions but i'm not going to take up your time. because we want to hear from you. the ground rules are, once i
recognize you, wait for a mike, identify yourself, designate to whom you want to pose the question and keep your question brief. these are smart people. you don't have to give a paragraph for them to understand the question. just one sentence will do. so who has the first question? yes, mike. >> reporter: we have had some speculation about how the prc might react to the results. is there any way of defining how the prc reacts just to the fact of this process? that you have the most vibrant democracy in asia, a lot of changes in power, tourists, business people travel from the mainland to taiwan, there's some media seepage into the country. how do they react to this democratic process going on so close to them?
>> anyone want to speak to that? go ahead. >> i think it's frightening to them. when their citizens travel for tourism, one of the most frequently things you hear is they want to stay home to watch all the talk shows, political debate shows, there are six or seven channels that are running these almost continuously. and this is something that they are very interested in. i think they have also been shocked by the potency of the sunflower student movement. and a similarity to that. here's to the umbrella movement in hong kong. and that these are things that for a government that is paranoid about its maintenance of political control in its own
society, i think these are very disturbing phenomena. >> anything in addition? >> well, i think for both the policymaker in beijing and also for the general public, this is a very predictable election. so i don't see the outcome to come as a surprise to any audience in china. this popular opinion poll has primed out the potential for a long, long time. but obviously people for xi jinping and his staff, once they get elected, they will go back to the drawing board on how they will continue this piece and development strategy, or they
will revisit the assumption of their past policy. i think this is obviously what creates a hard choice for the leaders. >> a couple of additional points. first of all, i think it's actually good that this election will not have, not be a surprise in its results. if there is a surprise, it sort of tends to create more of a reaction. i would also say that i think fundamentally chinese leaders and the ccp worry in a system like this, a relatively new democracy, it is very easy for demagogue r politicians can mak it unpredictable and difficult
outco outcome? >> well, i already mentioned in my remarks that this will obviously trigger a generation of shift. that will clearly be the case with dpp or for the green camp as a whole. and also a lot of people in their 30s or even late 20s, they have been very active in social movement and also grassroots ovation. they will steadily climb up the ladder and become an important force in shaping the actual politics. it depends on how his party
turns out. he might be around for quite a while, if his party turns out to be a critical voting bloc, then you know. on the other hand, in the end, a lot of the voters abandoned him in the end and his party actually couldn't really play a very significant role in any case, then it is questionable whether the pfp will survive. so this is more, obviously, less predictable a track. and it will have to lick its wound to go through a lot of soul searching. and one of the, you know,
so-called established leaders may have to come out to put the pieces back as one, again. then they will have to elect a new chairman as he is not going to serve again or take responsibility for the defeat. this guy could be jason, but if he did impressively well in terms of approval rate or support, electoral support, then she also may be a contender in the next election. but i would also pay more attention to people, like the son of jiang jiang.
right now they don't have many riding stars at the age of 40 or 30. so they will have a difficult task how to rejuvenate the party leadership and also mobilize enough young voters for vitality. but that's something we won't know until the aftermath of the election. yeah. >> any supplements or different views? >> can i get back to you on that? >> yeah. >> i would say that if the pfp doesn't win three or four seats, that's probably the end in terms of the pfp. i think three or four is sort of the threshhold. and how the pfp does in the legislative end to a certain extent does determine how much soul searching they need to do,
like how much have they lost? how many have defected. if it's minor defections then you can tell yourselves that we'll do better next time. if it is major defection, you have to start thinking about rebuilding. in a very different way. i think other smaller parties that this is going to be a challenge as well. the tsu was surprised that they -- how well they dmid 2012 in terms of pr seats. i'm not sure especially with sort of vent trends whether or not they can expect that again. so this may be a challenge for the tsu to survive as well. >> dave? >> on that latter point, it is expected that the tsu with thai, at least in terms of policy and not status quo and not moving in the direction of the constitutional reform and so
forth, i have a strong sense that there is a part of the green base that wants a more assertive policy. than she's articulating now. down in the south you have a taiwanese dependence party and you have a coalition of people associated with one county on each side of the alliance. this tells me that there is a segment of the taiwan electorate that wants a more assertive policy towards an independent status for taiwan. than thai is arctic waiting. and i will be interested to see if the tsu can plug into that when she was not talking about ethnic issues like the way the dpp did before. and i respect her for not emphasizing on those, but it clears up a little space, it
moves a little space for the deep green party and maybe they will feel that. >> you go for the district but your heart is still with the dpp on that party list. it's a matter of how many split like that. >> i would hypothesize this deep green effect would be more likely if the mainland took the kinds of steps it was saying in talking about before that create a sort of downward spiral in cross-trade relations. >> that probably won't happen. >> allen romberg has been waiting patiently. >> reporter: thank you. one question that the other microphone be looked at to see if it will work. >> i'm sorry? >> the other microphone didn't work very well the last time, so i request you look at it. all allen rombert.
i have a question on whether the university exams would conflict with the january 2016 election. and i do not know how that turned out, so does somebody have an answer? and the larger question is that there's a lot of discussion about the day of blue versus green is over. and you've talked around this a little bit, but i wonder if you can talk more directly about that. it seems to me if the issue is cross-straight, then even if you don't -- if one is not pushing for independence, that issue doesn't necessarily go away. so i would appreciate some thoughts on the future of blue/green versus some other division. >> so who wants to do the university exam question? >> yes. usually that week, okay, july 16th, okay, is exam week for a
lot of those in college. and there might be some students who are anxious to go back home to negotiate with the school or the teacher when they can try to move up the exams one week. but i don't think that will affect much. maybe a little bit. maybe just a little bit. but it is not a preview issue. so regarding the -- whether we could see the end of the blue and green divide, probably not. under two assumptions, okay in
number one, it's the dominant issue. and secondly, she and her party will never come to one agreement. okay? if that would be the case, then i think there would be -- they would continue to have the green and blue competition. >> okay. anybody else on the blue/green? >> you're a political scientist more than i am. >> i would generally concur with the continuation of the blue, sort of the blue/green divide. maybe, maybe under a couple situations there will be lower level elections means less over time where cross-elections aren't as -- at the forefront.
but i don't see it dissipating by much. >> harry buharding. >> reporter: thanks very much. i am harry harding. i want to ask about something that has not yet been raised and perhaps not as important. when he was first nominated, one of my most pro-kmt friends on taiwan said she not only has a great personality and unusual background, but she's a woman. and what she's going to do to put it away is to nominate a taiwanese man as a running mate to put it away from her. but that obviously hasn't happened. to the best of my knowledge in neither candidate has chosen a running mate. in many systems, including our own, where presidents and vice presidents are directly i elected, that is seen as an important choice, both for indicating the judgment of the presidential nominee and to build a broader base of support.
what is going on here? >> anyone? >> i don't have a good explanation for that. i am going to see where you need support geographically, okay, like this area, maybe if we put someone on the ticket that will bump up the vote a little bit. i really don't have an answer. >> i will pass. >> if i understand correctly, independent candidates have to announce their vp candidate, like now, when they register. whereas the registered parties don't have to. >> when they collect the signatures.
but no -- this race remains a three-way race. and -- they are running neck and neck in terms of potential support. the choice of the vp wouldn't affect too much as far as the dynamic. her dream running mate is eric hu. although it's a low probability event, but it has been seriously discussed. because this is the only way that they can make up for the
party after refusing to run himself. and also in that scenario, she might really help boost them to a substantial degree. and that may help the party to remain formidable moving forward. however, whether that will happen, i don't know. >> one aspect of this is at least in presidential campaigns, presidential candidates are focusing not just on how your vice president can -- or your vice presidential candidate can help you geographically and politically, but whether he or she can help you govern. and you see joe biden and george
herbert walker bush and al gore, they all played a role in governance and arguably added to their administrations. okay. >> i am with the agency from hong kong. the dpp is doing well in the election, but as an american expert, what are the reasons behind the facts that kmp is doing poor? and if kmp fails this time, do you still believe there's still opportunity for kmp to come back as china kmp? considering the identity and political momentum changing in taiwan. and the second question is also
for professor chu. thank you. >> when things go well, many people claim responsibility. when things go poorly, this morning it was said that they bear a certain amount of responsibility for the poor state of the kmp campaign. i would argue that eric shu does retain a good portion of that because of his decision not to run. and seemingly not willing to try and adjust strategy partway through the campaign when it's quite clear it's not going well. as party leader, he is ultimately responsible for the way the campaign goes for the presidency and legislature. that's the role of political parties to win elections. he's the head of the party and
has to bear a certain responsibility for that. that's in terms of personalities. i think in term of the other factors, that reflects everything from his polling on people's attitudes, they are fighting an uphill battle at a time when the party has shifted. it's a well-established party. in 2000 his death was predicted and it was recovered and i'm quite so it will do so again. >> let's speak to the nation of -- >> no.
that's the party name. >> obviously, this warrants the possibility that speaker wong will go for the party chair. but the possibility has been ruled out. he will not be contested and should not win the race. but if he would win, that would change things significantly. and also -- i will also take that low probability.
>> david keegan? >> dave keegan, bart institute. this is a question for anyone who wants to answer it. in some past presidential elections, the business community on the mainland has been an issue both as a voting bloc and in terms of their concerns about how the election would affect them. and i wonder if we know anything about how the taiwan business community on the mainland sees the upcoming election and its consequences. thank you. >> thanks, good question. views? >> i haven't seen anything, in particular, that sort of gave any new insight. and i think if this were a closer presidential election, then it would matter. >> in the previous election, a large number of taiwanese and their dependents, they managed
to come back to vote. in spite of the very substantial cost in terms of money and travel time. but this time i think they will be just as confused as other voters. but obviously they would say to know that they are not necessarily a unisonic group. they will support the green in the community. but i would say the majority will feel quite nervous and anxious about what happened in the aftermath. obviously, if xi jinping raises the bar too high for taiwan to
overcome, then obviously this group, this man will have to bear the burden in cross-relations, yeah. >> in the last campaign, several prominent taiwan businessmen with interests, chimed in at the last moment to endorse the importance of the '92 consensus. i doubt that that will happen this time in part because it's not a close race. >> tom has been waiting patiently and that's probably the last question. >> thank you. >> reporter: i am with the foreign policy extension group. to what extend hah have the proliferations in hong kong had an influence on the electorate in taiwan? >> i will answer that because this is a topic i've been
working on, in part. the answer is very little. if you're talking about the public as a whole. the attitude seems to be, taiwan is taiwan. hong kong is hong kong. and so what happens there doesn't affect us. where it's had a lot more impact is in, let's call it the political class. and among politicians, among the media that is -- that has a role-playing on political issues, so during the protests last fall, the green media sort of hammered away on hong kong. i suspect because it was a use ful consul in beating up myngul.
okay, we have a question in the back. >> reporter: i am from the institute of taiwan and medical study. my question is, later this mo h month -- talking about another newcomer, what is the possibility of that? thank you. >> zero. i really think that the state of u.s./china relations do not argue or create a good foundation. i think taiwan will be raised
because they just always raise it, but i think this is not in the cards. thank you very much for your great questions. and please join me in thanking our panelists. so listen carefully because i have some instructions about what happens next. we're going to have lunch. it's a buffet lunch. and it's out there. we're going to ask shelley to go first to get her lunch so she can be well-fed before she has to speak. and please be back in your seats within 20 minutes. because that is when i will introduce shelley and we will start the luncheon program. thank you very much. [ applause ]
discussion on the 2016 elections in taiwan and the potential impact on the u.s., this is part of a day-long forum on issues in politics in taiwan. a short break now to prepare for the luncheon speech from the east asian politics professor shelley rigger. later this afternoon we'll bring you the discussion on the u.s./taiwan policy. while we wait for the luncheon speaker, about 20 minutes or so, we'll go back to earlier today to show you remarks from earlier this morning where the panel gave the overview of current policy issues in taiwan. >> i think we are going to go ahead and brings things to order. so if people could go ahead and take their seats.
my name is chris johnson. i'm the head chair here at csis. and i am pleased to have the opportunity to open this outstanding conference we're having today with the brookings institution. thank you very much to richard bush, our co-convener of the conference. very pleased to be working again, cooperative, with brookings on this. and many thanks to my colleague bonnie for helping to pull this together. i think we have a very solid set of perceptions and discussions for you today. very robust set of topics and presenters. and i think we're going to sort of move through the day by starting off with looking at the current policy issues in taiwan. and what they are facing domestically and how they think about that in the context of cross-trade relations. then we'll have a very interesting panel secondly on
the 2016 elections in taiwan. how that is shaping up. how we expect that to affect cross-trade relations. i think it's fair to say there's a lot of speculation with regard to what might happen in the cross-trade relations context should the dpp come back to power or maybe if the kmt manages to win in some sort of stark commentary out there about how the mainland might react to the various scenarios and be very useful to get our panelists impressions. then we'll have a lunch and keynote speaker with shelley rigger, who is an extremely distinguished scholar in the field. we are pleased to have her come and talk to us today on how to sort of think about the state of cross-trade relations and what that means for the various political pieces going on. and this afternoon we'll wrap up with a presentation on the u.s./taiwan policy with several of our colleagues here at csis but also folks from outside who are long-time watchers of cross-trade relations and of
course, the u.s., china, taiwan tria tria triangulur relationship. with everything going on with the u.s. and china in regards to cyber, south china sea, human rights issues, i'm just back from beijing myself where it's pretty clear there's nervousness there. we thought this would be a particularly good time to give taiwan and cross-trade relations the spotlight as well and not forget how important that is in the context of our bilateral relationship with china and our relationship with taiwan and the tri-will the r tri-lateral context. with that in mind, i'll invite bonnie up and her two panelists to join her. we'll have several minutes of presentations and then we will have an open time for q&a from the audience. i'm just going to remind folks as per usual in csis process,
identify yourself, where you are from and do confine your question to a question rather than a soliloquy. with that in mind, i'll ask bonnie to come up with our panelists as well. thank you very much. good morning, everyone. i'm bonnie glazer and senior advisor for asia for the center of strategic and international
studies. and also director of a new project that we are standing up on chinese power. so you can all look in the future for some of our products and things that we're going to be doing related to that project. this panel is going to focus on the situation domestically in taiwan. some of the challenges, opportunities, in the context, of course, of the upcoming elections. as you all know, the elections will be january 16th. and there are three candidates. there's the dpp candidate currently leading in almost all the polls by double digits. there's the candidate for the knt polling in third place. and the independent candidate who has run in the past now
polling second. but there are many issues to talk about, i think, today. of course, cross strait relations are on the mind for many of us, and we'll talk about the candidate's policies toward the mainland and how the election of the dpp might altar the landscape and the dynamics across the strait. but i really would also like to talk about some of the internal challenges that taiwan faces. we'll talk about the economy and perhaps some of the other issues that pertain to perhaps employment prospects, energy, nuclear power, for example. it is something very controversial in taiwan. so there's lots of things on the agenda. and i really -- we could not have two better speakers. and we're so pleased that they both flew out from taiwan to
join us to have this discussion today. so speaking first to my right is tom genuine, he is the director of the center for prediction markets at national jungju university. and from 2006 to 2008, he served in the main affairs council as vice chairman. that was under the former president. and to my left we'll have speaker hasane who is currently at don gong university. and he was under mying-jo. he served under the national
security council from 2008 to 2010. so i very much look forward to great presentations and a very rich discussion afterwards. so i'll ask you, professor tung, you may speak from there if you wish. >> good morning, everyone. i will use a powerpoint to explain my presentation. thank you very much, bonnie, for the warm introduction. and good morning. i want to talk to you about the parliament election. so i will try to prevent this on the next page. you can see who is more likely to win the election in taiwan next year. secondly, why is taiwan so popular at this time? and third, i see most people are quite concerned about the
cross-strait relations. so we'll discuss this in two aspects. the first one is that we have the cross-strait relations. finally, if taiwan wins the election. then if taiwan wins the election, that will influence cross-strait relations with the united states and china. who is most likely to win the election? as most of you have observed, the polls in taiwan, you can see that taiwan is in the lead. it is not working. anyw anyway, there's 40% or higher, sometimes to 50%. and then jim song around 20%. so it's quite highly possible
that this will be the result of the election next year. and more than 80% expect this to be the result of the election. and in taiwan, around 90% probability that this will be the result of the election. the leading candidate is so popular in taiwan. according to opinion polls made up by taiwan indicators and research, over the last three-and-a-half years, the approval rate was on average below 20%.
so people were so dissatisfied with the current policy performers in the current president. so this is an important reason for the results. over the past three-and-a-half years, many people believe taiwan is going in the wrong direction. taiwan is more pivotal in terms of overall winning the country
in terms of their policy with china. this is how they look with policy and crisis management. particularly, people will ask, which one, which candidate will be able to maintain cultural peace simultaneously. most people believe that taiwan will do a better job. tsai ing-wen will do a better job. most of this has kept negotiation very open.
you can see the best negotiations come apart in china. in addition, both sides -- recently they just signed another agreement in china and taiwan. but the foundation for this kind of interaction, most people have heard that if we look deeper, the base of the foundation over the last seven years is not coming to consensus with this interpretation. one is that china is different
in their consensus. this is very fragile. but it is a visible foundation for both sides to interact with each other. however, this means insufficient trust and this could undermine the changes in china and taiwan. over the last seven years, parliament in china has maint n maintained many changes and currently maintains stable diplomatic relations with our allies. and also we sign a lot of peace offering agreements with many other countries, and also we sign prolific agreements with other countries.
so these are our achievements for the president over the last seven years. people in taiwan did not appreciate this kind of result very much. when we look at the approval rating for the president, the approval rating over the last seven years, particularly looking at three years is 30%. so this is quite serious for the president to sign agreements with china. from that perspective, i would say that there's a lot of consent in taiwan. the president plays too much attention on the consensus, but instead he played less or insufficient attention and looked to expand later.
this discussion with china continued to deepen. and overall there became an interest in terms of people's point of view, most people would say the president's policies played a larger part in taiwan instead of public interest. and, in addition, this position would bring about expending the population for taiwan in the international agreement. i also see people not so satisfied. and president ma ying-jeou
continues a position. but most people in tie juan has a lot of concerns and transparency issue in taiwan. and finally, president mao had transparency in the beginning, require the request taiwan to conduct -- it would be impossible to resolve those differences between taiwan and china and this kind of situation we undermine people's confidence to deepen the changes and sign
the agreement in china. so, people in taiwan perceive that president mao, 60% of china. the president is -- china less than 30% of people in taiwan -- most people have a lot of concerned the so-called economic security issue even from an economic perspective, more peoples in tie been a still have concern, 50% of people believe that the benefit of the cost of posteconomic exchanges will be eager than the benefit. the last column shows in terms of security and the issue, a lot of people have a lot of concerns
so-called security and the issue, you know, if you look at the course along 50% of people in taiwan have this aspect concern by the president this is reasonable or justifiable position to stop him from continuing negotiation about china. and i look at income distribution issue, mostly in taiw taiwan, posttrade changes benefit large enter prize most. we have heard blue collar works and farmer and fishermen. more than 70% of people in taiwan -- >> dr. shelley regehr is well known to everyone here, i think. it's safe to say among the american scholars who specialize on china and tie been aiwan, sh
arrived in davidson near rally in 1993, even before she received her ph.d. from harvard university. i know from personal knowledge how devoteded she is to her students and how much she regards teaching as a mission and vocation some we are very fortunate that she was able to take time away from that mission to be with us today.
we have learned in good ways and bad ways or -- i didn't put that way. we have learned it a lot of different ways over the last 20 years that the key driver of cross straight relations and u.s.-taiwan relations really is taiwan domestic politics, including elections. and in shelley's scholarly work, she has, i suggested, made a major under -- major contribution to how we understand that driver. i recall in the late 1990s when those of us who worked on taiwan in the u.s. government were becoming increasingly, um, cognizant of the fact that taiwan politics was changing. it was changing in ways that we did not understand. and we realized at one point
that the dpp, which we really didn't understand, might come to power. and it was just at that point that shelley began to contribute to our understanding of the dpp, which she did very well. she was the right person on the right issue at the right time. she brings to her work on taiwan and anna littic precision and enthusiasm that makes her work really interesting. i don't know if any of you saw it, it was late august, msnbc had a segment on strange legislatures and taiwan was one of the ones that was being featured and shelley was the key informant. and you could really feet enthusiasm with which she viewed
t it and also clear she didn't take the whole thing too seriously and had a real sense of humor which for taiwan politics, you have to have. at the core of all of her work i believe is -- this i'm serious about, is an empathy for the political -- for the people of taiwan and a hope that taiwan's democratic system will serve taiwan's people well. she understands very well why taiwan matters, for its own sake, for the development of democracy in general. and for peace and progress in east asia. in fact, she has written a book with that title, "why taiwan matters ""and it's the book that
i recommend to anybody who says tell me one book i should read about taiwan so that i understand everything. and that's the one i recommend. so we are very fortunate to have shelley with us today. please join me in welcoming her to our conference. [ applause ] >> well, thank you so much, richard. obviously, there's nothing lick a book plug like that to make your day. it's a real pleasure to be here and to be able to listen to this absolutely fantastic lineup of speakers already in the morning and i'm really looking forward to the afternoon. i have taken already 11 pages of notes. so, that's -- that's pretty good. earlier today, my brother-in-law said to me, you know, i'm notal much of a glass half-full kind of guy. in fact, i'm usually pretty suspicious about what's in the
glass. but those of you who know me know that i am a glass half-full kind of person. i generally is a very optimi optimistic -- there if there's a way you can take an optimistic view, i find it. so, it may come as a surprise that this is kind of a half-empty kind of a talk today. and i don't really mean it. i guess i need to start by saying i'm not sure i really mean what i'm going to say but i want to ask the question, especially to this room full of people about great expertise in taiwan politics, u.s.-taiwan relation, u.s.-taiwan prc relations. for a long time, the mainstream analysis of cross straight relations has been that the status quo is pretty stable. it can be sustained for a long time. but there's no immediate reason