tv Politics and Public Policy Today CSPAN September 14, 2015 1:00pm-3:01pm EDT
strait relations. most taiwanese people see little practical value in changing the status quo toward legal independence. so, taiwan's policy has been to cut rate is good relations with the prc, but avoid being drawn into political talks that could erode the island's freedom of action. that's what's keeping taiwan in check. what is keeping the prc in check are at least three things, i'm sure many of you could think of many more. first, the prc recognizes that acting to change the status quo, mean a non-coercive way, would definitely be difficult, definitely be costly and definitely be risky.
so it's safer and easier to kick the can. second, bay shipping believes that time is on its side. its relative power is growing, as is taiwan's economic dependence on the prc. then third, china's internal challenges are very significant and we have heard a little bit about that already today, but they are manageable as long as the leadership keeps giving them sufficient attention. so, having serious but manageable internal problems keeps bay shippi s beijing pre risk averse. the prc policy insists very strongly that taiwan make no moves toward legal independence but to remain pretty tolerant in practice of the status quo as long as taiwan is not lunging.
they occasionally leverage that for political gain. so, in short, both sides are good reasons not to push too hard for a change to the status quo so the situation is stable. but there are at least two developments that we routinely mention in conversations about what could upset this equilibri equilibrium, what could change this well-established pattern that supports the warm peace or the lukewarm peace, at worst? and one is that the prc's calculus could change so that it begins to believe time is not on its side, that if the prc really begins to sense that waiting puts it in a weaker position
than not waiting, than acting more quickly, then a change in strategy could result. and then the second thing we often talk about as a possible precipitator of a pronounced change in prc policy is that the prc could develop internal or external problems so severe that the leadership sees the need for some kind of diversion or demonstration of its nationalist commitments to distract the prc public and refocus chinese people's attention on the ccp as the defender of chinese nationalism. and the question that i have for you is are we seeing these developments today? is there evidence that time is no longer on beijing's side and that the constellation of
problems troubling the prc is ripening toward a place where bay shipping may see the need for some kind of change in its taiwan policy? the evidence that time is not on beijing's side, so i do have the qualifications or richard believes do. what is the evidence that time may not be on beijing's side or beijing may begin to perceive that to be the case? you know, the argument for the prc to remain patient is that the mainland is becoming increasingly powerful economically, politically and militarily, especially relative
to taiwan. so if present trends continue, it becomes increasingly not decreasingly difficult to imagine how taiwan could resist in the long term the prc's determination to athief some kind of outcome favorable to its preferences, which is like a really long-winded way of saying something like unification. um, and i -- i'm going to skip over a description of those favorable trends, but just to say that while the prc's political, economic and military might all are increasing, they are increase at different speeds and it's not really clear how we would know when the mainland's power had reached the point where the tide had decisively turned in its favor so that for the chinese leadership, trying
to know when to change policy toward taiwan is more art than science. so the biggest problem that they face in trying to understand when the trends -- whether the trends are favorable or unfavorable and whether it's safe to continue waiting for these military, economic and political forces to ripen up into a moment where the prc can act on its preferences, the biggest challenge to making that call is taiwanese public opinion. because if what you're trying to do is engineer peaceful unification and i thank you ink what prc would like to do engineer peaceful unification, you have to be able to sell peaceful unification, you have to sell unification in taiwan. if it's going to be peaceful, you have to be able to make the
case for it in taiwan. and i think it just looks like that is getting harder and harder and harder, not easier, easier, easier. positions notwithstanding, unification has no support at all in taiwan right now. and the other indicators that the prc looks at for measures of how it's doing in terms of the sales job also all look very negative. one of those indicators is support of independence versus unification. on the independence unification debate in taiwan, there's good news and bad news. the good news is that while support for unification is off the charts, that is off the bottom of the charts, support for independence is also low. and consistently low. we don't see a trend of rising
support for independence. it's been in the, you know, 20% range for 20 years and it just kind of stagnates there. but the bad news is if you dig a little deeper, support for independence starts to look less weak and support for unification starts to look even weaker than the surface-level trends would suggest. so for example, the taiwan national security survey, which i have -- i guess they did it again in 2014, but i don't think they have released the data yet, so i'm looking at 2011 data, asking people, if you could have independence and there would be no war, right, if you could have end against and it would does taiwan nothing, would you support independence? and around 80% of people say, yes, absolutely, if we could have independence for free, we would take it. but it it does have a military
cost, which i think we all agree it would right now, the support for independence drops to somewhere around 30 to 35%. meanwhile, if you could have unification and it was -- would cost you nothing because the conditions, the economic, political and social conditions in the mainland would have converged with taiwan, only like a quarter to a third, so, somewhere in the high 20s to low 30s, percentage wise, would favor unification under the best possible scenario. and at least half of taiwanese oppose unification under any circumstances. so even best case scene nair grow, we don't want it. another piece of negative evidence from the prc's point of view is that the trend in support for unification under
ideal circumstances is particularly negative. until 2005, more than half of taiwanese said we could accept automaticfication if it meant that the stuff wouldn't change. now, we are down to below 30% and opposition, active opposition to unification under the best possible scenario was up to around 60%. so, basically, support for unification under any circumstances has reached a low point while support for independence under the best case scene nair grow is extremely high. so, that's not a good trend for the prc. on the economic front, the strategy of waiting for economic integration to create support for political integration, i
would argue is also losing momentum. even four years ago, during the 2012 presidential election, the candidates needed to persuade voters that they could keep the economic ties only not topping at sort of the same pace but accelerating in order to make a persuasive case and i think the -- a big part of the reason that thailand was not elected in 2012 was she did not make the case to the voters that she could keep the economic momentum rolling past 2012. this time around, after four years of disappointing economic performance and rising skepticism about the distributional implications of economic -- cross strait economic engagement, voters' requirements have changed. they may not have reversed
completely, but they may actually have reversed completely, to the point were in this election, you don't have to be able to persuade anybody that you can make more economic integration happen. what you need to persuade people is that you can protect taiwan against the risks associated with the ever-accelerating dependence of taiwan on the prc economy. and in fact, many voters, maybe not a majority, but a significant chunk of voters, i would argue, are looking for a candidate who will talk about how to reduce taiwan's dependence on the main land, not deepen the interaction. another big problem for china is the canton knee shocking weakness at the moment, both in terms of party identification, which is below party identification with the dpp for the first time since the early 2000s and in terms of the
party's internal politics and i just have if the taiwan affairs office in beijing may sit around and ask each other, how in the world did this happen? [ laughter ] so, one final indicator to look at is taiwan people's self-identification as taiwanese, chinese or both and here the trend is clearly very negative for beijing billion is. since 2007, the percentage claiming taiwanese identity has increased from the low 40% to around 60%. and that is a huge trend. it maybe leveling off, but it's still extremely -- you know, just a very sharp increase in a very short time. the presidential and legislative elections will be an imperfect manifestation of how these trends translate into politics, but as imperfect as they are, they are still what we have to go on, so the prc will be looking at them very closely.
that's the evidence that time may not any longer be on beijing's side. and that beijing may have to change that calculus to think about how do we respond now to a negative trend rather than try to shape a positive trend? on the second point, there are many people in this room who understand china's problems much better than i do but i would just say it seems clear the prc is facing economic and political headwinds that could eventually sharpen into a situation where there is need for xi jinping to do something, to consolidate his support and to show his people that even if he can't control the economy, even if he can't control the prc's image in the region and lots of other -- even if he can't control corruption in the communist party, he can
droll something and if that's something that he can control turns out to be taiwan, you know, these not good. so, here, the per petch balance optimist is delivering some more soccer news, but i think there are still a number of forces that are actually pulling in a more positive direction and arabling as kind of traction on the status quo. one, the dpp is probably going to win the election, at least the presidential and make major inroads in the legislative, but it is a less odious dpp in 2016 from the prc's point of view than it was in best and if they allow themselves to take this in and to hear the message that taiwan is sending, i think they will be -- they will be lesner views about the implications of a dpp victory. you know, taiwan is not bien and
not worse than bien, from the prc's point of view and telling themselves that she is really doesn't serve the prc's interest. 'cause it's not accurate, among other things. and there are ways to spin this election through the will make it seem like less of a disaster for china. they can point to the chaos in the knt and say people didn't vote for the dpp, they voted against the chaos in the knt vote. they are splitting the vote with a blue vote so it looks less like a big surge of support for the dpp and more like, you know, a repeat of 2000. you know, i don't necessarily agree with this, i'm just giving the prc some talking points to talk themselves out of needing to overreact to this election result. [ laughter ] um, second, i think china's problems are actually still manageable with focused attention and as long as they
don't get distracted by side issues like tie juan, you know, they will be fine. third the military risk is still very high and so adventurism is still risky and therefore, the deterrence of more precipitous action or a powerful change in the prc's policy, i think the deterrence to that are still very noticeable and powerful. fourth, china can't afford to worsen relations with its neighbors so it those pay attention to taiwan in the context of a deteriorating regional scene. and finally, and here i am on shaky ground as a taiwan specialist commenting on politics but seems to me strong action or risk taking could activate or intensify rather than alleviate splits in the prc leadership and that knowledge of that possibility may be a
deterrent as well to taking stronger action on the taiwan issue. xi jinping would need to build a consensus for action on that front and given the risks involved, that could be very difficult and here, i will just end by giving two possibilities. one from this morning from tom juwan. a taiwan-related crisis would react poorly on she gin ping and plead source unlikely. she gin ping would be more damaged if he were seen to be looking the other way and tolerating taiwan going in that direction. honestly, both of those logics makes sense to me. so, i would be interested to hear which you think is more persuasive and also, whether you have other things that i can teed my glass of positive trends to help me, you know, have a
glass of even more than half-full so that i don't have to worry about the glass being, like, more than half-empty. thank you. [ applause ] >> so my answer to your two choices is only xi knows for sure. [ laughter ] we have ten minutes until we have to break. she willy's going to take the questions. you want do it here or? >> yep. >> okay. thanks a lot. >> yes? >> my name is hero mat sue mura, japan. although the don't tary is weakened, the party has a privileged position in societal, political, economic life there the party has a huge -- its own
asset, maybe leeching to the 100 billion, which originated from -- japanese asset. based on this wealth and asset, its controls, social keystones are concern and the control the media, right? so, do you think dpp's approach focusing on grassroots movement and sns is sort of inevitable choice and how do you see the competition between the position and dpp's new approach, particularly after the election? maybe cannot change the public opinion but it can based on this
position and dpp policies and public support. >> well what we see with the kn st. that money isn't everything, you know? you can have a lot of money. you can have a lot of positions in government. you can have a lot of resources and you can still blow it completely. so -- [ laughter ] but i have to be careful because i was one of the people back in 2000 and 2001 who predicted the demise of the knt. i probably at one of your events, i used a very ungenerous analogy, which i will not repeat here, but so, you know, i think it's right that the knt will pull itself back together, but i also think that taiwan politics has fundamentally changed. and something that was discussed in the previous panel is the blue-green divide disappearing.
yes and no i mean, i think the blue-green divide, those two vessels will remain because i think they are meaningful in the context of taiwan's electorate, but i don't necessarily think that the content is unchanging. i think this election is much more about economic issues than past elections have been and it is absolutely true that it -- that taiwan's conversation about economics invariably invokes cross strait relations, but if you think about julian hahn's last slide, almost everything on that slide, except for the part about cross strait, you know, like the external problems that taiwan has, but the political problems and the economic problems that taiwan has that he
identified, the usa has exactly that same litany of problems. the economic problem that taiwan is facing is not only a cross strait problem. it is a globalization problem. and the distributional problems that taiwan is facing are not about cross strait relations. they are about globalization and they are about technology and they are about why my students in the united states are just as desperate thinking about their future prospects as my colleagues from taiwan's students are thinking about their fall churs. so, i think what the blue-green baskets need to do is they need to go ac kba and teal in order to accommodate a broader range of issues but within that basic context, i think the new issues
can be encompassed. i think. knt will be back in some form but organizationally, they have to process this trauma fully in order to, you know, come to dom surging back the way they did after 2001. anybody else? yes. >>. >> thank you, eric gomez from the cato institute. i was wondering if you could comment, i know the election is more about economic issues but is there any significant split within the parties over how they think taiwan should be handling defense-related things if, indeed, the glass is half-empty or less that half machine empty? and also, do you perceive any any difference in political will
power from self-defense from the knt or the dpp? is any one more committed or less committed? >> both party leaders have consistently promised, right to increase taiwan's defense spending to 3% of gdp and to be more active in self-defense. and i think this is the sort of thing that we could talk about for the rest of the afternoon there is more going on than probably most of us are aware of, but i will say that the track record okn it. the past eight years has been disappointing to many in the u.s. in terms of not making it to that 3% and not really giving good anticipates to the question, you know, why not and when will you turn things around? so i think the dpp is trying to
use that as -- and not just trying to use that politically, i don't mean that -- i don't think it's cynical. i think the dpp is actually committed to doing better on the defense front. something i learned today that i had not thought about a lot, i had not thought about the 92 consensus as a larger package, as an edifice of ideas and practices, but if the administration has the goal of assembling a kind of coherent set of strategies that support a particular vision and version of cross strait relations, then we have to think about defense policies maybe in that package. the fact that the dpp is not interested in building that same
edifice might give the dpp more flexibility to be a little bit more active on the defense front. alan? >> thanks,ab ablabl ablable -- it may be a question that goes also to the previous panelist but you talk about the election being primarily about economic issues and we saw data which showed that comp tense that they can manage the economy or social issues better than either of her opponents is pretty obvious. my question is there evidence as to whether that reflects great confidence in her or lack of confidence in the others compared to her? >> well, one of the things that i really loved on that slide
that was some is way towering over the other two in terms of performance and experience and so even though people don't like point other measures, they recognize that he has this experience. what that tells me, that is a real poll people are answering seriously. they can disaggregate these people into their comp opponents. one of their components is performance and experience. another component is policy preferences what they stand for, what they are likely to do and another component is kind of personality and capacity to govern and to function well in interactions with others. and i think, you know, some does great on -- he has a lot of experience and i think it's worth mentioning that song is i think -- i think this one is going to be more like 2000 than 2012 because song is campaigning at the grassroots.
he is -- he is drawing back into those networks that he cultivated when he was the tie watch provincial governor and he is being a retail politician again. so, he is -- people can recognize that about him. but i think they also recognize that his capacity to interact successfully with other political leaders is limited and his policy agenda is not well understood. hong show jew does poorly across the board. she has no experience, people don't like her and she stands for the wrong things. taiwan has moderate experience. she is mostly standing for the right things, mostly. i mean, she's been really careful in how she talks. and she is perceived as being able to get along with people and do things better that the other two. so, i think it -- it is in that sense sort of, you know, she has -- she averages well.
the other song has peaks and valleys. hong has mostly valleys. i think it's in that sense that thai really dominates. i don't know if that was the answer to your question but it was something that i wanted to say. [ laughter ] it looks like we are out of time. >> yes. my obligation to the organizers was to get us off the stage at 1:30 and i'm going to fulfill that obligation. but this -- we will put a big demand on you because whatever you have to do in the break, you have five minutes to do it. and then be back here. but before you leave, please join me in thanking shelley for a great keynote. [ applause ]
our coverage will continue shortly as they resume here in just a bit. taking a look at our coverage of congress on the c-span networks, the senate comes back tomorrow. they will take another procedural vote on a disapproval resolution of the iranian nuclear agreement. they will come in at 1:00 eastern. the vote scheduled for 6. later in the week in the senate, they are expected to debate a bill that would ban abortions after 220 weeks. members take up a number of bills in the house, including one directing the tsa to enhance security at airports. and on thursday, the house will attempt to ban all federal funding for planned parenthood
unless that organization agrees to stop performing or funding abortions. our coverage of the senate is on c-span2. the house is on c-span. and our road to the white house coverage continues. earlier, we covereded the speech at liberty university in lynchburg by democratic presidential candidate bernie sanders, independent senator bernie sanders. we will show that to you again tonight at 8:00 eastern and follow that, 45 minutes later, with republican presidential candidate, former hewlett-packard ceo, carly fiorina. all that starting tonight at 8:00 eastern. here on c-span 3 again, as we said, we are back at the center for strategic and international studies and their discussion, focus on taiwan and taiwan politics and elections.
if aid take your-- if you'd take your seats, we'd appreciate it. >> you can stand up. >> yeah. >> okay. all right. let's get it down to a dull roar, everyone. get started. thank you. thank you. thank you. appreciate it. okay. we are going dive right in to the final panel of today, which is on u.s.-taiwan policy. we are very honored to have three very distinguished guests on the panel giving us their insights today. i'm going to keep the introductions to a minimum because these people are obviously familiar to most of you in the audience. dr. mike green, my colleague here at csis, senior vice president for asia and also our
japan chair here at csis, obviously also a professor at georgetown. and a former staffer at the nsc during the george w. bush administration, acting as the senior director for east asia and many other previous roles both in academia and government. ron berg, likewise, extremely experienced foreign service officer, 30ish years, give or take. and certainly one of the most renowned experts on u.s.-taiwan policy, the triangular relationship between china, the u.s. and way to juan and many issues. bob wong, an active state department officer still at this stain, currently in residence at georgetown university wrest doing some teaching and we are very honored as well to have him with us here at csis as a senior fellow helping us sort of think through a lot of these interesting issues this are happening in east asia now without further ado i'm going to turn it over to dr. green to kick us off.
mike? >> thank you, chris, thank you, everyone, for staying after lunch. we appreciate it. and it's great to be up here with three guys i've learned an awful lot about this issue from. when i took over as the senior asia person in the nsc, the first thing i did was read alan ronburg's -- read and memorize as best i cot book on the history of u.s. and taiwan relation about to say for the hundreds of billions of dollars of taxpayer money does not actually exist within the u.s. government. so everyone told me read alan's account and bob wong sired with great distinction in beijing and taipei when i was there. so, let me make a few comments on how i think we, the u.s., and friends of taipei should approach our dialogue and our relationship and our cooperation as we enter not one but dual political cycles at the same time. i look forward to seeing how i'm
misquoted tomorrow and your questions. so, it's always useful, i think, to start with interests, objectives and for the u.s., in particular, i think it's worthying about the importance of taiwan and u.s. foreign policy strategy and u.s. national security interests. obviously, taiwan is a variable, of the the variable in the u.s.-china relationship and one of the largest, many in this room would a urk the largest foreign policy challenge the united states faces in the decade ahead is managing relations with a growing china. so in that context, everyone will immediately recognize the importance of getting taiwan policy right but i would argue to get taiwan policy right that is the wrong starting play, as critical as that dimension is. and that it's important to start about the importance of taiwan on its own merits in u.s.
foreign policy interests in asia. and i would mention three things and i think in all three categories, arguably, this next president in taipei and washington will find that the relationship and their dialogue, which they can't have, of course directly, is going to be more important, not less important. so the first core interest i think the u.s. has in taiwan's future, and i use the core interest term with a little bit of -- but some intention as well. the first core interest is in taiwan's success as a democracy and that doesn't just mean the success of the process, but the ability of the people of taiwan to advance their democratic process without coercion or intimidation from beijing. is that a very, very important u.s. interest because, as chinese power rises, there will be a contest between beijing's
material power and the normative or values that have underpinned peace and stability in the pacific and taiwan will be right at the forefront of that -- of that question. the second which i also would argue is a core interest is one that is coming back and that is the fact that taiwan sits right in the middle of the first island chain and one of the most problematic manifestations of beijing's new power but more importantly beijing's new assertiveness is what's happening to the maritime security domain and the degree to which beijing has testimony mop straightened a readiness and a capacity to use military, economic, diplomatic, informational tools to intimidate claimants to terrors
to and waters in the first and second island chain. and we used to think for a long time, certainly when i was in government, of the taiwan problem as a security problem in the context of cross strait security, but i think over the last decade, basically since i left government and maybe it was because i was too dumb to think of this, but i think rather it is the nature of the problem has changed. now, increasingly, we have to think about the security of the whole first island chain which stretches from japan through taiwan straits to the philippines and the second island chain, which goes sort of straight down through guam. in the years before the nixon guam doctrine in 1969, almost every national security council document, mostly declassified now, start with some reference to the importance of the security of the first island chain. so this isn't new in our history, but it's coming back and taiwan is right in the middle of it, and it was for atchison, the importance of that offshore island chain and
taiwan's position in it, that means we don't want taiwan to be a vulnerable flank or a vacuum in terms of maintaining stability in the entire first island chain and therefore, taiwan's defense capabilities matter to us and i think should matter more in this broader context. and the third interest is the economic integrity and growth of taiwan and, you know, there's a tough balancing act, because obviously, growth depends on a very robust cross straits economic relationship, which is in u.s. interests, but also the integration of taiwan's economy into the expanding transpacific economic frameworks, tpp, of course, but there are going to have to be stepping stones to tpp. so, in that context, we ought t be thinking pretty hard about this election and what it means the outcome as much as what the next presidency should focus on or what we hope they will focus on to help us support a future
for taiwan that is -- that is in our interests. and i should say it goes without saying that i don't think the next president, one or two candidates who will go nameless core economical position of u.s. interests on china policy. no unilateral change in the status quo. i don't think it's changed very much. and i don't think it will change that much. i think that should go without saying. so in terms of process then, how should we here in washington and taipei talk to each other over the coming year and a half, two years as we have our presidential election cycles. i would say for taipei, there are three nots. first is no surprises. that means constant dialogue.
it doesn't mean calling at midnight before some announcement to say by the way we're doing x tomorrow. it means constant dialogue. so no surprises. should go without saying, but second, no unilateral changes to the status quo. jim kelly was asked in testimony and managed to answer without answering it, it's kind of like the famous supreme court decision on pornography. if it quacks like a duck, it's a duck. you don't know by having a long document on what the stat quus company is. this flows there a constant and honest dialogue. and third, and this is about the future of the next government in taipei, no free riding. i think to have a more robust trust and understanding , it's
worth thinking about the defense budget. think about the beef market. there is a shackle around the ankles as we move toward the eventual and robust economy especially tpp and what will flow from that is ttip and global trade arrangement among advanced economies. okay. three nos for the u.s. administration. i think the administration has learned these lesson, but first no taking sides in the election. no appear to go take sides in the election.to go take sides ie election.
second, no pressure to take positions that are not politically realistic. i this particular, i don't know if others on the panel agree, i don't think the u.s. government should be pressuring ing-wen. we shouldn't saying what outcomes should necessarily be. we can do intellectual facilitation which my 8-year-old does. why, daddy. and the third one, no violation of the six assurances this talking about taiwan's election with beijing. no promises about ways we will handle this election that are
not entirely consistent with our policy and with the six assurances. and if you need to know what the six sur sur ranassurances are, n give them to you chapter and verse. finally, i think both sides as a broad point will have to expand dialogue. when i was in the white house before i took over, we had two parallel and inconsistent dialogues between taipei and washington. and this is no big secret for people in this room. one with certain officials in the bush administration that the deep green really liked. and another dialogue with certain officials in the u.s. administration that the blue liked. and one thing randy schrieber and i and others had to do was consolidate our message on taiwan and the white house and
sort of discipline everyone. it's important for the u.s. side to have considered this and not have the message be too personalized or dependent on certain personalities. also it would be a big mistake for either candidate or either party to cherry pick what they're hearing in washington if they're serious about governing. they have to understand they can't just pick things that sound good. there needs to be a consideration of the administration's view. and some care about not saying that candidate a or b in our election will be radically different for taiwan. and that's on us. frankly, i don't have a fix to that because here i'm describing all the disciplines taiwan should have in its election and
we will have problems because there is a very robust and surprisingly unpredictable political debate in both parties, especially the republican party. but i do think it is highly likely that whatever you hear out of the campaign, u.s. policy won't change that much when the dust settles. and the very last thought, i hope the administration takes a page from ronald reagan when talking about these kind of issues. i interviewed george shultz recently for a book and he told me a story of the first high level visitor ronald reagan had, and they said we don't like the act, it needs to change. and ronald reagan said you're right, we need to toughen it up.
which is a classic george shultz moment. we shouldn't in this fluid electoral process make it appear that in any way our commitment to our taiwan relations act has diminished. thanks. >> i will speak from some notes because that's the only way i can it discipline myself. i'll approach this issue a little differently from mike, but i think quite consistently with what mike has said. most people in this room are familiar with the basics of u.s. policy toward taiwan. the key document of course is the taiwan relations act. and as we know, especially those
of us who have had the privilege think of sharing the wisdom of richard bush, while the tra is an important statement of policy, it is perhaps less precise as a statement of commitments. nonetheless, i think it would take something of a revolution in american posture for the u.s. to an ban do that tbandon the s responsibility that we have for bolstering economic foundation and i don't see that revolution coming. for the u.s. on the other hand, policy not only based on the tra, but also importantly shaped by the three u.s. prc joint commune days. at their core is the fact that while the u.s. does not acceptd. at their core is the fact that while the u.s. does not accept the prc view, it also has pursuit of a poll at odds with the one china approach. to some extent we can see the
art of these communiques in the form of parallel statements. but that art is seen not only in the individual points of each side's words, it's also seen in the carefully negotiated linkages between the positions of one side and the other. some people see ir resolvable inconsistent cities in those crucial documents and of course those do exist. but i tend to focus on their ability to bridge important differences and sometimes perhaps creating what i would call construction difference ambiguities, but at the same time leading the initial difference in our own hands. of course other policy statements have been made other time to explain or expand on the language of those documents. and sometimes colleagues from the prc want side statements
made especially in private that have gone beyond the communiques that might seem to lean in beijing's direction. but i would argue the reason why those communiques remain what some have called the holy script schu ures of the relationship, why they're generally not legally seen as treaty commitments, they are formal negotiated statement why they're generally not legally seen as treaty commitments, they are formal negotiated statements affirmed by every president after they have been issued. and it's critical not to forget that those formal words are important and they do create commitments. so for example when warren christopher in the clinton administration and later officials in the george w. bush administration insisted that neither side should unilaterally seek to change the status quo,
it was based on the fundamentals of u.s. policy already contained in in all four of those documents. sometimes there were stresses in cross-straits relations, this elaboration was meant to underare scounder a score that the united states would not stand by if efforts were made to push things in a direction inconsistent with the policy. but neither would it stand by if efforts were made to use coercion to change the stat fuu q quo. the point is not that the u.s. either seeks to push the situation toward reunification or to block such movements, the point is that u.s. national interests demand that all concerned seriously take the
american commitment with regard to peaceful noncompaercive whatr direction the two sides ultimately decide to take them in. and individual americans of course including some american officials may favor movement in one direction or another. we've seen the public debate with some people wanting to shape the situation so that some sort of reunification is virtually inevitable, while others believe it would be very harmful to u.s. interests for that to happen. and want to bring taiwan even more closely involved into u.s. national security orbit.. but tounder score a point i've made a lot of year, the u.s. policy is not and should not be designed to tell people on either side of the strait what their ultimate relationship should be. what it does do, what it should do, however, is to promote the
profound u.s. national interests that the relationship be conducted without provocation and without coercion. so when we look at the upcoming presidential election in taiwan, for example, all of these considerations are very much in place for the united states. on the one happened, as mike as already pointed out, strong support to democracy in taiwan. already pointed out, strong support to democracy in taiwan. on the other, emphasis on smooth relations across the strait. avoiding as i say either rof indication or coercion. some people may see even that level of involvement as undue interference. but if simply is a reality that while the u.s. has no desire or intention to become involved either in the election itself or in cross strait relations, as i've said, it does have vital interests at stake and in my view there is no doubt that the u.s. is prepared to act on those interests. in light of that reality, it
would be reckless and irresponsible to leave any doubt about this in the minds of those on either side of the strait who are involved in the political or policy process. similarly americans need to be aware of the seriousness and depth of commitment feelings and concern among people on both sides of the strait about their own interests and their open principles. and as this process plays out, it would be both arrogant and reckless for the united states to ignore those realities. some people in taiwan may believe that because the u.s. supports taiwan's democracy and security, that means the u.s. will back them as long as they take positions that rhetorically echo u.s. positions. and some of the mainland may believe that not only because the u.s. has committed not to promote separate status for taiwan, but also because it has a great stake in constructive and productive u.s./prc
relations, that this means washington will pressure people to accept various prc demands. any such expectations on either side would in my view be badlies misplaced and the consequences of failure to understand that could be quite serious. so-to-try to avoid any such misperception, we've seen the u.s. government layout a variety of points that will serve as benchmarks against which future actions will be judge. reference has been made for example to the importance of maintaining a firm basis for maintaining peace and stability going forward and to the fact that the high quality of the u.s. unofficial relations with taiwan th taiwan in recent years has been grounded among other things in the stable management of cross-straits relations. it's also clear that the prc use of coercion generates response. mike pointed this out with regard to recent actions in east asia and it's certainly no less true with regard to taiwan than
it is elsewhere. once the election is over, applying the kinds of lessons that we could take from the period of the china administration, i'm confident the u.s. will remain quite attentive to any indications on either side of the strait that peace and stability will be endangered. the issue of course is not simply embracing the goal, it's a matter of policies and actions that support it. let's not kid ourselves. if a new administration takes office in taipei that does not embrace one china, it's virtually certain that there will be consequences in terms of cross-strait relations. without trying to argue in terms of beijing's principles, many have strongly urged the main land not to react too strongly or as the u.s. administration has put it, to approach with
restraints. but that isn't a judgment we can make. similarly, there may be pressures on the win ners taiwan. especially if the tpp emerges victorious, to make a sharper break from the past than the rhetoric so far has suggested. that, too, could have unforeseen negative consequences. but here again, it's not a decision we can make to them. but americans, especially i would argue those in the u.s. government, can make clear that the matters are not just sensitive and important in beijing and taipei, but also for washington. and just as the u.s. needs to take account of the likely reaction on one side of the strait or the other to anything that washington might do in this realm, those in the mainland or in taiwan who would be implying to significantly change the direction of cross-strait relations that has existed over
the past eight years need to take account of the likely reaction not only on the other side of strait, but also in the united states. so just as people on both sides of the strait will to coin a phrase be listening to the words and watching the actions of those on the other side during the campaign between the election and the inauguration, during the as sessential of the new admission strain, the u.s. will determine its aekss and reactions in accordance with the basic tenants that have been in effect. thanks. >> my in-strugs structions are about the economic relationship between taiwan and the united states. and i'm still with the state department, so i want to make sure knows i'm not speaking on
behalf in an official role in a state department. and i'm glad to say that the economic relationship between taiwan and the yuchbd is fairly noncontroversial. so it's a little safer topic for me. and of course i'll make my comments relatively short to reduce the risk. but farankly speaking, i think the relationship is quite good in terms of the economic side of it. most of you know for the last 60 some odd years, our economic policy, the u.s. economic policy, has been generally to try to help sustain the sort of vibrant strong economic trade investment relationship between taiwan and the united states. and i think it's largely successful. we have statistics that can show that we can talk about for
example today. it's ahead of india which has one billion people with taiwan's 23 million. and also incorredirect trade, a well. someone this morning talked about global value chain. if you put that into the consideration, it's significantly larger. some people estimate over $100 billion worth more in terms of the trade. so i think it's very strong. one last thing is investment relationships. we now have about over $6 billion to $7 billion of taiwan investment in the united states
by companies. and the u.s. investment is substanti substantial. so you're talking about a substantial number of both trade and investment relationships between the two sides. so i think looking at those figures, i think very strong, but beyond sort of these trade investment statistics that are sort of the core, beyond that, i know for example we work closely with taiwan on a lot of trade issues and other kinds of issues in the multilateral trading system. wto, apec, very slow relationship. for example taiwan recently had signed the wto expanded ita, the information technology agreement. this is very important. for us it's a high priority. it reduces tariffs for an
expanded list of products which american companies are very much involved in. and at the same time i know that we work very closely with taiwan today on promoting what we call an open internet system meaning essentially that obviously open internet across borders, very much from our point of view facilitates trade and investment, but even more importantly in some ways, it facilitates the concept that we both endorse which is open societies. decrease open societies. so in many ways our trade policy with taiwan really supports our broader policy relationship that both alan and mig have talked about, which it's the substance of what we're doing, but it supports the political diplomatic relationship that we have today. so i think extremely important relationship here. obviously we do have problems. and if i was taiwan from '06 to
'09. and we did not have a tifa talk, trade frame investment talk for all those years. so we do have some issues, but i would say that for the most part we're able to handle it. i know from rick that ugs led a delegation to taiwan in august to get ready for the tifa talks coming up this fall. so we're continuing this process now.alks coming up this fall. so we're continuing this process now.o get ready for the tifa ta coming up this fall. so we're continuing this process now. and i understand that we're making progress on some of the key issues. and my own -- quite a number of them, ipr issues, we have medical devices, pharmaceutical,
investment, trade issues. but from my point of view, these are obviously important issues. but given the fact that we've hadding ing agricultural issues created a real irritant in our relationship especially with congress and other, i think it's really important for the two sides to come to an agreement and i think for taiwan in particular, i think to take some action to help us both resolve this issue, not because monetarily it's great, but it has been an issue, we did feel in -- i forget the date. i think 2009 or 2010, we arrived at a beef agreement that apparently we feel has not been implemented. so it's important as soon as possible to resolve this
issue,ing a sgri cultural trade issue, because i think this reflects in particular on taiwan's ability to meet its commitments made to the united states in this particular case. and so i think that's extremely important from that perspective. and also it also i think underscores the question of whether taiwan would be willing and able to actually base its policies, strait policies, on sound science. and as a responsible member of the world economy, i think it's important to at least try to resolve this issue as soon as it can. and finally, i know -- i think most of you know that taiwan is very interested and has made clear it's very interested in joining ttp once we complete the agreement. and i think that from our point of view, we've made very clear
that we clearly support the interests of taiwan in joining ttp once we complete this agreement. and so i think again a lot of economic issues were there, marginalization of taiwan, trade competitiveness and so on. these are key issues. so far i think our relationship has ben good aen and strong and has a strong economy. but looking into the future, the challenge will be out taiwan does not get marginalized. they're now over 80 some odd ftas in the region alone, in asia alone. not to mention later on with tt perform, taiwan cannot afford to simply have singapore and new zealand. it has to expand and make the pushing. and the one way do this, even
before t tctp is concludesed, a that time step that will make it more prepared to meet the requirements and standards of ttp.ime step that will make it e prepared to meet the requirements and standards of ttp. that may still be down the line, but i think taiwan can do many things. and whether the kmt or ttp administration coming up, must make this a key priority because it is essential to taiwan's sustained economic growth which is important to taiwan's sustained political stability and growth. so i think that these are really important challenges for both sizes. we need to step up as well. and work with taiwan to try to see if we can get this together. >> thanks, bob. before i turn it over to the audience, i guess i'm struck to some degree by what we've heard running through all of the
presentations today, something about this sort of sense of change in a lot of the key ways we look at various issues and cross-strait relations. we had some very interesting demographic and polling discussions in the first presentation this morning. i think shelly made a very compelling observation during her key note with regards to notes of reunification. mike, you raised the issue of positioning more about taiwan not in a cross-strait defense con context, but the broader theme of china's military and maritime strategy. so i guess i would ask each of you in your respective area, how much should we be paying attention to this change and how should it affect u.s. policy. so mike for you as you think about u.s. defense planning with regard to taiwan, how does that shift from a strait/cross-strait focus to the broader strategy,
what implications does that have for u.s. policy. and al lalan, you talked about status of the agreements and how important that is. to what degree do you think they still serve us well with regard to some of these changes this we're seeing and should u.s. policy think more creatively about how to adapt those documents in light of changes we're seeing. and bob, you stole my thunder, but a lot of people to comment about how the best way taiwan can maintain its independent position is to actually do the very difficult things internally that it needs to do with its economy to position itself to participate in ttp and other agreements to take counter moves if you will to some of the second sound of the mainland's economy. so i guess i'll ask each of you you to comment on those. >> so you broke those down into
basically defense diplomacy and economics. and the first point from a strategy respective, each one our respective questions complaint be answered without all three being addressed in terms of policy. you can't just do one of these lanes now. in terms of the defense or security piece, the trend in maritime asiaoff t over the las years as been for japan, as trail i can't, philippines to focus on intelligence sharing. and that is probably a bridge too far right now for taiwan.i focus on intelligence sharing. and that is probably a bridge too far right now for taiwan. i don't think a collective security certainly not a collective security organization by nato is remotely possible. but even the decidedecide dimen of collective security are not going to be accepted.
because everybody seeks not to cane or fight china, but to secure made we care about. that said, i can think of two specific areas with respect to i would argue the growing importance of taiwan across straits stability in this rnlg lat larger challenge. the first is i think taiwan's own defense planning has to that into account. if there is a fight or crisis, we will be stressed all p and down the island chain. there are new air fields going up in the south china sea.upp a down the island chain. there are new air fields going up in the south china sea. and down the island chain. there are new air fields going up in the south china sea. we'll face a much more complicated environment in peace time or in a crisis. so taiwan has to take care of its lane. it has to have the defense
capabilities necessary. and we can go into that more if people want, but it means certain kinds of capabilities and i think it means 3% of gdp which has been the plan for some time. the secondary is on strategic assessments of the china problem. this is not collective security but i think other countries with taipei have to deepen their sharing of if not intelligence assessments about what the capabilities and strategy is that we see. some people call it counter coercion. but we who live in this first island chain have to have a common picture of what is happening and think about what it means and compare note ps ps. so i think there is a lot of open dialogue. >> just on mike's first point,
this is a long standing rob and i can recall back in the administration when i used to make the point that we cannot be that the united states cares more about taiwan's defense than taiwan cares about its open defense. s of it was the same argument. and my sense is that both parties that the point are committed to this. of it was th. and my sense is that both parties that the point are committed to this.of it was the. and my sense is that both parties that the point are committed to this.f it was the . and my sense is that both parties that the point are committed to this.it was the sa. and my sense is that both parties that the point are committed to this. whether that translates in to, a we'll have to see. on the communiques and the tra and so on i guess i'm in in the position of saying in terms of the document, they still serve us very well. the situation has evolved significantly within taiwan, that's the biggest change on that side. prc has gained enormously in strength and prestige. and we need to take that into account as we move ahead. but i think the basics of u.s. policy are well laid out and i wouldn't play around with them.
that's one reason why as richard said before, it's impossible really to have another communique that doesn't touch on taiwan. and i don't see how you benefit from doing that. >> from my own perspective, i served '06 to '09 and the points we tried to make at that time is the fact that you're sort of -- your economic development, your is you taken ability of your growth and so on is really not -- should not be a political issue. its and we do though both sides quite well. obviously i'll sound a little naive. but this is clearly something
but it's important that we maintain our policy, economic policy, towards taiwan regardless of the part city that is in office. similarly it's really important for them to work together to make sure that this this transition going forward does keep taiwan from being marginalized. because if they begin to slow down its growth and become less competitive, it will be bad for both parties and taiwan. so i think it's extremely important that-and i to think that just knowing some of them that they do see that. but i also know politics. so this is something that we need to sort of underscore both sides, both in the u.s. and taiwan that we need to make this transition work for taiwan itself. >> all right. we'll open it up to the audience.
as always, identify yourself and confine yourself to a question. chris. >> thanks so much. great discussion. we have summit coming up between obama and president tsai. is taiwan one of the things that you talk about, i think all you guys have been involved in u.s./china summits. you've sat in the room and you've heard how the two leaders talk to each other. does obama say something like we've got an election coming up in january, how do you see that, or sg he say i'm talking that she's worried that you may position time is running out. do they talk about that? is that a summit topic, how should the president approach
these issues and these concerns and is this coming summit an opportunity for that and if so how should he talk about? thanks. >> it will be a summit topic. in the five year i was in the nsc, taiwan was a topic in every single summit or every single meeting. the amount of time it took went down from about 40% to 50% to about about 5% but i'd tell the president you don't have to say how do you see the elect because you can see mr. tsai will raise it and will tell you what he thinks. and we can all think what he thinks. and at that point the president should make two things very clear. one, our position. and he can put alan on the
phone. it has not and will not change. and including opposition to changes by the other side. but i would advise the president to make a second point which is we think we the american people think it's a wonderful thing that this presidential election is happening and this is very important for our values and our interests and make sure that that part is at least as clear. >> it will come up and pink xi jinping will raise it. whether he does what a number have done and say you americans needed to take this seriously because the risk to relations are pretty significant if things go off track.
i don't know if he'll to thdo tr not do that, but i think he'll want the president to understand if that's his view whether he would lean on the president as others haveskm if you want to understand it of course although it's ten years old, read my book. but it's a serious issue and i think the chinese leadership can
understand it. i think it does understand it. and i think it is generally concerned for all the kind of reasons we were talking about earlier today that they may face a challenge exactly how they see the u.s. role really playing out, i don't know. but i think that you recall the u.s. not in collaboration with the prc but because of our own interests because very unhappy with provocations we thought we saw coming out of taipei. and they may want to think that we can do this again. and as i've said and others have said, i don't think we'll tell anybody in taiwan what to do, but we'll look out for our own interests over time and we'll have to's wh esee what that mea. >> i'll defer to alan and mike. >> good. next. richard.
>> ruichard bush, brookings. mike, i'd like to follow up on your presentation. i take everything that you say to push you to be a little more operational and even though we'll have an election in 2016, it takes place well after the transition in taiwan, actually eight months between their inauguration and others. if there is a negative spiral in cross-strait relations, it may well be under way. we don't exactly get our personnel act together quickly. we'll have a president maybe a secretary of state, hopefully an asian director. so how does one operate in that context to protect u.s. interests and objectives? >> so you're absolutely right about that sort of vulnerable stays between taiwan's election
and ours. if it things spiral out of control in an american presidential election cycle, it will be to beijing's disadvantage. i don't see presidential candidates here saying if i'm elected, i'll get beijing's understanding on this. they will beat up china. so that is an important thing for our friends in beijing to remember. that ita coercive response if ing-wen becomes president, coercive response and even people are imagining other sort of larger steps, that will make an imprint on the new administration here. and in the context of our politi politics, china coercion will be the story, not the subtleties of '92 consensus.
so it will play badly for china. the candidates who never imagined donald trump and bernie already had advisers and policies and experienced people sort of thinking through some of these things. there will be transition teams. some of the most effective did diplomacy in the history of az i can't was during transitions. reagan administration with korea and its very sensitive problem with the arrest and so forth. so there will be people who are known to be close to the president-elect unless we get a completely out of the box inexperienced person. but then all the think tanks will be rounded up anyway. a little more problematic is what candidates say.
and so we don't have to wait until july 2017 to have policy on this in the u.s. no matter who in-withes in wins in the u.s. >> i wonder if i could add a little bit to shelly's half full glass.the u.s. >> i wonder if i could add a little bit to shelly's half full glass.u.s. >> i wonder if i could add a little bit to shelly's half full glass.>> i wonder if i could ad little bit to shelly's half full glass. i think the trends she identified are trends that are of considerable concern to beijing. but i would be very surprised if anything happens after the taiwan election that sort of pushes the situation toward a real security crisis. i don't think that's how despite the fact that there may be some internal concerns in beijing, internal maneuvers in beijing which would lead xi jinping to try to do something in terms of -- i don't think so to be honest with you. i think that this issue, taiwan
relationships, are both so accepts i have it,sensitive, bu special. not like foreign policy if you will. that they can control that more and it needs to watch out more. because it can trigger awry sis that will be unmanageable at the end of the day. and certainly if there were coercive response, i think mike's points are right on target. so i think that question will see some consequences. but i don't think those consequences are -- unless we get into a very negative vicious cycle here, which is a risk, i don't think they will be so consequential that we'll end up with that kind of vision of a
security risk for taiwan. over time we'll have to see what happens. but even then, i think as was pointed out earlier, people in taiwan are very risk averse, they do not want a crisis. why is the status quo so strongly supported even with its grade days gradations, because of that. it may have reasons to act, but not to have a crisis. >> i agree with that 70%, 80 prks 90%, but what worries me is not the taipei side, it's how beijing interprets what taipei does. and what worries me the last time china used this kind of coercion broadly, it was a decade or administmore ago. last time the capability of the
pla to put on a major demonstration of force either with missiles or service combatants or fires is several times larger than what it was last time beijing put on a major demonstration of force to try to intimidate taiwan. and i think the south china sea developments would suggest that our expectations of china's concerns about blowback from this kind of nonvademonstration military action is not as high as they expected. so i mention that because i think there is a possibility -- i can imagine a scenario where they think we'll just shift what we've been doing in east china sea and south china sea to the center. we'll demonstrate the enormous capabilities we have. it will be much big he are thge last time.
americans have not reacted as strongly as we thought. i'm not predicting that, but i can see that scenario and things flowing from that. >> as i look at it, lanai that has do what china has done has not pushed a button. even though we have no formal defense commitment, i think if there were an effort to use military coercion against taiwan, that would be a different situation and i don't think beijing is at all interested in testing that proposition. >> so i guess it comes down to how you define coercion. because i can imagine things that would have a major impact on the american view in terms of this problem of a presidential
cycle which may fall short of what you consider coercion. >> you're talking about the pl afternoo a. i'm talking about demonstrations of capability in a very explicit way. in a way that would cause debate to go this different directions. >> i want to push the two gentlemen a little further in a different direction. i think when we talk about spiral, i don't think he necessarily referred to coercive measures. but now beijing has option by taking one by one. and i think it's very difficult for the president-elect to act
in a very decisive way. i think that's a more realistic scenario. >> bonnie glazer, csi. i want to agree that i think the chinese have such a huge tool box that begins with stopping tourists and taking away diplomatic allies, they have the economic interdependence so great. we saw them use this against the philippines in japan. so coercion, the chinese think about very, very broadways and i think that they believe that there is less of a likelihood that they would result to a military force because they have all of these other tools that they can use against taiwan. so i would agree with you. my question to you in
particular, mig, we weke, we we talking earlier in the panel this morning about how the u.s. should play a particularly active role and that would probably begin after the elections in the period before the inauguration. but even after the inauguration. and i was talking with a scholar from the hamain land earlier th week about the role the u.s. played and the actions that the chinese took and taiwan took.la week about the role the u.s. played and the actions that the chinese took and taiwan took. i was trying to draw him out on lessons that the mainland drew. and since you were in the white house at the time, what are the lessons that you draw from that period, what are the moves that were made and that the u.s. policy that were right, that were wrong, how much you critique how the chinese reacted to the election? are they lessons that we can
draw that you would apply to how the u.s. and main land should manage this transition in taiwan? thanks. >> on the last point, all i would say is i think it would be a mistake for u.s. policymakers to assume that a demonstration of military information or coercion is highly unlikely after the election if beijing feels it has to react. i wouldn't count on beijing's reaction -- your point is very well taken, but i wouldn't count on beijing's reaction being limited to stopping tourists. not an attack, but a physical demonstration of force. and again, i'm not predicting this, i just don't thinki we ca rule it out. i think it would be a mistake
to. and i mention that because if we want to make sure that doesn't happen, we have to think how we demonstrate how the commitment will not go away. so i need a couch to lie down on if i'm going to talk about my sxir experiences in the bush administration. no, i'm just kidding. personally i do not think as some scholars have argued that the problem was that president bush in april 2001 said in an interview what would you do if taiwan came under attack and said i would rise up. i don't think that was a problem 23r57k ly trappingly and neither did he. the rproblem was more process ad we had two dialogues running with taipei out of washington. and randy schrieber and others
and i had to knit those together and make sure we had one line of communication that was authoritative on both sides. and i thought we were pretty effective actually. the other thing that we did, we didn't just focus on the nos. we spent most of the time talking about the affirmative, what do we need to do together in terms of international space. at that points the world health assembly was a very about beg issue. we were able to considered nature with japan and australia friends to speak with one voice. so think about friends, allies who will have impact. japan is a big one, but that's not enough. nato eu, australia, southeast
asia. but you have to start with a u.s./taipei dialogue that builds trust and some agenda for moving forward and some understanding of what -- where the rails are, where we will start to get uncomfortable. the other thing is to recognize that the president of the united states will develop relationships with other leaders in sensitive areas because he can talk to them on the phone, he can meet them in person p and you cannot overtight what an effect that has with taiwan. and how frankly i had to go in and tell the president based on reporting from taipei, based on very capable david lee and others who are here, we had to go in and sort of explain for the president where we saw things going, often in contradiction to what was showing up in the press. and so the incoming
administration here should recognize you can say stuff in the campaign, you can have bureaucratic mismatches, you can have problems. and often the president can get on the phone or have a summit and you start fixing those issues. you can't really do that with taiwan in the same way. and if you know that, you'll start establishing these authoritative channels. if the candidate or president cares, which all advisers should work for, they will find a group of people that trust they will have inclusion ve views and tai will know that. the man sitting next to you is a key part of the answer. >> the gentleman in the white shirt there. >> hi, eric gomez from the day tow institute. i was wondering what the panel thinks is the primary obstacle to taiwan spend 3g%3% on gdp.i
thinks is the primary obstacle to taiwan spend 3% on gdp.tow i. i was wondering what the panel thinks is the primary obstacle to taiwan spend 3% on gdp.i was thinks is the primary obstacle to taiwan spend 3% on gdp.nstit. i was wondering what the panel thinks is the primary obstacle to taiwan spend 3% on gdp. >> easy answer is the oi. look, our nato allies are hardly with the exception of authorize way shining examples of burden sharing and defense spending. of our major treaty ally, australia, japan, arguably our kind of moving in the right direction, but they're also very -- japan's 104th in the world per capita spending on defense. so i think we can appreciate that it's hard in taiwan as the modern democratic welfare state starts hitting aging societies, budget deficits, globalization, how hard it is to convince pubs to spend more on defense. one other part of the problem is
defense secretary goes to japan and nato and says, you knw, got to spend more. so there is probably something in our defense tidialogue that could be reconceptualized. aim not a big advocate of symbolic two star generals going to taipei just to show we can. but we should think about we have our exercise, we have our dialogue, we should think about whether there is a better way to allow the secretary of defense or national security advisers views to be came up chrd by an . because let's face it, taiwan hears in different levels and different ways than our treaty allies. i don't know if you -- >> okay.
mike. >> mike fonte, director of the mission here. did ttp has a whole range of defense papers it's put out. i think if you want to get access to those, look at our website. it will show you the commitment i think that the ddp has that doesn't depend upon free writing. >> it's a good paper. authors were thin go. in 2005 when they put out a strategypromised 3%. so politics are still hard. >> my name is brian bumpus and i'm in the asian studies program at georgetown. part of my question i think was just answered.
it seems that there is -- with the demonstration against the military training, the exercises in taipei, it seems like there is a shift in the demographic especially among the yout against military, but also, i'm curious how that relates to this general strategic position and the relationship between u.s. and taiwan. >> only thing i would say, volunteer foes are said to be expensive and have been working on the transition now. clear it's going to take longer and it's not going to be 100%, but you go back to mike's point where they were running into
problems, a year, two years ago, was on budget with the ly. the legal conclusion, so, all the good intentions are necessa necessary, but not enough. you've got to work the plix of it to make it happen. hold mike responsible if the ddp wins both presidency and -- that's well put. >> maybe one more. gentleman in the back. you've been very patient. >> thank you for the wonderful discussion. thank you for talking about the one side of -- which we see this powerful man has lots of difficulties at hand.
however, we seem to have forgotten this is a man who had taken bold actions. made bold decisions. he means what he says and he's going to do what he's going to do. so, recently, he said the issue of taiwan cannot be dragged on for jen races. so, that statement worries me. does it worry you as well? >> i wrote about that statement and was rather chastised by an official for overinterpreting it. he said some people looking at me across the table and i think it's fair criticism in a way. i think what he -- realistic about the prospects for reunify
kags within any midterm or near term time frame. he understands that's not going to happen. but i think what he is very interested in getting is political dialogue going and agreement on some basic principles about china. what he said, the political differences could not go on for generations and generations. he sometimes says it in ways that lead you to overinterpret it. i haven't heard him or read about him repeating that phrase. now, it was repeated i think by one senior official once, but what you hear of responsible people in beijing is that it's
the political dialogue dimension and the concern without it, and that you may get to what one observer is well known for having talked about it in the past, which is peaceful separation. so that's the push for this. >> his reflection on his education session were useful. we shouldn't overreact to any one statement and i would mention when he closes the session, but i don't think that's a marked departure
necessarily. on the other hand, if you look at how he's responded to changes in the status quo or the trajectory of an issue as he defines it, he's usually resorted to coercion. whether it's hong kong or a civil society on this do midwestically. so, when given a choice between sort of appealing to the better angels and the incentivising or motivating those who may be challenging the status quo, he sees it and e showing power, he's always chosen power so far, so that makes me nervous. on the other hand, the current framework is a pretty good foreign policy deal for beijing for the reasons alan pointed out and it's been pretty thoughtful for the most part and to start
picking that apart would be risky. which is why i don't think there will be a crisis, to be clear. but it does to answer your question. >> i think on this issue, i agree largely with that alan said, that it's confined that to context. that said, i think the more the chinese tell us on certain statements, don't overinterpret and he has demonstrated a pattern of making such remarks. which are well, you took it out of contest. in this case, my own sense is that represents his true sentiment on the subject. he has a pension and a track record of throwing his talking points away and just saying what
he believes to be on his mind because he is a confident leader, so i think we should take that seriously. i just know on the military modernization front, we have for the first time since we came to you turn to power in recent t e times, seen more and more amphibious or yented exercises that have a very clear time line, so we should not underestimate that issue, especially the many ways in which prc military modernization has greatly complicated u.s. defense planning. on that sure note, let me thank the panel and just close by thanking everyone for an excellent day and the audience. thank you so much.
we covered online. taking a look at congress, the senate is coming back tomorrow. they will take another proceedal vote on a disapproval resolution for the iran nuclear agreement. they failed to move forward last week on that. they gavel in at 1:00 p.m. eastern on tuesday. the house moan while comes back from work on wednesday. they will take up a number of bills including one directing the tsa to enhance security at airports and on thursday, the house will attempt to ban all federal funding for planned parenthood unless they agree to stop performing or funding abortions. and our road to the white house, we covered today bernie sanders at lynchburg. we'll follow that with comments from carly fiorina, former
hp ceo. starting at 8:00 eastern on cspan. tonight, gary epstein, chairman of the incentive auction tas b force, will discuss the spectrum auction to allow wireless companies to bid on air waves space. >> a determination made in the spectrum act and one thing i want to emphasize, that we're not taking spectrum from broadcasters. it is a voluntary auction on behalf of the spectrum. the broadcasters. broadcasters consider continue to be an extremely valuable service. but congress passed this act where broadcasters on a one-time only basis will be able to relen quish their rights in return for a share of the proceeds of a forward auction and so, what it is is congress's determination and the fcc's implementation to use market