tv Politics and Public Policy Today CSPAN September 14, 2015 3:00pm-5:01pm EDT
hp ceo. starting at 8:00 eastern on cspan. tonight, gary epstein, chairman of the incentive auction tas b force, will discuss the spectrum auction to allow wireless companies to bid on air waves space. >> a determination made in the spectrum act and one thing i want to emphasize, that we're not taking spectrum from broadcasters. it is a voluntary auction on behalf of the spectrum. the broadcasters. broadcasters consider continue to be an extremely valuable service. but congress passed this act where broadcasters on a one-time only basis will be able to relen quish their rights in return for a share of the proceeds of a forward auction and so, what it is is congress's determination and the fcc's implementation to use market forces to make
available more low band spectrum. the need is burgeoning by multiples. there isn't a lot of good low band spectrum left and this is a new and novel method that congress has put in place and the fcc is to implement. >> tonight at 8:00 eastern on cspan 2. more now about taiwan. of recent discussion that focuses here on the relations between taiwan and china with topics including the political and economic issue, antichina sentiments in taiwan and engaging young people on social issues. from the stimson, just shy of an hour and 20 minutes. >> when we get going, and if we have some late arrivals, they'll just fill in.
good afternoon. i'm alan romberg. i district the east asia program here and it's my pleasure to welcome you this afternoon. to a program on what i think is a really important topic and the fact that there are so many people here i think demonstrates very clearly that i'm not alone in that thought. we know that the situation in the region and particularly in taiwan and cross relations is facing an evolution potentially. maybe something of great significance politically. we'll see. but any way, as yogi bear said, it's a lot easier to protect the past than the future. we'll turn to our distinguished future to tell us how we might think about the future.
i'm not going spend a lot of time introducing professor long in great detail. you have his cv and brief on your invitations. very distinguished academic, who's not only taught and resear ched, but somebody who is well respected as a commentator on the matters today having to do with policy, so, without further adieu, let me turn the floor over for what, half hour? >> half hour, 40 minutes. >> that's fine. and then we will go to q and a and this is obviously on the record. and for attribution and we welcome our colleagues from the press here today. so, professor, all yours. >> thank you. podium.
>> thank you very much, alan, thank you for your kind introduction and thank you very much. i think today will be a very interesting discussion and i think this is a very important issue. not just for taiwan and china, but for the asia pacific and the global event. as you can see from today's topic, taiwan's china tangle ininvolve a lot of related issues, not just for -- but for global and also for domestic politics. but i will argue that first of
all, i will put that in the context of symmetric relationship between these two entities. so, things are very symmetric, i would argue there will several concerns for a minor power like taiwan. for instance, the economic security concern is heavily dependent economically in terms of investment. and also, taiwan is doing its best for the so-called finding engagement. try to more or less institutionalize the interaction and try to reduce the risk. on the third aspect, it's limited band wagoning, limited, symmetric relationship, it's better to have a direct confrontation going back to the cold era, so that would be more
like limited band wagoning and in kind, a dom nout denial. taiwan tried to keep autonomy. tried to have its own roots and to keep peace, so, that's why i argue that it's more of less kind of a soft balancing and it's entangling between domestic politics in taiwan and across regulatio regulations. that's why if you review back in year 2008, we had a very high expectation for the smooth transition of cross relations. but later on, we noticed that a lot of other issues, especially for the domestic change in taiwan, that shift more or less. the roots or the directions of cross regulations. so, these changes are in corporate a lot of issue, which i'm going to touch upon, but due
to the time constraint, i'm not going to talk all the details. so, i will talk about later about a change of identity and also more or less, the generational change. by the same time, i will try to introduce to you about the taiwanese prag-- because if youk at statistical data, you may have impression of oversimplification. so, that's why i think we need to have a thorough interpretation about what is the change of opinion including identity, including the political orientation like it's called. and the last part on my presentation will focus more on the economic aspect, what is the current taiwanesn links with
the -- with is the change and the continuity in a global context? what are the risks for taiwan to undertake in this new situation gi given the rise of china's comprehensive power and even the rise of the so-called red simply chain. to challenge taiwan's position in the global division of labor. so, let me start from some discussions about two famous opinion polls. i think most of you are familiar with this opinion polls. but i think today, i'm going to introduce you to my personal opinion about how to interpret these changes. so, as you all understand that what are the most element for taiwan's domestic politic politics really to cross regular laces is a change of taiwan identity. after democraticization in mid
1990s, so the soft part of china's policy to china seems late 1980s, has focussed on providinging economic benefits and so-called winning the heart of the taiwanese people. so, the chinese policy of putting hopes on the taiwan fellow country men has coincided with the continuous trooif of taiwdrive of taiwan's dm democratization. so, two parallel tendencies, which are being tangled together. so, the first -- you can see clearly about that. i still trust the survey conducted by the election
studies center of the university because i know most of them and i think this, it's a very serious opinion poll. and also, this opinion poll has contacted for about two decades since 1990s. but the problem is that how to interpret this kind of opinion poll about for instance, the rise of the taiwanese identity in the green line. and the gradual decline of the so-called tabo identity, which means the island -- taiwanese and chinese in the pink line and it continues decline of the china identity. in taiwan. purple line. and also notice that. so, let me just introduce some
of my personal analysis about that. so, when a survey was first conducted in 1992, during the early years of the administration, almost half of the taiwanese reported having identity as you can see. surveyed report. so, the chinese identity at that time will be about a quarter of about 25% was even higher than the taiwanese at that time. very beginning of this survey. and seems 1992, taiwanese identity has been on the rise, when the chy these identity has experienced a decline. p percentage for identity, the pink line, however, have remained relatively stable, but there are some changes right after 2007 and 2008.
so, this poll is available on the website of the election studies center. but two critical points. that deserve further attention. the first turning point was in 1997, as you note, about the time of the crisis, the act of the -- meso crisis. that was the first time a shock arise of the taiwan identity, the green line. could be reserved. the new identity in a town moving closer together after the 1997. around this area. so, the second political point that's very interesting was from 2007 and 2008. in the presidential election of
2008, jo won the landslide victory. to many surprise, taiwan's identity -- the new identity and the gap has become wider. it seems this tendency will continue in the foreseeable future. analysts argued that the widening gap of support of taiwan independents in the sense of separation from the mainland. but in my opinion, we have to be more prudent. in interprets this kind of gap. i would like to spend evolution of the change of identity in taiwan from the following aspects. first of all, such a long survey reflects the value of historical
evolution. but also experiences some setbacks. among these, the most important distortion is the change of contents of the term used in the sense of a -- let me elaborate further. roughly, before 2005, the taiwanese people perceived the term, chinese, or china. in the broader context. of culture, social or ethnic definition. it is a natural, it is so natural for the taiwanese at a that time to develop a dual identity. but seems the later years of the treasury administration, the perception has changed. the respondents began to perceive the term, china, from a
more political aspect intended to equate the term chinese, citizen of -- so, due to the change up in definition, the survey results after 2000s, actually reflected tendencies of political recognition. a real culture or ethnic identity. so, culturely speaking, the dole identity could be just a fight, but it is hard to develop a dual political identity. for the people. are doing that. on both the citizen of oc and prc. secondly, why the generational change matters, it is not necessary mean the radicalization of the taiwanese youth. never underestimate our young generation. the change of the content of
textbook and materials since early 2000s, had affected socialization for sure, but however, they are multiple agents of socialization. and the school education is just one of this. reflected in the recent debates about high school. so, it is true that in high china sentiment and the radicalism components for instance, in the spring of 2014, but it does not reflect overall radicalization of the whout youth, who have to be careful about that. so, based on my interviews with the young students who take part in the movement for instance, it is my understanding that many did so to voice their opinion.
topics like social justice. and political empowerment. they don't want to miss this unique opportunities. to be a part of this. big tendency, jen direction. so, using the term, china, to describe the others down the street does not necessarily mean the embracement of political independence for taiwan. it's more like a -- such a new situation quite different from the case of those over 40 years of age in taiwan, for this group using china in the mainland china represent difference goal orientations. and thirdly, the change of identity tendencies also reflects ambivalence of the taiwanese perception on the rise of china. in other words, the rise of a strong chinese economy along
with a preparation policies to china, to taiwan, do not really suede the hearts of the taiwanese general public. it is ironic that more con tept, culture and tourism, do not necessarily lead to the integration of the psychological mind set of the taiwanese and chinese people. in addition, after year 2008, no too many negotiations between the two sides of chemistry become institutionalized. repositioning taiwan's standing as an equal counterpart has become a strategic move to push the taiwanese negotiator, to protect the national interests. so, from a strategic point of view, to separate political identity may help preserve
taiwanese interests at a negotiation table. so, this is a general description and interpretation about the change of identity. but what about the political attitude? does it match the general tendency of the change of identity issues felt? an interesting story to tell. tendencies can be found in his tor cal data conducted by the same institutions, so, as you can see in the past two decades, those who support the so-called -- maintaining the prestigious court, which court being affected in the black lines and purple lines. two different kind of status quo.
in the past, those two supported status quo. decide at later date or indefinitely. enjoy a stable majority between 50 to 60%. combined black and the purple together. the percentage of those who supported is called move to independence has been on the rise over the past two decades for sure, which is described in the green line. but is still under 20%. the two extremes, which means that rush toward independence and the rush to unification, the percentage still very, very low. in the bottom two lines. the red line and the deep green lines. it's almost about 2 to 6%. so, this is very interesting that the contrast of identity
orientations and a preference of a cross street policies, reflects the rationality, i would argue on a taiwanese people, vital issues between taiwan and china. however, these two famous surveys or landmark or trademark surveys, are inevitably trapped in a situation of oversimplification on cross issues. so, domestic politics involved complex entanglements of emotions and the issues. it may also incorporate contradictions and inconsistencies on various key issues. in other words, the rise of taiwan independence sentiment does in the necessarily beat the rush of taiwan independence, so maintaining the status quo, still the majority opinion among
the taiwanese general public, but problem is that the definition of status quo is still very ambiguous. what is status quo? there are different ininterpreti interpretatio interpretations. sovereignty still cover the mainland according to the constitution. dpp argues that taiwan has already become independent pent country, so there's no need to declare dependence, but the pr size sticks to the 992 consensus, but focussed only on the one china part. things of the individual interpretation. so, the one china part is the core of the pr interpretation of the so-called statistical. so, the general public's preference to status quo only
reflects the desire of m maintaining stability. it's a situation. it takes different kind of policy to achieve this kind of situation. so even all these attorneys, let us try to figure out other aspects from the economic links, studying again from another set of opinion poll conducted by duke university incorporation with the national university. so, why the antiservice agreement in the spring of 2014 changed the public perception across links different from the general expectation as we can see from figure 3 in the figure 4.
choose that general public support was a position and it hasn't. instead of weakening of economic links with the other side down the street. and olalso, in terms of politic talk, we've got to -- some certain group of people even support legal talks with the other side down the street. again, the problem is that what is the definition of tops? why people try to go beyond economic engagement and then go further for illegal talks. does it reflect kind of our certain degree of anxiety among the public for the further
engagement of the others or any other interpretation? so, my next interpretation and my follow up discussion will be on the economic features with the other side. so, from the bilateral aspects, the lack of diversification with china put taiwan on the kind of economic security counsel or even threat. so, figure 7 give you an impression about the lack of diversity of a taiwanese investment to be concentrated in china. for instance, about 60% of the taiwanese investments go to china.
i doubt it also transferred to chip china, so combine these two together, that will be about 76%. compared to korea, it is more diversified. even though china market is one of the focus of the korean first. should be put in the broader context of global divisional labor, not just bilateral, but they still have some changes in the continuities, opportunities and the costs about these unique -- in the earliest stage of interaction, taiwan relied on its unique position in a global
supply chain and the benefitted from the expansion of the mainland china's manufacturing capacities. in most cases, taiwan's closed technological linkages with america and japanese high-tech firms, helped create an economic leech based on mutual trust between the vendors and mother company. and the benefits was founded on the weakness of the domestic chinese vendors and technological no how of manufacturers. china was regarded as world factory instead of market for global brand.
china has gradually transformed itself into a world market instead of just a world sector. this new situation gives indigenous mainland chinese i.t. for instance a competitive edge over throwing ones. for instance, one of the most case will be china's mobile phone manufacturer. they focus more on the game strength at home first. given the effect that china is one of the biggest market, not just factory. so, the technological -- use high-tech firms still remain. but the generation, general situation of a cross division labor is changing though. taiwan's oem model of manufacturing is now facing a threat in a small form.
the model is constrained by marketing in a global lodgistics capacities, so, the ups and downs of brands like htc reflects the pain staking process of the taiwanese model of manufacture and the expanse of a case like home high or foxcom empire provide another model of breakthrough. but still have a lot of problems, so, on the discussion of the fox com model. so under the rise of china's domestic manufacturer, also threatens the position of
taiwane srse vendor, for instan apple's ichb supply chain. the potential rise of the mainland's rise to replace taiwanese firms position is a reflection of the strong support of indigenous firms from the chinese government. so, in addition, the chinese government is promoting the merger and acquisition of state owned semiconductor firms. so, increasingly, the chinese government has encouraged firms to buy rather than rent or steal breakthrough invasion cape bableties through both technology and talent forces. the chinese companies are more than willing to take shortcuts by approaching top talents from the taiwanese competitors to
experience the enhancement of their technological capabilities in the market presence, so it's more like a competition not just about economic power, but a competition among talent forces. however, will evhether the chin system can really foster invasion and attract top elites, it's a highly debatable issue. the chinese higher education system has experienced major upheavels. to really create an invaift environment for the stops, for china to get into the top rims in the world. in my opinion. actually, there are a lot of relative issues like how to
strike a balance for taiwan. to have a more comprehensive and a global engagement, to engage with the western world or to engage with another market or to develop a kind of a comprehensive, not just cross street division of labor. for instance, in addition to the economic connections, taiwan is crossed pacific strategy of i.t. development is closely linked with it security and political dependence in the united states. on the other hand, taiwan's attempts to join a tpp request further domestic structure. adjustments. on the other hand, the formation of a new grand strategy in china such as one wide load or aiib,
does not necessarily apply an attempted dealing with the u.s. in dominant high-tech development. up until now, they still enjoy relative advantages in innovati innovation. but the deepening engagement between china and the countries of continental europe broadens the horizon of china to embrace a more comprehensive global corporative methods. so, taiwanese would think about different trends in the global divisional labor in terms of economic security arrangement. so, in my opinion, taiwanese took just its economic strategies to incorporate for instance, more southeast asian countries and even european regions into its global strategies of lodgistics. one of the policy options to create more comprehensive
economic strategic rises to explore these booming markets, such a partnership does not aim to replace a chinese market t. real prep work is to ally with new engines of global development and a guaranteed economic security at the same time. so, the last point i'm going to introduce briefly it's about whether culture industry or culture enterprises could be another kind of new niche for the taiwanese industry to reach the chinese market and to expand through the global market. the link in culture industry, we are still in counter opportunities in the challenges at the same time. for instance, culture industry if taiwan really tried to engage
with china, the industry in china with a unique combination of state intervention. political indoctrination and the market of advancement. it is not holding a sensitive issue, but also a lucrative financial resources at the local governments. so, the emergence of the spirit of the creative circle in taiwan may be the key for the taiwanese culture industry, so due to the limitation of the size of the domestic soil, enhancing the economy of skill and introducing strategies of globalization are key factors of success for taiwan's culture and creating industries and enterprises. so, the chinese market may provide both risk and income
opportunity for these taiwanese culture industries. let me wrap up some of my introductions and discussions. i think all in all, the china factor will be a key component for taiwan's global strategies of development. understanding the risk and opportunity of the rise of china from a global instead of a bilateral as pecht, will help illuminate the road map of taiwan's future growth and prosperity. coping with the rise of china involved hard choices for the domestic front. in taiwan. kind of entangling domestic plix and -- shoulders more risk and proceeding the changing world from a more realistic angle will
be the only solution to reverse the inward looking tendencies of national development in taiwan. on the other hand, in many cases, cross street relations have become a sick scapegoat of poor domestic governance within taiwan. urging the issues involve for instance, human resources development, the improvement of environmental protection in the dwmt. carrying about distribution, justice, reforming our social welfare system and then also immigration policy will be on the very important agenda. for the domestic governor's issues. the fader in domestic government will destroy the hard earned fruit of cross street.
as the minor player in the international arena, a very robust economic and political force. taiwan has to expand beyond its internal logic and imagine itself in other people's shoes. understanding the chinese, the u.s. in a global grand strategies and the repositioning itself in the changing international environment will be the key for the future development of taiwan. the global vision based on understanding of the strength in our limitation of taiwan will help promote a robust solution to the deadlock of domestic and global -- thank you very much.
>> i'm going to ask a couple of questions and we've got a lot of time for questions. is it viewed as those relations viewed as largely economically mutually beneficial, sort of transactional or are they highly politically guided to as some would say lure taiwan into a relationship where they're being controlled one way or another, both economically and eventually politically. and if it's the latter, what are
tie waiwa taiwan's options to make sure it doesn't get trapped? >> transitional period to the market economy, taiwan play a very important role in providing not just capital, but know how. to the chinese economy. so, on the other hand, it's not just for the central aspect, but also from the local aspects. many taiwanese business people and investment capitals now have a very close links with the local government. when we took cross revolutions, it is also mingled with a lot of our political concerns. about cross revolutions. for instance, the preferential treatment to the taiwanese business people in china. a lot of discussions to wonder whether these taiwanese business people will be the kind of to be in a trap if there's something
happening. between taiwan and china. according to our interviews, i think these business people are very smart. they know how to survive. they will not let it control government in the past three decades. they give out their own strategies of survival. in the mainland. but if you look to the future, you've searched economic linkages on the rule of man. that is still kind of dangerous. it's no doubt that they are kind of a political mingles with economic benefits and political consents. so, that's what i think how to develop kind of a more institutionalized and for these
business people can survive well. and also, we can develop a kind of a healthy division of labor. in a global market, not just from the bilateral aspect. that will be very important. >> just ask one more. you talk about diversification. my understanding is that the current administration has tried very hard and is trying very hard to diversify. and is officials including president jo have said many times, the degree, the percentage depends on the mainland, the export market, has not grown. number has grown, but the percentage of dependents has not. but diversification is part of the policy. so as not to become overdependent. not talking about individual firms, although that's part it, but the whole economy.
it's pretty cloer that in certain pretty prominent cases, the mainland is going to the trading partners saying maybe this isn't a good time to do too much. is sufficient opportunity for taiwan to diversify to get out of that system if you will. or does it really depend on somehow creating willingness to go along with that. in order for taiwan to succeed in that diversification effort. >> as you can notice there seems late 1990s, we have talking about the so-called south wall policy. and also, we continuously argue
that we have to diversify our foreign direct investment, so i think this kind of shifting or moving out are not driven by the state policies. i really wonder about the real effects about state policies. how will the state policy to guide the firm's behaviobehavio. i think that's also related to the structure of taiwanese firms. the majority up until now is still small to medium size enterprises. whether they have the capacities to have a jen picture of a global logics support, that will be difficult for them. in other case, they may move to diversify. to move to inland and also to be
in indonesia, southeast asian countries, but as to china's intervention about different kinds of trade deals between taiwan and other countries. deals will reduce the cost for these taiwanese business people and firms. but it depends on the individual firms. to find their own way. to develop a new territory, a new market. it hasn't been the taiwanese experiences for the past four or five decades, how to continue this dynamic, robust economic incentives are very important. >> okay. let's go to questions. we have microphones coming. when you get a microphone, could
you please identify yourself, name, affiliation and make your question. we have a question right back here. >> yes, i'm russell, retired federal employee. you mentioned chinese verses taiwan, but the people's republic of china has processes like organ harvesting and forced abortions. it's not going to be in taipei and the united states government is in pursuit of a policy of appeasement against beijing for many, many years, so don't you think unification is very, very bad idea? >> as you can see that, if you asked people now, i'm going to -- interpretation, i think the percentage is very, very low. so, the effects that even the region on the prc under the current arrangement, i think any
kind of unification will be very difficult. but if it is something changed in the future. probably there are some timing for talks between the two sides, but i'm not quite sure what kind of arrangement. and also, domestic consensus in taiwan. i don't think any party can go directly or secretly to talk with beijing.b#5
as a participant in the movement, what i observed is that this is, i wouldn't say thatst that was a movement which is mainly opposing or opposing to china or antichina because there are many participants that comes into this movement with with different angles. or maybe most of them i would say it was the opposing to the procedure, taiwanese, so looking at another movement lately, the one with anti -- as my personal observation, i think that shows that young generation doesn't no
longer concerned about taiwan under the context of antichina. but to a more pro taiwan. concept, so, i think the main points of those movements shows that what young generation cares is that we want to decide our own future through a democracy process, but not really that so antichina, so, what was your opinion of that? thank you. >> i totally agree with you because i got the same impression from my students. how do interpret all these, our younger generation. i think it's very important. so, they are the future of taiwan and probably the major pushing forces for cross relations. first off though, i think that is a typical reflection about the anxiety about globalization. not just for bilateral pact.
because people care about trans parnsy, antiblack box, making passes and they also care more about -- justice in distribution of wealth. all of these are side effects of globalization. they are justified to jump out, to say something. that's why my undergrad students ask me that. can i ask for the lead of the movement? go ahead, don't forget to come back for the return. it's also the desire of empowerment for the younger generation. people are tired about kind of old generations' style for decision
i notice, hey, they're more pragmatic than me and my cohorts. i learn a lot from students, including you. >> other questions? >> hi. mike upon tea, the director of the dpp's mission here in washington. thanks very much for a fine presentation. on the question of going forward with taiwan's economic prospects.
as you know dr. tang has lots of ideas about that, maybe not fully put out there yet. i guess the one question i have is don't you see a future where taiwan can begin to diversify away from the old models by developing new niches for its outlets. taiwan's professionalism and i.t. sector, all that stuff can be, seems to me, moving into a globalized world in a way that doesn't have to reject china, but has to have both parts working together. that's where the dpp would like to see it go. it's not easy, i understand. that's where getting ready for tpp should it ever happen, i think that's what the discussions are going on in the dpp at least. how do we prepare to be at least up to the chorus of the free trade agreement, what do we have to do? i'd love to hear your thoughts on that. >> evidently, there's taiwan and
other statesmen indicate we have to diversify and also try to put china market as one part, one important component of our global strategies, but i think the key -- there's two major important components. first, how to breed our entrepreneur shship is very important. i notice there's a past dependency of the chinese firms that try to reduce the risk and try to put itself in the global division of labor, but not in the upstream. if you want to move to the up stream, you have to show the more responsibilityies. i think that's part of the importance of entrepreneurship. if we really want to breed entrepreneurship, i think we have to develop this from the very beginning of our education
system, to have a more comprehensive education and also related to our human resources policies. it's not just about salaries. people are talking about low salaries. i don't think that's the major problem. so we have to have a comprehensive plan for education, for the talented forces and whether under a democratic society like taiwan, we can foster innovation and entrepreneurship. pure innovation is not enough. it will n if you don't create any entrepreneurship to diversify the economy. that will be the comprehensive plan for taiwan to go beyond the old mind set of old manufacturing model. >> in the back. >> my name is judy from george
washington university. my question is why is the entire china attitude keep rising in taiwan? is that mainly because of mainland china's behavior, or is that mainly because of domestic politics problems. if it's the former reason, is it possible for mainland china to change its behavior or its policy toward taiwan and make the anti china attitude going do down? >> you asked a very broad issue. actually, you can trace back to decades ago about the legacies of the -- after '49 for instance. after '45, thatt massacre, that
destroyed -- after different enter marriage and also interaction, taiwan gradually developed kind of a taiwan consensus in the domestic land to try to figure out the autonomous, political entity. but as you all know, there's some political considerations from the other side of the street trying to squeeze the space of the republic of china and also taiwan. so that will be an interactive reactions about so-called anti-china. but i don't quite really think that -- whether we can combine anti china. it's quite different. than if you put china as a very
broader sense, that would be a more moderate reactions. but, as you mentioned. whether that is the major roots of the problem will be the policies from the other side of the street. you argue that more or less there's some policies which are not welcomed in taiwan. so that will cause some repercussions and reactions among the general public including taiwan's participation in international organizations which are not that politicized. and also even in some cultural events we encounter some problems. during the lunch we have some conversations that my young kids ask me that, is north korea
member? yes. is taiwan? no. u.n. statehood is a riert. a lot of political calculations and considerations. what is, in the sports event, for instance. what is chinese taipei? does chinese taipei represent taiwan or things like that. so how to accumulate some minimum political consensus. it takes two for a corporaticood also conflicts. >> this may be an unfair question to you, but in light of what you were talking about, do you have any thoughts on what beijing, at the end of the day, really wants in terms of the relationship with taiwan behind
the label. >> you mean from beijing's aspect? >> what does beijing want? >> you mean -- >> what is beijing trying to -- what is important to beijing about the cross-trade relationship, beyond the agreement while being part of one china? what's the substance of that? where is the potential flexibility in thinking about how to implement what will be called one china and acceptable to beijing and also people in taiwan. i think one very important dilemma of taiwan is we can either use the term taiwan or roc. taiwan tried to interpret china as republic of china, but i don't think at the current stage in the political atmosphere in china prc will shift or adjust its tolerance about roc.
if not roc, not taiwan, what else? what will be the real connotation of the term one china, whether they'll continue to keep it as an ambiguity, ambiguous term of china? i'll argue with that. among the experts or intellectuals or scholars, we know how to manipulate the importance of using ambiguity. but how to explain to the general public, just like as i understand, how to explain to my young kids or even the students why you consider to say that one china but force us to accept probably is the prc and upped mines the legitimacy of roc. that will be a very difficult part for both sides.
>> my name is garrett vendor wooes, editor of taiwan communique, small publication here in d.c. you're saying in the opinion polls, the definition of chinese has undergone a change of definition, but the same token, i would suggest that the definition of status quo has undergone a change of definition. previously it coincided more with the rather nebulous international isolation after the 1970s. i think more and more people in taiwan see the status quo presently as a de facto independence. so doesn't that really change your analysis of what the people support in terms of status quo? >> as i mentioned, different people will have a different interpretation about the term status quo. i think you're right that status
quo may refer to de facto independence, which is the crept situation of taiwan. i think the major difference among all different parties or different groups of people will be that whether we still recognize the existence of republic of china, the sovereignties are limited only in taiwan or mysteriously it can cover sovereignty of the mainland, but assume the capacity is limited to taiwan. i think that's the major differences. my second point is that when people reply that i will support status quo. just hunch that people do not have ideas about what to do next. that's why people say that i will prefer the status quo,
unchanged, which means that people will have more comprehensive focuses, not just for the cross religious, but for domestic politics, governance issues, or reflected that it's difficult to explain to people what is status quo, roc, sovereignty, prc, et cetera. which means that people feel kind of anxiety and uncertainty about the future. >> i'm stanley koeber. i'd like to follow up on alan's question. one question that seems to not be discussed a commonwealth. the soviet union broke up, you had the commonwealth. when the bit tisch empire breaks up, you have the british
commonwealth. could the solution be a chinese commonwealth, a commonwealth of chinese states, kind of a nominal sort of cultural entity, but effectively the participants are politically i understand dent? >> as i mentioned, it's a symmetric relationship. china is too big and taiwan is too small. if we really have a new arrangement or ideas, i think china should take initiatives, not taiwan, because in the past four decades, a lot of discussions in taiwan about commonwealth or one china or one dependent china or two chinas. but if taiwan kick off these proposals, it's difficult to achieve kind of a feasible solution. if china can kick off or to
launch some new thinking beyond the current system, that will be an interesting development for the two sides to consider, but i'm not quite sure about in taiwan, whether we can achieve any kind of domestic consensus, about any kind of commonwealth, as you suggested. >> you had a question? can we have the microphone. >> in other words, you just say -- what do you think of taipei city mayor, modality going to shanghai and what he was saying about one china, all those things not lead to consensus. you think this provides a flexibility or more a pragmatic way because china is giving him reception. so you think this will work?
is this a modality that both sides can pursue? >> mayor kerr was well received in china and got a warm welcome in china. do i think that could be applied to central level? i think there are some limitations. you can see that mayor kerr is very clever in his languages. for instance, he said that one china principle is not a problem, but he didn't say whether there's one china, one taiwan. one china is not a problem. he made the play that there's no two china, one china. he didn't say the second part. i think in the local level, i think mayor kerr provide a very good example, and from this probably we can accumulate some
mutual trust, but i'm not quite sure whether that will be elevated to the central level without recognizing some basic principles. i don't quite think mayor kerr really recognized the '92 consensus. but he said one china principle is not a problem. and also he used the two sides belong to the same family. the merits of that is what xi jinping says and chinese leaders say. you have to swallow it. that's why mayor kerr is very smart. it doesn't mean he's against any public regiment. in the same family, what will be their future. he doesn't say anything. i think that would be a very good step to go forward. but i'm not sure whether it could be applied to the central level or not. it's a long way to go because we have to look into the details
about all these rituals. i noticed in the last bank wets, the mayor of shanghai did not attend. so i'm not quite sure that is a signal or not. but anyway, i think it's a successful trip to china. >> regarding the 1992 consensus, i remember that what he says, that with the respect of the 1992 consensus, he understood and respect the chinese position. i wonder that both of you, how do you think -- is it kind of simple that china is trying to show the flexibility for and then possibly the dpp in the
future, once they are in the office, they can imply in this way. you don't have to accept it, but show something like that, what he say, respect and understood or something, and then for both of you, how possibly in the future that presidentxi will come to the u.s., how strictly or less tension he will show the firm foundation that he will exist or less stressful for the dpp? what kind of signal that he will try to show to dpp? thank you. >> even though mayor kerr is a medical doctor, i believe he studies international relations. the choice of term is very smart. respect doesn't mean that i
recognize, our acknowledge, i pay attention to. it doesn't mean i acknowledge or accept. i think it's in the local level. taipei mayor is a very important position. but at the same time in return china doesn't say anything about appreciation about that or setting that as a model. so i think it's a testing -- testing, and i think ellen also share with my understanding that mayor kerr will have a bright future. but to xi jinping's visit, according to our past experiences, probably china will try to encourage u.s. to put some pressures on taiwan, but up until now i don't see the real agenda for xi's visit.
whether he will reiterate some existing policies or slogans i'm not quite sure about that. ellen may have some thoughts about that. >> right. he sent me an e-mail this morning. i agree on respect and understand the chinese position. there are a lot of phrases that you can look in the u.s.prc relationship, japanese prc relationship. none of which says we accept the other position, but we understand and respect it. i would also point out, for example, xi jinping talked about respecting differences. does that mean accept the other side's position? no. but you have to respect them, not just set them aside. you have to think about them and be respectful about them in a big way.
on what president xi will say when he comes here, i can't divulge the content of my e-mail exchange. but i would find it very strange to assume he would articulate a new position when he comes here. i think that the point that the mainland is trying to make is this is a very important moment. i think they have talked about it as a crossroads, in essence, juncture, and people should understand that, and that they should take the position that the mainland has on cross trade relations very seriously. i would be surprised if he would be talking in specific terms about the consequences of this or that or the other thing. clearly what they're hoping for is whatever administration takes office in may is going to have a position which is able to be
seen as essentially a one china position. but anyway, i don't -- i would not think that you would see a change, and certainly not one that's advertised to the united states. that's not the way i think it's going to work. other questions? >> i'm from diplomat magazine. i was wondering if you could elaborate a little on the diversification strategy you were talking about. you mentioned southeast asia and a number of european countries. i'm wondering what southeast country, for example, you would have in mind. obviously compared to, for example the strategy, the context has changed remark cli. some of these southeast asian countries have much closer relationships with china and going back to alan rom berg's point, beijing may not be happy about some of these countries
pursuing closer relationships with taiwan, if that means more than just pragmatic, economic cooperation. >> i would argue for the taiwanese business people to move to southeast asian countries, i tend not to regard it as a political movement or political issues. but it depends on the firms to make their decisions. as you can see, there's become a tendency, because of the rise of the labor cost, land cost in the coastal areas, many taiwanese firms have already moved to other places. this is for the small and medium size enterprises. for bigger enterprises like fox con, they can have more choices, to brazil, to india, not just neighboring countries. the majority of the town is small to medium-sized enterprises are now having a
hard choice. i don't quite think -- >> i'm a retired attorney and china watcher for about 49 years now, starting to get the picture. i have a couple of questions for you. one, my son and future daughter-in-law graduated the university of virginia undergraduate in 1996. i see you got your phd did in 19 1995. i wonder whether or not you ever get back to charlottesville. on the cross trade relations, i'm very curious about travel. i didn't hear you comment or i missed it if you did. i don't do immigration law or travel visas as a lawyer, but
what kind of documentation is required, what's the percentage of taiwanese who have gone over to the mainland temporarily, to travel or live or study. i don't want to use all of china in the denominator, either 1.3 or 1.4 billion, of the educated prc folks, what percent come over to taiwan? follow-on, what effect, if any, is measured on the attitudes of those people who do engage in that kind of cross street travel? cross trade interaction studied from visiting the relatives for the old soldiers from taiwan to mainland china, studying from i believe 1988 or '9, quite early. but in the first two decades is only taiwanese travels to china. china did not allow main land
chinese travellers to taiwan. things three or four years ago taiwan opened the group of tourists and then opened individual backpackers, travellers from the other side of taiwan industry. also, after year 2008, it would begin to have -- that would interpret no flow. and also things, four years ago taiwanese universities accept main land chinese students, accepted exchange students and later on registered students. in my undergrad classes, class size of about 35 or 40. annually we have about three to four students from china taking
my course about cross trade relations. they did a very good job, always top students. i really appreciate the interaction among all these young people. they learn each other. they become my subject of study. i observe closely about their interaction. i think it's a very positive. but again, there are some avoidable, some negativism pacts. for example, group tourists also create some negative images. that happens not just in taiwan but some other places. so there are some positive and some not-so-positive impacts in terms of interpersonal flows. in terms of your first comment about charlottesville, i really
appreciate charlottesville. for your information uvh has the lone china initiatives, open office this spring. i think in april there are four things of different schools that attended that grand opening office in shanghai, but thank you for mentioning my alma mater. taking a look at congress this week, the senate is back tomorrow, and they will take another procedural vote on the disapproval resolution for the iran nuclear agreement. they gravel in tuesday at 1:00 p.m. eastern, and the vote is scheduled for 6:00 eastern. later in the week, senators are expected to debate a bill that would ban abortions after 20 weeks. the house returns for legislative business on wednesday. members will take up a number of bills including one directing the tsa to enhance security at airports. and on thursday, the house will
attempt to ban all federal funding for planned parenthood unless that organization agrees to stopper forming or funding abortions. follow the house live on c-span and the senate live on c-span2. meanwhile our road to the white house coverage continues. earlier today we brought you senator bernie sanders speaking at liberty university in lynchburg, virginia. we'll show that to you again tonight at 8:00 eastern. following that, 45 minutes later at 8:45, remarks from former hewlett packard ceo, republican presidential candidate carly fiorina. all that starting at 8:00 eastern tonight on c-span. >> tonight on "the communicators," gary eastbound stein chair of the task force will discuss the broadcast spectrum auction that will allow wireless companies to bid on air wave space. >> a congressional determination that was made in the spectrum
act, and one thing i do want to emphasize, it's a voluntary auction on behalf of the broadcasters. broadcasters continue to be an extremely valuable service, but congress passed this act where broadcasters on a one-time-only basis will be able to relinquish their spectrum rights in return for a share of the proceeds of the forward auction. so what it is is congress's determination and the fcc's implementation to use market forces to make available more low band spectrum to meet the broadband needs. in other words, the need for broadband spectrum is burgeoning by multiples and exponentially. there isn't a lot of good low band spectrum left. this is a new and novel method congress has put in place and the fcc is to implement. >> tonight at 8:00 eastern on
"the communicators" on c-span2. a discussion now on the iran nuclear agreement, policy analysts talk about the impact of sanctions relief, how the agreement is viewed within the various factions of the iranian government. reports of so-called side deals between iran and the international atomic energy agency and how the agreement will affect iran's standing within the arab community. among the speakers who are representatives from the arms control association and the institute forward and peace reporting, the forum was posted by the project for the study of the 21st century in washington, d.c. this is 90 minutes. >> thank you for coming tonight. this is the event on iran at ps 21. if you're at the wrong place, please, you can leave now without any embarrassment, no judgment. otherwise you're at the right place. thank you for coming.
at this point people will be bored of this topic. it's heartening that people are still interested and still want to talk about it. i'd ask you all to kindly silence your phones at this point, make sure they're on silence, and you can also follow along with #ps21iran, all one word, attached. i have the twitter handles of each of our speakers before you so you can also follow them tonight and continue to follow them. these are honestly four very knowledgeable individuals on the iran nuclear deal. please follow them in the future as well. one last point before we get into the discussion, there's many different angles that we could have taken in discussing the iran deal. in fact, ps 21 which is a new
think tank had an event last week where they discussed the implications of the deal for israel and u.s.-israel relations. tonight we're going to focus almost exclusively on what this deal means for iran and by extension u.s. policy towards iran and the inspections regime and sanctions regime that affects iran. so i would ask that you guys keep to the framework of our discussion in the q&a session when we get there. so let me introduce our esteemed panelists. to my immediate right is kelsey davenport, the director for non-proliferation policy at the orms control association where she works on nuclear security issues concerning north korea, india, pakistan and of course iran. she's been very closely following the negotiation, able to go to several of the negotiations and follow very, very closely. one of the things i appreciate a lot about kelsey, she's able to explain incredibly technical and
detailed components of the deal in a way that people like me who did very badly in high school physics can actually follow along. i'm very happy that we're able to have her with us today. to her right is sam cutler, the senior editor in chief of sanctionlaw.com and the policy adviser at ferrari and associates which is a law firm here in washington that specializes in all things sanctions and ofac. he previously worked at the washington institute for nuclear policy. to his right, iraq rahry senior program officer at war and peace. he worked at the stimson center and the middle eastern institute and can speak to us about ways it's affecting the government and one of the most knowledgeable people on the internal iranian dynamics. to his right is dr. arian cav
taf i have which is a visiting professor, previously at the bell forster at harvard an gopt her phd in security studies from kings college. she's also going to speak a little about the european perspective since she also was educated there. i forgot to introduce myself. my name is nah czar ragavi, a phd candidate in anthropology and i actually study policy experts. so i studied all four of the individuals here, and as an expert of experts, i can say you are in good hands today. i want to start with kelsey, if you don't mind. we hear obama talking about this agreement being about verification and not trust. what does that mean, and can you talk about the ways the inspections mechanisms were set up based on this principle?
>> sure. thank you so much for having me, and thank you all for being here. so one implemented, what the iran nuclear deal will do is put in place a multilaird monitoring and verification regime that cover every element of iran's fuel cycle. there will be continued surveillance against the obtaining of raw materials, the production facilities, the components that allow it to enrich uranium. this has two primary benefits. first, it ensures that iran is actually abiding by the limits in the nuclear deal, it's enriching to levels suitable for civil low enriched your rainian, only operating about 560 centrifuges. so monitoring in realtime will
provide the international community with the assurance that iran is abiding by its nuclear commitments. the multilaird approach also has a second benefit. essentially it ensures that if iran were to covertly pursue nuclear weapons, it would need to replicate the entire fuel supply chain beginning with obtaining the raw uranium ore, converting it to gas, enriching it to weapons grade levels and actually make that into a nuclear weapon. it is highly unlikely that iran would be able to do this without detection, with every layer so stringently monitored because eventually an alarm bell would sound. particularly when you consider that all of this multilaird monitoring is also taking place alongside a separate channel that monitors iran's pro kurmt of materials that can be used for its nuclear program and that it's happening in conjunction with a much more robust
inspections regime. under the inspections regime, the iaea will have unprecedented access to iran's undeclared sites including military areas under an agreement iran will implement known as the additional protocol. the additional protocol in conjunction with the text of the deal will allow international inspectors to access sites if they have concerns about elicit activities within a 24-day period. that's unheard of at the international level. and essentially what that ensures is that iran will not be able to cover up elicit activities that involve uranium enrichment within that time frame without detection because of the very sophisticated tools that the international community has for environmental sampling and for monitoring and surveilling these sites. so taken together, what the monitoring and verification
regime ensures is that the international community will know if iran is abiding by its commitments, and that if iran attempts to break any of those commitments, if it deviates from the deal, the international community will be able to detect that quickly and then have an appropriate time to respond. >> thank you. >> so going to arian, it's easy to forget these negotiation haves been going on for a very long time. in 2003 iran was putting forward some proposals. in 2004 france, germany and the uk tried to launch and it didn't go anywhere. russia and china joined in 2006. finally in 2013 the u.s. started secret negotiations with iran and now we're here today i.'s almost a decade of work that went into this. so what factors helped make this particular moment successful in terms of negotiations and what brought the iranians to the
negotiating table and what did they achieve through this negotiation? >> thanks for having me. it does seem like a very long time to those of us following the issue closely. i'm sure my colleagues agree that we can't wait for it to be over. a number of factors came into play, and very often they're ignored, and the domestic discussion we've been having ability the iran deal, the conventional wisdom says iran came to the table because of sanctions, sanctions were biting hard. iran came to the table to get sanctions relief. there's a lot more to it than that. it's easy to forget iran is not an inward looking country. as a nation, iranians want to engage with the rest of the world. they've been engaging with the rest of the world for centuries and want to go back to that level. when iran became isolated, not just economically but also politically, it was something many iranians disagreed with, something people blamed
ahmadinejad for in last elections which brings me to one of the important factors in bringing iran to the table and changing things and ultimately making the deal happen which is the 2009 elections. they really changed domestic dynamics in iran in a way that i think no other event had in a very long time. that questioned the legitimacy as a whole. the supreme leader, other factions in government started to feel threatened and felt like their power, their authority, the very foundations that give them their power were starting to be questioned. so this means that in 2013 we finally had two countries that were essentially ready to engage with one another. until that point, when hoe tammy was in power, he was a reformist, very pro engagement as rouhani likes to hash tag on
instagram and twitter, the u.s. wasn't open to that. we'll remember it was under president bush, iran made a number of proposals, the u.s. wasn't ready to accept any of them. the next step was ahmadinejad came to power. at that point president obama was elected and said he was going to extend a hand to iran, but ahmadinejad was not interested. finally we get to a stage in 2013 where both governments want to have a chat essentiallynd try to solve certain issues, at least the biggest one, the nuclear crisis. certainly sanctions played a role, but that wasn't the whole story. it wasn't the only story. and one important factor that we tend to forget is that it wasn't just the u.s. and iran that were ready for this next stage. it was also the entire p5 plus one, the international community as a whole. if it wasn't for the sort of unity that the p5+1 had in the
past five years, we wouldn't get to the point we are today. that's something we may be jeopardizing with congress potentially rejecting this deechlt deal. >> i have a followup question for you. kelsey lays out a very invasive inspections regime. why would iran agree to that? >> iran came to the table essentially knowing that the u.s. had given up its maximalist position which is does your enrichment position that made the negotiations fail in the previous round in 2005. iran came to the table with an understanding that a number of things were going to be read lines. they became famous as the supreme leader's red lines, but actually they're shared by various institutions within iran including the parliament, the irgc, the revolution guards and i think the broader population also agrees with a number of them. this was to keep most facilities
open, actually all the facilities open. it was to continue having enrichment, an enrichment program even though they did scale back quantitatively, they wanted to have an enrichment program that was functioning and research and development which was a very important thing. iran knew somewhere it had to make certain concessions and i think the best solution for them was to actually help the iaea's inspections beyond the safeguards agreement and with additional protocol because it's something easily sold at home. rouhani government, zarif can say a number of countries have accepted. we're not an exception. we can accept this and it brings us closer to being an upstanding nation in the international community. it's something that was easily sold at home and they could stand behind and get some things
in exchange for. >> i'm going to ask kelsey one more question and then we'll move to sam. a lot of talk in washington is about this 15-year mark. everyone says, oh, it sounds great up until that point, but then after 15 years we've heard things like iran could break out and get a nuclear weapon within a few weeks. as someone who has been following this, can you explain what is going to happen after 15 years? >> there are a lot of misconceptions that after 15 years iran will be on the printing of a nuclear weapon. i think that ignores some of the provisions in the deal designed to extend confidence that iran's nuclear program is peaceful beyond that 15-year mark. up until year 15 there are very stringent requirements on how much uranium iran can enrich and to what level it can enrich that
material. that means iran will remain close to a year away from being able to obtain that material for the first 15 years. now, after 15 years, when iran can -- has introduced some of its more advanced centrifuge machines, when the enrichment limits expire, iran could be much closer to obtaining the material for a bomb, meaning if it wanted to break out, it could do that more quickly. however, the international community will still have a number of early warning signals regarding the direction of iran's nuclear program. this has to do with -- in part, with the fact that there will be continuous monitoring of the areas where iran produces its centrifuges which are the machines used to enrich uranium for 20 years. there will also be continuous surveillance of iran's uranium mines and mills for 25 years. watching both of these elements continually along with short notice inspections of iran's enrichment sites will give the
international community some advanced warning if iran is choosing to draw malt cli ramp up its enrichment program. also there are a number of very important personal nept restrictions in the deal that i think often get overlooked. one section has to do specifically with weaponization activities. and in the deal, iran agrees it will not conduct research, test or develop certain types of explosives that are applicable to dead nating a nuclear device. this goes beyond iran's commitments in the nuclear non-proliferation treaty which leaves open a loophole for peaceful nuclear explosions. so in the past when the international atomic energy agency has presented evidence about iran conducting tests of these types of explosives related to nuclear weapons development, iran has said, well, this is for conventional purposes, or this is for purposes related to oil
drilling. iran will not be able to claim that in the future if it's caught conducting these activities because it has agreed to forego these activities even for non-nuclear purposes. and also, as i said, i talked earlier about more intrusive inspections regime under the additional protocol. the additional protocol is a personal nept document once it's ratified. iran has agreed to seek ratification by year eight of the deal. so having that in place personal neptly will ensure that inspectors can access iran's declared nuclear facilities on short notice. that's as little as two hours, and that it can request access to undeclared facilities. so those are all of the facilities sort of outside iran's nuclear program if it has concerns about elicit activities. after 15 years iran may be closer to being able to get the material for a weapon more quickly, but the international
community will still have advanced notice and still have much more intrusive monitoring and verification than we did if there is no deal. i think that's certainly important to note. >> if you think the non-proliferation aspects are confusing, we should now turn to sanctions. because i feel in this town especially, it is extremely difficult to get a clear picture of what is actually going to happen in terms of sanctions relief. luckily we have one of the foremost experts on this. sam, what sanctions are actually going to be relieved? which are going to not be touched and what are the different layers of sanctions. when we're talking internationally? >> thank you for inviting me. i'd like to issue two disclaimers. my views don't necessarily reflect those of ferrari &
associates and nothing i say should be taken as legal advice, especially because i am not a lawyer. i'd also like to -- >> but you can hire -- >> you can hire us if you have a particular sanctions-related issue. i'd also like to define two terms that i'll probably use very frequently. when i refer to primary sanctions, that's restrictions that apply to u.s. individuals and companies. when i refer to secondary sanctions, those are -- those affect foreign on theities in their dealings with iran. so under the joint comprehensive plan of action, sanctions relief can really be divided into three categories, there's un, eu and u.s. sanctions relief. for the u.n., the prior u.n. security council resolutions are going to be rescinded, and a new
security council resolution is issued, encapsulating the contents of the joint comprehensive plan of action. for the e.u. side, a numb lar of nuclear related sanctions -- specifically one nuclear-related sanctions order is going to be revoked, and another is, provisio are going to be suspended. after eight years, additional proliferation related sanctions in the e.u. are going to be rescinded. those are more to do with technology transfer as opposed to sort of the broader economic sanctions like the oil embargo that was imposed in january of 2013. and then on the u.s. side, which is the most complicated, primarily sanctions relief from the u.s. side will be the suspension of congressionally mandated secondary sanctions that were imposed after 2010 as
well as certain provisions of the iran sanctions act of 1996, though it's important to note that isa was not enforced until 2010. it's primarily sanctions that have been imposed since the passage of the u.n. security council resolution 1929. these are everything from the mandate that foreign countries need to reduce their imports of iranian origin oil, sanctions on the iran energy sector, ports, ship building, insurance. you name it. the vast majority of secondary sanctions targeting iran will be waived. some of that will take place, as i mentioned -- some of that will take place via waivers that are embedded in congressional sanctions legislation. these are -- these generally
last anywhere from 90 to 180 days, it depends on the provision, that they can be renewed indefinitely. so you will see the president issue rolling waivers throughout the duration of this deal. other sanctions are imposed via executive order, that is, within the president's discretion to revo revoke. there are a number outlined in the jcpoa. additionally there will be relief by delifting certain iranian individuals and entities that have been sanctioned for a variety of different activity, primarily proliferation and sanctions evasion. what will remain especially in the u.s. side are primary and secondary sanctions -- secondary sanctions dealing with proliferation. individuals and entities that
remain for proliferation activities, terrorism as well as the iranian revolutionary guard corps. what this means is foreign entities that engage in significant financial transactions with these entities that remain delisted -- that remain listed could have their access to the u.s. financial system cut off. additionally there will be human rights related designations that will remain on the books as well as the vast majority of primary sanctions affecting what u.s. companies can do with iran. there are certain carve-outs in the jcpoa that will allow foreign subsidiaries of u.s. companies to engage in certain activity with iran, activity that is in line with the jcpoa. crucially that requires a significant amount of guidance from the treasury department to
have any impact. this is the status quo before the passage of the iran threat reduction act in 2012. however, we just saw recently shawn ber jay pay a very substantial fine for not walling off its foreign subsidiary from its u.s. parent which will continue to be required. so there's substantial liability that could continue with that. the u.s. will also authorize the sale of civil aircraft and aircraft parts to iran as well as authorize the importation of certain iranian food stuffs and carpet. so caviar, saffron, pistachios. >> i had a follow-up question if you don't mind. it sounds like most of the u.s. sanctions that are going to be relieved are the ones that had to do with the u.n. resolution, if i got that correctly.
right? >> i would actually say the u.n. resolutions are probably the least important of the sanctions. they don't generally contain a great deal of restrictions that would affect iran's overall economic health. they're very tailored. they effect certain individuals or certain categories of technology transfer, but what really has had the major economic effect was the proliferation of u.s. secondary sanctions, and general compliance with u.s. secondary sanctions across the board or across the world. the u.n. sanctions do give foreign countries and companies sort of the authorization under international law to accept u.s. secondary sanctions. but when it comes down to it, it's really the threat of being cut off from the u.s. financial system or having your u.s. assets blocked that has resulted
in the most pressure on iran. >> well, my follow-up question -- you guys can hear me, i don't need the mic. i have a loud voice. one, when is this really going to go into effecta, and when is iran going to start seeing some money? two, is there a risk that companies are going to be so confused about which sanctions are in place and which aren't, that they're not going to go in and invest -- i'm talking european companies at this point. they're going to be so confused by these changes in sanctions, which are for human rights and which are for -- that they'll just avoid. is that the risk? >> so for schedule, on october 8th is adoption day where the u.s. will issue the waivers under congressionally mandated sanctions that will not go into legal effect until the iaei has
certified that iran is in compliance with its nuclear-related commitments. once that happens, we come to implementation day when the actual legal impact of sanctions relief happens. the latest estimate i've heard from the state department is six to 12 months. so there's sort of a very broad window when that could happen, though it could be shorter, it could be longer. after that, i know we've seen a lot of sort of media reports about companies, european companies especially being very interested in the iranian market. i think to a certain extent once they actually try and game out sort of -- once their accountants and lawyers get a hold of these potential business deals, it will take some time for the remaining sanctions liability or exposure to sanctions, especially u.s. secondary sanctions, to be sused
out. i think while there remains significant sanctions on particularly the irgc,irgc and there's substantial reporting about how involved the irgc is and the iranian economy at large it will present continued liabili liability, there's also the issue of iran's general business climate. there's not sort of well developed investment protection, i.p. law, as well as sort of the state's general heavy-handedness. you don't know when some -- well-connected irgc commander is going to say, well, this contract that my company signed is void and the judiciary will go along with it. also, i think a point that is not generally appreciated -- particularly related to financial -- global financial
institutions -- anti-money laundering issue. iran is black listed by the task force for its deceptive financial practices and global financial institution will be very wary of getting back into significant iran business very quickly. you'll probably see more processing of payments for exported to iran or imports to iran, but general sort of trade finance or anything more complex than that will probably take some time. remind of the last -- >> you got it. >> so now we're going to reza to see how this is percolating into the iranian context. it's oftentimes iran is discussed outside of iran as if it's a monolith and that
politics doesn't exist in this country. can you explain the type of politics iran has because it is rather unusual and sort of the different factions that make up the political landscape and who affect the decision making process. kind of eluding to the role people have played but maybe you can expand. >> sure. thank you so much ps-21 for having me. thank you all for joining us here tonight. as mentioned, the dynamics of the internal dynamics of the iranian political testimony is very complex. it's an anot an aut tock crow s. it's consists of maze of formal and informal power structures,
constitutional assemblieassembl complicated military and security apparatus and relationship and power struggles before aforementioned entities are constantly changing. politic. environment is contested, often divided. personal and institutional rivryrrivr rivryri rivalries to keep in mind analyzing politics. there are factual and ideological shifts that happen frequently. to further complicate it, the clout of an institution often ebbs and flows based on the individual in charge, not an institutionalized norm. so to say the least, analyzing domestic debates about foreign policy in iran are very challenging. imposing a narrative in an attempt to kind of box in an individual or an organization without preconceived notions
oftentimes results in d disappointments, because we quite frequently see the opposite. so simply put, what may be the norm today may not be the norm tomorrow. i think the case in point is this entire deal, you know. if three, four, five years ago i would have told you iranians would be sitting across the table from americans and bilaterally negotiating you probably would have laughed me out of the room, but it happened. so however, for the sake of clarity, what i'm going to do is i'm going to take the current context of the nuclear debate, internal debate happening today, and try to group various players together to give it some kind of cohesion for you guys. but i just kind of set that with a previous face to kind of set
the groundwork assumptions based on everything that i'm saying. there are ultimately three large groups that are currently involved in the debate. there's the regime inner circle, which consists of the supreme leader, military apparatus, and the conservative factions within the country. there's the administration, which as we all know is a moderate administration, headed by president rouhani, the negotiation team, foreign ministry's a part of that as well, of course. and the third group is, i call it internal on signature, which are reformist factions and grouping civil society in with them as well. now, each group sees the negotiations within its own context. and there are various degrees of differences and that's when the
domestic kind of rivalries play a lot into how the domestic debate takes place. i believe that the nuclear file, as a whole, for the regime itself, for the inner circle, is a military and security issue. they do recognize the fact that a possible deal is going to have domestic political and social reverbiations but they're doing their best to kind of limit the domestic impact of the deal. as a result, they have been somewhat harsh when it comes to criticizing the negotiation process and the deal itself. for them, i think the issue is isolated from human rights, domestic, social, political freedoms that the opposition is demanding. and as mentioned by the supreme
leader and some of the conservatives, conclusion of the deal does not necessarily mean it's going to have broader collaborations with the west. the fear that the deal will essentially undermine the regime as a whole, because they believe it's going to empower moderate and pragmatic factions in the country. and i was told we're not going to have that much time, so i have a little bit of homework. if you want to have a better idea of the way that the conservatives think, there was a great article, regime security versus factional interests, publiced by iran matters blog, university centers blog, a great job of breaking down the various calculations that the conservatives have in mind. if i have the time, i would like to spend maybe a minute or so on the supreme leader himself. i think he is leviv clever polp,
to say the least. he has avided throwing his weight any side. he has made quite a number of optimistic and pessimistic remarks about the negotiation process and the ultimate outcome of the deal. so no matter what happens, i think he's positioned well to be the winner. if the deal does happen, i think he's going to credit himself and supporters will credit him for being prudent enough to let negotiations happen. it does not happen, he's going to have blame it on the dubious nature of the wherein powers and the fact that they did not have good intentions in mind. another, i think, interesting thing, briefly mentioned, i think, is that effects of the 2009 and the dynamics that we
had the domestic dynamics after 2009 presidential elections. the supreme leader is arguably just gaining control. again, over the chaotic domestic scene that he dealt with following 2009 elections. the environment was very contested, reformists were more or less completely isolated, conservatives, you know, had -- currently still do, have a lot of the power centers under control. and a lot of people were predicting, even a shift in the nature of the regime because of it. so i think the last thing he wants to see is another 2009. so he's doing his best to maintain some kind of key hoeco when it comes to internal domestics of the country. i believe the pragmatics can use
it as a bargaining chip to win battles with conservatives in the country and vice versa. if the conservatives win, which means failure of the deal, they can easily -- which some of the hard-liners actually have done -- called negotiators traitors and say they essentially endangered our national security by negotiating and all of a sudden you're going to have further isolation of the reformists in the country and other contested political environment that the supreme leader has to deal with. i think he genuinely is trying to avoid that. by staying away from it, more or less, he's hoping to maintain, you know, some kind of stability when it it comes to aftermath of the deal. the second group is the administration, as i mentioned. more or less we know where they stand. very optimistic,