tv Key Capitol Hill Hearings CSPAN October 1, 2015 6:00am-8:01am EDT
inside of its internationally recognized borders. there are a lot of things that need to be done before we are there. and remember that we have had well over 1500 armored vehicles, armored capabilities moved into eastern ukraine. we have air defenses there now. we have russian command and control structures there now. we have the stockpiles of equipment to support those forces. in order to get all of that out to reestablish the border of ukraine, that will take months and months. what about a good show of faith? show that we have a responsible way forward to e reestablishing the international border of ukraine. >> what do you think are the chances of the agreement coming into fruition in the next coming
months? >> next couple months? >> not couple months, in the coming months. i mean, the krem lin have continued to provide military support. >> i think this is a long-term proposition, not a short-term proposition. >> so ash carter has, in some ways, become the secretary of reassurance. everywhere he goes he seems as if he's reassuring allies that america's military will be behind that. and definitely in the case of our eastern european allies. almost all of the reassurance steps that we have taken so far militarily seem to be temporary. we have seen rotational deployment. we have seen more exercises. we have had had supplement l
funding. what needs to be permanent? what is the new normal? >> so i like the second part of your question better than the first. i won't use the permanent word. what the new normal is i think we'll see these assurance measures for quite some time. it's more than the united states. it's about our nato allies being a part of assurance. i was tasked as the military leader to develop assurance measures. it was described as air, land and sea, north, center and south. so we have set about building those assurance measures, air, land and sea, so we have done that. and we have a great rotational presence of several nations, but
certainly the united states, of ground forces which we say heel to toe and continues in theball tick nations, poland and romania so we have a land presence there to train and then that land presence facilitates exercises or receives increased presence to do more exercises. in the air presence, we have tripled our air policing stance so that before the russian invasion of crimea, we had one set of air policing operating in the northeast. now we have three. it's taken several forms,
increased positioning of our groups now the u.s. has four forward destroyers. each is capable that we have continually presence from the med and other locations. so we have developed these air, land and sea assurance measures, north, center and south. i think that's the new normal and i think we saw that affirmed through the last series of ministerials and that will be, i think, further defined as we go through warsaw. >> what's your view on that? >> i think that we will never see -- you're talking with hospitals and dod schools? >> you can ratchet it back. maybe not the schools.
>> i don't want to speak for our nation's decision makers. i'm not hopeful that we would see a large new movement of forces out of america into europe for a lot of reasons. one, you don't uproot all the jobs of a large force of america in today's world. i think what you're going to see in the future is increased rotational presence and i think you're going to see an increase in our forward stations of stocks and supplies and capabilities and then forces can go back and exercise and work to create a presence. in all honesty, i do not see large u.s. forces permanently meaning hospitals, schools,
commissari commissaries, returning. >> what are the next steps in ukrainian military training and assistance then? are we training these guys to do legal things? i know we're not providing legal aid at this point, but why won't we give them -- if we are training them, why won't we give them weapons? >> what we will do in the future with the ukrainians is largely up to the ukraines, what they ask for. curre currently they are training their national guard troops. i've been there and visited the training. and we are training them in skills just like we train ourselves in small unit skills.
this is really how do you apply the words. so we're in the midst of training program for the national guard troops. >> can you walk through for me, though, the rational at this point in not providing them lethal weapons? >> i think i can best do that by reciting what you have heard the pundits say. and that is that lethal weapons may be seen as provocative in a situation where there is hope
that we have reached a wall or at least a decrease in the fighting. i think that's what you hear most say. >> but you sound like a man who doesn't believe that. >> you have heard me, many in this group, has heard me before. i testified that i believe that as we approach this problem that we should not take any options off the table. that all options should be considered. that has been my advice and that hasn't changed. >> warsaw, can we talk a little bit about what before we get to problems in the east, what can nato do about problems in the south? i'm speaking specifically on migration. what should the rule of nato be
here and is this something that will be taken up in a real way next year? >> once again, i will not put words in the mouths of 28 political deciders. what i always talk about is that nato has things that it can offer if our political leadership chooses to do that. let me point you to two great examples. the problem of piracy off the horn of africa. nato partnered with the eu. the military competency, the military command and control structure, the military force structure of nato married with the eu's unique other governmental capabilities reaching into the judiciary policing and other assured functions so that the military competency afloat married to the eu other governmental e competencies have essentially
eliminated piracy. clearly the tactics and techniq techniques and procedures of the ships and the merchant lines have also helped. what you saw was a great marriage of what nato can bring to a problem with what the eu can bring to a problem, eliminated piracy off the horn of africa. so we have competencies and capabilities that we can bring to a problem. and just one more quick example. i think it's the ongoing progress slow but measurable progress we're making in kosovo. the mission working with the rule of law, judiciary, policing, coupled being recognized by both capitals as
the force keeping and maintaining what we call a safe and secure environment and guaranteeing freedom of movement. so we have a nato capability unique military capacities and disciplines, married to the other governmental capabilities of o the european union bringing opportunity to kosovo. so i think there are places where nato in concert with other entities that can address part of the root problem, there's opportunity there. but again, this is entirely a decision to be taken by our nato political leadership. >> do you see a challenge for nato in figuring out a way to balance allies, concerns in the east versus the south? >> i think it's best been said probably three ministerials
including at wales. you're tired of me saying that, but the capacities that we build and sustain in our capabilities these are applicable to both problems. the maritime parts are equally applicable in the medtarian as they are in the north see or black sea. so there are things that apply to both. so as we go forward building and enhancing our readiness and responsiveness, all of that brings tools to the table that can be used either east or south. the problem in the south is there are so many more tools
that need to be in the kickback that are beyond nato's core military competency that we would need to be in concert with others to truly get out the issues in the south. >> thank you, general. we're ready for question and answer. >> thank you. my question to you is about the issue of russia's antiaccess area denial in the baltic e sea region. there's a fleet of russia. we have air incidents have more of them. we have issue of deployments.
we have them already rockets brigade. we'll have them the next few years. what ir respectable what nato would do on the issues and these are dangerous weapons with a range of 1,000 kilometers offensive weapons. also we have a new air base so my question to you is what should be the proper nato response towards that and what you think could be feasible in that matter. thank you. >> i think i saw three questions emb embedded in that. let me first because it's the easiest to deal with talk about
the sea and air instance that you mentioned. first, i think we need to recognize that all nations have a right to exercise and train. we do as well. what is important that we do these exercises and training it rations responsibly. that we adhere to norms in how we conduct them. that we properly announce them when they start, when they finish, who is going to be a part of it, what the objective is. and invite each other to come and be a part of view said exercises. so when it comes to exercises, if done properly, we should not challenge this it. we do them. clearly there are some issues and you have brought some of
them up. wrong air space, flying through congested air space, not announcing start and finish, large size, not invited, there's things that need to be worked out. but let's at least say that russia as well as the west has all the rights to train, if done responsibly. we have mechanisms. one of the places we actually still have good mill to mill communication, we do a series that stands for incidents at sea, but we have broadened it to talk to air, land and sea so we can continue to try to deconflict what is happening out there. so as to a antiaccess area denied, typically we talk about this in terms of building
anti-ship and anti-air capabilities, but as you have brought up, you broadened it some to land attack capabilities. anti-access area denial is a growing problem. a large platform for capability, as you have pointed out. i would also point out that in their occupation o of krocrimea russia developed a very strong capability in the black sea. essentially, their coastal defense cruise missiles range the entire black sea and their air defense missiles range about 40%, 40 to 5% 50% of the black sea. so it's not limited to the baltic region. it has grown.
already in the black sea. frankly it's one of the things we're beginning to watch that they develop in the northeast mediterranean. as we see these capable air defense capabilities beginning to show up in syria, we're a little worried about another bubble being created in the eastern mediterranean. so how do we react to that? first and foremost, we have to realize that in peacetime, we need to exercise and operate in this air space to assure that we have and declare that we have open access to the baltic seas and the black seas. you have seen a responsible series of exercises which have been announced and conducted both in the baltic and black seas and those will continue as a part of the assurance measures that we talk about. we need to contest that those are not forbidden spaces.
they are open areas of water and air. and second of all, as an alliance, we need to step back and take a look at our capability in a military sense to address a challenge. this is about investment, this is about training and capabilities, et cetera. >> there were a slew of questions in the back. all the way on the end. >> i've professor at princeton university and a senior fellow. so you have called on the europeans to do r more militarily, maybe spend more. but the europeans are doing a lot of other things and it's a low growth area. take the sanctions estimated to cost them a quarter or half a percent of gdp. they are spending a lot of money on economic renewal and things
like that. to spend money on defense now would mean to take money away from something else. in fact, a lot of the big countries are spending less. so if you think they should, where do you think the money should come from? should they be spending less on things like sanctions or military activity elsewhere? or less on getting their own economic house in order or what? >> so i'm going to answer your question and you would like my answer. that is a question you should pose to our political leadership as a military individual. it's really not me to talk to nations about what they should do in an economic sense. i don't mean to be flip with you, but that's a question better asked to military leaders. but let me do talk to a couple
things. the personal pronounce you used was you. i haven't called on the nations to increase their spending. what i do as a military man is call on the nations to invest widely the money that they have and to help them understand through programs that the supreme allied commander for transformation, we give them investment targets and capability targets so that we can help the nations understand what they are going to invest in, how they can best add to the allianc alliance's capability. so we talk about that. then the second thing that i do do is i encourage the nations to use their military force as a part of our ongoing assurance measures and adaptation measures. this is one of the places we have had a good response. as we set up to build the
original, we felt like we needed three or four center nations to have a sustainable rotation of the center part of the very high readiness joint task force. and when we went to the nations and asked, we had seven nations respond. so while the nations do face challenges in their budgets and their investment packages, what they have done is put their forces into the mix and made them available to nato to do these things that we called for in wales. adapt the national core northeast and build, et cetera. so i do encourage, again, i don't want to be flip, i do encourage the nations to look at their investment profiles. i am as encouraging about inside of those investment profiles hit
ing the 20% target, which is that 20% of the investment should be on recapitalization and buying capital assets which enable their militaries. but as the military, i'm more about helping them shape what they do buy and then employ what they have. >> you had a question, the gentleman in front. right here. >> sydney from breaking defense. general, i was talking the other day with general hodges about his component of command. e he talked about how very different this it russian threat is from the threat officers like you grew up with in the cold war and how it requires not only different equipment, but
different modes of operation, really a different culture in terms of initiative, decentralization, what's different about this compared to the old days and how in terms of investments, organizational structure and the culture on leadership of your forces do nato forces need to adapt to russia take two? >> okay, thanks. i call him the energizer bunny. he's one of the most -- i don't know how to say it. he's one of the most energized commanders you've ever met out
there. he's really making a great difference as he engages the armies of europe. now we're talking in my u.s. hat as ben is a u.s. commander, not a nato commander. so how do adapt? let's turn that back a little bit to when i first became the u.s. commander. two years and three months or so ago, we were looking at how we were going to bring ourselves out of afghanistan. what the draw down was going to look like in afghanistan. and then how as a u.s. commander and a nato commander we would adapt our force structure after that mission began to draw down. long before the invasion of crimea, we decided that we had become an alliance that was very
good at counterinsurgency operations. we have really perfected this business of exski quit intelligence and striking that on the ground in a e precise way at exactly the right time to get the right effects. that is an important skill set and that skill set does contribute to other military capabilities. but what we had not done for over 14 years was that larger kinetic battle that collective defense battle the ability to fight at brigade division and even core level that we just had not done forever. so even before the invasion of crimea, we began thinking about how do we adapt u.s. force capability and nato force
capability post isaf. and of course, then e we had crimea, other issues, and we saw that truly we do we saw that truly we do need to get back to our core capabilities and capacities in nato, those higher end capabilities that enable us to do collective defense when we now have a threat that demonstrates that they will change international borders by force. and so, i think it was presheci what we decided to do and we have refined the approach to build exercises and training that sort of re-enable, re-train, re-grasp those skill sets that allow us to meet our collective defense capabilities. and so you have seen a series of
exercises and pretty soon jaguar 15 in the southwest mediterrane mediterranean, primarily centering on spain, italy, et cetera. we will have a fairly large exercise to help us to hone those larger force skills. >> right in the middle. uniformed officer. thank you. >> thank you, sir. spanish defense a tachement always happy to see you. about the strategic direction south, you mention, what is the ucom's operational relationship with africa? >> okay. so the question i think is what is a -- good to see you, my friend. what is ucom's relationship with africa? so it's two fold. as you know, the afri-com
commander, my good friend rod rodriguez really has no forces assigned to him other than a marine force which is at -- as you know. and so, all of the afri-com force structure is really shared with ucom. we are a force share ere with rod rodriguez so the bases of u.s.-european command shared with our great allies like yours from no rhone around through the mediterranean are those platforms by which ucom helps support afri-com's missions. item two, clearly your nation and other nation who is are in the ucom area of responsibility are affected by everything happening in north africa. all the things happening in north africa spill across the
mediterranean into your nations. and so, ucom supporting nations like yours our relationship is how do we help you deal with those issues. so i say all the time that my command has its own war fighting responsibilities. we have our own issues. but one of the things that ucom soldiers, sailors, airmen and marines do every day is enable centcom and afri-come so we have lots of responsibilities in both directions. >> let's go back to the back. second row from the end. >> hello. i'm poland's dcm. first, thank you very much, sir, for your leadership in leading nato, you know, in this effort to reassure the allies and to deter any possible disturbance in the region. i cannot overstate the
importance of nato's presence of u.s. presence in the region as a factor to prevent any possible destability in the region. i have a question but one a centers a road for warsaw. as a historian i can't help thinking about this in historical terms. there had been different roads for warsaw in the past. better to say different powers, use those roads for different purposes. to attack poland or to attack each other. the fact that we are talking in the context of a road through about increasing nato responsiveness and readiness and capability, to prevent any possible conflict, i think it speaks to a great historical achievement of nato and how nato was efficient in breaking up the geopolitical curse over poland and our neighbors.
my question is, though, about the future. sir, you mentioned the long-term adaptation of nato in the -- as a kind of a perspective for nato summit in warsaw. could you please dwell a little bit more -- i mean, what would be the main ingredients of that adaptation and what kind of, you know, ambition we should set to ourselves to make it substantial and real. thank you. >> so thanks for that question. and the answer is a bit broad because, again, what will happen is that the military commanders, myself, the saceur an ennew -- well, in here in a couple of days we'll have a new sacdeed. denny, french air force four star. the military commanders will put on the table a series of recommendations for our political leadership to
consider. i would not want to right now sort of put that cat out in the open. but i think that you could broadly understand that they will follow along the lines of what i said before. we need to continue to develop our readiness and responsiveness. we need to continue to invest in and develop a lot of capabilities. as you know, the alliance has nations which have a lot of great what i would call blocking and tackling center of mass capabilities. ground forces. certain air forces. certain naval forces. what we lack are exquisite things like strategic lift, intelligence surveil listens and reconnaissance. cyber defense. et cetera, et cetera. so, we need to take on developing those capacities in
places where we are thin right now. and then again, as we talked about, we have -- we have already succeeded at changing the readiness and responsiveness of portions of the nrf. we need to continue to adopt the nrf but that's not the end. that's why i say through warsaw and you correctly point out that may not be the best choice of words but i'm trying to communicate. but the point is we should not stop at the nrf in addressing our readiness and responsiveness. what truly will deter nations is as we bring the entire nato force structure, even just incrementally, more ready and responsive. and to the gentleman's previous question that takes money, doesn't it? prioritization and aloe case of money in order to do that. but i think as we go through
warsaw into longer term adaptation, it's about capabilities that are shored in and about continuing to address our readiness and responsiveness. >> i think we have time for a couple more questions. right in the middle. >> thank you. let's see. is it on? okay. joseph, cis. i'm going the try to provoke a little bit, i guess. nato has a lot of very good capabilities in terms of industrial scale war. which i think it was originally designed for. this spear tip force is also a pretty impressive new addition to that in terms of how quickly it can respond. but it seems when we discuss both tra steenlgic direction south as well as strategic direction east, we are seeing a lot of shall we say a mixture of internal and external security factors. so, you know, russia in eastern
ukraine, well, there's also a separatist force there, too, which, you know, there's sort of intermingled and the ability to undermine state sovereignty even from, shall we say, from the south, as well. you know, we look at the refugees coming in on a massive scale. you know, what kind of capabilities could nato develop in order the address this sort of internal/external mix that you see? perhaps either the streamlining of the communications between the internal policing forces or even the integration thereof. that would be my question. >> so i don't see that as provocative at all. i think that's heart of the matter on what we need to look for and that's what we're talking about all the time. some people label -- you talked about two things that i have written down as hybrid and south. some people like to talk about
hybrid war. i normally call it unconventional war. hybrid makes it sound neat and new and flashy and all that. really hybrid is just old tools being applied in a different way and i call that unconventional war. and then, south. let me attack that one first because it's easier. as we talked about earlier, in the south, this problem is i think bigger than the core competencies of nato. there's a lot of thing that -- a lot of things that nato can do about the problem in the south but the answer in the south is not military. it's military plus a lot of other things. diplomatic. informational. economic. et cetera, et cetera. and so in the south, nato can continue to develop capabilities and capacities that address the root problem or the problems of
foreign fighter flows, extremists, terrorism, et cetera, et cetera. but the rest of governmental approaches will have to be applied to the bigger part of the problem. ungoverned spaces. governments that cannot meet the expectations of their people. et cetera, et cetera. those are not core nato militaries. we need to be able to enable and pair with other organizations like the eu or the u.n. or whatever. i'm not a real -- i don't think that we should be developing specific capabilities outside of what really is nato's remit. we should pair with other organizations that have capabilities and capacities outside of that remit in the south. i hope you understand how i answered that. to the degree of this quote/unquote hybrid warfare or what i call unconventional
warfare, this is an interesting issue. and in nato, we are already working on this to a certain degree in many of our nations that are along our eastern periphery. and this is interesting because, again, most of the problems of unconventional warfare are not truly military to begin with. most of the problems are addressed by capabilities inside the moi. the little green men as they begin to show up will first be addressed by policing and legal functions. not necessarily military functions. until we determine what they are and that they're a military force. and so, we partner with our nations to help them understand and develop capabilities and capacities. there are those words again.
inside of their nations to deal with these issues. we talk about recognize, characterize and attribute. recognize that you have an unconventional activity going on. not something legitimate. charact eerize it as not a legitimate political movement, characterize it as not something emanating from your nation. and then, third, attribute it to an aggressor nation. if that is, in fact, the case. you might find out that it's a legitimate internal movement. but if we recognize, characterize and then attribute to an aggressor nation, now there are things that the nations of nato can talk about how do we more directly aid a country that's under such an attack? in nato, through several of our military capabilities, to include our special operations forces, both in nato and ucom,
we are working with nations to look at this problem. inside their own country and how do they work it. i'll just tell you that in some of the nations we work with, it's done completely differently. in one nation it's almost an entirely a military remit. and the chief of defense is given the mission. in another nation, actual nation, it is almost entirely a ministry of interior remit and it is handed over almost completely to policing and judiciary functions. so we work with the nations in their own way of dealing with the problemment we help them to build capability and capacity to address it and a framework of recognize, characterize, attribute in order to bring it to a position where we can look at in it a more nato or alliance way. >> we have about six or seven more minutes left. let's see if we can get as many as we can. right there. >> i'll try to answer shorter.
>> i'll try to ask a shorter question so thank you. general breedlove, i'm from bucharest, romania. i'll have a parochial question. obviously, the summit for my country perceived as a watershed moment and the renewed commitment of nato to the flank. still, not so much maybe romania but in other countries of let's say the eastern arc i'll call it with the balkans, poland and bucharest. there are voices who are talk about maybe an insufficiently developed deterrent of the article v commitment of nato, both in operational and political terms. obviously, i will not ask you to comment on the political aspects of this but i would be very interested in hearing what you would have to say from your standpoint as to the necessary and feasible ways that
operationally nato could develop and strengthen the article v deterring capability and also in view of the warsaw summit of next year. thank you. >> that is not a short answer. >> sorry about this. >> i'll try to hit a couple of high points. this is the $64,000 question. what deters? remember that out of wales we were first tasked to assure our nations and then as we developed our assurance measures we started to talk about what are and are there deterrents values in what we're doing. what deters? and many pundits 0pine and i agree that mr. putin understands the difference between a nato nation which has an article v attached to it and a non-nato
nation. i mean, just tick out some of the places around the world. georgia. ukraine and other places where these are non-nato nations where russia has invaded and holds portions of their land mass. so, we have to ask ourself what is deterrence. i'm going to give you a really short answer. i keep telling the nations that we have made a great progress since wales. i have said this a couple of times now. we have increased the readiness and responsiveness of the nrf and certainly of the vjtf. we have given the sacreur tasks back to alert stages. et cetera, et cetera. we have sped up and increased the ability to respond but it is not enough. what i think deters is that the entire -- i have said this now
this will be the third time now i think. what deters i think is increase the readiness and responsiveness of the entire nato force structure. we have to get to these investments, exercises, and training scenarios that raises the responsiveness and the readiness of the whole force and that's what i think deters in the long run. very short answer to a much more complicated question. >> in the back. right there. thanks. >> greg, arms control association. with the iran nuclear deal going forward and with the absence of any iranian irb or icbm flight testing ever, is it time for nato to reconsider its schedule for the european fazed adaptive approach? perhaps adapting the schedule to
a lower anticipated threat level? >> so the short answer i think i would give you is there remains a very dense and deep capability in iran to fire conventionally tipped weapons that can threaten multiple parts of our alliance. and so, i think that we should stay on course with our epaa. >> yes, sir? >> pardon me. kelp smith, stanford university student. question, you were mentioning south asedia. what do you think should be done about these geopolitical anomalies and why do you think what you think? >> so, i have never heard them
called a geopolitical anomaly. i'm not a stanford graduate. i'm a simple georgia tech graduate. i would -- i would offer that the frozen conflicts of which there are several out there are -- are not conducive to any sort of forward progress in places like ukraine and others. these seem to be tools that are used in order to preclude a nation from being able to develop a leaning to where they want to lean. whichever direction it is. we don't go out and try to force a nation to lean one way or another. a nation makes its own choices. et cetera. and then, we see sometimes actions taken to have a quote/unquote veto on how they might progress.
and so, i don't think that we should accept incursions across internationally recognized borders, holding the sovereign lands of another nation in order to preclude that nation's aspirations of taking whatever steps they want to take in whatever direction. we don't recognize that as an appropriate tool. and i don't think that we should into the future. again, if a nation wants to become a part of the responsible nations who address great problems of the world, like isil, then show responsible behavior across all spectrum of these kinds of issues. >> that sounds to me like a great way to end. karen gave me her watch to m