tv Albert Gallatin and the Treaty of Ghent CSPAN October 3, 2015 11:05pm-12:02am EDT
other stops on our tour at cspan.org/citiestour. >> albert gallatin was treasury secretary and a member of the commission that because she did the treaty of ghent. next, historical interpreter for trace albert gallatin who talks about the war of 1812, and the peace treaty that ended. this talk was hosted by the u.s. capital has started -- u.s. capitol historical society and is one hour. >> thank you ladies and gentlemen. i am very pleased of this introduction. i have to ask who is this person that montoya was referring to, this wonder can -- this wonder kindt he was speaking of. i would like to thank my hosts for this afternoon.
it is a great pleasure to be among my fellow citizens and be able to discuss at some length what happened in ghent, and to address a few other matters which are of interest to us at this particular time, which is the recent application of napoleonic and the possibilities being discussed, the removal of the capital from the current location to another. but i will save those for the , end of our discussion. as you know or may not know, i was a relatively young man when i came to the treasury. i was 40 years old. now i am 54 years old. and as you can see there has been some change in my appearance in that time.
some would say it is the responsibilities. i would simply prefer to think of it as the passage of time. more than anything else. what i should begin with today is what it was that first , brought us to war and then what happened subsequent to that which led us to negotiating with the english in ghent, and the signing of the treaty on christmas eve. you may recall that the wars in europe began shortly after the beginning of the french revolution. it evolved into a world war between england and her allies and france and her allies. england, as the mistress of the seas, wished as much as possible
to man her ships. approximate cause or war was impressment of our sailors from our merchant vessels, that, not only was she impressing and sailors from the merchant vessels she was doing it in one , specific instance from the uss chesapeake. it is the first time that a belligerent on one side should impress and claim a right of impressment of any sailor from a neutral. this is a matter of considerable concern to mr. jefferson. it was this that led to the embargo, which i had the responsibility of ensuring its enforcement. this decision was rather than go to war with england and/or france, we would simply refuse
our trade with both of them until one of them should come to its senses and should eliminate the orders and councils or the various decrees. the decree of milan and berlin. eventually, it became clear that the efforts for economic pressure on france and england was not to work. we were hurting ourselves more than we were hurting england and france. so, there were the subsequent attempts of non-importation and a number of other actions, and of which were affected in the end. and so it became quite clear to the administration of mr. madison that matters were tending to war.
of course, this is not a matter that was automatically popular. there were certain people in the northern part of our nation who disagreed with this, because they had been profiting from their intercourse with england, in a mercantile sense. it was a matter of considerable debate, until finally in june of 1812 mr. madison sends a war , message to the congress to debate and to decide upon the declaration of war. they did this, and you will forgive me if i refer to my notes. i would rather be condemned for a poor memory than inaccuracy. the issues for a declaration of war were impressment, which was the principal matter. our commerce being harassed, entering and leaving our ports,
mostly by england. because, by this point the french navy had been swept from the seas. it was a matter of pretended blockades, saying we had blockaded your ports, but not having more than one ship standing off the roads from whatever port it was they claimed to be placating. -- blockading. blockade, in order to be understood as such, and to be effective as such, it must be an effective blockade. not simply, i say i blockade your report. no, it must be actually ships that are visible and actually can prevent the majority of the ships from entering or leaving a particular port. and finally, the orders in council. devolved, the orders in
already in mid-june of 1812, then lifted. they no longer applied. of course, because of communications and the length of time it took for any message to come from europe to us or the other direction, we had no knowledge of this. now the first year of our war was a disaster on land and a glory at sea. i must admit to you as someone thought -- fought to have the navy reduce its size, it was a difficulty on my part to admit the navy had done extremely well.
but in point of plain fact, our , frigates were very well handled, well commanded, and as a consequence they got the country glory. the army, on the other hand, was an altogether different matter. many of its senior officers were superannuated. they served honorably in the revolution. however, for the most part they had no idea how to conduct a war. had it not been for his nephew, usshad been so glorious in constitution, it is entirely possible that general whole -- h
ull might have been executed for his incompetence. the court-martial results were overturned in he pardoned him. he no longer had concern himself with finding himself with a stretched neck. but, in any event, in the first year of work it was not a , particularly encouraging state of affairs for the administration. on the other hand, from the very beginning president madison made , it clear he wished to take advantage of all opportunities to return to a peaceful state, to the extent that two weeks after war was declared he spoke and made it clear that we would entertain whatever discussion england wished to initiate in the interest of returning to
peace. of course this did not move quickly across the ocean. 1813, thech of russians came to president madison and secretary munro and proposed that a russia mediates between the united states and england. now why would a russia be , interested in acting as a mediator between russia and -- the united states and england? is quite simple. in the first instance russia was a neutral. she had been a part of a leak of neutral relations earlier in the wars in europe. she understood our difficulties as a neutral nation involved in trade. her trade has been damaged by
english depredations on neutral nations trading with other nations, not under england's control. the second reason was that by 1813, russia had become an ally of england, prussia, and austria in an attempt to bring napoleon to heal in central europe. it was in russia's interest to ensure that the english would focus exclusively on what was happening to central europe, as opposed to this war, which was wholly unnecessary and that certainly was damaging to the prosecution against napoleon. so the count in march of 1813, , approach the ministration with a letter and he offered to act as a mediator. even though we did not have an answer from the english at that
time, president madison felt it was important enough to act and to act promptly. , consistent with his idea of finding peace as quickly as possible. and so he agreed to this. he named a commission which consisted of john quincy adams, son of the second chief magistrate, and probably the most experienced diplomatists we had at the time. a senator, a moderate federalist from delaware, and who service had been noted by us in a number of instances. i regret to say that now we must refer to him as the late senator, as i understand he passed several days after he returned from europe and not so long ago. i asked for your kind thoughts
in his regard. and myself. we left in may of 1813, and shipped to st. petersburg, thing in theritish meantime to allow us to travel should we be stopped right any english, we should be allowed to continue on our way. we arrived in st. petersburg on the 22nd of july in 1813. we were presented to the court. unfortunately his imperial majesty was not in st. petersburg. he was already in his army to confront napoleon with the allies of his coalition. and so, we remains in st. petersburg and we went to the opera, went to the ballet, when two concerts, when two palaces and gardens, and i have seen
more gardens and palaces that i care to see again for the rest of my life. however long it may be. nothing occurred until november of 1813. two pieces of news came to us. -- first was that i had been i had not been confirmed to be a member of this commission by the senate. it failed of one vote. i believe my friends, in particular samuel smith among others and thus i was not officially a member of the commission. i was now a private citizen. despite the fact that the counselor assured me that i would be treated as though i were a member of this commission
i said no. opportunity, i will re-embark for home and stop in london along the way. what i hope to discover when i went to london would be what the ministry there would be looking for. because the second piece of news, which we received, was that russia had refused the mediation. i found out later from esther alexander behring, who is a banker in london and a very good friend of mine, was that the ministry felt that this was a family quarrel. and that it should not be in the hands of anyone else to do this. my reaction was, once again, england sees us as a rebellious daughter, who by various means of enticement and whippings will be back to her arms of england.
and so i left in one of the worst winters in many years. it took us 38 days to go from st. petersburg to amsterdam. in amsterdam i went to london, had discussions with mr. behring and other individuals who had some notion of what it was that would be the ministry's position so i could report what it was that england would be looking for in a direct negotiation. i was then informed there was a second commission which had been formed, and this would consist of myself and mr. quincy adams
and included mr. henry clay, who was speaker of the house. a very interesting group of people, you must admit. there is a story i can tell you about the nature of the negotiations. i'm getting ahead of myself slightly. but mr. quincy adams was known , for his discipline, that he would rise early in the morning and begin his devotions and his correspondence. it was usually the time mr. clay would roll in from some party he had been involved with. which had only been ended. needless to say mr. quincy adams , was not frequently very happy about this.
mr. clay didn't care. now that we have moved to the question of actually sitting down with the english. in june of 1814, after a proposal to meet either in london or in sweden, we count the proposal again and they agree. it was convenient for the english ministry to find her representatives as well as it was for us to be there. in 1814,hen we arrived nothing happened. because england was hoping for some positive results in various activities. it wasn't until august 8 that
the english representative, dr. adams, and another gentleman presented themselves to us and the negotiations began. now what was it the english , wished to see happen as a result of these negotiations? , that without which the treaty would not be considered, to establish an indian barrier state north of the line of the treaty of greenville, which was just slightly north of the ohio river. in essence, it would bar our settlers from going into what had been our territory. the territories of indiana,
illinois, michigan, and so forth. furthermore, the various tribes that adhered either to the united states or to england would be the responsibility of each of those respective nations and negotiations would be under the responsibility of those various nations. the second matter was to end the fishing rights. you can imagine since it was particularly negotiated for by john adams and the signing of the treaty of paris, that mr. john quincy adams would not be particularly anxious to see this right eliminated. it would be a matter of concern later on in our discussion. continued free access to the mississippi river, which was a matter of the treaty. this is for the english, that they should be able by whatever
land connection they can make they should be about to get to the can -- get to the mississippi river, they would have free access all the way to the sea. the basis for all border adjustments is that which we actually possess. that is a matter of concern. and we will discuss it in just a moment. that there would be no american forts and no american naval presence on the great lakes. that the british trade rights with indians, as per the treaty of 1795, should be renewed. and adjusting the borders canada in thend st. john's river basin. our opening positions was that there be an end, that blockades be clarified what is in the nature of a blockade.
what are our fishing rights as per the treaty of 1783. and finally, the basis for the treaty negotiations should be the status quo antebellum, that which existed before the war began. you will notice there are some difficulties here. the reason there are difficulties in all of this, first of all the english position was we will win this war, we will have territory, we will use it as a marker for negotiations, and the americans will exceed as a consequence of this. and their position will be improved as a consequence of possessing this territory. in addition, it is a very interesting, i mentioned the treaty rights of 1783 for the fisherman of new england to be able to use unoccupied land in canada near the fishing banks to
be able to address their fish. this right was aggregated since the wars beginning. but the same treaty, which , guarantees them access through to the mississippi somehow was , not aggregated by the same war, which was a difficult position to reconcile. i had incredible difficulty reconciling the zone matters in my own mind. furthermore, when you look at the question of the status quo antebellum, it was a matter of understanding between secretary munro and ourselves, prior to the negotiation, that we would not press the matter of impressment. why? napoleon had abdicated in 1814.
he had been sent to exile. the english lit -- in this navy no longer needed to have somebody ships at sea. the sailors are being dismissed. the need for impressment no longer existed. so, we, at the beginning of our negotiations, did not even address the matter of impressment. as it would make matters easier for us to discuss. now as we look at the situation , in the country at the various military activities, we have four invasions. how many of you realized that were four invasions of the united states in 1814? sarah, --sir, you are aware of
these? where were they, can you tell me that? >> we invaded canada, there were a whole series of battles that went on in the area between what is now vermont and new hampshire, new york, that area. obviously we were aware of what , was going on in new orleans. and the british invasion of eastern -- excuse me, western florida into mobile. and of course then there was the , invasion of the chesapeake bay and the burning of washington. >> there is a fourth one. that is the one in maine, in northern maine. the english -- this is one that is frequently forgotten. i'm sure my friends and colleagues from massachusetts would not appreciate my comments, but i really don't know that northern maine would have been a great loss.
because, it is a great deal of bogs and trees. however i would expect if i were , to say to the georgians, for example, there is a spot of georgia that is nothing but swamp and trees and we would hand it over to another nation there would be substantial objections on their part. and so i could understand why my , colleagues from massachusetts would object to seeing a part of their state being handed over to a foreign country. those four invasions, three of which were significant and at -- in the military situation the , traditional invasion route to lake champlain, the chesapeake bay, and new orleans, and the seizure of new orleans was important from an english standpoint because it was a chokepoint. and once they seized new
orleans, as they would control the traffic from the interior of the country and use it as a way of separating the western space from their allegiance to the united states. that is a possibility not something actually discussed. however, in the end, all 4, well, three at the time of the negotiation, in one sense or another failed. the invasion of northern maine was to establish a military road more directly between halifax and quebec. the invasion of northern new york down to st. john's through lake champlain was commodore madonna at the battle of lake champlain and the lieutenant general withdrew his army when he saw the navy he expected support from was defeated. in the chesapeake bay, i am sure
many of you are well aware of the damage that was caused by general ross and admiral colburn. however, in the end, this invasion was also not ultimately successful when they went and attempted to take -- to destroy fort mchenry and they failed to do so. and so in the end, a failure for , land operations. we found out later that a request had been made of the duke of wellington to become the commander in north america is -- and that in essence, his message to the military was i will go where you will send me. however, no amount of troops will ultimately defend the
-- defeat the americans on their territory. you do not have enough now to make any claim. i would suggest that you negotiate an end to this more -- and into this war quickly. why was he so concerned about an end to the war? because the situation and france -- in france was extremely unstable and he, as england's representative and france to the court, could see that they were not particularly well settled on their throne. despite the size of louis xviii. and so as a consequence, we were , able to come to an end of discussions and at the status quo ante bellum was accepted by england and we signed the treaty on the 24th of december, 1814.
the last matter which was a possible block, the 2 matters that had to do with the treaty of 1783. the english claimed that the right for fishing in canadian waters that had been established by the treaty of 1783 had been abrogated because of the war. and we exhausted the right of navigation, free navigation down the mississippi has been equally abrogated. and so this was a more important -- of more importance to england's, than ensuring there will be unoccupied lands for dry fish. and so they were prepared to , sign. both mr. quincy adams and mr. clay went out with the difficulty.
whenever one thinks in a diplomatic arena that one is negotiating simply between one country and the next, i can assure you ladies and gentlemen, there are discussions and negotiations that take place within the team. and it is in this particular instance that i had to apply whatever diplomatic as i had between mr. quincy adams and mr. clay. finally mr. adams accepted it , was not a right but a liberty that the english were granting in 1783 and he was prepared to sign. but mr. clay was prepared to leave and not adhere to the treaty. and i said to him, mr. clay, when you are prepared to act seriously, please come and let me know and we will sign the treaty. and he signed the treaty. and so this is how we came to the treaty of ghent. i have not gone through other the discussions back and forth between the english and what is a proposed and what we proposed.
the end result is, at the end, we had achieved a victory of a stalemate. and mr. quincy adams is supposed to have said that he hopes this was the last treaty between the united states and england. i am not a particularly religious man but i can devoutly hope that is the case. now, this ends my presentation on the treaty of ghent. but, i now wish to go forward a little bit in time. because, now, we have, of course, the matters of the abdication of napoleon. napoleon, who was in exile in elba returned in march of 1815
and began a march on paris. which no one would have credited him with being able to do. and yet, by june of this year he brought in army and to the northeastern part of france and and into the low countries, not very far from where we were negotiating, in fact read and at , waterloo, a great battle over three days between the french on one side and on the other, the prussians and to the english under duke of wellington. napoleon was defeated. and -- he has abdicated yet again. and this particular time we believe it will be permanently. it is ironic that he threw himself on the mercy of the english, his greatest opponent, because he trusted and their sense of honor and in their
unwillingness to act in a way he would have acted. had it been the other way around if george iii through his mercy on napoleon, i do not think there would be much question of what would've happened to george iii. as to where napoleon will end, i do not know at this point. we know it was restored to the throne and hope what he said of them will not be true that they have forgotten nothing and learned nothing. it is yet to be seen whether or not louis xviii has learned the lessons of his brother and his ancestors. i have some degree of confidence that he cannot return to the absolute monarchy that was there prior to the revolution and i have a measure of confidence that out of self-preservation if
nothing else, he will continue to speak and treat and deal with those who adhere to napoleon. who are numerous and are also powerful. as far as the last question which i was prepared to discuss which was the removal of the , capital which i've heard since i have been in the federal city, some discussion. my view of it is this -- i speak as a private citizen. i am not a member of the current administration. i have no political intentions and so, my view is that removing the federalist city, where would you put it? if you move it north, those from the south would say it is to their disadvantage. if you move it from the south to savannah or charleston, it would
be the northerners who would say it is to their disadvantage. if you moved it west across the mountains, it would be both the north and the south saying it is the vantage of the westerners and to our disadvantage. if you're going to annoy anyone, leave it exactly where it is. ladies and gentlemen, that ends my presentation to you. i am prepared to entertain your questions at this time. [applause] yes, sir? >> there were troops left that were left in the northern territories. what was the final resolution of getting them out of their? albert: 1795 which ultimately settled the question of the british removing their soldiers
that had been in the various forts through the northwest into the west. and the final resolution would -- was that they all removed themselves. which was a matter of concern to the indians because they looked at the british as the guarantors of their independence. vis-a-vis ourselves. and our settlers that were coming in. yes, sir? >> yes, thank you very much, mr. secretary. if memory serves me correctly, there is a provision in the treaty, i think the last provision that promises both parties that we would address the slavery issue and at the indian issue. where did that come in? who allowed that to enter into the treaty? did it come from the british? did it come from the americans? albert: the original concern,
the original matter of indian -- rights, i would suppose you would have to say, was a concern expressed by the british. but, that was in his their own favor. and by the end of the negotiation, it was clear that england had abandoned her indian allies. and so this matter which as you stated correctly left somewhat vaguely worded, is not likely to be acted upon promptly. >> what about slavery? albert: the slavery issue is a very difficult one. if you recall in our later revolution, there was a matter of the slaves which had been freed by the english under a claim if they fought for them, they would seek and ensure their freedom. and of course, the slaveowners
from the south, for the most part, not exclusively, they put a claim against the english government for the recovery of those slaves of their value. that has yet to be fully resolved. and it would be my estimation that in this particular matter is likely to be one of lindsay -- one of lengthy negotiations. have i answered your question, sir? >> i think you have. but the british did give to liberty to those slaves who sought asylum on their ships and gave them settlement elsewhere in the empire. that is a fact. albert: the matter is from the american perspective, it is property. i personally do not agree with this view. however, the simple fact of the matter is that there is an
argument that is made that these are property and the provisions of the treaty in an earlier provision actually speaks of the restoration as possible by compensation or property. so the question becomes, do you , see the slaves as property or do you not? >> thank you. >> can you describe some of the personal attributes of alexander hamilton? things you most like about him. things you did not necessarily like about him. and how do you think history will treat alexander hamilton? albert: i have found a little profit in trying to play the profit. so, i shall not discuss what generalmight view of hamilton. general hamilton and i had a difficult relationship as you
are probably well aware. the difficulty began in a most personal sense when i briefly served in the senate between november 1793 and march 1794. i was there very briefly because there was a claim i had failed to meet the citizenship requirement of time to serve as a senator despite the fact i had mentioned this to the legislature and pennsylvania. they went, don't worry. we will put you there. it will not be an issue, and as soon as i took the oath of office, electives, good federalists, decided i was not qualified to hold the office. however in that brief time of , four months, i submitted a bill in which i required, it required the treasury to outline where the money, which have been appropriated, had in fact gone.
because at the time, the , administration would ask for an appropriation. but not specified. so much for the navy, for the army, so much for the state department. and as a consequence, it was unclear where the people's money was being spent. i also in this bill hope to the administration of those moneys would be clarified. let us be very clear -- secretary hamilton was a brilliant man. there is no question. his ability to encompass the questions of finance, i'm parallel. mr. jefferson, himself, wrote mr. hamilton is a host upon himself. and so his brilliance in creating a system of financing
for this country did not improve -- did not include administration and clarity of administration and when i came to the treasury i hope to do big to achieve and clarity of administration that anyone should be able and should be able to understand exactly what the money went and how they have been expended and so on. in addition, one of the things that i ask for in that bill was that secretary hamilton gave us a very explicit rendition of the management of the treasury in terms of the funding which had been appropriated and had been spent, who knew where. and whether or not the general washington was aware and approved it. his answer was he was far too
busy. that he had far too few people to do it despite the treasury was the largest executive department at the time. and as a result, we were not able to learn all of the information we wished to learn. now you have asked me a question , which is a very challenging question. what did i like about alexander hamilton? given our personal difficulties at one point during the whiskey rebellion he came as part of the , 13,000 men militia to the ohio country and if it had been up to him, my neck would be considerably longer than it is now. however, what i most admire -- perhaps like and dislike not really the words we need to use
when men are in public service, but what i most admire about mr. hamilton was the sheer energy and creativity of his effort. and that he personally was incorrupt as a secretary of the treasury. we know of his personal peccadilloes which he revealed , and he revealed those so we would not think that his administration, as a public official, was correct -- was corrupt by his personal difficulties. what i did not like about alexander hamilton was immaterial, truthfully. what i found difficult to encompass of his administration was its lack of clarity. i hope i've answered your question, sir. madam? >> you had a close relationship
with aaron burr at one time. you were his supporter and i would like to hear what your opinions of how they changed or didn't. albert: mr. burr, when i came to -- for those of you who may not be aware, when i had come to this country in 1780, eventually, i settled in western pennsylvania. my estate is called friendship hill. i married for the first time in 1789 a young woman for virginia -- from virginia named sophie. ,sadly five months after we were , married i brought her to the western country of pennsylvania, she passed away of a fever. in 1793 just before i took the oath of office as a senator, i married hannah nicholson. hannah nicholson was the second daughter of james nicholson the elder.
a good democrat republican. and she was from new york. and so simply by being a part of the nicholson family, i became familiar with and familiar to a number of other figures, the schuylers, the -- and in so far as my personal relations with colonel burr, they were excellent. he and i understood exactly what it was that was transpiring in new york and his efforts. however, when he refused to step into the second position that was offered, that of the vice presidency, i disagreed not only strongly but as the leader of
the democratic republics in the sixth congress, i was responsible for ensuring as so for as it was possible that in the election of the president of the united states and the will of the people had been expressed. and as we had understood within the party would come to pass. and that meant mr. burr would have to be the vice president. that did not as it turned out, , it did not sour our relationship at all. in so far as his activities of -- subsequent of 1805 after left the office of the vice president. nothing was proven. and it would not to be appropriate for me to make a comment that was made by john marshall in the treason trial. they found him not guilty.
i have no reason to challenge that particular view. i will say that when it came to my attention that colonel burr and general hamilton had had a duel, my view of it was even though i did not agree in so far as a duel concerned, it seemed to be quite fair. >> at of the outset of the war of 1812, what was the regard of canada? was it the invasion for the british permanently? or as a bargaining chip? what were our intentions? albert: your second point is exactly what i would have understood as our intentions were in terms of canada. i know with mr. clay said and what mr. jefferson said that if
we should go into canada we shall march and it will fall into our hands. unfortunately, the pair -- it had a bitter pits. and so as a consequence, we cannot honestly say that we had any realistic intentions of taking over canada. that was our revolution which we hoped to make canada our 14th colony, our 14th state. but in terms of the war of 1812, , i would argue that it was more in the nature of a bargaining chip to force the english to come to their senses and end the impressment and treat with us as a nation instead of this rebellious i referred to earlier.
>> the subsequent victory of colonel andrew jackson and the battle of new orleans. would that have influenced your treaty -- had it been known about -- albert: the victory, it would not have changed matters significantly. because our intention was to return to the status quo ante bellum. and general jackson's victory was a defensive victory. it was not that we had seized the territory's data had some -- that we had seized territory or had some sort of earning chip to apply against the english. if, on the other hand, general jackson had been defeated, and it had been known before the treaty had been ratified then it , would probably have been a reason for the english to reopen
negotiations. and it would be difficult for me to guess what would have been the results. any further questions? sir? >> your interest in native american languages, what brought that about? albert: an interest in languages in general particularly because i was not unaware of the fact with the removal of indian tribes and the difficulties they had vis-a-vis the settlers coming in, it was possible their languages would be lost. that to me, would be a great loss for our understanding of what it was that was here. i personally believed none of us are truly native americans, only the indians are truly native americans. i believe that antonio will say
something. >> can i call you ron now? yes, disrobe. we had a -- turn around. [laughter] [applause] >> ron and i had a plan before that his signal for jumping ahead 200 years to the modern day would be his defrocking. because -- prague, we are in d.c. civilized ways here. sometimes, i wonder this thing to ron channeling albert. i wonder if i would've enjoyed living back then more. i have listened to ron speak on many occasions about a variety of critical moments. we could've had just a wonderful
time of him talking about an immigrant experience and the first decades of the american republic. i've heard of government -- i've heard him give a wonderful talk about lewis and clark. we spoke together at the state department on native american relations. we heard a glimpse of the war of 1812 which we asked him to focus on because of the burning. you can listen to ron on any number of occasions. maybe you have questions to pose about why he got into living history. what is it called? ron: history first interpretation. it is an odd sort of field. because it is at a nexus between theater and history. and as a consequence, it is
neither exactly pure history, because it -- because it is imagined to some extent. but you have to have the background in order to be able to discuss it intelligently and accurately. most importantly, accurately. >> that is not a wig. that is his head. this is how you played to the character. i have to say, ron, i've listened to many historians and very few approach not just the then very few approach not just the know-how but the passion interpreting what is an important character. under song in american political history. some of you might want to approach him and talk about the immigrant experience. this is a man that rose to the highest echelons of that oral federalnt and -- government and was a citizen of geneva.
independent city state. >> we have discussed this over fondue. let's close the formal session. people can come up. if you want to ask the question -- [applause] >> you are watching american history tv. to join the conversation, like us on facebook. >> each week, american history tv sits in on a lecture. you can watch the classes that 8:00 p.m. and midnight, eastern. established under the indian claims act by the united states congress, the indian claims commission was a judicial panel meant to resolve many long-standing claims between the u.s. government and native american tribes.